MARCH 2015

INTERNET FREEDOM 2.1LESSONS FROM ASIA’S DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES

Dhruva Jaishankar

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About this ReportThis report is the conclusion of a project undertaken by The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) that exam-ines how better to advance Internet freedom based on the experiences of Asia’s large developing democracies. This project was supported by Google, Inc.

AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank colleagues at GMF for their help in producing this report, including in particular Javid Ahmad, Benjamin Lamont, Amy Studdart, Christine Chumbler, and Dan Twining, as well as Rasika Gynedi for providing invaluable research assistance. The report benefited from discussions at two workshops in late 2013. The first was held in Hyderabad, India, with the Indian School of Business (ISB). The second was in Jakarta, Indonesia, co-hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The author is grateful to Arun Kumar and Reema Gupta of ISB and Philips Vermonte and Tobias Basuki of CSIS for their help in arranging these workshops and for their participation in this project.Participants who contributed their valuable time and expertise to the two workshops include Shahed Amanullah, Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Endy Bayuni, Iman Brotoseno, Travis Coberly, Mishi Choudhary, Olof Ehrenkrona, Richard Fontaine, Kirst-en Gollatz, K. Asheque Haque, Mudit Kapoor, Prashant Jha, Shahab Khan, Bien Marquez, Nikhil Pahwa, Stacie Pettyjohn, Susan Ritchie, Irma Saligumba, Arthit Suriyawongkul, Praveen Swami, Valerie Tan, and Yuyun Wahyuningrum. Reuben Abraham, Sasiwan Chingchit, Maneeza Hossain, and Evan Laksmana also provided incredibly helpful advice and guid-ance. Samir Saran and Mahima Kaul organized a discussion at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi in April 2014, which enabled a useful preview of findings. Additionally, Tom Lynch and Karunesh Khanna offered an opportunity to present recommendations at the National Defense University in Washington, DC in 2014, while Madeline Earp and Ben Boudreaux participated in the launch event in Washington in March 2015. Finally, the author is grateful to Raman Jit Singh Cheema, Shinto Nugroho, Lokman Tsui of Google Inc., and Claudio Lilienfeld for their support.

GMF Paper SeriesThe GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to info@gmfus.org.

About GMFThe German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institu-tions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democra-cies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

On the cover: Three novice Buddhist monks look on as a senior monk uses a tablet device to take a photograph of the view over Luang Prabang, Laos, at dusk. © Kevin Landwer-Johan/iStockphoto

INTERNET FREEDOM 2.1

Lessons from Asia’s Developing Democracies

March 2015

Dhruva Jaishankar1

1 Dhruva Jaishankar is a transtlantic fellow, Asia, with The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Logging On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Profile Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Terms of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Software Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Rebooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Internet Freedom 2.1 1

1 Executive Summary

The Internet has become closely associated with freedom of expression and the global economy. Today, it plays a direct or indirect role in almost every aspect of life. Yet many fear the Internet as we have come to know it is at risk, with restrictions forcing fragmen-

tation along political, corporate, or cultural lines. Despite growing concerns about the future of the Internet, discussion surrounding online freedom remains largely mired in a handful of issues: the necessity and appropriateness of government surveillance in the United States, digital privacy in Europe, and censorship in authoritarian states such as China. However, between them, the United States, Europe, and China account for less than half of the world’s Internet users. For much of the rest of the world, any discussion of Internet freedom falls at the complex intersection of political and social liberties, nation-building, security threats, economic development, and resource constraints.

Asia’s biggest developing democracies — India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand — account for one-quarter of the world’s people, but only about one-tenth of the global online population. The policy decisions these states make going forward will be of considerable importance for the future of the Internet and offer some useful lessons about the limitations and vulnerabilities of the global Internet freedom agenda as it is currently being pursued by the United States and Europe.

Six broad conclusions or principles can be drawn from a survey of these countries’ experi-ences.

1. The online world is an outgrowth of the offline world, rather than a distinct phenomenon. Internet policy cannot be considered in a vacuum, or divorced from other relevant aspects of public policy, such as security, economic policy, or governance.

2. Laws, norms, and cultural attitudes related to Internet use vary widely, even among democracies. A one-size-fits-all approach to Internet freedom will not work and may even prove counterproductive.

3. Online freedoms and greater security are not inherently at odds with one another in open societies. Discourse that presents a false choice between security and freedom is harmful for both, as well as for state legitimacy and economic growth.

4. While much discussion of Internet freedom frames the issue as a conflict between govern-ments, corporations, and civil society, each sector is divided on the merits of unfettered Internet freedom.

5. Current legislation pertaining to the Internet in many democratic countries is deeply flawed, even in the context of their own constitutional rights pertaining to freedom of expression. By and large, Internet-related legislation is vague, making implementation arbitrary, and undermining public trust in state institutions.

6. Users are often not adequately informed of the privileges and restrictions associated with Internet use in their native countries.

Policies and initiatives designed to advance Internet freedom globally — whether by Western governments, Internet companies, international NGOs, or local Internet activists — have

The German Marshall Fund of the United States2

not necessarily been developed with these constraints in mind. The Internet freedom agenda consequently suffers from a lack of capabilities, skepticism about intentions, misplaced objec-tives, a dependence on unreliable technological solutions, and charges of double-standards. Governments and Internet activists in Asia’s large democracies can take a few important steps to address some of these shortcomings. First, they can better integrate issues related to Internet freedom with other aspects of policy discourse, including security, intelligence, trade, economics, healthcare, immigration, and the environment. Secondly, they can over-come the apparent trade-off between freedom and security by strengthening the rule of law: empowering independent regulators to oversee government programs and ensuring avenues for recourse to justice for those accused of online infractions. These steps can help improve security while protecting individual rights and privacy. Finally, they can introduce Internet awareness as an element in school curricula, in a manner similar to drug, sex, health, and civic education, along with other measures to better inform the public about the privileges and restrictions of Internet use.

Meanwhile, U.S. and European governments, institutions, and NGOs would be better off adopting a more modest and less eye-catching approach to Internet freedom. If the first step of Internet freedom was recognizing the challenge, and Internet Freedom 2.0 involved putting ideas into practice, what may now be required is a patch to fix glitches in current policy: Internet Freedom 2.1. In addition to assisting developing democracies in their efforts, U.S. and European governments, institutions, and NGOs could help educate legislators, jurists, and journalists from around the world on comparative Internet laws and practices. They could also help “de-Americanize” Internet discourse by highlighting case studies of successful Internet businesses from around the world. And lastly, they could support better research on the relationships between online communications, political and social freedom, and economic development.

Internet Freedom 2.1 3

The exact relationship between the spread of the Internet, economic growth, and advances in individual freedom is poorly understood, and often contested.

The Internet, Democracy, and Economic Growth

Over the past two decades, the spread of the Internet has transformed politics, societies, and the global economy. Across the world, people are becoming increasingly dependent on the free flow of information via the global network of networks that constitutes the

Internet. Large-scale online communications have facilitated unprecedented forms of dissent and activism, as well as the rapid global dissemination of news. In many cases, Internet use has helped empower previously disenfranchised groups, and made citizens more demanding about their roles in their countries’ political processes.

The Internet has also underwritten globalization, enabling the faster and cheaper exchange of information, capital, goods, and people. Direct commerce over the Internet is now valued at over $1 trillion, not counting the other forms of economic activity enabled by Internet access. According to the National Foreign Trade Council, content flowing over the Internet was responsible for 15 percent of U.S. economic growth between 2007 and 2012.1 A 2010 McKinsey survey suggested that consumers in the United States and Europe derived $133 billion in benefits from free Internet services. Other studies suggest that Internet use contrib-uted $65-$150 billion in consumer surplus to the U.S. economy.2 The business of the Internet is already supplanting many traditional business models. In 2010, for example, Google’s advertising revenue surpassed that of all U.S. newspapers combined — and the gap has only widened in subsequent years.3

These changes are not limited to the United States and the industrialized world. Another 2012 McKinsey study suggested that the Internet contributed an average of 1.9 percent of gross domestic product to developing countries (compared to 3.4 percent to developed economies).4 Meanwhile, a Boston Consulting Group analysis calculated that the Internet economies of the G20 countries would double in size between 2010 and 2016 to $4.2 trillion.5

The exact relationship between the spread of the Internet, economic growth, and advances in individual freedom is poorly understood, and often contested. But it is increasingly evident that the lack of access to the Internet can be detrimental. A survey by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China found that 86 percent of respondents said that their busi-nesses were negatively affected by the blocking of websites and online tools.6 In China, diffi-culty accessing Flickr, Facebook, and Gmail — and the crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs) — restrict access to such things as data for scientists, elements for graphic designers, and even applications for aspiring international students.7 China’s economy may not have

1 Karen Kornbluh, “The Need for a True Foreign Policy of the Internet,” The Internationalist, Council on Foreign Relations, January 17, 2014. 2 “Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake,” IAB Europe, September 2010; “Net Benefits,” The Economist, March 9, 2013. 3 Robert G. Kaiser, “The Bad News about the News,” The Brookings Essay, Brookings Institution, October 16, 2014. 4 Olivia Nottebohm, James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Michael Chui, and Abdur-Rahim Syed, “Online and Upcoming: The Internet’s Impact on Aspiring Countries,” McKinsey & Company, January 2012. 5 David Dean, Sebastian DiGrande, Dominic Field, and Paul Zwillenberg, “The Connected World. The Digital Manifesto: How Companies and Countries Can Win in the Digital Economy,” Boston Consulting Group, January 27, 2012. 6 Reuters, “Internet Censorship in China Hurts Businesses: Study,” The Times of India, February 12, 2015. 7 Andrew Jacobs, “China Further Tightens Grip on the Internet,” The New York Times, January 29, 2015.

2 Logging On

The German Marshall Fund of the United States4

suffered not just because of circumventing the so-called Great Firewall, but also because indi-viduals make use of technologies and platforms that the Chinese government finds indispens-able and consequently does not block.8

Long-term trends do, however, suggest a correlation between democracy, growth, and Internet use.9 (see Figure 1) What the numbers do not always show is the depth of freedom, the quality of economic growth, and the intensity of Internet use. An index of global connectedness compiled by DHL suggests that the quality of such interconnectedness has increased over 20 percent between 2005 and 2013, although the quantity may in fact have declined (possibly due to the 2008 global financial crisis). And while information exchanges have increased at a more rapid rate than goods, people, and capital, all of these elements of global interconnectedness have seen positive gains over that period.10 While the exact degree is debatable, the Internet

8 David Robinson, Harlan Yu, and Ann An, “Collateral Freedom: A Snapshot of Chinese Internet Users Circumventing Censorship,” Open Internet Tools Project, April 2013. 9 For optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the Internet’s contributions to freedom and economic growth, see Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers, “Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age,” Center for a New American Security, June 2011, 15; Steve Coll, “The Internet: For Better or for Worse,” The New York Review of Books, April 7, 2011; Anriette Esterhuysen, “A Long Way to Go: Civil Society Participation in Internet Governance,” in Wolfgang Kleinwachter, ed., MIND: Collaboratory Discussion Paper Series No. 1, Volume 2: Internet Policy Making (Berlin & Nairobi: Internet & Gesellschaft Collaboratory, 2011); Robert J. Gordon, “Does the New Economy Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 14, Fall 2000, 49-74; Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). For a study of the costs of information opacity, and how it impedes development, see Joel Kurtzman, Glenn Yago, and Triphon Phumiwasana, “The Global Costs of Opacity,” MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall 2004. 10 “Signs of Life,” The Economist, November 15, 2014.

Figure 1: The Internet, Freedom, and the Global Economy

Sources: IMF, ITU, Freedom House

Internet Freedom 2.1 5

Internet freedom — the ability to access the global Internet unimpeded and without fear of repercussion — has gradually permeated public discourse.

has made the world into a smaller, more open, and (cat videos notwithstanding) more produc-tive place.

At the same time, the startling impact of the Internet as a public good has led to new questions and concerns. The Internet does not yet have defined, universally accepted, or easily enforce-able rules or norms. Political leaders in many countries worry that new digital technologies undermine the power of national governments to exercise leadership, as well as their ability to uphold the functions of representative democracy.11 Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes have often used new digital technologies to preserve their systems of government and constrain political freedoms and human rights.12 At the World Conference on International Telecom-munications (WCIT) in Dubai in 2012, countries found themselves divided as to whether the Internet should be governed by national governments or multiple stakeholders — with the split roughly mirroring the divide between democratic and authoritarian governments.13 Similar debates characterized later summits, such as the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Busan, South Korea, although compli-cated by the positions of many emerging democratic states.14

Other concerns have come to the fore in recent years. Perceived tensions between security and freedom may be longstanding, but the speed, ease, and extent of information transactions enabled by the Internet have lent such tensions a greater sense of urgency. Uneven Internet penetration across and within countries has raised concerns about a digital divide, effectively disenfranchising — and certainly disadvantaging — large swathes of the global population.15 How these complexities are to be addressed will help determine the future of global politics, economics, security, and social trends.

Internet Freedom

The preservation of an open Internet is today very much in question. Some have argued that the Internet’s fragmentation — or balkanization — is inevitable, with the end result being several distinct, private, and autonomous networks.16 Internet freedom — the ability to access the global Internet unimpeded and without fear of repercussion — has gradually permeated public discourse and has now become a policy priority for many Western governments.

Debates concerning Internet freedom have taken different forms in different countries, based largely on their political systems and stages of development. In the United States, home to many of the world’s leading multinational Internet companies and a strong national security

11 Mark K. Lewis, “Digital Direct Democracy is Crushing Representative Democracy,” The Week, October 10, 2013; Lincoln Dahlberg and Eugenia Siapera, eds., Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 12 Morozov, The Net Delusion 13 Carolina Aguirre, “Beyond Dubai: Post WCIT Reflections from an Internet Governance Viewpoint,” LSE Network Economy Forum, The London School of Economics and Political Science, April 4, 2013, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/nef/2013/04/04/postwcit-internet-governance/.14 Samantha Dickinson, “How Will Internet Governance Change after the ITU Conference?” The Guardian, November 7, 2014. 15 See Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet World Wide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4.16 Katherine Maher, “The New Westphalian Web,” Foreign Policy, February 25, 2013.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States6

The United States is certainly not alone

in engaging in lawful Internet surveillance,

but the Snowden revelations raised

the global profile of debates surrounding

the issue.

apparatus, debates have largely concerned the legality and appropriateness of government surveillance. The 2013 leaks by Edward Snowden detailed cooperation between several leading private Internet companies and the U.S. National Security Agency on the PRISM data mining program, resulting in significant public and international criticism of the U.S. government. Others have explained the NSA’s surveillance activities as a natural and — to some degree — necessary government intervention.17 The United States is certainly not alone in engaging in lawful Internet surveillance, but the Snowden revelations raised the global profile of debates surrounding the issue.18

However, the fault lines on Internet freedom have often been different in other large markets. In Europe, where security concerns are often given a lower priority, governments and civil society groups have frequently found themselves at odds with private companies over consumer rights and digital privacy. For example, in 2011, German regulators asked Facebook to disable its photo-tagging system, which it deemed an unauthorized collection of individuals’ private data.19 In another case, in 2013, a German civil court said that Google had an obliga-tion to block, upon request, the appearance of libelous words that followed a person’s name in Google’s autocomplete search tool.20 And a May 2014 European Court of Justice ruling stated individuals had the right to erase outdated data from search engine results: what came to be known as the “right to be forgotten.”21 Similar concerns have also been raised in the United States, with criticism of corporations’ ability to collect users’ data.22

Meanwhile, in China, questions surrounding Internet use relate primarily to comprehensive state control over the Internet, which impinges not just on user access and anonymity but also on the operations of major multinational and domestic Internet companies.23 Chinese regulations ask that new technology companies prove their security credentials by sharing their source code with the Chinese government, providing back doors to software, and local-izing intellectual property, practices that are considered risky and anticompetitive.24 Chinese netizens have expressed, and do express, their frustrations: one popular thread on the Weibo social network ridiculed the lack of official recognition of China’s Great Firewall — before

17 David Jackson, “ACLU Sues Obama Administration on NSA Surveillance,” USA Today, June 11, 2013; Bruce Schneier “The U.S. Govern-ment Has Betrayed the Internet. We Need to Take It Back,” The Guardian, September 5, 2013; Benjamin Wittes, “There’s a Perfectly Good NSA Defense that the Obama Administration Isn’t Making,” The New Republic, August 18, 2013. 18 Ian Brown, “Lawful Interception Capability Requirements,” SCL, August 13, 2013, http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed32980; Stuart Taylor Jr., “The Big Snoop,” The Brookings Essay, Brookings Institution, April 29, 2014. 19 Kevin J. O’Brien, “Germany Investigating Facebook Tagging Feature,” The New York Times, August 3, 2011. 20 Rolfe Winkler, “Should Google Have to Scrub Its ‘Autocomplete’ Suggestions?” Digits, The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2014. 21 “Factsheet on the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Ruling,” European Commission, June 3, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf; Mark Scott, “Google Reinstates European Links to Articles from The Guardian,” The New York Times, July 4, 2014.22 Jeffrey Rosen, “Madison’s Privacy Blind Spot,” The New York Times, January 18, 2014; “A Disappointing Internet Decision,” The New York Times, January 15, 2014.23 Rebecca MacKinnon, “Google Confronts the Great Firewall,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2012. 24 J. Michael Daniel, Robert Holleyman, and Alex Niejelow, “China’s Undermining an Open Internet,” Politico, February 4, 2015.

Internet Freedom 2.1 7

it too was censored.25 Despite being seriously contemplated, a reversal of China’s stringent Internet controls in a new Shanghai Free Trade Zone was eventually ruled out by authorities.26

Asia’s Developing Democracies

Although they constitute the three largest concentrations of Internet users, the United States, Europe, and China account for less than half of the online world. For much of the rest of the global population, the fault lines on major debates about Internet freedom are far from clear. For this reason, the large democracies of the developing world — India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, Thailand, and South Africa — will be particu-larly important in shaping the future of the Internet, just as they will be in determining the contours of the international order.27 Five of these countries — India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand — are located in Asia, a region increasingly perceived to be the driver of the global economy, an emerging locus of international power, and the site of massive and lucrative Internet growth.28 Because of their sheer size, their economic trajectories, and their rising influ-ence, the choices they make with respect to Internet freedom will matter.

As Figures 2 and 3 indicate, Asia’s five large developing democracies, despite being home to about one-quarter of the world’s population, are underrepresented online. The poten-tial for the Internet’s growth in these states is vast, as indicated by Figure 4. One evalu-ation of countries’

25 David Wertime, “Chinese Web Users Vent Outrage at Gmail Block,” Tea Leaf Nation, Foreign Policy, December 29, 2014. 26 “Party Paper Rules Out Internet Freedoms in Shanghai Free Trade Zone,” Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2013. 27 See Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine, “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Future of International Order,” Center for a New American Security & The German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2012, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/global-swing-states-brazil-india-indonesia-turkey-and-future-international-order.28 Eva Dou, Juro Osawa, and Wayne Ma, “Internet Power Balance Tilts Toward Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2014.

Figures 2 and 3: Asia’s Large Developing Democracies

Sources: ITU, IMF

Population

Internet Users

The German Marshall Fund of the United States8

digital readiness classifies the likes of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines as “Break Out” countries, with the potential to develop strong digital economies given their low bases and rapid digital advancements over the past five years.29At present, Internet use in these states is overwhelmingly over mobile handsets rather than fixed broadband networks.30 But regardless of other factors such as expected population growth, decreasing costs, technological break-throughs, and higher living standards, relatively high rates of Internet usage among youth in these countries all but guarantees a doubling of Internet penetration over the coming years. (See Table 1.)

As developing countries that are also democracies of varying stages of maturity, these five countries are confronted with an unusual set of policy choices. And because of both the political transformations underway and their development profiles, their circumstances argu-ably have more global salience for other underdeveloped markets in Asia, Latin America, and Africa than those facing the United States, Europe, or China.

The first key state objective in all five countries is the preservation of political unity, law and order, and security, often against the perceived threat of separatism, simmering sectarian tensions, and organized militancy. Such concerns are often used to justify limitations on Internet freedom, whether through the select censorship of online material, or widespread restrictions on online access and anonymity.

A second objective these countries have is rapid economic growth, which can be induced by expanded Internet access. The Internet has the potential to create a more level playing field, enlarge markets for local businesses, and increase efficiency. Economic growth also requires

29 Bhaskar Chakravorti, Christopher Tunnard, and Ravi Shankar Chaturvedi, “Where the Digital Economy Is Moving the Fastest,” Harvard Business Review, February 19, 2015.30 For the broader trend among emerging economies, see “Emerging Nations Embrace Internet, Mobile Technology,” Pew Research, February 13, 2014.

Table 1: Asia’s Large Developing DemocraciesPopulation, Millions

Internet Users, Millions

Internet Users, %

Internet Users, Youth, %

Fixed Broadband Subscriptions, per 100

Mobile Subscriptions, per 100

ICT Development Index Rank

1 = bestIndia 1,237 156 12.6 27.8 1.2 69.9 120

Indonesia 247 38 15.4 33.3 1.2 114.2 97

Bangladesh 155 10 6.3 14.6 0.4 62.8 139

Philippines 97 35 36.2 67.4 8.2 106.5 98

Thailand 67 18 26.5 53.0 2.2 127.3 94

Total 1,803 257 14.2 30.5 (est.) 1.5 79.5 110 (avg.)

Sources: World Bank, ITU (2012)

Internet Freedom 2.1 9

attracting foreign investment, preserving a favorable business climate, creating incentives for local entrepreneurs, and finding technological solutions to large-scale development challenges. The Internet, in this respect, provides an unparalleled opportunity to stimulate businesses, increase living standards, and improve social welfare.

Finally, as emerging democratic polities, these five countries have relatively high levels of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and dissent by the standards of the developing world. (See Table 2.) In all five states, the Internet has become a tool for organized political activism, as well as a new arena for competing political parties and social movements. Unlike some more closed societies, these states are unlikely to be easily disconnected from the global Inter-net.31

Yet, in the recent past, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand have all adopted approaches to the Internet that combine aspects of openness with varying degrees of government intervention in its management. All five countries, for example, have seen limita-tions placed on Internet use that have inhibited the self-correcting forces of civil society and open political discourse. Some evidence of content filtering has been identified (See Table 3), and all have requested that large Internet companies such as Google remove specific content (See Table 4).

31 Jim Cowie, “Could It Happen In Your Country?” Renesys, November 30, 2012.

Figure 4: Total Internet Users

Sources: IMF, ITU

The German Marshall Fund of the United States10

Going forward, the choices these countries make with respect to the Internet will become increasingly important for their evolutions as secure, prosperous nation states. And the lessons to be drawn from Asia’s developing democracies are not applicable only to these countries, but are in fact more widely relevant — even to the United States and Europe. For example, Hungary experienced popular protests when the government of Viktor Orban tried to imple-ment a tax on Internet traffic that would have impeded economic opportunity.32 Meanwhile,

32 “Hungary Internet Tax Cancelled after Mass Protests,” BBC News, October 31, 2014.

Table 2: Political Rights and Civil LibertiesFreedom Status Political Rights

(1 = best)

Civil Liberties

(1 = best)

Electoral Status

India Free 2 3 Electoral Democracy

Indonesia Partly Free 2 4 Electoral Democracy

Bangladesh Partly Free 3 4 Electoral Democracy

Philippines Partly Free 3 3 Electoral Democracy

Thailand Partly Free 4 4 Electoral Democracy

Source: Freedom House (2014)

Table 3: Content Filtering

Political Filtering Social Filtering Internet Tools Filtering

Conflict and Security Filtering

India Selective Selective Selective Selective

Indonesia Selective Substantial Selective No evidence

Bangladesh No evidence No evidence No evidence No evidence

Philippines No evidence No evidence No evidence No evidence

Thailand Selective Selective Selective No evidenceSource: OpenNet Initiative (2011)

Table 4: Removal of Specific ContentNumber of Government Requests to Google to Remove Content

Number of Items Requested for Removal

Partial or Full Compliance by Google

India 673 5,274 32%

Indonesia 11 105 55%

Bangladesh 4 15 0%

Philippines 4 8 0%

Thailand 10 432 90%

Source: Google Transparency Report (January 1, 2010-June 30, 2013)

Internet Freedom 2.1 11

liberal Iceland — whose domain names end with “.is” — opted to close down the site khilafah.is, for its affiliation with the Islamic State.33

Balancing online freedom with security and economic opportunity is thus a global challenge. How much should democracy or any system of governance extend to the online sphere? Are diplomatic initiatives that are designed to advance Internet freedom counterproduc-tive, engendering suspicions of innocuous online activities such as basic communication and commerce? How can Internet privacy be preserved, while at the same time ensuring systems are in place to crack down on illegal online activity, such as child pornography or communica-tions between terrorists?

Rethinking the Internet Freedom Agenda

Despite the Internet’s evident importance for many day-to-day activities, for national security and law and order, and for businesses in almost every sector, discourse on Internet policy has been mostly overlooked by the policy community at large, both within Asia’s large developing democracies and internationally. The very notion of Internet freedom as a matter of national or international public policy is new. Senior policymakers often lack technical expertise or even a working understanding of the relevant issues. And due to concerns about citizens’ privacy, national security, and military contingency planning, the discussion of Internet freedom has often been closed, particularly on more controversial or sensitive matters.

Additionally, Internet freedom as it is currently being propagated is deeply problematic. The Internet freedom agenda confronts limitations in government capabilities and accusations of double-standards. Often designed with authoritarian regimes in mind, Internet freedom policies can be counterproductive when applied to non-Western democratic societies, particu-larly when divorced from local policy constraints and considerations. Discourse on Internet freedom often presents a false choice between freedom and security, or pits “good” civil society groups against “bad” governments, when the reality is rather more complex. Further, by assuming U.S.-style civil liberties for freedom of expression online, the Internet freedom agenda risks misleading publics about their rights and restrictions in their own countries.

Three other policy issues are distinct from Internet freedom, but are nonetheless relevant. The first relates to the growing militarization of cyberspace and the need to secure defense systems and critical infrastructure from the threat of cyber-attacks. Efforts to thwart attacks or secure networks may impinge in various ways on Internet freedom in many countries, or may be used as a justification for restricting the freedom to connect. A second aspect is cyber espionage and hacking, in which the targets or perpetrators are either corporate entities, individuals, or loose collectives.34 Such espionage or hacking is not only a security concern but also puts open societies at an economic disadvantage. Finally, debates related to Internet freedom are also very much tied to global Internet governance. National consensuses on policies will contribute one way or another to the Internet’s balkanization. And countries that are major beneficiaries

33 Rick Noack, “Why the Islamic State is Interested in Iceland,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2014. 34 Adam Segal, “Shaming Chinese Hackers Won’t Work Because Cyber-Espionage is Here to Stay,” The Guardian, May 30, 2013.

The very notion of Internet freedom as a matter of national or international public policy is new.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States12

The Internet is simultaneously

treated as a source of insecurity,

an opportunity for economic

advancement, and an increasingly important forum for political and

civic discourse.

of an open Internet are more likely to support a multi-stakeholder model, and let corporations and civil society have a say in how the Internet is governed.

How the likes of India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand choose to address issues related to cyber warfare, espionage and hacking, and Internet governance will both affect and be affected by the levels of Internet freedom they provide to their citizenry. In all these developing democracies, the Internet is simultaneously treated as a source of inse-curity, an opportunity for economic advancement, and an increasingly important forum for political and civic discourse.

A significant dilemma facing these states is whether the Internet should be subject to national security laws, rules that govern the media and freedom of speech, market regulations, or some combination thereof. All of these countries have constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression — even if there are caveats in place that make these rights less assured than, for example, those in the U.S. Bill of Rights. At the same time, current laws related to online communication in all these countries have important restrictions in place, ranging from punishments for inciting hate speech and defamation to religious blasphemy and severe libel laws. Taken together, their experiences suggest that the Internet freedom agenda requires an upgrade.

About this Report

This report investigates how India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand are addressing the complex opportunities and challenges posed by the advancement of the Internet. Chapter 3 of this report provides a snapshot of the state of the Internet in each of the five countries. This section details the state of development and democracy in each country, the state of the Internet, and describes some of the restrictions on Internet use.35 Chapter 4 summarizes some of the relevant laws in each of these countries related to freedom of expres-sion and Internet use. Chapter 5 integrates the experiences of these countries to identify some of the primary policy implications for Internet freedom. Chapter 6 evaluates current U.S. and European approaches to Internet freedom and suggests policy courses for governments, corporations, and civil society groups — in Asia’s developing democracies, as well as in the United States and Europe.

35 For a more comprehensive overview of limitations on Internet freedom, see Sanja Kelly, Madeline Earp, Laura Reed, Adrian Shahbaz, and Mai Truong, “Freedom on the Net 2014: Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls,” Freedom House, October 31, 2014.

Internet Freedom 2.1 13

India

India as a Developing Democracy

India’s history of democracy goes back to its independence in 1947, with a constitution coming into effect in 1950. Barring a short period known as Emergency in the 1970s, India has witnessed continuous democratic rule, which is all the more remarkable for the rise and growing diversity of political parties representing regional and disadvantaged groups. The 2014 general elections — the 16th in independent India’s history — had over 800 million eligible voters, about half of whom were under the age of 35. While threats to India’s democ-racy have rarely been existential, the country has experienced a large number of separatist movements, terrorist attacks, episodes of sectarian violence, and other threats to national security and social harmony, although these have all declined in severity over the past decade.

After years of sluggish growth and few successes in tackling endemic poverty, India’s economy began to accelerate in the early 1990s. Higher rates of growth followed in the late 1990s and 2000s, which helped to create a new, rising consumer class. Nonetheless, India still confronts a significant challenge in having to pull several hundred million of its citizens out of rural areas and subsistence agriculture. Despite some impressive strides over the past two decades, efforts at providing basic services such as education, electricity, and roads are ongoing. The Internet in India

India is often heralded as a major software success story, having developed brand recognition in ICT services and business process outsourcing. In fact, India is unusual among developing democracies for having globally successful information and communication technology companies that are not primarily mobile service providers. As of 2013, the ICT sector as a whole contributed about $100 billion in total revenue, $69 billion in exports, and an estimated 7.5 percent of India’s GDP, and directly employed about 2.5 million people.36 These figures have enjoyed a mostly positive trajectory despite a period of global economic downturn after 2008 and the growth of competitors. In addition to the likes of software giants Wipro and Infosys, indigenous Indian Internet companies have made important strides in recent years. Among those with the highest traffic are Indiatimes.com (a news portal), Flipkart (online

36 “Indian IT-BPO Industry,” NASSCOM, September 1, 2013 (http://www.nasscom.in/indian-itbpo-industry).

3 Profile Activation

Table 5: The Internet in India

Population 1,252 million

Internet Users 189 million

Top Web Sites Google, Facebook, YouTube, Yahoo, Blogspot

Top Local Web Sites Indiatimes, Flipkart, Rediff

Top ICT Companies by Revenue TCS, Infosys, Wipro

Top Mobile Companies by Users Airtel, Vodafone, IDEA

Sources: World Bank, ITU, Alexa, TCS, Infosys, Wipro, COAI, Facebook, Comscore

The German Marshall Fund of the United States14

At one level, the Indian government

recognizes the value of the Internet and

other information technologies as an integral part of the

Indian growth story.

shopping), Rediff.com (news and webmail), Quikr (an online marketplace), and Naukri.com (a jobs site).37 Zomato and MakeMyTrip are other Indian Internet companies enjoying a rising international profile.38 Overall, India’s e-commerce market is large and growing rapidly, leading to enormous investments by the likes of Amazon.

At one level, the Indian government recognizes the value of the Internet and other informa-tion technologies as an integral part of the Indian growth story, and describes it as a “key enabler for ‘inclusive and sustainable’ growth…in the areas of poverty reduction, employment generation, gender equity, balanced regional development, and special protection for vulner-able sections of the society.”39 The much-vaunted Aadhaar biometric identification scheme was initiated to improve, among other things, financial inclusion and the distribution of subsi-dies. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s government has intensified such efforts, unveiling a “Digital India” campaign intended to use online tools to improve governance. One example is eBiz, a public-private partnership that established a user-friendly web site to make it easier to start a business.40 However, some of these improvements may be offset by proposals that could raise telecommunications costs to fund other signature national initiatives.41

The 2014 general election saw unprecedented political organization and debate online. India is now home to over 66 million social media users, and many Indian politicians now dedi-cate considerable effort to cultivating what has been described as the “newest vote bank with the power to shape Indian politics.”42 Middle-class protests in India against corruption have benefited from online organization, as have demonstrations in Delhi following the much-publicized rape and murder of a female student in December 2012.

The Internet is also affecting Indian society in many positive respects. India has seen the advent of web sites, such as IPaidaBribe.com, which encourages individuals to document their experiences with corruption online. Indian developers are harnessing digital technologies for a variety of other social innovations from improving water supply to alleviating child traf-ficking.43 Education and urbanization are further areas where India’s demands are vast, and where the Internet provides opportunities for rapid improvements.44 And India’s film industry strands to benefit from the growing international demand for online streaming of Bollywood films.45

37 Alexa.com, September 5, 2013. 38 Leo Mirani, “Meet Zomato, the Indian Restarant App that Wants to Take Over the World,” Quartz, May 20, 2013; Lynn Cowan, “MakeMy-Trip, Up 89%, Has Best IPO Since 2007,” The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2010. 39 “Annual Report 2011-12,” Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, Government of India, New Delhi, 2012 (http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR%20Englsih%2011-12_0.pdf), 1.40 “Digital India,” Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, 2014, http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Digital%20India.pdf; See also http://www.ebiz.gov.in. 41 Press Trust of India, “Telecom Cess buzz to Fund Clean Drive,” The Telegraph, January 21, 2015. 42 Vasudevan Mukunth, “An Uneven Appreciation of Dissent,” The Hindu, August 9, 2013. 43 Mayank Jain, “Four Indian Apps that Are Strong Contenders for Facebook’s $250,000 Social Innovation Prize,” Scroll.in, October 13, 2014. 44 Rohan Sandhu and Subir Gokarn, “E-ducating India — Technology is Just One Piece of the Puzzle,” Business Standard, September 28, 2014; Amulya Gopalakrishnan, “Smart Cities: Art of Smart,” India Today, November 21, 2014.45 Leo Mirani, “Mobile Carriers Have a Secret Weapon in Their Battle Against Web Giants. It’s Called Bollywood,” Quartz, June 5, 2014.

Internet Freedom 2.1 15

India faces a wealth of challenges — sometimes self-imposed — to tapping the full power of the Internet as a tool of development.

Restrictions to Internet Freedom

India today faces some restrictions to online expression. Two oft-cited threats are terrorism and sectarian violence. For example, online restrictions had been imposed in 2013 to address rioting in the northeast.46 Indian authorities have also found terrorists to be particularly adept in adapting to new online tools, including communication tools and financing. Speeches uploaded online were believed to have inspired a terror cell in the Indian state of Karnataka.47 The terrorist Yasin Bhatkal was found to have used encrypted messages in communicating with his handlers.48 And a popular propagandist for the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) was found to have been operating out of the Indian city of Bangalore.49 Cyber attacks targeting government web sites — emanating from within India but also neighboring countries — have also been a cause for concern, and India’s telecommunication networks are deemed particu-larly vulnerable.

India faces a wealth of other challenges — sometimes self-imposed — to tapping the full power of the Internet as a tool of development. According to the World Bank, India ranks low in terms of ease of doing business, and fares particularly poorly in terms of property regis-tration and access to credit.50 India also suffers from infrastructure constraints, particularly broadband connectivity and electricity shortages.51 These constraints naturally affect both local entrepreneurs and multinational companies interested in doing business in the Indian market. Multinational Internet companies have often found themselves at odds with the Indian government over demands to screen content beyond court orders.52 The Modi govern-ment has pledged to address some of these concerns, particularly the overall ease of doing business.

Further constraints beyond infrastructure and security threats involve legislation. Discus-sions had been underway to amend the IT Act of 2000 when high-profile terrorist attacks took place in Mumbai in 2008. The legal process was consequently fast-tracked with the end result being harsher restrictions than had earlier been contemplated. The sending of “offensive” information over the Internet was outlawed, although the constitutionality of this legislation has since been deliberated by the Supreme Court.53 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) criticized this element of the IT Act as draconian when it was in opposition, but walked back its posi-tion upon forming the government in 2014. Some of the concerns about unfettered freedom

46 See Kelly et al., “Freedom on the Net 2014,” 2.47 Press Trust of India, “Bangalore Stadium Blast: Al-Qaeda’s E-Zine ‘Inspired’ Arrested Youth,” The Hindu, September 2, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/bangalore-stadium-blast-alqaedas-ezine-inspired-arrested-youth/article3850782.ece. 48 Johnson TA, “Bhatkal’s Grilling Reveals IM is Way Ahead of Security Agencies in Tech Use,” The Indian Express, September 16, 2013.49 M.K. Madhusoodan and Chetan Kumar, “Mehdi Masroor Arrested, Confesses to Operating ISIS Twitter Handle: Cops,” The Times of India, December 13, 2014.50 Doing Business 2013, International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, October 23, 2012. 51 Victor Mallet, “Indian Power Shortage is Achilles Heel of Economy,” Financial Times, May 30, 2013. 52 Anjana Pasricha, “Indian Internet Lawsuit Puts Spotlight on Freedom of Expression,” Voice of America, January 17, 2012; “Online Uproar as Kapil Sibal Seeks Social Media Screening,” The Times of India, December 6, 2011. 53 Sruthi Gottipati, “Five Ways Indian Internet Users are Fighting for Free Speech,” India Ink, The New York Times, November 30, 2012.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States16

The sending of “offensive” information

over the Internet was outlawed, although the constitutionality of this

legislation has since been deliberated by the Supreme Court.

of expression stem from social pressures. Controversy over a video by Indian comedy group All India Bakchod — deemed offensive by several social groups — triggered a national debate on the right to offend.54 In response to such seemingly offensive online material and incidents of social unrest, Indian politicians have periodically called for social media to be completely banned “on the lines of China.”55

The IT Act also allows the “Central government or a state government or any of its officers specially authorized by the Central Government or the state government” to intercept online communications.56 India is in the process of developing a Central Monitoring System (CMS) for “Lawful Interception and Monitoring of communications to address…national security concerns.”57 India’s Internet users may already be subjected to keyword-based monitoring, including on emails, Internet searches, and chat programs. And questions have been raised about the appropriateness of safeguards.58 Additionally, a National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) will reportedly be used by India’s intelligence communities to monitor the Internet for cyber crime.59 Such government access to online information has often put it at odds with private corporations. In one high profile example, the Indian government’s inability to decrypt Blackberry communications during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack resulted in a four-year stand-off with Research in Motion (RIM) over access to encrypted communications.60 In other cases, multinationals have more readily acquiesced to Indian government wishes, in part to address fears about data privacy.61

54 Salil Tripathi, “The Right to Be Offended,” Mint, February 11, 2015. 55 Makarand Gadgil, “Ajit Pawar Wants Social Media Banned, RR Patil Says No Such Plans,” Mint, June 2014. 56 Prashant Iyengar, “Privacy and the Information Technology Act — Do We Have the Safeguards for Electronic Privacy,” The Centre for Internet & Society, April 7, 2011. 57 “Surveillance System,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 9, 2011, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=70747. 58 Shalini Singh, “Govt. violates privacy safeguards to secretly monitor Internet traffic,” The Hindu, September 8, 2013. 59 Mahima Kaul, “Is India About to Get Its Own PRISM?” Index on Censorship, July 2013. 60 Joji Thomas Philip, “BlackBerry Maker Research in Motion Agrees to Hand Over Its Encryption Keys to India,” Economic Times, August 2, 2012. 61 “Xiaomi to Open India Data Centre to Allay Privacy Fears,” BBC News, October 27, 2014.

Internet Freedom 2.1 17

Indonesia

Table 6: The Internet in Indonesia

Population 250 million

Internet Users 40 million

Top Web Sites Google, Facebook, Blogspot, YouTube, Yahoo

Top Local Web Sites Kaskus, Detik, Tokobagus

Top ICT Companies by Revenue Telekomunikasi, Indosat, XL Axiata

Top Mobile Companies by Users Telkomsel, Indosat, XL Axiata

Sources: World Bank, ITU, Alexa, Facebook, Comscore, Telkmosel, AxiataIndonesia as a Developing Democracy

Indonesia, rather unusually among large countries, democratized in the Internet Age. As a result, Indonesian society and political life has, in various ways, come to associate democrati-zation closely with Internet freedom, and the Internet has become a central tool in Indonesia’s democratic participation. Indonesia’s 2014 election, like India’s, witnessed the unprecedented use of social media and other online tools as part of the competitive political process.

However, Indonesia is also a fine example of the tortuous relationship between the web and electoral democracy. The 2014 presidential election was closely contested and saw supporters of the two major candidates — Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto — take to online political discussions in droves. However, allegations and smear campaigns by the two candidates’ supporters and rivals were disseminated online, often under the cover of anonymity on social media.62

Indonesia is also distinctive for having substantial monitoring and filtering of social content. Despite being a religiously pluralistic society, Indonesia has stringent blasphemy laws, perceived to be protective of the Muslim majority. The greatest victims, in many cases, have been Ahmadis and Shias, who have often been targeted in recent years. Attempts at repealing the blasphemy laws in courts have failed and Indonesia consequently struggles — like many other developing democracies — to find a balance between religious freedom and freedom of speech. The Internet in Indonesia

Indonesia’s Internet penetration rate — although relatively low by regional standards — has begun to grow at an accelerated pace. In 2011, the Internet accounted for about 1.6 percent of the country’s GDP, a figure that was expected to rise to 2.5 percent by 2016.63 Like Asia’s other developing democracies, Internet penetration is largely the result of inexpensive mobile communications rather than fixed Internet bandwidth, which is considerably more expen-

62 Joe Cochrane, “After Barrage of Personal Attacks, Indonesian Presidential Election Tightens,” The New York Times, July 5, 2014. 63 “The Connected Archipelago: The Role of the Internet in Indonesia’s Economic Development,” Deloitte, December 2011, 1.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States18

The relationship between the Internet and democracy was

tested by the drafting and introduction of

Indonesia’s cyber law in 2008.

sive. A recent report indicated, for example, that Internet connections in Indonesia were the “second slowest in the world.”64

Despite such constraints, Indonesia is home to a remarkably vibrant blogging community, with Bahasa being the second most used language on WordPress, after English. Indonesia is home to a large number of Twitter users, who have employed microblogging in social move-ments such as relief efforts following humanitarian disasters. The Indonesian blogger commu-nity has also helped the country with regional integration efforts, and the ASEAN Summit in Bali saw bloggers take part as members of official delegations. The Freedom of Information Act in Indonesia is another major boon for Indonesian civil society, and the government is using the Internet to aid transparency — and thereby increase its accountability — by showing tax filings and YouTube videos of meetings.

The Indonesian government has ambitious plans to double the number of people online, which would parallel the doubling of its middle class by 2020. The country’s communication ministry is also encouraging tech start-ups with funding, contributing to a culture of entre-preneurship. And Indonesia stands to be a prime beneficiary of the shift in global investments away from China.65 That being said, Indonesia — like India — still faces problems of access to computers and broadband infrastructure.Restrictions to Internet Freedom

The relationship between the Internet and democracy was tested by the drafting and intro-duction of Indonesia’s cyber law in 2008. This was a truly participatory process that involved the House of Representatives and was supported by the constitutional court. However, the end product was deemed too draconian by many members of the media. Although media and broadcasting laws formed the basis of the new cyber laws, the application of these laws to the public at large — rather than just journalists — was deemed problematic. An attempt at declaring the law unconstitutional was rejected in 2009, but civil society groups still sought to amend it. The House of Representatives made subsequent attempts at legislation targeting IT crimes, which Indonesian journalists criticized for being “more repressive” than the 2008 law.66

Defamation according to the cyber law was deemed harsher than the criminal code, and the inclusion of six-year sentences ensured that crimes under this act were detainable (as opposed to crimes carrying maximum five-year sentences). Legislation in 2008 directed at pornog-raphy came out of a compromise: while initially much more wide ranging, it was criticized by women’s organizations and artists. Another relevant aspect of restrictions on freedom of expression relates to the ability to criticize officers of the state. Until 2006, it was considered a criminal offense in Indonesia to insult the president and the vice president. The Indonesian government has periodically proposed restoring the ban on insulting the head of state.67

64 “Minister Questions Use of Fast Internet,” The Jakarta Post, February 1, 2014.65 Matt Rusling, “Could Indonesia Be an Internet Powerhouse?” The Diplomat, November 20, 2014. 66 Ismira Lutfia, “Indonesian Cyber Crime Bill to Spark Debate,” The Jakarta Globe, December 25, 2009. 67 Patti McCracken, “Insult Laws: Insulting to Press Freedom,” World Press Freedom Committee & Freedom House, 2012, 122-126; Yeremia Sukoyo and Ezra Sihite, “Insulting the President Could Be Illegal Under New Code,” The Jakarta Globe, March 27, 2013.

Internet Freedom 2.1 19

Despite much criticism of its existing policies, the government sees the cyber law as an inadequate measure in the face of national security threats, invasions of privacy, and cyber security. Indonesia faces some 40 million cyber attacks each year, mostly targeting government sites such as the Ministry of Defense. By some measures, in 2013 Indonesia may even have surpassed China as the leading source of cyber attacks.68

Indonesia does have filtering in place, mostly targeted at pornography, and implemented through the handful of Internet service providers who dominate the Indonesian market. About 45 million sites are currently blocked, but such pre-censorship is nonetheless selec-tive. Communism, for example, is illegal in Indonesia, but communist material is not filtered. There are only a handful of cases of specific online content being blocked, perhaps most notably the notorious “Innocence of Muslims” movie on YouTube. The State Security Act allows for some monitoring, but the government’s capabilities are currently limited.

68 Jennifer LeClaire, “Indonesia Claims Top Spot as Cyber-Attack Source,” Top Tech News, October 16, 2013.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States20

Bangladesh

Table 7: The Internet in Bangladesh Population 157 million

Internet Users 10 million

Top Web Sites Facebook, Google, YouTube

Top Local Web Sites Bangla News 24, Prothom Alo, bdews24

Top ICT Companies by Revenue Grameenphone, Banglalink, BTCL

Top Mobile Companies by Users Grameenphone, Robi Axiata, Banglalink

Sources: World Bank, ITU, Alexa, Grameenphone, Banglalink, BTCL, Axiata, FacebookBangladesh as a Developing Democracy

Between 2007 and 2009, Bangladesh experienced two years of army-backed rule, which ended in January 2009 with the swearing in of Sheikh Hasina as prime minister following the landslide victory of her Awami League. However, the four years following the country’s return to democracy have been politically tumultuous, with a failed army mutiny followed more recently by the Shahbagh protests.69 Elections held in 2014 were boycotted by the main oppo-sition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Outside actors — notably the United States and India — have been divided about the fairness of the election.70

Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh’s economy has made some impressive strides — reflected in the important growth of its telecommunications network — but these have often been to the detriment of the country’s democratic spirit. Critics have alleged that the security of the state has become equated with the security of the prime minister and the preservation of her party in power. At the same time, there have been some positive developments in Bangla-desh’s democratic trajectory, such as the passage of a Right to Information Act in 2009.71

The Internet in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has been less successful in harnessing the power of the Internet to advance its economic prospects than many other Asian democracies, having a comparatively small ICT sector and a low rate of Internet penetration. The $250 million ICT sector, however, is growing and already boasts some 800 companies. And they are beginning to reach foreign markets through the Bangladeshi diaspora.

Internet penetration is mostly urban, with a lack of infrastructure in rural areas. 3G mobile licenses were offered only in late 2013, but should lead to a rapid increase in mobile Internet use. As in other developing states, the cost of fixed broadband is a severe limitation. Bangla-desh also suffers from a weak regulatory and legal framework for Internet-related businesses. Nor is there adequate access to necessary finance, in part because Bangladesh has strict foreign 69 For an excellent explanation of Bangladesh’s political and social divisions, see Hassan Mneimneh, “Bangladesh’s Failed Elections, Troubled History, and Uncertain Promise,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 8, 2014, http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2014/01/08/bangladeshs-failed-elections-troubled-history-and-uncertain-promise. 70 Jason Burke, “Bangladesh PM Hints at Fresh Polls if Violence Ends,” The Guardian, January 6, 2014. 71 “The Power of Using the Right to Information Act in Bangladesh: Experiences from the Ground,” World Bank Institute, 2011.

Internet Freedom 2.1 21

As in other areas of Bangladesh’s economic development, information and communications technologies have been used in innovative ways to improve public welfare.

currency laws. As a whole, foreign direct investment in Bangladesh is relatively marginal at $1.3 billion, although growing rapidly.72

The Internet in Bangladesh has not been without its success stories. As in other areas of the country’s economic development, information and communications technologies have been used in innovative ways to improve public welfare. Grameenphone, Bangladesh’s largest mobile carrier, has introduced services that enable the payment of utility bills and the purchase of train tickets via mobile communications.73 The power of social media in Bangladesh was demonstrated in its use by Dhaka University students to stage protests in 2010. A proliferation of NGOs are also taking advantage of Internet tools for mobile banking, youth training, and increasing public awareness for social causes. But much of this success in popular mobilization was offset by a ban on using social media in pre-election campaigning in 2013 and 2014.

With some 66 million mobile phone subscribers, telecommunications services present unprec-edented business opportunities. The largest web sites, by number of users, are invariably news sites, reflecting the incredible public appetite for news. The Awami League government also advanced a “Digital Bangladesh” slogan, to draw attention to their nascent efforts at devel-oping an ICT industry. However, multinational corporations have yet to take full advantage. Restrictions to Internet Freedom

The basis for Bangladesh’s current laws pertaining to the Internet is the ICT Act of 2006. The most pertinent passage to Internet freedom is Section 57, which bestows wide-ranging powers to police, and could result in 14 years in prison. Punishable acts, as in many other developing democratic states, are vaguely defined. Blasphemy laws are still widely applicable in Bangla-desh, and motivated by concerns such as rioting following the tagging online of a photograph of the Prophet Mohammed by a Buddhist user. Monitoring activities, particularly of mobile handsets, has increased, with journalists tracked without being physically followed. Bangla-desh’s security agencies recently established a cyber crime unit.

Bangladesh has witnessed little in the way of direct state intervention in terms of Internet freedom, despite being a country with weaker democratic institutions. But there have been some notable exceptions. YouTube was blocked for six days in March 2009 to prevent access to a conversation between Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Bangladeshi army officers in the aftermath of a failed mutiny. A senior government official said the site was blocked for hosting “contents subversive to the state.”74 In 2013, three bloggers were arrested by Bangladeshi police for “hurting religious sentiments.”75 Similarly, censorship of an entire web site — because specific accounts could not be targeted — took place when Facebook was temporarily blocked in 2010 because of content related to the Prophet Mohammed.76

72 “FDI Rises Despite Global Downturn,” The Daily Star, June 27, 2013. 73 Ciara Byrne, “Grameen IT CEO on How Technology Transformed Bangladesh,” VentureBeat, February 25, 2011. 74 “Bangladesh Blocks YouTube Over Mutiny Tape: Govt Source,” AFP, March 8, 2009.75 Mohammed Sanaul Islam Tipu, “Four Bloggers Indicted,” Dhaka Tribune, September 8, 2013. 76 “Facebook Blocked,” The Daily Star, May 30, 2010, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=140613.

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Questions over Internet freedom in Bangladesh assumed greater salience in the backdrop of the Shahbagh protests against the Islamist group Jamaat-e-Islami, which benefited from unprecedented online activism. At the same time, others have pointed to limitations to online discourse, including coercion against influential voices in the Internet. In January 2013, the Bangladeshi blogger Asif Mohiuddin was stabbed. While violence against journalists has taken place in South Asia — Bangladesh, for example, is ranked 129 out of 179 in Reporters without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index — this episode marked a tragic extension of this trend to those writing online.77

77 “Statement of Solidarity on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Internet Users in Bangladesh,” Internet Democracy Project, January 15, 2013.

Internet Freedom 2.1 23

The Philippines

Table 8: The Internet in the PhilippinesPopulation 98 million

Internet Users 36 million

Top Web Sites Facebook, Google, YouTube, Yahoo, Blogspot

Top Local Web Sites Sulit, Inquirer.net, ABS-CBN News

Top ICT Companies by Revenue PLDT, Globe Telecom, Bayantel

Top Mobile Companies by Users Smart, Globe Telecom, Sun Cellular

Sources: World Bank, ITU, Alexa, Businessweek, FacebookThe Philippines as a Developing Democracy

Since emerging from the rule of strongman Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s, the Philippines has gradually strengthened its democratic institutions, despite turmoil in the 1990s and early 2000s that included attempted coups and rigged elections. The current government of Benigno Aquino III embarked on a popular anti-corruption initiative, which has met with mixed success.

The Philippine economy was affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Slower rates of growth in the subsequent years saw the country drop from the list of states widely deemed to be emerging economic powers, although Goldman Sachs later included it (along with Indonesia and Bangladesh) as one of the “Next 11” economies, primed to drive future global growth. Corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and inequality remain hurdles, and today, the Philippines’ economy continues to be heavily dependent on remittances from citizens working abroad. The Internet in the Philippines

The Philippines has among the most developed Internet capabilities of Asia’s developing democracies, with comparatively strong broadband infrastructure and high Internet use — particularly among youth. A goal of the Philippines’ Intellectual Property Office is to achieve 90 percent Internet penetration within the next few years. But like other developing democra-cies in the region, the Internet in the Philippines is still largely dependent on mobile connec-tivity rather than broadband infrastructure.

The Philippines has safeguards in its Constitution and in the Data Privacy Act of 2012 to preserve high levels of Internet freedom and freedom of speech. And in a similar manner to countries such as Brazil, the Internet has actually been used to help bolster democracy, in the Philippines’ case through the crowdsourcing of a document known as the Magna Carta for Philippine Internet Freedom, which was filed as a bill in the Philippines House of Representa-tives and Senate. While overturning the cyber crime prevention act of 2012, and ensuring a degree of protection for freedom of expression on the Internet, it still places limitations. These

The German Marshall Fund of the United States24

include those on libel, hate speech, and child pornography.78 Additionally, a freedom of infor-mation act has also been proposed, along the lines employed by Indonesia.Restrictions to Internet Freedom

The Philippines’ most relevant legislation to Internet freedom is the Cybercrime Preven-tion Act of 2012. The more problematic aspects of the law, as in other countries, pertain to extending stringent social laws from the offline world to the online sphere. The Philippines has particularly stringent libel laws, and its Internet legislation ensures that the punishments for libel and other such crimes online are harsher. Numerous petitions have been made to stop the Act from coming into force, and the Supreme Court has placed an indefinite restraining order.79

The Philippine business community is particularly concerned that their prospects will suffer. Corporations — including multinationals — have had to rethink their online presence for the Philippine market. For example, the use of online advertising campaigns and social media are causes of legal concern, rather than important opportunities to expand market access. The law has also placed significant additional costs on small and medium enterprises seeking to be compliant.

Although the Philippines is home to terrorist activity and active insurgencies, the issues that most affect Internet freedom after libel relate to hacking and sex crimes. The ILOVEYOU virus — which spread globally in 2000 and was created by a student in the Philippines — led to harsher cyber crime laws coming into effect. More recently, government web sites were hacked by the activist group Anonymous in retaliation for what was perceived to be an overly restric-tive law. Sex crimes constitute another area of concern that has led to more careful monitoring of online content. For example, city officials in Cebu are attempting to tackle cybersex, which has become a significant source of revenue for some lower income families, including for parents exploiting their children.80

78 Jillian York, “A Brief Analysis of the Magna Carta for Philippine Internet Freedom,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, July 8, 2013.79 Louis Bacani, “It’s Miriam’s Internet Freedom Bill vs Anti-Cybercrime Law,” philstar.com, July 3, 2013.80 Katrin Kuntz, “The Curse of Cybersex: the Lost Children of Cebu,” Der Spiegel, April 17, 2014.

The use of online advertising campaigns

and social media are causes of legal

concern, rather than important

opportunities to expand market access.

Internet Freedom 2.1 25

Thailand

Table 9: The Internet in ThailandPopulation 67 million

Internet Users 18 million

Top Web Sites Facebook, Google, YouTube, Blogspot

Top Local Web Sites Dealfish, Pantip, Sanook

Top ICT Companies by Revenue AIS, True Corp, DTAC

Top Mobile Companies by Users AIS, Telenor DTAC, True Move

Sources: World Bank, ITU, Alexa, Telenor, True, Facebook, ComscoreThailand as a Developing Democracy

Thailand is something of an outlier for being a country that has experienced significant back-sliding for democracy and political freedoms — if not necessarily social freedoms — over the past two years. In 2014, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra became the third leader removed by the courts since the 2006 coup that ousted her brother Thaksin Shinawatra. This is part of an enduring struggle in Thai politics between the so-called Yellow Shirts opposed to Thaksin and supported by the royal family and the military, and the populist Thaksin supporters known as Red Shirts. However, Thailand’s democracy-in-name-only features some similar dynamics to the other four countries under consideration, possibly because of a relatively high degree of personal freedoms.

Economically, too, Thailand distinguishes itself by boasting a higher average standard of living, approximately double that of Indonesia and five times that of Bangladesh. Thailand was seen as a regional economic leader in the 1980s and early 1990s, but suffered badly from the Asian Financial Crisis. Despite considerable wealth creation, Thailand’s economy has been affected by the familiar forces of inequality, crony capitalism, and disastrous state subsidies.The Internet in Thailand

The Internet has established itself in urban areas and among educated Thais. Like many other developing democracies, its most popular features include its use as a source of news and means of communication. The Internet market has also expanded rapidly, with a growing retail value of over $250 million.81 While private Internet companies have grown, the market for high-speed Internet services is still dominated by TOT Public Company Limited, which is state-owned.

At the center of Thailand’s Internet freedom debates is the Computer Crime Act of 2007, drafted the same year as Thailand’s current constitution under a transitional military leader-ship. As in Asia’s other large developing countries, the law extends the criminality of offline activities to the online world, most notably Thailand’s notorious lèse-majesté law. This crimi-nalizes any action deemed to violate the king’s person or image, and extends crimes to defa-mation, insults, or threats against the king, the royal family, any past or future monarchs,

81 Sinfah Tunsarawuth and Toby Mendel, “Analysis of Computer Crime Act of Thailand,” The Centre for Law and Democracy, May 2010.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States26

or activities — such as development activities — associated with the king. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s government has attempted to introduce new cyber security laws, but has also attempted to better integrate Thai business and government with the Internet.82

Restrictions on Internet Freedom

The limitation to Internet freedom most closely associated with the Thai context is the lèse-majesté law. The agencies responsible for imposing Thailand’s lèse-majesté law include the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) and the Special Branch Police. Among those that the country’s military government has recently listed as a threat to Thailand’s stability for insulting the royal family are a Thai professor based in Japan, a London-based hairdresser who was critical of the monarchy on social media, and even the television show host John Oliver.83

Thailand’s 2007 Computer Crime Act was previously used as justification for a wave of blogger arrests in 2010, and has had other more far-reaching effects. Private cable and wireless providers have assumed a legal liability for content. The NBTC has asked for the cooperation of companies like Facebook to identify users violating the law, and asked Internet providers to monitor and report infringements.84 Furthermore, IP addresses are being used as evidence to identify individuals responsible for criminal activities. Outside the realm of government inter-vention, Thailand’s telecommunications infrastructure has also been the object of vandalism by political protestors, impeding Internet access.85

82 Shuan Sim, “Thailand Internet Censorship,” International Business Times, February 25, 2015. 83 Andrew MacGregor Marshall, “Thailand’s Military Government Thinks John Oliver is a Threat to Its Monarchy,” Vice, July 24, 2014. 84 “Thai Authorities Urge Internet Providers to Use Their Own Judgment in Blocking Lèse-Majesté Websites,” Prachatai English, December 30, 2014. 85 Kelly et al., “Freedom on the Net 2014.”

The law extends the criminality of offline

activities to the online world, most notably

Thailand’s notorious lèse-majesté law.

Internet Freedom 2.1 27

India

• Article 19 of Constitution (1949) | “All citizens shall have the right…to freedom of speech and expression” but State can impose “reasonable restrictions…in the interests of the sover-eignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality…”86

• IT (Amendment) Act (2008).87

• Section 66A | Anyone sending “by means of a computer resource or a communication device” “grossly offensive,” “menacing,” knowingly “false,” or misleading information shall be punished “with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.”

• Section 67 | Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form.

• Section 69 | Authorizes Central or State government to “intercept, monitor or decrypt” “any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource.”

Indonesia

• Article 28 of Constitution (1945, amended 1999-2002). | Freedom to “express written and oral opinions, etc., shall be regulated by law.” “Every person shall have the right…to express opinions.”

• Law on Electronic Information and Transactions (2008)88

• Article 27 | Prohibited acts: Distributing, transmitting or causing to be accessible “contents against propriety…of affronts and/or defamation…of extortion and/or threats.”

• Article 28 | Prohibited act: Disseminating “false and misleading information” or “infor-mation aimed at inflicting hatred or dissension on individuals and/or certain groups of community based on ethnic groups, religions, races, and inter-groups.”

• Article 45 | Those who violate Articles 27 and 28 to be sentenced to maximum sentence of six years and/or fine of one billion rupiah.

86 The texts of countries’ constitutions can be accessed and compared at The Constitute Project, www.constituteproject.org. 87 http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_act2008.pdf88 http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Law-No.-11-Concerning-Electronic-Information-and-Transactions.pdf

4 Terms of Service

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Bangladesh

• Article 39 of Constitution (1972). | “Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement of an offence — (a) the right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression; and (b) freedom of the press, are guaranteed.”

• ICT Act (2006)89

• Section 57 | “If any person deliberately publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the website or in electronic form any material which is fake and obscene” or tends to “deprave or corrupt” “or causes to deteriorate or creates possibility to deteriorate law and order, prejudice the image of the State or person or causes to hurt or may hurt religious belief or instigate against any person or organization, then this activity of his will be regarded as an offence.” This “shall be punishable with imprison-ment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to” 10 million Taka.

The Philippines

• Article III of the Constitution (1987) | “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”

• Cybercrime Prevention Act (2012)90

• Section 4 (c) 4 | Punishable act: “The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code…committed through a computer system or any other similar means.”

• Section 6 | For “all crimes…if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies…the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher.”

• Section 12 | “Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time.”

89 http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Bangladesh/comm2006.pdf90 http://www.gov.ph/2012/09/12/republic-act-no-10175/

Internet Freedom 2.1 29

Thailand

• Section 36 of Constitution (2007) | “A person shall enjoy the liberty of communication by lawful means. The censorship, detention or disclosure of communication between persons…shall not be made except by virtue of the law specifically enacted for security of the State or maintaining public order or good morals.”

• Computer Crime Act (2007)91

• Section 14 | Anyone who commits any offence “that involves import to a computer system of any computer data related with an offence against the Kingdom’s security under the Criminal Code” “shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than one hundred thousand baht or both.”

• Section 15 | “Any service provider intentionally supporting or consenting to an offence under Section 14 within a computer system under their control shall be subject to the same penalty.”

• Section 16 | “Any person, who imports computer data where a third party’s picture appears either created, edited, added or adapted by electronic means or otherwise in a manner that is likely to impair that third party’s reputation or cause that third party to be isolated, disgusted or embarrassed, shall be subject to imprisonment for not longer than three years or a fine of not more than sixty thousand baht.”

91 http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/117; Thailand’s proposed digital economy-cyber security bills are available in translation at https://thainetizen.org/2015/01/digital-economy-cyber-security-bills-en/.

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The varying goals of developing democracies — maintaining law and order in potentially volatile societies, ensuring security against technologically agile threats, creating a favor-able business climate including for foreign investors, addressing daunting challenges

to development, and preserving a modicum of political and personal freedoms — present a complex picture for the future of Internet freedom. Governments in countries like India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand face a number of choices with regards to the relative costs and benefits of various policy decisions. Several broad conclusions can be derived from their experiences at the level of first principles.

The online world is a natural extension of the offline world. Policy debates too often segre-gate Internet-related discourse (under the broad rubric of “cyber”) from other aspects of public policy. But the Internet in each country is closely intertwined with its system of gover-nance, laws, security situation, development profile, and socio-cultural norms and practices. Expecting a state or society to allow activity online that is not permitted offline is unrealistic. At the same time, the argument that the Internet as a medium for sharing information is somehow inherently different from other forms of mass communication (such as print, radio, and television) and therefore should be subject to more stringent regulation, is flawed, as is the notion that opinion on the Internet should be subject to local media laws, given the variety of functions that the Internet serves. Internet policy has to be connected to other relevant aspects of public policy. And discouraging laws and practices that mete out harsher punishments on unlawful online actions than similar violations committed offline is a worthy and attainable objective.

Democracies are diverse: there is no global consensus about freedom of expression. Very little can be done to overturn deep-seated cultural traits, which are often determined by local tradition and circumstances. A certain amount of contradiction should also be expected in open societies — including restrictions on Internet use in otherwise free environments — assuming there are appropriate checks and balances, as there often are in states with resilient civil societies. Bringing the rest of the democratic world in lock step with U.S. or Western values is unrealistic. A one-size fits all approach to Internet freedom will not work and may, in fact, prove counterproductive.

Freedom and security are not necessarily in conflict. In open societies, online freedoms need not be at odds with the security requirements to address online threats. Discourse that presents a false choice between security and freedom is harmful for both, as well as for state legitimacy and economic development. Just as legalization and regulation go hand-in-hand, a certain amount of regulation on the Internet — whether in the form of surveillance or censor-ship — should be considered permissible, as long as there are adequate checks and balances, transparency about processes, and avenues for recourse to justice. Concerns about surveillance relate as much to the individuals doing the surveillance as to the technical ability to conduct such surveillance. The Internet freedom agenda would enjoy greater success if it were to focus less on cases of surveillance and censorship, but rather on broader government transparency

5 Software Upgrade

Discouraging laws and practices that mete out

harsher punishments on unlawful online

actions than similar violations committed

offline is a worthy and attainable objective.

Internet Freedom 2.1 31

in such matters, the presence and power of independent regulatory bodies, and avenues for recourse to justice through the courts and media.92

Governments, businesses, and even civil society are divided on Internet freedom. Thinking of individual sectors as cohesive wholes, unified by a shared agenda, is limiting. Governments are often receptive to using Internet tools to improve transparency, disseminate public informa-tion, make better decisions, promote educational initiatives, and collect revenue. But states are also skeptical of things outside their control. While many businesses see natural advantages to commerce enabled by the Internet, many traditional businesses and state-owned enterprises would like to see Internet commerce further regulated to level the playing field.93 And while Internet activists and blogger communities are vocal, passionate, and active, other elements of civil society — such as those representing minority interests — may actively encourage certain restrictions on Internet freedom. Strong Internet freedom coalitions will require participation from government, business, and civil society (including academia, NGOs, and the press).

Current Internet laws are deeply flawed. Legislation pertaining to the Internet in many democratic countries is problematic, even in the context of their own constitutional rights pertaining to freedom of expression. Laws are often intentionally vague, and designed to be used under the broadest possible circumstances. Violations are numerous and often uninten-tional. Arrests and prosecutions for violations online are consequently infrequent and appear arbitrary. Moreover, Internet policy and pertinent legislation has often been advanced by stealth, without seeking broad public consent. And while current governments may be respon-sive to public sentiments and accountable, current laws can be grossly misused in the hands of others. All of this leads to a culture of fear, and undermines public trust in state and civic institutions. Bad Internet laws, in other words, threaten to destabilize democracy.

There is low public awareness of the privileges and responsibilities associated with Internet use. Internet users are often not adequately informed of their rights and restrictions — legal or otherwise — in their native countries. Even with public awareness initiatives, there is wide-spread apathy about restrictive Internet laws in many states. In part due to U.S. dominance of the Internet, there are popular misconceptions that online expression is subject to the kinds of freedoms enshrined in the U.S. Bill of Rights. Consequently, the Internet is often perceived as a free for all space, and there is frequently a disconnect between online and offline behavior, contributing to such phenomena as cyber-bullying. Governments, NGOs, educational institu-tions, and businesses hold joint responsibility for Internet awareness. The absence of public education on the legal and ethical aspects of Internet use is a shortcoming comparable to inadequate education on government, drugs, sex, nutrition, and public health.

92 Rebecca MacKinnon, “The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media,” Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, January 27, 2015. 93 For example, see “Received Many Complaints on Flipkart Discout Sale; Govt to Take Call: Nirmala Sitharaman,” Economic Times, October 9, 2014.

Arrests and prosecutions for violations online are infrequent and appear arbitrary. Bad Internet laws threaten to destabilize democracy.

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Norms and ideals advanced by the United States and Europe have helped ensure a high degree of online freedom and preserved a loose multi-stakeholder model, which grants a voice and meaningful role in Internet governance to corporations and civil society

groups. But as the percentage of Internet users in the non-Western world rises, long-standing assumptions about Internet freedom are beginning to be questioned. Just as efforts are underway to give national governments a bigger say in how the Internet is governed, there is a danger that Western democracies are failing to uphold some of the basic principles of Internet freedom, focusing instead on high-profile advocacy efforts that are not necessarily effective in practice.

Yet those principles are as relevant today as ever. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ explicitly states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” And even skeptics of the Internet freedom agenda concede that its objectives are worthwhile. Evgeny Morozov, for example, has written: “While I was — and remain — critical of many Western efforts to promote ‘Internet freedom’ in [authoritarian] regimes, most of my criticisms have to do with the means, not the ends, of the ‘Internet freedom agenda,’ presuming that the ends entail a better climate for freedom and more respect for human rights.”94 From both a norma-tive and practical standpoint, upgrading the Internet freedom agenda is necessary.

However, there are limitations in terms of what Western governments, Internet companies, and activists can realistically do to advance the cause of Internet freedom without unintended repercussions. While governments can be useful conveners and coordinators, can channel resources, and can establish guidelines, they are restricted in many other respects. After all, any overt intervention — even funding — is looked at suspiciously. Internet activist organi-zations in South and Southeast Asia are perceived unfairly as fronts for U.S.-based Internet companies and even the U.S. government. Using human rights mechanisms such as the UN’s Universal Periodic Review will be of limited effect in improving Internet freedom in emerging democratic states, given the much more egregious violations of Internet freedom taking place in other — far less open — societies.

Working through existing multinational mechanisms will also be limiting. Regional multi-lateral institutions, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have a poor record of prioritizing human rights. Even ASEAN, which is much more effective than SAARC and has even included bloggers in official summit delegations, has had trouble in such places as Laos and Vietnam, where prominent bloggers from other ASEAN countries have been banned. In the absence of viable alternatives, there is certainly a value in emphasizing the economic and commercial benefits of an open Internet.

The Internet freedom agenda faces further complications, not least skepticism from coun-tries who believe that the Internet — over which the United States plays a preponderant role

94 Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), xiii.

6 Rebooting

There is a danger that Western democracies

are failing to uphold some of the basic

principles of Internet freedom, focusing

instead on high-profile advocacy efforts that

are not necessarily effective in practice.

Internet Freedom 2.1 33

— is an insidious “back door” to preserving U.S. hegemony. The fact that none of the large, emerging democracies of Asia participate in the Freedom Online Coalition is telling.95 Indeed, only three Asian countries — Japan, the Maldives, and Mongolia — are members. Internet freedom will continue to be seen as the exclusive preserve of the West if more efforts are not made to accommodate non-Western democracies. Similarly, the dominance of U.S. ICT companies in the Global Network Initiative perpetuates the notion that they are the biggest beneficiaries of Internet freedom.96 And some of the rhetoric concerning Internet freedom overlooks what are often very real limitations as to what the U.S. and European governments can accomplish in countries that are sensitive to their national sovereignty.97

U.S. Internet Freedom Initiatives

Over the past few years, the Internet freedom agenda has gained greater salience in U.S. policy circles. In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice established the Global Internet Task Force (GIFT), a multidisciplinary group that reviewed international Internet censorship and cooper-ation with U.S. businesses, non-profits, and scholars. The focus of discussions was addressing constraints to Internet freedom in countries such as Iran, Cuba, and China.98

Rice’s successor Hillary Clinton was more assertive in raising the profile of Internet freedom. GIFT was rechristened the NetFreedom Task Force, and focused on coordinating policy within the State Department and involving Internet businesses.99 Clinton also gave two impor-tant speeches on the subject, which made her a leading public exponent of the view that the Internet could be a transformative tool that advances democratic freedoms.100 She forcefully argued that the freedom to connect should be added to Franklin Roosevelt’s four freedoms — freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear — as the “fifth freedom.”

If the basic recognition of Internet freedom as a staple of the United States’ foreign policy agenda was Internet Freedom 1.0, implementing a global strategy represented version 2.0. This involved not just the State Department, but also the U.S. Agency for International Devel-opment, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.101 Their contributions have included developing and promoting technologies to circumvent firewalls and encrypted communications, including by midwifing software — Tor, Freegate, Ultrasurf. These efforts parallel initiatives by leading Internet companies such as

95 “Fact Sheet: Freedom Online Coalition,” U.S. Department of State, November 20, 2012. 96 Global Network Initiative, January 18, 2014, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php. 97 Morozov, “Freedom.gov,” Foreign Policy, January-February 2011.98 “Global Internet Task Force Meeting Focuses on Advancing Freedom on Web,” U.S. Department of State, April 5, 2006. 99 “Net Freedom Task Force Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2010. 100 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” The Newseum, Washington DC, January 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. For the views of some of Clinton’s key advisors, see Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations, and Business (New York: Knopf, 2013); Alec Ross, “Internet Freedom: Historic Roots and the Road Forward,” SAIS Review (Vol. 30, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2010), 3-16. 101 Fontaine and Rogers, “Internet Freedom,” 26.

If the basic recognition of Internet freedom as a staple of the United States’ foreign policy agenda was Internet Freedom 1.0, implementing a global strategy represented version 2.0.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States34

Google’s uProxy, which allows for users to switch identities so as to evade detection.102 U.S. government agencies have also sponsored training and advocacy efforts and supported the multi-stakeholder model at Internet governance forums.

But Internet Freedom 2.0 faces some important shortcomings. Its efforts are directed not at rising democracies, but at authoritarian states seen to be undermining U.S. interests, such as China, Russia, and Iran. Indeed, some of the same open-source encryption and circumven-tion software being developed and disseminated can be used for more nefarious purposes by parties opposed to the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.

Moreover, the United States appears to be pursuing contradictory policies on security and Internet freedom, which often detract from one another. The United States is perceived as an outlier in the West in its emphasis on security at the expense of individual privacy. Whether or not such an assessment is fair, the United States is certainly unique in its capacity to conduct large-scale surveillance and monitoring activities. Revelations about the PRISM program and other NSA activities have risked an exposure to double standards and compromised the United States’ global standing and legitimacy on matter of Internet freedom, although this may be only a temporary setback. Suggestions that agencies of the United States government are seeking back doors to Tor have faced criticism, even from some within the government.103

Decisions made by U.S. corporations only further open the United States up to charges of hypocrisy. Yahoo! has been accused of complicity in providing information to the Chinese government that led to the arrests of writers and dissidents.104 Similarly, Cisco Systems was found to be marketing its routers to China in service of the Great Firewall.105 And in 2005, Microsoft shut down the site of a Chinese blogger at the request of the Chinese government.106

Indeed, Internet companies often have to contend with criticism that their attempts at advancing Internet freedom are far from altruistic. The dominance of U.S.-based multinational Internet companies in many countries contributes to the feeling that users are — first and foremost — commodities.107 Civil society groups are often skeptical of corporate intentions, occasionally inhibiting potentially useful collaboration with the private sector. For their part, companies, who are obliged to follow due legal processes in countries in which they operate, are not always able to successfully counter government arguments for greater intervention.

Europe and Internet Freedom

Europe, unlike the United States, has the capacity to act as a normative role model. In the aftermath of Edward Snowden’s revelations, it can potentially lead the conversation on Internet

102 Josh Rogin, “Google Sends a Lifeline to Internet Users in Iran and China,” The Daily Beast, October 21, 2013.103 Leo Kelion, “NSA and GCHQ Agents ‘Leak Tor Bugs’, Alleges Developer,” BBC News, August 22, 2014. 104 “Yahoo Plea Over China Rights Case,” BBC News, August 28, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6966116.stm. 105 Sarah Lai Stirland, “Cisco Leak: ‘Great Firewall’ of China Was a Chance to Sell More Routers,” Wired, May 20, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/05/leaked-cisco-do/. 106 Robert McMahon and Isabella Bennett, “U.S. Internet Providers and the ‘Great Firewall of China’,” CFR.org, February 23, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/us-internet-providers-great-firewall-china/p9856. 107 Cass Sunstein, “republic.com,” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 18-19.

Internet companies often have to contend

with criticism that their attempts at advancing

Internet freedom are far from altruistic.

Internet Freedom 2.1 35

freedom. Data privacy is paramount in European public discourse and the European Union is the dominant actor in this area. The EU has staked out goals for 2020 and identified key pillars on its agenda, including digital literacy and international discussion.

European efforts have been primarily inward focused, including on building infrastructure and preserving net neutrality. But there is a strong human rights-oriented externally focused element to its Internet freedom. This includes initiatives spearheaded by multilateral institu-tions, such as the Council of Europe. In late 2011, the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provided recommendations on principles for Internet policymaking.108 However, the effectiveness of such multilateral initiatives — despite consider-able political backing from European governments and leaders — is questionable. As former French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner noted, “No fewer than 180 countries meeting for the World Summit on the Information Society have acknowledged that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies fully to the Internet, especially Article 19, which estab-lishes freedom of expression and opinion. And yet, some 50 countries fail to live up to their commitments.”109

Given that the EU — and Germany in particular — are trade superpowers, trade agreements offer one possible tool by which to advance Internet freedom, although not without important costs. Trade agreements can be designed to better encourage innovation and counter online piracy, and may be less politically sensitive. Such initiatives have seen decreases in pirated software and media content in places like Indonesia. Trade policy has also worked well to advance other normative causes, such as child labor. Negotiations underway on the Trans-Pacific Partnership involving the United States and several Asian countries may affect Internet regulation in many of these countries, as could the EU-ASEAN free trade agreement. But the risks of using trade as a tool to advance Internet freedom are that it could also contribute to the Internet’s balkanization by extending intellectual property rights to online materials, while unnecessarily prolonging and complicating negotiations.

Internet Freedom 2.1

As it stands, U.S. and European Internet freedom policies are limited by capabilities, skepti-cism of intentions, misplaced objectives, uncontrollable technological solutions, and the risk of double-standards. Modest corrective measures are therefore required. With some minor amendments regarding realistically achievable objectives and shifts in emphasis, Internet Freedom 2.0 can be upgraded and improved. A patch — Internet Freedom 2.1, if you will — can help fix some of the more obvious glitches.

Governments, businesses, and civil society institutions in Asia’s developing democracies — and, for that matter, other emerging democratic states at various stages of development — could take several meaningful steps to improve Internet freedom at home, without sacrificing their sovereignty, security, or culture.

108 “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Internet Policy Making,” OECD, December 13, 2011. 109 Bernard Kouchner, “The Battle for the Internet,” International Herald Tribune, May 13, 2010.

U.S. and European Internet freedom policies are limited by capabilities, scepticism of intentions, misplaced objectives, uncontrollable technological solutions, and the risk of double-standards.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States36

• First, efforts need to be made to bridge the divide between Internet policy discourse and that concerning other aspects of public policy. While there is a globally linked commu-nity of passionate advocates for Internet freedom, their views risk being marginalized by established communities of experts focused on such topics as security, intelligence, trade, economics, foreign policy, healthcare, immigration, and the environment. Efforts designed at engaging those communities and involving them in policy debates related to Internet freedom would do more to advance the cause of Internet freedom than simply perpetuating an echo chamber of voices who are broadly in agreement on Internet freedom as a priority.

• Second, working on the principle that greater freedom can coexist with greater security, more emphasis should be placed on ensuring checks and balances, empowering inde-pendent regulators to oversee government programs that may limit Internet freedom, and ensuring due process for those accused of violating Internet laws. More transparency regarding processes for government intervention would also help strengthen state legiti-macy while preserving security.110

• Third, governments — with private and NGO support — should consider boosting Internet awareness, including by its introduction into school curricula. This would make students and future Internet users more aware of their rights and local restrictions on Internet access, and prevent unintentional violations of local Internet laws. Such initiatives can complement other forms of public-private partnerships designed to promote Internet awareness and bridge the digital divide. They could extend to investing in public libraries, developing low-cost smart phones, and improving broadband infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. Educational and outreach efforts like this are already underway; one notable example is the “Google Bus Bangladesh.”111

Promoters of Internet freedom in the United States and Europe should intelligently support such initiatives. They could sponsor conferences and research projects involving members of the broader policy communities in these countries, focusing on how various policy issues influence and are influenced by Internet freedom. Report cards designed to raise awareness of countries’ restrictions on Internet freedom should focus less on actions taken by governments in line with their own laws, and more on the transparency of regulatory processes, presence of adequate checks and balances, and recourse to justice for alleged violators. Finally, U.S. and Europe-based actors can promote educational initiatives to ensure better Internet awareness, including through informational web sites, social networks, and popular online education platforms, such as Khan Academy.112 As an added benefit, online educational tools can also help encourage more self-taught programmers, who can become better contributors to — and not just consumers of — the Internet.

110 Global Network Initiative, “Submission on ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,’” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Unied Nations, April 1, 2014, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20submission%20OHCHR%20April%201%202014.pdf. 111 Sean Buckley, “Google’s Driving All Over Bangladesh to Teach Students about the Internet,” Engadget, November 14, 2014. 112 See http://www.khanacademy.org.

Report cards designed to raise awareness of countries’ restrictions

on Internet freedom should focus more on

the transparency of regulatory processes, presence of adequate checks and balances,

and recourse to justice for alleged violators.

Internet Freedom 2.1 37

In addition to encouraging developing democratic states in this manner, U.S. and European governments, institutions, businesses, and NGOs could take a number of meaningful steps.

• First, they can establish programs to help share best practices with international legis-lators, jurists, and journalists on Internet laws and practices. These programs can be administered through U.S. or European public policy or law schools, many of which already have programs in place for mid-career officials and political leaders from different countries.

• Secondly, initiatives aimed at “de-Americanizing” perceptions of the Internet would be useful in giving developing states a stake in and sense of ownership of the Internet freedom agenda. This can be done in part by highlighting successful local Internet busi-nesses, particularly those that have had success outside their countries of origin. While the top Internet sites in all of Asia’s large developing democracies are U.S.-based multinational corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Yahoo!, the United States would be better off highlighting successful European transplants such as Skype or Spotify along with model start-ups from the developing world. The largest Internet companies in Asia’s developing democracies are still dwarfed by U.S.-led multinational entities — by a factor of 100.113

• And finally, better research on the relationship between online communications and political and social freedom, and between Internet use and economic development (including innovation) is needed to provide a useful academic and rhetorical basis for discourse related to Internet freedom, including the benefits to be derived from social media for state legitimacy and resilience. Supporting opinion survey research on attitudes to privacy, online freedom, and the economic value of the Internet would be just as useful. Such research would help move arguments in favor of Internet freedom from the norma-tive to the practical realm. It would help better inform political leaders, lawmakers, and bureaucrats on the consequences and costs of bad Internet policy.

Overall, U.S. and European governments, institutions, and NGOs would be better off adopting a more modest and less conspicuous approach to Internet freedom. In fact, there are perhaps some useful lessons the United States and Europe can learn from the experiences of non-Western democracies. A shrewder approach need not involve increasing resources for Internet freedom initiatives nor relinquishing control of the Internet freedom agenda, but instead more efficiently and effectively using existing resources. Internet freedom remains a principled and worthy objective, both for normative and pragmatic reasons. Now is the time for a subtler and more effective strategy to be adopted.

113 “Start Me Up,” Graphic Detail, The Economist, July 7, 2014.

Internet freedom remains a principled and worthy objective, both for normative and pragmatic reasons. Now is the time for a subtler and more effective strategy to be adopted.

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