- POLICE POWER -

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005

MMDA vs. GARIN

FACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver‘s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver‘s license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver‘s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?

HELD:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to ―enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.‖ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People‘s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in

nature. LAWS GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 BALACUIT vs. CFI

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes ―any person group of persons, entity or

corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.‖

The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.

declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court but was later on denied.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalid exercise of police power.

HELD:

(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and

void. This decision is immediately executory. 146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-

63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the

State. HELD:

The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989

DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON

FACTS:

This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto.

The said law requires the use of generic terminology or generic names in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinary doctors. Government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies are likewise obliged to use generic names ―in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines‖. Certain penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of the law. ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing Administrative

Order No. 62 are unconstitutional. HELD:

The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost"(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. 152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987

TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ FACTS:

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The

NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic

objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

xxx (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a

medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;;‖

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.‖

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word,the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of

this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary

injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL

FACTS:

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the ―Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.‖ On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004.

Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The

senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of

the National Internal Revenue Code, asamended.The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

HELD:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and

flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.‖ It is ―[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.‖

ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES

20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA

FACTS:

Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice- Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.

HELD:

A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged

statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

123 SCRA 569 (1983)

CRUZ vs. PARAS

FACTS:

Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed on November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction. They contended that the enforcement of Municipal Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no power to prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violative to their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses

HELD:

Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that the municipal council shall

enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.

A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates theconstitutionalprovision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted.

120 SCRA 568 (1983)

VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.

HELD:

Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such law is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.

234 SCRA 255 (1994)

MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES

FACTS: