ECOSOPHY AND PRESENT-DAY HUMANISM

Nanni Kuling

Bakhuizen van den Brinkstraat 7 bis A

3532GA, Utrecht

Tel. 06-43469694

Studentnr: 1001736

nannikuling@live.nl

Bachelor thesis UvH

Bachelor year 2013-2014

Mentor: Dr. Fernando Suarez Müller

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Examiner: Hanne Laceulle

Coördinator: Dr. A. Machielse

July 4 2014, Utrecht

Abstract

Nanni Kuling, Humanistic studies, University for Humanistic

studies

Abstract of Bachelor’s thesis, submitted 3 July, 2014:

Ecosophy and Present-Day Humanism

Through a synthesizing philosophical approach, we consider in

this thesis if ecosophy could be of value to present-day

humanism, because the latter has a gap in its philosophy of

life concerning the relation of humans with nature – animals

and plants; something ecosophy does contain.

According to Peter Derkx, present-day humanism meets at

least the following four aspects: 1) every philosophy of life

is always contextual work of man; 2) human dignity; 3) self-

actualization and 4) love for specific, vulnerable, unique and

irreplaceable persons. Herein, the human is being transcendent

and nothing is said about nature. Several humanist thinkers

have criticism concerning the lack of attention for the

problematic relationship of humanism with nature. Especially in

the current ecological crisis, this is a serious problem.

Ecosophy could be of value to present-day humanism because

it gives a clear view on man’s relationship with nature through

working out a new ontology based on the principles of

interrelatedness and interdependence of all life. Therefore,

ecosophy is valuable for humanism, because humanism gets the

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chance to lead our current society towards a sustainable

future.

With this thesis I hope to inspire humanist associations

and make them enthusiastic to create their own ecosophy.

Acknowledgements

This philosophical paper came into being within the framework

of my bachelors thesis at the University of Humanistic studies.

I was able to make this thesis as good as it is under the

guidance of Dr. Fernando Suárez Müller, who I want to thank for

thinking along, his feed-back and his advice concerning

literature. From the literature he advised me to use for this

thesis, I have learned what I had hoped to learn during this

proces.

Furthermore, I want to thank Aad Kuling and Berry Schwartz

for their great reviews on my English writing skills. Above all

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I want to thank Daniel Blondelle for introducing me to ecosophy

and his critical view on my thesis.

I dedicate my thesis to the University of Humanistic

Studies, to give guidance to the Humanistic Association (HV) in

favour of the transition that needs to be made in (Dutch)

Humanism in order to give a meaningful contribution to Dutch

society, and help the society to deal with the ecological

issues we are currently facing.

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Table of Contents

Abstract...........................................................2

Acknowledgements...................................................3

Table of Contents..................................................4

Introduction.......................................................6

Research Design..................................................9

Chapter 1. Humanism and its relation with nature..................11

1.1 Derkx’ humanism.............................................11

1.2 Changing the relation of humanism towards nature............12

1.3 And thus…...................................................13

Chapter 2. The content of Ecosophy................................14

2.1 The current problem within humanism.........................14

2.2 Basic principles and ontology...............................15

2.3 Self-realization............................................18

2.4 The place of humans in the world............................18

2.5 Critique on ecosophy........................................20

2.6 Ecosophy is.................................................20

Chapter 3. Is ecosophy of value to present-day humanism?..........21

3.1 Derkx’ humanism and ecosophy................................21

3.2 Ecosophy as an answer to the critique from within humanism. .22

3.3 Ecosophy could be of value to present-day humanism..........23

Conclusion........................................................24

Discussion........................................................25

Epilogue: vision on humanism......................................27

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Literature........................................................28

Appendix one: Desperations concerning ecosophy....................30

Appendix two: The Deep Ecology Platform...........................31

Appendix three: Deep Ecology and Lifestyle........................32

The main point is that we do not hesitate today, being inspired by ecology and a

revived intimate relation to Nature, to recognize and accept wholeheartedly our

ecological self.

- Arne Næss (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 22)

[I]nhabitory peoples sometimes say “this piece of land is sacred” – or “all the land is

sacred.” This is an attitude that draws on awareness of the mystery of life and death;

of taking life to live; of giving life back – not only to your own children, but to the life

of the whole land.

- Gary Snyder (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 69)

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Introduction

Most of us do not hate the natural world. We are deeply moved

by its beauty, awed by its majesty and power. We do not

wantonly destroy or pollute it. Each of us knows that we are

not separate from it. Yet there is pollution and destruction.

Our collective actions cause serious consequences.

- Alan Drengson (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 85)

The above stated is a view on the ecological crisis according

to a Deep Ecology thinker. Deep Ecology derives from ecosophy.

The word ‘ecosophy’ is a combination of ecology (meaning

“habitation”) and philosophy (“wisdom”). It uses basic concepts

from the science of ecology like complexity, diversity and

symbiosis, to clarify the place of our species within nature

through the process of working out a total view (Næss, 1989, p.

3; Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. xxiv). The term ‘Deep Ecology’ is

meant to characterize a way of thinking about environmental

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problems that attacks them from the origin. In Deep Ecology the

problems are seen as symptoms of the deepest ills of our

current society (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 155).

Ecosophy came into being through the work of the Norwegian

philosopher Arne Næss. He was a lecturer in semantics,

philosophy of science and systematic exposition of the

philosophies of Ghandi and Spinoza for over thirty years. In

the seventies of the last century, a lot of attention and great

protests arose from the threatening ecological crisis (Næss,

1989, p. 1). Næss believed that philosophy was needed to lead

these protests, whereas ‘for him it had always been not just a

“love of wisdom”, but a love of wisdom related to action’

(Ibidem). All philosophical insight should be directly relevant

for action, because it is through action that one shows his

philosophy or the lack thereof (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p.

xxiv; Næss, 1989, pp. 3, 37-38). Therefore, ecosophy forms the

philosophy of the Deep Ecology Movement. This movement is

constructed to unite all kinds of ecological movements that

otherwise would be on their own. The aim of this platform is to

make people share the basic principles, whatever their religion

or culture is. It also gives local movements a global view. To

set a core of values, a platform to guide discussion and

action, eight basic points have been formulated, dealt with in

appendix one Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. xxiv; Næss, 1989, pp.

29-32).

Currently, we live in a time of ecological crisis. Ecosophy

sees a positive aspect in our current situation: it could

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contribute to open our minds to sources of meaningful life and

help us choose a new path based on new criteria for living our

lives, which have largely gone unnoticed or have been

depreciated in our efforts to adapt to the urbanized, techno-

industrial mega-society (Næss, 1989, pp. 24, 26). Næss states

that some kind of ‘back to nature’ attitude must be nurtured in

which our developed intellect has to be used: ‘This does not

imply that lifestyle and society will become too simple in

relation to our great intellectual capacity. On the contrary,

(...) [w]ith increasing understanding, increasing sensitivity

towards internal relations, humans can live with moderate

material means and reach a fabulous richness of ends’ (Næss,

1989, p. 183).

In contrast with Deep Ecology, present-day humanism, in

general, is not focusing on how we should deal with the

ecological crisis: nature, the value of nature and conservation of nature

are concepts that scarcely occur in the vocabulary of humanism

(Wissenburg, 2007, p. 4). Nature is understood as ‘milieu’: the

environment of the human that exists to provide in human needs.

The world is at the service of the human being. All of nature

is positioned under the imperatives of the human being, because

the human being is made the measure of all things (Manschot,

2010, 16; Wisenburg, 2007, p. 1; Suárez Müller, 2014, pp. 17).

As a result, ecology is reduced to an object – milieu – and a

means. This ‘milieu’ is the precondition of the preconditions

of a (human) worthy existence and miles away from the great

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humanistic questions about the meaning of life and a worthy way

of living (Wissenburg, 2007, pp. 1).

Throughout the years, there have been several humanist

thinkers who expressed their critique on humanism concerning

its relation with nature: Hans Achterhuis (1990) pointed at the

silence of Dutch humanism when it comes to environmental

questions, Wouter Achterberg (1992) pointed at the problematic

relationship between anthropocentric humanism and ecocentrism

and Marcel Wissenburg, one of today’s humanist thinkers, points

at the ‘obvious impossibility of humanism to assign more than

just a (...) value of utility to nature’ (Wissenburg, 2007, p.

3). Henk Manschot (2010, p. 18), contemporary of Wissenburg,

poses that when one speaks about humanism, one should treat the

issue of present-day ecological destruction. Contemporary

Fernando Suárez Müller (2014, p. 17) states that the human

being is the most responsible being on earth and from this he

forms an alternative humanism in which the human being no

longer has a central position: man is subordinated to the

world. Furthermore, Manschot states that humanism should design

a cosmology which can give orientation to the current

ecological problems. For, if the diagnosis, that the actions of

humanity led to a situation in which every aspect of life is

interwoven with human action, is correct, then herein lies an

assignment to expand the responsibility of the human being,

which, after all, forms the heart of humanism (2010, pp. 79-

80). The lack of a clear cosmology within humanism, according

to Manschot (2010, p. 64), is probably a consequence of its

anthropocentrism and the transcendent position that it assigns

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to the human being: humanism assigns to humans the

characteristics freedom, autonomy and being an end in oneself.

Assigning those characteristics means assigning a transcendent

position to humans in relation to other beings. It presupposes

‘being free’ from the natural processes to which every living

being is subjected: it means you are not determined by your

environment.

In today’s reality this problematic relation of humanism

towards nature is even more pressing because of the current

ecological crisis. Paul Cliteur and Wim van Dooren (1991, p. 9)

circumscribe the axioms of humanism as the conviction that

humans are rational beings, they are equal, have freedom of

choice, are interwoven with each other, depend on the natural

world and are subordinate to the strengths of nature. To

understand ourselves, to accept our freedom, to have the

ability to be autonomous and responsible – all are core values

of humanism – we need to understand our relation with and our

positioning in nature.

Ecosophy gives us a clear view on our relation with and our

positioning in nature. It departs from the point of view that

we, as humans, are interrelated with all other living beings on

earth and that acknowledging this interrelatedness is of the

greatest importance for our own life as a human being, because

‘[w]e are not outside the rest of nature and therefore cannot

do with it as we please without changing ourselves’ (Næss,

1989, pp. 164-165). It has a clear cosmology that is created to

change towards a sustainable future, something which humanism

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is still missing, as we have seen above. Therefore, we will

consider if ecosophy can be of value to humanism. In this paper

present-day humanism is compared to Arne Næss’ ecosophy to

reflect from this point of view on humanism to conclude if

ecosophy can be a fruitful contribution to present-day

humanism. To deal with the above, the following question is

formulated:

What could be the value of ecosophy for present-day humanism?

This question shows the hypothesis that ecosophy could be of

value to humanism. To answer this thesis, the following sub-

questions are formulated, which will form the outline of this

paper in the following order:

1. What is the content of present-day humanism?

2. What should be the relation of humanism with other living

beings according to the humanists Henk Manschot and

Fernando Suárez Müller?

3. What is the content of Arne Næss’ ecosophy?

4. What could be the value of ecosophy for present-day

humanism?

The aim of this research is to give a valuable contribution to

present-day humanism, taking Næss’ philosophy as point of

departure to inspire humanism to change the humanistic idea of

– and relation with – nature, in order to [1] close this gap

within humanism; the gap that concerns our interrelatedness

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with nature and [2] give guidance to live a humanistic life

which is sustainable and ecological friendly.

This thesis is also of great importance to society,

because Western society reflects the ideas of humanism to a

great extent: the Dutch Humanist association (2006, p. 1)

states in her policy that ‘[n]owadays, important humanist

values and ideals have become common property. Values like

freedom, equality and responsibility have become self-evident.

We live in a society which has become exceedingly secularized’.

As a result, this paper will indirectly deal with the question

if ecosophy could be of value to our current society.

Research Design

From the above it follows that this thesis is a thematic

research: it discusses the theme present-day humanism and her

relation with nature through discussing ecosophy.

Simultaneously, a hermeneutic approach is used by trying to get

a thorough understanding of ecosophy. The philosophical

approach is synthesizing: the diverse knowledge of ecosophy and

of present-day humanism are brought together, in order to see

if ecosophy can be of value to humanism.

This paper centres upon Arne Næss’ Ecology, community and

lifestyle (1989) because it forms the basis of ecosophy. To

understand Arne Næss’ ecosophy thoroughly, the works of

Drengson, Inoue and Sessions on ecosophy are used. Those works

are compilations of essays from ecosophical thinkers, thus, we

get a broad theoretical view on ecosophy. Furthermore, the work

of Eric Katz, Andrew Light and David Rothenberg is used because

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it supplies us with criticism on ecosophy, which is needed for

falsification. This work is also a compilation of different

essays reflecting on ecosophy.

Næss’ ecosophy is an all-round worldview. His system is

very structured: he deals with gestalt theory, politics and

eco-politics, with Ghandi’s norms of nonviolence, and much

more. In this thesis, we only discuss the worldview of

ecosophy, its view on man and its critique on humanism.

In order to get a clear view on what present-day humanism

contains, the framework of Peter Derkx, a Dutch humanist, is

used. He forms an explanation of the minimum content of

humanism, wherein every kind of humanism should recognize

itself: ‘(...) all four characteristics are necessary to talk

of humanism’ (Derkx, 2010, p. 112). Furthermore, the works of

Suárez Müller and Manschot are used because they write about

present-day humanism and her relation to nature – and on how

this relation should change. In order to avoid spilled words,

Derkx’ present-day humanism is called ‘humanism’ from now on.

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Chapter 1. Humanism and its relation with nature

In this chapter we consider the content of humanism and what

the critique of different humanist thinkers is, who are

thinking of a more nature-bound humanism. Through this, we

answer the first two sub-questions in this chapter (paragraph

1.3).

1.1 Derkx’ humanism

In his book Humanism, a meaningful life and never ‘growing old’1 Derkx

gives us a proposition of how to define ‘humanism’ in the

second half of the twentieth century, wherein he concentrates

on humanism as a modern ‘philosophy of life’: a more or less

explicit and systematized framework that helps people to give

1 Original title: Humanisme, zinvol leven en ‘nooit meer ouder worden’.15

or experience meaning in their lives. He defines humanism

through four aspects: 1) every philosophy of life is always

contextual work of man; 2) human dignity; 3) self-actualization

and 4) love for specific, vulnerable, unique and irreplaceable

persons. Concerning the relation between humanism and nature,

Derkx tells us at the beginning of his book that he has not

dealt with the problems of the ecological destruction in his

book, which, according to him, he should have (Derkx, 2010, p.

10-11).

The first aspect includes the acknowledgement of human

fallibility and the preparedness of rational accountability to

oneself and others. Furthermore, Derkx states that a philosophy

of life is always bound to place, time and culture and is also

personal work of humans. Herewith, he claims that all the

claims of philosophies and religions are contextual work of man

and therefore relativistic and temporary. With this statement

he makes a claim on the truth of his own, one that is not

relativistic nor temporary. This is paradoxically. He concludes

that humanism is an open, tolerant philosophy of life with

appreciation of diversity, which arises out of humanist

relativism (Derkx, 2011, pp. 77-82). Next to this paradox, the

problem with this first aspect is that it is too general. Derkx

does not tell us what the content is of the concepts place,

time and culture, human fallibility and rational

accountability, which makes it unclear what is meant by the

first aspect. By not defining the meaning of his claim,

everything could be meant by it, and therefore it has no

meaning in itself.

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The second aspect stands for the principle that all human

beings ought to treat each other as equals, because all human

beings deserve human dignity. Moral awareness is an

evolutionary grown capability of humans, not just an obvious

natural given thing. Whether animals or plants have dignity,

Derkx does not say. We can only conclude that he does not see

it as necessary to say something about it (Derkx, 2011, pp. 82-

87).

The third aspect is taking responsibility for one’s own

life: to care for oneself and make an artwork of one’s life. It

includes knowing what you want, doing what you want and reflect

on your actions. Self-actualization is the story of a self,

that grows from this self to a fuller self, constantly

interwoven with the lives of others. Man has to actualize all

his capacities as far as possible. This self-actualization

demands a moral orientation: what kind of life do you want to

live, what are your values? Every human being should constantly

exercise learning, working, caring and enjoying, throughout his

whole life. The core of this aspect is that you should use your

freedom to give your life form and content (Derkx, 2011, pp.

87-102). Derkx does not tell us what this moral orientation has

to contain. And thereby, this point is unclear as well: one has

to act according to one’s morals, although which morals, is

unrequited. Furthermore, making one’s life an artwork has its

limits: if you want to make this aspect universal, it has to

have its limits concerning consuming and a description what is

meant by ‘enjoying’, otherwise, only Western people can make an

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artwork of their lives, at the expense of the lives of people

of the global South.

The last aspect states that a human being is not a means

to an end but an end in itself. Whether he thinks that only

humans are ends in themselves and apparently animals and plants

are not, is left out (Derkx, 2011, pp. 102-110).

1.2 Changing the relation of humanism towards nature

Suárez Müller (2014, p. 17) and Manschot (2010, p. 18) state

that the responsibility of the human being has to be expanded

in order to include nature. Manschot poses that humanism, like

every other philosophy of life, has to create a cosmology that

helps us to understand and work towards a solution for the

ecological problems of our time. In Suárez Müller (2014, p. 17)

his alternative humanism, humans have the duty to care for

other beings, because humans are the most responsible beings on

the planet. This new humanism has respect for whatever lives

and contains more duties than rights for humans, because we

also have duties towards animals, plants and natural phenomena,

and, in accordance with Kant, duties come first.

The ecological situation forces us to consider ourselves

as planetary beings, embedded in and dependent on the ecosystem

and the resources of nature (Manschot, 2010, p. 16). If we

broaden the principle of humanist ‘righteousness’ – which

embraces principles like equality, freedom and solidarity – it

becomes something with which justice can be done to non-human

beings. So, the task of humanism is to broaden the idea of

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society beyond the limits of humanity, in order to make humans

responsible for non-human beings (Suárez Müller, 2014, p. 19).

1.3 And thus…

The content of humanism according to Derkx is thus stated

above: every philosophy of life is always contextual work of

man, every human has dignity and we need to treat each other

according to that principle, man needs to actualise his

capabilities and live according to his values and man has to

treat other humans according to the principle that every human

being is an end in itself. The above shows that Derkx does not

define what he means with the claims he does and why these

claims can be made. Therefore, his four aspects become open to

any interpretation: his words can include everything, and as a

result do not contain a meaning in themselves. Furthermore,

nothing is said about nature, animals nor plants, only about

human beings. Derkx tells us before he starts that he will not

talk about nature, although this is of great importance.

Nevertheless, he simultaneously states that the four aspects

discussed above are sufficient for a life philosophy to call it

a ‘humanism’ and that gives the idea that nature, after all, is

not that important to humanism.

From the above follows that the relation of humanism

towards other living beings is a subject-object relation: the

human being is transcendent and nature is seen as ‘milieu’ – it

gives what the human needs – and consequently, other living

beings are means to human ends. Thus, humanism has an

anthropocentric worldview wherein nature is no end in itself. A

clear cosmology which can help us with the current ecological

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problems is missing. Therefore, according to Manschot and

Suárez Müller, humanism has to reconsider the position of the

human being in respect to nature, in order to create a clear

cosmology and broaden the ideas of responsibility and society

so that they include nature. Humanism has to make the human

being a planetary being in order to create an eco-friendly

worldview, from which man can live responsibly towards and in

the name of justice for all living beings on earth.

Chapter 2. The content of Ecosophy

In this chapter we pay attention to the content of ecosophy.

The sub-question is being answered in paragraph 2.5. The names

‘Deep Ecology Movement’, ‘ecosophy’, and ‘Deep Ecology’ address

to the same thing and therefore are used simultaneously.

2.1 The current problem within humanism

According to Næss, our current culture gives us an inaccurate

conception of the self: we think nature and humans are two

separate things, but we are interdependent and interconnected

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with all life (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 133). Paul Shepard

gives us an illustrative explanation of our interdependence,

which stems from a long evolution:

Even society, mind, and culture are a part of that evolution.

There is an essential relationship between them and the natural

habitat: that is, between the emergence of higher primates and

flowering plants, pollinating insects, seeds, humus, and

arboreal life. (...) The fruit’s complex construction and the

mammalian brain are twin offspring of the maturing earth,

impossible, even meaningless, without the deepening soil and

the mutual development of savannas and their faunas in the last

geological epoch (Sessions, 1995, p. 134).

Thus, ecosophy states that we are, in our origin, interrelated

with all life forms. From this, it follows that if we destroy

our environment, we destroy what is in fact our larger self:

one that includes animals and plants (Drengson & Inoue, 1995,

pp. 103, 133). Næss states that, because of the idea of

interconnectedness, ‘our dysfunction is part of our ecosystem,

and it is through us that it is selecting itself out of

existence’ (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 133). He accounts that

our maladaptive worldview has to be restored by healing our

relations ‘to the widest community, that of all living beings’

(Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 27). Currently, we are not changing

our relation with nature fundamentally. We try to fix the

ecological problems from within the existing paradigm. This

attitude towards the ecological crisis is called the small

ecology movement (Næss, 1989, p. 28,40). Næss distinguishes

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between those who see the problems in isolated ways compatible

with mild reform and those who see the problems as holistic,

all in need of a deep change in our lifestyle. Only the latter,

according to Næss, will put our relationships with our

ecosystems on a co-evolving basis and make it possible to solve

the ecological problems (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, pp. 75-76).

Humanism can be seen as small or shallow ecology because

of its anthropocentric bias, its Western lifestyle and view on

nature as milieu. Small or shallow ecology sees nature as a

resource for humans and therefore has an anthropocentric bias

(Ibidem). It is essentially oriented toward the health and

well-being of humans of the developed industrial nations and

uses technology to find solutions for ecological issues

(Ibidem; Næss, 1989, pp. 28, 40).

According to Deep Ecology nature does not belong to

humans, we should only inhabit the lands and use resources to

satisfy our vital needs (Sessions, 1995, pp. 74). It positions

itself against the small ecology movement, whereas Deep Ecology

recognizes the need for a fundamental shift to new paradigms of

human-environmental relationships: a biospheric egalitarianism,

in which all life has intrinsic value and the right to live is

one and the same for all individuals, whatever the species

(Drengson & Inoue, 1995, pp. 75-76; Næss, 1989, pp. 94, 96).

Ecosophy sees anthropocentrism as a cause of the current

ecological crisis, which it sees grounded in Western religion

and has to be repudiated. However, religions like Daoism,

Buddhism and Hinduism, according to ecosophy, provide good

grounds for ecological ethics. Therefore, it does not subscribe

22

supernatural powers to anything, in order to make it suitable

for these different religions (Tyler, 2005, 456).

2.2 Basic principles and ontology

Deep Ecology is emerging as a way of developing a new balance

and harmony between individuals, communities, and all of

nature. It can potentially satisfy our deepest yearnings: faith

and trust in our most basic intuitions, courage to take direct

action, joyous confidence to dance with the rhythms of our own

bodies, the rhythms of flowing water, and the overall processes

of life on Earth.

- Arne Næss (1989, p. 18)

Næss states that Deep Ecology must relate to our fundamental

beliefs, not just to ethics, because ethics follow from how we

experience the world (Næss, 1989, p. 20). This is why Næss

comes with a new ontology, inspired by the conditions of life

in the ecosphere, from where common points, ethics and

practices arise (Næss, 1989, p. 2). Concerning a Deep Ecology

lifestyle, Arne Næss reckons that it is practically impossible

to formulate precise criteria, so he states that supporters of

the Deep Ecology Movement have to try to live in harmony within

what they accept as ecologically relevant guidelines and to

allow more or less inevitable lapses, because complete

consistency does not exist according to Næss. However, he

states that this lifestyle departs from quality of life instead

of standard of living. This lifestyle is simple in means and

rich in ends. Ecosophy states that everyone should live

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according to a universable lifestyle, one that is accessible for

everyone, not only for the global West. By living in accordance

with such a lifestyle, equality becomes feasible (Sessions,

1995, pp. 259-261). Næss states that everyone should make its

own ecosophy: his personal ecosophy is called Ecosophy T and

that of another person could be Ecosophy N or B (Næss, 1989, p.

37). However, he lists 25 characteristic points of Deep Ecology

supporters (summarized in appendix three) (Næss, 1989, p. 88;

Sessions, 1995, p. 259).

Ecosophy sees the ecosystem as a living body: the world

consists of intersecting fields of processes, the organism is a

complexly interrelated whole of processes, with both internal

and external principles of organization (Drengson & Inoue,

1995, p. 87-88). According to Næss, when this ontology is fully

understood, ‘it will no longer be possible for us to injure

nature wantonly, as this would mean injuring an integral part

of ourselves’(Næss, 1989, p. 2).

The ontology of ecosophy contains two basic principles: all things

hang together, which stands for the idea of the interrelatedness

of all life on Earth (Næss, 1989, p. 36). This stems from the

study of ecology: humanity is inseparable from nature.2 Biology

tells us that the transaction is always circular, always a

mutual feedback (Sessions, 1995, p. 131). The second principle

2 It should be noted that interconnectedness does not imply that organisms do not possess a genuine individuality: their functional unity gives an essential ontological distinctness and integrity. But this individuality isstrictly relative – it is itself a function of the particular environment which is capable of sustaining such a self-realizing, self-maintaining system. Organisms are seen as essentially interactive beings, logically incapable of existing independently of other beings (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, pp. 126-127).

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is the unity of life, which represents the thought of the

interdependence of all life (Næss, 1989, p. 167). To this,

ecosophy allocates the value of equality: no single member of a

species has more right to live and unfold itself than any other

member of another species (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 88). The

first maxim that flows out of these principles is each individual

has values in itself, for itself (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 93). The

second maxim is the right of every living thing to live and blossom (Næss,

1989, p. 28, 39-40, 166-167). These two form the ethic of

fulfilling only the vital needs in order not to kill and

destroy living beings for unnecessary reasons: living simple in

means and rich in ends (Næss, 1989, p. 18). The third maxim is

live and let live, which suggests a class-free society in the entire

ecosphere. Deep Ecology states that, if these maxims are

practiced, our society becomes a democracy in which we can

speak of justice for human beings, animals and plants (Næss,

1989, p. 173). However, it acknowledges that in any realistic

praxis there needs to be some killing, exploitation and

suppression to meet our vital needs (Næss, 1989, p. 195). So

the maxim live and let live is bound to this acknowledgement (Ibidem,

pp. 28, 39-40). In order to realize this democracy, it states

that we need an egalitarian attitude towards life on Earth.

This transition opens the doors to a richer and more satisfying

life (Næss, 1989, p. 91). But, the criticism we can give on the

idea of this democracy is that only humans are able to talk and

debate. Therefore, this democracy will still be human-centred.

25

Ethically, what ecosophy does is expanding Kant’s maxim

you shall never use another person only as a means to you shall never use any

living being only as a means (Næss, 1989, p. 174).

In its worldview and lifestyle it says to move from

anthropocentrism to ecocentrism: centring on the ecosphere,

thinking of nature first, before human needs (Næss, 1989, p.

15-16). Against the backdrop of this, Næss states that we will

never understand the ways of other beings, as long as we

approach them only via our own interests. We must be able to

approach them on their own terms, through love and respect.

Every other approach separates us from other beings and narrows

our perspective (Næss, 1989, pp. 150, 165). But can we depart

from a point of view other than our own? At the utmost, we can

use our empathy to imagine what it would be like to be another

being.

Our interrelatedness with all nature creates one great Self,

consisting of plants, animals, ecosystems, bioregions, et

cetera. This is referred to as the ‘ecological self’. We need

to explore this ecological self in order to heal ourselves in

the world. By broadening our idea of Self, and therewith

developing our ecological self, we will feel the

interrelatedness and joyfully defend and interact with that

with which we identify; we will naturally respect, love, honour

and protect that which is our self. According to ecosophy, we

will therefore not be in need of environmental ethics or

obligations (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, pp. 104-106). Ecosophy

tries to be a joyful philosophy of life which, through a new

26

ontology, makes ecologically justified action self-evident, in

contrast with philosophies that activate by self-castigating:

moral exhortation, punishment of eco-criminals and economic

sanctions (Næss, 1989, pp. 91, 176). Only, in reality, duties

and sentences are needed for the days you just do not feel like

helping the little creatures.

Humanism could be accused of maintaining a small

definition of the self, because it does not recognize that it

is interrelated to all other life. Ecosophy calls this the

shallow self, which is self-centred, rootless, alienated from

human community and from wild nature (Drengson & Inoue, 1995,

p. 112). In order to change this minimal self into the deep,

ecosophical self, Self-realization is needed (Ibidem).

2.3 Self-realization

Now it is time to share with all life on our maltreated Earth

through the deepening identification with life forms and the

greater units, the ecosystems, and Gaia, the fabulous, old

planet of ours.

- Arne Næss (1989, pp. 173-174)

Self-realization forms the heart of ecosophy (Drengson & Inoue,

1995, p. 126). It encloses that all living beings are ruled by

the principle of self-realization: self-maintenance and self-

perfection (Næss, 1989, p. 166; Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p.

129). Spinoza defined it as the ‘effort by which each thing

endeavours to persist in its own being’ (Drengson & Inoue,

1995, p. 129). We humans should realize ourselves from our

27

narrow self to the wider and deeper Self, with which we enrich

ourselves (Næss, 1989, p. 86). This process starts by

recognizing our interrelatedness: ‘There is no completely

isolatable I, no isolatable unit. Ecosophy ties together all

life and all nature’ (Næss, 1989, p. 164). We need the process

of identification in order to grow our ‘self’ towards the

‘Self’ (Næss, 1989, p. 56). If we find our self only in our

narrow ego – which humanism does – we separate ourselves from

nature, underestimate our self-potential and, above all, our

ability to move in a self-realizing way (Drengson & Inoue,

1995, p.102). We neglect a part of that which the ‘I’ is built

up of. ‘Its ‘identity’, ‘what the individual I is’, and thereby

sense of self and self-respect, are broken down’ (Næss, 1989,

p. 164). Ecosophy suggests that if we want to exist fully, we

need to see that the vital needs of ecosystems and other

species are our own needs: therefore, there is no conflict of

interest (Næss, 1989, p. 10-11). ‘Our own benefit’ will then

mean ‘that which serves the great Self’, not merely the

individual ego or human societies (Næss, 1989, p. 168). The

greater our comprehension of our togetherness with other

beings, the greater the identification and the greater care we

will take of our environment (Næss, 1989, p. 175).

2.4 The place of humans in the world

Our deep ecological paradigm sees human life at home once more

in a harmonious world. We are not isolated and alone. We are

28

citizens of the world, members of the larger communities of

life.

- Alan Drengson (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 96)

Deep Ecology sees humans as an element of the rest of life. It

says to reject the anthropocentric worldview of the Modern

World.3 However, it ascribes a unique and vital place to the

human being in the natural order, because of its special

capacities among millions of other species: its brain, its

hundreds of original cultures, it is the only species that is

able to consciously limit its number and can perceive and care

for the diversity of its environment. Finally, it is able to

live in community with all other living beings (Drengson &

Inoue, 1995, p. 30; Næss, 1989, pp. 23, 169). The essential

idea of ecosophy is that, because of our special abilities, we

are responsible in our actions as to motivations and premises

relative to any question that can be asked of us (Næss, 1989,

p. 38). Furthermore, this unique place gives us the

responsibility to recruit it for the right ends. Now we use

this for domination and mistreatment, although we should use it

as ‘a premise for a universal care that other species can

3 This anthropocentric worldview came into being through the influences of the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions, Descartes who argued that the newscience would make humans the “masters and possessors of nature” and his mind-body dualism, wherein all the tangible things (including the environment) were disgraceful. This was followed by Renaissance anthropocentric humanism through the philosophies of Erasmus and Montaigne and was later found in the humanistic existentialism of Sartre. According to Sessions (1995, p. 161) the Scientific Revolution that followed ‘also overturned the age-old organic view of the world as a living organism and replaced it with a mechanistic clockwork image of the world as a machine’ (Sessions, 1995, pp. 160-161).

29

neither understand nor afford’ (Næss, 1989, p. 171). Here, we

encounter difficulties: in its worldview, ecosophy poses to

leave anthropocentrism for ecocentrism, while it maintains a

special place for humans in the ecosphere, because of our

special capabilities, and builds an eco-friendly lifestyle upon

the abilities of humans: empathy, consciousness, rationality

and altruism, which appear in its fundamental aspects. Above

all, it delegates us to think of the ecosphere first. However,

this is something only humans are capable of: in nature, every

individual thinks (if it thinks) of his own (family, community

or species) first. Therefore, we can conclude that ecosophy

does not leave anthropocentrism. But, although it maintains the

view that humans are more special than other beings, it states

that we are not more important than other beings, a statement

which pleas for equality. The special characteristics of the

human being have to be recruited to care for other humans and

non-human life. Thus, although ecosophy turns out to be

inaccurate concerning its ecocentrism, it contains a soft form

of anthropocentrism, because it recruits it for ecocentric

ends.

2.5 Critique on ecosophy

Peter Reed, a student of Arne Næss, argues that the basis of

respect for nonhuman nature is to be found in recognizing its

difference from us rather than its identity with us. Thus,

instead of identifying with all nature we should concentrate on

the differences (Katz et al., 2000, p. xvii). According to Eric

30

Katz, the three basic points of ecosophy – identifying with all

nature, Self-realization and its ontology – are in basic

anthropocentric, while Næss states that ecosophy is ecocentric

(Ibidem., p. 17-42). This demonstrates a paradox that we have

already seen validated. Bron Taylor states that Deep Ecology

has to be open to the possibility of anthropocentric arguments

for environmental protection, which it is not because of its

proclamation of ecocentrism. As we have seen, this statement is

open to discussion. However, let us continue with the second

aspect of his critique: ecosophy has to be open to the

possibility that Western religions can be made sustainable.

Currently, ecosophy disqualifies these religions and focuses on

non-Western, indigenous religious traditions as a source for a

new environmental consciousness. Finally, it does not use

political power to enforce environmental policies (Ibidem., p.

269-300).

2.6 Ecosophy is...

In the above, we have seen what Arne Næss’ ecosophy contains.

It can all be brought back to three fundamental aspects:

identification of the individual self with the natural world,

the task of Self-realization and a relational and holistic

ontology. From acknowledging these three aspects, it follows

that we will live in accordance with nature because we identify

with it and therefore, our interest does not differ from that

of nature: caring for nature will become self-evident. This

does not corresponds with humanism, due to an inaccurate

conception of the self, one which does not recognize our

31

interrelatedness and interdependence with all life. Thence,

humanism has to leave its anthropocentrism, alter to a deep

conception of the Self, in order to deal with the ecological

crisis: if it recognizes that the human being is part of the

greater Self, it will act in accordance with nature, because

the needs of man and of nature will no longer differ. However,

from the above follows that ecosophy itself has not left

anthropocentrism, because of the special place it ascribes to

human beings and because it inserts these special capabilities

to practice an ecological friendly lifestyle. Apparently, the

means of ecosophy are anthropocentric, but the ends can be seen

as ecocentric.

Finally, we can state that ecosophy is sometimes too

optimistic, which makes it a less realistic praxis. A further

critical reflection on ecosophy is given in appendix one.

Chapter 3. Is ecosophy of value to present-day humanism?

This is where everything comes together. In this chapter we

take the answers on the already treated questions to answer

sub-question four. First, we compare ecosophy with the four

aspects of Derkx’ humanism, in order to see to which extent

ecosophy can form a humanism, and where the two collide.

Subsequently, we look at to which extent ecosophy offers an

answer to the critique of the humanist thinkers. Finally, we

conclude what the value of ecosophy could be for present-day

humanism.

3.1 Derkx’ humanism and ecosophy

32

Just like the first aspect of Derkx’ humanism advocates,

ecosophy posits that it is an open and tolerant philosophy: it

is designed as to fit to every culture and religion.

Furthermore, ecosophy is contextual work of man. In spite of

this, it does claims on the truth, through the science of

ecology: complexity, diversity and symbiosis. Another claim it

does on the truth is that the current ecological crisis will

end in an apocalypse wherein, due to humans, the whole earth

will be destroyed, while we only know that we are currently

destroying different species, heating the world et cetera. We

do not know how this will end.

Ecosophy is not freed from anthropocentrism. Consequently,

it looks like it is not necessary for humanism to leave its

anthropocentrism, as long as it uses the special capabilities

ascribed to humans to care for nature, like ecosophy

prescribes.

Derkx states that humans have accountability to oneself

and others. In ecosophy this is recruited to the extent of

one’s environment, including both human and non-human beings.

In ecosophy the second aspect of Derkx’ humanism is broadened:

instead of ‘all human beings’ ‘all living beings’ are equal and

deserve dignity. And not just all human beings deserve human

dignity, but all living things have the right to live and

blossom. To make equality possible, everyone should live

according to a universable lifestyle.

33

The third aspect of Derkx’ humanism is taking responsibility

for one’s own life. Ecosophy accentuates this and enlarges it

to responsibility for all life in a human its environment,

instead of only its own life. The statement of humanism derives

from the determination of the small self. Ecosophy stand for

the same statement, although out of the deep, broad Self:

taking responsibility for Life and care for the Self, for

example by retaining diversity.

Derkx states that self-actualization demands a personal

moral orientation. Næss seems to agree because he states that

everyone should make their own ecosophy. Self-actualisation is,

according to humanism, the story of a self, that grows from

this self to a fuller self. This resembles Self-realization of

ecosophy, only here it is not meant to comprehend all the

living beings, just to actualise your individual self. Ecosophy

would say that, to grow from this self to a fuller self, is to

identify one’s self with all life on earth.

The last aspect of Derkx’ humanism includes that a human being

is not a means to an end but an end in oneself. This statement

is broadened in ecosophy to all life as well: every living

being, an elephant as well as a grass haulm is an end in

itself.

3.2 Ecosophy as an answer to the critique from within humanism

Through the claims of the interrelatedness, interdependence and

equality of all life, ecosophy could solve the problems

attached to the anthropocentric worldview and the way in which

34

humanism sees nature. The anthropocentric worldview would not

be rejected, because ecosophy does not discard this as well.

Still, it would become a more egalitarian humanism, in which

the human being cares for nature and thus is seen as a

planetary being. Ecosophy changes the subject-object relation

(subject-milieu relation) of humanism into a subject-subject

relation towards humans and all other living beings. Instead of

a ‘milieu’, one’s surrounding would become a living whole to

which one is bound to survive. Due to the maxims each individual

has value in itself, for itself, every living thing has the right to live and blossom and

live and let live, the idea of society is being broadened to all

living beings.

Furthermore, ecosophy could shape the ontology of humanism

in order to create an eco-friendly worldview: through the

principles all things hang together and the unity of life the ideas of

interconnectedness and interdependence emanate. When fully

respected, it will be logical to maintain an eco-friendly

lifestyle.

Ecosophy does not mention how this transformation should

be practiced. This forms a great hindrance for the profound

switch that, according to several humanist thinkers and

ecosophy, humanism has to make. Although ecosophy states that

action is the most important aspect of a philosophy, it is not

clear what exactly has to be done by, in this case, humanism.

According to ecosophy, humanism has to let go of its

anthropocentrism (as noted above, this statement leads to

discussion), alter to a deep conception of the Self, in order

to deal with the ecological crisis.

35

3.3 Ecosophy could be of value to present-day humanism From the above, we can conclude that ecosophy could be seen as

a humanism, because it meets the four aspects of Derkx’

humanism and it does acknowledge the special capabilities of

the human being. The only difficulty is the broadening of the

last three aspects of humanism to all life or one’s

environment. Because, in his book, Derkx does not talk of

nature, we do not know if this would be a problem. Anyhow, it

does not collide with the four aspects which he does treat in

his book.

Comparing what we know of both the critique on humanism

and of ecosophy, we can conclude that ecosophy could be the

solution to the problems described by humanist thinkers: it has

a clear cosmology, it broadens the responsibility of the human

being and presents it as a planetary being. It recruits a

lesser anthropocentrism for ecological ends by caring for

nature and it broadens the idea of society towards all the

living beings.

This means that ecosophy could be of value to humanism. It

could be an inspiration and it gives room for preferences. We

could even state that ecosophy is of great importance for

humanism, because it gives the input that humanism needs to

make itself meaningful regarding our current crisis.

36

Conclusion

At the beginning of this paper, we started with the question if

ecosophy could be of value to present-day humanism. We saw how

ecosophy interprets the current ecological crisis and that

humanism does not talk of nature or this crisis. That ecosophy

does try to give guidance to a sustainable, ecological

lifestyle, through working out a philosophy. After dealing with

Derkx’ framework of humanism, critique of humanist thinkers on

humanism and viewing Næss’ ecosophy, we are now able to answer

the question of this thesis.

Ecosophy could be of value to present-day humanism because it

does not rebut the four fundamental aspects of Derkx’ humanism

37

and, though it poses to be against anthropocentrism and for

equality of all beings, it maintains a special place in the

ecosphere for humans, because of their special capabilities. We

can thus conclude that the possibility for ecosophy to

contribute to humanism is open. What it could contribute to

humanism is a clear cosmology, because humanism is missing one.

Through its cosmology, the responsibility of humans is being

broadened towards all life and the human being is herein seen

as a planetary being. In its philosophy it makes room for other

life forms through new rights and maxims and it recruits a

lesser anthropocentrism for ecological ends by caring for

nature and it broadens the idea of society towards all living

beings. Like this, ecosophy could be a great inspiration for

humanism to make its philosophy of life more eco-friendly and

create an ontology according to that of ecosophy. It gives

guidance to relate to nature positively in order to solve the

ecological problems.

As we have seen above, criticism on ecosophy is possible.

Humanism could take the above criticism and consider what it

wants to incorporate and what it wants to transform, in order

to create its own ecosophy.

38

Discussion

Interpreting the results

Ecosophy still holds on to anthropocentrism and is therefore

not attached to ecocentrism. This makes a contribution of

ecosophy to humanism a lot easier, because it subscribes a

special place to humans. Also, ecosophy gives a very applicable

answer to the critique of humanist thinkers.

We stated at the beginning of this thesis, that ecosophy

gives us a new idea of how to live one’s life. In this, it

succeeds: live simple in means and rich in ends, practice a

lifestyle that is universable. It advocates that the West should

take several steps back: consume less, live less luxurious.

This creates a more ecological friendly lifestyle and will also

lead to humanization of the global South, through an

advancement in equality.

Humanism could use ecosophy as an inspiration to create

its own ecosophy. With this, it breaks through the silence it

preserved for years, it will solve the problematic relation

between anthropocentric humanism and ecocentrism by using the

special abilities of the human being for ecological ends, it

will create an ontology wherein more than a value of utility

will be ascribed to non-human beings and the core values of

humanism will get a reason to exist through explaining our

relation with nature.

39

Restrictions of this thesis

This research has some restrictions. One is that I have

restricted myself to critique of Dutch humanist thinkers in

order to make this research realizable in the period of time

that is calculated for it. Another restriction is that peer

reviewed articles about Deep Ecology scarcely exist. Critique

on Deep Ecology in general is not easily found. That is why I

found myself restricted to the work of Eric Katz et al.

Consequences and recommended supplementary studies

This thesis shows present-day humanism that it has to solve its

problematic relationship with nature and that it can change

towards ecosophy in order to be of meaning in our current

society and take the lead in making this world a better place

for human and non-human beings.

Compared to other philosophical papers concerning humanism

and its relation with nature, this paper does not only express

critique on humanism, but also forms a feasible solution to

solve the problems it encounters. The conclusion of this thesis

means that humanism has to realize the task of creating its own

ecosophy, in order to solve its gap concerning its relation

with nature.

Supplementary studies have to search for an ecosophy that

fits present-day humanism and make explicit what the needed

action of humanism and its league is, in order to become

ecological friendly and lead society in the same direction.

40

Epilogue: vision on humanism

Questions about the meaning of life and about humanization

where I thought about during this thesis are: ‘to what extend

is our life meaningful if we destroy life in general and if we 41

neglect our bond with nature?’, ‘can we explain humanization

as “making the world a better place” instead of “making the

world more humanlike” in order to include nature in the

philosophy of humanism?’ and ‘is humanism still humanizing the

world or is it actually falling asleep?’. Based on these

questions I created my own vision on humanism, stated below.

Humanism has humanized Western society by secularization of the

state and through making the values autonomy, freedom and being

an end in oneself common ground. Still, it fails to humanize

further than borders of de West: other countries are still

being used for the fulfilment of our ends. In my opinion,

humanism stands for wonderful values, only fails to bring them

in to practice. Furthermore, I think that humanism should

broaden its values towards all living beings. That the values

only go for humans, is extremely limited and maybe even

outdated.

As we have seen above, the starting points for a

meaningful, ecological friendly humanism are already present in

the values of humanism. Therefore, I think, the realization of

this change is achievable. This is why I have the confidence in

a future of humanism, wherein it manifests itself as a

meaningful philosophy of life, one that gives guidance to the

society, concerning a more sustainable lifestyle in which human

as well as non-human beings are both better off.

42

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45

Appendix one: Desperations concerning ecosophy

Ecosophy sees the natural world as harmonious and accuses the

human being that it is molesting this harmony and nature. But,

nature is not harmonious: it is a powerful unity, within which

there is constant devastation and life is subordinated to the

maxim the survival of the fittest. Furthermore, it states that every

being is equal and that the human being should think of planet

first, before it thinks of itself. But, if we look at nature we

see that every living thing is concerned with self-

preservation: it takes care of itself and its family/community

and uses other living beings to do so. Every living thing is

being eaten by a being that is higher in hierarchy.

Against the backdrop of this, we could state that the

human being is currently living in accordance with nature: we

are ruling over the world and do with it as we please, we are

self-preserving, exploiting other living beings in order to

survive. If we look at it this way, it is very unnatural for

the human being to think of nature first, to care for other

species, to counteract population growth and to live simple in

means. This would be an unnatural lifestyle in which the

special capabilities of the human being (the capability to live

aware and to choose your actions) are being used to live a life

which can be practiced only by humans, because a horse will

never consciously take care of the trees, the chickens et

46

cetera. In this sense, ecosophy looks like a very

anthropocentric philosophy.

While following this thought, we could state that humanism

is more realistic than ecosophy: It acknowledges the special

abilities of the human being and recognizes that it views this

being as most important.

To contract the point we made, we could state that – in

the light of evolution – we try to improve ourselves as a

species, and thus ecosophy follows the regularity of nature

after all by improving our way of living to an ecological

friendly one.

For all that, it would be contradictory if humanism did

not concern itself with the ecological crisis, because if we do

not take action to solve the problems, that which humanism

worships – the human being – will disappear. So this should be

enough reason to change humanism into an ecological friendly

philosophy of life, in order to try to lead society through a

change in our lifestyle.

Currently, humanism proves of evasive behavior, because it

worships the human being, but does not look at its flaws:

killing its congener, molesting its surroundings, et cetera.

Appendix two: The Deep Ecology Platform

Deep ecology is a way of rethinking the relationship of

humanity and/in nature that has critical implications for

envisioning ideal societies, preferred ways of life, and the

47

development of practical strategies for approaching these

ideals. This rethinking has three purposes: 1) it can provide a

firm philosophical grounding for activism, 2) it can encourage

decision-makers to connect philosophical and religious

assertion with concrete policy and 3) it can be used to get as

many people as possible to think about themselves and nature in

a new way.

To set a core of values, a platform to guide discussion

and action, eight basic points have been formulated: 1) Life!

The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on

Earth has value in themselves (intrinsic value).These values

are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for

human purposes. This is in its essence a rejection of

anthropocentrism: not only human but also non-human life should

flourish; 2) Nature! The whole nature contains many different

kinds of individuals, species and ecosystems (diversity) in

this diversity things are bound to each other through treads of

symbiosis: the dependence upon interaction with others for

survival. Symbiosis together with diversity frame the

complexity of nature – a vast world of relationships,

connections, and possibilities that show how the many can be

seen as one. ; 3) Human in/and Nature! Humans have no right to

reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital

needs. By this a important distinction is made between “vital”

and other needs; 4) No false distance! The flourishing of non-human

life requires a smaller human population. This implies we have

to decrease the human population. This does not imply

misanthropy. This is needed to provide a decent life to all

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instead of only the West; 5) Outside change! Our current

interference with the non-human world is excessive and the

situation is rapidly worsening; 6) Inside change! Therefore,

policies must be deeply changed. These policies affect basic

economic, technological, and ideological structures; 7) Spread

of ideas! The ideological change would be one that leaves the wish

for a higher standard of living for an appreciation of the

quality of life; 8) Action! Those who support the foregoing

points have an obligation to try to implement the necessary

changes (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, pp. 49-53, 158-159; Næss,

1989, pp. 29-32; Sessions, 1995, pp. 68, 86-89).

Appendix three: Deep Ecology and Lifestyle

Arne Næss lists twenty-four points that concern a lifestyle

which correlates with Deep Ecology. In this appendix I will

present them to you summarized:

1. Use of simple means.

2. Propensity to prefer activities most directly serving

values in themselves and having intrinsic value.

3. Anticonsumerism , minimalization of personal property.

4. Maintain and increase the sensitivity and appreciation for

goods of which there is enough for all to enjoy.

5. Cherishing old and well-word things instead of a love for

something new merely because it is new.

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6. Resting in situations of intrinsic value and act instead

of being busy.

7. Appreciation for ethnic and cultural diversity.

8. Avoid a standard of living which is higher than needed and

concern about the situation in Third and Fourth Worlds.

9. Appreciation of lifestyles which are universalizable.

10. The want for experiences which are deep and rich

rather than intense.

11. Choosing, if possible, meaningful work in stead of

just making a living.

12. Leading a complex life; trying to realize as many

aspects of positive experience as possible within each

time-interval.

13. Cultivating life in community instead of in society.

14. Appreciation of, or participating in, primary

production: small-scale agriculture, forestry, fishing.

15. Satisfying vital needs instead of desires.

16. Avoiding tourism, attempting to live in nature.

17. When in vulnerable nature, living “light and

traceless”.

18. Tendency to appreciate all life forms, not merely

those considered beautiful, remarkable, or narrowly

usefull.

19. Never use life forms merely as a means. Even when

using them as recourses, remain conscious of their

intrinsic value and dignity.

20. When there is a conflict between the interests of

pets and wild species, a tendency to protect the latter.

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21. Effort to protect local ecosystems, feeling one’s own

community as a part of ecosystems.

22. Deploring excessive interference in nature as

unnecessary, unreasonable, disrespectful, outrageous and

criminal – without condemning the people responsible for

the interference.

23. Try to act resolutely and without cowardice in

conflicts, but to remain non-violent in word and deeds.

24. Participate in or support of non-violent direct

action when other ways of action fail.

25. Vegetarianism, total or partial (Sessions, 1995, pp.

259-261).

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