Demonic Possession and Dissociation: Towards a Fuller Understanding of the Role of Dissociation in...
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Demonic Possession and Dissociation: Towards a Fuller Understanding of the Role of Dissociation in Religious Experience Anna Preston
Transcript of Demonic Possession and Dissociation: Towards a Fuller Understanding of the Role of Dissociation in...
Demonic Possession and Dissociation:
Towards a Fuller Understanding of the Role of Dissociation in
Religious Experience
Anna Preston
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Introduction: possession as religious experience
'Possession' is one of the most fascinating topics in the study
of religious experience, and one which is far from well understood.
These powerful and often dramatic events appear to be a near-
universal feature of religious experience cross-culturally, making
them a particularly promising area of interest for scholars. What can
account for the undeniable similarity beneath this nonetheless
dizzying array of behaviors? Dissociation theory offers one possible
account of these experiences. This paper will attempt to answer the
following question: What is the position of dissociation theory in
efforts to account for the religious experience of possession? I will
try to bring this question up to date, but I will also be looking at
some fairly 'outdated' sources which can nonetheless help to situate
the debate in historical context.
The structure of this study is as follows. First I will define
'dissociation', delimiting its boundaries, and outlining a
psychological theory of dissociative phenomena as constituting a
continuum of parallel, related experience. Then I will describe some
different dissociative conditions. Then I will introduce the topic of
'possession' as a possibly universal theme cross-culturally in the
study of religious experience. I will then narrow this topic further
to the experience of 'demonic' possession, as a most useful general
case study. This will reveal interesting differences in the
experience of possession as it manifests in different cultural
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settings under differing narratives of illness, madness, and health—
and the larger cultural cosmologies at play. These contrasting
narratives will be examined briefly in an historical context,
focusing on those most current and relevant to a modern, 'Western'
understanding of disease. It will be argued that a theory of
dissociation may be most powerful—and therapeutic—in making sense of
these possession experiences. I will try to show how dissociation may
underlie the experience of possession in general, and particularly
possession experienced as 'demonic', using various particular case
studies available in the possession literature. I will connect this
theory, in these particular case studies, to the causal mechanism of
trauma, and argue that trauma—and dissociation—are far more common
than has historically been imagined. Dissociation theory, I will
conclude, offers a compelling explanatory framework for understanding
possession experiences, and may even be a much larger unifying factor
underlying many diverse psychological conditions cross-culturally.
Defining and deliminating 'dissociation'
'Dissociation' is a term which has taken on many meanings since
its introduction into psychology by Pierre Janet at the end of the
19th century. As one current expert in the field puts it, “There are
currently so many confusing and often contradictory definitions of
dissociation that the concept has become very problematic. […] The
range of symptoms that are now described as dissociative has become
so broad that the category has lost its specificity.”1 'Dissociation'
1 Onno Van der Hart, Ellert Nijenhuis and Kathy Steele, The Haunted Self: Structural Dissociation and the Treatment of Chronic Traumatization (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
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has been used to represent symptoms, an 'altered state of
consciousness', a 'defense mechanism', or even a simple lapse in
attention, such as the state of semi-trance one might enter when
driving down the highway for an extended period of time.2
I will be using this definition of 'dissociation', which I think
is true to the original Janetian sense of the term: dissociation
refers to “the splitting of consciousness into separate systems of
ideas and memories. Each system will have its own set of associations
although some will be shared with other systems. Some of the systems
may develop their own sense of identity or selfhood.”3 This is not
merely a set of symptoms, an altered state of consciousness, a lapse
in attention, or a passing defense mechanism, but a structural separation
of a whole into parts—an abiding fragmentation—which is usually if not always a
result of trauma. As Van der Hart puts it, “Structural dissociation is a
particular organization in which different psychobiological
subsystems of the personality are unduly rigid and closed to each
other. These features lead to a lack of coherence and coordination
within the survivor's personality as a whole.”4 Another set of
authors summarize it thus:
Although the discontinuities characterized by dissociation can also be induced by substance use […] or some spiritual practices[…], dissociative fragmentation is conceptualized as a
2006), viii.2 For a detailed overview of both the conceptual overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
the authors argue is commonly applied to the term 'dissociation', see Onno Van der Hart, Ellert Nijenhuis, Kathy Steele, and Daniel Brown, “Trauma-related dissociation: conceptual clarity lost and found,”Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 38 (2004): 906-914.
3 Richard J. Castillo, “Spirit Possession in South Asia, Dissociation or Hysteria?Part 1: Theoretical Background,” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 18 (1994): 4-5.
4 Van der Hart et al., The Haunted Self, viii.
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protective mechanism that permits individuals to psychologicallydetach from events that are too overwhelming for the psyche to process […]. Consequent manifestations may include symptoms likedepersonalization (a sense of detachment and alienation from one's body), derealization (a sense of unreality about the external world), identity confusion, and psychogenic amnesia.5
These are only a few of the most general symptoms that
dissociative fragmentation can manifest. Next I will briefly outline
some of the more concrete manifestations of dissociative conditions.
Dissociative conditions: a continuum of parallel, related experience
The degree of structural dissociation in an individual can vary
widely, with widely differing, though fundamentally related,
manifestations as a result. On one end of the spectrum6 we may locate
relatively mild somatic symptom disorders, such as mysterious,
seemingly physical symptoms with no apparent physical cause; at the
most extreme end is Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), formerly
known as 'Multiple Personality Disorder', in which the dissociated
parts seem to take on an entire personality of their own.7 DID is
perhaps the dissociative condition most easily linked to the
5 Eleanor Longden, Anna Madill, and Mitch g. Waterman, “Dissociation, Trauma, and the Role of Lived Experience: Toward a New Conceptualization of Voice Hearing,” Psychological Bulletin 138(1) (2012): 29.
6 Note that this is in no way meant to be construed as a complete or exhaustive overview of the forms dissociation can take, nor is the order of conditions presented meant to imply a specific linear relationship along a continuum.
7 While some of the authors cited in this text continue to use the outdated term 'Multiple Personality Disorder' or 'multiple personalities', it should be noted that the current term 'Dissociative Identity Disorder' more accurately represents the condition it points to; the problem with 'multiple personalities'is that it implies the existence of not only 'multiple', but fully distinct and complete, personalities in one individual, whereas a definition of Dissociative Identity Disorder emphasizes that each of these seemingly distinct personalitiesare only parts of the greater whole of the individual.
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phenomena of 'possession', with many compelling examples available in
the possession literature.8
We also have such potentially mild manifestations as 'voice
hearing' (VH), which evidence suggests is actually an extremely
common phenomenon throughout society, independent of any necessarily
pathological or psychotic features.9 VH has been plausibly linked to
dissociative mechanisms, as one set of authors note: “Although VH can
manifest in a broad range of psychotic and non-psychotic conditions,
it seems persuasive and plausible that dissociative mechanisms are an
important underlying mediator for VH experiences per se.”10 They go
on: “... VH could be characterized as disaggregated representations
of past events (i.e., trauma fixated) that aurally encroach on
functioning-focused parts of the personality and are perceived as
perceptually and cognitively decontexualized (i.e., experienced as
current rather than understood in the context of past events.”11 This
results in the experience of hearing the voice of an apparently
'alien' self speaking, as disengaged from autobiographical
experience. While these voices may appear as benign, even friendly or
helpful, they can also take aggressive, violent, or persecutory
forms, i.e. 'demonic'.
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is another condition which
may be located along the dissociative spectrum. BPD is characterized
8 For one fascinating example, see Burkhard Peter, “On the History of DissociativeIdentity Disorders in Germany: The Doctor Justinus Kerner and the Girl From Orlach, or Possession as an 'Exchange of the Self',” International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 59(1) (2011): 82-102.
9 See Longden et al., “Dissociation, Trauma,” 28-76.10 Ibid., 43.11 Ibid., 50.
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by impulsiveness, emotional instability, and serious problems with
self-image and relationships. This condition is typically understood
to be the result of abuse or neglect in childhood, leading to severe
attachment issues. Attachment issues may be distinct from
dissociation, but they are often intimately linked, because unhealthy
attachment early in life, if not traumatizing in itself, leaves one
particularly vulnerable to trauma later on. One study of cases of
'cinematic neurosis' following the viewing of the film, 'The
Exorcist', found these possession experiences to be an example of “a
culturally shaped syndrome, whereby a film shapes the symptom
presentation of pre-existing mental health conditions in vulnerable
people. Vulnerable individuals include those who have issues with
their identity, e.g. possessing varying degrees of borderline
personality structures.”12 BPD, then, can also be linked to possession
experiences.
We may also briefly look at Dissociative Trance Disorder (DTD),
as yet another dissociative manifestation relevant to the
interpretation of possession experiences. As the authors of one study
state, “dissociative trance disorder seems to be a distinct clinical
manifestation of a dissociative continuum, sharing some features with
dissociative identity disorder.”13 Though DTD and DID are “parallel
trance-related disorders,” they are “psychoculturally distinct. The
basic difference concerns the way the secondary conscious entity is
12 Bruce Ballon and Molyn Leszcz, “Horror Films: Tales to Master Terror or Shapers of Trauma?” American Journal of Psychotherapy 61(2) (2007): 212.
13 Stefano Ferracuti, Roberto Sacco, and Renato Lazzari, “Dissociative Trance Disorder: Clinical and Rorschach Findings in Ten Persons Reporting Demon Possession and Treated by Exorcism,” Journal of Personality Assessment 66(3) (1996): 525.
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seen and treated: If the entity is considered as a part of the same
person, the treatment will attempt to develop to integration […]; if
the secondary conscious is diagnosed as a spirit or demon, the
treatment will be organized around the theme of expulsion.”14 DTD,
then, might be a particularly relevant form of dissociation for the
study of possession experiences, especially as they relate to
particular cultural-religious setting with corresponding treatment
options, e.g. Roman Catholicism and the practice of 'exorcism'. The
authors go on:
Persons with DTD are possibly conflicted individuals who have guilt feelings, are psychologically complex, have problems in control, and maintain strong religious values. They use extreme dissociation for regenerative purposes, performing the behavioral state in a 'safe' and controlled situation accepted within their cultural setting. Unlike patients with DID, possession trance in these persons is expressed mainly in the presence of an exorcist, thus allowing a form of guidance duringthe altered conscious state.15
Dissociative mechanisms also underlie the condition of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and have even been theoretically
linked to Schizophrenia.16 However, the above-mentioned conditions
will suffice for the scope of this paper.
The experience of 'possession'
Possession may be defined as “the episodic experience of being
controlled by another spirit or force with the loss of one's personal
identity often manifested in culture-specific, stereotyped movements
14 Ibid., 534-35.15 Ibid., 537.16 See Longden et al., “Dissociation, Trauma,” 28-76.
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and behavior with or without an associated trance state.”17 Possession
behavior points to psychosocial distress, as a way of coping and
reaching out for help, and it is not necessarily experienced or
interpreted as pathological. This may make it seem incompatible with
the Janetian view of dissociation and its roots in trauma, but I
suggest that a key factor in whether possession is considered
'pathological' is not just the presence or absence of trauma at the
root of the experience, but rather the individual and society's
response to the possession behavior. As the authors of one study
points out, “Past experience or exposure can play an important role
in causing, shaping and maintaining possession states. Recurrence or
chronicity may correlate with social integration when community
tolerates or accepts the behavior; with control and mastery of the
timing and pattern even veneration is achievable.”18 If a culture
makes room for it, possession can even be seen as divine. They go on:
“A clear religious sanction for divine possession is found in Hindu
holy texts and philosophy where the highest achievement is said to be
the passive experience of the divine taking full control of the self
and carrying out all actions.”19
Possession is only experienced as 'possession' when the
individual's cultural and personal religious framework allow for it;
i.e. possession as religious experience is culturally mediated and
even to an extent constructed, generally following a pattern of
learned behavior. 'Possession', without a religious framework to
17 Daya Somasundaram, T. Thivakaran, and Dinesh Bhugra, “Possession States in Northern Sri Lanka,” Psychopathology 41 (2008): 246.
18 Ibid., 251.19 Ibid., 251.
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contain it, may instead be interpreted as a psychological disorder or
disease. In these cases, lacking the element of cultural acceptance
and support, the dissociative behavior may be immediately interpreted
as pathological, and this could be self-fulfilling to a certain
extent. This, I think may be one major problem with the 'Western',
dominant model of psychology and disease. We will return to the
question of the therapeutic value of cultural narratives of madness
and health later on.
Delimiting 'possession'
Emma Cohen, in her anthropological analysis of possession forms
occurring cross-culturally, defines 'possession' as conforming to one
of two broad categories: 'executive possession' or 'pathogenic
possession'. In executive possession, “the spirit entity is typically
represented as taking over the host's executive control, or replacing
the host's 'mind' (or intentional agency), thus assuming control of
bodily behaviours.”20 In pathogenic possession, on the other hand,
“the presence of the spirit entity is typically (but not always)
manifested in forms of illness.”21 This is an important distinction,
which I think is justified by the evidence and well-argued in her
analysis. For the purposes of my research, however, I will be
confining my analysis mainly to the phenomena of executive possession.
While, in both possession forms, some kind of dissociation may be
present, in executive possession, the sense of an alien identity
20 Emma Cohen, “What is Spirit Possession? Defining, Comparing, and Explaining Two Possession Forms,” Ethnos 73(1) (2008): 103.
21 Ibid., 103.
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taking over one's agency is clearly compatible with the more extreme
forms of dissociation, such as DID or DTD. In pathogenic possession,
the dissociation may be closer to the mild end of the spectrum, e.g.
a manifestation of somatic symptoms. However, I think it would be an
over-generalization to summarily assign all these cases a common root
in structural dissociation of the personality, especially if an
initiating trauma cannot be located. Cohen herself denies a basis in
dissociation theory, stating “The distinction is not one between
consciousness and dissociation,” but admits that “Executive
possession concepts […] display significant continuities with […]
lay-understandings of Dissociative Identity Disorder.”22 Unfortunately
she does not herself explore the theory of dissociation beyond the
typical 'lay-understanding', which focuses almost exclusively on the
most extreme end of the dissociative spectrum.
The experience of 'demonic' possession
As noted above, 'possession' experiences generally are not
always interpreted as negative or pathological; 'demonic' possession,
on the other hand, is rarely interpreted or experienced in a positive
or appreciative fashion. This may be due to several factors. First
off, possession can only be experienced as 'demonic' when the
individual's religious framework allows for it; i.e. conforming to a
dualistic worldview, and/or belief in the existence of absolute evil—
so again, culturally mediated. As Owe Wikström points out in his
study of possession as a form of 'role-taking', “... The cognitive
map which is part of the world of religion contains roles that offer 22 Ibid., 120.
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systems of language in which anxiety is expressed in terms of non-
naturalistic, mythical, and demonic terms.”23 Role-theory, he argues,
emphasizes how religious modes of apprehension provide accounts of
the “interplay between God and man or spirits and man. Regarded from
the psychological point of view, these partner-roles imply
possibilities of identification which, in their turn, generate a
readiness of perception.”24 While the religious framework obviously
provides a role-relation of God-to-man, it also provides a role-
relation of Devil-to-man. This makes the experience of demonic
possession possible. Wikström puts it nicely:
The experience of [demonic] possession can be described as an interaction between the cognitive frame of reference of the religious (sub-) group with its verbal mythologic model for the interpretation of evil (as the Evil One) one the one hand, and aneurotic reaction in an individual in whom certain impulses charged with anxiety have been suppressed from consciousness.25
Following this, I would venture to guess that there is probably
a significant difference in the experience of, for example, Southeast
Asian 'spirit possession', and the Christian experience of 'demon
possession' or possession by the Devil himself. Although both
possession experiences may be interpreted as malevolent, the
Christian conception of 'evil' may be more absolute and
irreconcilable.
Citing one case of demonic possession in the context of a church
group, Wikström explains, “A strongly concretized symbolic world has
23 Owe Wikström, “Possession as Role-Taking,” Journal of Religion and Health 28(1) (1989): 27.
24 Ibid., 27.25 Ibid., 30.
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been developed in the group to which the patient belongs, in which
the physical palpability of Evil has been stressed. Evil is not an
abstraction, but is described as a Person, a role, not Evil, but the
Evil One, the Devil.”26 A psychologically vulnerable individual
holding to a cosmology of absolute good vs. evil may encounter great
resistance when trying to integrate 'evil' parts of their
personality, especially in subcultures where natural bodily urges,
such as sexual feelings, are interpreted as demonic. As Wikström
concludes in this particular case, “The patient projects her own
emergent 'evil', that is, sexuality, onto this Devil.”27
Indeed, cases of Christian or Catholic demon possession often
betray major fixation on sexual and bodily issues. In one study of
demonic possession behavior among Roman Catholic practitioners, for
example, some individuals “expressed unusual body concerns […] which
often were associated with very high sexual contents (sometimes quite
uncommon ones).”28 This, I think it is quite safe to argue, is clearly
linked to the individuals' religious and moral positions on the
nature of sexuality. As the authors of this study go on to point out,
in demonic possession, there is usually if not always a significant
element of moral dilemma and ambivalence discernible in the struggle; “The
possessing agent always manifested a moral character different from
that of the person's habitual state, usually expressing sexual and
aggressive concerns.”29
Other examples of moral ambivalence may include: feeling
26 Ibid., 29.27 Ibid., 29.28 Ferracuti et al., “Dissociative Trance Disorder,” 534.29 Ibid., 527.
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responsibility to one's family vs. desire for a different way of
life; loyalty to one's religious community vs. personal feelings of
doubt or dissent; or, perhaps earlier and more fundamentally, the
attachment a child feels for an abusive caretaker vs. the knowledge
that what the caretaker is doing is wrong. These conflicts result in
feelings of guilt, shame, and personal 'evil-ness' that may be
expressed through culturally sanctioned roles of illness or
possession. In cases where the possession experience is culturally
mediated in relatively clear-cut ways—for instance, fitting
traditional roles generally accepted throughout the individual's
community—successful treatment may be a relatively simple exercise,
e.g. a purification ritual performed by a shaman. I would suggest
that the cultural mediation of cases in advanced industrial and
western societies is more complex and problematic. Next I will give a
brief historical overview of some of the competing cultural
narratives at play in the interpretation of possession experiences,
of which dissociation theory is only one explanatory framework
struggling for dominance.
The biological-psychiatric model of 'mental illness'
In their study of 'Dissociation, Trauma, and the Role of Lived
Experience: Toward a New Conceptualization of Voice Hearing', Eleanor
Longden, Anna Madill and Mitch G. Waterman present a cogent analysis
of the shifting paradigms of psychological theory and practice since
the 19th century. They point out: “... in the years since the giants
of 19th-century psychiatry first forged them, the links between
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trauma, dissociation, and psychotic experience have been relatively
neglected, and at some points forgotten entirely.”30 Their study
focuses on the conditions currently known as 'schizophrenia' and
'voice hearing', arguing that these apparently 'psychotic' symptoms
may actually have a common root in basic, universal human mechanisms
of dissociation. 'Dissociation', here, is emphasized as a completely
normal and—at least initially—adaptive human behavior; “In the short
term [dissociation] can function as a survival strategy by reducing
conscious awareness for intolerable information.”31 However, as they
point out, “the autonomous, sometimes extreme nature of dissociative
intrusions means that considerable distress and impairment can result
if dissociation becomes a habitual way of responding to anxiety or
threat.”32
The history of dissociation theory's origins, development, and
decline is too much to go over in detail here, but the outcome is
significant: “From the 1950s onward, psychiatry would witness the
ascendance of taxonomic neo-Kraepelin models […] that advocated
operational diagnostic criteria and emphasized somatogenesis over the
notion of a continuum of psychological functioning.”33 This model,
Longden explains, sees psychiatric conditions as clearly discrete or
different from one another, as biological or genetic in origin, and
as fundamentally different from normal mental states, but these
assumptions are increasingly being called into question today. The
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
30 Longden et al., “Dissociation, Trauma,” 29.31 Ibid., 29.32 Ibid., 29.33 Ibid., 30.
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now in its fifth edition, makes a point of stating that the disorders
it attempts to classify should not be seen as necessarily discrete,
or fundamentally separate, conditions. However, this warning is
largely nominal, as an underlying unifying process or mechanism of
disorder has not yet been established.
In addition, I would argue that the biological psychiatric model
has very questionable value as a cultural narrative, mediating as it
does the experience of psychological illness and distress. This
narrative, summarized most simply in its most extreme, some might say
'materialist' form, tells the following story of 'mental illness' and
'recovery': A biological defect in brain activity occurs; this defect
leads to cognitive malfunctioning and maladaptive behaviors in the
individual; the individual is correctly diagnosed with the
appropriate psychiatric condition and given corresponding medical
treatment, often in the form of a psychotropic medication; the
individual 'recovers'. Certainly, few would subscribe to this most
oversimplified and reductionist viewpoint. However, lacking a
coherent alternative model with an empirical basis in scientific
knowledge, this narrative remains an enduring force in the popular
imagination. As Longden points out:
… Many individuals can derive comfort from illness models […] and the therapeutic options they confer. However, some psychiatric patients show preferences for social and experiential interpretations of their distress […] arguing that such models value subjectivity, honor lived experience, and promote understandings that are less stigmatizing and disempowering than passive concepts of mental disease.34
34 Ibid., 42.
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As they go on to say, research has found that “explanations for
mental health problems that emphasize social factors (like trauma)
are related to lower prejudice and greater empathy and tolerance
within the general public […]. In contrast, biomedical explanations
were found to positively relate to perceptions of instability and
dangerousness and a consequent desire for social distance.”35 This
popular perception, perpetuated by a biological psychiatric model of
mental disease, makes such extreme experiences as possession very
difficult for members of a given community to interpret in a
compassionate and/or helpful manner. This may be part of the reason
why, at least in 'Western' contexts, one rarely encounters possession
experiences which are interpreted as positive, creative, or divine.
The psychoanalytic theory of 'repression'
Another important cultural narrative mediating interpretations
of possession is the Freudian psychoanalytic theory of 'repression'.
For an overview of the history of the shifting paradigms of
psychological theory regarding the 'splitting of consciousness', I
will refer to an excellent article by Richard J. Castillo. As he
argues in 'Part 1: Theoretical Backround' of his study on spirit
possession in south Asia, one major factor in the decline of
dissociative theory was “the growing popularity of the psychoanalytic
method […] which essentially denied the possibility of multiple
consciousnesses, and discounted the value of hypnosis in therapy.
Freud substituted the mechanism of repression for dissociation,
thereby providing a coherent alternative conception for psychological35 Ibid., 43.
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phenomena observed in hysterical patients.”36 He goes on: “[Freud's]
interpretation of the splitting of consciousness was founded on the
idea of active repression [which] implies the existence of
psychological forces which produce and maintain a repressive barrier
against recall of information that is somehow unacceptable to
consciousness.”37 This may sound similar to the theory of structural
dissociation, but there are key differences. For one, in repression,
only unacceptable information is blocked off, whereas in
dissociation, positive and healthy parts of the personality may be
lost along with the bad. As Castillo points out, “In modern cases of
multiple personality it has been noted that a subliminal or concealed
personality is sometimes more normal or mentally 'healthier' than the
primary one.”38 Also, repression is conceptualized as a regressive
“defense mechanism, protecting the ego from unacceptable ideas and
impulses”; whereas dissociation may result in pathology, “it is not a
defense mechanism in the Freudian sense, and can be thought of as a
psychological process adaptive for other purposes in varying social
situations and cultural contexts, for example, religious practices.”39
Finally, in repression, the Freudian unconscious is only accessible
through indirect means, such as dream interpretation;
By contrast, in dissociation theory, once the dissociated part of consciousness has been uncovered it is possible to converse directly with the secondary consciousness. This is what occurs when one converses with a multiple personality, once the dissociated personality has emerged, and also, I will submit, when one
36 Castillo, “Spirit Possession,” 7.37 Ibid., 8.38 Ibid., 8.39 Ibid., 10.
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converses with a 'spirit' or 'demon' possessing an individual.40
Another key disagreement between Freud and Janet, the founders
of repression and dissociation theory, respectively, involved the
status of unconscious material: “... Dissociation theory considers
mental processes unknown to the primary consciousness with their own
self-awareness and sense of identity as a separate secondary
consciousness. Freudian theory is unwilling to grant these
psychological processes the status of a separate consciousness
[...]”41 For Freud, Castillo argues, “consciousness had to be a
functioning unity and what is not known to the primary consciousness
had simply been labelled by Freud the 'unconscious'.”42 As to cases of
'double conscience' or 'splitting of consciousness', as the
phenomenon was known then, this was simply a matter of the one
unitary consciousness focusing itself within, or upon, one or another
superficially cordoned group of mental activities in turn. However,
as Castillo points out, this explanation neglected to account for
observed cases of “simultaneous multiple consciousnesses.”43
One more major area of disagreement—and controversy, then as now
—involves the empirical status of traumatic memories, especially
those recalling childhood sexual abuse. Originally, Freud granted
that 'grave sexual injuries' were inflicted on many of his patients
in childhood, but later, as Castillo relates, he “had an abrupt
change of reasoning and published a recantation of his earlier ideas.
'I overestimated the frequency of these occurrences. … I have since 40 Ibid., 8.41 Ibid., 9.42 Ibid., 8-9.43 Ibid., 9.
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learned to unravel many a fantasy of seduction and found it to be an
attempt at defense against the memory of sexual activities practiced
by the child himself – the masturbation of children' (Freud 1905).”44
Freud decided that, in most cases, the sexual abuse his patients
reported were mere fantasy. As Castillo explains, he “simply could
not believe that such perverted acts against children could be so
common.”45
This is really very significant, because Freud based his whole
'Oedipus Complex' theory on this assumption of the 'masturbation of
children', with resounding consequences for the subsequent
development of psychological theory, treatment, and the nature of
childhood sexual experience in the popular imagination. We now know,
with only a few detractors, that sexual abuse of children is
shockingly—horrifyingly—common. And the vast majority of patients
with seemingly 'multiple personalities' have experienced such
childhood abuse—either sexual, physical, or both. This has clear
implications for the assessment of possession phenomena, especially
those experienced as 'demonic' with a significant sexual element.
Problems: assessing the reality of reported instances of childhood
abuse
However, this issue remains the 'elephant in the room' during
any discussion of dissociation, especially its most extreme
manifestation in Dissociative Identity Disorder. The 90's witnessed
the widely publicized discrediting of dissociative theory due to the
44 Ibid., 10.45 Ibid., 10.
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discovery that traumatic memories could possibly be false, and may
even be accidentally planted by the overzealous therapist. Granted,
there is certainly evidence of this occurring in some instances. The
problem is compounded by the fact that, in structural dissociation of
the personality, the 'Apparently Normal Part' of the personality is
deeply emotionally invested in denying the reality of abuse.46 This
dilemma is fundamental to the very essence of dissociation; the
dissociation only occurs in the first place because the trauma—often,
memories of abuse—was too overwhelming to admit to oneself. Only
after extensive therapy will many survivors reach a high enough level
of mental functioning to begin to admit, and integrate, these
experiences.47
For an interesting examination of these issues, we can return to
the previously mentioned study of demonic possession among Roman
Catholic practitioners. This study examined the cases of ten
individuals, many of which showed clinical features of DID. The
authors note, “Interestingly, they denied all forms of sexual abuse
in childhood.”48 However, “during the possession state 1 participant,
talking as the demon and using the first person, spontaneously stated
that the 'bodily flesh' he had entered had been sexually abused in
childhood.”49 This individual then “firmly denied childhood sexual
abuse when interviewed during his normal state of consciousness.”50
46 See Van der Hart et al., The Haunted Self, 194.47 For an exhaustive guide to the treatment process, see Van der Hart et al., The
Haunted Self.48 Ferracuti et al., “Dissociative Trance Disorder,” 529.49 Ibid., 528.50 Ibid., 529.
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This behavior, the authors rightly note, “creates some perplexity.”51
It could very well be that these cases, involving deeply committed
practitioners of a religious faith with acknowledged inhibitions
against sexual feeling and expression, were simply not given the
opportunity to realize and admit their experiences within the narrow
religious setting provided them for treatment. One, however, must be
very careful in making such speculations, as they remain empirically
unknown and, often, unknowable, without the corroborating proof of
witnesses. However, even if sexual abuse was absent in all these
cases, physical abuse was reported in four, and seven participants
used to belong to ritualistic satanic groups, which may have involved
a form of emotional trauma just as damaging as any sexual or physical
abuse in childhood.52
On this issue, I agree with the position of the authors of
'Dissociation, Trauma, and the Role of Lived Experience', who state:
Concern for the veracity of trauma disclosure among psychiatric patients is understandable. Both delayed and continuous memoriesare vulnerable to misrepresentation, and there are valid reasonsto be cautious of recollections that are provided only after extensive use of suggestive procedures. Nevertheless, accounts of trauma among individuals with serious and enduring mental health problems have generally been shown as sufficiently reliable to justify the use of retrospective research methodology.53
As they go on to say: “Indeed, evidence suggests a strong trend for
51 Ibid., 535.52 Perhaps unfortunately, the authors of this study “made no attempt to inquire
further into problems arising from participation in cults, activities about which all participants expressed strong feelings of guilt.” See Ferracuti et al., 533.
53 Longden et al., “Dissociation, Trauma,” 40.
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psychiatric patients to underreport, rather than overreport, abuse.”54
Conclusion: the broad applicability and promise of dissociative
theory
In conclusion, I am in agreement with Castillo, who states:
“Dissociation theory combined with a firm grounding in the
anthropology of experience […] offers an alternative framework for
the description of spirit possession experience and related
pathological and nonpathological manifestations.”55 'Dissociation' is
a very powerful and broadly applicable heuristic tool in the study of
psychological—and religious—experience. Especially when looking at
the experience of possession, it is difficult to find cases in which
some form of dissociation does not seem like an obvious explanation.
It is this author's opinion that dissociation theory is far more
powerful in explaining possession experiences than is psychoanalytic
theory, or the dominant biological psychiatric model of mental
illness and disease. Terrible and traumatic events are extremely
common, and are especially likely to lead to dissociation when
experienced in the vulnerable period of childhood. This dissociation
may easily take on religious form and content, in keeping with
culturally prescribed roles and cosmology.
Some final cautionary points
However, because dissociation is such a powerful heuristic, it
is also has the potential to be a perilous one when applied in a
54 Ibid., 41.55 Castillo, “Spirit Possession,” 3.
25
sloppy, indiscriminate manner. It is important to properly limit the
boundaries of what is meant by the term, since otherwise,
'dissociation' may be seen operating in some vague form almost
anywhere. Certainly, dissociation cannot account for all psychiatric
conditions and pathological behavior. Attachment issues are often
related, but separate, as are processes of culturally-learned
behavior, and biological factors; 'repression', in the Freudian
sense, may also be a very real factor in many psychological
conditions, but following a different pattern; and 'altered states of
consciousness' can be seen to take place with or without an
underlying condition of trauma-based, structural dissociation of the
personality.
As one final remark, I would like to encourage future
researchers to at least consider avoiding the temptation to reduce
all religious phenomena—including possession experiences—to a theory
of psychological or 'mental' illness. This tendency, though
understandable, has the effect of alienating many sufferers and
subtly demeaning their experience as basically 'all in their head'.
While perhaps many scholars, especially those in Religious Studies,
do have a more sophisticated and sympathetic understanding of these
matters, there still exists a pervasive popular conception of the
terms 'psychological'/'subjective'/'internal' as equaling somehow
'not real', whereas 'biological'/'objective'/'external' denote things
that are 'real'.
Certainly there is good cause, as scholars, to limit ourselves
to those interpretations of reality which allow us to operate in
26
intellectually safe territory, i.e. following mutually agreed-upon
standards of empirical testing and reliability. However, it also
behooves us to cultivate the so-called 'post-modern' awareness that
our use of language is fundamentally bound up in our perceptions of
reality—implying, through structure, what is and isn't 'real'. As
Alfred Korzybski pointed out so bluntly almost a century ago, “The
map is not the territory.”56 Of course, I am not suggesting that the
'spirits' or 'demons' of possession experiences exist empirically
'out there' in a simplistically dualistic manner.57 Rather I am
suggesting, in line with Korzybski, that the thin covering of skin
over our persons may not be such a substantial dichotomous barrier as
our habits of language and perception imply.
When speaking of dissociation—as with language itself—we are
fundamentally dealing with issues of identity and structure. As Korzybski
states, “ignorance, identification, and pathological delusions,
illusions, and hallucinations, are dangerously [structurally] akin,
and differentiated only by the 'emotional' background or intensity.”58
While we, as scholars, are hopefully relatively free of pathological
delusions, and perhaps less ignorant than most, we nonetheless must
guard against the persistent tendency to identify our ideas—and the
structural relations implied—with reality itself. If we do not, we
56 Alfred Korzybski coined the expression in "A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics and Physics," a paper presented before the American Mathematical Society at the New Orleans, Louisiana meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 28, 1931.
57 See L. Stafford Betty's article, “The Growing Evidence for 'Demonic Possession':What Should Psychiatry's Response be?” for an example of just such an attempt atan arguably regressive turn to a simple, dualistic cosmology.
58 Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, 5th ed. (New York: Institute of General Semantics, 1994), 81.
27
ourselves may be 'possessed' of subtle convictions which are no less
'demonic' in their effects than in the cases of those we study.
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