1

Do Development Aid Donors Give More Aid to Democracies than

Autocracies?

Introduction

Foreign aid, which is also designed to promote democracy,

is considered a major goal of some liberal democratic donor

countries. In support of this idea, some scholars have argued

that through the “modernization” of developing country

societies, foreign aid could promote democracy and this would

improve the prospects for economic growth, but only

indirectly. Based on empirical studies, scholars have found

that the level of democracy could be increased by improving

levels of literacy and increasing per capita income, both of

which correlate and overlap with democracy. Since increases in

per capita income and literacy have long been considered

essential elements of modernization, many aid programmes are

targeted to improving literacy and access to education (Knack

2004).

On the other hand, other scholars have argued that

conditioning aid on democratic political reforms by recipient

nations is largely ineffective. They argue that such

conditional foreign aid can undermine democratic governance,

because this foreign aid goes to the country’s government

instead of the private sector. Friedman and other scholars

have shown that when economic activity is organized by the

public sector, “Democracy and freedom” are less likely to take

hold and grow (Knack 2004).

2

This paper examines the volume of foreign aid which goes

from liberal democratic developed countries to developing

nations, the volume of aid which goes to democratic developing

countries, and the volume of aid going to autocratic

developing countries. This comparison is being made in order

to determine if more aid is being given to democratic

developing countries than to autocratic nations, then this

would appear to show support for the idea that democratic

donor countries are also trying to promote democratic

governance; by providing more foreign aid to democracies than

they provide to autocracies.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) is considered to be the largest group of democratic

developed country donor nations. According to OECD statistics,

the total foreign aid given by OECD members in 2009 was $119.6

billion and this total rose to $128.7 billion in 2010 (OECD

2010). Foreign aid from the OECD member states and the OECD’s

Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is also known as

“Official Development Assistance”, is believed to represent

about 80% of all international foreign aid and 30% of Official

Development Assistance (ODA). But donors have to be careful

about promoting social movements in favour of more democracy

when they provide foreign aid because this can sometimes lead

to instability and civil unrest. Therefore, developed country

donors prefer to work for a careful balance between supporting

domestic social movements on the one hand and supporting human

rights conventions on the other (Eyben 2010)

3

“Aid is only effective if it achieves good development

results and good development results are not possible if

gender inequalities persist, environmental damage is

accepted or human rights are abused. “

According to the DAC member countries, the concept of

political conditionality is based on the idea that these

developed countries have a moral responsibility to promote

human rights and democracy as universal values, so they have

been using foreign aid allocation as a tool to not only

transfer money and resources, but also as a tool to transfer

human rights values and democratic principles (Zanger 2000).

These liberal democratic donors believe that when they

deal with countries which are democratic and respect human

rights, this means that those countries practice good

governance, which is believed to be a significant determinant

of the developmental aid returns for ODA.

Moreover, European country donors also take into

consideration the importance of promoting democracy outside

their national boundaries. They attempt: first, to diminish

the potential threat from unstable nations in the developing

world. Secondly, they also try to spread the Western ideals of

democracy and respect for human rights in developing nations,

in order to facilitate the economic development process

(Zanger 2000).

This essay will be organized as follows: we will begin

with a literature review, which will include an overview of

bilateral aid by OECD countries to democratic and autocratic

4

developing countries, as well as the bilateral aid allocations

of one of the largest OECD donor nations, Germany. Then, we

will use a case study of German development aid in an attempt

to answer the research question about whether donor countries

do indeed take the democratic governance or the lack of

democratic governance of recipient countries into

consideration when they give foreign aid. The case study will

use Germany as a democratic donor country and compare the

volume of aid that it has provided both before and after the

end of the cold war to three African countries: Mali as a

democratic nation, Niger as a democratizing country and Guinea

as an autocratic nation. Finally, we will discuss the

conclusions of our research and attempt to answer the question

“Do democratic donor nations give more aid to democratic

countries than they provide to autocratic developing

countries?”

Literature Review

In this research paper we will see how the formal

commitments to democracy and social freedoms were made by all

major donors of bilateral foreign aid. They promised to

withhold or reduce giving aid to regimes that violate human

rights and to support the promotion and consolidation of

democracy (Hyde, 2008 pp.91). For example the United Nations

(UN) has expressed its support for democracy promotion for

more than 20 years:

“Since 1988, the Assembly has adopted at least one

resolution annually dealing with some aspect of

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democracy, and the Commission has examined democracy

increasingly from a human rights perspective.  Through a

series of resolutions, it has attempted not only to

clarify the concept of democracy but also to elaborate on

democratic principles, values, processes, institutions

and mechanisms”.  (Office of the United Nations

Commission for Human Rights)

Furthermore, in 1994 the International Conference of New

or Restored Democracies asked the UN to study how it could

promote democracy:

“The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights concluded

that democracy, development and respect for human rights

are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and

recommended that priority be given to national and

international actions to promote democracy, development

and human rights.  The Plan of Action adopted in 1994 at

the Second International Conference of New or Restored

Democracies called on the United Nations Secretary-

General to undertake a study of ways in which the United

Nations system could support the efforts of Governments

to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies.”

(Office of the United Nations Commission for Human

Rights)

  As a result of the aforementioned international push for

greater respect for human rights as well as democracy

promotion, the goals of foreign aid began to move beyond

6

economic liberalisation towards support for democracy as a way

to strengthen states burdened with failed institutions.

Figure 1 below displays data provided by the Development

Assistance Committee of the OECD with respect to bilateral aid

flows, which covers a wide range of donors. However, it should

be noted that 70% of aid is coming from the U.S.A., Japan,

France and Germany. (Alesina &Dollar 2000)

Figure 1

In fact, the flow of bilateral aid was actually linked to

several different policy objectives; such as trade openness,

democracy, civil liberties, direct foreign investment, initial

income, bilateral aid per capita (small countries get more per

capita) and it was also interrelated to the colonial status of

the developing country (Table 1). (Alesina &Dollar 2000)

7

However, some scholars have argued that bilateral aid is

not only correlated with the variables which are mentioned in

Table 1, but this aid is also connected to political and

strategic considerations. For example, in Figure 2 we notice

that the volume of aid which came from some egoistic donors in

1985; such as the United States, France, Italy, Germany and

Japan, was high for Egypt (about 400% higher) and also for

Israel (where it was about 500% greater) even though Israel is

considered to be a rich country with no colonial past. This

shows that some donors have more political and not as

altruistic (interested in providing aid based on a country’s

needs and merits) motives in providing aid, and that the

relationship between political democracy and aid is important.

For that reason, more democratic and open countries appear to

receive more aid than autocratic nations (Claude Berthelemy

2006).

8

Figure 2

9

In contrast to the more egoistic donor countries, some

donors such as Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and the Nordic

states (with the exception of Finland, and possibly Sweden),

which are considered more altruistic than other donors,

believe that selectivity should depend on recipient countries’

needs and the merits of the aid (Claude Berthelemy 2006.

p193).

Now, some scholars have begun to question why more

egoistic bilateral and multilateral aid donors also appear to

select democratic nations to receive more aid than autocracies

when they choose recipient countries. In other words; why is

Germany concerned about promoting democracy and supporting the

rule of law in other nations such as those of the Arab

homeland? For example, recently Germany pledged an amount of

100 million Euros to support democracy in the countries of the

Arab Spring like Tunisia for the years 2012-2013 and to

promote all projects which ensure a smooth transition for

Tunisia into a democratic and self-sufficient nation (Melki

2011).

One possible explanation is that Germany, as member of

the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance (IDEA), believes that the direct relationship

between promoting democracy and good governance is very

important. Therefore, it is a matter of principle for many

liberal democratic donors to pursue the promotion of democracy

as a goal in its own right (Federal Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and Development 2005). Many scholars also note

there is an equally important indirect relationship between

10

democracy and good governance because they believe democracy

strengthens the capacity of governments and thus enhances the

economic performance of developing countries private and

public sectors, as mentioned in Figure 3 (Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development 2005).

Figure 3

(Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

2005)

Furthermore, as seen previously in figure 2, America and its

allies have also provided large amounts of aid to Israel and

Egypt as a way to encourage peaceful resolution of their

conflict over Palestine and Gaza.

Figure 19.1 (Hopkins 2000)

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After the Second World War, the role of bilateral aid

became more important because regional conflicts led to a need

for more emergency relief (Hopkins 2000). The chart in Figure

19.1 (above) shows OECD aid volumes from 1960 to 1996. The

chart shows that foreign aid started to decrease in 1994 due

to a variety of different reasons such as; the end of the cold

war, globalization, and disappointment with the effectiveness

of aid and neo-liberal philosophies (Hopkins 2000). Before the

1980s foreign aid was allocated in favour of countries with

poor economic governance, but after the second half of 1980s

bilateral aid donors started to place more emphasis on

democracy and began allocating more aid in favour of

democratic developing countries. Furthermore, there is also

12

some evidence that multilateral organizations channel

significantly more aid to countries with good economic

governance (Dollar & Levin 2006). This is probably because

multilateral aid is more selective than bilateral aid and more

dependent on good economic governance, which creates a climate

for growth and poverty reduction as well as enhances foreign

aid effectiveness.

OECD Aid before and after 1989

The total volume of foreign aid has increased

dramatically during the last four decades, particularly during

the early 1980s. For example, according to the OECD, foreign

aid flows have grown around 3% a year but in 2004 real

official development assistance (ODA) from all donors actually

increased by 4.6%. However, since the end of 1990s the overall

share of development aid going to Asia has been reduced while

the amount of aid provided to sub-Saharan African countries

has increased because of the African nations’ need for debt

relief. By 2015, the EU recommends giving Euro 46 billion

instead of Euro 20 billion a year in ODA, with 50% of this

increase heading to Africa (Gupat et al 2006).

In addition, in 1960 overall ODA was approximately US$30

billion but by 2004 the overall amount of ODA was almost US$80

billion, an increase of over 150%. However it should be noted

that foreign aid donors also have different targets. For

example, by 2010 Belgium wants to meet the UN aid target of

0.7% of GNI but the United Kingdom (UK) committed to 0.47% of

GNI by 2007-08 instead of the UN GNI target. EU members have

13

also decided to increase their aid to poor countries by 2015

with half of that going to countries in Africa. Furthermore,

the richest 15 EU member states agreed to increase their

foreign aid allocation to at least 0.51% of national income

and to raise this share to 0.7% by 2015. However, developed

countries’ total populations, the volume of aid they provide

and the selectivity of their aid are correlated, and countries

like the US and Japan also give less aid per capita than

countries with much smaller populations like Denmark and

Norway.

“The difference in donors’ aid efforts can also bemeasured in terms of their populations. In addition tothe total volume of aid, the degree of aidconcessionality is also important for itseffectiveness...” (Gupat, Pattillo and Wagh 2006)

Since 2000 bilateral grants have increased due to the

debt crisis in poor countries such as those in Africa. For

instance, in the 1990s the volume of bilateral aid was less

than 2% a year, but it is has increased by almost 7% a year

since 2000 with the biggest increase coming in 2004 (i.e.

bilateral aid was US$ 22 billion in 1960 but US$ 59 billion in

2004). The United States also increased its grants by over 40%

in the year following the Monterrey summit.

In order to answer the question “Do democratic donor

countries indeed give democratic recipient countries more aid

than autocratic countries?” we will examine the volumes of

OECD aid which have been given to countries and their levels

of democracy at the same time. It should be noted that before

1989 the allocation of foreign aid was not selective and

14

bilateral and multilateral development agencies used to focus

primarily on nations with low levels of income, but sometimes

was also distributed in favour of democratic recipient nations

with poor economic governance. However, much of this aid

proved to be ineffective because there is no real relationship

between low incomes and democracy among the poorest developing

countries. Today the OECD is one of the multilateral

development agencies that has allocated aid more selectively

since the end of the Cold War, by also using an assessment of

economic governance that is based on an index of property

rights and the rule of law.

For multilateral assistance, signi cantly more aid is nowfi

channelled to countries with good economic governance,

the opposite of the case in the 1984–89 periods (Dollar

and Levin 2006)

CASE STUDY

German bilateral aid to democratic and autocratic countries

Germany was selected as the donor nation for this case

study because it is a long-time member of the OECD and one of

the world’s largest bilateral aid donors. Mali, Niger and

Guinea were selected as recipient nations for this case study

because they are all low income developing countries at

approximately the same level of economic development that rely

heavily on development aid and are located in the same region

of sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, while Mali and Niger share

a common border and most of their territory lies in the Sahara

desert, all three nations’ farmers rely on the Niger River for

15

water. However, there is a notable difference in these three

nations level of democracy, with Mali considered to be a

democracy, Niger a democratizer, and Guinea considered to be

an autocracy (See Table 2).

Table 2

Mali

as a

democratic country

Mali geographically lies at the great bulge of West

Africa and shares its southern border with Guinea But most of

its land to the north and east is part of the Sahara desert

and is mostly uninhabited. Mali’s economy depends on

subsistence farming and three other main resources: livestock,

mining and tourism. However, because of the drought that

occurred in the late 1970s and mid-1980s livestock herding was

seriously affected. So, with support of U.S agency for

International Development (USAID) Mali has made serious

efforts since then to increase its cattle exports.

Mali’s political governance and transition to democracy

16

During the 1980s the political situation in Mali was

stable, but there was also a lack of democracy. By 1990, there

was growing dissatisfaction with the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) economic reform programs’ demands for austerity.

But even though the people were weary of Mali’s dictatorship,

the country also was not ready for democracy. In 1991 Mali

started to move towards democracy, but the transition did not

go smoothly due to misunderstandings about the concept of

democracy.

Mali’s first democratic constitution established a five-

year presidency with a limit of two-terms and Alpha Konaré won

the first two elections in 1992 and 1997 while Mali also

established comprehensive political and religious freedom. But

according to the 2005 United Nations Human Development Index

(UNHDI), Mali was ranked 174, while Guinea was ranked 156 and

Niger was at 177 among the 177 countries covered by the

report. However, it should be noted that Guinea has also

regressed since then and is now ranked lower than Mali in the

latest 2011 United Nations Human Development Index.

The 2005 United Nations Human Development Index, based on

a combination of economic, demographic, and educational

data, lists Mali as fourth from the bottom among 177

countries. Only Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sierra Leone

rank lower. But despite persistent poverty and on-going

turmoil in neighboring states, in a single decade Mali

has launched one of the most successful democracies in

Africa (Pringle 2006)

17

Mali - Foreign Aid

Mali is considered a major recipient of foreign aid from

many sources. This foreign aid is very essential for this

country because it is considered to be a way to exchange new

ideas which are important for developing new policies and

changing existing policies as well as for financial support.

Germany is also considered to be one of the major sources of

foreign aid for Mali because of its funding of multilateral

organizations and bilateral programs.

During the period 1980 – 1990, per capita incomes in Mali

shrunk by 20% to $ 250 and aid flows to Mali averaged 15-20%

of Mali’s GDP. Before the end of the Cold War, (1991) the

Soviet Union was the major source of economic and military aid

for Mali, but during 2010 Mali received $117.87 million in

bilateral foreign assistance from the US Department of State

and USAID. However, Germany has been a long-time donor of

foreign aid to Mali and has given Mali foreign aid totalling

more than $1,767 billion since 1978.

Niger as a democratizer country

Niger is located east of Mali with whom it shares an 821

km border as well as the water resources of the Niger River.

Like Mali, over 80% of Niger’s territory (north of the Niger

River and its southern border area with Nigeria) lies in the

Sahara desert and is mostly uninhabitable. Niger is also an

18

economically poor nation like its western neighbour Mali and

its economy relies on livestock and mining (particularly

uranium and gold) as well as subsistence agriculture.

Beginning during the early 1970s, drought, desertification,

government intervention and bad economic governance have

further aggravated a poor economic environment. Although

Niger was a country that had long been dominated by

agriculture, Niger experienced a boom in uranium mining during

the late 1970s. But this boom subsided very quickly and as a

result, significant national debts incurred between 1983 and

1986 necessitated an IMF structural adjustment program.

However, due to on-going political instability, the

implementation of this program was plagued by substantial

irregularities, which led to its intermittent suspension (U.S

Department of State, Niger 2011).

Niger’s political governance and transition to democracy

Niger was governed by series of authoritarian rulers from

1958 until 1991 when it took the first steps in the direction

of democracy by holding a constitutional referendum in 1992

followed by free elections in 1993 when Mahamane Ousmane, of

the Democratic and Social Convention party, became the

country’s first democratically elected president.

However the country reverted to authoritarianism

following a military coup in 1996 and real democratization

didn’t begin until the beginning of the Fifth Republic era in

1999. During the first years of its democratic transition,

donors such as Germany, France, Italy and United States did

19

not withdraw basic support, but financial assistance from

these countries was decreased enormously especially from 1992

onwards (Gazibo 2005) because of political instability and

armed conflicts with Tuareg tribes. However, between 1994 and

1995 the conflict with the Tuaregs was settled and another

period of political instability ensued from 1995 until new

elections were held in 1999. Current President Mamadou Tandja

and the coalition made up of the MNSD-Nassara, the CDS-Rahama

and a number of smaller parties emerged as victors.

(Bertelsmann Niger 2009)

Niger- Foreign Aid

In general, the volume of foreign aid from the bilateral

and multilateral organisation is still limited. This is due to

the breakdown of its democratic processes even though the

government was committed to a free market economy.

Furthermore, the level of corruption in Niger was still very

high and most of the announced economic reforms were not fully

implemented. Like its neighbour Mali, Niger is also heavily

dependent on foreign aid from Western donor’s (around 11.4% of

GDP in 2006). Figure 5, shows the fluctuations in Niger’s

bilateral and multilateral aid between 1988 and 2002. Note the

sharp decrease in 1994 when the Tuareg unrest began and an

increase in aid in 1996 after a peace agreement was reached.

Figure 5 (Gazibo 2005)

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As Figure 5 shows Niger also experienced another decrease

in foreign aid due to civil unrest and questionable democratic

elections, followed by another increase in 2000 after new free

and fair democratic elections were held in 1999. Niger then

received 25 million euros in development aid from the European

Union (EU) based on a commitment from the EU to support

Niger’s new democratically elected government. EU Development

Commissioner Andris Piebalgs says, “It is a sign of our

confidence in the new government and of our commitment to

supporting (it).” However, EU development aid to Niger was

suspended again in 2009 after then president Mamadou Tandja

attempted to overturn the constitution in order to remain in

power. But he was arrested and Mahamadou Issoufou won the next

set of democratic elections in March 2011. As a result, the EU

has allocated a total of 458 million euros in aid for Niger

through 2013 for health and education programs (IOL News

2011).

Niger’s democratic reforms were also supported by the

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which allocated USD

21

40 million from the UN donor community for electoral

commission programs designed to organize a constitutional

referendum, two rounds of presidential, parliamentary and

municipal elections as well as assistance dealing with

problems related to the food crisis and drought in Niger (UNDP

2011).

Guinea as an autocratic country

The Republic of Guinea, which is also known as either

Guinea-Conakry to distinguish it from its neighbour Guinea-

Bissau or as French Guinea because of its French colonial

history, is located on the Atlantic coast of West Africa. It

is bordered on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, by Guinea-

Bissau and Senegal to the north, Mali to the north east, and

by Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast on the south-

east. Its total land mass is about 246,000 square kilometres

and the Niger, Gambia and Senegal rivers all have their

origins in Guinea. While it was a colony of France gold and

diamonds were Guinea’ main exports, but since 25% of the

world’s bauxite reserves were discovered in Guinea, its

economy also relies on exports of bauxite as well as

pineapples, cocoa, bananas, coffee, livestock and peanuts.

However, due to civil wars and political unrest linked to

Guinea’s autocratic political leaders, investment in Guinea’s

export industries has been restricted (www.worldatlas).

Guinea’s political governance

Throughout its history Guinea has been governed by a

series of autocratic rulers.  Following the defeat of the

22

French by the armies of Almamy Samory Touré, Guineans rejected

membership in the proposed French Community and Guinea became

an independent republic under the presidency of Touré.

However, Touré was a dictator who repressed political

opposition, human rights and freedom of expression and who

also implemented economic policies which destroyed Guinea’s

economy. His relationship with the West and foreign aid donor

nations was also very bad due to the tyranny of his autocratic

government which drove more than a million Guineans into

exile. In 1984 Lt. Col. Lansana Cone seized the power after

the death of Sékou Touré and announced the establishment of

the Second Republic. In an effort to pull Guinea out of its

isolation and revive its economy, the Second Republic

announced that it would implement policies to protect human

rights, encourage foreign investment and freedom of speech and

other measures designed to liberalize tis developing country’s

economy (Cheryl 2009). However, there were many election

irregularities and after Conté was elected the president of

Guinea from 1998 until 2003 conflict with the opposition led

to civil war and conflicts with its neighbours Sierra Leone

and Liberia (Cheryl 2009).

Guinea – Foreign Aid

The amount of foreign aid provided to Guinea has always

been less than what its African neighbours, Mali and Niger

receive. Despite its high levels of poverty and need for

foreign aid, except for humanitarian assistance, beginning in

the late 1990s foreign aid to Guinea was suspended by most

donor nations. Poor institutional development in Guinea,

23

corruption, economic inefficiencies, and bureaucratic systems

as well as a lack of democracy are often cited as reasons for

the volume of aid to Guinea being lower than that of Mali

(which is a democratic nation) and Niger (which is considered

a democratiser).

Analysis of German foreign aid to Mali, Niger and Guinea

Democracy

Since all three of the developing countries in this case study

have experienced autocratic rule during the years being studied, it

was necessary to determine how many years, if any, these countries

had democratic regimes. The democracy index data used in Bar Graph 1

is from a data set provided by Aid Data that indicates a country's

type of political regime. It is based on Freedom House’s regime

statistics and for every year of a country's independence, each

country's political regime for that year is designated with a 1 or

0. For each year, states that are either fully or partly democratic

for that year are marked as a 1 and states that are semi-autocratic

or fully autocratic that year are given a 0.

Bar Graph 1 (Years of Democratic rule 1978-2009)

Guinea/0 years Mali/13 years Niger/ 4years02468101214

Total

Total

24

Bar Graph 1 shows that between the years 1978 and 2009

Guinea was never governed by what could be considered a

democratic regime. On the other hand, Mali had experienced 13

years of democratic rule while Niger was governed by

democratic regimes for four years.

Democratic Electoral freedom

The level of democratic electoral freedom index used in

Bar Graph 2 is based on the Polity data in the data set

provided by Aid Data. The Polity data series is a widely used

data series in political science research that contains coded

annual information on levels of democratic freedom for all

independent states. Polity’s scores reflect scholars’

conclusions about a nation’s level of democracy and are based

on an evaluation of the country’s elections for

competitiveness, openness and level of participation (Casper

and Tufis 2003).

Bar Graph 2 (Polity Democratic electoral freedom index 1978-

2009)

Guinea Mali Niger

-160-140-120-100-80-60-40-200

Total

Total

25

Bar graph 2 shows that according to the Polity index of

democratic electoral freedom, Guinea’s total score of -138

from 1978 and 2009 shows that Guinea has very low levels of

democratic freedom. On the other hand, Mali’s Polity score of

-5 shows the effects of 13 years of democratic rule while

Niger’s Polity score of -59 shows the effects of 4 years of

democratic electoral freedom and is also much better than

Guinea’s score.

German foreign aid volumes

In order to determine if democratic donor nations provide

more aid to democratic developing countries than autocratic

developing countries, Germany’s foreign aid to the countries

of Mali, Niger and Guinea from 1978 to 2009 was analysed. Bar

Graph 3 illustrates the differences in Germany’s foreign aid

allocations to these sub Saharan developing African nations.Bar Graph 3’s data, which shows Germany's total volume of foreign

aid to Mali, Niger and Guinea, is taken from OECD data for 1978 to

2009 provided by Aid Data.

Bar Graph 3 (German foreign aid 1978-2009)

26

Guinea/0 years

Mali/13 years Niger/4 years0

200400600800100012001400160018002000

Total

Total

Bar Graph 3 clearly shows that between 1978 and 2009

Germany gave a total of only $723 million in foreign aid to

Guinea (an autocracy), but gave its more democratic neighbour

Mali over $1 billion more in total aid as well as almost $500

million in additional aid to Niger, a country which is

considered a democratizer. Since all three countries are

desperately poor and have equally low Human Development Index

rankings, they would seem to be equally in need of foreign aid

and development assistance. So it appears that Germany is

allocating its aid in this region of Africa based on more

factors than just a recipient’s needs.

Selectivity of Foreign aid before and after the end of the

Cold War

Table 3’s comparison of Germany’s foreign aid to Guinea

in the 12 years before the end of the Cold war (1978-1989) and

the aid it gave this autocratic state in the 12 years after

the Cold War (1990-2002) also shows some evidence that

27

Germany’s foreign aid was allocated more selectively after the

end of the Cold War than it was during the Cold War. The OECD

data provided by AidData shows that in the first 12 years

after the end of the Cold War, Germany cut the total amount of

foreign aid it was giving to the autocratic nation of Guinea

by almost 30% (from $308 million to $216 million) compared to

what it gave Guinea during the Cold War.

Table 3 (German aid to Guinea before and after the end of the

Cold War)

German aid to Guinea 1978-1989 1990-2001Sum of

aid_USD_millions Total Total

Total $307.7822219 $216.4833

Conclusions

The three case study’s recipient countries: Mali, Niger

and Guinea, are shared three important features. First, before

1978 they were all colonial states that had been ruled by

authoritarian regimes after they became independent countries.

Second, all three were among the poorest countries in sub

Saharan Africa and were adversely affected by the drought

which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Third, because they

were all so economically poor, they all needed or were very

dependent on foreign aid from democratic Western donors.

Based on the allocations of foreign aid made by one of

the world’s largest donor countries, we found that Germany

28

allocated far more aid to the most democratic of the three

countries studied, Mali (44% more than Niger and 144% more

than Guinea), than it did to Mali’s less democratic

neighbours, Niger and Guinea. Germany also provided about more

aid to the democratizing country of Niger (69% more) than it

did to Guinea’s autocratic regime.

This appears to show support for scholars who claim that

donor countries have become more inclined to provide more aid

to democracies now that Cold War politics is no longer an

issue. Therefore, it seems that bilateral and multilateral aid

takes into account not only the recipient’s needs and merits,

but also other donor variables. So, foreign aid represents a

combination of donor nation self- interests and the

development needs of recipient nations (Claude Berthelemy

2006, pp. 183).

Accordingly, this case study shows that foreign aid is

not allocated just on the basis of a recipient country’s needs

because poorer countries would then receive more aid than

richer countries, but it also depends on if the recipient

nation is democratic and has good economic governance, and is

thus less likely to be affected by corruption, civil wars and

interstate conflicts (Claude Berthelemy 2006).

Bibliography

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