Cultural Practices of “Ordinary” Youth: Transitions to Adulthood in South Korea

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1 Cultural Practices of OrdinaryYouth: Transitions to Adulthood in South Korea Kyong Yoon (2006) Asian Studies Review 01/2006; 30(4):375-388. In the field of youth cultural studies, it is increasingly suggested that globalisation accelerates the process of individualisation, which constructs “young people as self- determining, and youth culture as autonomous” (Côté 2002, 132). Such studies, many of which have had Western European contexts, look at the way in which young people are dis-embedded from institutions of socialisation in the process of globalisation (e.g. Bynner et al. 1997; du Bois-Reymond 1998; Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Pollock 2002). They argue, in the main, that increased uncertainty and risk in the transition from education to the labour market force young people to organise their own “choice biography” free from the paths determined by collective identity markers such as the family and class (du Bois-Reymond 1998; see also Beck 1992). The individualisation of youth, in contrast to the previous “normal biography, refers to the enhanced possibilities of diversifying the transitional path and an intensified search for individual identity (see Machácek 1997). However, the thesis that young people’s individualisation is accelerated through global social change has been challenged both theoretically and empirically. In particular, empirical studies have suggested that the degree to which sociality for young people has changed has emerged in different ways according to the specific local context and subcultural identity. First, it has been shown that “peripheral” young people (Pilkington and Johnson 2003) are removed from individualisation in that they suffer from a lack of resources and are restrained by traditional norms and familial ties (see Machácek 1997; Pilkington et al. 2002). Studies with an East Asian context suggest that, despite a comparable level of economic development to that of Western societies, Confucian values emphasising collective harmony have remained influential (Wee 1999; White 1993). Second, more importantly, it has been argued that different groups of young people tend to deal with rapid social change by developing their own methods, in relation to social pressure on the group (Brake 1990, 11). For example, young people involved in subcultural music scenes are more likely to adopt a conspicuous style in comparison with mainstream youth (Pilkington et al. 2002).

Transcript of Cultural Practices of “Ordinary” Youth: Transitions to Adulthood in South Korea

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Cultural Practices of “Ordinary” Youth:

Transitions to Adulthood in South Korea

Kyong Yoon (2006)

Asian Studies Review 01/2006; 30(4):375-388.

In the field of youth cultural studies, it is increasingly suggested that globalisation

accelerates the process of individualisation, which constructs “young people as self-

determining, and youth culture as autonomous” (Côté 2002, 132). Such studies, many

of which have had Western European contexts, look at the way in which young

people are dis-embedded from institutions of socialisation in the process of

globalisation (e.g. Bynner et al. 1997; du Bois-Reymond 1998; Furlong and Cartmel

1997; Pollock 2002). They argue, in the main, that increased uncertainty and risk in

the transition from education to the labour market force young people to organise

their own “choice biography” free from the paths determined by collective identity

markers such as the family and class (du Bois-Reymond 1998; see also Beck 1992).

The individualisation of youth, in contrast to the previous “normal biography”, refers

to the enhanced possibilities of diversifying the transitional path and an intensified

search for individual identity (see Machácek 1997).

However, the thesis that young people’s individualisation is accelerated through

global social change has been challenged both theoretically and empirically. In

particular, empirical studies have suggested that the degree to which sociality for

young people has changed has emerged in different ways according to the specific

local context and subcultural identity. First, it has been shown that “peripheral” young

people (Pilkington and Johnson 2003) are removed from individualisation in that they

suffer from a lack of resources and are restrained by traditional norms and familial

ties (see Machácek 1997; Pilkington et al. 2002). Studies with an East Asian context

suggest that, despite a comparable level of economic development to that of Western

societies, Confucian values emphasising collective harmony have remained

influential (Wee 1999; White 1993). Second, more importantly, it has been argued

that different groups of young people tend to deal with rapid social change by

developing their own methods, in relation to social pressure on the group (Brake 1990,

11). For example, young people involved in subcultural music scenes are more likely

to adopt a conspicuous style in comparison with mainstream youth (Pilkington et al.

2002).

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We therefore need to examine carefully the tendency of individualisation in

youth transition and sociality, with regard to the unique features of a specific local

context as well as to young people from different subcultural backgrounds. Bearing

the current debates in mind, this article examines how young South Koreans

(hereafter, Koreans) rearticulate local norms and environments in their transition to

adulthood, on the basis of empirical data collected in the course of in-depth

interviews with students aged 16 or 17 from five academic high schools1 in Seoul.

The research consisted of 45 semi-structured interviews with 33 young people. The

majority of the interviews were with individual respondents. Exceptions included

joint interviews with two young people; these were conducted at the express request

of participants, who preferred being involved in interviews in pairs.

The field research concentrated on “ordinary” young people in order to examine

the transition and sociality of mainstream teenagers, rather than on subcultural young

people who have already discussed much in previous studies of youth culture (e.g.

Hebdige 1979; Kang 1993). During initial interviews with a number of potential

respondents, it was found that mainstream young people described themselves as

“ordinary kids” (pot’ongaedŭl), young people who were positioned between “brains”

(bumsangidŭl) and “slackers” (nonŭnaedŭl), accodting to attitudes to schooling. It is

not only in my field study but also in previous empirical studies of young Koreans

that these major categories appear to be significant (e.g. Lee 1998).

In the field study, potential respondents qualified in terms of following criteria:

first, they would be teenagers (16 or 17 years old, high school first or second

graders) aiming to enter higher education and seeking to maintain a high enough

academic score to do so. However, I excluded students with very high exam scores

since the intent was to focus on “ordinary kids”. Second, they would belong to middle

class as measured by their father’s occupation and education as well as residence. In

the beginning, I asked my gatekeepers, school teachers in their early thirties, to

introduce some “ordinary” students to me for the purpose of the research. On the

basis of the gatekeeper’s judgment, I conducted initial sessions with potential

informants. The introductory sessions focused on addressing the research purpose on

the one hand and confirming whether the potential participants fitted the sample

parameters on the other. At the session, questions were given them to identify

themselves in terms of academic desire (i.e. their desire for higher education)

especially in comparison with other groups of young people. In the process, most

informants identified themselves as being in between “brain” and “slackers”; however,

after the introductory sessions, a few potential respondents were excluded from the

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sample of “ordinary kids” because they did not perceive themselves as being in

between “brains” and “slackers”.

In this study I use the term pot’ongaedŭl (hereafter “ordinary kids”) in the same

way as my informants to describe the majority of young people in high school; those

who have a strong desire to raise their educational attainment and make a conscious

effort to achieve this. The second category, bumsangidŭl (hereafter “brains”),

according to my respondents, are young people who are obsessed with study and have

indeed achieved high exam scores, but pay little attention to developing harmonious

relationships with other students. In my respondent’s comments, “brains” meant

young people who were very keen on individual competition aimed at succeeding in

examinations. This individualistic striving for academic success, according to my

respondents, was the major feature which demarcated the “brains” from “ordinary

kids” who were also eager to get a high score in exams but prevented themselves

from “being selfish”, for example by not monopolising information and failing to get

along with peers as they suspected the “brains” did. In contrast to “ordinary kids” and

“brains”, nonŭnaedŭl (hereafter “slackers”) refers to young people who were

unwilling to make the effort to study in school but were likely to hang out in groups.2

In order to explore the construction and negotiation of “ordinary” young people

in Korea, the article begins with briefing the way in which dominant social discourses

have formed a particular notion of youth and its transition in contemporary Korea.

Subsequent sections empirically demonstrate how “ordinary kids” position

themselves by coping with local norms and educational pressures. In so doing, the

article aims to explore how “ordinary kids” negotiate, through the educational process,

social positioning of youth and identify themselves in comparison with others. Given

that “ordinary” young people have not been fully investigated in previous cultural

studies of youth, despite the fact that they constitute the majority of students in

secondary school (see Valentine et al. 1998), the current research may enhance our

understanding of Korean youth and its culture.

SCHOOLING AND YOUTH CULTURE IN KOREA

It has been argued that Confucian norms and schooling, in relation to the process of

rapid modernisation of the country, have a strong impact on young Koreans’

transition to adulthood (Choi 1994). Above all, it seems evident in Korea, as in other

East Asian societies, that strong family bonds and supports affect young people’s

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academic achievement and therefore their life routes (see Choi 1994; Kim 2004; Seth

2002; Wee 1999, 369). It should also be emphasised that the Confucian norms

surviving in Korea consider educational merit as a highly honourable achievement for

the family as an extension of the self (Choi 1994, 80).

In addition to Confucian influences, modernisation after the Korean War

strengthened Koreans’ educational desires to the point where the term “educational

fever” (kyoykyŏl) was used (Seth 2002; see also Kim 2004; Son 2001), equivalent to

what Dore (1976) named “diploma disease”. The war, which reorganised previously

existing class hierarchies, together with the adoption of a single-track educational

system, gave Koreans the conviction that schooling was a short cut to social mobility

(Son 2001, 181-183). Consequently, exam-orientated education (ipsichungsimchuŭi)

has dominated secondary and higher education in Korea (Son 2001, 188-189; see also

Seth 2002). This has been complemented by a state policy that has increased the

number of students eligible for secondary and higher education. As a result, the rate

of school attendance in Korea for people aged 15-18 has outstripped that in any other

country (Korean Ministry of Education 2002; OECD 2002) and higher education

participation rates have increased so rapidly that the proportion of university students

in the population exceeds that of most developed countries; as of 2002 the rate of

entrance into further and higher education from secondary education reached 79.7%

(Korean Ministry of Education 2002).

The popularity of mass education and higher education, in combination with the

highly homogenised and state-controlled Korean educational system and culture (see

Lee 1992), resulted in young people being defined predominantly as students, at the

expense of other identities (see Cho Han 2000). In the uniform system of the

“modernist school”, young people of the same age “are forced into a common arena,

that compels individuals and groups to find a place and identity within a single

complex matrix” (Willis 2003, 407). Although the post-authoritarian regimes since

the late 1980s have gradually relaxed their disciplinary power over youth, daily life

for young Koreans is still constructed by schooling to a great extent and cultural

space for teenagers is limited. In particular, for “ordinary” young Koreans, the period

of high school concentrates on preparation for the university entrance exam, with

daily competition for good scores (see Choi 2005; Lee and Larson 2000). It should be

noted that the uncertainty and risk derived from globalising forces experienced via the

financial crisis of 1997 has strengthened both state and familial commitment to, and

investment in, the education of young people. Indeed, the recent rapid and unstable

restructuring of the Korean economy as it has been managing globalisation is said to

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have even strengthened “educational fever” as a means of achieving reliable

resources to cope with a risk society. A number of surveys have also shown that after

the IMF bailout of 1997 most families were spending as much as or even more on a

child’s private education, including payment for crammers or private tutors,

compared with what they had done before, despite their increased financial

difficulties (Lee 2002, 26; see also Shim 1998, 120).

In the process of modernisation of Korea, the model of transition from

secondary school to higher education has dominated the social discourse on youth

transition; moreover, the discourse has focused on the protection of teenagers as a

collective, and more or less passive, group of people.3 In the dominant discourse of

youth attitude toward schooling has thus been a crucial criterion by which young

Koreans’ cultural identities are categorised.

In the subsequent sections of this article I focus on young Koreans’ response to

the dominant positioning of youth in Korea by exploring how young people

themselves engage in schooling, on the basis of in-depth interviews. An examination

of young “ordinary” Koreans’ own conception of their transition to adulthood reveals

how they position themselves in relation to other youth and also in relation to their

own biography.

YOUTH TRANSITION AND SOCIALITY

As indicated earlier, the current study discusses how “ordinary” young Koreans

negotiate educational pressures and local norms, while positioning themselves as

“ordinary kids” in the period of high school. In the narratives of my respondents, high

school (kotŭnghakkyo: ages 16-18), the final stage of secondary education, offered

“ordinary kids” a dilemma between their need for individual educational achievement

and their aspirations to maintain harmonious relationships with others. They seemed

to articulate a strategy of their own to negotiate the new environment which we may

call “self-mainstreaming”. This is not only a process of attaining educational

achievement but also one of getting along with other “mainstream” students and

teachers. This sense of harmony, which was deeply internalised by “ordinary” young

people, can be seen as an expression of Korean local sociality, in keeping with

Confucian familism, where harmony is one of the crucial elements in human

relationships. As Yim and Janelli (1998) have demonstrated, individuality in

contemporary Korean sociality tends to have negative implications, since it is

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considered to break down local harmony. This influence appeared to be clear amongst

“ordinary kids” when they coped with their transitional tasks, that is, at the same time

managing extended social relationships and educational pressures. Although they

were eager to develop their educational achievements through competition, they were

reluctant to disrupt collective harmony by pursuing certain individualistic behaviours

associated with academic achievement, such as monopolising information or ignoring

others.

In this regard, it should be noted that my respondents, in coping with extended

sociality in high school, began to distinguish themselves from the other two

categories: from “slackers” involved in “spectacular” subcultures without conforming

to “mainstream” school culture (see Hebdige 1979), and from “brains”, who were

considered very individualistic and self-oriented. In attempting to engage in

harmonious relationships, “ordinary” young people considered themselves as bearers

of a “purer” local sociality in comparison with other groups of young people (i.e.

“brains” and “slackers”). Above all, they positioned themselves as the opposite of

“brains”, who were considered “very selfish” and “kids without friends” (Sangsu: 17,

male) since they did not care about relationships and concentrated only on academic

achievement.

Sŏnghŭi (16, female): First of all, the brains don’t listen to others. I

can’t talk with them. The ordinary kids around me are at least good

listeners. But the brains say only what they want to say, without

caring about others. They usually talk for a long time without

stopping. Crazy! Most of all, I can’t communicate with them. They

are the kind of people who are hard to communicate with.

Interviewer: Meaning, they are self-centred?

Sumi (16, female): Yeah. First, they are selfish. Second, they ignore

others.

In contrast, “slackers” were depicted by my respondents as too loutish to fit in

with collective norms in school; the behaviour of “slackers” was criticised for

disrupting the collective rule of the class. An informant described a “slacker” whose

behaviour disturbed her:

It makes me angry to talk about the slacker. She doesn’t have any

respect for teachers. You know, there should be a certain respect for

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teachers in school. She often naps in class without caring about

anything. She’s rude to friendly teachers very rudely. She never

does that with the really strict teachers (Sura: 17, female).

Although the “slackers” often hung out in groups, my respondents tended to look

down on their cliquishness. This is because “ordinary kids” believed that the

friendship of slackers was not sincere; the collective gathering of “slackers” was

considered a “fake” form of friendship:

Slackers don’t even say hello to each other when they are put into

different classes for the new academic year. They usually say a lot of

rude things about others [i.e. other members in the same gang] behind

their backs. Many, well, most of them seem to hang out just because

they want to use each other. If kids hang out together, they can collect

information about where to hang out, can’t they? When the girls go to

the dance club, they can ask others what make-up would be cool, that

sort of thing. But, they criticise others behind their backs when they

aren’t together [in school]. They hang out together when they need

each other though (Mina: 17, female).

Differentiating themselves both from “brains” and “slackers”, “ordinary” young

people tried to be harmonious in school and the family. In the respondents’ narratives,

“leading a quiet life” (Sura: 17, female) was the phrase often used to describe an

important characteristic of “ordinary kids”. Indeed, some of my informants defined

themselves as “quiet kids” (choyonghanaedŭl) in school, differentiating themselves

from “noisy kids” (sikkrŏunaedŭl). It should be noted that “being quiet” for the

respondents does not simply mean being silent but rather refers to harmonious

communication with others and abstaining from speaking out.

Sura (17, female): Noisy kids are always unhappy with everything.

Interviewer: Always?

Sura (17, female): Some of them are good students, but mostly they

are very noisy – speak loudly.

Hana (17, female): But, they don’t realise what they sound like. When

they chat, they talk very loudly, but if others speak up a bit, they get

mad at the others ... So scary!

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For “ordinary kids”, integration into school life may mean a search to maintain local

harmony instead of expressing individual desires or resistance. On the surface, it can

be said that, by avoiding both “selfish” and “false collectivistic” behaviours,

“ordinary kids” try, to some extent, to be “invisible”, fitting in with others at school.

However, this may be a means of finding a positive identification for themselves. As

Mullaney (2001) suggests, non-involvement in noticeable activities may be an

attempt to gain recognition from others and self-recognition. Indeed, in my study

“leading a quiet life” referred not only to conformist behaviours:

Interviewer: How would your peers describe you?

Wŏnha (17, female): Maybe “That girl doesn’t have any individual

taste”… it may be true. Or they can say, “she is simply honest”,

something like that.

This may imply that they identify themselves as bearers of certain moral capital while

having neither much educational capital (in comparison with “brains”) (see Bourdieu

1986), nor much “subcultural capital” (in comparison with “slackers”), referring to

certain tastes in youth subculture appropriated through consumption (see Thornton

1995).

Their sense of possessing more moral resources than other groups of young

people comes mainly from their rejection both of individuality and of engagement in

subcultural activities. However, despite denying that they were either “brains” or

“slackers”, some respondents sometimes expressed their envy of those young people.

For instance, one female informant said, “Slacker girls are all skinny, although they

eat a lot. They are also kind of fashionable … They go out with boys very easily.

They may be popular with boys” (Suji: 16, female). “Ordinary kids” also sometimes

envied young people who achieved more academically than they did: “I would envy

kids studying very hard, as long as they have good relationships with other kids”

(Sangsu: 17, male). However, such envy was often a kind of transient daydreaming

and did not last long. My respondents expressed their concern about the immature

personalities or unstable future of “slackers” and the self-oriented attitude of “brains”:

“Slackers hang out too much. Maybe it’s fun. But I suppose it’s too much. It’s like,

say, they are quite immature” (Jŏngmi: 17, female).

Overall, “ordinary kids” tried to cope with their uncertainty about becoming

adults by using their own resources on the basis of local sociality and morality, in

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comparison with other youth groups who use their educational or subcultural capital.

This self-mainstreaming of young people as “ordinary kids” can be a process of

negotiation and thus of empowerment, so long as they feel recognised and powerful in

the process (Deveaux 1994, 234). Indeed, young people in the current study

considered themselves to have more potential for the future while criticising “brains”

or “slackers” for “standing out” and not conforming to local norms of sociality

represented as a “mainstream” school culture. In this manner, as Pilkington et al.

(2002, 132) have pointed out, “ordinary” young people tended to elaborate “a

localised and inward-looking strategy for negotiating the present.”

CONSTRUCTING A NORMAL BIOGRAPHY

The dominant social positioning of youth as students and the single-track educational

system in Korea involve a wide range of young people, regardless of their eligibility

for higher education. In particular, school exams and the university entrance exam

(suhangnŭngnyŏkp'yŏngga), which is taken nationally at the end of the third and final

year of senior high school are crucial in young Koreans’ everyday lives. Indeed, for

my respondents, educational achievement was a central issue, since entry into a good

university was considered one of the most important objectives of their present lives.

They felt under great pressure throughout their high school period:

Interviewer: What do you feel about Korea?

Minho (16, male): I want to get out of this country!

Interviewer: What makes you think that?

Minho (16, male): Too tough to enter university…

Interviewer: Does that mean that, if you got into university, you would

not want to escape from the country …. would you?

Minho (16, male): If I make it … if I make it … if I enter a prestigious

university.

Under familial and social pressures my respondents themselves also had their

own intense desire to enter higher education. Above all, according to “ordinary kids”,

their families forced them to study harder for the sake of family honour as well as for

their own sake. Reflecting Confucian familism, parents emphasised that studying

hard for the exam was the main way for their children to avoid “being left behind”

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and to make a success of their future (see Choi 1994). This familial desire was a

significant pressure on my informants:

My mum and dad are doing their best to support me. I feel sorry for

them because I’m not a very good student. My mum always takes

good care of me. She does this and that for me … But I am

sometimes anxious and feel inhibited … then sometimes I lose my

temper with my mum (Sangsu: 17, male).

The educational system emphasises preparation for the university entrance

exam, to the point of discouraging “ordinary kids” from thinking about other options.

According to my informants, teachers tended to ignore students who were not very

interested in studying and concentrated on preparing students for exams: “My

teachers don’t respect us at all if we are not good students” (Sangsu: 17, male). One

respondent, who was relatively sceptical about schooling focused on exam-

preparation, pointed out:

A school is supposed to be a place where kids prepare for the exam or

for something else. But, actually this is not the case. We should only

prepare for the exam! Otherwise, we are treated as nobody (Kimin: 17,

male).

By recognising only those young people who study hard and ignoring the rest, the

educational system reproduces the dominant notion of youth as students and of youth

transition to adulthood. The point which arises here is that young people, forced to

conform to normal biography and postpone their individual desires, may at times feel

disempowered. In particular, my interviewees sometimes felt “inhibited” in that they

did not clearly design their individual future nor enjoy their present opportunities.

Their feelings about the disciplined present and postponed autobiography were

mirrored in one respondent’s narrative of a dream:

I sometimes have funny dreams. Dreams about Sailor Moon.4 In

my dream, I am a Sailor Moon. Strangely, other Sailor Moon kids

around me can transform themselves and fly. But I can’t. I’m the

only one who can’t. All the others can fly, all the others …. (Minju:

16, female).

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Given the features of “Sailor Moon”, it is implied in the excerpt above that the

respondent felt powerless and also was afraid about “being left behind” among peers:

she was not able to transform herself into the powerful character while others around

her were. In this manner, “ordinary” young people felt immobilised in the present and

tried not to drop out of “normal biography”.

Despite such feelings of “being inhibited”, “ordinary kids” themselves also

thought it necessary to study hard in the interests of familial harmony and for their

own security. For example, one female informant living with a divorced mother who

was self-employed stated, in response to the question “What does your mum say

about you?”:

She’s probably happy with me because I am a good student. I don’t

have any slacker friends. You know, this is what my mum wants.

Not hanging around. My mum likes me to study hard. Because I

study hard, my mum thinks nobody in her neighbourhood looks

down on her as a powerless, divorced woman (Mina: 17, female).

“Ordinary” young people’s devotion to study was not usually based on any clear aims,

such as future career development: nor they did exploit the present to their own

advantage. What most respondents wanted as a result of self-mainstreaming was

greater freedom in the near future, but this did not necessarily mean independence

from the family. Rather, they saw their present and future within the “security

blanket” of the family and other institutions of socialisation. Indeed, their emotional

attachment to the family was so strong that several respondents clearly did not want

to leave their parents’ home even when they reached the age at which they could

count on financial independence:

Interviewer: When would you like to become independent from

your parents?

Romi (16, female): Even when I get older I don’t want to leave my

current home.

Arim (16, female): Me neither. Living on my own would be very

tough.

Such an attitude may also be related to the way in which young people are recognised

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in Korean society and the way in which “ordinary kids” want to be recognised. In

keeping with Confucian values, the self is considered as part of the family rather than

gaining clear individuality (Choi 1994). For this reason, one respondent pointed out:

‘Sometimes I am not very happy with my family. But, I shouldn’t blame my dad.

Blaming my family is indeed blaming myself. Isn’t it? That’s a bad thing’ (Sangsu,

17, male).

The self-mainstreaming, whereby “ordinary kids” are involved in the social

positioning of youth in school and the family, may provide them with significant

resources for identity formation and with a sense of belonging. For instance, one

informant, who ranked in the middle in terms of exam score, expressed her feelings

about study:

Interviewer: Could you tell me when the happiest moment in your

life was?

Sura (17, female): Well, I can say, once in my life there was a very

happy time. It was a couple of years ago. One day I studied very

hard. When I got up the next morning I felt so good. The feeling

lasted for two days.

Interviewer: What do you think made you so happy?

Sura (17, female): Don’t know. Maybe … I felt I was getting

smarter by studying. Felt so good. I wish I could have such a feeling

again!

Indeed, my respondents were satisfied when they acquired educational capital by

“fair” methods: studying hard without breaking collective harmony in their local

communities. It is significant here that study for “ordinary kids” is not only a way of

gaining recognition from others; study is also crucial in their self-recognition. For

most respondents, study was not just a means for entering a prestigious university but

also a way of self-actualisation whereby they could gain satisfaction. It can also be

said that this method of self-discipline via study within collective harmony is the

embodiment of traditional norms of selfhood primarily due to Confucianism; self-

regulation as a way of gaining collective harmony and achieving educational aims is

encouraged (see Hahm 2001).

When encountering pressures from school and family to be “good” students on

the one hand and incorporating themselves with local norms of sociality on the other,

the young people in my study tended to forge a common image of their future. They

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felt forced to conform to a standard, reinforcing the notion of a “normal biography”,

in which the transition from high school to higher education was considered the

“normal” and only way to be a “desirable” adult; other routes often signified “being

left behind”. It was agreed among “ordinary kids” that, to a great extent, a university

qualification guaranteed success in the future and they did not conceive of any

alternative route.

There is nothing else I can do. I don’t have any other skills or

talents…. So, entering a university is kind of the only hope I can have

… To be honest, I often get depressed … when I’m studying is the

only time I feel happy. I don’t know what else I can do (Wŏnha: 17,

female).

Indeed, many respondents felt that they were not versatile enough to do anything but

achieve a “normal biography” and it was assumed that choosing a different

transitional route involved a high risk. Therefore, by being voluntarily engaged in

study, “ordinary kids” seemed to manage the uncertainty and risk inherent in young

people’s transition to adulthood (see Machácek 1997).

Most respondents seemed to have internalised a “normal biography” rather than

a “choice biography” in their map of the future, in that they sought to be “desirable”

adults by gaining good educational qualifications. For this reason, the “ordinary kids”

looked down on their peers who, after graduation from high school, were preparing

for direct entry into the labour market without going to university. Diverging from a

safe track “doesn’t look so good, because … that is kind of risky” (Sura: 17, female):

They will regret it when they grow up. They only need to hang on for

just three years [the duration of high school]. Then, everything will be

OK, but they are not patient enough to wait for that. They spend too

much energy on small things like growing their hair long. The time for

study is supposed to be limited to a specific period of life [the high

school period]. Now it is the time to study. They can grow their hair as

long as they like when they are grown up (Jŏngmi: 17, female).

In my informants’ narratives, it was assumed that a “choice biography” would have to

be delayed until some time in the future, or at least until after they entered university.

It is significant that in my study – in contrast to previous studies in the Western

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European context (e.g. Brannen and Nilsen 2002) – a wider range of secondary

school students associated the transition to adulthood with entry into university.

Indeed, most of the young people in the present study used such expressions as “when

I enter university” or “when I become a university student”, when they were asked to

describe the transition to adulthood. They had ‘no idea about being an adult’

(Mihong: 17, female) or expected “never to be independent” (Soram: 16, female). A

common statement by my respondents on their future plans was: “I think my future

will begin on the day of the exam. I haven’t thought about my future after D-day”

(Hana, 17, female):

Interviewer: What would you like to do when you finally enter a

university?

Hyŏngmin (17, male): Most of all, I just want to get into university.

Then, I can think about what to do. Most of all, I can feel free there.

That’s nice.

Most of the informants assumed that they first had to enter university before

preparing to become an adult, while avoiding deep involvement in any activity

beyond local boundaries. This postponement of transition can be seen as a way of

coping with the uncertainty and risk in that transition, with most mainstream high

school students restraining themselves temporarily from engaging in “society” (see

Wexler 1993, 138-141).

As discussed in this section, Korean high schools and the family function

through all their practices to reinforce the notion of ‘normal’ biography and therefore

to position young people in the “mainstream”. In response to the dominant

positioning of youth, while other groups of young people might negotiate it in

different ways, “ordinary” young people in the present study were inclined to

conform to a uniform route of transition without expressing clear dissent from the

norms in the family and school. It can be added here that “ordinary” young Koreans’

conformist attitudes to transition did not show any significant differences by gender;

as far as their desires for “normal biography” is concerned, gendered features in youth

culture, which are often argued in previous studies, are not applied well (e.g.

Blackman 1995; Griffin 1993).

15

CONCLUSION

This study has suggested that “mainstream” high school students in Korea strive

towards academic achievement, while also trying to maintain local norms of sociality.

It has been found that traditional norms of sociality and educational pressures

combine in the process of mainstreaming “ordinary kids”. Their desire to be

“mainstream” demonstrates the way in which traditional elements of socialisation

remain crucial but are negotiated by young people. It is significant that this

educational process of mainstreaming is in sharp contrast to the theories of

individualisation in which young people are described as making their own choices

beyond collective references and support (du Bois-Reymond 1998, 65).

It should be emphasised that self-mainstreaming is not only a conformist

strategy but also one that takes care of “ordinary” young people’s anxiety about the

transition to adulthood. The dis-individualised confrontation with the transition to

adulthood suggests that mainstream young people may to some extent give up

individuality as a possible strategy in order to ensure their welfare in an uncertain and

globalising world (Anderson and Miles 1999, 110). This aspect requires us to

challenge both the generalised application of youth transition as “choice biography”

to all types of youth groups and common representations of Korean youth as

depressed and victimised by the severity of their schooling; we may do this by

updating previous studies of youth and education, which have analysed the process of

mainstreaming in terms of “technologies of domination” through which hegemonic

powers are played out (e.g. Allan 1996). As Pilkington (1996, 189-190) argues, it is

necessary to contextualise the transitions of young people into adulthood in terms of

both the dominant positioning of young people and the possibilities for “youthful

negotiation” of that positioning (young people’s self-positioning).

In the contemporary world, it may be true that “young people are forced to

reflect on the available options and justify their decision” (du Bois-Reymond 1998,

68). In encountering challenges in front of them, “ordinary” young Koreans choose a

“normal biography” and to some extent postpone their engagement with their “choice

biography”, while other groups of young Koreans may choose different routes of

transition to adulthood. Being “ordinary” is not necessarily the act of giving up or of

subordination. The “ordinary” cultural practice of young Koreans can be a way of

coping with the uncertainty in their transition to adulthood in Korea. In so doing,

Koreans’ local norms of sociality is embedded in the process of becoming adults

16

while young people’s aspiration to academic achievement is also pursued. The

“ordinary” cultural practices imply that familial and social desires for young people’s

academic success are continuously articulated with an emphasis on collective and

harmonious relationships in young Koreans’ everyday cultural practices and

schooling.

Notes

1 In Korea, high schools (for ages 16-18) are mainly divided into two types: academic high

schools (inmun’gye) and vocational high schools (sirŏupkye). The former prepare students for

entrance into university, while the latter provide students with vocational skills. Nationally,

the number of vocational high schools is 741 (with a total of 189,238 students, amounting to

approximately 32 percent of all high school students) while that of academic high schools is

1,254 (with 411,007 students) (Korean Ministry of Education 2002). Students passing an

exam are, regardless of their exam score, allocated to a high school near their residence. In

fact, the exam for high school cannot be considered a specific selection process. Therefore, it

can be said that Korean students do not go through any clear educational selection process

until the university entrance exam. This single-track system tends to foster in most students

and their families high educational aspirations and consequently to enhance the educational

competition for prestigious universities (Nakamura 2003).

2 In addition to three major categories, there might be another type of young people in school,

named wangtta or tta. Amongst young people, wangtta is a term to indicate contemptuously a

group of people who are mentally or physically ‘weak’ and isolated in school (Park et al.

1998). Since wangtta is a title for all types of young people who are isolated from his/her

classmates for different personal reasons, it may be difficult to define wangtta as a youth

group whose members have a sense of belonging and show similarities in their attitudes to

schooling. In this regard, the three categories, “ordinary kids”, ‘brains’ and ‘slackers’, would

be sufficient to understand “ordinary” young people’s positioning of themselves.

3 This is comparable with Western European discourses increasingly covering different

phases of transition occurring between the ages of 12 and 30, or even older (Roberts 2003), in

the discussion of youth transition.

17

4 “Sailor Moon” is the main character in Bishōjo Senshi Sērā Mūn (literally means ‘beautiful

young girl soldier Sailor Moon’ and is known as Sailor Moon in Korea), the popular Japanese

comic book and animation, targeted mostly at teenage girls. It is a story about a 14 year-old

clumsy girl who, however, can transform herself into a powerful fighter with a sailor suit; in

later episodes, Sailor Moon becomes a story of a team of sailor-suited fighter girls. Critics

have noted that the Sailor Moon series represents the world of “magical girls” and

empowered girlhood (see Allison 2002). In addition, it should be noted that in Sailor Moon,

group work rather than individuality is emphasised.

18

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