Daniel M. Chick 1
Ethnosubordinance and anonymity: An identification, metaphor, and
narrative analysis of ISIS rhetoric
Building off of the work of Kenneth Burke, Cheney (1983)
firmly established the role of identification rhetoric in the
study of organizational communication. Cheney observed four main
rhetorical strategies employed by organizations to build
identification with constituents: common ground technique,
antithesis, assumed and transcendent “we,” and unifying symbols.
By applying and furthering Burke’s findings, Cheney essentially
began the contemporary subdiscipline of organizational
identification studies. However, as Cheney (1983) initially
argued of his new assertions, “the role of identification in
rhetorical criticism has been [again] unnecessarily limited” (p.
144). Organizational rhetorical studies have largely suffered
from a unitary focus on Western organizations (i.e. corporations
and nonprofits; see: Evans, 2015; Henderson, Cheney, & Weaver,
2015; Williams & Connaughton, 2012). Specifically, while the
investigation of Western organizations has been lucrative for
rhetorical scholarship, the discipline has largely overlooked
other types of organizations outside of this scope. Understanding
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 2
the rhetoric of ideological groups that share little aesthetic
similarity with Western organizations, such as terrorist groups,
is an appropriate, yet underexplored avenue of research.
At its core, ISIS is a terrorist organization. It produces
fear and loathing from those it deems to be enemies. Terrorism,
conceptually and methodologically, is a disturbing and
traumatizing phenomenon that moves the victim out of a realm of
contentment and reminds all who see the action of the frailty of
human life (Pojman, 2006). To provoke this response from their
enemies, ISIS employs a number of brutal tactics that
purposefully undermine the inalienable human rights of their
captors, such as gruesome beheadings (see Adams, 2014; Bucktin,
2014; “ISIS video appears…”, 2015) or burning their captors alive
to send a message to their home government (see “WARNING,
EXTREMELY GRAPHIC…”, 2015). The particularly brutal and horrific
methods employed by ISIS speak to their nature as a terrorist
organization. The shock-and-awe campaign of brutal deaths left in
their wake conceptually and methodologically aligns with all
present understandings of terrorism.
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 3
ISIS stands as a dominating force in western Asia and
northern Africa, establishing themselves in significant portions
of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, among other Arab states (see:
“A visual guide”, 2015). Geographically, ISIS is best
characterized by its rapid spread across the Middle East, seizing
vast amounts of land as it moves forward. In one of its more
recent land grabs, ISIS invaded Tunisia and even came close to
appropriating “Tatooine,” the real Tunisian location where Star
Wars was filmed (Mazza, 2015). Politically, ISIS relies on a
theocratic governing structure, headed by their presumed Caliph
Abu Bakr al-baghdadi (Thompson, Greene, & Torre, 2014). Thompson
et al. (2014) liken their governing structure to Western
civilization by illustrating the parallels between the
commanders-in-chief, legislative, and judicial governing
concepts. Finally and ideologically, ISIS “follows a distinctive
variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of
Judgment matter to its strategy” (Wood, 2015, para. 4). Their
goal is to ultimately act as the harbinger of both a “seventh-
century legal environment, and … to bring about the apocalypse”
(Wood, 2015, para. 8).
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 4
The historical circumstance of ISIS belongs to Wahhabism, a
sect of Islam relying on a radically monotheistic interpretation
of the Quran. Those who disagreed with the Wahhabistic
interpretation of scripture were perceived by al-Wahhab as
polytheistic, were consequently guilty of heresy, and should be
put to death (Cook, 1992). The dichotomy of the other directly
pertains to Wahhabistic ideology: we are correct in our
interpretation and those who disagree are “others” deserving
death. Even those within the Islamic belief who held different
interpretations were views as the “other:”
Abd al-Wahhab, despised "the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca.
In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their "superstition" (e.g.revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine) (Crooke, 2014, para. 9-10).
Thus, al-Wahhab embodied a particularly radicalized belief in the
“us” versus “them”, or “otherness” mentality. Such is the
foundation of the ideological system employed by ISIS: those who
are different shall be put to death.
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 5
What remains unclear is how this appalling group still
manages to create a constituent base that remains fiercely loyal
and identifies with the organization. This paper seeks to examine
the identification rhetorical situation present in the narratives
employed by ISIS. In the following literature review, I examine
literature pertaining to conceptual understandings of terrorism,
the rhetorical strategies of otherness employed by Americans and
the American government as a method of perceiving terrorism, and
the rhetorical strategies and historical significance of
otherness as employed by ISIS. Immediately following, I explicate
(1) the ways in which ISIS utilizes narrative fidelity, (2) the
use of the ethnosubordinance as a means of organizational
identification, and (3) the significance of anonymity as a
subrhetoric of the assumed and transcendent “we.”
Literature Review
Ideology is an important and defining characteristic of any
group (Sedgwick, 2012). Whereas Americans rely heavily on the
concept of the American Dream, ISIS, as noted above, relies on a
rigid jihadist ideology as a central, “necessary cause” of
terrorism (Sedgwick, 2012, p. 359). Sedgwick (2012) notes the
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 6
core philosophies of jihadists are guided by a concept of utopia.
The difference from the American concept of utopia is perceived
by contemporary scholarship to be their reliance on Sharia law as
a means of instilling “justice instead of injustice, prosperity
instead of poverty, with the Muslims strong and respected instead
of weak and subject to attack” (p. 364). The system to which they
strive is, in a sense, a utopian “state of affairs” that “have
wide appeal” and “almost no possibility of counter-ideology
challenging it” (p. 365). To accomplish this utopian system,
Jihadists will attempt to accomplish three means of change: “(1)
it is appropriate in general for force to be used to address the
problems” (p. 365) facing the spread of Islam; (2) this force may
or may not utilize the killing of civilians, rather than simply
attacking military enemies; (3) “it is acceptable for Muslims as
well as non-Muslims to be killed” (p. 365). Through the provided
conceptual framework, we begin to understand the ideological
reasoning behind ISIS attacks.
Beyond knowing and responding to their historical
ideological circumstances, major Western nations are struggling
to build coherent responses to the political and geographic
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 7
successes of the Islamic State. “Sectarian atrocities” grow in
numbers on either side of the conflict in the Middle East
(Stansfield, 2014, p. 1330). The United Kingdom, specifically
does not know how to combat the rise of ISIS:
It is into this environment that the UK entered, with a
self-acknowledged open-ended military strategy and with an
understanding that the political, social, and economic
levers needed to be crafted first, in order to then be
pulled (Stansfield, 2014, p. 1330).
Stansfield broadly reiterates the enigmatic nature of the Islamic
State as an organization; as such, entire governments and
developed Western militaries do not have an accurate grasp, nor
effective infrastructure, on how to effectively influence the
region and the growing state.
Organizational Identification
The inability of Western governments to respond
appropriately to ISIS ideology presents an interesting case study
from multiple rhetorical perspectives (i.e. identification,
metaphorical, and narrative analyses). Cheney (1983) established
the central means of understanding identification in
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 8
organizations. These means of identification are the common
ground technique, identification through antithesis, the assumed
or transcendent we, and unifying symbols. The common ground
technique attempts to equate the rhetor and the
intraorganizational audience member. Identification through
antithesis attempts to “unite” organizational members “against a
common enemy” (p. 153). The assumed or transcendent we is an
established, common bond between the rhetor and the audience
member, and often paints others as “they;” typically others are
other organizations or those not conforming to organizational
values. Unifying symbols manifest as the symbols a company uses
to create identification with members, such as a logo,
letterhead, colors, or uniforms.
In the organizational context, identification through
antithesis is defined as when an organization attempts to unify
against a perceived common foe. However, the category is broad
and does not take into account particular subrhetorical
strategies that utilize cultural expectations or understandings.
Ethnocentrism is one of those cultural expectations that go
unnoticed through Cheney’s original work. Defined as using one’s
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 9
own value system as the standard through which one judges other
values (Neuliep, 2002), ethnocentrism plays an important role in
the rhetoric of ISIS. Historically, as previously outlined, the
Wahhabistic ideology is contingent upon a strict adherence to
monotheistic Islam; al-Wahhab used this value system to judge the
worthiness of others around him.
Given the ethnocentrism and social dominance aspects of
ethnosubordination, one must also consider ethnosubordination as
a tactic of identification. Consequently, to the work of Cheney
(1983), ethnosubordination is a subrhetoric of antithesis insofar
as it utilizes theoretical tenets from ethnocentrism and social
dominance orientation as a means of identifying a “common
‘enemy’,” “outsiders,” or those who are “misguided” (p. 148).
Those “misguided” “others” who disagree with the ideology of
Wahhabism are immoral, and therefore are lesser than those who
are in the ingroup. Thus, according to Wahhabistic rhetoric, they
are to be put to death.
Terrorists are defined through many different lenses of
identification. Reshetnikov (2008) examines the social violence
perspective, wherein participants in terror are racked by
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 10
“identity crises and by the tendency to challenge aggressively
established norms and rules” (p. 655). Ethnocentrism also plays
an important role in determining the perception of terrorism, or,
“the almost genetic conviction that my kin, or more generally, my
ethnic group … cannot be bad, with the converse conviction that
if something has gone wrong it is the fault of the stranger”
(Reshetnikov, 2008, p. 657). Ethnocentrism is best described as
the “disposition where the values, attitudes, and behaviors of
one’s ingroup are used as the standard for judging and evaluating
other group’s values” (Neuliep, 2002, p. 201). These perspectives
directly impact one’s identification with organizations through
the use of values. Ethnocentric beliefs value identification with
the ingroup over identifying with others; the social violence
perspective furthers identification by actively challenging the
values of other groups with whom one may negatively identify.
For example, the September 11th attacks, wherein the Trade
Towers and the Pentagon were attacked, intimately affected the
perception of terrorism in Western society. Specifically, the
Bush administration capitalized on the attacks, using persuasive
rhetoric to spur American anxieties regarding personal vengeance
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 11
against American citizens. Therefore, President Bush put the
United States on the path to war by relating to the citizenry the
intimate immediacy of the threat to the American dream that Al
Qaeda presented (Rogers, 2013). The American Dream is, at its
core, a rigid hegemonic structure designed to perpetuate the
“American” way of life (i.e. capitalism, rugged individualism;
Kasiyarno, 2014). Consequently, any threat presented to this
dream, such as that from Al Qaeda (as argued by the Bush
administration), it threatens American hegemony and the very
structures upon which this country was founded. Any slight
against the dream, accordingly, becomes personal.
In response to intimate, immediate threat to the dream,
Americans build perceptive structures around their understanding
of terrorism and terrorists. Americans believe in the immediacy
of the threat of terror and that, as a nation, we must
proactively eradicate the threat (Nitcavic & Dowling, 1990). In
view of the belief of proactivity, Kossowska, de Zavala, and
Kubik (2010) demonstrate American’s perceptions of terrorists
(i.e. unreasonable, sociopathic, and/or ideologically driven).
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 12
Further, Americans rely heavily on stereotyping the terrorist to
maintain the hegemonic structures inherent to American life.
To stereotype the perception of terrorists, Westerners
commonly employ the concept of togetherness and otherness.
Westerners, relying on a common history, are together in the
fight against radicalism and terrorism. Otherness, defined as a
broad classification of difference (Kastoryano, 2010),
encompasses the perception of terrorist identity by Westerners.
Again, the Bush administration is a chief perpetrator of
persuasive rhetoric defining terrorist groups as “others.”
Throughout a number of speeches on the topic of terrorism,
President Bush employed a common theme of “their” against “our”
goals, in dichotomizing fashion (Bartolucci, 2012).
Metaphors and Narratives as a Tool of Organizational
Identification
ISIS rhetoric, as illustrated below, is contingent upon
strong member identification. Identification is accomplished
through the rigid application of the “necessary cause” jihad
(Sedgwick, 2012, p. 359), through which ISIS members identify
common foes and establish bonds. Their ideological constructs
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 13
make available other tools of rhetorical scholarship, such as
metaphorical and narrative analysis. The larger ideology that
motivates ISIS allows members to routinely use metaphors and
narratives to assist in member identification and recruitment.
First, metaphorical criticism as a tool of rhetoric largely
stems from Osborn (1967) and his discussion of the archetypal
metaphor. The archetypal metaphor is defined through five
important characteristics: popularity, time, experience,
motivation, and persuasion. Osborn (1967) first argues that
metaphors hold a distinct popularity with rhetors. Second, the
use of archetypal metaphors remains largely the same from
generation to generation. Third, metaphors arise from certain
inescapable experiences throughout one’s life. Fourth, the
archetypal metaphors becomes inextricably bound to “basic human
motivations” (p. 338). Fifth, and finally, the archetypal
metaphor utilizes each of the preceding characteristics to
exhibit a sense of universality used to appeal to a wide, diverse
audience.
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 14
The metaphor is largely an intangible concept that helps
construct one’s understanding of social reality. Deetz (1986)
engages with metaphor from this viewpoint by arguing,
Other metaphorical structurings are more specific yet no
more visible than the pervasive up structure. For example,
the notion of an ‘idea’ is abstract and hard to talk about.
‘Idea’ gets expressed metaphorically (p. 174).
Further, Deetz (1986) argues that metaphors are imperative to the
social construction of reality in the organization. Therefore,
the metaphor is an integral tool to build member identification
in organizations. Whereas Cheney (1983) argues what an
organization might do to create identification, Osborn’s (1967)
metaphor operationalizes identification and assists the reader in
understanding how an organization might go about creating it.
The narrative paradigm is also a tool for organizations to
go about creating identification amongst members. The narrative
paradigm of rhetoric is contingent upon a sense of narrative
logic (Fisher, 1987). The foundational pieces of narrative logic
according to Fisher (1987) are probability and fidelity, which
break down to coherence, truthfulness, and reliability,
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 15
respectively. The probability of a narrative is reliant upon the
construction of its argument, material coherence (comparing this
narrative to others about the same story), and characterological
coherence (the believability of the characters therein).
Fidelity, or the accuracy of a narrative, is established through
the “logic of good reasons” (p. 47) which is inextricably bound
to one’s values. Additionally, Hoffman and Ford (2010) argue,
“Organizations attempt to influence how people prioritize their
values” (p. 155). In this application, the organization will use
the narrative to establish and persuade members to adopt
organizationally-prioritized values. These values are, in a
sense, equitable to the strategies through which organizations
craft identification (i.e. a sense of “we,” common ground). In
sum, the narrative can be used in conjunction with metaphors by
the organization to create member identification.
Since there is the effective intellectual vacuum regarding
how constituents identify with ISIS, and terror groups in a
broader sense, I use the preceding literature to sensitize and
contextualize ISIS both conceptually and organizationally. The
preceding sensitizing information provides a conceptual framework
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 16
to move forward in understanding organizational identification in
this new context. Therein, otherness arises as a pervasive
narrative throughout their history and ideology, which provides
ample opportunity for research and rhetorical criticism.
Method
To conduct this rhetorical analysis, I collected a video and
relevant news articles that explain both the methods and
ideologies employed by ISIS (see “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC…”,
2015; Thompson et al, 2015; Crooke, 2014; “ISIS video”, 2015;
Wood, 2015). To accomplish this, I employed Google searches, in
March, April, and May 2014, of ISIS history, ISIS methods, and
relevant ideology. The video depicting the burning alive of
Jordanian pilot Mu’ath al-Kaseasbeh served as the primary source
of information for this study; other news bulletins or stories
assisted in developing a coherent narrative that spans both their
historical circumstances as well as their present methods. To
draw conclusions about the theoretical implications of the
actions and narratives employed by ISIS, the author utilized
theoretical expositions on organizational metaphor and narrative
to guide and interpret Cheney’s (1983) rhetorical categories of
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 17
organizational identification and Osborn’s (1967) metaphorical
analysis to a new context.
Analysis
Present in the rhetoric of the jihadist, caliphate-oriented
terror group, ISIS, are identification rhetorics that increase
the appeal of the organization, as well as maintain ideological
consistency and member identification. These rhetorics manifest
in the rhetoric of ethnosubordination, a subrhetoric of
identification via antithesis, and the rhetoric of anonymity, a
subrhetoric of the assumed and transcendent ‘we’. To accomplish
the rhetoric of ethnosubordination, ISIS fighters routinely
utilize the rhetorical strategy of beheading, which both shocks
the audience and portrays the common enemy as lesser than ISIS
fighters.
ISIS Narrative Fidelity
ISIS attempts to influence not only the prioritization of
values outside of their organization (i.e. through acts of
terror; Almasy, 2015), but also prioritization of values of their
organizational constituents, current and potential. Through the
use of identification strategies, ISIS influences its members to
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 18
accept and value such Islamic tenets as Sharia Law and a
theocratic caliph as governed by a strict Wahhabistic
interpretation of the Qur’an. ISIS is succeeding in this
prioritization (Baker, 2014; Gaffey, 2015; Haq, 2014). A
rhetorical message is “inextricably bound to a value” (Fisher,
1987, p. 107); yet, how ISIS maintains this rhetorical message,
gains member identification, and ensures the propagation of their
values has previously escaped scholarship, analysis, or
journalistic inquiry. To this end, I offer two propositions that
attempt to bridge the gap between currently existing scholarship
and the organizational enigma that is ISIS.
Proposition 1: ISIS uses the rhetoric of ethnosubordination,
a subrhetoric of identification by antithesis.
Proposition 2: ISIS uses anonymity as a subrhetoric of the
assumed and transcendent “we.”
Through ISIS rhetoric it is clear that Wahhabistic ideology
supercedes any other organizational value. The historical
narrative of ISIS belongs to the radically monotheistic, Sharia-
driven Wahhabistic interpretation of the Quran. According to the
teachings, any non-Muslim or a Muslim practicing an incorrect
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 19
interpretation of the Quran should be put to death for their
heretical beliefs (Crooke, 2014). Additionally, ISIS believes in
one caliph who is anointed to bring about the end of times; he is
both the harbinger of utopia and the apocalypse. To this end, and
to reify the narrative in a present era, ISIS agents routinely
behead or otherwise gruesomely murder those who believe
differently than they do (Abdallah, 2014; Almasy, 2015; Fadel,
2015; Kaufman, 2015).
Each of the four stories cited above (Abdallah, 2014;
Almasy, 2015; Fadel, 2015; Kaufman, 2015) is the account of
someone else. The common themes evident in their stories,
however, illustrate the fidelity through which ISIS disseminates
and controls its values, as well as subordinating and eradicating
the values of others: a horrifying death. The commonality of the
themes inherent in the narratives told illustrates a sense of
coherence (similar events), truthfulness (multiple observations),
and reliability (commonality of the explained observations).
Hearkening to al-Wahhab’s exposition on the treatment of non-
Muslims, the manifestation of a contemporary mindset that
intimately mirrors the feelings of derision or disdain al-Wahhab
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 20
felt for ‘others’ becomes evident. Through these narratives, the
“character” that is ISIS (the organization) and its members have
believability; their actions are perceived as within the realm of
their character and are to be expected.
The organizational narrative established through multiple
beheadings and gruesome deaths explicates ISIS organizational
values. Specifically, explication manifests through the beheading
of Kenji Goto. The organizational value of derision for
“otherness” is exhibited in acts of violence against ISIS
captors. In justifying the beheading, “Jihadi John,” the infamous
ISIS spokesperson, acts as the foremost character in the ISIS
narrative. He embodies ISIS organizational values, such as the
commitment to violence against nonbelievers, anonymity, and
ethnocentrism. As a preeminent character, the words he speaks
carry weight with outside audiences. To that end, “John” labeled
Japan’s decision to actively fight against ISIS as “reckless.” In
response to Japan dropping any pretense of neutrality in the war,
the spokesperson attempts to intimidate the Japanese government
by warning them of the “nightmare” yet to come (“Jihadi John,” as
cited in Almasy, 2015, para. 9). Here, “John” uses the otherness
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 21
of Goto as both a symbol of the superiority of ISIS values—and
therefore ideology—and the inferiority of other national values.
“
ISIS narratives of beheading are particularly alienating to
the Western observer, which in turn is best described by the
values established by the actions partaken by ISIS. Specifically,
values inherent to ISIS rhetoric are depravity and ideology;
while on their face these values may not run counter to Western
values—especially given the Western penchant for war—the methods
through which the terror group establish, illustrate, and
maintain these values are particularly heinous.
For example, to evidence its value of depravity, ISIS
disseminated the video in which fighters burned Jordanian Pilot
Muath al-Kaseasbeh alive. The video was of high quality, with
polished graphics that illustrate technological sophistication
amongst its members (see “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC”, 2015).
Through this video, ISIS purposively illustrated their
understanding of American and Jordanian politics and battle
strategies. At the end of the video, masked ISIS fighters
surrounded the pilot, who was caged and clothed in prisoner garb.
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 22
A masked fighter lit a flammable liquid that traced along the
ground. The camera follows the lighting of the fluid and affixes
on al-Kaseasbeh as the flames engulf him.
In this context, the reduction of human rights lies not in
what was explicitly said, but how ISIS carried out the killing of
al-Kaseasbeh. The burning of al-Kaseasbeh was predicated on the
belief that those who are in the outgroup—non-Muslims or, as they
perceive, polytheistic Muslims—should be denied basic human
rights, such as the right “from being subjected to torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” (UN
Documents, 1975). ISIS burned al-Kaseasbeh alive because he
belonged to the outgroup, with which ISIS is at war. Values of
depravity and ideology are organizationally established and
maintained, and hearken back to the values established by al-
Wahhab. The values as established by their logic of good reasons—
i.e. their Wahhabistic ideology—supercede that of government and
international law. Since the two factions are at war with one
another, treatment of prisoners of war is expected to encompass
certain inalienable rights as explained in the Geneva Convention,
such as humane treatment and a lack of prosecution for
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 23
participation in hostilities (“Prisoners of War & Detainees”,
2013). al-Kaseasbeh was denied these rights and subject to
inhumane conditions, including his horrifying death. Therefore,
the narrative through which ISIS made their values clear is not
merely through spoken word, but through the comprehensive message
sent through each and every action used to punish al-Kaseasbeh
for his people’s crimes.
The Rhetoric of Ethnosubordination
ISIS rhetoric, as illustrated by the assessment of the al-
Kaseasbeh video, does not simply end at a generic value judgment.
As illustrated, ISIS has made significant efforts to terrorize
and overcome those against whom they stand. It is in this context
that a group’s social dominance orientation becomes relevant.
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994) introduced this
orientation as a cognitive disposition “toward intergroup
relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such
relations to be equal, versus hierarchical … ordered along a
superior-inferior dimension” (p. 742). Throughout the rhetorical
narrative utilized by ISIS, and especially that as espoused by
al-Wahhab, their ideology is contingent upon a social dominance
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 24
orientation that prefers a strong hierarchical structure that
places stringently practicing Muslims above all others.
For example, ISIS and Wahhabistic rhetoric is contingent
upon portraying those holding different beliefs than the rhetor
as the other: “In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims;
they were imposters masquerading as Muslims” (Crooke, 2014, para.
10). Cooper (2004) argues that Wahhabism is predicated on the
belief of religious dominance, or the premise that the particular
sect of Islam Wahhabists exalt is principally superior to other
interpretations or religions. Those who extol a different set of
beliefs are “imposters” unto Islam and do not fully support the
Wahhabistic-perceived tenets crucial to a successful religion.
Consequently, the other, according to Wahhabistic belief, is
lesser than.
The Rhetoric of Beheading
It seems previous research has, mostly, shied away from
understanding the rhetoric of beheading. Rightfully so; the
process of beheading is an utterly barbaric and abominable act
that traumatizes the psyche to understand and consider. Rechtman
(2006) engages with this damaging task through the context of
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 25
Khmer Rouge, wherein the oppressors utilized the rhetoric of
deprivation of humanity. Therein, Rechtman (2006) claims “the
killing machine has not only killed in an almost industrial way,
but it has also claimed to destroy the human condition of all
those who came under its wheels” (p. 3). That too, in essence, is
the rhetoric of the beheading. It is the conscientious,
purposeful threat or action of removal of the head of the other,
while still alive. The rhetoric of beheading is a strategy
through which ISIS identifies its ethnosubordinate common enemy,
and rallies its fighters in an attempt to destroy it.
The threat of beheading is an all too common device employed
by ISIS fighters in their highly produced videos. In a video
aimed at the American audience, specifically President Barack
Obama, an anonymous ISIS fighter stated,
"Know, oh Obama, that we will reach America. Know also that
we will cut off your head in the White House and transform
America into a Muslim province" (“ISIS Fighter,” as cited in
MacKenzie, 2015, n.p.).
The anonymous ISIS fighter thereby simultaneously refers to Obama
as a symbol of the American culture, something that should be
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 26
toppled and overcome—a symbol of the “misguided,” common enemy—as
well as the target of the beheading. The beheading becomes,
therefore, rhetoric of ethnosubordination. Beheading is an
abominable act reserved for those with whom ISIS disagrees; those
with whom ISIS disagree are lesser than, and therefore deserving
eradication.
The Rhetoric of Anonymity
Anonymous members exist as a pervasive metaphor in ISIS
rhetoric. The nature of anonymity speaks to how ISIS may see an
increase in member identification, recruitment, and
identification maintenance. As previously mentioned, Deetz (1986)
argues that metaphors are imperative to the social construction
of reality in the organization. Such social construction of
reality is present in the rhetoric utilized by ISIS propaganda.
In each of the prominent videos released by the organization,
ISIS fighters are shown as masked individuals, with barely
perceptible voices and completely masked faces (Adams, 2014;
Bucktin, 2014; MacKenzie, 2015; “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC”,
2015). The mask of the ISIS fighter acts as a metaphor of
darkness in this sense, illustrating the ISIS-prescribed,
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 27
socially constructed reality of the anonymity of the group. The
mask, and therefore anonymity, is metaphoric of darkness; it
commands “fear of the unknown;” it “discourages sight, and makes
one ignorant of their environment” (Osborn, 1967, p. 339). It is
in this context that we see anonymity as a subrhetoric of the
assumed and transcendent “we,” as it stands as a nonverbal
metaphor for the communal nature of ISIS, in contrast to its
enemies in Western Society.
ISIS’ masked crusaders establish themselves anonymously to
create a socially constructed perception of equality amongst its
members and the prescribed perception of fear in those who oppose
it. Equality plays an important role for ISIS: in this sense,
equality creates an environment of ignorance in its opposition.
Western Governments and secular societies have little idea who
may be an ISIS member amongst their ranks. Inevitably, this
environment ushers in “fear of the unknown” (Osborn, 1967, p.
339). Because secular Western societies have little idea who may
be a member of or sympathize with ISIS, the darkness that is
membership in ISIS shrouds light. ISIS, then, capitalizes on this
spreading darkness by claiming responsibility for domestic
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 28
attacks that may arise later such as the Draw Muhammad event in
Garland, Texas (FoxNews.com, 2015; Payne, 2015).
This anonymity presents a key departure from strategies
previously employed in Islamic terror group rhetoric. Whereas
Usama Bin Laden was the very public face of Al Qaeda throughout
the early 2000’s, ISIS has—until recentlyi—not had a public face
equivalent to Bin Laden. In that regard, ISIS allows its rhetoric
to play to the imagination of its audience: a potential jihadist
is able to see himself in this role, on camera, and making a
message known. A Western audience member sees the masked man as a
metaphor for darkness, and therefore the unknown and ubiquitous.
ISIS has no ‘face,’ therefore could be anyone, anywhere, at any
time. Through this open-ended interpretation available to
multiple audiences, I posit that ISIS holds its greatest power in
organizational identification. Further, I posit that this is why
ISIS has seen more geopolitical success than Al Qaeda ever could:
ISIS allows for the audience to envision themselves as the face
of jihad, rather than allowing the face to tell them to do jihad.
Discussion and Implications
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 29
ISIS ubiquity, coupled with the rhetorical
ethnosubordination of their enemies, makes ISIS a remarkable
threat to Western values. The sheer brutality through which this
organization engages speaks to their ruthless efficiency in
geopolitical domination of the Middle East. The Wahhabistic
influence is clear in the rhetorical strategies employed by this
organization: they routinely and ruthlessly pursue their
perceived enemies to eradicate them; a person, however, must
willingly join their ranks before the onslaught, otherwise it
seems they will fall as a victim.
To engage in the rhetoric of otherness is common fare in
contemporary Western civilizations. Habitually and
characteristically, political figures—even the President of the
United States (Rogers, 2013; Kasiyarno, 2014)—engage in the
rhetoric of division. Perhaps our collective surprise in
encountering a foe that engages organizational member
identification rhetoric equally as well as Western leadership has
led to our collective confusion in exactly how to appropriately
counteract this terror organization. Contemporary military
strategy simply is non’t enough to wipe out ISIS, as the UK
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 30
sorely understands (Stansfield, 2014). Perhaps this confusion is
equally attributable to the bloodlust found in the ongoing
American political climate; most Americans, after all, ascribe to
the philosophy that terrorism should proactively be eradicated
(Nitcavic & Dowling, 1990). This lust may have led the militaries
to jump the gun, metaphorically speaking, and engage too early
with an enemy we did not yet understand.
This paper presents a foundational understanding of the
rhetoric employed by ISIS. As such, the research is not yet—and
nowhere near—complete on the rhetorical and identification
strategies employed by this organization. To that end, this study
does contain its limitations, such as the lack of previous
scholarship on ISIS upon which this paper could build, in
addition to the relative isolation of the researcher from the
phenomenon that is ISIS. Hopefully, this paper begins to bridge
the intellectual gap found in this first limitation. At times,
research without existing foundations must occur. The isolation
of the researcher from the Middle East is, as stated, another
limitation. Because of this isolation, the researcher relied
solely on second-hand accounts found in various sources of media.
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 31
While the researcher attempted to utilize reputable sources of
information, some information is not independently verifiable. To
that end, the researcher attempted to find multiple sources
utilizing the same context and quotes to build existential
credibility to these claims.
Future research in understanding ethnosubordination and the
rhetoric of anonymity is virtually unlimited. Branching out the
rhetoric of identification from noncorporate entities allows for
a field of study that was not previously realized. For example,
applying the rhetoric of ethnosubordination to political parties
in Western civilizations would provide an excellent venue for
scholarship. Additionally, examining the effect of anonymity on
identification within public postings from “hacktivist” groups
such as Anonymous or Lulzsec is an essentially understudied
realm. It is not understood whether these subrhetorics apply to
any other organizations than ISIS; utilizing the understandings
present in this study will open many doors to future researchers.
Conclusion
Organizationally, ISIS is a force with which it is wise to
reckon. Their sheer geopolitical strength, and an ever-growing
ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 32
base of constituents speaks to their ability to organize and
create identification with its base. To this end, ISIS furthers
the organizational identification rhetorics discovered by Cheney
(1983) by identifying common enemies as ethnosubordinate to
Wahhabistic ISIS ideology, as well as collectively identifying—
the assumed and transcendent ‘we’—through the rhetoric of
anonymity. To accomplish ethnosubordinance, ISIS routinely
engages in the rhetoric of beheading, a threat or action that
rallies its base to destroy the common enemy.
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i ’Jihadi John’, as he is known, was recently unmasked and discovered to be British-born Mohammad Emwazi:
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