Section 5G

1

Digital Photography and the Problem of Indexicality:

Revising “Photo-Index Theory” from a Peircean Point of View

This paper was presented at 18th International Congress of Aesthetics 2010 at Beijing University, Beijing, China.

Mi-Jung Kang1

1. Introduction

Can digital photos be regarded as indices like analogue ones, despite the fact that the technology of

photography has been drastically changed? In search of the identity of photography, many contemporary photo-

theorists have tended to regard it as a kind of index, following the footsteps of Charles S. Peirce, the founder of

modern semiotics.2 The validity of this so-called “photo-index theory,” however, has begun to be questioned

with the spread of digital cameras in the 1990s.

Since Peircean index is usually defined as a sign which has a direct physical (i.e., causal) connection with its

object, a number of photo-theorists have casted doubt on the notion that a digital photo can be an index on the

ground that no physical causality is found between a digital photo and its object.3 It is not altogether clear,

however, that the kind of physically causal relations are what Peirce had in mind when he said that an index is

“a real thing or fact which is a sign of its object by virtue of being connected with it as a matter of fact and by

also forcibly intruding upon the mind, quite regardless of its being interpreted as a sign” (CP 4.447). My doubt

was raised when I saw Brian Walski’s documentary picture taken at Iraq War in 2003. [See Figure1] He had to

quit his job at LA Times for the reason that submitted a composite photo which is a combination of two different

source photos.

My claim is that digital photos can be regarded as Peircean indices when Peirce's actual notion of index is

closely examined. Main points of my argument are drawn from Albert Atkin's recent paper on indexical

signification. Atkin says that any Peircean index has these five defining features: significatory, independence,

singularity, indicatory, and phenomenological features.4 Before getting into the details of each feature, I will

briefly review the definition of the terms, “sign” and “index” that Peirce himself offered.

1 Lecturer at Seoul National University; Senior researcher at Advanced Institute of Convergence Technology, SNU 2 Among those are Rosalind Krauss, Philip Dubois, Denis Roche, Pascal Bonitzer, etc. 3 Scholars who pursue this line of thought include W. J. Mitchell, Thomas Lister, Tom Gunning, David Tomas, Joo-Whan

Kim, Young-Joon Lee, Joon-Seong Yoon and many others.

4 Albert Atkin, “Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference,” Transactions of Charles Peirce Society, 2005, pp. 163-4

Section 5G

2

2. Index, the informational sign

Peirce’s celebrated definition of sign goes as follows:

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.

It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more

developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something,

its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes

called the ground of the representamen. (CP 2.228)

In this definition of sign, the process of interpretation named “Semiosis” by Peirce is infinite and continuous

since every sign must have its own interpretant. According to Peirce, nothing can be a sign until it is interpreted

as a sign. (CP 2.308) He classified the signs in various ways in the course of developing his pragmatism and

semiotics. Signs are classified in terms of their relation to their objects, giving rise to Peirce’s well-known

trichotomy of signs: icon, index, and symbol. An icon is a sign whose appearance is similar to its object, since

an icon and its object should share the same qualities. The symbol is identified by Peirce with a sign “which

refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas.” (CP 2.249) The

index is the class of signs which are physically connected with, or, which “point to,” their objects. A main

difference which sets apart the index from the other two classes of signs is that an index must be individual

while the other two are general. Unless an index is an individual, it could not be physically connected to its

object. I will come back to this point later.

The distinguishing attribute of the index described above is further elaborated on by Thomas Goudge.

It is also important to keep in mind that while all signs whatsoever represent or stand for objects, [all]

signs cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of objects. Hence in order for information about an

object to be conveyed by signs, the person who is on the receiving end must succeed in identifying the object,

and this presupposes some acquaintance, direct or indirect, with it. Identification is accomplished only by

means of an index.5

5 Thomas A. Goudge, "Peirce's Index," Transactions of Charles Peirce Society, Vol.1, No. 2, 1965, pp. 52-53

Section 5G

3

Here, Goudge makes several points about the index, but the most important point is that it is an “identifying

sign.” Though every sign represents its object, it cannot provide the whole truth about the object since “a sign is

something which stands to somebody for something in some respect.” According to Peirce, every sign not only

has its own interpretant, but also is itself an interpretant of the preceding sign.6

In other words, no sign can

represent its object without mediation. An exception, however, could be made when it comes to the

interpretation of the index since it is “in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual

object.” (CP 2.305) For example, the polar star which is in the spatial connection with the direction of north is

also an index. We will revisit this issue sooner.

3. Five features of the indices

Now let’s look into each of the five features of the indices which Atkin sorted out as follows.

1) Indices use some physical contiguity with their object to direct attention to that object.

2) Indices have their characteristics independently of interpretation.

3) Indices refer to individuals.

4) Indices assert nothing.

5) Indices do not resemble, nor do they share any lawlike relation with, their objects.7

The first and foremost one is called “Significatory feature,” which has two components: physical contiguity

and attention directing.8 To grasp the significance of these two components, let’s go back to Peirce’s triadic

definition of signs. In this definition, Peirce distinguishes two major relationships: “sign-object relation” and

“sign-interpretant one.” Atkin’s point of departure is that every kind of sign, including the index, should be

considered in the context of these relationships, no matter how weak they may be.

In the introduction, I have questioned if the relation between an index and its object is causal or not. One of

“the photo-index theorists,” Philip Dubois claims that the index has physically causal relation with its object.9

6 In principle, Peirce’s Synechism, the doctrine of continuity which has originated from his thought-sign theory explored in

1860s, suggests that every sign be in continuum. That is to say, there is no sign without any preceding sign or following

interpretant. It could be said that Peirce’s early epistemology was developed into his semiotics. 7 Atkin, op. cit., pp. 163-4

8 Atkin, ibid., p. 164

9 See Dubois, L’acte photographique, SEJER, Nathan, 1990

Section 5G

4

Peirce, however, has never restricted the relation to a causal one, although he takes photography as an example

of the indices. This is why Atkin calls the first component “physical contiguity,” not physical causality.10

Since the index has a direct connection with its object, the role of the interpreter is minimized. Minimal it

may be, it also needs to be interpreted as a sign. How to interpret the index is largely determined by its object

because “the characteristic function of the index” is “forcing the attention upon its object.”(CP 2.357) Therefore

we can say that we interpret an index in terms of its dynamical relationship to the object. That is to say, attention

directing, the second component of the Significatory feature, is about the interpretant of the indices. When

Peirce said that “Index, which is a Sign whose significance of its Object is due to its having a genuine Relation

to that Object, irrespective of the Interpretant”(CP 2.92; my emphasis), his point was not that the index cannot

have interpretants. Rather, it is that an index can function as a sign without producing any interpretant.11

The second feature of the indices, “indices have their characteristics independently of interpretation” is

concerned with ontology of them. By calling this “independence feature,” Atkin indicates in the first place that

both an index and its object are real things or facts. According to Peirce, “an index is a real thing or fact which is

a sign of its object,” and what could be called real has nothing to do with the mind that interprets the sign. Main

point in this feature is that the existence of an index and its object are independent of interpretation. Because

“that those characters are independent of how you or I think is an external reality,” a real entity is, for Peirce,

not varied according to the mind that thinks of it. This is the point where reality and fiction, its opposite, are

differentiated. (CP 5.405) In Short, reality is not fictional being for Peirce. Still, it is not confined to the physical

things, including the metaphysical ones such as mental concepts.

A fuller account of Peircean concept of reality would be beyond the scope of this presentation. However, a

few remarks will be in order. For Peirce the real is independent of interpretation, while it is conceived of as the

object of truth that should be found by the infinite community of interpreters in the long run. This is the most

controversial claim in Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics because it doesn’t seem clear whether reality is independent

of the mind that interprets it or not. He convincingly solved this problem by dividing 2 kinds of objects:

immediate and dynamical object. The one is “the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus

10 Peirce scholars such as Goudge, James Litzka and Thomas Sebeok also don’t identify the major feature of the indices as

physical causality, but this identification became common misunderstanding of the index among many “photo-index

theorists.”

11 Strictly speaking, the index could be a sign without any “actual interpretant.” Around 1905 Peirce discriminated 3 kinds

of the interpretants such as immediate, dynamical (i.e., actual), and final one. (SS. 111) According to him every sign has its

immediate interpretant as the potentiality for interpretation. (Refer to Short, 2007; Mi-Jung Kang, 2009.) Therefore, we can

say that every index has an immediate interpretant, if not actual one.

Section 5G

5

dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign” and the other is “the Reality which by some means

contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation.” (CP 4.536) For Peirce, the reality or dynamical object can

only be known by the inquirers’ community which would continue to pursue the inquiry, not by an individual

inquirer. Consequently, it could be said that the reality is independent of the individual mind, but not of the mind

in general. It was because Peirce’s version of realism was strongly influenced by Scholastic philosophers that

the reality is usually regarded as the general such as abstract concepts.12

What we now have to bring our focus

on is, however, the fact that Peirce has thought that an index and a symbol are in continuum, because an index

which refers to an individual thing exemplifies the concept to which a symbol refers. In short, the existence of

an individual thing is not separable from the reality of a general concept. The third feature of the indices will

further explain this.

Thirdly, the indices have Singularity feature, “indices refer to individuals,” which is keenly related with the

second feature. For Peirce, an index and its object are both existent individuals, not universals. (See CP 2.283)

For instance, a particular plume of smoke is an index of a particular fire. The object of an index could be plural

or a collection. Peirce includes among the individual objects “single collections of units or single continua.” (CP

2.306) As Goudge pointed out, they are inseparable pair since an index involves the existence of its object.13

What is the particular for Peirce? Two characteristics of the particular could be mentioned: haecceity and

determination.14

From Duns Scotus Peirce has borrowed the term, haecceity or thisness by virtue of which an

individual is distinct from everything else and is fit to be indicated this or that. (CP 3.460) Not only a

weathercock which points out a particular direction has haecceity, but also the words like proper names,

personal and demonstrative pronouns have it. By determination an individual possesses or does not possess

every possible quality and does not both possess and lack any. (CP 3.611) In short, what makes a particular with

all its concrete features is determination which has been also called individuation traditionally.

Thanks to this third feature, an index (Secondness) could embody a quality (Firstness) and exemplify a law

or any sort of regularities (Thirdness).15

The generals – qualities or regularities – could be hardly understood

12 Peirce’s pragmatic realism is keenly related to a version Scholastic realism that is often called moderate one such as Duns

Scotus’s. In his late version of pragmatism renamed ‘pragmaticism,’ Peirce pronounces there are real possibilities as a kind

of real vagues. “For possibility being the denial of a necessity, which is a kind of generality, is vague like any other

contradiction of a general.” (EP2: 354)

13 Goudge, op. cit., pp. 53-54

14 Goudge, ibid., p. 60 15

In Peirce’s Phenomenology – that is his own version of category theory – a phenomenon is composed of three

components: firstness, secondness and thirdness. These three categories will be explained more in exploring the fifth feature

Section 5G

6

without the individuals that embody or exemplify them. In other words, we cannot understand what an icon or a

symbol refers to without an index which shows it. For instances, a red cap can be called an index which

embodies the general quality, “redness,” and “a2＋b

2=c

2” printed in this paper is also an index which

exemplifies the Pythagorean theorem. The fourth feature of the indices will illuminate more clearly how

indexical signs function.

By the fourth “indicatory feature” of an index Atkin means that the index asserts nothing, but only shows or

indicates something. To explore what Peirce called “collateral experience” would inform us of what kind of

knowledge the indices can provide for us.

We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, - i.e., the Object as represented in the sign, - and the Real

(no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the

Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and

leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I

can't make my companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, separate

itself from the surrounding objects in the field of vision. (CP 8.314)

In Peirce’s semiotics, it is said that no sign can furnish recognition of real or dynamical object. The only

exception could be made by the indices that provide the acquaintance with their objects through the “collateral

experiences.” This is why the indices are defined as “informational sign.” The signification of indices is very

different from that of symbols and icons in this respect. ‘Indication’ is the word for the typical signification of

the indices. Just as a pointing finger, an index indicates what it refers to. You can mean something only by

pointing it out without any further description. However, we have to keep in mind that Peirce didn’t regard the

acquaintance, the knowledge provided by indices as a proper meaning effect, cautiously making a distinction

between it and intuition.16

An appropriate example of indexical knowledge is “Punctum” which Roland Barthes

introduced in his book, Camera Lucida.17

of the indices. 16 Although the interpretation of indices might look like an intuition, Peirce distinguished firmly the former from the latter

because he had tried to deny Cartesian knowledge of intuition. There have been complicated arguments about the kind of

knowledge provided by the experience of index, so-called “collateral experience.” (For the more information about it, see

Short, 2007: 192-94) 17 “Puctum” is, for Barthes, the characteristic meaning effect that only photographs have and the opposite is “Studium.” See

Barthes, La chambre claire : note sur la photographie, 1980

Section 5G

7

Finally, indices have a phenomenological feature as an integral part. The indices are paradigmatic examples

of the Secondness, while the icons are of the Firstness, and the symbols are of the Thirdness. As all the other

Seconds, an index is an actual existence which stands for an existence. Therefore, “the idea that an index does

not resemble or share a law-like relation with its object confirms the brute existence or secondness of the

relation between the index and its object.”18

Besides the secondnss of the indices, we need to consider that those

three components of a phenomenon are not discreet but continuous.

Peirce characterized the Firstness as “pure feeling” or “bare possibility.” This means that at the very moment,

when one begins to reflect on its feeling or quality, it becomes impure. In order to know what the quality is, one

has to compare it with another which is similar or different, so the category of Secondness is introduced at once.

The phenomenon of the Second is usually described as “hard fact” which is experienced as actuality. However

brute and vivid the experience is, one has no idea until one interpret it. The moment the meaning of it occurs to

one’s mind, the category of the phenomenon becomes Thirdness with its mediating concept. Just as a first,

second, and third are integrated in a phenomenon according to the principle of continuity, an index, an icon and

a symbol are, too. The continuity among them appears to be more important in the context of Peirce’s semiotics

and “photo-index theory.”

In the light of the above discussion on the features of the indices, let’s consider whether digital photos are

indexical or not from Peirce’s viewpoint. If a digital photo has all those features of indices, there would be no

problem with calling it an index. At this point, however, we can ask this question: couldn’t we regard a digital

photo as an index if it lacks some of those features? To answer this question, we need to consider the kinds of

indices

4. Classifications of the indices

Atkin distinguishes two kinds of indices according to the number of features that indices have. If an index

has all these five features, according to Atkin, it is regarded as an index simpliciter; but if does not, it is called a

sort of sub-indices.19

The examples of the former are footsteps on the beach, the Polar star, fossils, analogue

18 Atkin, op. cit., p. 165

19 Peirce considered every subject term has indexical function. Actually Peirce classified 3 kinds of subject terms and

according to him Atkin divides 3 kinds of indices: Index, Sub-Index and Precept. ( See EP2:274, CP 2.357) However, unlike

Atkin who is focusing on the linguistic signs, I don’t need to distinguish the 2 kinds of symbolic indices, sub-index and

precept. Therefore, I’ll name as “sub-indices” all the indices except the indices simpliciter.

Section 5G

8

photos. In Peirce’s writings, sub-indices are usually linguistic signs such as proper names, relative pronouns or

phrases, which have only three of those features such as significatory, singularity, and indicatory ones.

Peirce himself suggested another division of the indices: genuine and degenerate ones. The division is based

on the indices’ involvement of iconicity.

The Genuine Index represents the duality between the representamen and its object. As a whole it stands for

the object; but a part or element of it represents [it] as being the Representamen, by being an Icon or analogue

of the object in some way; and by virtue of that duality, it conveys information about the object. (EP2: 171)

An index is a genuine one if it "represents the duality of represetamen and its object. (It is not just and index

but an icon.)"A sundial or a clock indicating the time of day is a genuine index owing to its duality. What lacks

the duality and is only factually connected with its object is a degenerate index. A proper name or The letters

attached to a geometrical diagram belong to the group of degenerate indices without the involvement of

iconicity. (EP2: 172, see also CP 2.283-84)

5. Conclusion: On the Digital Photo-Indices

Can we regard a digital photo as an index on the basis of the discussion above? If we can, what kind of index

is it? I think, first of all, we have to distinguish the kinds of digital composite photos from unaltered ones. In the

case of the images called “the original files” which were not altered or fabricated, they should be called indices

simpliciter without any objection.

Among composite photos, there are sub-indices which have fictional references, thereby lacking

independence and phenomenological features. A composite photo of Hamlet, a fictional character is an example

of this category. Nevertheless, it is not a degenerate index, but genuine one because it involves iconicity owing

to its resemblance with its fictional object.

Not all the composite photos, however, are to be regarded as sub-indices. To demonstrate this point, let us

reconsider Brian Walski’s documentary photo which was derived from two originals. Despite be composite, it

could be said that the final image indicates a real state of affairs at the Iraq War in 2003. Our common-sense

will allow us to consider the event Walski has captured as a real fact occurred at the time. Therefore, his digital

photo could be classified as an index simpliciter just like the Polar star and any other analogue photos. Peirce’s

Section 5G

9

pragmatic realism provides us with a theoretical ground that could render Walski’s picture as an index of a

certain real thing. In his scholastic version of realism, as I have mentioned before, the generals are real, while

the particulars are instances of the real. The state of affair that Walski has captured could be described by this

statement: “An American soldier was deterring one of the refugees holding his child in his arm from standing

up.” From Peirce’s viewpoint, Walski’s composite photo is an index exemplifying the concept referred to by the

statement, a symbol.

Many have identified ‘indexicality’ as causality. In particular, the defenders of “photo-index theory” have

considered photos as the evidences of the past existence of people or facts. While their interpretation is not

totally misguided, it fails to present the whole picture about the Peircean indices. To see the whole picture more

clearly, we need to remind ourselves that when Peirce was talking about the three kinds of signs - that is, icon,

index and symbol - he was mainly concerned with the linguistic or symbolic signs. The reason he was

specifically interested in the indices lies in their function of them in his logical scheme of semiotics. As the

particulars they indicate the generals embodying the Firstness (or quality) and exemplifying the Thirdness (or

concept). With this “big picture” in mind, I have explained how one can regard digital photos as indices. In most

cases, they are indices simpliciter, and in every case genuine indices.

Section 5G

10

IMAGES

Figure 1. Composite photo by Brian Walski appeared in The LA Times (2003)

Figure 2. Source files for figure 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atkin, Albert, 2005, “Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce

Society, Vol.41, No.1

Barthes, Roland, 1980, La chambre claire : note sur la photographie ; translated to Korean by Woong-Kwon

Kim, Dongmoonsun, 2006

Dubois, Philippe, 1990, L’acte photographique, SEJER, Nathan; translated to Korean by Kyung-Ryul Lee, Sajin

Masil Pubilshing Co. Ltd, 2005

Section 5G

11

Goudge, Thomas A., 1965, “Peirce's Index,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol.1, No.2

Gunning, Tom, 2007, “Moving Away from the Index : Cinema and the Impression of Reality,” DIFFERENCES :

A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol.18, No.1

Kang, Mi-Jung, 2009, “Habit and Meaning: A Study on C.S. Peirce’s Theory of Interpretant” Semiotic Inquiry,

Vol.25

Krauss, Rosalind, 1977, “Note on the Index 1: Seventies Art in America,” October, Vol.3

_____________, 1990, Le Photographique: pour une Théorie des Écarts; translated to Korean by Bong-Lim

Choi, Goong-Lee Publishing Co. Ltd., 2003

Lee, Young-Joon, 1998, “Epistemological Change contemplated on the threshold of 21st Century,” in

Photography in the Digital Era, edited by Joo-Suk Park, Noonbit.

Lister, Martin, 1995, “Introduction” ed. Martin Lister, The Photographic Image in Digital Culture, Routledge;

translated in Korean by Seon-Ah Woo, Vision and Language, 2000

Liszka, James J., 1996, A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce, Bloomington:

Indiana University Press

Mitchell, W. J., 1992, The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era, The MIT Press.

Moore, E. C., 1952, "The Scholastic Realism of C. S. Peirce" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

Vol.12, No.3

Peirce, C. S., 1931-35, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. 1-6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul

Weiss, Harvard University Press

____________, 1958, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. 7-8, ed. Arthur Burks, Harvard

University Press [Reference to Peirce’s papers will be designated CP followed by volume and paragraph

number.]

____________, 1992, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. I, ed. Nathan Houser and

Christian Kloesel, Indiana University Press

____________, 1998, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. II, ed. Peirce Edition Project,

Indiana University Press [Reference to The Essential Peirces will be designated EP1 and EP2 respectively]

____________, 1977, Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria

Lady Welby, Indiana University Press [Reference to Semiotic and Significs will be designated SS]

Short, T. L., 2007, Peirce's Theory of Signs, Cambridge University Press

Sebeok, Thomas A., 1995, "Indexicality," Peirce and contemporary Thought, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner,

Section 5G

12

Fordham University Press

Tomas, David, 1996, “From the Photograph to Postphotographic Practice: Toward a Postoptical ecology of the

Eye” ed. Timothy Druckrey, Electronic Culture, APERTURE foundation

Yoon, Joon-Sung, 2004, “Post-photography: Reconsideration of Photography as Contemporary Art Medium,”

AURA, No.11