Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Competence

(DEU CCC/ ZentrZMZBw)

Clausewitz Barracks

31582 Nienburg - GER

A discussion paper on

Climate Change and Global Peace Governmental Structures and the Conflict Potential of

Global Warming in Sub-Saharan Africa

mail@dominikdross.org

Summer 2014

Table of Content

1 Famine, migration, instability ............................................................................................... 4

2 The issue of climate change ................................................................................................... 5

2.1 But what is climate change exactly about? .................................................................. 6

2.1.1 Tetris .......................................................................................................................... 6

3 Society and conflict ................................................................................................................. 8

3.1 Max Weber’s conflict theory .......................................................................................... 8

3.2 Natural resources as warmonger? ................................................................................. 9

3.2.1 Water as a weapon.................................................................................................. 10

3.3 The importance of resource management ................................................................. 10

4 Climatic migration................................................................................................................. 13

4.1 Definition “Refugee” ..................................................................................................... 15

5 Environmental migration in Sub-Saharan Africa ............................................................. 19

5.1 Patronage ........................................................................................................................ 20

5.2 The Sudan case .............................................................................................................. 21

5.3 Sudan’s political elites .................................................................................................. 23

5.4 Ecological effects ........................................................................................................... 24

5.5 Socio-ecological effects ................................................................................................. 26

6 Catalyzer of climatic-induced changes ............................................................................... 29

6.1 Institutional passivity ................................................................................................... 30

6.2 Social identity................................................................................................................. 32

7 Counter migration ................................................................................................................. 33

7.1 Politics and climate change .......................................................................................... 34

7.2 Strategic cooperation – EU’s input ............................................................................. 37

7.3 Good Governance .......................................................................................................... 38

7.4 German military contribution ..................................................................................... 41

7.5 Every day challenges ..................................................................................................... 42

8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 44

9 References .............................................................................................................................. 48

9.1 Online sources ............................................................................................................... 53

9.2 Interview ......................................................................................................................... 55

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1 Famine, migration, instability

What we today call ‘climate change’ will be the greatest social challenge of the modern age, especially since there will be no way of escaping the question of how to cope with the masses of refugees who can no longer survive in their land of origin and wish to enjoy the opportunities available in better-off countries.1

Climate change will through increase in “soil degradation, flooding, water

shortages or hurricanes”2 create if not deepen situations were armed conflicts are

taking place, argues one of the leading scientists on climate change, Professor

Harald Welzer. Global food crises are not a phenomenon of the past - around 900

million people are currently threatened by malnutrition, most of which are

children. They have been exposed to life-long diseases or, even worse, die at young

age. Intensified by climate change and global warming, hunger does not only mean

a heavily decreased life expectancy. It is also a trigger for regional, national, and

international armed conflicts, and, thus, affects global security.3

Regionally limited asymmetric armed conflicts, the so-called “new wars”4, have

become an immense threat to global security within the last two decades.5 This has

recently happened in countries like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Afghanistan,

and has national and regional roots. Nationalism and poverty, hunger and

migration, corruption and religious fanaticism are only a few of the triggers that

have caused these new dynamics.6 Environmental migration in the context of

natural resource conflicts has only been sporadically an issue in the 1990s.7

However, with the 2007 published report by the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) these phenomena became more popular. The report states

that climate change is a significant threat amplifier, especially in areas where

1 Welzer, Harald: Climate Wars, UK 2012, p. vi. 2 Ibis, p. 160. 3 Thalwitz, Margret: Hunger und globale Sicherheit, APuZ 37/2013. 4 Münkler, Herfried: The new wars, Berlin 2005, p. 21. 5 Ibid, p. 18. 6 Petersen, Lars: Länder im Chaos; in: Y – The German Armed Forces‘ Magazine 08/2012, p. 21, Berlin 2012. 7 Scheffran, Jürgen: Kriegs- und Umweltflüchtlinge, in: Böhme, Gernot/Chakraborty,

Rabindra/Weiler, Frank: Migration und Ausländerfeindlichkeit, Darmstadt 1994, p. 23-38.

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violence, social grievances, inequality and poverty are prevalent.8 In these areas

migration is most likely. On the other hand, however, climate change has led to

various academic impulses within the last century, including but not limited to the

field of conflict research.9 Since the early 80’s, researchers have examined the

relationship between climate alteration and the new wars. Researchers of different

think tanks have noted that armed conflicts caused by global climate change are

actually expressly stipulated in developing, but not in developed-, countries. This

identification leads to the question why climate change leads to armed conflicts.

This paper will discuss one of these conflict intensifiers - the interaction of climate

change, migration movements and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. More

specifically, the question which impact do essential resources have on the current

situation in Sub-Saharan Africa? The paper also assumes that not only natural

disasters and changes in environment due to climate change create critical

tensions, but that these situations will interact with other processes such as the

growing number of refugees, race for resource acquisitions or the increased

security efforts on behalf of the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD), and generate autocatalytic effects. In due

course, violence is then not seen as a unique and logical outcome but as part of

complex chain of various events that produce unexpected consequences in the

social realm.

2 The issue of climate change

One of the big questions in the climate change debate: Are humans any smarter than frogs in a pot? If you put a frog in a pot and slowly turn up the heat, it won't jump out. Instead, it will enjoy the nice warm bath until it is cooked to death. We humans seem to be doing pretty much the same thing.

Jeff Goodell

Climate change has never been more present than nowadays. During his State of

the Union address, United States President Barack Obama admitted: “The debate

8 Scheffran, Jürgen/Brzoska, Michael/Brauch, Hans/Link, Michael/Schilling, Jan-Peter: Climate

Change, human Security and Violent Conflict, Berlin 2012. 9 Weart, Spencer: The Discovery of Global Warming, Cambridge 2008, p. 36-38.

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is settled. Climate change is a fact. And when our children’s children look us in the

eye and ask if we did all we could to leave them a safer, more stable world, with

new sources of energy, I want us to be able to say yes, we did.”10 Barack Obama is

strengthening America’s role in negotiations on a global climate change convention

currently. This does not only re-establish the U.S. leadership in world politics and

climate issues, but gives him a last chance to lead earth to a cooler and promising

future before leaving the Oval Office. As John Podesta, Obama’s counselor on

climate issues, states: “Taking action on climate is one of the most important goals

in the president's second and last term.”11 However, by the time Obama will be

leaving the office the United States will most likely be passing Saudi Arabia and

Russia as the biggest producers of both oil and gas combined.

2.1 But what is climate change exactly about?

There is a game of Tetris happening on a global scale: The playing space is planet

Earth, and all those pesky, stacking blocks represent carbon dioxide - a greenhouse

gas that is piling up ever more rapidly as we burn the fossil fuels that run our cars,

factories and power plants. Joss Fong outlines how this overload of CO2 leads to

climate change and reminds us that, unlike Tetris, we won't get an opportunity to

start over and try again. Until a quarter-century ago, almost no one knew that CO2

was dangerous. But now that we understand that carbon is heating the planet and

acidifying the oceans, its price becomes at central issue – to world’s wealth,

economy, and security.12

2.1.1 Tetris

To understand climate change, think of the game Tetris with blocks of carbon.

They enter the atmosphere as carbon dioxide gas from volcanos, decaying plant

matter, breathing creatures, and the surface of the sea and they leave the

atmosphere when they are used by plants during photosynthesis, absorbed back

into the ocean or stored in soil and sea ground. This game of Tetris is called the

carbon cycle and it is the engine of life on earth. What is the connection to climate?

10 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-

union-address (Dec 21) 11 http://climatecrocks.com/2014/04/24/has-obama-made-up-his-mind-on-keystone/ (Apr 24) 12 http://www.climasphere.org/#!article/climate-change-earth-s-giant-game-of-tetris (Apr 22)

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When carbon dioxide is in the air waiting to be reabsorbed it traps a portion of the

sun’s heat that would have otherwise escaped to space. That is why carbon dioxide

is called a greenhouse gas. It creates a blanket of warmth, known as the

greenhouse effect that keeps our Earth from freezing like Mars. The more carbon

dioxide blocks that are present in the atmosphere waiting to be cleared the warmer

earth becomes. Over the past 8000 year this stabile climate we know took shape

but about 200 years ago we began digging up the old carbon that had been stored

in the soil. These fossil fuels, coal, oil and natural gas, are made from the bared

remains of plants and animals that died long before humans evolved. The energy

stored inside them was able to power our factories, cars, and power plants, but

burning these fuels also injected new carbon blocks into Earth’s Tetris game. At

the same time we cleared forests for agriculture, reducing the earth’s ability to

remove these carbon blocks. And since 1750, the amount of carbon in the

atmosphere has increased by 40 percent and shows no sign of slowing. Just like in

Tetris, the more blocks pile up the harder it becomes to restore stability. The extra

carbon dioxide in the atmosphere exalts the greenhouse effect by trapping more

heat near the surface and causing polar ice caps to melt. And the more they melt,

the less sunlight they are able to reflect, making the oceans warm even faster. Sea

levels rise, costal populations are threatened with flooding, natural ecosystems are

disrupted, and the weather becomes more extreme over time. Climate change may

affect different people and places in different ways, but is ultimately a game that

we all start playing, whether we want to or not. And unlike Tetris, we won’t get a

chance to start over and try again.13 “Just look outside the window to see the

climate change’s impacts.”14 The most recent reports from the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change, which are authored by the world's top scientists, have

erased any doubt that climate change is real and the risks – famine, drought,

flooding – are increasing with each passing day.

13 http://www.climasphere.org/#!article/climate-change-earth-s-giant-game-of-tetris (Apr 22) 14http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2014/03/31/barbara_boxer_on_un_global_warming_rep

ort_i_can_see_climate_change_from_my_house (March 31)

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3 Society and conflict

This is part of the involuntary bargain we make with the world just by being alive. We get to experiences the splendor of nature, the beauty of art, the balm of love and the sheer joy of existence, always with the knowledge that illness, injury, natural disaster, or pure evil can end it in an instant for ourselves or someone we love.

Jeff Greenfield

It is assumed that global climate change does not only affect ecologically, but has

also social impacts on society. The degree of the impact on social structures is,

however, depending and framed by a government’s capacity and willingness to

counter those influences. It is therefore relevant for the following discussion to

consider equally both government and social order. Max Weber’s conflict theory

points out the connection between social conflicts, social order, and conflict

settlement.15 The closer governmental capacity comes to a minimum, the more

likely is the appearance of armed conflicts caused by climate change. In the

subsequent sections social and economic vulnerability in ecological changes will be

examined. In due course, the paper chooses migration as a mechanism to climate

change adaption as the central theme.

3.1 Max Weber’s conflict theory

Shifts in social structures and society influence not only social action between

individuals, but also entire groups. The following analysis is focusing on these

group actions. According to Weber, power is the core of all social relationships. He

defines power as “the ability to impose ones will on another, even when the other

objects.”16 This defines power as a social relationship. The stratification of society

is based on a broader range of factors, including wealth, power or prestige. People

can have any of these in order to be in a ‘higher’ class. Inequality is, therefore,

caused by power, wealth and prestige and conflicts are most likely to occur when

these three kinds of stratification overlap with each other. However, conflicts are

15 O‘ Campo, Patricia/Dunn, James R.: Rethinking Social Epidemiology, Heidelberg/London/New

York 2012, p. 163. 16 O‘ Campo, Patricia/Dunn, James R.: Rethinking Social Epidemiology, Heidelberg/London/New

York 2012, p. 163.

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also likely, when the access to these positions is restricted. Groups that fight over

rare resources put the respective society off-balance until a dominant group gains

control and stability through power. In addition to property or wealth, for Weber

includes social class power and prestige. Thus, an attempt to combine ideal,

structural, and cultural factors leads to class struggle and competition, as these

factors play a significant role in the distinction of power. Socio-economic and

ecological changes can easily limit governmental authority.17 According to Weber

power is used in both ways physically and economically. His thoughts on society,

power and conflict are, as seen in African societies in which low governmental

structures prevail, still up to date.

3.2 Natural resources as warmonger?

Which impact do essential resources have on the current conflicts in Sub-Saharan

Africa? Many academic studies prove the connection of resources, its feeding and

prolonging impacts on conflicts already in the Congo conflicts.18 Rebel groups and

conventional armies have always conducted trade by having control over local

natural resources. The then resulting income has been mainly used to finance

small arms and light weapons in order to provide breeding grounds for further

hostilities. This resulted in an endless cycle of warfare economy in which none of

the conflicting parties were economically keen to a quick conflict settlement.

Within the last few years media and NGOs have increasingly stated the importance

of resources as a motivation for the use of force and the financing of conflicts in the

Eastern Congo. Consequently, international sanctions have been set up to prevent

the trade of “conflict resources”.

The assumption that violence in Eastern Congo is going to end by preventing trade

with conflict resources is unlikely. Even though official trade recently decreased,

illegal smuggling with wolfram, coltan, and gold is still flourishing. Smuggle of

these minerals takes places mainly in Rwanda and Uganda.19 However, to focus

only on resources as a conflict trigger is too shortsighted. Causes for conflicts may

17 Dahrendorf, Ralf: Konflikt und Freiheit, München 1972, p. 32. 18 http://kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/divers/wp12-01.pdf (Jan 11) 19 UN Security Council, S/2011/738 and S/2012/843.

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rather be found in social disputes over identity or territory. Although armies and

armed groups still profit from controlling mining areas and natural resources, this

is only one of many possibilities to finance conflicts and violence. Crucial factors

for ongoing conflicts lie, especially, in political conditions.

3.2.1 Water as a weapon

Water has always been of strategic importance in world history. Not only does it

lead to conflicts, like the one at the Golan-Heights between Israel and Syria, it has

also been the cause for the restored peace at the Jordan Valley with the Jordanian

kingdom.20 Supply shortages of water are often caused by broad and rapid changes

in supply and demand and challenge even well-developed countries and

management-systems. In doing so, various parameters impact the situation.21

Triggers for local supply shortage may be seen in stimulation of demand.

Dynamics in demand for water are generated by a rapid population growth and

migration movements. These lead to a greater demand for water for both domestic

use and indirectly for the increasing food production.

3.3 The importance of resource management

Regardless of the lack of institutional ability to act or substantial consideration,

mismanagement of water resources is most likely to happen when the impact of

climate change is inadequately considered or totally being left outside. This means

key factors in supply crises will be found in a missing adaptability of water

management to global climate change. In fact, water crises are often still caused by

hydrological shortages, rather than inefficient management.22 However, it is not

beyond the realm of possibility that climate change will cause unknown dramatic

changes in water availability, which leads to excessive stress in management of

natural resources. In the long-run, water crises will most likely occur if the current

methods of the previous centuries of management and planning criteria of water

20 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842 (Dec 21) 21 Breslin, Edward D.: Water as a Weapon of War, USA 2002, p. 28. 22 UNESCO: Water. A shared responsibility, NY 2006, p. 34.

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availability are kept running.23 As David Suzuki after hurricane Sandy commented:

“The damage that climate change is causing will get worse if we fail to act and goes

beyond the hundreds of thousands of lives, homes and businesses lost, ecosystems

destroyed, species driven to extinction, infrastructure smashed and people

inconvenienced.“ Also the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)

warns that if governments do not adapt to recent changes and future trends, and

do nothing to counter the shortage of water, its decrease will become a growing

threat to global security.

Shortfalls in adaption to climate change usually go along with each other and are

caused politically, economically or bioregionally. As different shortfalls often occur

at the same time, these doubly affected areas are extremely at risk. It is therefore

evident that conflicts over water supply often occur in developing countries that

already struggle with poverty reduction. These areas sustain both inadequate water

management systems and inauspicious geographic conditions.24 Competition for

the water use and collection and the probability of crises become more likely with a

lack of water usage control systems. Political, social and natural conditions do not

only influence crises on water. More recently, they have strongly promoted

conflicts. However, water shortages do not necessarily lead to conflicts and

violence; key triggers lie in government structures, and in social and political

stability. This means the degradation of water resources in connection with

politically and socio-economic criteria may cause these conflicts. The adaptability

of water management in a changing environment, rather than the shortage of the

resource itself has great impact on water conflicts. 25 Political factors influence and

promote shifts in its usage more than the above mentioned factors. Especially is

this the case in local redistribution of water resources caused by unilateral political

measures – often without the consultation of the other party.26

23 IPCC: Hydropower, NY 2007, p. 211. UNDP: Annual Report, NY 2006, p. 134. 24 WWF: Living Planet Report, CH 2006, p. 12. 25 Wolf, Aaron T: Dispute Resolution, Public Participation, and Institutional Capacity-Building,

Cambridge 2007, p. 44. 26 ibid, p. 38.

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Internationally speaking, tensions of water usage and resources might worsen

already existing conflicts and tension relations to neighboring governments.

Cooperation, on the other hand, has proven to improve international relations.27 In

the past, it was cooperation of these resources rather than conflicts and tensions

that shaped international relations. Benefit sharing has been the guiding principle

for cooperation.28 Missing information on the actual use of water creates mistrust

that becomes a breeding ground for conflicts.29 Information and capacity sharing,

confidence-building and common management bodies are thus tools for

intergovernmental and adequate management of resources. They are vital in order

to overcome conflicts on the use of water.

It is arguable whether or not intergovernmental wars on water will shape

international relations in the near future. Only governments able to act politically

and militarily might be likely to develop an incentive to conduct wars. According to

conflict analysis, governments do not control disputes by violent means as wars on

territory are neither economically nor strategically appropriate options. Thus,

governments willing to conduct wars to conquer (water) resources outside its

national borders have to be run autocratically.30 Conflicts on resources do not only

hinder economic and social development, moreover they are destabilizing on the

local level and likely to broaden internationally.31 Water crises nowadays are often

caused by lack of management rather than in hydrological terms. Due to

population growth and the consequences of climate change, however, the amount

of water will low tide in many areas in the near future and hamper a non-violently

management on these resources. Meeting development goals like economic

growth, food security, poverty reduction, and protection of the ecological system

require a nationwide approach and integrated principles for water management if

climate change is continuing. Certainly, climate change is seen as only one threat

among various others to the successful management of resources, balance, and

27 Sadoff and Grey: Beyond the river. The benefits of cooperation on international rivers,

Washington D.C. 2002, p. 403. 28 German Development Institute: Transboundary water management in Africa, Bonn 2006, p. 103-172. 29 UNDP: Annual Report, NY 2006, p. 144. 30 UNDP: Annual Report, NY 2006, p. 145. 31 Wolf, Aaron T: Dispute Resolution, Public Participation, and Institutional Capacity-Building,

Cambridge 2007, p. 72.

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stability. Its consequences will mostly affect political systems already suffering

great variability and shortage in essential resources.32 It is, therefore, important to

resolve shortcomings and adapt management strategies to be able to adequately

face future challenges.

4 Climatic migration

They will never be the same again because you just cannot be the same once you leave behind who and what you are, you just cannot be the same.

NoViolet Bulawayo

Climatic migration is not monocausal, but crucially linked to current political,

social, and demographic conditions.33 Since the consequences of climate change

not necessarily cause migration, it is important to differentiate between non-

climatic factors and climatic caused parameters when talking about migration

movements. Adaption-strategies to changes in living conditions have a great

impact on movements, as the vulnerability of societies is dependent on both the

geographical level of risks and the societies’ endeavor to adaption.34 Therefore, it is

evident that hydro-meteorological disasters such as heavy thunderstorms or floods

result in migration movements only in connection with social and political

shortfalls in adaption to the level of risks. The level of vulnerability is increasing

with the lack of dams, multi-bank rescue plans and rapid alert systems. This is

shown, for example, in the 2004 water quake in the Indian Ocean where about 1.7

million people became homeless, and 165,000 were killed when the tsunami hit

and destroyed entire coastal areas in South East Asia and the Bay of Bengal.

Reasons for these devastating outcomes can be found in missing early warning

systems and ultimately the missing evacuation of particular coastal areas. In

addition have ecological conductions like the removal of artificial flood zones and

clearances of the mangrove forests contributed to the high number of casualties.

However, natural disasters do not promote emigration alone; prognoses state that

32 IPCC: Assessment Report on Climate Change, NY 2001, p. 109. 33 Acketoft, Tina: Environmentally induced migration and displacements: a 21st century challenge,

Brüssel 2008. http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=12098&Language=EN (Jan 16)

34 Brown, Oli/Hammill, Ann/McLeman, Robert: Climate Change as the “New” Security Threat. Implications for Africa; in: International Affairs 83 (6), UK 2007, S. 1149.

14

the collapse of living environments as a consequence of climate change will be the

greatest catalyst of future migration movements.35 As the social struggle of

ecological loss in living space caused by natural disasters can actually be

prevented, the long-term conceivable consequences of climate change threaten

possibly affected societies already.36 Climatically caused migration is associated

with the so-called pull parameter. These conditions do not only make migration a

necessary phenomenon but also an attractive option. Cultural, political,

demographic and social reasons can be seen as such. Population pressure, bad

governance and social systems cause, next to the climatic grievances itself, these

movements. At the same time, climatically caused migration in developing

countries occurs in urban environments due to economic reasons. Therefore,

conventional and climatic migration into cities is difficult to distinguish. The

mutual interaction of ecological factors with cultural, political, and social aspects

leads to difficulties distinguishing voluntary and involuntary migration.37 Climate

change will be seen as only one factor among many, whose particular impact is

simply unascertainable.38 If great mismanagement and bad governance are

present, a climatic event is likely to cause migration even though the actual factor

is of a social and political nature.39 According to this, climate-induced migration

has in fact a complex nature and is not simply the result of cause and effect of

climatic events.40 Current pull-parameters play a decisive role in order to

understand the reason and background of migration movements.41 These

difficulties in distinction and understanding of migration are reflected in

classification, definition, and, subsequently, treatment of climate immigrants.

35 Warner, Koko: Climate Changed induced Displacement, Geneva 2009, p. 11. 36 Bogardi, Janos J.: Control, Adapt or Flee. How to face environmental migration, Bonn 2007, p. 34. 37 UNHCR: Global Trends 2008. Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and

Stateless Persons, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html (Jan 18) 38 Graeme, Hugo: Migration and Climate Change, Oxford 2008, p. 112.

Warner, Koko: Climate Changed induced Displacement, Geneva 2009, p. 89. WBGU: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel, Berlin/Heidelberg 2007, p. 156.

39 Acketoft, Tina: Environmentally induced migration and displacements: a 21st century challenge, Brüssel 2008. http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=12098&Language=EN (Jan 16)

40 Brown, Oli/Hammill, Ann/McLeman, Robert: Climate Change as the “New” Security Threat. Implications for Africa; in: International Affairs 83 (6), UK 2007, S. 1151.

41 Jakobeit, Cord/ Methmann, Chris: Klimaflüchtlinge. Die verleugnete Katastrophe, Hamburg 2007, p. 49.

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4.1 Definition “Refugee”

I find it vulgar that people are so fascinated by natural disasters, and we allow footage of young people that are looting because they have no choice because of natural disaster.

Sasha Grey

Environmental refugees are “people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in

their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and

other environmental problems, together with associated problems of population

pressures and profound poverty.”42 It is predicted that by 2015, the quantity of the

affected population will be doubled to about 58 million.43 Their migration is

directly linked to the consequences of climate change. Changes in environment,

such as degradation of soil cause social, economic or political changes and worsen

living conditions generally.44 Environmental change does not only promote and at

the same time in another context hinder migration itself, but it also increases

poverty in rural areas and, therefore, possibilities for rural depopulation. In the

long-run, the dimension of climate migration is strongly connected to social

resilience of the affected society.

Next to the mentioned definition of climatic migration exists the term

“climigration” and “ecomigration”. The synonyms highlight the connection to

either environmental or economic elements in the context of migration

movements.45 In doing so, the definition of the affected people is of great

importance as classification as either a migrant or a refugee results in different

treatment and responsibility by governments. In contrast to migrants, refugees

may seek shelter and assistance from international organizations such as the

UNHCR, according to the Geneva Convention on Refugees. Furthermore refugees

must not be deported by the hosting nations.

42 Myers, Norman: Environmental Refugees. A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century; in:

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 357 (1420), UK 2002, p. 609.

43 Ibid, p. 611. 44 Piguet, Etienne: Climate Change and Forced Migration, New Issues in Refugee Research,

Research Paper No. 153, Neuchâtel 2008, p. 3. 45 Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra: Future Floods of Refugees. A Comment on Climate

Change, Conflict and Forced Migration, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oslo 2008, p. 7.

16

The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees addresses refugees as “someone who is

unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded

fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group, or political opinion.”46 Within the Geneva Convention the

terminology of escape was synonymized with migration. In contrast to this, the

International Organisation of Migration (IOM) uses a term of wide comprehension

and includes internally displaced people (IDP): “Environmental migrants are

persons or groups of persons who for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive

changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions,

are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or

permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”47 IOM

continues that “migration may be one of several adaptation strategies in the face of

natural disasters, [however], distinctions between slow- and sudden-onset events

are important.”48 Due to IOM’s classification, the internationally greatest accepted

definition is the “climate migrant”. This categorization considers several factors set

by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, including the degree on voluntariness,

time, and direction of the migration movements.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) distinguishes between four types of

possible environmental migration without explicitly mentioning events caused by

climate change, such as hydro-metrological disasters, long-lasting disasters, loss of

territory due to raising sea level, shortage of resources or environmental

abasement.49 The researchers Frank Biermann and Ingried Boas, on the other

hand, specify climate refugees as people who are forced to leave their living

environment in the wake of droughts, water shortage, and the rise of sea level.50

46 UNHCR: Abkommen über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge vom 28. Juli 1951, p. 3.

http://www.unhcr.de/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/03_profil_begriffe/genfer_fluechtlingskonvention/Genfer_Fluechtlingskonvention_und_New_Yorker_Protokoll.pdf (March 16)

47 IOM: Discussion Note. Migration and the Environment, Geneva 2007. http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf (March 16)

48 http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_summary.pdf (March 14) 49 IASC: Climate change, migration, and displacement: impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation

options - 5th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 5). Bonn 2009.

50 Biermann, Frank/Boas, Ingried: Protecting Climate Refugees: The case for a global protocol, in Environment 50, PA 2008, p 12.

17

Against this is the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) as this specification is delusive

and imprecise.51 UNHCR tries, as it seems, to avoid the broadening of its mandate

in course of the debate on the classification of refugees and migrants, as

underequipment and overspending challenge the organization’s efforts already

now.52

The legitimate status of environmental and climatic caused migration is still

unwritten. Regarding the Nansen Principles on Climate Change and Displacement

however, governments are obliged to prevent its population from climate change

and incoming climate refugees.53 The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) addresses

the need to replace the term of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) by

Environmentally Displaced Persons (EDP), as this identification furthermore

applies to all people crossing international borders and to people expelled within

their own country.54 Crucial to NRC’s definition is that migration is primarily

caused by the consequences of climate change. The term “environmental refugee”

is seen as quite controversial, as refugees have a right to special legal treatment

according to the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its additional protocols.

Climate caused migration, however, does not meet the basic conditions of the

Geneva Convention on Refugees - the corpus delicti of persecution and cross-

border migration. Justified is this as climate change consequences are not yet

considered as persecution, neither do migrants always cross international borders

and are, therefore, still under protection of its home country.55

Human rights organizations claim that environmental migrants are in a refugee-

like situation and therefore lack the protection of their basic human rights in the

same way. Ipso jure, these people must also be treated as permanent refugees. A

categorization as environmental refugees has to apply accordingly.56 Additionally,

migration movements are a consequence of externally caused grievances.

51 http://unhcr.org./cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search%5C?page=&comid=4e01e63f2&keywords=Bellagio-

meeting. (Mar 18) 52 UNHCR: Climate Change, Natural Disasters and human Displacement, NY 2008, p 7. 53 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/nansen_prinsipper.pdf (Feb 19) 54 Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra: Future Floods of Refugees. A Comment on Climate Change,

Conflict and Forced Migration, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oslo 2008, p. 8. 55 UNHCR: Statistical Yearbook 2010, NY 2010, p. 26. 56 Biermann, Frank: Umweltflüchtlinge. Ursachen und Lösungen; in: Aus Politik und

Zeitgeschichte B12, Bonn 2001, p. 26.

18

Protection of environmental migrants is still precarious as internationally binding

documents and regulations do not exist yet and current conventions can be applied

ad libitum. Therefore, their protection is of discretionary elementary nature.

Scope of application of The Geneva Convention on Refugees:

Transnational migration

Voluntary migration Forced migration

Local migration

Sinking island scenario

Conflicts on resources Slow changes

in environment

Natural disasters

Intended

migration

Geneva Scope of application

19

5 Environmental migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

There is almost no country in Africa where it is not essential to know to which tribe, or which subgroup of which tribe, the president belongs. From this single piece of information you can trace the lines of patronage and allegiance that define the state.

Christopher Hitchens

Prognoses on climate-induced migration differ largely; many experts are

hypothesizing more than a dozen million climate victims in the near future.57 In

2008 alone, more than 20 million people migrated due to climate change events.58

The population living in climate change vulnerable areas need to be flexible as they

are forced to adapt their lifestyle and habits to new conditions in the long run. In

doing so, tensions and conflicts, subsequently caused by the movements of

migration between the floating herdsmen tribes and the permanent population are

documented. However, it is important to consider that movements of migration

have always been a traditional phenomenon within the semi-arid African areas.

With these events, the population typically adapts to the annually occurring dry

seasons. They escape from periods of shortages by spreading to more lucrative

areas.59 Nevertheless, traditional migration movements still differ in quantity and

quality from climatic migration, caused by droughts and other extreme weather

conditions. Thus, more than 320,000 Somali were forced in 2010 alone to leave

their habitual communities in eastern Africa.60 Nowadays is a total of 10 million

people threatened by droughts in Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenia.61 Long

lasting droughts are especially challenging the Somalian government. The Somali

population is greatly affected by droughts and additionally suffering a

humanitarian disaster. In August of last year, Doctors Without Borders (MSF)

closed all of its humanitarian programs in the Somalian region as a result of

57 Jakobeit, Cord/Methmann, Chris: Klimaflüchtlinge als drohende Katastrophe? Eine Kritik

herrschender Zahlenspiele, in: Brzoska, Marburg 2012, p. 157-172. 58 UNOCHA: Monitoring disaster displacement in the context of climate change, Geneva 2009.

http://ochaonline.un.org/News/ClimateChange/KeyResources/tabid/4992/language/en-US/Default.aspx (Jan 09)

59 Black, Richard: Environmental Refugees. Myth or Reality?, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 34, Brighton 2001, p. 5.

60 UNHCR: Global Trends 2011, NY 2011, p. 7. 61 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters: Disaster Data. A Balance Perspective,

Belgium 2012, p. 2.

20

extreme attacks on its staff. This exemplifies the impact of local violence to

humanitarian assistance.62 Somali seek shelter not only in refugee camps, as IDPs

they mainly flee into the neighboring countries like Ethiopia or Kenia. Currently

has Kenia the largest refugee camp registered.63

It is likely that in the near future around one-third of international migration will

take place in Africa.64 This means around ten to 27 million environmental

refugees. Furthermore, the greatest demographic increase is measured in sub-

Saharan Africa and is not to slow-down neither in near future nor in long-term.

Urban growth and the emergence of slums in affected areas are growing rapidly;

countering these trends is due to lack of proper governmental organization and

infrastructure quite challenging.65 Still, migration is seen as a current and

traditional strategy to counter extreme weather conditions, degradation of soil or

climatic caused consequences both temporary and seasonally. Population growth

and climatic consequences cause not only huge movements of migration; they also

challenge social strategies to adaption by increasing these movements in quality

and quantity and lead, in long-term, to conflicts.

5.1 Patronage

Non-democratic governments are more likely to face economic and climatically

caused conflicts compared to their democratic counterparts.66 Different studies

confirm this triangle between governance, conflicts, and shortage in resources.67

Within African societies, intra-social relations and networking form governmental

structures. The imperative of interchange shapes workday and political life. The

support of local politicians in elections is, therefore, connected to a direct

62 http://www.msf.org.uk/article/somalia-msf-forced-close-all-medical-programmes (March 06) 63 UNHCR: Global Trends 2011, NY 2011, p. 1. 64 UNHCR: Statistical Yearbook 2010, NY 2010, p. 65. 65 Meyer-Ohlendorf, Lutz: Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Adaption in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cities. New Challenges for Development Policy, Discussion Paper Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn 2009, p. 7.

66 Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene/Wooden, Amanda: Water Resources, Institutions, and Intrastate Conflict; in: Political Geography 29, Geneva 2010, p. 444.

67 Koubi, Vally/Bernauer, Thomas/Spilker, Gabriele: Climate Change, Economic Growth, and Conflict; in: Journal of Peace Research 49 (1), Zurich 2012, p. 113.

21

expectation and the resulting individual benefit for the supporting party.68 As this

patrimonialistic way of social interaction is legitimized by gaining great support by

the population’s majority, it is not seen as corrupt as western democracies typically

would claim.69 However, the informal character of this personalized policy still

minimizes the equality of opportunities and access to public capabilities, and is

mostly only accessible with individual personal contacts.70 As shown in Senegal

and Kenia, the practice of informal policy has stabilizing effects on social

structures.71 The probability of manipulative interference in economic issues is

especially likely to happen in satellite states where rulers and politicians tend to

act mainly for their own benefit. Africa’s natural resources are strongly limited by

little lucrative acreages. This implies not only great economic and social

significance to those territories, but also increases informal dealings.72 Advents of

conflicts are dependent on financial means as well as on the mobilization of

forceful groups and networks.73

5.2 The Sudan case

Due to diverse shifts of climate zones, its geographical locations, and the potential

for conflicts over resources, South Sudan and its counterpart in the north, Sudan,

are quite appropriate for the use as case studies. The multifaceted prevailing

ecological systems in the sub-Saharan area serve as a basis to analyze its local

population within diverse climatic contexts and different living conditions. Long-

lasting and seething civil wars in these regions indicate that there is a connection

between social tensions and climatic changes. A close-up examination of the local

circumstances leads to an affirmation of this assumption. Additionally, it shows

the significance of the ruling political system to climate change and potential for

68 Chabal, Patrick/Daloz, Jean-Pascal: Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument, Indiana 1999, p. 156. 69 ibid, p. 157. 70 Neubert, Dieter: Kulturelle Differenz und soziale Strukturierung in Afrika; in: Karl-Siegbert

(Hrsg.): Soziale Ungleichheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in München, Frankfurt am Main 2006, S. 1639.

71 Arriola, Leonardo: Patronage and Political Stability in Africa; in: Comparative Political Studies, 42 (10), Berkeley 2009, p. 1340.

72 Le Billon, Philipp: The Political Ecology of War. Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts; in: Political Geography 20, Geneva 2001, p. 573.

73 Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke (2002): On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa; in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1), London 2002, p. 14.

22

conflicts. Based on the conditions which sub-Sahara is currently facing, experts

predict that a mere 13% coverage of nutritional demands will be covered by the

year 2050. Therefore, African countries will always be dependent on stable world

markets regardless of their own efforts. 98% of the world’s malnourished

population is living in developing countries. Developing countries are struggling to

overcome starvation and low earnings. Governmental protectionism, conflicts over

water, borders and ground, incalculable price fluctuation, and increasing

migration and famine, all cause a risk of instability. Climate change and migration

are often seen as fields of action in security policy.74

19 ethnic groups consisting of more than 600 subgroups inhabit Sudan and South

Sudan. A majority of the population are dedicated to practice Islam, especially is

this case in the north. However, South Sudan is predominantly Christian

orientated.75 With focus on Darfur, the boundaries between the various ethical

classifications are blurry and numerous nomadic tribes can be found. Therefore,

tensions between the different local persuasions such as Muslims or Christians,

Arabs or African origin happened only rarely in the past.76 Coexistence has been

peaceful and the different tribes not only respected, but also practiced trade with

each other. Economic relationships have always supported an untroubled

cohabitation. Here, the Fur tribe is mainly conducting farming and lives in climate

stabile and profitable areas in the south. During the dry period in the 80s the Fur

sold its cattle to the nomads who are vitally dependent on these herds. However,

with an increase in population and greater extreme weather conditions, tensions

within Darfur’s population started to rise. Climatically caused migration

movements challenged not only the living conditions of both parties the refugees

and receiving society, but also nourish the possibility of armed conflicts between

them.77 Acceptance of climate refugees is, therefore, shaped by and dependent on

social and economic conditions of the host.

74 Scheffran, Jürgen/Vollmer, Ruth: Migration und Klimawandel: Globale Verantwortung der EU

statt Angstdebatte, in: Friedensgutachten 2012, Bonn 2012, p. 214. 75 Biel, Melha/Roth, Maria/Maja, Isaac: Das Scheitern des Zusammenlebens zwischen arabischen

und afrikanischen Stämmen im Sudan, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 9. 76 UNICEF: Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan, Khartoum 2003, p. 50. 77 UNICEF: Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan, Khartoum 2003, p. 53.

23

5.3 Sudan’s political elites

When colonialism ended, political elites attempted to set-up a parliamentary

majority ruled government; however, their attempt to governmental structures

failed as abuse of power and corruption were rampant within the system. This was

not only followed by a national strike, but also failed the coup d'état that aimed to

re-establish economic and political stability. Another military coup was met with

criticism when Colonel Gaafar Mohmed Al-Numeiri established a prohibition of

political parties and an Islamic constitution. When Sharia law was finally

established and Al-Numeiri still continued islamization in today’s South Sudan,

the former south of Sudan, Christian riots were often the outcome. Finally the

escalation in armed conflicts ended the 25 years presidency.78 Greater Islamization

by military means under leadership of Omar Hasan Ahmed Al-Bashir led to the

Islamic Republic of Sudan.79 Desertification as a consequence of the diffusion of

the Sahel causes not only migration movements, but also armed conflicts between

Arabic nomads and African farmers over the usage of diminishing feasible soil.

Fluctuation in power due to ecological migration increased in 2003 making

conflict levels increase when rebellious tribes negotiated with the government to

re-broaden their influence on local political decision making. The National

Congress Party however, worried that with the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement, cooperating tribes could gain too much power and instigated ethnical

cleaning of the respective rebellious villages. The source of the revolt was caused

by marginalization of the local interests and rivalry for natural resources.80 When

the competition between the farmers and nomads over resources was beyond

control, political elites seized the chance to broaden their power curtailing the

riots. Power-politics and self-interest intensified the situation.

Vital natural resources are not only in local demand. Also public elites rely on them

in order to preserve their patronage structures. This is shown in the 1960s when

the Sudanese government purchased fertile soil extensively to broaden

78 Biel, Melha/Roth, Maria/Maja, Isaac: Das Scheitern des Zusammenlebens zwischen arabischen

und afrikanischen Stämmen im Sudan, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 14. 79 Ibid, p. 19. 80 Natsios, Andrew: Beyond Darfur. Sudan´s Slide Toward Civil War, in: Foreign Affairs May/June

2008, NY 2008, p. 2.

24

commercialization of its agrarian economy. Especially the crofter got struck hard

by the policies of minimizing the areas of cultivable land. Thus, pauperization and

famine led to migration into refugee camps or cities and farmers were forced to

work as cheap labor within the commercial agrarian sector.81 Famine,

pauperization, and tensions in society facilitated these governmental plans for

reformation of the agricultural sector - the easy recruitment of cheap labor. The

crucial point that led to these excesses was the individual ambition for power by

Khartoum’s elites, attended by greater profit of the export of agricultural

commodities.

5.4 Ecological effects

The following section will highlight the ecological characteristics and the climatic

conditions in Darfur. The northern topography, with its semi-arid and arid

conditions, is shaped by the Sahel and is way more prone to corrosion due to its

ecological and climatic conditions. Rainfall measurements within recent years

indicate that climatic changes exist in the entire Darfur region. The southern

Savanna, however, is shaped by high-yield soil.82 Comparative observations of

Darfur’s northern and southern regions show not only differences in local climatic

conditions, but also highlight the consequences of climate change. A decrease in

precipitation is measured in all local areas compared to the middle of the last

century. However, the decline in rainfall has not been distributed proportionally.

The northern areas are more threatened by droughts than the south. During the

indicated period, the quantity of rainfall has decreased by around one-third in the

north and, on the other hand, underlies a lowering of about 15 percent in the

south.83 This has resulted in droughts that hinder vegetation reproduction and

cause its dieback; leading in the long-run to degradation of land and explains why

about one-third of Sudanese area has been desertified.84 The Blue Nile area is quite

81 Verhoeven, Harry: The Logic of War and Peace in Sudan; in: Journal of Modern African Studies

49 (04), UK 2011, p. 675. 82 Suliman, Mohamed: Civil War in Sudan. The Impact of Ecological Degradation; in: Baechler,

Günther/Spillman, Kurt (Hrsg.): Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War, Bd. 2, Berlin 1996, p. 141.

83 United Nations Environment Programme: Sudan. Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, Kenia 2007, p. 60.

84 Ibid, p. 62.

25

often striked by floods. Within the last decades, entire populated areas close to the

Nile got destroyed by erosion of the river channel.85

Extreme weather events were documented about 120 times in the 1980s. Within a

period of just 25 years the quantity of those occurrences, rose to 450, measured in

2009. Under these circumstances the World Food Programme adapted to these

menaces and now spends 20 percent of its budget in conventional development

cooperation, while 80 percent of its budget is used for emergency relief and

humanitarian action.86 Populations affected by climate change get completely torn

from their everyday lives and are forced to adapt to new and unknown conditions

within a very short period of time. The increasing consequences of climate change -

storms, droughts, forest fires and floods - do influence temporary meteorological

patterns. This is plainly shown by many flooding events in Africa. Since the

recording of climatic events began in the 1970s the quantity of natural disasters

has been rising constantly.87 Even nowadays almost a half of the African continent

is covered with desert areas or other unprofitable soil.88 Within just twenty years,

desertification led the Sahel area to grow about 30 kilometers south.89 Fragile soil

conditions, especially in those areas, impede agricultural efforts.90 Within the last

couple of years it has turned out that the sensitive but rich ecological system of the

African continent is threatened by degradation of soil. This is especially the case in

Sahel, where the adverse environment is prone to climatic changes. The Sahel

forms a geographical border between the southern savanna and the Sahara, and

contains the countries Senegal, Mauretania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and

the Sudan. In these semi-dry climate areas, the evaporation exceeds the annual

precipitation by more than a half. This leads not only to critical life aggravating

circumstances, but also increases droughts in the near future that will enlarge

85 Ibid, p. 66. 86 Südhoff, Ralf: die Welternährungskrise. Ursachen, Auswirkungen und Lösungsansätze, in:

Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2/2009, p. 50. 87 Weltbank: Weltentwicklungsbericht 2010, Düsseldorf 2010, p. 112. 88 Shah, Mahendra /Fischer, Günther/Van Velthuizen, Harrij: Food Security and Sustainable

Agriculture. The Challenges of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Luxembourg 2008, p. 16.

89 IPCC: Hydropower, NY 2007, p. 439. 90 Hammer, Thomas: Nachhaltige Entwicklung im Lebensraum Sahel. Ein Beitrag zur

Strategietheorie nachhaltiger ländlicher Entwicklung, Münster 1999, p. 154.

26

desert areas and ultimately threats the Sahel. 91 It is debatable that within the next

years droughts will rapidly increase and imagines of the great desertification like

from 1970s - 1990s will be on a daily basis.92 This means that, due to lack of

natural resources, governments will be struggling to compensate for shortages in

food supply.93 Increases in temperature will affect this area broadly. However,

disagreements among scholars on global climate change and its consequences to

the ecological system have been observed in recent years.

5.5 Socio-ecological effects

The following section examines the consequences of global climate change and

climate vulnerability which Sudan and South Sudan are facing, while keeping

economic indications in mind. The population of both countries, Sudan and South

Sudan, is estimated at 47 million. New settlements are constantly formed around

the Nile River and its stolon. Ranked 169 of 187 countries (in comparison – the US

is ranked 4th, Germany places in 9th), the Human Development Index puts both

countries at the bottom of the table when it comes to social, economic, and

political development.94 Only in December 2012, the United Nations included

South Sudan on the list of the Least Developed Countries (LDC), as its

governmental and civil structures and infrastructure are because of its five decades

of long-lasting civil wars and neglect. According to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA), institutional and social reconstruction of the South is directed

to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). For this purpose, South Sudan was

included in the group of the g7+. This group has been initiated with the awareness

that the 18 world’s most fragile states will not meet the criteria of the MDG. A so

called New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States aims at institution building,

peacekeeping, and good governance.95 However, not only is the rate of population

growth within both countries at 2.6 percent the highest worldwide. The Deutsche

Stiftung Weltbevölkerung has estimated that by the end of the 21st century, every

91 WBGU: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel, Berlin/Heidelberg 2007, p. 145. 92 Ibid. 93 Gonzalez, Patrick: Desertification and a Shift of Forest Species in the West African Sahel, in:

Climate Research 17/2001, p. 226. 94 United Nations Environment Programme: Human Development Report 2010, NY 2010, p. 151. 95http://static.squarespace.com/static/5212dafbe4b0348bfd22a511/t/52ae9ac6e4b049a9e1b1c7b

2/1387174598415/South%20Sudan%20Fragility%20Assessment%20Report.pdf (Dec 21)

27

third person will be from the African continent. A continent which is endangered

and dangerous at the same moment, challenging national capabilities. In due

course, its population is called the poorest of the poor.96

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, more than half of the

Sudanese population is employed with agriculture. This shows great vulnerability

to changes in climatic and agricultural conditions, as farming is the main economic

sector, especially in the northern country.97 As agriculture is dependent on

precipitation, it creates big threats not only to farmers, but also to society, local

government, and, in the long-run, to international stability. The consequences of

the great drought in the middle of the 1980s hit around 8.5 million Sudanese

people. The flood disaster seven years ago affected an additional 400,000

people.98 However, a quantitative registration of only climatic caused migration

movements is not fully accurate, since these movements go alongside with those

caused by armed conflicts in the sub-Saharan area. Historically proven, on the

other hand, is the probability of conflicts caused by struggles for natural resources

in Darfur. Most of the conflicts that occurred within the last eight decades are

deeply rooted in issues over water and high-yield soil.99 The average number of

immigrants and IDPs state that about 5.2 million people were affected by climate

change in Sudan only in 2010.

Slow increase in agricultural areas contrasted by rapid increase in population,

agrarian products abused as alternative energy sources, and rising water shortage

are mainly prevailing in the Sub-Saharan and Mediterranean area. In areas that

are already lacking harvest, conflicts over water and nutrition are most likely.100

Developing countries have a strong need for investments in technology and

education, for a fiscal system and rural infrastructure as their politico-economic

and institutional shortfalls are predominantly affected in those areas. Climatic

96 Zakieldeen, Sumaya Ahmend: Adaption to Climate Change. A Vulnerability Assessment for

Sudan; in: Gatekeeper 142, London 2009, p. 4. 97 FAO: Sudan, Italy 2005, p. 2. 98 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters: Sudan Country Profile. Natural Disaster,

Belgium 2012, p. 9. http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile (Feb 23) 99 United Nations Environment Programme: Yearbook 2003, NY 2003, p. 81. 100 Petersen, Lars: Länder im Chaos; in: Y – The German Armed Forces Magazine 08/2012, Berlin

2012, p. 21.

28

conditions are not only strongly linked to agricultural economies, but more

importantly to the living conditions of the African population. Especially in the

southern Sahara, agriculture is of great socio-economic significance.101 In South

Africa, only ten percent of the population is employed within the agricultural

sector; however, in countries like Mozambique and Tanzania, the occupation rate

in the agricultural field lies at about 80 percent. The significance of agrarian

economy differs from country to country,102 however, in Sub-Saharan Africa

farming occupies more than half of its residents.103 Interviewed farmers point-out

that in the east of Africa, the domiciled population, especially the peasant part,

already face the consequences of climate change. In due course, heavy rains and

periods of heat were reported, which greatly reduce harvest. Farmers adapt to dry

seasons with simple available resources. – They exchange traditional crop plants

with resistant strains, cover long distances on foot or minimize the crop area in

order to keep necessary soil irrigation.104 However, the capability to adapt to

climate change varies not only on an individual basis, but also strongly on the

conditions of the political and social environments and prevailing alternatives.

People with low access to education often struggle to overcome the barriers they

face in new, low climatic-based regions, as their knowledge is mostly limited to the

once familiar agrarian situation.105 Already in early stages of development, farmers

ensure the continuation of existing ecological conditions by farming sustainably

and efficiently.106

101 Eriksen, Siri/O´Brien, Karen/Rosentrater, Lynn: Climate Change in Eastern and Southern

Africa. Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaption, Global Environmental Change and Human Security Report 2008, Oslo 2008, p. 14.

102 The World Bank: The World Bank Data. Employment in Agriculture, Washington D.C. 2012. http://data.worldbank.org/about/world-development-indicators-data/agriculture-and-rural-development (Apr 06)

103 Croser, Johanna/Anderson, Kym: Agricultural Distortion in Sub-Sahara Africa. Trade and Welfare Indicators. 1961 to 2004, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5344/ 2010, p. 2.

104 Magrath, John: The Injustice of Climate Change. Voices from Africa; in: Local Environment 15 (9-10), UK 2010, p. 896.

105 Eriksen, Siri/O´Brien, Karen/Rosentrater, Lynn: Climate Change in Eastern and Southern Africa. Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaption, Global Environmental Change and Human Security Report 2008, Oslo 2008, p. 15.

106 Rahmato, Dessalegn: Environmental Change and State Policy in Ethiopia. Lessons from Past Experience, Addis Ababa 2001, p. 70.

29

African food security will be, in the long-run, threatened by decline of local crop

production. Within the next ten years, a 50 percent reduction in crop yields is

anticipated.107 Many people have no choice but to sell their belongings and leave

their familiar surroundings, leading to rural depopulation as well as

impoverishment. Dependency on agrarian economy causes proneness to climatic

changes to the bulk of Africa. Extreme weather conditions such as floods, droughts

and storms may ultimately cause migration to more lucrative grounds.

6 Catalyzer of climatic-induced changes

Extreme weather conditions influence agricultural production; however, in the

most sub-Saharan countries, agriculture has the greatest impact within its

commercial sectors. In the last century, farmers used to adapt agricultural

production to regional as well as national needs and, by doing so, avoided big

starvations during the three year dry period in the 1970s. However, when the

Sudanese government started to modernize its agrarian economy by focusing on

exporting its products, traditional farming collapsed.108 This took mostly place in

unilateral support by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development. In due course, farming areas for their own

living got cut-back in order to broaden soil for commercial farming. This led not

only to determination of traditional subsistence farming, but also increased

society’s vulnerability. This ended in an unexpected famine in the 1980s, flow of

refugees and emergence of slums. With the use of military means, the Sudanese

government tried to counter the consequences of its one-sided and short-sighted

politics. However, the resettlement of its population by the use of force and public

reformation caused significant damage in the traditional way of adaption to

climatic changes.109 The following riots were mainly caused by insufficient

governmental assistance to the Sudanese population, and as a result, about

107 IPCC: Hydropower, NY 2007, p. 436. 108 Suliman, Mohamed: Civil War in Sudan. The Impact of Ecological Degradation; in: Baechler,

Günther/Spillman, Kurt (Hrsg.): Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War, Bd. 2, Berlin 1996, p. 128.

109 Suliman, Mohamed: Civil War in Sudan. The Impact of Ecological Degradation; in: Baechler, Günther/Spillman, Kurt: Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War, Bd. 2, Zürich 1996, p. 130.

30

200,000 died of famine.110 Root causes for the riots were incompetence and

ignorance by the government, as the still ongoing and unlimited quantity of food

exports has shown in retrospect.111

6.1 Institutional passivity

The picture is predominantly the same in many African countries – governmental

intervention in times of crises can hardly be counted on, as administration is often

lacking acceptability or its means are insufficient, especially in rural areas.

Particularly the tribes of the herdsmen require cooperation and agreements with

the local population on the usage of resources, as a spill-over of conflicts from the

local to a higher (national) level means limited access to lucrative soil and thus to

necessary resources itself.112 This is shown in the Sudan as great disputes reduce

access to key resources significantly and, in doing so, fuel ongoing conflicts caused

by climate change.

Not only IDPs, but also the herdsmen tribes, seek shelter in humanitarian camps.

As their traditional role as nomad and stock breeders diminishes, this makes this

group strongly dependent on commercial farming and the government gains

ultimately more influence in society.113 Even though the immigrants in the camps

are often provided a small amount of farmland, this is usually not enough to

sustain themselves. Thus, the residents are forced to make use of natural resources

within the surrounding area and practice farming and hunting illegally. However,

those resources are already demanded by the local population, which leads to

rivalry on natural resources and food.114 Both parties are dependent on natural

resources such as water, soil and wood. The local population perceives the refugees

110 Atta El Moula, Mutasim El Amin: Vulnerability to Famine in the Sahelian Zone of the Sudan.

The Case of Omodiat Burush, Eastern Darfur, Dissertation, Bayreuth 1994, p. 32. 111 Keen, David: The Benefits of Famine. A Political Economy of Famine & Relief in Southwestern

Sudan 1983-89, Princeton, New Jersey 2008, p. 135. 112 Hagmann, Tobias: Fighting in the Desert? Conflict and Resource Management in Eastern Africa

Drylands; in: Péclard, Didier (Hrsg.): Environmental Peacebuilding. Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World, Bern 2009, p. 25.

113 Duffield, Mark: Aid and Complicity. The Case of War-Displaced Southerners in the Northern Sudan; in: Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (01), UK 2002, p. 85.

114 Martin, Adrian: Environmental Conflict Between Refugee and Host Communities; in: Journal of Peace Research 42 (3), UK 2005, p. 336.

31

as threat to their own living conditions, rather than as a part of their society. The

main result is, therefore, the restriction of local natural resources. The local

population’s dependence on these resources increases not only their vulnerability,

but also increases the risk to armed conflicts.115 Social exclusion and classification

of identity are enforced by suspending the refugees from the usage of local

resources outgoing from the local population.116 This shows that the concept of the

enemy is rooted in their own social and ecological situation rather than by an

actual refugee threat.

Migration caused by climate change influences not only the national level. Often

do climate refugees cross international borders and affect neighboring countries. A

deficit of governmental prevalence in the refugee camps leads to violence and bad

living conditions for the refugees.117 Instead of taking responsibility for the camps

host governments often impose restrictive sanctions that additionally worsen

refugees’ situation even more. As a result, refugees’ proactivity such as further

education or occupation is prohibited, and in times of shortfalls of humanitarian

assistance and provision by the camp management such as UNHCR, suffers even

more.118 Inadequate provision leads to lethal tensions over resources within the

host nation’s population and crimes within the camps.

Provision of refugees is mostly conducted by UN organizations such as UNHCR.

Their funds and resources are limited in the long-run, whereas interventions by

the host nation mostly target domestic interests. Not only do restrictive actions to

refugees show passivity and disinterest by the local government, but deepen the

already tensioned social situation between refugees and the local population.

115 Le Billon, Philipp: The Political Ecology of War. Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts; in:

Political Geography 20, Geneva 2001, p. 581. 116 Collier, Paul/Elliot, Lani/Hegre, Håvard: Breaking the Trap. Civil War and Development Policy,

Washington D.C. 2003, p. 60. 117 Crisp, Jeff: A State of Insecurity. The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya´s Refugee Camps;

in: African Affairs 99 (397), UK 2000, p. 616. 118 Milner, James: Refugees and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding; in: Refugee Survey

Quarterly 28 (1), UK 2008, p. 24.

32

6.2 Social identity

When talking about climatically caused migration, both sides, the environmental

and the receiving society, need to be considered. IDP camps are not only artificially

established but cause a change and interference of the receiving nation’s social

fabric. With the establishment of these camps, the refugees are separated socially,

politically, and economically from domestic society. This situation may cause the

perception of the refugees as complete strangers.119 A consequence of

concentrating on the differences within a society is a new determination of

identity. The development of different groups on the basis of coexisting identities

within one territory mostly leads to inter-group conflicts. Character of

identification can be found in religious or ethnic regards. The consideration of the

other party as a complete stranger means not only social exclusion, moreover, it is

a statement of social affiliation and separation. With this, a precondition and

trigger for social conflicts is already set at the beginning.

Refugee and IDP camps aim to offer a secure environment in logistics, medical

treatment, and provision of basic needs. However, gender inequality and sexual

assaults still occur on a daily basis. Some camps in the sub-Sahara got already

three decades ago established and shelter, by now, almost the fourth generation.120

The refugees are still used to their own culture and social habits and thus imprint

and influence the host nation’s local population. The exile socializes not only the

refugees, but also leads to many of them suffering enormously both physically and

mentally from being pulled out of their once familiar and natural environment.121

Local elites do not gain asset on the fled population anymore and social structures

that previously guaranteed security no longer exist in the camps. Especially the

young immigrants are dissatisfied with their social situation; this bears a high risk

to easily become recruited by insurgent groups.122 The Sudan People’s Liberation

Army, for example, often takes advantage of these grievances by offering young

people a possibility to escape from their poverty and integrates them in their

119 Ibid, p. 15. 120 UNHCR: Global Trends 2011, NY 2011, p. 23. 121 Crisp, Jeff: A State of Insecurity. The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya´s Refugee Camps;

in: African Affairs 99 (397), UK 2000, p. 624. 122 Ibid, p. 625.

33

network.123 The low level of education and social grievances in the camps make it

even easier for those rebel networks to recruit new blood.

The people within the camps are in a constant transitional situation and barely

find their place in society. Moreover, they are torn between their traditional

culture and familiar systems and the new unknown situation in the exile. They are

struggling to fully lose their traditional culture, matched with everyday violence in

the camps. The situation immigrants are facing is also affecting and challenging

the host nation’s local population. An ongoing perception of inequality and rivalry

for natural resources means not only social tension between both parties, but often

leads to violence or, in the worst case, to armed conflicts.

7 Counter migration

“Men argue. Nature acts.” Voltaire

The fight against unauthorized immigration into European countries is a constant

issue for western governments and rhetorically equalized with human trafficking

and crime. In due course, immigration becomes a significant value for

Europeanization, the security and migration policy. Along with governmental

organizations, private organizations are now actively involved in the entry process

at European borders to let people through only with a valid visa. The European

agency Frontex is committed to this policy, which coordinates not only

comprehensive patrols, but aims at catching refugees at sea and forcing them to

turn back.124 The selection process of desired, highly qualified workers and tourists

and undesired immigrants is a political decision. To the latter is entry at western

European borders refused. According to NGOs more than 15,000 people died

during the effort to reach the EU between 1988 and 2009. More than 10,000

drowned in the Atlantic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea, the other got deported or

living now in primitive western reception camps.125

123 Collier, Paul/Elliot, Lani/Hegre, Håvard: Breaking the Trap. Civil War and Development

Policy, Washington D.C. 2003, p. 68. 124 Laitinen, Ilka: Frontex and African Illegal Migration to Europe, in: Africa and Fortress Europe,

UK 2007, p. 128. 125 www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-167-arab-spring-med.pdf. (Nov 17)

34

Migration has always been a feasible reaction to political, climate or economic

changes to soften risks for both the emigrants and the communities of the country

of origin. In doing so, emigrant networks have to be seen as self-dependent acting

parties, seeking better circumstances. Migration is the conditio sine qua non to

feed the family, avert dangers, and to realize individual lifestyle concepts while

threatened by changing conditions in climate, political or social dimensions. To

not let people be forced to flee the consequences of climate change, it is essential to

combat its roots. In doing so, it is vital to herald the exit from nuclear and fossil-

fuel energy to low environmental impact and renewable resources. Industrialized

countries have to face their responsibilities in due course. Additionally, external

migration should be considered as legitimate adaption strategy to climate change.

It is necessary to establish adequate entry methods as well as protection from

exploitation and lack of rights, whereby illegal immigration will be limited more

effectively. The promotion of human rights must neither be depending on the

country of origin nor the individual persons’ status.

7.1 Politics and climate change

“The question whether we will have the courage to act before it's too late. And how we answer will have a profound impact on the world that we leave behind not just to you, but to your children and to your grandchildren. As a president, as a father and as an American, I'm here to say we need to act,”126

Even though this excerpt is from a speech by the U.S. president at Georgetown

University, Washington D.C., under the same man America was facing “the

warmest year in history, 2012, featuring a summer so hot that corn couldn't grow

across much of the richest farmland on the planet. We've seen the lowest

barometric pressure ever recorded north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, and the

largest wind field ever measured, both caused by Hurricane Sandy. We've watched

the Arctic melt, losing three quarters of its summer sea ice. We've seen some of the

largest fires ever recorded in the mountains of California, Colorado and New

Mexico. And not just there, of course – his term has seen unprecedented droughts

126 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change (Feb 28)

35

and floods around the world. The typhoon that just hit the Philippines, according

to some meteorologists, had higher wind speeds at landfall than any we have ever

seen before.”127 The surplus of mined coal producing western nations do not need

is ending-up “overseas”. Meaning in Europe, South Korea, and in China. And when

it gets there, it slows the move to cleaner forms of energy.128 Until now planet

earth’s temperature rose slightly below 1 degree Celsius – 0.8 degrees Celsius, to

be precise. For this, we are already currently facing great consequences – “a third

of summer sea ice in the Arctic is gone, the oceans are 30 percent more acidic, and

since warm air holds more water vapor than cold, the atmosphere over the oceans

is a shocking five percent wetter, loading the dice for devastating floods.”129 Even

though the several weeks long 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen was a

crucial event where the world’s leading nations came together to agree on keeping

the earth's temperature from rising more than two degrees Celsius in total, the

conference, however has been aptly described as “the Munich of our times.”130

Again, the key players on climate change did not come to a binding resolution

including obligatory sanctions. Economic power, leadership, and greed explain

why the big fossil-fuel companies have fought by any means possible to prevent a

regulation of carbon dioxide. “There is no supranational organization that can

order sovereign states to emit lower amounts of greenhouse gases than they think

reasonable. The same is true of river pollution, dam construction or deforestation.

Nor is there an international monopoly of forces that can sanction individual

countries.”131 However, raising the earth’s temperature about two degrees is simply

insane, as the World Bank's chief biodiversity adviser Thomas Lovejoy puts it: “If

we're seeing what we're seeing today at 0.8 degrees Celsius, two degrees is simply

too much.”132 NASA’s well-known climatologist James Hansen confirms that “the

target that has been talked about in international negotiations for two degrees of

127 http://www.salon.com/2013/12/17/bill_mckibben_obama_made_climate_change_worse/ (Dec 28) 128 http://activistnewsletter.blogspot.se/2014/01/1-5-14-activist-newsletter.html (Feb 21) 129http://www.neaq.org/conservation_and_research/climate_change/climate_change_and_the_

oceans.php (Feb 21) 130 http://www.ecc-

platform.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2099&Itemid=157 (Jan 16)

131 Welzer, Harald: Climate Wars, UK 2012, p. 167. 132 McKibben, Bill: Oil and Honey – The Education of an Unlikely Activist, New York 2013, p. 79.

36

warming is actually a prescription for long-term disaster.”133 Nowadays threatened

countries fear that they would not survive a raise of two degrees Celsius in global

temperature. Some nations, especially those on small islands would then simply

disappear. Some scientists claim that two degrees would represent a suicide pact

for drought-infested Africa - "one degree, one Africa."134 They go on that in order

to not overrun the two degrees limit by the middle of this century earth just may

cope with a further pollution of roughly five and a half gigatons of carbon dioxide.

However, world economics currently predicted to burn almost the fivefold by this

time. This new number - 3,000 gigatons of fossil fuels - is five times higher, which

clearly poses a big problem. This means burning five times as much as healthy for

our eco-system. Corinne Le Quéré of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change

Research prognosis a dark future for development, the likelihood of climatic

caused conflicts, and world’s security. “The trend is perfectly in line with a

temperature increase of about six degrees which would create a planet straight out

of science fiction.”135

Germany is one among view countries that puts efforts in alternative energy

sources. In due course, they generated almost half of its power from solar panels

and wind turbines. This example shows that technologies, so far, reached an

adequate level to solve the world’s problem.136 But we still lack the will. So far,

Germany is a lone wolf, the trend is ever more carbon. And even though Germany

is going quite green, its coal-use recently reached the highest level since the 1990s.

Its energy policy is double tracked driven – “maintaining commitments to green

energy while also controlling the costs and protecting economic

competitiveness.”137 The decision by Andrea Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, to

phase out nuclear power plants simply left a huge gap that only fossil fuels could

quickly fill.

133 Tekeuchi, Kazuhiko: Leading to Copenhagen: forging global solidarity; in: East Asia Forum

Quarterly, Oct-Dec 2009, p. 17. 134 McKibben, Bill: Oil and Honey – The Education of an Unlikely Activist, New York 2013, p. 132. 135 http://c-minus.com/trends/article/money-time-and-will-the-perilous-climate-change-reality-

that-we-choose-to-ignore/ (March 19) 136 http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/08/22/2508191/germany-solar-generation-record/ (Dec 19) 137 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6470600-77bf-11e3-807e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz30py50xDk (Feb 22)

37

7.2 Strategic cooperation – EU’s input

The European Union supports not only humanitarian projects with payments of

111 million Euros. A vital focus has been, in addition, on developments with

payments of 285 million Euros to improve education, food, and health systems.

José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, says:

“There is no time to be lost to leave behind the one-sided donor-recipient relationship. We do have to come to a responsible partnership between each other respecting parties. Parties, based on political dialogue to reach the millennium development goals by adequate and precise cooperation”,

and calls for a fundamental change in EU-African relations.138 The African

continent, he continues, has great capabilities to contribute to the nowadays

international political agenda. Growing international interest, which might lead to

business competition in the future, is a positive omen for our neighboring

continent – if this takes place coherently, responsibly, and transparently for the

collective African good. In this regard it is important to stress that there is no

sustainable development without good governance.139 Sustainability can only be

ensured if receiving nations act responsible and development-oriented. However,

it has not been gone unnoticed that the African continent made progress in

governance within the last decade.140 One recent example is the ratification of the

Rome Statute, the treaty of the International Criminal Court, by more than half of

the African states. The previous identification may surprise western people as they

mostly have incomplete and excessive pictures of humanitarian disasters and

natural catastrophes in their minds when thinking about Africa, spread by political

players, media, and society. Of course there are serious grievances like armed

conflicts, migration, starvation, and diseases, however, positive trends are mostly

disregarded by the west. Democratic elections and governmental changes,

economic growth, as well as decrease in civil wars are positive trends currently

occurring in Africa, indicating that Africa’s potential is not fully tapped yet.

Budget support by the west is essential in issues where Africa does have serious

needs to strengthen its capacities on transparent and efficient governance. In this

138 EU-Afrika Gipfel, Lissabon 2007. 139 BMZ: Gute Regierungsführung konkret, Berlin 2012, p. 21. 140 The Economist: A hopeful continent, March 2nd 2013.

38

regard, the European Commission is supporting good governance by helping

others to help themselves - autonomous learning and collegial collaboration at the

regional level. In doing so, the receiving countries will be able to independently

take over the responsibilities of public administration such as education,

administration, culture, law and justice, as well as health care services. However,

the challenges are huge; Africa’s paradox is a rich continent with a quite poor

population.141 Africa lags behind the rest of the world on its way to meeting the

millennium goals.142 The complexity of problems is shown in its entirety, as this

continent, for example, exploits only seven percent of its hydro power resources,

and only ten percent of its population in the Sub-Saharan area has access to

electricity. Although the European Commission initialized an alliance and funds to

counter climate change in 2006, its cumulative consequences will, for sure, still

affect Africa’s development. Continual desertification and sudden flooding in the

previous years are only two signs of this alarming phenomenon. Europe has to

anticipate these changes by broadening its humanitarian assistance internationally

and investing money and effort in the prevention of natural disasters. Migration is

a complex and broad issue that requires a global approach, including frontier-

defense, security, law and justice, as well as developing politics.143

7.3 Good Governance

Climate change could produce a lot of misery and waste without necessarily leading to large-scale armed conflict, which depends more on ideology and bad governance than on resource scarcity.

Steven Pinker

The local population is not the only ones who suffer in the areas where states are

falling. In places where lawlessness becomes the norm, doors are open for illicit

trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs. Moreover, these places are breeding

141 The Economist: A hopeful continent, March 2nd 2013. 142 United Nations Environment Programme: Human Development Report 2010, NY 2010, p. 151. 143 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-

approach-to-migration/index_en.htm (Feb 17)

39

areas for terrorism. Fragile states hold a great threat to national and international

security.144

Since the 1990s the concept of Good Governance is vital to enable sustainable

development and combat poverty.145 As Kofi A. Annan once put it “Good

Governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and

promoting development.”146 It is the exercise of economic, political, and

administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. As “governance”

is the process of decision-making perceived, focused on societies at the national,

regional and local level.147 Developing countries and countries in transition are

oftentimes assisted by the international community. It is out of question that

strengthening of subnational governments and administrations is vital in order to

overcome domestic problems and bad governance. Within its efforts to assist, the

international community has to consider the roles of public elites and vital core

groups. It is up to the local population to adjudicate on its political authority and

leaders. In doing so, the latitude of intervening parties has to be framed by

understanding of the local context, history, culture and politics. Here, it is

important to mention that what we assume as “good” governance is not always

shared by other cultures and authorities.148 However, as Germany’s former

minister of defense, Thomas de Maiziére once admitted, “Within international

military deployment own national values still have to be considered. German

politics is both, driven by national interests and values.”149 In this context it is

important to know, military efforts are primarily being used in order to support a

higher nationally driven aim. At the close second, it ‘can’, however, also be used to

achieve civilian aims.150

144http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/AktuelleArtikel/120919_Fragile_Staaten_

node.html (Apr 19) 145 www.uno.de/sg/millennium/millenniumerklaerung.pdf (Nov 27) 146 http://www.ifpri.org/publication/improving-governance-eradicate-hunger-and-poverty (Jan 13) 147 CCOE: Good Governance Makes Sense, Netherlands 2012, p. 12. 148 CCOE: Good Governance Makes Sense, Netherlands 2012, p. 18. 149 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik 2010,

Berlin Januar/Februar 2010, p. 23. 150 CCOE: Good Governance Makes Sense, Netherlands 2012, p. 14.

40

Everywhere on the African continent centralist governmental structures are

receding – state apparatus get smaller, public services privatized and

governmental duties and responsibilities to combat domestic poverty redefined. At

the same time, however, state monopoly of power is still inefficient and

underdeveloped.151 The increasing complexity of globalization requires

governmental structures with fully developed public and private capacities.

Structures that promote performance and norm-oriented actions. Not only in

Africa, but worldwide. In a marked-orientated world it is the government that has

to meet vital obligations, on national as well as international level. Here, the

concept of Good Governance offers an adequate framework for institutional

structures. Good Governance is mainly about the promotion of governmental

institutions to enable sufficient and adequate governance and administration. In

doing so, the international community assists to decentralize governmental

structures and promote local self-administration of particular states.

Decentralizing means the assignment and break down of responsibilities and

duties to a subnational level, as prevalent in almost all western societies. By the

reason that adequate governmental implementation requires a fair basis of

capabilities.152 As failed and failing states often lack acceptability by their citizen, a

breakdown of power to the subnational level is sine qua not to (re-)gain social and

public acceptance and the necessary capacity to act. Decentralization of

governmental structures means an institutional and social change in order to

reestablish the relationship on governmental and administrative arrangements.

Further between citizen and state. The aim of decentralization within this concept

is the improvement of particular conditions to overcome domestic grievances such

as low healthcare, education, income, vulnerability and public votes.153 These days

Good Governance is more important than ever; with the increase of foreign aid and

individual responsibility of the receiving countries the chances to corruption and

embezzlement are on a maximum.

151 Mehler, Andreas: Governance in Africa. Ein Diskussionspapier für die GTZ, Eschborn 2004, p. 2. 152 BMZ: Positionspapier – Dezentralisierung, Bonn 2003. 153 Fuhr, Harald: Dezentralisierung. Beitrag zur Demokratisierung und Armutsbekämpfung, non-

published document, Eschborn 2004.

41

7.4 German military contribution

A well balanced, inclusive approach, according to certain standards and ideals, is essential for the proper governance of any country.

Laisenia Qarase

“Once warfare is connected to both development and diplomacy, strategic and

tactical military decisions can have a lasting impact on long-term objectives.”154

Recently, a vast majority of the German Bundestag agreed on a further

involvement of its federal armed forces in multinational peacekeeping missions.

Currently, this means mainly the UNAMID (United Nations African Union Mission

in Darfur) and UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan as successor of

UN’s mission in the Sudan, UNMIS). Those missions do not only observe

ceasefires, but actively support nation building and Good Governance in crucial

states. In addition, these peace operations provide security to civilians and

humanitarian aid workers. Only in 2010 and 2011, twelve members of NGOs got

killed, five kidnapped within the UNAMID. UN operations are not, as Kerstin

Müller from Germany’s green party says, a guarantor to peace. However,

international involvement is a precondition to stand a chance to national

development.155 Controlled and evolving development is seen as basis to stabile

peace in the (South) Sudan region. Dr. Axel Krohn from the Bundeswehr

Command and Staff College, the German Federal Armed Forces’ highest training

school, outlines three greater motives of the German Africa involvement: the set-

up of a peace and security architecture, police cooperation, and combating causes

of national conflicts. The German commitment is based on deployment of its

highly specialized military units, so called ‘functional specialists’ in Civil-Military

Cooperation (CIMIC), from the Civil-Military Cooperation Competence Centre,

Nienburg (Zentrum ZMZBw). These troops are constantly deployed in

multinational military operations, under the umbrella of UN, EU or NATO. One of

CIMIC’s core purposes is the coordination of civilian and military activities in the

field. As numerous multilateral parties are engaged in development aid, these

154 Travers, Patrick/Taylor, Owen: Canada in Afghanistan: Between Metaphor and Strategy, in:

International Journal, Toronto 2008, p. 689. 155 http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/parlament/bundestagsreden/2012/oktober/fortsetzung-des-

unmiss-einsatzes_ID_4385977.html (Nov 30)

42

actors establish often similar programs due to lacks of consultation and

information exchange. The purpose of these peace missions is not only promotion

of African’s peace and security architecture and the bolstering of sub regional

organizations, but the support of the African Union, that is still lacking

infrastructure and is financially weak. Germany’s military diplomacy, policy,

educational endowment and military equipment are only seen as vital means to

successful and fruitful assistance in Africa. Deployments of its Military Observers

and, of course, involvement in military missions itself are key factors too.156

7.5 Every day challenges

But precisely because I expect little of the human condition, man’s periods of felicity, his partial progress, his efforts to begin over again and to continue, all seem to me like so many prodigies which nearly compensate for the monstrous mass of ills and defeats, of indifference and error. Catastrophe and ruin will come; disorder will triumph, but order will too, from time to time.

Marguerite Yourcenar

The beforehand mentioned fivefold amount of carbon dioxide is, of course, not dug

yet, however, already included into governments’ and companies’ prospective

accountings and assets. It is, therefore, literally already economically pumped. The

world’s economic parties based “their budgets on the presumed returns from their

patrimony. Those reserves are their primary asset, the holding that gives their

companies their value. If they couldn't pump out their reserves, the value of their

companies would crash.”157 It is simply impossible to have both at the same time, a

relatively healthy planet and an adequate fossil-fuel balanced sheet. If we keep

polluting and digging in quantity and quality as we do nowadays the emissions

limit of five and a half gigatons of fuels will already be reached within the next 16

years; around “the time today's preschoolers will be graduating from high

school.”158 If we really do so the investors will do fine, the planet, however, will

kicks the bucket. This industry, and this industry alone, holds the power to our 156 Interview (German) with COL Wolfgang Paulik, Commander Zentr ZMZBw, Nienburg, March

08th 2014, transcript on request. 157 Berners-Lee, Mike/Clark, Duncan: the Burning Question. We can’t burn half of the world’s oil,

coal and gas. So how do we quit? London 2013, p. 4. 158 http://earth-humanrelation.blogspot.se/2012_08_01_archive.html (March 15)

43

world’s future and they are likely to use it. To combat global warming means to

keep natural reserves in the ground which would, of course, cost governments and

companies’ money. It is, therefore, a problem of greed.159 Most of our society is not

particularly keen on changing the habits of their usual lifestyle; to abstain from

luxury manner, to give-up the familiar and easy way of mankind – meaning to go

green and to respect the environment. Who does not like cheap flights to warm

places? As the entire society is actually benefiting from exhausting natural

resources, to combat climate change is

“like trying to build a movement against yourself – it is as if the gay-rights movement had to be constructed entirely from evangelical preachers, or the abolition movement from slaveholders. Given a hundred years, you could conceivably change lifestyles enough to matter – but time is precisely what we lack.”160

Canada signed the 1997 Kyoto treaty in order to cut its emissions on the agreed

level to reach the millennium development goals; recently, however, they withdrew

from this less stringent voluntary document. As the multinational nation failed to

meet Kyoto’s agreements, they withdrew before facing respective fines. The U.S.,

moreover, blamed the industrializing countries such as China and India for being

reluctant to take necessary actions on serious changes also the global financial

crisis is to be responsible for that dilemma.161 “Can one really suppose that things

will take a turn for the better? As climate effects become more extensive and visible

and as hunger, migration and violence grow in intensity, the pressure to find

solutions will be more acute and the space for reflection narrower. The likelihood

of irrational and counter-productive strategies will become greater, especially in

relation to the problems of violence exacerbated by climate change.”162

159 http://climatebuddies.org/blog/page/3/ (Feb 04) 160 Harden, Joel D.: Quiet No More. New Political Activism in Canada and Around the Globe,

Toronto 2013, p. 60. 161 Ibid. 162 Welzer, Harald: Climate Wars, UK 2012, p. 181.

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8 Conclusion

One of the essential elements of government responsibility is to communicate effectively to the people, especially in time of a potential terrorist attack or a natural disaster.

Vito Fossella

Climate change and its consequences are not only predictable in sub-Saharan

Africa, but have started to challenge governments and societies worldwide.

Keeping for example a focus on Sudan and its various climate zones shows that the

impact of global warming to ecological systems do vary within different climatic

conditions. Sudan’s south offers a wet savanna, while the north is rather shaped by

arid and semi-arid conditions: Thus, both zones react differently to changes in

their ecological systems. The vulnerability of social structures and the population’s

living conditions results from its level of dependency on the agrarian economy.

Subsistence economy occupies more than half of the Sudanese and South

Sudanese population and farmers have been adapted to its environment and

particular conditions, including migration to fertile soils. In due course, during the

annual dry seasons, the nomad herdsmen move to the south where they face

calmer conditions. In this context, traditional structures and mechanisms within

the tribes conciliate probable conflicts with the host population when they

immigrate seasonally. However, economic correlations are vital to peaceful

cooperation. The quantitative exploitation of soil plays a sensitive factor in the

Sudanese society, especially since the country has the world’s fastest population

growth. Due to its increase in population, the ecological balance became unsettled;

the population in the affected areas perceives these limitations in resources and

environment more and more as a threat which makes armed conflicts more likely.

The paper on Climate Change and International Security by the European

Commission’s states environmental migration as one of seven global threats to

security.163 Countries in the sub Saharan area, which are already affected by the

lack of water resources, are even more at risk due to the increase of dependency on

imports for food and inflated prices. Droughts are not only challenging the poor,

163 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/99387.pdf (nov 16)

45

but impose a threat to human security generally. Poor people, however, are facing

the dilemma of whether to emigrate from their homeland into the cities’ slums to

seek a new life or to stay and face aggravation. The worsening of human security

causes not only local and international threats to security, but also leads to

conflicts over food, water, and fertile soil.164

Climate change as a global threat to security:

Shortly after Sudan’s independence in January 2011, elites tried to push the

already started Islamization of the country, which was met with criticism and led

ultimately to marginalization of other religious groups. This partisanship and

rejection of other religious identities increased the already existing local conflicts

to a higher degree. Aggravation and delimitation of the use of force in its quantity

164 Brauch, Hans Günter: From a security towards a survival dilemma, in: Globalization and

environmental challenges, Berlin 2008, p. 548.

Global change

Local availability of

water

Local water crisis

Destabilization and

conflicts

Violence/lethal use of

force

1 Dynamics of demand: -Population: growth, migration -Economy: industry, agriculture, domestic homes

2 Water management: -Financial/technically capacities -Right of use -Water policy

6 Interstate water regime: -quality/stability -confidence building -international affairs

4 Political stability/governance: -supply of public goods -law enforcement -willingness to int. cooperation

5 Social structure: -social disparities -history of conflicts -culture of participation

3 Water management: adaption to climate change: -evaluation/monitoring -dealing with insecurity -growing resilience of water management

46

and quality were fueled by Karthum’s support of Arabic militias and, on the other

side, the mobilization of rebel groups by the SPLA. A logical consequence was not

only the threatening of traditional social structures, the fragmentation of society

and armed conflicts, but the broadening to a national level including the whole

Sudanese government. In addition to climatic changes, low governmental presence

and incompetence challenge mediation of social conflicts. The given example on

the Sudan highlights possible negative impacts of interventions and reforms within

climate issues by both the government and its elites. The probability of armed

conflicts is strongly linked to a government’s capacity and willingness and

increases as governmental actions decrease. The described connection of public

elites and their influence to the degree of social conflicts emphasizes governmental

obligations and responsibilities to climate change.

The armed waging of tensions and competition for natural resources due to

environmental migration is territorially limited to its region of origin and rarely

rises to the national level. Even though the presence of governmental institutions

that are put in place to reconcile conflicts peacefully is quite low, environmental

disputes nearly never challenge a nation’s entire stability. Instead, governmental

interventions and reforms of traditional structures and cultures catalyze local

tensions and conflicts, as shown with the reformation of the agricultural sector in

northern Sudan. The accumulation of power by public elites is, mostly, a result of

the strong connection between national, local, public and political elites, promoted

by a social culture based on give-and-take and exchange. Thus, elites hold an

outstanding position in the typical African patronage-society.

The use of solar power stations in desert areas is still being launched.165 However,

photovoltaic stations may lead, in the medium-term, to attractive alternatives. Also

solar-powered desalination plants may contribute to bypass the absurd prices for

gas and oil. Intensified usage of renewable and alternative energy sources in arid

environments may offer various new bases for life and, thus, an economic solution

for national and international human security. In the middle and long-run those

165 Faiman, David: solar energy on a global scale: its impact on security, in: Facing global

environmental change: environmental, human, energy, food, health and water security concepts, the Hague 2009, p. 402.

47

techniques lower not only the competitive environment to access and monitoring

of fossil fuels, but are also income-producing for countries with weak energy

reserves.

Mental frameworks have a huge impact in terms of justifying violence. In the past,

the cases of Yugoslavia via Nazi Germany or Rwanda display how a mentality of

the “Us” and “Them” allows groups to murder each other. Here, perception and

framing are the apparatus enabling such violence and constitute the frame of social

violence. Today, over-crowding along with the use of metaphors and rabble-

rousing attack in discourses and social tensions create the necessary frame of

reference allowing violent conflicts. Along this, climate change reveals the

injustices that are inherent between developed and developing countries in dealing

with its effects. Combining a historical approach to understand current and

possible future processes leading to violence is, as clarified by authors such as

Diamond (2005)166 or Fukuyama (2006)167, a relevant way to forecast the effect

that climate change might have on future societies. Looking at the future, a global

increase in low intensity armed conflicts and increased climate change are likely to

create a new kind of violence that will challenge our western mental models.

Salient challenges in terms of security, responsibility and justice. People already

affected by unemployment, low level of healthcare, or social exclusion will become

even more threatened by the consequences of climate change. This will, in the

long-run, cause big migration flows within western or just neighboring countries.

Countries affected by climate change claim most likely for international acceptance

of the phenomenon of environmental migration. Migration may increasingly lead

to conflicts within the transit- as well as the countries of destination. Europe has to

prepare for a high pressure due to migration.

166 Diamond, Jared: How societies choose to fail or succeed, New York 2005. 167 Fukuyama, Francis: The end of history and the last man, New York 2006.

48

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55

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9.2 Interview

Interview (German) with COL Wolfgang Paulik, Commander Zentr ZMZBw, Nienburg, March 08th 2014, transcript on request.