SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

ContentsHEIRS OF URIARTE V CA....................................................1VIZCONDE V CA............................................................2TISON V CA...............................................................6PAVIA V UGARTE...........................................................8SALAO V SALAO...........................................................10DIAZ V PAMUTI...........................................................12LEONARDO V CA...........................................................14ROSALES V ROSALES.......................................................15RODRIGUEZ V RAVILAN.....................................................17

ADOPTION..................................................................21SANTOS YNIGO V RP.......................................................21MANUEL V FERRER.........................................................23ACAIN V IAC.............................................................24SUAREZ V CA.............................................................27TEOTICO V DEL VAL.......................................................28

HEIRS OF URIARTE V CAThe heirs of Uriarte claimed that they have asuccessional right over a 2.7 hectare piece of land inSurigaodel Sur left by JustaArnaldoSering upon herdeath on March 31, 1989.

Half of this land (0.5 hectares), formerly wasconjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo andUrsula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares,was acquired by Justa after the death of her

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parents. Accordingly, the division of Justas propertyshould be as follows as private respondent contends:

A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into twoparts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrueto petitioners and the second half which pertains toUrsula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.

B - As to the second portion of the area of the landin question which as already stated was consolidatedwith the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to theconjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil,the same shall accrue to private respondent, who isthe son of AgatonicaArreza, and who is only threedegrees from JustaArnaldo, whereas petitioners who arethe children of PrimitivaArnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo,are five degrees removed from JustaArnaldo

ISSUE:

Who among the petitioners and the private respondentis entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relativeswithin the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

The nephew who is the son of Justa’shalf sisteris entitled to the property

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the commonancestor and then descent is made to the person withwhom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person istwo degrees removed from his brother, three from hisuncle, who is the brother of his father, four from hisfirst cousin, and so forth.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, thehalf-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degreerelative of Justa.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are thesons and daughters of Justas cousin. They are thusfifth degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes thefarthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir ofJusta. The fact that his mother is only a half-sisterof Justa is of no moment.Nevertheless, petitionersmake much of the fact that private respondent is notan Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not byJuan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that thisbeing the case, private respondent is not an heir ofJusta and thus not qualified to share in her estate.

Petitioners misappreciate the relationship betweenJusta and private respondent. As already stated,private respondent is the son of Justas half-sisterAgatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew isconsidered a collateral relative who may inherit if nodescendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-bloodrelative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualifyhim from being his aunt’s heir. As the Court ofAppeals correctly pointed out, The determination ofwhether the relationship is of the full or half bloodis important only to determine the extent of the shareof the survivors.

VIZCONDE V CACHARACTERS:

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PETITIONER LAURO G. VIZCONDE and his wifeESTRELLITA NICOLAS-VIZCONDE had twochildren, viz., CARMELA AND JENNIFER.

 SPOUSES RAFAEL NICOLAS AND SALUD GONZALES-NICOLAS (parents of Estrellita). 

The other children of Rafael and Salud are:

o Antonio Nicolas;

o Ramon Nicolas;

o Teresita Nicolas de Leon;

o Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent; and

o  Antonio predeceased his parents andis now survived by his widow, Zenaida,and their four children.

FACTS:

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael aparcel of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan(hereafter Valenzuela property) for P135,000.00,evidenced by a LubusangBilihan ng Bahagi ngLupanaNasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734. On March30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property forP3,405,612.00.  In June of the same year, Estrellitabought a parcel of land with improvements situated atVinzon St., BF Homes, Paranaque (hereafter Paranaqueproperty) using a portion of the proceeds was used inbuying a car while the balance was deposited in abank.

The following year an unfortunate event inpetitioner’s life occurred. Estrellita and her twodaughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June

30, 1991.  Petitioner entered into an Extra-JudicialSettlement of the Estate of Deceased EstrellitaNicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,   with Rafael and Salud . The extra-judicial settlement provided forthe division of the properties of Estrellita and hertwo daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafaeland Salud.  The settlement gave 50% of the totalamount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and herdaughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves atoken amount. The other 50% was allotted topetitioner. The Paranaque property and the car werealso given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waivingall their claims, rights, ownership and participationas heirs in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaelsestate, Teresita instituted an intestate estateproceeding listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo andthe wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresitaprayed to be appointed Special Administratrix ofRafaels estate and sought to be appointed asguardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo,her incompetent brother.  Private respondent Ramonfiled an opposition praying to be appointed instead asSalud and Ricardos guardian.  Ramon filed anotheropposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita wasgiven the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she soldfor not less P6,000,000.00 before her gruesomemurder.  On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petitionentitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G.Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that theirlegitime should come from the collation of all theproperties distributed to his children by Rafaelduring his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein

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petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right ofrepresentation as the widower of deceased legitimatedaughter of Estrellita.

The RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud andRicardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as theSpecial Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courtsOrder did not include petitioner in the slate ofRafaels heirs. Neither was the Paranaque propertylisted in its list of properties to be included in theestate. Subsequently, the RTC in an Order datedJanuary 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardosguardian for selling his wards property without thecourts knowledge and permission.

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released anOrder giving petitioner ten (10) days to file anyappropriate petition or motion related to the pendingpetition. In response, petitioner filed aManifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing thathe was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heirof Rafael and he has no interest to participate in theproceedings.  Despite the Manifestation, Ramon,through a motion moved to include petitioner in theintestate estate proceeding and asked that theParanaque property, as well as the car and the balanceof the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuelaproperty, be collated. Acting on Ramons motion, thetrial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In itsdecision respondent Court of Appeals denied thepetition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicatedthe question on the title of the Valenzuela propertyas the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to

matters incidental and collateral to the exercise ofits recognized powers in handling the settlement ofthe estate of the deceased. Dissatisfied, petitionerfiled the instant petition for review on certiorari. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctlysustained the Order of the Probate Court. (NO!)

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde inthe intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’sestate is proper. (NO!)

RULING:

No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case ofcollation. The probate court, as well as respondentCourt of Appeals, committed reversible errors

First: The probate court erred in ordering theinclusion of petitioner in the intestate estateproceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is oneof Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the CivilCode is clear on this point:

Art. 887 .   The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimateparents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, withrespect to their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

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Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded bythose in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classesmentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extentestablished by this Code.

With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not evenshown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or astranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estateproceeding.   Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding,   which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon anddetermine the title or ownership of a property whichmay or may not be included in the estateproceedings. Such determination is provisional incharacter and is subject to final decision in aseparate action to resolve title. In the case atbench, however, we note that the probate court wentbeyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceededto determine the validity of the sale of theValenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita andruled that the transfer of the subject propertybetween the concerned parties was gratuitous. Theinterpretation of the deed and the true intent of thecontracting parties, as well as the presence orabsence of consideration, are matter outside theprobate courts jurisdiction. These issues should beventilated in an appropriate action

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting theParanaque property to collation is premature. Recordsindicate that the intestate estate proceedings is

still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing hereinto indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaelsheirs has been impaired to warrant collation. 

Fourth:   Even on the assumption that collation isappropriate in this case the probate court,nonetheless, made a reversible error in orderingcollation of the Paranaque property. We note that whatwas transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed ofsale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaqueproperty which Estrellita acquired by using theproceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property doesnot become collationable simply by reasonthereof. Indeed collation of the Paranaque propertyhas no statutory basis. The order of the probate courtpresupposes that the Paranaque property wasgratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Recordsindicate, however, that the Paranaque property wasconveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, thedecedent, has no participation therein, and petitionerwho inherited and is now the present owner of theParanaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus,the probate courts order of collation againstpetitioner is unwarranted for the obligation tocollate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and notto herein petitioner who does not have any interest inRafaels estate. As it stands, collation of theParanaque property is improper for, to repeat,collation covers only properties gratuitously given bythe decedent during his lifetime to his compulsoryheirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer ofthe Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a publicinstrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any

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claims, rights, ownership and participation asheir[38] in the Paranaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court toascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property maybe brought to collation. Estrellita, it should bestressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafaelwho inherited from Estrellita an amount more than thevalue of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, evenassuming that the Valenzuela property may be collatedcollation may not be allowed as the value of theValenzuela property has long been returned to theestate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by theprobate court on the matter serves no valid andbinding purpose.

The content of the Order: (ARON MAKA RELATE TAS PANGHITABO….)

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument isthat spouses Vizconde were then financially incapableof having purchased or acquired for a valuableconsideration the property at Valenzuela from thedeceased Rafael Nicolas.   Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased RafaelNicolas in the latters ancestral home.   In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent forsupport on the deceased Rafael Nicolas.   And LauroVizconde left for the United States in,   de- facto   separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrenceof violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizcondewere financially incapable to buy the property fromthe late Rafael Nicolas, LauroVizconde claims thatthey have been engaged in business venture such astaxi business, canteen concessions and garmentmanufacturing.However, no competent evidence has beensubmitted to indubitably support the businessundertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show thatthe acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolaswas for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property atValenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father wasgratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque whichwas purchased out of the proceeds of the said transferof property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor ofEstrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is herebyDENIED.

TISON V CAFacts:

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller arethe niece and nephew of the deceased TeodoraDezollerGuerrero, who appears to be the sister of their fatherHermogenesDezoller. TeodoraDezoller Guerrero died onMarch 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, andwas survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, andherein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes,died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit

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from TeodoraDezoller Guerrero by right ofrepresentation. 

The records reveal that upon the death ofTeodoraDezoller Guerrero, her survivingspouse executed an Affidavit of ExtrajudicialSettlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly assole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot toherein private respondent Teodora Domingo andthereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter’s name.Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitionersfiled an action for reconveyance claiming that theyare entitled to inherit one-half of the property inquestion by right of representation. Teodoro Domingohowever, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon DezollerTisonwas presented as the lone witness, with documentaryevidences offered to prove petitioners’ filiation totheir father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafterrested their case and submitted a written offer of theexhibits. Subsequently, private respondent filed aDemurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the groundthat petitioners failed to prove their legitimatefiliation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. Thetrial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance.Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal,declaring that the documentary evidence presented byherein petitioners, such as the baptismalcertificates, family picture, and joint affidavits areall inadmissible and insufficient to prove andestablish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent),not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacyof the petitioners.

2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled toinherit one-half of the property in question by rightof representation.

Ruling:  

1. NO. The private respondent is not the properparty to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.There is no presumption of the law more firmlyestablished and founded on sounder morality and moreconvincing reason than the presumption that childrenborn in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled isthe rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot beattacked collaterally. Only the husband can contestthe legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is theone directly confronted with the scandal and ridiculewhich the infidelity of his wife produces; and heshould decide whether to conceal that infidelity orexpose it, in view of the moral and economic interestinvolved. It is only in exceptional cases that hisheirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outsideof these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugnlegitimacy; that would amount to an insult to hismemory. The necessity of an independent actiondirectly impugning the legitimacy is more clearlyexpressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) whichprovides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by

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the husband or his heirs must be made by propercomplaint before the competent court; any contest madein any other way is void.’ This principle appliesunder our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of thecode confirm this view, because they refer to “theaction to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can bebrought only by the husband or his heirs and withinthe periods fixed by law. Upon the expiration of theperiods provided in Article 170, the action to impugnthe legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought.The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. Theobvious intention of the law is to prevent the statusof a child born in wedlock from being in a state ofuncertainty for a long time. It also aims to forceearly action to settle any doubt as to the paternityof such child, so that the evidence material to thematter, which must necessarily be factsoccurring during the period of the conception of thechild, may still be easily available.

2. YES. The following provisions of the Civil Codeprovide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:"

"“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers orsisters of the deceased survive, they shall inheritfrom the latter by representation, if they survivewith their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,they shall inherit in equal portions.”

“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendantsand ascendants, and illegitimate children and theirdescendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, thesurviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,without prejudice to the rights of brothers andsisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,under Article 1001.”

“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or theirchildren survive with the widow or widower, the lattershall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance andthe brothers and sisters or their children to theother half.”

Upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, one-halfof the subject property was automatically reserved tothe surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share inthe conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequotedstatutory provisions, the remaining half shall beequally divided between the widower and hereinpetitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit intheir own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could onlyvalidly alienate his total undivided three-fourths(3/4) share in the entire property to herein privaterespondent. Resultantly, petitioners and privaterespondent are deemed co-owners of the propertycovered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in theproportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively."

PAVIA V UGARTEFACTS:

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Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate onthe 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte eIturralde asked that she be judicially declared thelegitimate heir of the deceased.

The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, thenthe only claimant to the estate, having been heard inaccordance with the provisions of the Code of CivilProcedure in force at the time, intestate proceedingswere instituted, and she was declared, in an ordermade on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudiceto third parties, to be the heir of the deceased,Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, CarmenLinart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimedone-half of all of the estate of the deceased, RamonIturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time thatMaria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declaredthe lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which thisnew relative did notdeny — be required to render anaccount of the property of the estate.

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION:What she claims is that, although she is one degreelower in the line of succession that her aunt, MariaJuana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to ashare of the estate of the deceased through herfather, Pablo Linart, by representation — that is tosay, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled tothe same share in the estate as the direct niece,Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.

COURT'S DECISION:The court below held that the grandniece was entitled

to the same share of the estate that the niece wasentitled to.

ISSUE:WON herein petitioner is entitled to represent hisfather Pablo Linart and is entitled to half of theestate of the deceased.

RULING:NO.the error which the appellant claims was committed inthe court below is very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was entitledto the same share of the estate that the niece wasentitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right ofrepresentation in the collateral line can only takeplace in favor of the children of brothers or sistersof the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case isnot a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased,such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son ofa sister of the deceased. It would have been quitedifferent had it been shown that her father, PabloLinart, had survived the deceased. In that case hewould have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she,the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of theestate corresponding to her father's. It is not anerror to consider that the word "children" in thisconnection does not include "grandchildren." There isno precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such aconclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are notapplicable to this case. Those decisions were renderedin cases relating to testate and not to intestate

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successions. In both cases, and in many others decidedby the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operationof the Civil Code, where a testator had named certainpersons as heirs and, they failing, that the propertyshould pass to their children, it was held that"Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word"children," and that in such a case the grandchilddoes not, properly speaking, inherit byrepresentation, "for the reason that he must in anyevent succeed the child in the natural and regularorder," and pointed out in the last decision referredto. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision,"the fact that it was stated with more or lesscorrectness in the prayer of the complaint that theaction was based upon the right of representation, isnot sufficient to deny to the appellant a right whichhe had under the terms of the will." The difference isthis, that in the case of a testamentary succession,we must take into consideration and give force to theintention of the testator when he substitutes thechildren for the heirs first named by him. Thedescendants are ordinarily considered as included inthe term "children," unless they are expresslyexcluded, whereas in intestate successions, referenceshould only be had to the provisions of the law underwhich it is evident that the rights of representationin the collateral line do not obtain beyond the sonsand daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession agrandniece of the deceased can not participate with aniece in the inheritance, because the latter, being anearer relative, the more distance grandniece isexcluded. In the collateral line the right ofrepresentation does not obtain beyond sons and

daughters of the brothers and sisters, which wouldhave been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of theplaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

The court ordered the record be remanded to the courtof First Instance from whence it came for execution ofthe said judgment.

SALAO V SALAO

FACTS:

Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, theirthree children and 1 grandson partitioned herproperty. (pls. see table below) Prior to Valentina’sdeath, her children Ambrosia and Juan Sr. secured aTorrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds ofPampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare

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fishpond located at SitioCalunuran and they exerciseddominical rights over it to the exclusion of theirnephew, Valentin Salao. Later, Ambrosia and Juan Sr.,acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond laterbecame Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastrewhich adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said Calunaranand Lewa fish ponds are the bone of contention in thiscase.

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japaneseoccupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao'sdeath on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she wasallegedly eighty-five years old when she died), shedonated her one-halfproindiviso share in the twofishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao,Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani'sfamily. He was already the owner of the the other halfof the said fishponds, having inherited it from hisfather, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed ofdenotion included other pieces of real property ownedby Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufructover the said properties during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children ofVictorinaSalao in a letter dated January 26, 1951informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had aone-third share in the two fishponds and that whenJuani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused togive Benita and Victorina's children their one-thirdshare of the net fruits which allegedly amounted toP200,000.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6,1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did nothave any interest in the two fishponds and that thesole owners thereof his father Banli and his auntAmbrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee ofAmbrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed theiroriginal complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. onJanuary 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance ofBataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint onJanuary 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of thedonation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for thereconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond asValentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145hectares of fishpond registered in the names of JuanY. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defensethe indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured byhis father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute ofFrauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, heasked for moral damages amounting to P200,000,attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not lessthan P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums whichhe has been paying on his bond for the lifting of thereceivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at theage of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow,Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by theadministrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of hisestate the two fishponds in question were adjudicatedto his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the

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condition that the properties would remain underadministration during the pendency of this case.

The trial court found that there was no community ofproperty among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao andValentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan(Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership overthe real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed amongher heir after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and thatit subsisted up to 1918 when her estate waspartitioned among her three children and her grandson,Valentin Salao.

Issues:

Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs ofVictorina) have successional rights over Ambrosia’sshare.

Ruling:

Succession: Even if the donation were declared void,the plaintiffs would not have any successional rightsto Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosiawas her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative withinthe third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legalheir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr.(Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, couldnot represent him in the succession to the estate ofAmbrosia since in the collateral line, representationtakes place only in favor of the children of brothers

or sisters whether they be of the full or half bloodis (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes agrandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews likethe plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil.176).

DIAZ V PAMUTI

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Table 1. Properties of Valentina Ignacio upon her death on 1914.(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents, Feliciano Ignacio and DamianaMendoza, and the other half of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 21,700 (2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . .. . . 7,418 (3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . .. . . . 6,989 (VALENTIN)(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 50,469 (VALENTIN)

FACTS:

Thee respondent filed a Petition dated January 23,1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp.Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the IntestateEstate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero,"praying among other things, that the correspondingletters of Administration be issued in her favor andthat she be appointed as special Administratrix of theproperties of the deceased Simona PamutiVda.deSantero.

It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is aniece of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero who togetherwith Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimatechildren of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and PetronilaAsuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and outof their union were born FelisaPamuti and anotherchild who died during infancy; 3) that SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSanteroand the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santerowas the only legitimate son of his parentsPascualSantero and Simona PamutiVda. deSantero; 5)that PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that PabloSantero, at the time of his death was survived by hismother Simona Santero and his six minor naturalchildren to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diazand two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 19761 and December 9, 1976 2 declared FelisaPamutiJardinas the sole legitimate heir of Simona PamutiVda.deSantero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelatedcases filed to wit:

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Lettersof Administration of the intestate Estate of PabloSantero;

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Lettersof Administration of the Intestate Estate ofPascualSantero;

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition forGuardianship over the properties of an IncompetentPerson, Simona PamutiVda. deSantero;

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlementof the Intestate Estate of Simona PamutiVda.deSantero.Issue: whether oppositors-appellees (petitionersherein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santerocould inherit from Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, byright of representation of their father Pablo Santerowho is a legitimate child of Simona PamutiVda, deSantero.

who are the legal heirs of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero— her niece FelisaPamutiJardin or her grandchildren(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Ruling:

Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to theintestate estate of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, whois the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, theapplicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of theCivil Code which reads as follows: ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right toinherit ab intestato from the legitimate children andrelatives of his father or mother; nor shall such

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children or relatives inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not anillegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children ofPablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrieror iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely asuccession ab intestato between the illegitimate childand the legitimate children and relatives of thefather or mother of said legitimate child. They mayhave a natural tie of blood, but this is notrecognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992,Between the legitimate family and the illegitimatefamily there is presumed to be an interveningantagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate childis disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimatefamily; the family is in turn, hated by theillegitimate child; the latter considers theprivileged condition of the former, and the resourcesof which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the productof sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;the law does no more than recognize this truth, byavoiding further grounds of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the NewCivil Code that the phrase "legitimate children andrelatives of his father or mother" includes SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero as the word "relative" includesall the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The recordshows that from the commencement of this case the onlyparties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of thelate Simona PamutiVda. deSantero are

FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural orillegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Sincepetitioners herein are barred by the provisions ofArticle 992, the respondent Intermediate AppellateCourt did not commit any error in holdingFelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir tothe intestate estate of the late Simona PamutiVda.deSantero.

LEONARDO V CAFACTS:

- Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12,1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Mariaand SilvestraCailles and a grandson, SoteroLeonardo, the son of her daughter,PascualaCailles who predeceased her.

- Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, whileSilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue.

- On October 29, 1964, petitioner CresencianoLeonardo, claiming to be the son of the lateSotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownershipof properties, sum of money and accounting inthe Court of First Instance of Rizal seekingjudgment (1) to be declared one of the lawfulheirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitledto one-half share in the estate of said deceasedjointly with defendant, private respondentherein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have theproperties left by said Francisca Reyes,described in the complaint, partitioned betweenhim and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to havean accounting of all the income derived from

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said properties from the time defendants tookpossession thereof until said accounting shallhave been made, delivering to him his sharetherein with legal interest.

- Answering the complaint, private respondentMaria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership overthe subject properties and alleged thatpetitioner is an illegitimate child who cannotsucceed by right of representation.

- For his part, the other defendant, privaterespondent James Bracewell, claimed that saidproperties are now his by virtue of a valid andlegal deed of sale which Maria Cailles hadsubsequently executed in his favor. Theseproperties were allegedly mortgaged torespondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc.sometime in September 1963.

- the trial court rendered judgment in favor ofthe petitioner finding the evidence of theprivate respondent insufficient to proveownership of the properties in suit.

- From said judgment, private respondents appealedto the Court of Appeals which reversed thedecision of the trial court. Hence. Thispetition.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED INHOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREATGRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGALRIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.

RULING:

1. NO. Even if it is true that petitioner is thechild of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, byright of representation, claim a share of theestate left by the deceased Francisca Reyesconsidering that, as found again by the Court ofAppeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown bythe fact that when he was born on September 13,1938, his alleged putative father and motherwere not yet married, and what is more, hisalleged father's first marriage was stillsubsisting. At most, petitioner would be anillegitimate child who has no right toinherit ab intestato from the legitimate childrenand relatives of his father, like the deceasedFrancisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of thePhilippines.)

ROSALES V ROSALESINTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.ROSALES, petitioner, vs.FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL

Principle:A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-lawby right of representation. Article 971 explicitlydeclares that the representative is called tosuccession by law because of blood relationship. Therepresentative does not succeed the person representedbut the one whom the person represented would havesucceeded. A widow of the person represented cannot

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assert the same right of representation as there is nofiliation by blood.

Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survivedby her husband, their two (2) children Magna RosalesAcebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, CarterioRosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales,the herein petitioner.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trialcourt issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaringthe following in individuals the legal heirs of thedeceased and prescribing their respective share of theestate —Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; andAntonio Rosales son, 1/4.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insistedin getting a share of the estate in her capacity asthe surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, sonof the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsoryheir of her mother-in-law together with her son,Macikequerox Rosales.

Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir asenumerated in Art. 887 being the widow or widower ofthe son of the decedent and that at the time of thedeath of her husband Carterio Rosales he had aninchoate or contingent right to the properties ofPetra Rosales as her compulsory heir by right ofrepresentation together with her son.

Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?

Held: NOThere is no provision in the Civil Code which statesthat a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heirof her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of anyprovision which entitles her to inherit from hermother-in- law either by her own right or by the rightof representation.

The provisions of the Code which relate to the orderof intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestateheirs of a decedent, with the State as the finalintestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provisionwhich makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of thedeceased all the more confirms Our observation. If thelegislature intended to make the surviving spouse anintestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have soprovided in the Code.

Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceasedspouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow orwidower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply tothe estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a thirdperson as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of theCivil Code aforecited does not support petitioner'sclaim. A careful examination of the said Articleconfirms that the estate contemplated therein is theestate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is thesubject matter of the intestate estate proceedings inthis case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales,the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from theestate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales

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draws a share of the inheritance by the right ofrepresentation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representationis explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the CivilCode, viz—

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fictionof law, by virtue of which the representative israised to the place and the degree of the personrepresented, and acquires the rights which the latterwould have if he were living or if he could haveinherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to thesuccession by the law and not by the personrepresented. The representative does not succeed theperson represented but the one whom the personrepresented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that MacikequeroxRosales is called to succession by law because of hisblood relationship. He does not succeed his father,Carterio Rosales (the person represented) whopredeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but thelatter whom his father would have succeeded.Petitioner cannot assert the same right ofrepresentation as she has no filiation by blood withher mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of thedeath of her husband Carterio Rosales he had aninchoate or contingent right to the properties ofPetra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,said right of her husband was extinguished by hisdeath that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosaleswho succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of

representation. He did not succeed from his deceasedfather, Carterio Rosales.

RODRIGUEZ V RAVILANFacts:

JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in representation oftheir son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amendedcomplaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebuagainst Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughtersMaximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamedBarte. The complaint recites, among other things, thatmany years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died inthe pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs,Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo,Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte,and that, although five of them divided amongthemselves the said property, consisting of landssituated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, thelegal portions which pertained to four of them,Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remainedundivided, and these latter continued to possess, incommon, the property that fell to their shares, andwere also associated in business separately from theirother coheirs.

The said property, as aforesaid, was administered byEspiridionBarte, in common accord with the others,and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force oflaw the part that pertained to him passed to hisbrother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as theheirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, bycommon agreement, the said brother and sisterscontinued their partnership organization and appointed

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the brother Pedro as administrator; that during thelatter's administration, MateaBarte also died, leavingas her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his fatherDonato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death ofPedro Barte, JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in thename of their son Nicolas decided upon thedistribution of the property mentioned and so stated,in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian ofthe heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would notagree to the partition, on the pretext that, as theadministratix of that property, she had to pay debtsof the deceased.

That three years having elapsed, up to the time of thecomplaint, and the debts having been settled, asadmitted by the defendant herself, the latter wasrequested to present the accounts, which sheabsolutely refused to do, and that she continued inthe possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the saidproperty, without the consent or intervention of theplaintiffs; that JorgiaBarte, Nicolas Mendoza, theheir of MateaBarte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte,named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte,were then entitled to the property in question, whichshould be divided among them in three equal parts, oneto be allotted to JorgiaBarte, another to NicolasMendoza, and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

Issue:

Whether or not partition should be granted.

Ruling:

No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:"A person having or holding real estate with others,in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may

compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafterprescribed."

Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "Thecomplaint in an action for partition shall set forththe nature and extent of the plaintiff's title andcontain an adequate description of the real estate ofwhich partition is demanded, and name each tenant incommon, coparcener, or other person interestedtherein, as defendants."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of theproperty must have the status of a coproprietor orcoowner of the property the partition of which isasked for; and notwithstanding the fact thatJorgiaBarte and the son of MateaBarte, through hisrepresentative, aver that they are the coowners of thesaid Mandaue lands of others situated in themunicipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have notproved their averment by titles which establish thecommon ownership alleged. A mere affirmation withoutproofs is insufficient, since the defendant party,representing the four daughters of the deceased PedroBarte, absolutely denied all the allegations of thecomplaint.

In actions for the partition of property held incommon it is assumed that the parties are all coownersor coproprietors of the undivided property to bepartitioned. The question of common ownership need notbe gone into at the time of the trial, but only how,in what manner, and in what proportion the saidproperty of common ownership shall be distributedamong the interested parties by order of court.

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Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded,it must be remembered that the hereditary successionof the deceased EspiridionBarte, who it is said leftno legitimate descendants at his death, should bedivided among his eight brothers and sisters who mayhave survived him, and in case any of these have died,the children of his deceased brother or sister, thatis, his nephews and nieces per stirpes, are entitled toshare in his inheritance, according to the provisionsof articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, thelast cited of which prescribes: "Should brotherssurvive with nephews, children of brothers of thewhole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and thelatter per stirpes," representing their respectivefathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of thedeceased.

The record does not show whether JorgiaBarte left anylegitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, hercollateral relatives succeed her in the mannerprovided by law.

It is to be noted that the partnership contractentered into by the four brothers and sisters can notaffect the hereditary rights which belong to therelatives of the deceased predecessor in interestsuccessions.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in ouropinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealedfrom, to declare and we do hereby declare, that thepartition prayed for be denied

Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASEDJOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

BAR Q: Suppose that A begets X with B, and Y withanother woman, C; then X and Y would be naturalbrothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship.Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are the Delgados, half- blood sibling anddecendants of Josefa Delgado while Respondents are thesiblings of Guillermo. This case concerns thesettlement of the intestate estates of GuillermoRustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The claimants to theestates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may bedivided into two groups:

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Roman Rustia (deceased)childrenSisters: Marciana Damian & Hortencia Cruznephews and niecesGuillermo RustiaIllegitimate childde facto Adopted childLucio CampoFelisa DelgadoJosefa DelgadoNazarioEdilbertaJoseJacobaGorgonionephews and nieces, grandnephews and grandniecesRamon OsorioLuis Delgado Half- blood sibling of JosefaLuisa Delgadopetitioner

(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,nephews and nieces, and grandnephews andgrandnieces, and

(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews andnieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the defacto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of thedecedents.

Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were allnatural children of Felisa Delgado. However, LucioCampo was not the first and only man in FelisaDelgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whomFelisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike herrelationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly onewithout the benefit of marriage, the legal status ofRamon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is indispute. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorioever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer willdetermine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of therule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate andillegitimate relatives

ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of the decedents GuillermoRustia and JosefaDelgado.

RULING:

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and fullblood sibs, nephews and nieces may represent but notthe grandnephews and nieces. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OFGUILLERMO RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.

1. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her halfand full blood sibs, nephews and nieces mayrepresent but not the grandnephews and nieces.

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgadoare, the questioned status of the cohabitation of hermother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first beaddressed. We hold that Felisa Delgado and RamonOsorio were never married. Hence, all the childrenborn to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with RamonOsorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamedDelgado,51 were her natural children.52

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children andlegitimate children of the same parent, even though there isunquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow anillegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate childbegotten with a parent different from that of the former, would beallowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that, succession should beallowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only ofthe half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition onreciprocal successions between legitimate andillegitimate families does not apply to the case underconsideration.

That prohibition has for its basis the difference incategory between illegitimate and legitimaterelatives. There is no such difference when all thechildren are illegitimate children of the same parent,even if begotten with different persons. They allstand on the same footing before the law, just likelegitimate children of half-blood relation.

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We submit, therefore, that the rules regardingsuccession of legitimate brothers and sisters shouldbe applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers andsisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers andsisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,they shall share equally.53

We note, however, that the petitioners before us arealready the nephews, nieces, grandnephews andgrandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 ofthe new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateralline takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters(nephews and nieces).Consequently, it cannot be exercisedby grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the onlycollateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who areentitled to partake of her intestate estate areher brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at thetime of her death on September 8, 1972.

They have a vested right to participate in theinheritance.55 The records not being clear on thismatter, it is now for the trial court to determine whowere the surviving brothers and sisters (or theirchildren) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled toinherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with thewidow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of theinheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the otherone-half.

2. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- hissisters,69 nieces and nephews.

Intervenor (now co-respondent) GuillermaRustia is anillegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, shemay be entitled to successional rights only upon proofof an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She,however, claimed the status of an acknowledgedillegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after thedeath of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which timeit was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

IntervenorGuillerma sought recognition on two grounds:first, compulsory recognition through the open andcontinuous possession of the status of an illegitimatechild and second, voluntary recognition throughauthentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed thestatus of an illegitimate child from her birth untilthe death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.However, this did not constitute acknowledgment buta mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgmentthrough the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) actionfor compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation:the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of theputative parent.65 On the death of either, the actionfor compulsory recognition can no longer befiled.66 In this case, intervenorGuillerma’s right toclaim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon thedeath of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s secondground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, forpurposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as agenuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in thiscase, Guillermo Rustia). The report card in UST ofintervenorGuillerma did not bear the signature ofGuillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there

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as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight sincehe had no participation in its preparation. Similarly,while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustiahimself who drafted the notice of death of JosefaDelgado which was published in the Sunday Times onSeptember 10, 1972, that published obituary was notthe authentic writing contemplated by the law. Whatcould have been admitted as an authentic writing wasthe original manuscript of the notice, in thehandwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed byhim, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. Thefailure to present the original signed manuscript wasfatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan,GuillerminaRustiaRustia, who was never adopted inaccordance with law. Although a petition for heradoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never cameto fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death.We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and theCourt of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to thedeceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inheritfrom them ab intestato. We quote:

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimantsto the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,intervenorGuillermaRustia and the ampun-ampunan GuillerminaRustiaRustia, are not lawful heirsof the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new CivilCode, if there are no descendants, ascendants,illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, thecollateral relatives shall succeed to the entireestate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs ofGuillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants,consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

ADOPTIONSANTOS YNIGO V RPG.R. No. L-6294             June 28, 1954

In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIALELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUELDE SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

PRINCIPLES:

ADOPTION; PURPOSE - The purpose of adoption is toafford to persons who have no child of their own theconsolation of having one by creating, through legalfiction, the relation of paternity and filiation wherenone exists by blood relationship. This purpose rejectthe idea of adoption by persons who have children oftheir own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, anddifferences may arise resulting from the infiltrationof foreign element into a family which already countswith children upon whom the parents can shower theirpaternal love and affection

ADOPTION; PERSONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOTADOPT - There is merit in the contention that thepetition should not be granted in view of theprohibition contained in article 335, paragraph 1, ofthe new Civil Code.

This article provides that persons who have legitimatechildren cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about itsapplication because the petition was filed on June 24,1952 and at that time petitioners had two legitimate

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children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950 and theother, a girl born on April 13, 1952.

FACTS:

a. June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in CFI ofZamboanga by Santos and his wife for theadoption of a minor namedMarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that thelegitimate parents of said minor have giventheir consent to the adoption.

b. It was also alleged that petitioners had rearedand cared for the minor as if he were their own.

c. OSG filed a written opposition on the groundthat petitioners have 2 legitimate children whoare still minors, and as such they aredisqualified to adopt under the provisions ofthe new civil code

d. Petitioners argue that their 2 LCs were bornafter the agreement for adoption was executed bypetitioners and the parents of the minor. Alsothe old code at the time of agreement containsno such prohibition.

ISSUE: Is the adoption valid even if the agreement toadopt was made before the spouses had legitimatechildren.

HELD:

No.

While the adoption agreement was executed at the timewhen the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of theRules of Court and that rule does not prohibit persons

who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannotagree to the proposition that such agreement has theeffect of establishing the relation of paternity andfiliation by fiction of law without the sanction ofcourt.

Now, said rule expressly provides that a persondesiring to adopt a minor shall present a petition tothe court of first instance of the province where heresides (section 1). This means that the only validadoption in this jurisdiction is that one made throughcourt, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down bythe rule, which shows that the agreement underconsideration can not have the effect of adoption asnow pretended by petitioners.

MANUEL V FERRERPRINCIPLE: A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

FACTS: Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling are spouses.During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had anextra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. Fromthis relationship, Juan Manuel was born.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, marriedEsperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, adonation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with anarea of 2,700 square meters, was executed in favor ofJuan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel (WHO?). Juan andEsperanza tookModesta Manuel-Baltazar into their foldand raised her as their own "daughter" (WARD).

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In 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of EstanislaoaManuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-yearperiod of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion ofhis land.

Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Twoyears later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gambaalso passed away.

A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executedan Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herselfthe three parcels of land. Following the registrationof the document of adjudication with the Office of theRegister of Deeds, the three titles were transferredin Modesta’s name.

In 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciationand Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2)portion of the land that was sold to the latter byJuan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto deRetro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sitwell with petitioners who are the legitimate childrenof spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling.

Petitioners SOUGHT TO ANNUL THE RENUNCIATION ANDQUITCLAIM MADE BY MODESTA (WARD) argue that they arethe legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestateestate (while the other half would pertain to Juan'ssurviving spouse) under the provision of the lastparagraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providingthusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, anillegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or

her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled tothe entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive withbrothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she orhe shall inherit one-half of the estate, and thelatter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 shouldbe read in conjunction with Article 992 of the CivilCode, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right toinherit ab intestato from the legitimate childrenand relatives of his father or mother; nor shallsuch children or relative inherit in the same manner from theillegitimate child.

In a summary judgment, the RTC dismissed the complaintholding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato oftheir illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not thereal parties-in-interest to institute the suit.

ISSUE: WON the legitimate brothers and sisters can bean heir of their illegitimate brother who diedintestate survived by a spouse and a ward (ampon)

WON a ward can be an intestate heir

HELD:

1. NO!

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is socommonly referred to in the rules on succession as the"principle of absolute separation between thelegitimate family and the illegitimate family." Thedoctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral

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line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, andillegitimate relatives, on other hand, although itdoes not totally disavow such succession in the directline. Since the rule is predicated on the presumedwill of the decedent, it has no application, however,on testamentary dispositions.Consequently, when the lawspeaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of anillegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well asto the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers andsisters.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been appliedby the Court in several other cases. Thus, it hasruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no rightto the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimatecollateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed fromher illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannotrepresent his natural father in the succession to theestate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that thenatural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of herdeceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of hernatural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child hasno right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimatechildren and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, thelaw on succession is animated by a uniform generalintent, and thus no part should be renderedinoperative 11 by, but must always be construed inrelation to, any other part as to produce a harmoniouswhole. 

2. NO!

Modesta is also not an heir of decedent. In her answerto the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of

formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

ACAIN V IACCONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs.IAC, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ andROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

Principle:

Preterition applies to adopted children but not tospouses. (A spouse is not a relative in the directline of the other spouse. Adoption makes the adoptedchild the legitimate child of the adopter).

FACTS: (FYI: This happened in Cebu. They live inSanciangko Street. The disputed properties are in CebuCity and Bantayan) 

Petitioner ConstantinoAcain filed on the RegionalTrial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition forthe probate of the will of the late NemesioAcain andfor the issuance to the same petitioner of letterstestamentary on the premise that NemesioAcain diedleaving a will in which petitioner and his brothersAntonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted asheirs. The will allegedly executed by NemesioAcain onFebruary 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with atranslation in English submitted by petitioner withoutobjection raised by private respondents. The willcontained provisions on burial rites, payment ofdebts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. IgnacioG. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.

Part of the will:

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“THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from ourproperties. house, lands and money which I earnedjointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be givenby me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower,of legal age and presently residing…. In case mybrother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the moneyproperties, lands, houses…. which constitute my shareshall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita,Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus the children ofSegundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantinoas the petitioner.

The oppositors respondents herein Virginia A.Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceasedand the latter's widow Rosa DiongsonVda. deAcain fileda motion to dismiss on the following grounds for thepetitioner has no legal capacity to institute theseproceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3)the widow and the adopted daughter have beenpretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition with preliminaryinjunction which was subsequently referred to theIntermediate Appellate Court. Appellate Court grantedprivate respondents' petition and ordered the trialcourt to dismiss the petition for the probate of thewill of NemesioAcain.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,petitioner filed this present petition for the reviewof respondent Court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents have beenpreterited.

SC RULING:

Yes, on the part of the adopted child but NO on thepart of the wife.

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, orall of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,whether living at the time of the execution of thewill or born after the death of the testator, shallannul the institution of heir; but the devisees andlegacies shall be valid insofar as they are not;inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before thetestator, the institution shall he effectual, withoutprejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator'swill of the forced heirs or anyone of them eitherbecause they are not mentioned therein, or, thoughmentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs norare expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow isconcerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not applyas she does not ascend or descend from the testator,although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,there is no preterition even if she is omitted fromthe inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.however, the same thing cannot be said of the otherrespondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoptionby the testator has not been questioned by petitioner.Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Childand Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adoptedperson the same rights and duties as if he were a

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legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adoptedperson a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot bedenied that she has totally omitted and preterited inthe will of the testator and that both adopted childand the widow were deprived of at least theirlegitime. Neither can it be denied that they were notexpressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case ofpreterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir andannulment throws open to intestate succession theentire inheritance. The only provisions which do notresult in intestacy are the legacies and devises madein the will for they should stand valid and respected,except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together withhis brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance ofthe testator results in totally abrogating the willbecause the nullification of such institution ofuniversal heirs-without any other testamentarydisposition in the will-amounts to a declaration thatnothing at all was written. The effect of annullingthe "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, theopening of a total intestacy except that properlegacies and devises must, as already stated above, berespected.

REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE MATTERS:

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene ina probate proceeding he must have an interest iii theestate, or in the will, or in the property to beaffected by it either as executor or as a claimant ofthe estate and an interested party is one who would bebenefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has

a claim against the estate like a creditor. Petitioneris not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or alegatee there being no mention in the testamentarydisposition of any gift of an individual item ofpersonal or real property he is called upon toreceive. At the outset, he appears to have an interestin the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 ofthe Civil Code as a person called to the successioneither by the provision of a will or by operation oflaw. However, intestacy having resulted from thepreterition of respondent adopted child and theuniversal institution of heirs, petitioner is ineffect not an heir of the testator. He has no legalstanding to petition for the probate of the will leftby the deceased and Special Proceedings must bedismissed.

As stated by respondent Court, the general rule isthat the probate court's authority is limited only tothe extrinsic validity of the will, the due executionthereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and thecompliance with the requisites or solemnitiesprescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the willnormally comes only after the Court has declared thatthe will has been duly authenticated. Said court atthis stage of the proceedings is not called upon torule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of theprovisions of the will

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute.Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court isnot powerless to do what the situation constrains itto do and pass upon certain provisions of the will

In the instant case private respondents filed a motionto dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591

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ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on thefollowing grounds: (1) petitioner has no legalcapacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he ismerely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and theadopted daughter have been preterited. It was deniedby the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985for the reason that "the grounds for the motion todismiss are matters properly to be resolved after ahearing on the issues in the course of the trial onthe merits of the case. A subsequent motion forreconsideration was denied by the trial court.

For private respondents to have tolerated the probateof the will and allowed the case to progress when onits face the will appears to be intrinsically void aspetitioner and his brothers and sisters wereinstituted as universal heirs coupled with the obviousfact that one of the private respondents had beenpreterited would have been an exercise in futility. Itwould have meant a waste of time, effort, expense,plus added futility. The trial court could have deniedits probate outright or could have passed upon theintrinsic validity of the testamentary provisionsbefore the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved

Petition is hereby DENIED.

SUAREZ V CAaPrinciple:Thelegitime of the surviving spouse isequal to the legitime of each child. The proprietaryinterest of petitioners in the levied and auctionedproperty is different from and adverse to that oftheir mother. Petitioners became co-owners of theproperty not because of their mother but through theirown right as children of their deceased father.Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from

instituting the action to annul the auction sale toprotect their own interests.FACTS:Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their fatherdied in 1955 and since then his estate consisting ofseveral valuable parcels of land in Pasig, MetroManila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal RealtyCorporation lost in the consolidated cases forrescission of contract and for damages, and wereordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of FirstInstance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) topay, jointly and severally, herein respondents theaggregate principal amount of about P70,000 asdamages. 1

 The judgment against petitioner’s mother and RizalRealty Corporation having become final and executory,five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, MetroManila, (worth to be millions then) were levied andsold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of theprivate respondents as the highest bidder for theamount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were thenissued a certificate of sale which was subsequentlyregistered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of theredemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatoryaction 2 against private respondents and theProvincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed asCivil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auctionsale and the recovery of the ownership of the leviedpieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among

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others, that being strangers to the case decidedagainst their mother, they cannot be held liabletherefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, ofwhich they are co-owners, can neither be levied norsold on execution.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents can validly acquireall the five (5) parcels of land co-owned bypetitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’sdeceased father?

RULING:The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, thelaw applicable at the time of the institution of thecase."The rights to the succession are transmitted from themoment of the death of the decedent."Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children anddescendants consists of one-half of the hereditaryestate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half,subject to the rights of illegitimate children and ofthe surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralawvirtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:

"If there are two or more legitimate children ordescendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled toa portion equal to the legitime of each of thelegitimate children or descendants."Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of thesurviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each

child.The proprietary interest of petitioners in the leviedand auctioned property is different from and adverseto that of their mother. Petitioners became co-ownersof the property not because of their mother butthrough their own right as children of their deceasedfather. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in anyway from instituting the action to annul the auctionsale to protect their own interests.

TEOTICO V DEL VALTeotico vs Ana Del Val

Adoption

Facts:

Maria Mortera y BalsalobreVda. de Aguirre made awill giving a legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico of P20,000.Dr. Rene Teotico is the husband of Josefina Mortera,the testatrix's niece. The testatrix also institutedJosefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to allthe remainder of her properties not otherwise disposedof in the will. The testatrix died on July 14, 1955.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child ofFrancisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix,as well as an acknowledged natural child of JoseMortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix,filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to theprobate of the will alleging the following grounds:(1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2)the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to

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execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3)the will was executed under duress, threat orinfluence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss theopposition alleging that the oppositor had no legalpersonality to intervene. The probate court, after duehearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as anadopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17,1959, the oppositor amended her opposition byalleging, the additional ground that the will isinoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teoticobecause the latter was the physician who took care ofthe testatrix during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, theprobate court rendered its decision on November 10,1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring thedisposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico voidwith the statement that the portion to be vacated bythe annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs byway of intestate succession.

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration whichwas denied. Both petitioner and oppositor appealedfrom the decision, the former from that portion whichnullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico anddeclares the vacated portion as subject of successionin favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from thatportion which admits the will to probate.

Issue:

Whether or not an adopted child of thetestatrix’s deceased sister (Ana del Val Chan) has theright to intervene in the probate proceeding in thiscase.

Ruling:

NO.

The Supreme Court held that the oppositor (Anadel Val Chan) cannot derive comfort from the fact thatshe is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera becauseunder our law the relationship established by adoptionis limited solely to the adopter and the adopted anddoes not extend to the relatives of the adoptingparents or of the adopted child except only asexpressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationshipis created between the adopted and the collaterals ofthe adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted isan heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of theadopter.

The relationship established by the adoption, however,is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extendto his other relatives, except as expressly providedby law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be consideredas a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of theadopting parents, nor of the legitimate children whichthey may have after the adoption, except that the lawimposes certain impediments to marriage by reason ofadoption. Neither are the children of the adoptedconsidered as descendants of the adopter. Therelationship created is exclusively between theadopter and the adopted, and does not extend to therelatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of thePhilippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted,and does not extend to other members of the family ofeither; but the adopted is prohibited to marry thechildren of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline

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of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyesand Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed.,Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right tointervene either as testamentary or as legal heir inthis probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of thecourt a quo.

1. A) (Family Code) Art. 189.Adoption shall have the following

effects: (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of hisparents and other blood relatives.

Section 16 of RA 8552 provides that except in cases wherethe biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, alllegal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adopteeshall be severed and the same shall then be vested on theadopter(s).

It is by this severance that an adopted child is not anintestate of either his biological parents or his bloodrelatives. Adoption relieves the birth parents of theadopted person of all parental rights and responsibilitiesand terminates all legal relationships between the adoptedperson and the birth parents and other relatives of theadopted person. Thereafter, the adopted person is a strangerto the former relatives for all purposes, includinginheritance.

B) RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestatesuccession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall havereciprocal rights of succession without distinction fromlegitimate filiation.

In other words, after adoption, the adopted person shall betreated as if he or she was born to the adopting parents andshall have all rights and be subject to all of the dutiesarising from that relation, including the right ofinheritance. Thus, an adopted child is an intestate heir ofthe adopters.

As regards to the adopter’s blood relatives, he is not anintestate heir. The relationship established by theadoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, anddoes not extend to his other relatives, except as expresslyprovided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot beconsidered as a relative of the ascendants and collateralsof the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate childrenwhich they may have after the adoption, except that the lawimposes certain impediments to marriage by reason ofadoption. Neither are the children of the adopted consideredas descendants of the adopter. The relationship created isexclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and doesnot extend to the relatives of either.

2. No. RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal andintestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shallhave reciprocal rights of succession without distinctionfrom legitimate filiation. If the adopting parent should diebefore the adopted child does, the latter cannot representthe former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendantsof the adopter.

In other words, the law does not create any relationshipbetween the adopted child and the relatives of the adoptingparents, not even to the biological or legitimate childrenof the adopting parents.

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3. Article 39 (2) PD 603 provides that adoption dissolvesthe authority vested in the natural parent or parents,except where the adopter is the spouse of the survivingnatural parent.

Article 342 NCC provides that parents by nature shallinherit from the adopted child and the adopter shall not bea legal heir of the adopted person.

However, they were repealed by RA 8552 which states that inlegal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and theadoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession withoutdistinction from legitimate filiation.

Thus, an adopted child shall not inherit real or personalproperty from his or her birth parents or their relativeswhen the relationship between them has been terminated byfinal order of adoption, nor shall the birth parents or their relativesinherit from the adopted child. This means that the adopter andadopted shall become intestate heirs as to each other.

4. Article 39 PD 603 provides that: The adopter shall not bea legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by natureshall inherit from him, except that if the latter are bothdead, the adopting parent or parents take the place of thenatural parents in the line of succession, whether testateor interstate.

Article 342 CC provides: The adopter shall not be a legalheir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shallinherit from him.

However, Article 190(2) CC provides that when the parents,legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants ofthe adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide theentire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents orascendants and the other half, by the adopters.

But by the enactment of RA 8552, the birth parents of anadopted person are relieved of all parental duties andresponsibilities toward the adopted person, including the

right of inheritance unless specifically provided by will.Thus, adoptive parent is an intestate heir of the estate of the adopted child.

The adopter’s blood relatives shall not be entitled toinherit from and through the adopted individual underthe laws of intestacy in the absence of a will, unlessexpressly excluded. The rationale for this is therelationship established by the adoption is restrictedto the adopting parents, and does not extend to hisother relatives.

5. Both shall inherit.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate ofthe adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or thelegitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with theadopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the otherhalf, by the adopters

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