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I have divided my presentation into three parts. In the first part titled definition, I

attempt to define ISIS in military sense in the light of its political objective and military

strategy shaped by it. In the second part titled description, I aim to provide a brief military

analysis of ISIS tactics. Then In the last part titled prediction, I humbly provide my

personal insights on the possible future of ISIS both in Iraq and in the region in military-

strategic sense.

So lets begin with the definition part. I think we should first concentrate on ISIS

organizational structure, strategic objective and its strategy to better understand how it

attempts to achieve these objectives. I will then turn to tactics I mean military methods

and techniques I mean the ways and means it mobilizes.

ISIS’s organizational Structure:

Militarily speaking, when we are talking about ISIS’s military presence in Syria and

Iraq\ we are talking about roughly 10,000 armed fighters, nearly one third of whom are

skilled fighters, 2,000 of whom foreigners from more than 60 different countries, around

1000 of whom are Europeans. So in the Salafi-Jihadi side of the story we have roughly

10,000 people. But ISIS dos not include solely those guys as it is an umbrella

organization including ex-baathist cadres, local sunni tribal structures, some local and

transnational criminal networks and some other Salafi-Jihadist networks as well. These

guys are around 5000. I should also add that there are currently around 10,000 local

Iraqis, surely Sunnis, working for ISIS to carry out logistics, governance, recruitment,

training and indoctrination what we call in military terms local unarmed militias. So

simply, when we say ISIS we are talking about an umbrella organization including 25,000

people with different interests, expectations and tasks, but nearly 15.000 of whom are

armed. The Salafi-extremists fighters sits at the tip of this ice berg and thus we all see

them, but As you have seen ISIS is more than those salafi fighters. Also let me

emphasize that around 3000 fighters in ISIS which is equal to roughly 6 battalions,

heavily armed. By heavily armed I mean they have armed personnel carriers, tanks,

artillery, howitzer, rocket launchers etc. Thanks God that up until now, we have not

noticed a news that indicates ISIS has air force capability, meaning, for now ISIS cannot

fly..

There are some interesting facts we should know about ISIS organizational

structure.

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- First this is a sort of “liquid” structure in a continuous state of flux. I mean every

morning we wake up with a new ISIS as there are ins to and outs from ISIS

organizational structure both in terms of personnel, operational capabilities, local

and transnational logistic support etc. This liquid structure makes ISIS hard to be

knowable by the Iraqi security forces. This also means ISIS always holds the

advantage of surprise.

- Second, interestingly while everything has been in a state of flux in ISIS, it has a very

disciplined and hierarchical military command, which enables ISIS to function as a

military rather than as a terrorist network.

-Third, as ISIS is a learning organization, it is very good at adapting to the changing

situation and new developments.

- Fourth while ISIS has centralized decision making and planning, during the

execution of operation it endows maximum initiative to the commanders on the

ground. Simple orders only asking for what to do and leaving how to do the

commanders on the ground turn ISIS into an effective war machine. “With your men,

siege this town, clear conquer and rebuild it” sort of simple order and leaving how to

do question to the commanders is a good example of interactive use of initiative and

simplicity.

-Fifth Mainly due to the geographical and demographical facts, Iraq is a sort of

country in which campaigns occur as small conflicts in or around urban settlements

and on roads connecting them. This fact necessitates fighting groups comprising

fighting formations from 100 upto 500 fighters, but not less than and not more than.

ISIS takes this fact into account effectively.

So my shorts def. of ISIS is very small and dedicated group of people with a

Bolshevik-style ruthless leadership. ISIS is the also the most violent group we have

seen in the post-9/11 setting.

Coming to the ISIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE;

Simply, ISIS seeks to create an Islamic Emirate extending across Iraq and Syria, meaning

it has a “territorial objective. This vision is also expansionist, and more importantly it is

implemented through military conquest not solely through terrorist tactics. That is why I

tend to define ISIS as a military network because ISIS’s grand strategy depends upon

military superiority to control Sunni populated terrains by overcoming state security. We

should however note that the ISIS style of warfare combines and hybridizes terrorism,

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guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare. This characteristic makes ISIS a new breed

and thus I do not agree with the presentation of ISIS as a neo-al Kaide or post-Alkaida.

When seeing its strategic objective and methods, it is hard tell that al-Qaida in Iraq is

predecessor of ISIS. The current fighting style of ISIS clearly proves that ISIS possesses

a cadre of former Saddam-era military officers who know the military terrain and

demographic dynamics in Iraq as their own and how to exploit it. For me, the military

campaign design exhibited by ISIS over the last two years bears the signature of multiple

commanders because successive campaigns have consistently demonstrated scope,

distribution, deception, and timing as overarching strategic characteristics.

I could simply divide the ISIS political objective into four phases.

First is Permanently breaking down political boundaries in Iraq, Syria, and the region by

cultivating conditions for government failure and regional sectarian civil war.

Second is Establishing the Islamic Emirate by controlling terrain across Iraq and Syria,

governing the population within, and defending against external threats. (at this point, it

is vital to recognize that ISIS cannot proceed with its Islamic Emirate if the unitary state

of Iraq still stands. That is why ISIS is a separatist organization, meaning that It has not

appetite to rule Iraq as a whole.)

Third is Bringing like-minded people to fight alongside and settle within the Islamic

Emirate. (ISIS first strategy is to set itself up as the protectors of the Sunni population in

Iraq, helping to consolidate its hold on Sunni population centers.)

Fourth is Expanding the territory of the Emirate and connect it to the wider Sunni Muslim

community, or the Ummah if you will.

It’s Tactic or fighting strategy:

I would suggest that ISIS’s urban offensive which begun in Mosul has not culminated,

and its campaign for Iraq is not over. ISIS’s ultimate military objective in Iraq is likely to

destroy the government in Baghdad.

The ISIS’s grand strategy seems to surround the capital of Baghdad before laying siege

to it. This plan, to take over the "belt" region outside of Baghdad and cut off the capital,

appears to be the same strategy used by the Al-Qaida- Iraq back in 2006. Thus, its

operational plan is to seize control of the outer provinces and Baghdad's belts, or key

areas surrounding the capital. The ISIS would then use its bases in the belts to control

access to Baghdad and funnel money, weapons, car bombs, and fighters into the city.

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At this point, let me cite to David Kilcullen’s recently published book titled Out of

Mountains: According to K, we are entering a multideimensional security environment

where the lines between activists and civilians, war and crime, state and non-state, local

and global are becoming increasingly blurred, and where the environment is in a

continual state of flux. Moreover, K warns that existing institutions, international

governments and militaries may simply be overwhelmed by the exponential acceleration

and tempo in the two themes he identified: increased connectivity and growing

urbanization.

Iraq could be a relevant example of K’s depiction of future conflicts since throughout the

war in Iraq between 03 and 10, 50% of the whole conflict occurred in Baghdad and it

slums.

In the recent Musul example also indicates us that non-state actors that can effectively

“shut down a city of 1.7 millions”

Then Kicullen proposes the concept of “FERAL CITY” when the state collapses, cities

do not disappear, they simply go FERAL. I think we should not conceive current Iraq as a

nation-state but conceiving it as a system of cities. Then for me our Units of analysis

should be cities in Iraq not Iraq as whole in military sense. So, simply ISIS utmost

objective is to turn Baghdad into a feral city as they successfully did to Mosul, the

second biggest city in Iraq.

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The maps are up to date to understand to what extent ISIS is successful in implementing

its strategy.

But please note that, given the current situation, ISIS has only one bullet to shot. Would

it shoot it to Baghdad or Kirkuk? Would the Kurds in the north let them to attack to

Kirkuk? If you also look at the map you would notice a simple fact which provides a

strategic advantage to Kurds. To be in the iSIS’s back when it is dealing with Baghdad.

Would the Kurds attack ISIS from its rear If ISIS decides to go for Baghdad? These are

important questions which emphasis the kingmaker status of Iraqi Kurds? The question

of whether the Kurds in the north will opt for uniteray Iraq or let ISIS to break Iraq apart is

extremely significant one for the future of Iraq. But, at the moment it is highly likely to

suggests that it is a necessity for ISIS to negotiate with Kurds and reach a compromise

before attacking Baghdad in the south and before turning its back to Kurds .

Tactics:

ISIS is currently a military organization that is no longer conducting terrorist activities

exclusively but is conducting conventional military operations in company and battalion

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formations, which was not the case in traditional al-Qaida way of fighting. ISIS has been

attacking Iraqi military positions with company or battalion-size formations to clear

towns and urban settlements, and then hold and then build those settlements. This tactic

of clear-hold-build is surprisingly the counterinsurgency tactic coalition forces used both

in Iraq and Afghanistan. I mean at the moment interestingly and paradoxically ISIS fights

with exactly the same tactics we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve the objective

of territorial control. Put differently, ISIS has been fighting as the Americans fought

against Sunni insurgency in 2006 by mimicking their tactics. Please remember its

learning and adapting capability.

The basic Isis tactic is to make a surprise attack, inflict maximum casualties and spread

fear before withdrawing without suffering heavy losses. And then wait the Iraqi forces

and unfriendly locals to evacuate or flee from the designated territory. This aim for me

explains the usage of excessive violence and the dissemination of gruesome photos and

videos. In this sense their use of violence is not indiscriminate one but a strategic one

serving to the purpose of creating a steril environment. Simply, their aim is to drive the

unwanteds out of the captured lands and building an a “steril” human population in

sectarian terms in the controlled territories. This strategy provides ISIS a submissive

human population and thus makes the holding phase easier to realize. This strategic use

of fear and intimidation to not solely for propaganda purposes but also for controlling

the territory captured is another dynamic we have not noticed since 9/11.

ISIS has been pursuing a phased campaign design as well. It has skilfully achieved

building a balance between the phased campaign design and maintaining the tempo of

warfare. This could only be achieved with increased tactical and situational awareness

and with the implementation of centered planning and de-centered execution. ISIS is

good at this. This is a strong indication of a unified, coherent leadership structure that

commands from the top down. It proves that while the provinces may have freedom to

act as they wish in some regards, ISIS has a centralized command structure for its

military campaign that is superior to all of the regional military commands in Iraq. But as

the Iraqi security forces and Americans are not good at gathering human intelligence in

the ISIS captured settlements because they could easily be discovered. We are away

from working on this and only relying on intelligence flowing from air reconnaissance.

Can disenhancing and dislodging ISIS possible? Yes but extremely difficult task when

considering the current status.

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The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies

its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming battle. But at

the least, ISIS should be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad

and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, suicide

assaults, artillery and howitzer fires and rocket attacks that target civilians, the

government, security forces, and foreign installations to force Baghdad to go feral.

Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the

violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters

roam the streets.

Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them. Additionally, US air

power is absent, the Awakening once established among the Sunni tribes is currently in

disarray, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated while surrendering or retreating

during the ISIS campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. The US government

has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq to fight with ISIS, either on the

ground or at airbases to conduct air operations. Simply, ISIS is advancing boldly in the

looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's

refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to

further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested

neighbors such as Iran. Secret Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis

still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq

would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war, and risk a wider war throughout the

Middle East.

What would be the ISIS Next Step?

It is unlikely that conditions are optimally set for an ISIS offensive against Baghdad. ISIS

will need to decide whether to commit to a strategy of destroying military installations or

whether to destroy the Iraqi government through violent means, such as targeting the

2014 gathering of the Council of Representatives which will occur tomorrow. Either way,

ISIS will need to thin Baghdad’s defenses by drawing the ISF and Shi’a militias out of

Baghdad in order to protect other targets, such as the Samarra, Kadhimiya, and Karbala

shrines. ISIS is likely aware of the widespread disposition of Shi’a militias within

Baghdad; they are also likely aware that there are Sunnis communities in Baghdad under

suppression that present support opportunities.

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ISIS now has artillery and other indirect fire capabilities, in addition to heavy machine

guns. This is visible in their social media coverage of their acquisitions in Ninewa. ISIS

can induce a surface-to-air threat against Iraqi air force at Balad Airbase, Taji Base, and

Baghdad International Airport that effectively neutralizes Iraq’s air assets. ISIS can also

attack fortified positions in downtown Baghdad through medium-range direct fire via the

artillery pieces it has seized. ISIS likely intends to strike the Green Zone and other

fortress targets that have adequate ground protection.

Coming to the ISIS’s vulnerabilities, first ISIS has opened a wide area of urban control in

Iraq within a short period of time. This requires an organization to consolidate control in

the Sunni heartland of Iraq. ISIS likely intends to consolidate and insulate recent gains

from any counter-offensive by the Iraqi Army. ISIS has to balance its plan to repel

external threats with the requirement to maintain control of recently seized territory. ISIS

faces internal threats, especially suppressing resistance from the Sunnis in Iraq or Syria;

ISIS will also have to figure out how to transition from military control to political control

in order to realize its Islamic State. These are strategic vulnerabilities for ISIS; however,

they do not preclude further ISIS offensives. Rather, ISIS is incentivized to drive forward

with its military strategy in order to perpetuate the message of victory. Culmination or

withdrawal would also generate cascading vulnerabilities for ISIS therefore. ISIS must

both keep winning in battle to preserve the tempo of conflict, and consolidate its control

over the Sunni population in Iraq and Syria, two objectives the simultaneous

accommodation of which are highly unlikely.

Who will say the last Word: SUNNIS the Sunnis are faced with an existential crisis on

two-fronts: the threat of ISIS, and the threat of Iran, both assaulting Iraq’s Sunnis with

military force. But the question still lingering is that: who will engage those alienated

Sunni tribal leaders and political elites? The Maliki government, The united States , or

Saudi Arabia?

At the end of my presentation, I want to share a dilemma we face and a broad question

the answer of which extremely significant for the future of Iraq.

Our dilemma in Iraq: How to reset the old game in Baghdad with the support of the Maliki

government and Iran without alienating the Sunnis, and how to integrate Sunnis into the

Iraqi politics without alienating the Iraqi Shiite population and Iran?

Broad Question I want to ask. How can the “Western world” engage this getting more

chaotic situation?

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a. No engagement. “let them burn in their own hell” sort of attitude. I call it (strategy

of ignorance)

b. As “this is Islam’s 30-years war,” trying to figure out at distance what would pop

up from this war. I would call it (strategy of silence)

c. Constructive engagement with the tools of soft power to ease the current tension

among Muslims. (strategy of soft engagement with both sides)

d. Choosing as “enemy” { either Sunni or Shiite} and engaging with hard power

capabilities (strategy of use of military force either on one side or on both)

Could ISIS export its way of fighting to other states in the region? Not so likely because I

think that ISIS exploits geostrategic and demographic realities peculiar to Iraq. As I

emphasized it aims to control territory and uses conventional military formations and

tactics. Then I would suggests that ISIS is a phenomenon very unique to Irak and not so

easy to export its tactics. But in the idea part, of course we should be ready that ISIS

would export it.