Dualism, Incentives and the Demandsof Rawlsian Justice

COLIN FARRELLY University of Waterloo

I. Introduction

In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy ~1999! makesa distinction between two approaches to normative political theory. Helabels these two positions “dualism” and “monism.” The former main-tains that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personalconduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practicalprinciple” ~1999: 254!. The most influential proponent of dualism is JohnRawls. In A Theory of Justice Rawls defends his theory of “justice as fair-ness,” which recognizes a division of responsibility between the princi-ples that apply to the main social, economic and political institutions ofsociety, and the principles that apply to individuals. Institutions are to bearranged so that citizens’ basic rights and liberties are protected and socialand economic inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least advan-taged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditionsof fair equality of opportunity. The principles that apply to individualsinclude various principles of natural duty, as well as the principle of fair-ness. These principles impose on citizens a diverse array of duties and obli-gations, such as the duties of mutual respect and mutual aid.

In contrast to the division of labour approach of Rawlsian justice,monism rejects the idea that “there could be a plausible fundamental nor-mative principle for the evaluation of legal and other institutions that doesnot apply in the realm of personal conduct” ~Murphy, 1999: 254!. Murphyincludes himself, G.A. Cohen and utilitarians among the proponents ofmonism. What Murphy and Cohen reject is the kind of principle Rawlscharacterizes the difference principle as—one that only applies to insti-

Acknowledgments: For their comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grate-ful to Matthew Clayton, Jerry Cohen, Liam Murphy, Thomas Pogge and two anony-mous referees for this JOURNAL.

Colin Farrelly, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,Ontario, N2L 3G1; farrelly@uwaterloo.ca.

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique38:3 (September/septembre 2005) 675–695

© 2005 Canadian Political Science Association ~l’Association canadienne de science politique!and0et la Société québécoise de science politique

tutions.1 Murphy argues that “any plausible overall political0moral viewmust, at the fundamental level, evaluate the justice of institutions withnormative principles that also apply to people’s choices” ~1999: 253!. InIf You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?, Cohen makes asimilar argument in developing the egalitarian critique of Rawlsian jus-tice he put forth in a series of earlier articles. According to Cohen, prin-ciples of distributive justice, regardless of their other attributes, apply topeople’s legally unconstrained choices.

In chapter 2 of A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the obviousstarting point for a theory of distributive justice is equality of primarygoods. Such a starting point is a benchmark from which we are to judgeother ~unequal! distributive arrangements:

Imagine, then, a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the social pri-mary goods are equally distributed: everyone has similar rights and duties,and income and wealth are evenly shared. This state of affairs provides a bench-mark for judging improvements. If certain inequalities of wealth and organi-zational powers would make everyone better off than in this hypothetical startingsituation, then they accord with the general conception. ~Rawls, 1971: 62!

This is the Pareto argument for inequality. Movement away from thebenchmark of equality is justifiable so long as everyone benefits from it.But how could a movement away from equality benefit everyone? Herewe come to the issue of incentives. By offering the promise of a higherpost-tax income to the talented2 members of society, we can entice themto be more productive than they would be otherwise. If their higher levelof productivity brings benefits to everyone, then there is no reason toinsist on the initial equal division. The underlying intuition behind egal-itarianism is, for Rawls, concern for the least advantaged in society. Whyobject to a move away from equality if everyone, including the least advan-taged, benefits? Rawls believes that there is no reasonable reply to thisquestion. The difference principle combines considerations of equalitywith those of efficiency.

For Cohen, the key issue is the role economic incentives play inRawls’s apparently egalitarian defence of inequality. Why would the tal-ented members of an equal society need more goods in order to be moreproductive? Once we begin to delve deeper into this question, we seethat such individuals do not share a commitment to the fraternal ethosthat Rawls claims informs the difference principle—namely, a concernfor the least advantaged members of society. According to Cohen, “Thedifference principle can be used to justify paying incentives that induceinequalities only when the attitude of talented people runs counter to thespirit of the difference principle itself: they would not need special incen-tives if they were themselves unambivalently committed to the princi-ple” ~1992: 268–9!.

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In “Incentives, Inequality, and Community,” Cohen points out thepractical importance of his dispute with Rawls by using a policy debateto illustrate the deficiencies of Rawls’s dualistic framework. In March of1988 Nigel Lawson, who was then Margaret Thatcher’s chancellor of theexchequer, brought the top rate of income tax in Britain down from 60 to40 per cent. Many distinct justifications were put forth in defence of thistax cut. The most politically effective justification of the unequalizingpolicy of Thatcher Conservatism, claims Cohen, was consistent with therationality of Rawls’s defence of inequality-generating incentives—namely,that such tax cuts would benefit everyone, including the least advan-taged, because higher levels of post-tax incomes cause people to be moreproductive than they would be otherwise. While Rawlsians may disputethe factual claims at stake in Thatcher’s tax cut they cannot, argues Cohen,object in principle to such a move.

The central concern that motivates the criticisms Murphy and Cohenraise against Rawls’s dualism is the ~alleged! generous allowance it per-mits for self-seeking choices. A central hope behind all the argumentsfor dualism, claims Murphy, “seems to be that it will help with a funda-mental problem faced by, specifically, egalitarian theories of justice: theproblem of the unreasonable demands such theories of justice may poten-tially impose on some people” ~1999: 255!. But monists like Murphyand Cohen charge that dualism takes things too far in the opposite direc-tion, and ends up imposing very few demands on citizens. The demandsof Rawlsian justice appear to require little more than complying withjust institutions and fulfilling what Murphy calls “special choices,” suchas voting for those political parties that are most likely to secure therequirements of the two principles of justice.3

Abstract. In normative political theory, the position called dualism maintains that the twopractical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level,two different kinds of practical principle. The most influential proponent of dualism is JohnRawls, and his theory of “justice as fairness” has recently been criticized by the monists LiamMurphy and G.A. Cohen. In this paper I argue that if Rawlsians are going to salvage his dual-istic framework from the challenge raised by Murphy and Cohen, they will have to reject Rawls’s“political conception” of justice in favour of the partially comprehensive view defended in ATheory of Justice. I contend that dualism is only a viable approach to normative political theoryif both aspects of the dualistic framework are emphasized.

Résumé. Dans la théorie politique normative la position du « dualisme » maintient que, sur leplan pratique, les deux problèmes primordiaux de la conception institutionnelle et de la con-duite personnelle, nécessitent, au niveau fondamental, deux types différents de principe pra-tique. L’adepte le plus influent du dualisme est John Rawls dont la théorie de « la justice commeéquité » a été critiquée récemment par les monistes Liam Murphy et G.A. Cohen. Dans cetarticle, je maintiens que si les partisans de Rawls comptent sauver son schéma dualiste du défilancé par Murphy et Cohen, il va falloir qu’ils rejettent la conception politique de la justice deRawls en faveur de la position partiellement compréhensive défendue dans « Une théorie de lajustice ». De plus, je maintiens que le dualisme est une approche viable en théorie politiquenormative uniquement si les deux aspects du schéma dualiste sont mis en valeur.

The question raised in the title of Cohen’s book—How come you’reso rich?—challenges egalitarians who opt for Rawls’s dualism. If one iscommitted to equality then how can one reconcile this with the fact thatone possesses an unequal share of society’s resources? Cohen argues thatit is not enough to say that you fulfilled the special choices required byRawls’s dualism. The fact that you voted for the most egalitarian politi-cal party does not entitle you to keep the unequal rewards you receivewhen that party fails to secure political office or does not effectivelyimplement its promised egalitarian agenda. The demands of distributivejustice apply to our day-to-day choices.

In this paper I shall argue that if Rawlsians are going to salvage hisdualistic framework from the challenge raised by Murphy and Cohen—and I argue that there are good reasons for wanting to do this—they willhave to reject Rawls’s “political conception” of justice in favour of thepartially comprehensive view defended in A Theory of Justice. Politicalliberalism presents, claims Rawls, a “political conception of justice forthe main institutions of political and social life, not for the whole of life”~1993: 175!. But Rawls’s dualism is only viable if one assumes, as hedoes in A Theory of Justice, that a complete theory of justice will takeaccount of the principles that apply to individuals. This insight was cen-tral to Rawls’s original project in A Theory of Justice; the second taskgiven to the parties in the original position was to choose principles thatapplied to them as individuals. In this paper I bring this aspect of Rawls’stheory to the fore and argue that dualism is only a viable approach tonormative political theory if both aspects of the dualistic framework ~i.e.,the principles that apply to institutions and the principles that apply toindividuals! are emphasized. Furthermore, I maintain that the emphasison the duties that apply to individuals does not compromise the liberalcommitment to pluralism. Endorsing strong conclusions about the require-ments of justice does not mean that a theory is perfectionist. Rather, itindicates that a theory has taken seriously both the realities of existingunjust social structures and the vulnerability of human beings.

II. Why Opt For Dualism?

Rawls does not actually put forth explicit answers to the question of whyhe opts for dualism, but two answers are implicit in his work. The firstanswer is that dualism helps clarify what demands it is reasonable toexpect of individuals in their different capacities, be it as governmentofficials or as citizens. This answer is central to A Theory of Justice. Asecond answer, which has become more central to Rawls’s later work, isthat the division of responsibility approach makes possible the condi-tions for consensus. Instead of opting for dualism as a way of helping to

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clarify what the distinct demands of justice are on us as individuals, Rawlsnow conceives of justice as fairness as being dualistic in the sense thatit endorses principles that only apply to institutions; thus, it adopts arestrained posture towards questions concerning how individuals are tolive their daily lives. Let me expand on these two different justificationsfor dualism before I critically assess them.

The first justification for dualism concerns a problem that faces allegalitarian theories of justice—the dilemma of the unreasonable demandssuch theories may potentially impose on some people. The failure ofmonism ~especially utilitarianism! to adequately resolve this problem isone of the main objections levied against it as moral theory. Bernard Wil-liams ~1973! and other critics see utilitarianism as enslaving us to thepursuit of general happiness. The onerousness of monistic theories likeutilitarianism contradict our conviction that morality should respect theimportance that our projects have for our lives by permitting us to pur-sue at least our most central projects free from the imperative to promoteoverall utility. As Samuel Scheffler argues, any plausible moral theorymust “allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater weightto his own interests than to the interests of other people” ~1994: 20!.

While A Theory of Justice is primarily concerned with a second majorshortcoming of utilitarianism, its failure to take seriously the separate-ness of persons, Rawls also aims to ensure that the demands of justice asfairness are not “all-controlling.” This imperative provides the central ratio-nale behind his dualistic approach. Rawls claims:

It may be thought that once the principles of justice are given precedence,then there is a dominant end that organizes our life after all. Yet this idea isbased on a misunderstanding. To be sure the principles of justice are lexicallyprior to that of efficiency, and the first principle has precedence over the sec-ond. It follows that an ideal conception of the social order is set up which is toregulate the direction of change and the efforts to reform. But it is the princi-ples of individual duty and obligation that define the claim of this ideal uponpersons and these do not make it all controlling. ~1971: 565!

This passage is important for a number of reasons. It makes clearthe role played by the second component of Rawls’s dualism—that is, todefine the claims that the ideal conception of the social order imposesupon persons and to ensure that these claims are not “all-controlling.”The parties in the original position must first choose the principles thatapply to institutions, since these determine, to a large extent, the naturalduties and obligations of individuals. For the purposes of this paper Ishall limit my discussion to Rawls’s account of the natural duties of jus-tice and thus ignore his discussion of obligations. Natural duties, arguesRawls, apply to individuals, without regard to our voluntary acts. Theyinclude both positive duties: to uphold justice, the duty of mutual respect

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and the duty of mutual aid; and negative duties: not to injure and not toharm the innocent. These are, claims Rawls, the principles for individu-als that would be chosen in the original position, and are paramount forhis dualism. The principles of natural duty and obligation “are an essen-tial part of a conception of right: they define our institutional ties andhow we become bound to one another. The conception of justice as fair-ness is incomplete until these principles have been accounted for” ~Rawls,1971: 333!.

The extent to which these diverse duties help clarify what demandsjustice imposes on us as individuals will be addressed in sections III andIV. But let me briefly mention some of the objections that have beenraised against the proposal, put forth by monists, that the difference prin-ciple should also apply to the personal choices people make about careerand spending. Such a proposal fails Rawls’s stipulation that the demandsof justice should not be all-controlling. As Andrew Williams ~1998:235–6! points out, Cohen’s suggestion would lead to an expansive ethosthat would govern career choice as well as wage negotiation. Applied toour daily choices, the difference principle would require us to take upjobs that would best benefit those least advantaged. Such a stringent dutyviolates the priority that a moral theory should attribute to the value ofautonomy. Further complications for the Cohen proposal are raised byDavid Estlund ~1998!. If Cohen is willing to accept a prerogative thatlimits the claims of justice, allowing some room for the pursuit of self-interest, he ought to recognize a range of related prerogatives, such asthe pursuit of the interests of one’s family, loved ones and friends. If, asI shall argue below, Rawls’s dualism accommodates these types of con-cerns, this issue certainly offers much evidence in favour of endorsingdualism over monism.

The Concern for Stability

Before defending Rawls’s dualism I want to consider a second justifica-tion for dualism. This second justification is implicit in Rawls’s later writ-ings and is not premised on the concern for ensuring that the demands ofjustice are reasonable. Instead, it is primarily concerned with stability. Ajust democratic society must be stable. It must be able to exist over timeand to secure the support of citizens who remain profoundly divided byreasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. Rawls now claimsthat the theory presented in A Theory of Justice violated this require-ment. It required citizens to hold the same comprehensive doctrine4 andthis included aspects of Kant’s comprehensive liberalism. I will not pur-sue here the details of Rawls’s shift to a political conception of justice.The important point for my purposes is that his political conception of

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justice rules out the natural duties justice as fairness imposes on citizens,since these duties constitute at least a partially comprehensive doctrine.

By making justice as fairness “political,” Rawls has undermined theviability of his dualistic theory. The principles that apply to individualshave all but disappeared from Rawls’s writings. The extent to whichRawls’s political conception fails to commit itself to the formative aspi-ration of his original theory is most evident by the former’s inability toimpose duties beyond the “special choices” criticized as insufficient byMurphy and Cohen. For example, Rawls ~1993, 1997! claims citizensshould vote in accordance with public reason when fundamental ques-tions are at stake ~for example, constitutional essentials!.5 However,Rawls’s liberalism no longer concerns itself with the formative questionsthat were central to A Theory of Justice. Consider the following passagefrom Political Liberalism:

@W#hen may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive politicalpower over one another when fundamental questions are at stake? Or in thelight of what principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our doingso is to be justifiable to others as free and equal? To this question politicalliberalism replies: our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifi-able only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentialsof which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light ofprinciples and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. ~Rawls,1993: 217!

The important question that political liberalism does not, and cannot,address is this: What duties must citizens fulfil when they live in a soci-ety where political power is not publicly justified? A society, for exam-ple, where extensive unjustified socio-economic inequalities exist. Bymaking justice as fairness a strictly “political conception,” Rawls hasundermined the theory’s applicability at the level of non-ideal theory.Recall that Rawls ~1993: 175! claims that a political conception of jus-tice is a conception for the main institutions of political and social life,not for the whole of life. But how do we come to have just institutions inthe first place? And how do we ensure that such institutions will con-tinue to persist? The strategy of dualism, as envisioned by Rawls in ATheory of Justice, recognizes that fulfilling the principles that apply toindividuals is vital for creating and maintaining a just society. But byleaving the issue of the principles that apply to individuals open, the laterRawls defends an incomplete theory of justice.

If Rawls’s dualism is to be defended one must ground it in the firstconcern noted above: that of making fair demands on citizens. This can-not be accomplished by a theory that adopts a restrained posture towardsquestions of how we are to live our daily lives. The primary concern fornormative theorists ought to be the stability of a just society and not

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stability in general. The later Rawls, with his emphasis on a politicalconception, conflates the concern for the stability of a just society withstability in general. Furthermore, the version of dualism endorsed by theearlier Rawls can actually be defended against the later Rawls. The ver-sion of dualism outlined in A Theory of Justice is not premised on a per-fectionist theory that violates reasonable pluralism. Rawls ~1971: 25!defines perfectionism as the view that we should maximize human excel-lence. The demands of upholding justice, mutual respect and mutual aidare not demands that are premised on a concern to maximize human excel-lence. Rather, such demands are entailed by the desire to treat others asfree and equal persons.

Contrary to what the later Rawls and communitarians like MichaelSandel ~1996, 1998! maintain, the main justification put forth in defenceof “justice as fairness” in A Theory of Justice is not premised on Kantianmetaphysics. What legitimizes the principles chosen in the original posi-tion is the fact that no one could reasonably reject them, not that theycohere with the Kantian requirement that we express our freedom fromcontingency and happenstance. In the concluding paragraph of A Theoryof Justice, for example, Rawls asks why citizens should accept the prin-ciples chosen in the original position:

@W#hy should we take any interest in @the original position# , moral or other-wise? Recall the answer: the conditions embodied in the description of thissituation are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then we can bepersuaded to do so by the philosophical considerations of the sort occasionallyintroduced. Each aspect of the original position can be given a supporting expla-nation. Thus what we are doing is to combine into one conception the totalityof conditions that we are ready upon due reflection do recognize as reasonablein our conduct with regard to one another. ~1971: 587!

This passage is telling in that Rawls does not try to justify his theoryby appealing to Kantian metaphysics. Rather, he appeals to the moralconsiderations—such as impartiality and fairness—embodied in the orig-inal position, which he believes diverse reasonable persons also accept.Therefore, dualism does not compromise the concern for respecting plu-ralism, such respect is necessary if the demands of justice are to bereasonable.

Why, one might then ask, do many of Rawls’s critics, and indeed thelater Rawls himself, believe that his earlier theory was premised on Kant-ian metaphysics? This belief stems from the fact that there are actuallythree distinct justifications of the principles of justice in A Theory ofJustice. Allen Buchanan ~1982! labels these three justifications the prin-ciples matching justification, the conditions matching argument and theKantian interpretation. The first two justifications are based on appealsto considered moral judgements and the third on distinctively Kantian

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grounds. It is Rawls’s invocation of this third justification that motivateshim to revise his original theory. But the Kantian interpretation onlyreceives a brief discussion in chapter IX of A Theory of Justice, whenRawls addresses the issue of congruence. The conditions matching argu-ment is much more central to Rawls’s theory. It captures the idea of pureprocedural justice,6 the central idea upon which the original position ispremised. The conditions matching argument does not violate pluralismand thus it could be the focus of an overlapping consensus among rea-sonable persons.

III. The Duties in Non-Ideal Theory

Having provided some background to the issue of why one should optfor dualism, I now consider Rawls’s discussion of the principles that applyto individuals in the hope of showing that Cohen’s objections can be over-come by the version of dualism proposed in Rawls’s earlier work. Indefending his view of distributive justice Cohen invokes the slogan “thepersonal is political.” The just society, for Cohen, is one governed by asocial ethos in which citizens adhere to the principles of justice in theirdaily lives. The principles of justice do not just apply to the basic structure.

The charge that Rawlsian justice permits unjust choices within legallycoercive structures cannot be established by looking only at the require-ments of the difference principle, since it is not designed to apply to thechoices people make in their daily lives. In order to determine what Rawls-ian justice requires of us as individuals we must consider the require-ments of the principles that apply to individuals. I shall focus on thethree positive natural duties of justice: the duty to uphold justice, theduty of mutual respect and the duty of mutual aid.

The Duty to Uphold Justice

The duty to uphold justice has two parts. First, we are to support and tocomply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. Second, we areto assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist,at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves. In order toassess what the specific requirements of this duty are, we need to distin-guish between ideal and non-ideal theory. In a society where the require-ments of the two principles of justice are satisfied, the duty to upholdjustice requires little of individuals besides complying with and support-ing these institutions. But if we turn to non-ideal theory, and considerreal societies that fail to fulfil the requirements of the two principles ofjustice, especially the difference principle, the story gets much more com-plicated. The more unjust the social structure is the greater the demandsof the principles that apply to individuals.

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Citizens of an unjust society are to assist in the establishment ofjust institutions, at least when this can be done with little cost to them-selves. Unfortunately, Rawls ~1971: 565! does not expand on this point,but what he does make explicit is that the principles of individual dutyand obligation do not make the demands of justice all-controlling. How-ever, individuals do have to do their part in helping to establish just insti-tutions. A determination of exactly what this entails requires one toconsider the details of a particular society, how unjust it is, and the rea-sons for these inequalities. The greater the level of unjustness and inequal-ity, the greater the requirements of this duty—and, in particular, the greaterthe demands on those individuals who profit from the unjust institu-tional arrangement.

Do the self-seeking high fliers Cohen condemns do their part in ful-filling the requirements of the duty to uphold justice? Are, for example,the talented individuals who demanded the rate of income tax be reducedfrom 60 to 40 per cent doing their part in helping to bring about justinstitutions? A complete reply to these questions would require a detailedanalysis of the socio-economic inequalities in Britain. Cohen presentsthe Thatcher tax cut as if it is an example that applies at the level ofideal theory for Rawls. That is, the tax cut is just if it results in thosewho are socio-economically disadvantaged being as well off as is possi-ble under the circumstances. But the assumption that Thatcher’s tax cutfulfils this requirement neglects the important role institutional factorsplay in perpetuating existing unjust inequalities.7 In order for the Thatchertax cut to apply at the level of ideal theory, all inequalities in Britainwould have to be caused by concerns relating to efficiency, not to men-tion that the requirements of fair equality of opportunity would also haveto be satisfied. But neither of these requirements are met in real capital-ist societies like Britain or America. Some inequalities may be tracedback to the incentive argument Rawls makes, but most stem from otherfactors ruled out by the second principle of justice, for example, factorslike unequal opportunities for education, gender inequalities, and unjustinheritance laws. The question for Rawlsians is this: Is it just for individ-uals to be acquisitive maximizers in their daily lives when the institu-tions of their society are unjust? I shall argue that the answer to thisquestion is no and that there are many distinct grounds on which thisnegative answer could be developed.

Assuming unjust inequalities exist in Britain, then citizens and gov-ernment officials have a duty to help remedy such injustices. This dutystems from Rawls’s natural duty to uphold justice. Any major restructur-ing of public institutions is going to require a substantial amount of rev-enue, which can be raised by three means: by decreasing governmentspending, by borrowing money or by raising revenue through taxation.Assuming that substantial reductions in government spending and

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increases in federal debt will, by themselves, be harmful rather than ben-eficial to important social programmes such as health care or education,raising revenue through taxation is likely to be a necessary measure inany serious effort to remedy the substantial injustices that exist in thecurrent social structure of capitalist societies. By demanding lower ratesof income tax, the talented individuals Thatcher’s tax cut sought to appeasewere in fact exacerbating existing injustices. What the duty to upholdjustice requires of such individuals, at a minimum, is that they supportgovernment initiatives that seek to remedy the injustices of the socialstructure. This entails that they vote for political parties that come clos-est to meeting the requirements of the second principle of justice.

Cohen will reply that this posits incompatible motivations: it requirescitizens to be conscientious when acting in the political realm but per-mits them to be acquisitive maximizers in their daily lives. So even if thetalented individuals that Thatcher’s tax cut sought to appease voted againstthe Conservative government they are, according to my argument, mor-ally permitted to reap the benefits of this tax cut. This point cuts to theheart of Cohen’s main argument in If You’re An Egalitarian. How canaffluent people who claim to be “egalitarian” reconcile their commit-ment to this belief with the fact that they are much better off than othersin their society? Replying that you voted for the Labour party is not suf-ficient. Justice, for Cohen, requires more than merely voting for the mostegalitarian political party.

However, the duty to uphold justice is just one of the three positivenatural duties of justice we must fulfil. I have argued that, at a mini-mum, the duty to uphold justice requires individuals to vote in accor-dance with the demands of the second principle of justice. One may beable to extract more from this duty, but rather than pursue such a strat-egy I shall turn to the duties of mutual respect and mutual aid, which arebetter suited for addressing Cohen’s concerns and are important aspectsof Rawls’s dualistic framework. Let us first consider the demands ofmutual respect in non-ideal theory.

Mutual Respect

Not only do citizens have a duty to uphold justice, they must also show“a person the respect which is due to him as a moral being, that is, as abeing with a sense of justice and a conception of the good” ~Rawls, 1971:337!. This mutual respect for others can be expressed in different ways—for example, when we are willing to see the situation of others from theirpoint of view, or when we are prepared to give reasons for our actionswhenever the interests of others are materially affected. The parties inthe original position would choose this duty because it is essential forthe most important primary good, that of self-respect:

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Now the reason why this duty would be acknowledged is that although theparties in the original position take no interest in each other’s interests, theyknow that in society they need to be assured by the esteem of their associates.Their self-respect and their confidence in the value of their own system ofends cannot withstand the indifference much less the contempt of others. Every-one benefits then from living in a society where the duty of mutual respect ishonored. The cost to self-interest is minor in comparison with the support forthe sense of one’s own worth. ~Rawls, 1971: 338!

I believe it is the duty of mutual respect that will impose the moststringent requirements on affluent individuals who have profited froman unjust social structure. I shall now argue that this duty requires morethan simply justifying our voting behaviour. But it is important to bearin mind that Rawls does not believe that the requirements of any of theprinciples for individuals will be all-controlling. Between the extremesof permitting individuals to be egoists and requiring them to be saintsthere is plenty of ground for reconciling the different demands of Rawls-ian justice.

Like the duty to uphold justice, one cannot determine how stringentthe requirements of the duty of mutual respect are without knowing someimportant details of the cooperative enterprise in question. It is impor-tant to distinguish between the ideal Rawlsian just society, where the basicstructure fairly distributes social primary goods, and non-ideal societies,which can fail, in varying degrees, to fulfil the requirements of the twoprinciples of justice. Let us focus on non-ideal theory, for that is reallywhere the force of Cohen’s Thatcher tax cut objection comes from. Recallthat Cohen could object to the argument developed above by claimingthat justice requires more than merely voting for egalitarian political par-ties. I will now suggest that the duty of mutual respect does in fact imposequite stringent requirements on citizens, particularly on those individu-als Cohen wants to criticize ~namely, the rich!.

The duty of mutual respect is not necessarily fulfilled by simply com-plying with the institutions of our society or even by voting for politicalparties that seek to promote justice. Consider, for example, a democraticsociety that enacted a policy resulting in a gross violation of fair equal-ity of opportunity. Let us say that the policy in question excluded mem-bers of a particular ethnic group from holding certain occupations.Members of this particular ethnic group were no longer permitted tooccupy positions deemed “influential” by this new racist, democraticallyelected government. All politicians, lawyers, judges, doctors, universityprofessors and such who belonged to this ethnic group were dismissedfrom their positions and a nation-wide job search was conducted to hiresuitably qualified candidates to fill these vacancies.

Such a blatant violation of the requirements of fair equality of oppor-tunity would impose on citizens a range of obligations to act. For exam-

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ple, Rawls ~1971: 363–391! claims that serious infringements on the firstprinciple of justice and blatant violations of fair equality of opportunitydo warrant grounds for civil disobedience in certain circumstances. Butlet us consider the duty of mutual respect. Let us suppose that I am not amember of the ethnic group that has now been systematically discrimi-nated against. Furthermore, I actually opposed the racist government thatbrought in the unjust policy. I have even taken part in public demonstra-tions protesting the injustices of the new policies in the hopes of gettingthem overturned. All of these actions would suggest that I do strive tofulfil the duty of mutual respect. I am willing to see the situation of oth-ers from their point of view and thus I can relate to their pleas of injus-tice and these pleas compel me to take action to help remedy the situation.

Even though I reject the legitimacy of the policies invoked by thenew racist government, it turns out that I actually stand to personallybenefit from the policy. As a result of dismissing a number of academicsin my field ~because of their ethnicity! there are now numerous job oppor-tunities that would otherwise not be available. In fact, a dismissal hastaken place in the institution I have always wanted to work for. The chairof that department has already approached me about applying for theprestigious appointment. I now have to decide if I should pursue thisnew opportunity that has arisen as a result of the unjust policy. DoesRawlsian justice permit me to pursue my self-interest in this instance,provided I continue to be politically involved in trying to have the racistpolicy abolished? If so, then Cohen’s charge that the Rawlsian projectposits contradictory motivations would be correct. But the duty of mutualrespect in this instance is very demanding and a decision to apply forand0or accept the appointment created by such a racist policy would be aviolation of mutual respect. Recall that this duty requires us to be pre-pared to give reasons for our actions whenever the interests of others arematerially affected. Any reason that appeals to my own personal gains insuch a scenario will fail this test.8 A decision to accept the new appoint-ment will have an impact on the material ~and non-material! interests ofthe minority group in question. Such an action will impede the efforts tohave the policy overturned. I do not show respect for others when I reapthe benefits of a policy that treats them unfairly. The greater the injusticeof existing policies, the greater the requirements imposed on us by theduty of mutual respect.

This example illustrates the different ways the duty of mutual respectcan be violated. One could apply this example in a similar way to theaffluent individuals that Cohen wishes to condemn. Assuming that theseaffluent individuals have acquired their wealth in a social structure thatdoes not satisfy the second principle of justice, one can claim that suchindividuals do not fulfil all of the requirements of Rawlsian justice. Likethe case of taking up the academic appointment in a racist society, the

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talented egalitarian who reaps the rewards of an unjust tax regime failsto provide compelling reasons for her action. The fact that she does notpolitically endorse the unjust social structure does not exempt her fromthe requirements of this duty. She must provide reasons for keeping herunjust entitlements. These must be reasons the least advantaged couldreasonably accept. The richer an individual is, and the more precariousthe situation of the least advantaged, the smaller the scope for appeals toyour own self-interest. A commitment to mutual respect does require ~atleast! the affluent members of society to voluntarily tax themselves whenexisting inequalities violate the requirements of the two principles of jus-tice.9 The duty of mutual respect does not settle in advance how exten-sive such a levy should be. But by requiring citizens, in particular theaffluent, to be prepared to give reasons for their actions whenever theinterests of others are materially affected, the duty of mutual respect seeksto find a reasonable balance between self-interest and a concern for theleast advantaged.

Mutual Aid

Let us now briefly consider the third and final positive natural duty of jus-tice, that of mutual aid. Like the other two natural duties I have alreadydiscussed, a determination of the requirements of mutual aid requires usto consider the extent to which our society is unjust and our position inthis unjust institutional arrangement. If certain conditions are met this dutycan be rather demanding, in particular on the affluent members of an unjustsocial structure. This, coupled with the arguments I have put forth con-cerning the duty to uphold justice and the duty of mutual respect, furtherundermines Cohen’s interpretation of the requirements of Rawlsian justice.

The duty of mutual aid imposes on citizens “a duty of helping anotherwhen he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without exces-sive risk or loss to oneself ” ~Rawls, 1971: 114!. There are many distinctarguments for including this duty in an account of justice. Kant ~1964!,for example, argues that the ground for proposing this duty is that situ-ations may arise in which we will need the help of others. But this is not,for Rawls, the most important ground for adopting the duty of mutualaid. The most important reason for adopting this duty is its pervasiveeffect on the quality of everyday life:

The public knowledge that we are living in a society in which we can dependupon others to come to our assistance in difficult circumstances is itself ofgreat value. It makes little difference that we never, as things turn out, needthis assistance and that occasionally we are called on to give it.... The primaryvalue of the principle is not measured by the help we actually receive but ratherby the sense of confidence and trust in other men’s good intentions and theknowledge that they are there if we need them. Indeed, it is only necessary to

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imagine what a society would be like if it were publicly known that his dutywas rejected. ~Rawls, 1971: 339!

The duty of mutual aid can be utilized to buttress the arguments Ihave presented with respect to the duties to uphold justice and mutualrespect. I also think it is important to once again emphasize that a deter-mination of the requirements of this duty must distinguish between thedemands it makes in ideal and non-ideal theory. Certain requirements ofthis duty will apply equally in both just and unjust societies. For exam-ple, climbers have a duty to help one another and to offer their consid-ered opinion in urgent circumstances ~Rawls, 1971: 406!. The fact thatthe climbers live in a society which fulfils or fails to fulfil the require-ments of the difference principle will not have an impact on this duty.However, Rawls’s use of this example is telling, in particular his stresson the duty’s emphasis on “urgent circumstances.” The greater the jeop-ardy involved for the vulnerable, the greater the duty on others to pro-vide assistance. Thus, assuming that the least advantaged are morevulnerable in an unjust society than they are in a just society, the require-ments of this duty will be more stringent in non-ideal theory than theywill be in ideal theory.

The self-seeking choices the difference principle permits can onlybe pursued when such choices do not violate the duty of mutual aid. Therequirements of this duty are even greater in the unjust society, wherethe least advantaged may be even more vulnerable than they would be ina situation of equality. The duty will be especially demanding on the afflu-ent individuals who have profited from the unjust social arrangement andare in a position to help the least advantaged, with little cost to them-selves. Merely voting for just reforms will not be sufficient if such mea-sures are not effectively implemented. The greater the needs of the leastadvantaged, the greater the demand on all citizens, especially the afflu-ent, to help. Similar to the demands of the duty of mutual respect, ~atleast! the affluent members of society have a moral obligation to volun-tarily tax themselves and donate these funds to assist the least advan-taged. How extensive this levy should be will depend on one’s ownprosperity as well as the needs of the least advantaged.

Taken together, the three positive natural duties of justice impose oncitizens of an unjust society a diverse array of duties that cannot be ful-filled simply by voting. Liberals who opt for dualism and focus only onvoting behaviour undermine the viability of Rawls’s dualism. It makesRawls’s theory ineffectual at the level of non-ideal theory. An accurateinterpretation of Rawls’s defence of dualism in A Theory of Justice revealsthat his dualism imposes a diverse array of duties on citizens and gov-ernment officers. By focusing exclusively on the difference principle Ido not feel that Murphy or Cohen have ruled out the version of Rawlsian

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dualism that I have defended here, but they may contend that the short-comings of dualism are best revealed once we consider how demandingit is in ideal theory. I now turn to this issue.

IV. The Duties in Ideal Theory

The Thatcher example that Cohen uses in “Incentives, Inequality and Com-munity” was meant to undermine Rawls’s dualism at the level of idealtheory. That is, Cohen believes that such a tax cut could be deemed justby the difference principle, as it would benefit the worst off. Earlier Iargued that this example really applies at the level of non-ideal theorybecause the only way the tax cut would be consistent with the secondprinciple of justice is if all socio-economic inequalities in Britain couldbe traced back to considerations of efficiency, in addition to fulfillingthe requirements of fair equality of opportunity. I think Cohen wouldagree that Britain does not satisfy either of these requirements. For thisreason, I think the gulf between Rawls and Cohen, at least at the level ofnon-ideal theory, is not very significant. But what about at the level ofideal theory? That is, what is required of Rawlsian citizens in a societywhere the requirements of the equal basic liberties principle, the fair equal-ity of opportunity principle and the difference principle have all beenmet? I shall argue that there can still be stringent demands on talentedindividuals in this just society. While these demands may not go farenough to appease Cohen, I think that any more stringent duties wouldimpose unfair demands on individuals.

I will ignore the duty to uphold justice, as this duty will require, inideal theory, little more than complying with and supporting just institu-tions. Having said this, one should not belittle the importance of thisduty; citizens of a just society must remain vigilant in fulfilling its require-ments. Let me turn to the duties of mutual respect and mutual aid, forthese duties can be demanding even at the level of ideal theory. In orderto determine how demanding these duties are we need more informationbeyond knowledge that the institutions are just—we also need to knowwhat the level of prosperity is for both the least advantaged and the mostaffluent. Consider, for example, the following situation. Imagine we havean equal society. The talented individuals of our society make it knownthat they would be willing to be more productive if given a higher, unequalincome, and some of the benefits of their higher level of productivitycould be filtered back to the least advantaged through various redistribu-tion policies. We thus have the situation Rawls describes in his Paretoargument for inequality. It is this kind of scenario, Cohen claims, thatreveals the inadequacies of Rawlsian justice in ideal theory. The talentedindividuals of this society are morally permitted to demand extra incen-

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tives, and by doing so they exploit the very morally arbitrary advantagesRawls claims justice seeks to mitigate. If individuals were truly commit-ted to the fraternal ethos of the difference principle, argues Cohen, theywould agree to work more productively without the promise of a higher,unequal reward.

There are at least three possible replies to Cohen’s objection which,taken together, show that egalitarians should find little of practical sig-nificance in this critique of Rawls’s ideal theory. First, if this equalsociety is truly just according to Rawls’s dualism, then not only do itsinstitutions fulfil the requirements of the two principles of justice, its indi-viduals also fulfil the requirements of the principles that apply to them.This means that individuals would not exploit their good luck in the nat-ural lottery of life if such actions would violate the duties of mutualrespect and mutual aid. If, for example, the initial equal distribution wasvery low, so low that the basic needs of everyone could not be satisfiedwithout the talented producing more, one could argue that the talentedhave a duty to be more productive without the reward of a higher, unequalincome. Such actions would show respect for others as well as aid them.But this sacrifice would have to be short-lived and not too onerous. Theduties that apply to individuals do not make the demands of justiceall-controlling.

The demands that mutual respect and mutual aid impose on citi-zens of a just social structure further reveal the reasonableness of Rawls’sdualism. If the initial equal distribution in question was very high, sohigh that the basic needs of all citizens could be easily met, it would beodd to object that the talented were being unreasonable when theydemanded incentives. Similarly, if the equal distribution was so low thatthe basic needs of all could not be met without the virtual enslavementof the talented, such rigorous demands could rightly be rejected as unrea-sonable. The duties of mutual respect and mutual aid clarify under whatcircumstances a moral duty to be more productive could be reasonable,in both ideal and non-ideal theory—namely, when others are in jeop-ardy and one is in a position to alleviate or remedy their suffering with-out incurring too much cost to oneself. But these types of considerationsare ignored if one just opts for applying the difference principle to indi-vidual choices. Such a proposal will make the demands of justiceall-controlling.

A second reply to Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian justice in ideal theoryis that Cohen overlooks the impact a just social structure would have onour choices. Cohen falsely presumes that pervasive inequalities will stillexist in the Rawlsian just society. However, this assumption overlooksthe impact a just basic structure is likely to have on the whole nature ofthe social system and, in particular, on the role considerations of effi-ciency are likely to have on us. Rawls claims:

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@T#he social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come tohave. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as thesort of persons they are. Thus an economic system is not only an institutionaldevice for satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fash-ioning wants in the future. How men work together now to satisfy their presentdesires affects the desires they will have later on, the kind of persons they willbe.... Since economic arrangements have these effects, and indeed must do so,the choice of these institutions involves some view of human good and of thedesign of institutions to realize it. This choice must, therefore, be made onmoral and political as well as on economic grounds. Considerations of effi-ciency are but one basis of decision and often relatively minor at that. ~1971:259–60!

In order for societies to evolve from their current unjust social struc-tures to the Rawlsian just basic structure, citizens and government offi-cials must drastically alter their existing wants and aspirations. The onlyway a just economic system could be brought about in the first place isif moral and political considerations are given priority over issues of effi-ciency. And once in place, this new economic arrangement would play aformative role in shaping the desires of future generations. The selfishhigh flyers Cohen targets are the product of the existing unjust socialstructure. Their wants and aspirations have been shaped by an economicsystem that gives primacy to considerations of efficiency.

Third, Cohen overestimates the power self-seeking high flyers wouldhave in a society with a just basic structure. The institutionalization ofthe fair equality of opportunity principle, for example, would drasti-cally alter the class system of the Rawlsian just society. If Rawls is cor-rect, his just society would be an open society where excessiveinequalities would not be the rule. Equal opportunity for all would notonly decrease the vulnerability of the least advantaged, it would alsolimit the degree of economic incentives that self-interested top achiev-ers could demand. The educational expertise necessary for developingtheir skills and talents would no longer be the special privilege of therich.

V. Conclusion

Whatever the disagreements are between Rawls and Cohen at the levelof ideal theory, the practical significance of this debate is really at thelevel of non-ideal theory. A theory of justice should provide some guid-ance as to what is needed to move from the current unjust situation to amore just society. After considering the details and complexities of issuesinvolved in balancing the diverse demands of Rawlsian justice, one canappreciate why Rawls makes the basic structure the main focus of a theoryof justice. The best way to secure justice is by establishing a stable, insti-

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tutional framework that fairly distributes the benefits and burdens of coop-eration. In order to attain this ideal, government officials and citizensmust fulfil the principles that apply to individuals. Until a just socialstructure is brought into existence, justice as fairness imposes a diversearray of stringent duties on citizens. We must strive to bring about justinstitutions, oppose injustices, respect others and come to their assis-tance when they need us. The exact requirements of these diverse dutiesvary depending on how unjust a social structure is and on one’s positionwithin that structure. I have argued that the self-seeking top achieversCohen condemns do fail to fulfil these diverse duties when they demandtax cuts and0or reap the benefits of their fortunate position in the unjustarrangement.

If Rawls’s dualism is to be championed by liberals, they need toensure that his principles for individuals play a more central role. Farfrom requiring a “political conception” of justice, the stability of a justdemocratic society requires a formative public philosophy that engageswith the citizenry in their daily lives. Such a formative philosophy is notperfectionist, nor does it conflict with reasonable pluralism. Rawlsianjustice does not require us to maximize human excellence but it doesrequire us to fulfill the natural duties of justice. The concern for stabil-ity, which motivated Rawls to revise his theory, must remain a concernfor the stability of a just society, rather than stability in general. Justice,not stability, is the first virtue of institutions. Such an insight was centralto A Theory of Justice and is also central to the viability of justice asfairness as a dualistic theory. If justice as fairness is not at least a par-tially comprehensive theory it will not inspire the changes needed to cre-ate a fair and more equal society.

Notes

1 In Political Liberalism, Rawls maintains that:

The difference principle ... applies to the announced system of public law andstatutes and not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the decisionof individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional background againstwhich these transactions take place. ~1993: 283!

2 In this paper I follow Cohen’s definition of talented persons: “they are so positionedthat, happily for them, they do command a high salary and they can vary their pro-ductivity according to exactly how high it is” ~1997: 6–7!.

3 Cohen also makes this claim:

According to John Rawls, and to liberals quite generally, the fundamental prin-ciples of justice apply to rules of the basic structure of society, and not to thechoices people make within that structure, beyond their choices about whetheror not to promote, support, and comply with the rules of a just basic structure.~2000: 148!

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4 According to Rawls, a doctrine is comprehensive

when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals ofpersonal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associ-ational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in thelimit to our life as a whole. A conception is fully comprehensive if it coversall recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated sys-tem, whereas a conception is only partially comprehensive when it comprisesa number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and is ratherloosely articulated. ~1993: 13!.

5 Rawls seems to have merged and whittled down the notions of obligation and naturalduty under the idea of “public reason” in his later writings. See Lecture VI of Polit-ical Liberalism as well as 1997: 765–807. Rawls’s focus on “reasonable” persons,public reason and the political virtues—such as civility and a sense of fairness—might suggest that he still does place a significant emphasis on the principles thatapply to individuals. I do not deny that such an interpretation of Rawls’s later work isplausible, but I would argue that it further demonstrates the point that justice as fair-ness must be at least partially comprehensive.

6 Pure procedural justice, claims Rawls, “obtains when there is no independent crite-rion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that theoutcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure hasbeen properly followed” ~1971: 86!.

7 This point is emphasized by Thomas Pogge ~2000!.8 The only way of passing such a test would be if taking up the new appointment would

allow me to more effectively protest the racist policy.9 These funds would have to be donated to a cause~s! that would benefit the least advan-

taged. A referee for this Journal suggested that I should rephrase the claim aboutvoluntarily taxing oneself to the following: “donating a greater proportion of theirtime, energy and wealth to private and public organizations whose purpose is to ame-liorate social and economic inequalities.” Given the negative association many citi-zens have with the word taxation, this suggested rephrasing is probably prudent andnecessary. However, a key point of my argument is that such donations are a duty ofjustice, not charity. My appeal to voluntary taxation presupposes ~perhaps too opti-mistically?! that citizens see taxation as a major instrument for implementing socialjustice. When the state fails to secure fair terms of agreement individuals are requiredto make a good faith attempt to deploy their personal resources in accordance withthe demands of mutual respect and mutual aid.

References

Buchanan, Allen. 1982. Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. London:Methuen.

Cohen, G.A. 1992. “Incentives, Inequality, and Community.” In The Tanner Lectures onHuman Values, vol. 13, ed. Grethe Peterson. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Cohen, G.A. 1997. “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.” Philosophyand Public Affairs 26~1!: 3–30.

Cohen, G.A. 2000. If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Estlund, David. 1998. “Liberalism, Equality and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls.”Journal of Political Philosophy 6: 99–112.

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Kant, Immanuel. 1964. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by H.J. Paton.New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Murphy, Liam. 1999. “Institutions and the Demands of Justice.” Philosophy and PublicAffairs 27~4!: 251–91.

Pogge, Thomas. 2000. “On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen andMurphy.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29~2!: 137–169.

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.Rawls, John. 1997. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” University of Chicago Law

Review, 64: 765–807Sandel, Michael. 1996. Democracy’s Discontent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Sandel, Michael. 1998. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, second edition. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Scheffler, Sammuel. 1994. The Rejection of Consequentialism, revised edition. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Williams, Andrew. 1998. “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity.” Philosophy and Public

Affairs 27~3!: 235–36.Williams, Bernard. 1973. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In Utilitarianism: For and Against,

eds. J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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