Digests July 12

1 |Digests by Garcia, Ke-e, and Rafael

|Persons and Family Relations Law 1-E

Article 37-41

Quimiguing v. Icao G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

J.B.L. Reyes, J:

Facts: Felix Icao, a married man, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen

Quimiguing several time by force and intimidation. As a result, Carmen became pregnant

despite efforts to abort and had to stop studying. Carmen Quimiging filed a petition claiming

support at 120 pesos per month. Icao moved to dismiss the petition for lack of cause of

action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The lower court

dismissed the complaint. Carmen moved to amend the complaint to allege that she had given

birth to a baby girl but the Court disallowed by saying that no amendment was allowable.

Thus the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a valid cause of action?

Held: Yes. A conceived child, although yet as unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favourable to it. It may receive donations as prescribed

by Art. 742 of the Civil Code which states:

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by

those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

The lower court’s theory that support does not contemplate to children as yet unborn

violates Art. 40 of the Civil Code which states:

The conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to

it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following

article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's

womb)

The second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that a married man to

force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of the

victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.



GELUZ V. CA

G.R. No. L-16439 | July 20, 1961 | J. J.B.L. REYES

ART 37-41, CC

Summary: The plaintiff’s ex-wife aborted three times: before their marriage, during their marriage

while employed in the Comelec, and two years thereafter. Plaintiff files a complaint for damages

against Dr. Geluz for the third abortion. Held: He is not entitled to receive compensation for an

unborn child who died in the womb. This case is not covered by the provisional capacity given to an

unborn child under Art. 40. It also appears that the plaintiff was previously indifferent to his ex-

wife’s first and second abortions and only wanted to demand a huge amount of money (P50,000)

from the doctor.

1. Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —

through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband

before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and

acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her

marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the

Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself

aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became

pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's

daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez

streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of

a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The

plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the

provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

2. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award

of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

3. The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of

P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines.

Held:

This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death

of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to

the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of

the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively

accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn

child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take

place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to

act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato

habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such

provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:

"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,

there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.



This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages

must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights

of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,

support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the

illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of

distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.

Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.

2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any

basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous

abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned

with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate

or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after

learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative

and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining

from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00

attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without

medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too

severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But

the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the

circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

DECISION REVERSED.



De Jesus v. Syquia G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

Street,J:

Facts: Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de Jesus which resulted in De Jesus giving

birth to a baby boy. The defendant, Syquia, went on a trip to China and Japan and while there

sent letters to her showing paternal interests with the use of the words “junior” and “padre.

After defendant came home, he lived with them in a house for a year but left and began living

with another woman when petitioner started showing signs of a second pregnancy. Petitioner

is now filing for damages for the breach of his promise to marry her and to compel Syquia to

recognize Ismael and Pacta as natural children begotten by him and to have him pay a regular

500 pesos per month for maintenance.

Issue: Whether or not the letters written by the father before the child’s birth be the basis for

the compulsory acknowledgment of the child by the defendant after its birth?

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the word “padre” is sufficient to prove acknowledgement of

paternity. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived becomes a

bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as

yet as unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. It is undeniable that the defendant

had acknowledge this child in the writings because he supplied a home for it and the mother

in which they lived together in.

The law does not fix a period during which a child must be in the continous

possession of the status of a natural child and the period in this case was long enough to

evince the father’s resolution to concede to his status of being a father.



Article 43

Limjoco v. Estate of Fragante G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

Facts: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public

convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said

intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of

competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity

of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced

from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City;

that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of

Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is

a contravention of the law.

Issue: Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

Held: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante

had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the

certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and

the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the

service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left

by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which

survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased

person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the

avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal

rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless

the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes

of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial

administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which

survived after his death.



DUMLAO V. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS G.R. No. L-27956 | April 30, 1976 | J. AQUINO ART 43, CC Summary: Civil personality is extinguished by death. In the case at bar, the lower court has no jurisdiction over the deceased Pedro Oria. He can no longer be the subject of any civil action.

1. On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).

2. Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.

3. It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.

4. On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate). The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria.

5. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

Held: There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in the civil case is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, CC). The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case. But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant. REVERSED.



Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

Barredo,J:

Facts: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the

Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She

was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival,

Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that

said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration

of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the

Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the

Philippines up to February 13, 1962.

On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto

Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the

Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate

deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction

with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied

the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her

marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held: Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not

disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an

alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine

citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she

does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien

woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision

to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies

during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to

be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino

cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or

indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or

administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as

res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her

marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of January

25, 1962.



FRIVALDO V. COMELEC G.R. No. 87193 | June 23, 1989 | J. CRUZ ARTS 48-51, NCC

1. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Salvador Estuye filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of election and proclamation of Governor Juan G. Frivaldo of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.

2. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. Moreover, he claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.

3. Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied. It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. This stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Court may now review.

Held: The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times."

1. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.

2. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

a. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country.

b. Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary.



That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.

c. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I must emphasize that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly. The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.



UYTENGSU V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-6379 | September 29, 1954 | J. CONCEPCION

ARTICLES 48-51, NCC

Summary: Chinese national Wilfred Uytengsu was born in Dumaguete City. He finished grade school

up to college in the Philippines. He then left for US to study. When he returned to the Phils for

vacation, he applied for naturalization to become a Filipino. But right after his filing of application,

he left again for US to continue his studies. He finished his course, but did not return until after

several months. Hence, the hearing of his case was postponed. Held: His application was not granted

w/o prejudice to his filing of another application. Actual and substantial residence — not merely

legal residence — is necessary to dispense with the filing of a declaration of intention in order to give

ample time for the government to make a requisite investigation prior to his filing of application.

1. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on

October 6, 1927. He began his primary education at the Saint Theresa's College in said

municipality. Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San

Carlos College and, still later the Siliman University — all in the same locality — where he

completed the secondary course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua

Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States, where, from

1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and

was graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor of Science.

2. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then,

to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith,

he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in

another educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

3. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13,

1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had

to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.

4. Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the application of Wilfred Uytengsu. The Republic

of the Phils, thru the Solicitor-General appealed this decision.

Held:

SC reversed the grant of application.

Although his domicile is in the Philippines, the main requirement for an application for naturalization

is that one must reside therein for not less than 10 years, except in some special cases, in which 5

years of residence is sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth Act No. 473). Consequently, when

section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn

application "that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not

refer merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, irrespective of actual

residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the

requirement contained in said clause. Exemption is given to "those who have resided in the

Philippines continuously for a period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." (Dy v.

Republic) The Court however ruled that "actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not

legal residence", or "domicile," along, is essential to the enjoyment of the benefits of said exemption.



It is nothing but to give the government sufficient time to check the truth of the statements made in

said declaration of intention, if any, and in the application for naturalization, especially the allegations

therein relative to the possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by

law. Although data pertinent to said qualifications and disqualifications could generally to be obtained

from persons familiar with the applicant, it is be expected that the information thus secured would

consist, mainly, of conclusions and opinions of said individuals.

In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye

on petitioner herein. Immediately after the filing of his application — and — notwithstanding the

explicit promise therein made him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the

Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine

citizenship" — he returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13,

1951. For this first time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for opportunity needed by the

Government to observe petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having been born in the

Philippines, where he finished his primary and secondary education, petitioner his not have to file,

and did not file, a declaration of intention prior to the filing of his petition for naturalization. Thus,

the Government had no previous notice of his intention to apply for naturalization until the filing of

his petition and could not make the requisite investigation prior thereto. Moreover, considering that

petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from early 1947 to late in

1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the

application, it may be said that he resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States

at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6)

months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the right to suffrage in a given municipality (section

98, Republic Act No. 180); residence for sentatives (sec. 7, Art. VI, of the Constitution); and

residence for two (2) years, to run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution).

In short, the Court is of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of

section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his

application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.

REVERSED, but without prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so desires, in

conformity with law.



ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976 | September 18, 1995 | J. KAPUNAN

ARTS 48-51, NCC

1. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on

March 8, 1995.

2. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative

of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for

Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs.

Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the

House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration

Record and in her Certificate of Candidacy.

3. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,

changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in her certificate. On the same day,

the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that her Corrected

Certificate of Candidacy cannot be accepted on the ground that it is filed out of time, the

deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.

4. Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private

respondent's petition was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said

Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of

Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by

adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy

and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She also said

that Montejo has been opposing her candidacy since the day she announced her intent to

run for Congress in the First District of Leyte. He allegedly filed a bill to transfer the town of

Tolosa where the petitioner resides from the First District to the Second District. Having

failed to achieve his purpose, he now filed this petition in order to remove her as rival.

5. COMELEC granted the petition.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a

registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not

less than one year immediately preceding the election." The mischief which this provision —

reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger

or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with

the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."

1. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective

positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of

"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile":

2. The honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the

First District if such fact (in the Voter’s Registration, publicized visits and charity works,

etc.) were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.



3. Her domicile is in Tacloban City. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has

lived and maintained residences in different places.

4. There was no evidence pointing to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin. What is

inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last

four decades. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally

followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there

and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.

Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,

petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,

celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,

instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and

establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of

power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or

consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore

of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.

5. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law

as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The right of

the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to

strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring

into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to

any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may

"live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to

"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the

domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)

residences.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to

run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's

questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.

Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim

petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

1. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents

were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate

in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as

her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of

origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of

choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

2. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand

E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the

right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code. However, it merely gave the

husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband



may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile

remains unchanged. I vote to grant the petition.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as

voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in

Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a

voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of

such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married

Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death

certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his

lifetime. I vote to GRANT the petition.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the

same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the

basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."

The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with

the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution.

I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference

between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of

political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with

domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to

the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue

thereon is relevant or controlling.

My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the

"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of

a new domicile in a different place. In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of

origin, at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,

domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of

birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium

propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, is sometimes

called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced

by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.

When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only

international or American but of our own enactment, she acquired her husband's domicile of origin

in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to

Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her

thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places



was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the

assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course,

those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient

purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite

residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to

acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal

domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to

successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual

change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.

We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice

apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium

originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her

domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her

continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the

contingencies of the case at bar.

It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her

marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law

(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte

although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin.

―Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New

Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her

domicile of origin. . . .‖

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium

necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not

intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law

that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative

intent to hold on to her former domicile.

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance

with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or

reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law.

Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.

If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily

abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does

not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he

evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what

petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.

One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile

of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd

Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said

party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law,

other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which

the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge

on one's freedom of choice.



Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we

assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment

was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is

even a case of both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more

reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989,

petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in

1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she

was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of

suspended animation.

Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the

right to elect her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband

until she makes an actual change. In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the

presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue

after his death.

I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of

women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory

conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which

either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic

reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.

In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having

automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the

political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent

commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her

amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original

certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the

election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised

by petitioner. ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of

merit.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium),

her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That

conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her

deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the

burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She

miserably failed to discharge that burden. I vote to deny the petition.



STAR PAPER CORP VS. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774 | April 12, 2006 | J. PUNO

ART. 1, FC

1. Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of paper

products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration

Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.

2. Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia and Lorna E. Estrella were all regular

employees of the company. Ongsitco advised them that should they decide to get married,

one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995.

a. Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit,

also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Simbol

resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.

b. Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a

co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them

that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married.

Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

c. Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-

worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The

company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she

opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

3. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,

separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is

illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were

dismissed due to their union membership.

4. Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they

did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company

policy.

5. On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for

lack of merit. An employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment

all the aspects of employment.

6. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

7. They appealed to the lower courts which reversed the appealed decision, ruling that the

subject 1995 policy is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family

of employees.

8. Hence, this petition for review.

Held:

We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer banning

spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the

Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

SC AFFIRMED the lower court’s decision.

1. It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same

company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these

policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather



than upon their ability. These policies focus upon the potential employment problems

arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives. SC noted that two

types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working

in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate

family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism

employment policies). However, there must be a compelling business necessity for which no

alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide occupational

qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is

reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a

factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would

be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’ sole contention

that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related

between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.

2. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found

fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed

to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit,

then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations.

Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda

Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia,

then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees

married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid

justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a

perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.



PT&T V. NLRC

G.R. No. 118978 | May 23, 1997 | J. REGALADO

ART. 1, FC

Summary: Grace de Guzman was terminated by her employer Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Company allegedly due to her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. PT&T provided that it is only concerned with the health of their married employees (flight attendants) who would become pregnant eventually, and with the institution of marriage since her absence would contribute to an unhappy married life. Held: The Court upheld NLRC decision granting Grace’s complaint for unlawful termination. Enshrined in our Constitution and Labor Code are the rights of women against unwarranted discriminations. The company policy not only violates these rights, but also deprives women of freedom to choose their status. It may even encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

1. Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a ―Supernumerary Project Worker,‖ for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent’s services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

2. On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. PT&T branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations.

3. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.

4. On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner on the ground of insufficiency of grounds for termination, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the National



Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned.

5. PT&T filed for a petition for special civil action with certiorari.

Held:

On PT&T’s freedom to regulate its manpower:

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.

On grounds for unlawful termination:

1. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. From the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that ―you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.‖ Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage (―and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.‖)

2. Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.

3. In the present controversy, petitioner’s expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. In other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.

4. Finally, petitioner’s collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner’s submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a



promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.

On marriage as a ground for termination:

The Court cannot agree to the respondent’s proposition that termination from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. This needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family

as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of

the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the

youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the

Government.



Article 1 Family Code

Estrada v. Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003

Puno, J:

Facts: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.

Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of

Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor

has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually

begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before

she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another

woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas

but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to

remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch

Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in

conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on

July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the

congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for

a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses

since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of

and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and

Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch

Tower Central Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light of the Free Exercise clause?

HELD: No. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals

and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent

possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by

laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on

religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if

respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has

demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is

remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such

exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s

conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free

exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by

the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of

her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at

respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state

interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an

opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which

can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.



Goitia v. Campos Rueda G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

Trent, J:

Facts: The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and

immediately thereafter established their residence. One month after their marriage, Campos

Rueda demanded to her wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his

genital organs. Plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to

perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Her refusal resulted to his

maltreatments by word and by deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different

parts of her body. She was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of

her parents. The lower courts ruled that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the

plaintiff, except in his own house, unless by virtue of judicial decree granter her a divorce or

separation from the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant be compelled to render support to his wife outside of the

conjugal home?

Held: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the

act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may

fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own

home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not

permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is

driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the

wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault

of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance

even outside the conjugal home.



CHAPTER III Officials and Offices Common to All Municipalities

ARTICLE I The Municipal Mayor

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -

(a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall:

(i) Determine the guidelines of municipal policies and be responsible to the sangguniang bayan for the program of government;

(ii) Direct the formulation of the municipal development plan, with the assistance of the municipal development council, and upon approval thereof by the sangguniang bayan, implement the same;

(iii) At the opening of the regular session of the sangguniang bayan for every calendar year and, as may be deemed necessary, present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the consideration of the sangguniang bayan as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the municipal government may require;

(iv) Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sangguniang bayan and, from time to time as the situation may require, provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of its legislative functions;

(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;

(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance;

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

(viii) Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or wages of the officials and employees of the municipality;

(ix) Allocate and assign office space to municipal and other officials and employees who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings owned or leased by the municipal government;

(x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the municipality who may have committed as offense in the performance of his official duties;

(xi) Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of the municipality and in aid of his executive powers and authority, require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality to make available to him such books, records, and other documents in their custody, except those classified by law as confidential;

(xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him to the provincial governor within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuance: Provided, That municipalities of Metropolitan Manila Area and that of any metropolitan political subdivision shall furnish copies of said executive orders to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the President;



(xiii) Visit component barangays of the municipality at least once every six (6) months to deepen his understanding of problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants, inform the component barangay officials and inhabitants of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the municipality will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants;

(xiv) Act on leave applications of officials and employees appointed by him and the commutation of the monetary value of leave credits according to law;

(xv) Authorize official trips outside of the municipality of municipal officials and employees for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days;

(xvi) Call upon any national official or employee stationed in or assigned to the municipality to advise him on matters affecting the municipality and to make recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects, and when appropriate, initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or assigned to the local government unit concerned;

(xvii) Subject to availability of funds, authorize payment of medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees of municipal officials and employees who are injured while in the performance of their official duties and functions;

(xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;

(xix) Conduct a palarong bayan, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as an annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and international games; and

(xx) Submit to the provincial governor the following reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertaining to the management, administration and development of the municipality and all information and data relative to its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the municipality, province, region or country. mayors of municipalities of the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions shall submit said reports to their respective metropolitan council chairmen and to the Office of the President;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:

(i) Ensure that the acts of the municipality's component barangays and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers, functions, duties and responsibilities;

(ii) Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of the municipality, including provincial officials and national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality at such time and place and on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the local government unit and its inhabitants;

(iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances;

(iv) Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction;

(v) Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and order plan of the municipality and upon its approval implement the same and exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police in the municipality in accordance with R.A. No 6975;

(vi) Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the municipal police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;



(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for gro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

(i) Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation process under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the municipality for the ensuing calendar year in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected and that municipal funds are applied in accordance with law or ordinance to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality;

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

(v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public morals;

(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance;

(vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and

(viii) Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property; and cause the municipality to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests, resources and rights shall be adequately protected;

(4) Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code and, in addition thereto, shall:

(i) Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the national government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner and in coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the municipality and the province; and

(ii) Coordinate the implementation of technical services rendered by national and provincial offices, including public works and infrastructure programs in the municipality; and

(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

(c) During his incumbency, the municipal mayor shall hold office in the municipal hall.

(d) The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.



EUGENIO V. VELEZ G.R. No. 85140 | May 17, 1990 | J. PADILLA

ART 2-6, FC

Summary: Who between the common-law spouse and the siblings has the right to bury Vitaliana’s

body? Held: Her brothers and sisters have such right. The term spouse may include common law

relationships within the contemplation of the penal laws, but referred to in the Civil Code are

exclusively lawfully-wedded relationships.

1. Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas (Vitaliana for brevity), her full

blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases, for brevity) filed on 27

September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch

20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence

sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,

Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty

without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana

was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

2. The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus,

but the writ was returned unsatisfied.

3. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to

the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus

proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from

the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace

quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered

religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder. Petitioner also

alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28

August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.

These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two

(2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing

delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

4. The private respondents amended their petition. Claiming to have knowledge of the death of

Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition),

private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way

related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.

Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of

kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.

5. RTC held in favor of private respondents.

6. On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction seeking to enjoin

respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case. In a resolution issued on

11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but

denied the application for a temporary restraining order.

Held:

The right to bury Vitaliana’s body should be given to the Vargases, not to her common-law spouse.



1. Herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which

disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

2. There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"

embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of

theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal

Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is

sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23

But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions

of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring

to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a

lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her

lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters

(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

―Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body

of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall

devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of

burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the

Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.‖

DISMISSED.



COSCA V. JUDGE PALAYPAYON

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 | September 30, 1994 | PER CURIAM

ARTS. 2-6, FC

1. Complainants Cosca, et al are Stenographer I, etc. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,

Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy

are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

2. Respondents were charged with the illegal solemnization of marriage, among others.

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite

marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of

paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. As a

consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. In

addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date

of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be

submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the

marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo,

who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of

marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed

with the celebration of said marriages.

3. Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the

employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo

who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only

lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of

Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract

and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these

marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however,

claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the

latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting

parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.

4. Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano

and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the

marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to

furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil

registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses

subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their

marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five

marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because

the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of

marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo;

that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria

Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita

Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a

marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even

without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid



embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract

which remains unsigned up to the present.

Held:

In all the marriages which Judge Palaypayon solemnized, the blank space in the marriage contracts to

show the number of the marriage solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not

filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge

Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin

when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage

under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were

not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a

copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.

1. The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge

Palaypayon without a marriage license. Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if

he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and

not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the

contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing

the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared,

visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be held

was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did

not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties

and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do

not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated

testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared,

among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return

after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been

impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the

marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table, cannot possibly be

just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a

person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allow

himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a

person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly

improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit

by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and

in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.

2. With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he

solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so

a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit

that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already.

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it

was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days

old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6)



years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must

ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his

wife and this is hard to believe.

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married

again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). This act of

Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second

time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he

solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under

exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had

already signed the marriage certificate.

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was

not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage

was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their

marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under

Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the

beginning.

Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still

valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself

from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official

function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting

parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.

3. With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio

Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio

executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A

and Exh. 1).

Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon

did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-

examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their

affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by

a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint

affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,

Camarines Sur.

4. With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage

contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and

respondent Baroy . Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also

paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy. When she

was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that

she thought the marriage was already solemnized.

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the

marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she

wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was

solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the

contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already

required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the



marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts,

as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose

was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to

four (4) times everyday

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not

illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing

officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing

officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign

their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really

solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report

of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases

and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly

report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4)

marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has

presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons

and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar. These persons who executed affidavits, however,

did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial

as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not

charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.

Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future

will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED

from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any

branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled

corporations.



Wassmer v. Velez G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

J.P. Bengzon, J:

Facts: Velez and Wassmer applied for license to contract marriage, which was then issued.

The wedding was formally set, due preparation and publicity were made. However, 2 days

before the big day, Velez left a not for his bride to be, stating that the wedding will have to be

postponed due to his mother’s opposition. The next day, he sent another letter saying that he

will return very soon. However, he did not appear nor was heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages. The respondent failed to show up and answer the

complaint numerous times. The court gave the parties chances to amicably settle. He was

declared default, but he moved for a new trial asserting that there is no Civil Code provision

authorizing an action for breach to marry.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has claim for damages on ground of breach of promise to

marry?

Held: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also

unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such

promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal

from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of

action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person

who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award

for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of

exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in

breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this

warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.



NAVARRO V. JUDGE DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 | July 19, 1996 | J. ROMERO

ART. 7, FC

1. Mayor Rodolfo G. Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint against Municipal

Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency

in office and ignorance of the law.

a. On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar

A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely

separated from his first wife.

b. He performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma

G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent

judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.

Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent

judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his

jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40

to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

2. In his letter-comment, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal

Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly

concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. In relation to the

charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized

the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.

Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of

Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each

other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in

solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,

paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)

Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction‖; and that Article 8

thereof applies to the case in question.

Held:

The Court ruled against the Judge.

a. The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga

states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding

ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that

they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September

1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda

left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been

heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already

dead. In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is

sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed

with the marriage ceremony.

We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that even if the spouse present has a well-

founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the



declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a

mandatory requirement to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the

previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,

in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the

declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains

married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the

part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such

neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

b. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having

solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his

court's jurisdiction. However, there is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at

the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed

to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the

solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the

"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,

among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."

Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony

and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the

preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant

irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the

validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby

SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of

the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.



ARAÑES V. JUDGE OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 | April 11, 2002 | J. PUNO

ART. 2, FC

Summary: A Judge cannot solemnize a marriage outside of jurisdiction, and in doing so, he may be

administratively liable.

1. Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes alleges that on 17 February 2000, Respondent Judge

Occiano solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite

marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

2. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her

husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the ―vast

properties‖ left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of

Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

3. Petitioner charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-

Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge

for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,

embarrassment and sufferings.

4. In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that:

a. a certain Juan Arroyo requested that petitioner and Orobia be wed. He was later

informed that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to

Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then

requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he

acceded.

b. before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted

to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite

marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another

date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery

of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human

compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical

condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated

the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it

would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they

would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,

respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same

reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial

Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

c. he did not tell the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the

absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by

the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

5. On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001

with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to

solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of

her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed



this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge,

she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Held:

Respondent Judge is guilty. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,

there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not

affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

He solemnized a wedding in Nabua, Camarines Sur which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of

Balatan, Camarines Sur. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of

the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their

territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

The Affidavit of Desistance cannot exculpate him. The withdrawal of the complaint does not

necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the

prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be

undermined.

RESPONDENT JUDGE IS FINED P5,000.00 WITH A STERN WARNING AGAINST

REPETITION OF THE SAME AND SIMILAR OFFENSE.



Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Torres, J:

Facts: The respondent, Gina Lao-Tsoi filed a case of annulment based on psychological

incapacity on the part of her husband, Chi Ming Tsoi. She claims that the defendant is

IMPOTENT, a closet homosexual. Gina claimed that the petitioner married her in order

to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the

appearance of a normal man. Chi Ming Tsoi however claims that it is Gina who does not

want to have sex with her and that she always avoided him and that the one time he forced

himself but he stopped because she was shaking and did not like it. Defendant insists that the

marriage remain valid because they are young and there is still a chance of it working out.

The petitioner submitted himself to a physical exam and there is no evidence of impotency.

Its only that the defendant has a SOFT ERECTION which is why his penis is not its

full length, but it is still capable of further erection and capable of having sexual intercourse.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage should remain valid?

Held: No, Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To

procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual

cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will

finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and

protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to

psychological incapacity.

Digests July 12

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