ARTICLE IN PRESS

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Behaviour Research and Therapy 45 (2007) 2397–2406

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Depressogenic inferential styles, negative events,and depressive symptoms in youth: An attempt

to reconcile past inconsistent findings

John R.Z. Abela�, Alexander McGirr, Steven A. Skitch

Department of Psychology, McGill University, Stewart Biological Sciences Building, 1205 Dr. Penfield Avenue, Montreal, Que.,

Canada H3A 1B1

Received 7 November 2006; received in revised form 21 March 2007; accepted 22 March 2007

Abstract

Research examining the diathesis-stress component of the hopelessness theory (HT) in youth has provided mixed

support for the theory. One explanation for inconsistent findings is the failure to consider relationships among the three

inferential styles posited to serve as vulnerability factors by the theory. The weakest link hypothesis posits that an

individual is as vulnerable to depression as his/her most depressogenic inferential style (DIS) makes him/her. A second

explanation is that researchers have operationalized ‘‘high stress’’ from a nomothetic, as opposed to an idiographic,

perspective. The current study tested the diathesis-stress component of the HT in 230 third-grade and 152 seventh-grade

schoolchildren using both a weakest link and an idiographic approach towards analysis. Children completed measures

assessing depressive symptoms and DISs. Children subsequently completed measures assessing depressive symptoms and

negative events once a week for 6 weeks. Hierarchical linear modeling and time-lagged analyses indicated that a

depressogenic weakest link was associated with greater elevations in depressive symptoms following elevations in stress.

r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Hopelessness theory; Depression; Children; Early adolescents

Introduction

A large body of research has accumulated examining theories of cognitive vulnerability to depression inadults. Substantially fewer studies, however, have tested these theories in youth (see Abela & Hankin, inpress). This is unfortunate given that results from studies examining models of cognitive vulnerability in adultscannot automatically be extended downward to youth. Rather, age-related differences in cognition, emotion,behavior, and physical development must be taken into account and the theories must be tested in child,adolescent, and adult samples.

e front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

at.2007.03.012

ing author. Tel.: +1514 398 6109.

ess: abela@ego.psych.mcgill.ca (J.R.Z. Abela).

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The hopelessness theory of depression

One cognitive theory that has generated a large body of empirical research in adults but relatively lessresearch in youth is the hopelessness theory (HT; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). The HT posits threedistinct depressogenic inferential styles (DISs) that serve as distal contributory causes of depression: (1) thetendency to attribute negative events to global and stable causes; (2) the tendency to catastrophize theconsequences of negative events; and (3) the tendency to view the self as deficient following negative events.Each of these styles predisposes individuals to depression by increasing the likelihood that they makedepressogenic inferences following negative events. Making such inferences increases the likelihood thathopelessness develops. Once hopelessness develops, depression is inevitable, as the theory views hopelessnessas a proximal sufficient cause of depression.

Empirical status of the diathesis-stress component of the hopelessness theory in youth

Early research examining the diathesis-stress component of the HT in youth tested the HT’s attributionalvulnerability hypothesis. Although some studies provided full support for this hypothesis, others providedpartial or no support (see Abela & Hankin, in press). Recent research examining whether DISs aboutconsequences and the self serve as vulnerability factors to depression in youth has obtained similarly mixedfindings (see Abela & Hankin, in press).

Researchers have begun to search for factors that may account for such inconsistent findings. The currentstudy examines three possibilities: (1) the use of samples of youth at different stages of cognitive development;(2) the failure to consider possible relationships among the three DISs posited to serve as vulnerability factorsby the HT; and (3) the operationalization of ‘‘high stress’’ from a nomothetic, as opposed to an idiographic,perspective.

The developmental hypothesis

Turner and Cole (1994) offered one explanation for inconsistencies in findings from studies examining theattributional vulnerability hypothesis of the HT in youth. More specifically, they hypothesized thatattributional styles are acquired during the transition from late childhood to early adolescence when childrendevelop the capacity for abstract reasoning. Turner and Cole noted that this developmental hypothesis was inline with past findings (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994).

Subsequent research examining the HT in youth has, however, yielded a pattern of findings contrary to thedevelopmental hypothesis with studies (1) failing to support the HT in early adolescents (Abela & Sarin, 2002;Spence, Sheffield, & Donovan, 2002) and adolescents (Lewinsohn, Joiner, & Rohde, 2001); (2) providingsupport for the HT in younger (M ¼ 6.6 years) but not older (M ¼ 9.8 years) children (Conley, Haines, Hilt,& Metalksy, 2001); and (3) providing support for the HT in both children and early adolescents (Abela, 2001;Abela & McGirr, in press; Abela & Payne, 2003; Abela, Skitch, Adams, & Hankin, 2006; Brozina & Abela,2006).

The weakest link hypothesis

A second explanation for inconsistent findings is that researchers have examined the three DISs featured inthe HT independently of one another without considering possible relationships between them. Doing so islikely to provide an inaccurate test of the HT as youth who possess only one DIS but who show increases indepressive symptoms following negative events will appear to support the HT in some analyses but tocontradict the HT in others. The weakest link hypothesis posits that an individual is as vulnerable todepression as his/her most DIS makes him/her (Abela & Sarin, 2002). Therefore, according to this hypothesis,when testing the HT, researchers should assess all three DISs and determine each participant’s degree ofvulnerability using his/her most depressogenic style.

In the first study to examine the weakest link hypothesis, 79 seventh-graders completed measures assessingDISs and depressive symptoms (Abela & Sarin, 2002). Ten weeks later, they completed measures assessing

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depressive symptoms and negative events. When examined individually, none of the three DISs interacted withnegative events to predict increases in depressive symptoms. Children’s weakest links, however, interacted withnegative events to predict increases in such symptoms. Subsequent research has provided equally strongsupport for this hypothesis in youth (Abela & McGirr, in press; Abela & Payne, 2003; Abela et al., 2006).

Nomothetic versus idiographic approaches to analysis

A third possible explanation for past inconsistent findings is that researchers have operationalized ‘‘highstress’’ from a nomothetic, as opposed to an idiographic, perspective. In the typical study examining thediathesis-stress component of the HT, DISs and depressive symptoms are assessed at Time 1. Depressivesymptoms and negative events are assessed at Time 2. Analyses are then conducted examining whether DISsinteract with negative events to predict increases in depressive symptoms. Implicit within such a design is theuse of a nomothetic approach towards operationalizing ‘‘high stress.’’ In other words, an individual isconsidered to be experiencing ‘‘high stress’’ when his/her level of stress is higher than the sample’s average.Although such an approach sounds plausible on the surface, it may lead to inaccurate predictions at the levelof individual participants. More specifically, a cognitively vulnerable individual can exhibit a sharp increase inhis/her level of stress between two time-points and yet still exhibit a level of stress that is lower than thesample’s average. In such a case, the HT would predict that the vulnerable individual would show an increasein depressive symptoms. Yet, a nomothetic approach would make the exact opposite prediction.

The most powerful examination of the diathesis-stress component of the HT likely involves the use of alongitudinal design in which negative events and depressive symptoms are assessed at multiple time-points and‘‘high stress’’ is operationalized from an idiographic perspective. From an idiographic perspective, anindividual is considered to be experiencing ‘‘high stress’’ when he/she is experiencing a level of stress that ishigher than his/her own average level of stress. In the first study to examine the diathesis-stress component ofthe HT using an idiographic approach, 140 children (ages 6–14) of parents with a history of major depressioncompleted measures assessing depressive symptoms and DISs. Every 6 weeks for the next year, children andparents completed measures assessing depressive symptoms and children completed measures assessinghassles. In line with hypotheses, a depressogenic weakest link was associated with greater increases indepressive symptoms following increases in both children’s level of hassles (Abela & McGirr, in press) andparental depressive symptoms (Abela et al., 2006).

The current study

The current study tested the diathesis-stress component of the HT in 230 third-grade and 152 seventh-gradeschoolchildren using both a weakest link and an idiographic approach towards analysis. In order to expandupon the findings of Abela and McGirr (in press), the current study: (1) tested hypotheses in a community, asopposed to a high-risk, sample; (2) used groups of youth at two different stages of cognitive development inorder to provide a more powerful examination of Turner and Cole’s (1994) developmental hypothesis; and (3)utilized a briefer time interval between follow-up assessments (1 week as opposed to 6 weeks) in order to testhypotheses using both contemporaneous and time-lagged analyses. Time-lagged analyses allowed for apowerful examination of the direction of the effects obtained in our contemporaneous analyses. In otherwords, such analyses allowed us to distinguish between (1) a vulnerability–stress model in which DISsmoderate the association between elevations in stress at Time n�1 and elevations in depressive symptoms atTime n and (2) a differential exposure model in which DISs moderate the association between elevations indepressive symptoms at Time n�1 and elevations in stress at Time n (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).

Although the sample used in the current study was the same as that used by Abela (2001), a novel data-analytic approach was employed in order to examine two possible reasons for inconsistent findings in pastresearch examining the diathesis-stress component of the HT in youth. First, in contrast to Abela’s use of anomothetic approach towards data analysis, the current study employed an idiographic approach. In otherwords, whereas Abela examined whether DISs were associated with higher average levels of depressivesymptoms following the experience of a level of stress that was high in comparison to the sample’s average, thecurrent study examined whether DISs were associated with greater within-subject increases in depressive

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symptoms following within-subject increases in stress. Second, whereas Abela examined each of the three DISfeatured in the HT separately, the current study conceptualized cognitive vulnerability using a weakest linkapproach. At the same time, we also conducted analyses separately for each of the three DISs in order toexamine whether results similar to those reported by Abela were obtained when using an idiographicapproach.

Method

Participants

Consent forms were sent to the parents of all third- and/or seventh-graders at participating schools. Thefinal sample consisted of 152 seventh-graders (71 girls and 81 boys; mean age ¼ 12 years and 11 months) and230 third-graders (109 girls and 121 boys; mean age ¼ 8 years and 11 months). The sample was 68.3%Caucasian, 23.6% African-American, 5.5% Hispanic, and 2.6% of other descent.

Procedure

During the initial assessment, children were verbally administered the following questionnaires:(1) Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovaks, 1981); (2) Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire(CASQ; Seligman et al., 1984); and (3) Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CCSQ; Abela, 2001). Once aweek for the subsequent 6 weeks, children were verbally administered the following questionnaires: (1) CDIand (2) Children’s Negative Life Events Scale (CLES; Coddington, 1972; Kanner, Feldman, Weinberger, &Ford, 1987).

Measures

Child Depression Inventory (Kovaks, 1981)

The CDI is a 27-item measure that assesses the cognitive, affective, and behavioral symptoms of depression.For each item, children are asked whether it describes how they were thinking and feeling in the past week.Total scores range from 0 to 52 with higher scores indicating greater symptom severity. The CDI possesseshigh internal consistency and distinguishes children with major depression from non-depressed children(Saylor, Finch, Spirito, & Bennett, 1984). We obtained alphas ranging from .61 to .86 (m ¼ .81, SD ¼ .09) inthird-graders and .87 to .91 (m ¼ .89, SD ¼ .02) in seventh-graders across administrations indicating moderateto high internal consistency.

Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire (Seligman et al., 1984)

The CASQ contains 24 items each of which is a hypothetical negative event that respondents are asked toimagine happened to them. For each event, respondents are presented with two possible causes and are askedto choose the one that best describes the way they would think if the event happened to them. The two causeshold constant two attributional dimensions (internal–external, global–specific, and stable–unstable) whilevarying the third. In line with the HT, we used the generality composite score (sum of all global and stableresponses). Total scores range from 0 to 16 with higher scores indicating a more depressogenic attributionalstyle.

Seligman et al. (1984) found CASQ scores to be fairly consistent over a 6-month interval (r ¼ .66, po.001)in children between the ages of 8 and 13. Cronbach’s alpha for the negative events composite score rangedfrom .50 and .54 across administrations indicating moderate internal consistency. Regarding validity, apessimistic attributional style predicted increases in depressive symptoms during the 6-month follow-upperiod. We obtained an alpha of .56 in the third-graders and .52 in the seventh-graders indicating moderateinternal consistency.

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Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire (Abela, 2001)

The CCSQ is a two-part questionnaire. Each part contains 12 items, each of which is a hypothetical negativeevent involving the child. Respondents are asked to choose the response that would best describe the way theywould think. Part one assesses the tendency to catastrophize the consequences of negative events. Part twoassesses the tendency to view oneself as flawed following negative events. Higher scores on each subscaleindicate more DISs.

Abela (2001) found CCSQ subscale scores to be fairly consistent over a 7-week interval (r ¼ .31–.63,po.001) in third- and seventh-graders. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales ranged from .64 to .81 acrossadministrations indicating moderate internal consistency. Regarding validity, CCSQ subscale scoresinteracted with negative events to predict increases in depressive symptoms. We obtained alphas rangingfrom .77 to .78 in the third-graders and from .78 to .81 in the seventh-graders indicating moderate to highinternal consistency.

The Children’s Negative Life Events Scale (Coddington, 1972; Kanner et al., 1987)

The CLES is a list of 67 negative events that children may experience. For each item, respondents are askedwhether or not they have experienced that event in the past week. If they have, they receive a score of 1. If theyhave not, they receive a score of 0. Scores on the CLES range from 0 to 67 with higher numbers indicatinggreater number of stressful events.

Results

Descriptive data

Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between all measures are presented by Abela (2001). Inorder to compute children’s weakest link scores, for each grade, we standardized scores on the CASQ and oneach CCSQ subscale. Each child’s weakest link score was equal to the highest of his or her three standardizedscores. Of the third-graders who scored in the top quartile on at least one measure assessing DISs, 22.1% alsoscored in the bottom quartile on at least one of the other measures. Of the seventh-graders who scored in thetop quartile on at least one measures assessing DISs, 30.9% also scored in the bottom quartile on at least oneof the other measures.

Diathesis-stress analyses: weakest link

To test our hypothesis that a depressogenic weakest link would be associated with greater elevations indepressive symptoms following elevations in stressors, we used multilevel modeling. Analyses were conductedusing the SAS (version 8.1) MIXED procedure and maximum likelihood estimation. Our dependent variablewas within-subject fluctuations in CDI scores during the follow-up interval (FU_CDI). Our primarypredictors of FU_CDI scores were GRADE, GENDER, fluctuations in CLES scores during the follow-upinterval (FU_CLES), and children’s weakest link scores (WEAK). As FU_CLES is a within-subject predictor,CLES scores were centered at each participant’s mean prior to analyses such that FU_CLES reflects upwardsor downwards fluctuations in a child’s level of stress compared to his/her mean level of stress. In order tocontrol for individual differences in baseline level of depressive symptoms, Time 1 CDI scores (T1_CDI) wereincluded in the model.

Model specification was achieved using a sequential strategy, which involved first examining random-effectcomponents and then examining fixed-effect components (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Models initiallyincluded random effects for children (RE_CHILD; random intercept) nested within schools (RE_SCHOOL;random intercept) and a random effect for slope (RE_SLOPE). Additionally, each model included aheterogeneous autoregressive covariance parameter. Non-significant random effects were deleted from themodel prior to examining the fixed effects. In all subsequent analyses, RE_CHILD (po.0001), RE_SLOPE(po.05), and the ARH(1) parameter (po.01) were significant and thus were retained in the models.RE_SCHOOL, however, was not significant and consequently was deleted from the model prior to examiningthe fixed effects. Fixed-effects components of the models were specified through a process of backwards

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deletion. Specifically, higher order terms were examined and removed if non-significant prior to estimating thesignificance of lower order terms.

The final results with respect to the fixed-effects component of the model are presented in the left panel inTable 1. Of primary importance, a significant two-way cross-level interaction emerged between WEAK andFU_CLES. In order to examine the form of this interaction, the model summarized in the left panel in Table 1was used to calculate predicted CDI scores for children possessing either a depressogenic or non-depressogenicweakest link (plus or minus 1.5 SD) and who are reporting either low or high CLES scores in comparison totheir own average CLES score (plus or minus 1.5�mean within-subject SD). The results of such calculationsare presented in Fig. 1. As both FU_CDI and FU_CLES are within-subject variables centered at eachparticipant’s mean, slopes are interpreted as the increase in a child’s CDI score that would be expected giventhat he or she scored one point higher on the CLES.

Follow-up analyses indicated that children possessing a depressogenic weakest link reported higherdepressive symptoms when reporting high CLES scores than when reporting low CLES scores (slope ¼ .16;

Table 1

Grade, gender, weakest link scores, and negative events predicting depressive symptoms during the follow-up interval

Simultaneous Lagged

b SE F d.f. b SE F d.f.

T1_CDI 4.04 0.21 363.11**** 1,332 3.72 0.24 249.66**** 1,321

GRADE �0.83 0.44 3.60 1,332 �1.08 0.49 4.98* 1,321

GENDER �1.02 0.43 5.70* 1,332 �1.48 0.47 9.73** 1,321

WEAK �0.01 0.22 0.00 1,332 �0.16 0.24 0.44 1,321

FU_CLES 0.10 0.02 40.27**** 1,1271 0.06 0.02 7.98** 1,861

WEAK�FU_CLES 0.04 0.02 4.41* 1,1271 0.04 0.02 3.92* 1,861

Note: T1_CDI, Time 1 Children’s Depression Inventory; WEAK, weakest link diathesis; FU_CLES, fluctuations in CLES scores during

the 6-week follow-up interval.

*pp.05; **pp.01; ***pp.001; ****pp.0001.

Pessimistic Weakest Link

Optimistic Weakest Link

10.5

9

7.5

6

4.5

3

1.5

0

Pre

dic

ted C

DI

Score

Low

Level of Negative Events

Intercept High

Fig. 1. Predicted slope of the relationship between negative events and depressive symptoms for children possessing either a depressogenic

or non-depressogenic weakest link.

ARTICLE IN PRESSJ.R.Z. Abela et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 45 (2007) 2397–2406 2403

t(1271) ¼ 5.13, po.001). At the same time, depressive symptoms did not vary as a function of CLES scores forchildren with a non-depressogenic weakest link (slope ¼ .05; t(1271) ¼ 1.62, ns). Planned comparisons of theslopes of the relationship between CLES scores and depressive symptoms revealed that the slope wassignificantly greater in children exhibiting a depressogenic weakest link than in children exhibiting a non-depressogenic weakest link (t(1271) ¼ 2.10, po.05).

In order to provide a more stringent test of our hypothesis, we also examined two additional models. First,we conducted time-lagged analyses examining whether WEAK moderated the relationship betweenfluctuations in CLES scores at Time n�1 and fluctuations in depressive symptoms at Time n. Results withrespect to the fixed-effects component of the model are presented in the right panel in Table 1. Results weresimilar to our contemporaneous analyses with respect both to the direction and magnitude of relationships.Specifically, a significant two-way cross-level interaction was obtained between WEAK and FU_CLES.

Follow-up analyses indicated that children possessing a depressogenic weakest link reported higherdepressive symptoms 1 week following high CLES scores (CDI ¼ 7.10) than 1 week following low CLESscores (CDI ¼ 4.86; t(861) ¼ 3.19, po.001). At the same time, depressive symptoms at Time n did not vary asa function of CLES scores at Time n�1 for children possessing a non-depressogenic ‘‘weak link’’(t(861) ¼ �.19, ns). The slope of the relationship between CLES scores at Time n�1 and depressive symptomswas significantly greater in children possessing a depressogenic weakest link (slope ¼ .12) than in childrenpossessing a non-depressogenic weakest link (slope ¼ �.01; t(861) ¼ 1.98, po.05).

Second, we conducted time-lagged analyses examining whether WEAK moderated the relationship betweenfluctuations in depressive symptoms at Time n�1 and fluctuations in CLES scores at Time n. With respect tothe fixed-effects components of the model, significant effects were obtained for the following variables:T1_CDI (b ¼ 1.20, SE ¼ .04, F(1,323) ¼ 9.51, po.01) and GRADE (b ¼ �3.87, SE ¼ .83, F(1,323) ¼ 21.67,po.0001). Significant effects, however, were not obtained for any of the remaining variables.

Diathesis-stress analyses: inferential style about the self

Similar analyses were conducted in order to examine whether a DIS about the self was associated withgreater elevations in depressive symptoms following elevations in CLES scores. The final results are presentedin the left panel in Table 2. Of primary importance, a significant two-way, cross-level interaction emergedbetween SELF and FU_CLES. Follow-up analyses indicated that children who possessed a DIS about the selfreported higher depressive symptoms when reporting high CLES scores (CDI ¼ 6.20) than when reportinglow CLES scores (CDI ¼ 10.13; t(1271) ¼ 6.75, po.0001). At the same time, depressive symptoms did notvary as a function of CLES scores for children possessing a non-DIS about the self (slope ¼ .00; t(1271) ¼ .14,ns). The slope of the relationship between CLES scores and depressive symptoms was significantly greater inchildren exhibiting a DIS about the self (slope ¼ .17) than in children exhibiting a non-DIS about the self(slope ¼ .00; t(1271) ¼ 3.57, po.001).

Table 2

Grade, gender, inferential style about the self, and negative events predicting depressive symptoms during the follow-up interval

Simultaneous Lagged

b SE F d.f. b SE F d.f.

T1_CDI 4.06 0.22 328.79**** 1,332 3.80 0.25 235.33**** 1,321

GRADE �0.81 0.45 3.22 1,332 �0.99 0.50 3.98* 1,321

GENDER �1.05 0.43 6.04* 1,332 �1.48 0.47 9.91** 1,321

SELF �0.11 0.22 0.25 1,332 �0.24 0.25 0.93 1,861

FU_CLES 0.09 0.02 30.55**** 1,1271 0.05 0.02 5.65* 1,861

SELF�FU_CLES 0.06 0.02 12.72*** 1,1271 0.03 0.02 2.56 1,861

Note: T1_CDI, Time 1 Children’s Depression Inventory; SELF, self-subscale of the Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire; FU_CLES,

fluctuations in CLES scores during the 6-week follow-up interval.

*pp.05; **pp.01; ***pp.001; ****pp.0001.

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We next conducted lagged analyses examining whether SELF moderated the relationship betweenfluctuations in CLES scores at Time n�1 and fluctuations in depressive symptoms at Time n. Results withrespect to the fixed-effects component of the model are presented in the right panel in Table 2. Contrary to theresults obtained in our contemporaneous analyses, the two-way interaction between SELF�FU_CLES wasnot significant.

Last, we conducted lagged analyses examining whether SELF moderated the relationship betweenfluctuations in depressive symptoms at Time n�1 and fluctuations in CLES scores at Time n. With respect tothe fixed-effects components of the model, significant effects were obtained for the following variables:T1_CDI (b ¼ 1.18, SE ¼ .41, F(1,323) ¼ 8.22, po.01) and GRADE (b ¼ �3.87, SE ¼ .85, F(1,323) ¼ 20.56,po.0001). Significant effects were not obtained for any of the remaining variables.

Diathesis-stress analyses: inferential style about causes

Similar analyses were conducted in order to examine whether a DIS about causes was associated withgreater elevations in depressive symptoms following elevations in CLES scores. The final model consisted ofsignificant effects for the following variables: T1_CDI (b ¼ 4.07, SE ¼ .21, F(1,338) ¼ 366.66, po.0001),GENDER (b ¼ �1.00, SE ¼ .42, F(1,338) ¼ 5.58, po.05), and FU_CLES (b ¼ .10, SE ¼ .02,F(1,1292) ¼ 43.08, po.0001). As no interactions involving CAUSES and FU_CLES were significant in ourcontemporaneous analysis, alternative models (e.g., time-lagged models) were not examined.

Inferential style about consequences

Similar analyses were conducted in order to examine whether a DIS about consequences reported wasassociated with greater elevations in depressive symptoms following elevations in CLES scores. The finalmodel consisted of significant effects for the following variables: T1_CDI (b ¼ 4.07, SE ¼ .21,F(1,338) ¼ 366.66, po.0001), GENDER (b ¼ �1.00, SE ¼ .424, F(1,338) ¼ 5.58, po.05), and FU_CLES(b ¼ .10, SE ¼ .02, F(1,1292) ¼ 43.08, po.0001). As no interactions involving CONSEQUENCES andFU_CLES were significant in our contemporaneous analysis, alternative models (e.g., time-lagged models)were not examined.

Discussion

When examining each of the three DISs separately, the current results provided limited support for the HT.More specifically, a more DIS about the self was associated with greater increases in depressive symptomsfollowing increases in stress in contemporaneous, but not time-lagged, analyses. DISs about causes andconsequences, however, failed to confer vulnerability to depressive symptoms in either set of analyses. Whenexamining the diathesis-stress component of the HT using a weakest link approach, results provided fullsupport for the HT. More specifically, contemporaneous analyses indicated that a depressogenic weakest linkwas associated with greater increases in depressive symptoms following increases in stress. Similarly, time-lagged analyses indicated that a depressogenic weakest link was associated with greater increases in depressivesymptoms at Time n following increases in stress at Time n�1. Last, time-lagged analyses failed to providesupport for the alternative model in which a depressogenic weakest link is associated with greater increases instress at Time n following increases in depressive symptoms at Time n�1.

The weakest link hypothesis may be one factor that accounts for discrepancies in past research examiningthe diathesis-stress component of the HT in youth. According to the weakest link hypothesis, the degree ofsupport a given study obtains for each individual DIS is likely to vary according to the proportion of childrenin the sample for whom that style is the ‘‘weakest link.’’ Past research may have failed to provide support forthe attributional vulnerability hypothesis of the HT in children because attributional style was not a commonweakest link among the children in the sample. The weakest link hypothesis is likely to have particularlyimportant implications for research examining the HT in children. Although research examining DISs aboutcauses, consequences, and the self in adults has not found them to be empirically distinguishable, research withchild samples has (see Abela & Sarin, 2002). A closer examination of the children in the current study revealed

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that many children’s propensities towards depressogenic thinking varied tremendously depending on whichinferential style was examined. For example, 22.1% of third-graders and 30.9% of seventh-graders classifiedas extremely pessimistic on one inferential style were classified as extremely optimistic on at least one other.

Second, given that the current study utilized an idiographic approach to analysis, our results expand uponpast research examining the diathesis-stress component of the HT in youth using a nomothetic approach.Interestingly, when examining whether each of the three individual DISs confer vulnerability to depressivesymptoms in the current sample, different patterns of results were obtained when using idiographic (e.g.,current manuscript) and nomothetic (e.g., Abela, 2001) approaches. More specifically, the results of thecurrent study suggest that (1) a DIS about the self confers vulnerability to depressive symptoms in both third-and seventh-grade children but that (2) DISs about causes and consequences do not confer vulnerability todepressive symptoms in either age group. In contrast, the results obtained by Abela (2001) suggest that (1) aDIS about the self confers vulnerability to depressive symptoms in third- and seventh-grade girls but not boys,(2) a DIS about causes confers vulnerability to depressive symptoms in seventh- but not third-grade children,and (3) a DIS about consequences confers vulnerability to depressive symptoms in both third- and seventh-grade schoolchildren.

The central hypothesis of the current study is that the use of both weakest link and idiographicapproaches represents the most accurate and powerful test of the diathesis-stress component of theHT and consequently such an approach is likely to generate the most consistent findings across studies.At the same time, differences in patterns of results obtained when examining individual DISs using idiographicversus nomothetic approaches should not be ignored. An idiographic approach can be viewed as anexamination of cognitively vulnerable youth’s degree of stress reactivity. More specifically, such anapproach examines the degree to which youth exhibit increases in depressive symptoms when their levelof stress increases. In contrast, a nomothetic approach can be viewed as an examination of the cumu-lative effects of stress on children’s depressive symptoms. In other words, although a nomothetic approachis not sensitive to within-subject covariation between stress and depressive symptoms, it is sensitive toexamining whether prolonged intervals of elevated stress ultimately end up triggering depressive symptoms.As the HT posits that the occurrence of stressors serve as the ‘‘occasion setter’’ for cognitively vulnerableindividuals to make the types of depressogenic inferences that increase their risk for experiencing increasesin depressive symptoms, we believe that operationalizing ‘‘high stress’’ using an idiographic approach ismore consistent with the diathesis-stress component of the HT in its current form. At the same time,future research comparing patterns of results obtained when using both idiographic and nomotheticapproaches may ultimately uncover a more multifaceted role for stressors within the etiological chain positedby the HT.

Last, the results of the current study failed to provide support for Turner and Cole’s (1994) developmentalhypothesis. It is important to note that the majority of research that has found age-related differences in theemergence of DISs as vulnerability factors to depression has only examined the DIS about causes (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994). Research examining the diathesis-stress component of the HTfrom a weakest link perspective has not obtained age-related differences. Thus, past age-related differences arelikely the result of (1) a DIS about causes being less likely than DISs about the self and consequences to serveas a weakest link for younger children (e.g., Abela & Payne, 2003) and (2) the CASQ exhibiting poorerpsychometric properties than the CCSQ.

Several limitations of the current study should be noted. First, self-report measures were used toassess depressive symptoms. Although the CDI possesses high reliability and validity, it is difficult tomake conclusions about clinically diagnosed depression based on self-report questionnaires. Second, self-report measures were used to assess stress. Although measures of stress that require participants only toindicate whether or not an event occurred are less likely to be influenced by informant bias than those that asksubjects to rate the subjective impact of each event, more sophisticated methods of analysis such asinterviewing procedures that assess contextual threat may provide better assessments of stress. Last, althoughthe CASQ and CCSQ exhibit adequate psychometric properties for use in empirical research, similar measureswith higher levels of reliability would allow researchers to examine whether unexpected and inconsistentfindings (1) between age or gender groups and (2) across studies are simply a consequence of the qualityof the measures.

ARTICLE IN PRESSJ.R.Z. Abela et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 45 (2007) 2397–24062406

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