Carmen Collado Solís Human Settlements in Development – Final Assignment – 2015

CARACAS SLUM-UPGRADING PROJECT [CAMEBA1]

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Short description

The Caracas Slum Upgrading Project (CAMEBA), financed by the World Bank and the Government of Venezuela; it

is a project on poverty reduction, human settlement development and Environmentally Sustainable Development.

It aimed to improve quality of life for the inhabitants of two agglomerations: Petare Norte and La Vega, located in

the municipalities of Sucre and Libertador respectively. Together, they contained twelve barrios and a target

population of 184,000 at the beginning of the project (World Bank, 1998). The project integrated three components:

(i) urban upgrading, which includes the design and execution of roads, potable water, sanitation and electricity

infrastructure, and new housing for resettlement of buildings in risk areas; (ii) institutional development; for

financing of the operational costs of the Project Management Unit (PMU); including monitoring and evaluation;

plus technical assistance and ‘capacity building’ in several areas; and finally (iii) a micro-credit pilot project for

housing upgrade, which eventually was not implemented due to difficulties in the political and institutional

environment.

In general, the project achieved most of the goals settled at the beginning. It improved the infrastructure and living

conditions of over 115,000 people and provided new technical tools and information systems (like the cadaster

system), that helped the municipalities in its later work. However, it is questionable if the project was “community-

driven” and “sustainable”. There were also some externalities and execution issues that provoke significant changes

and delays in the final output of this U$ 152.90 million’ project.

1 Proyecto Caracas Mejoramiento de los Barrios. 2 Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Fomento Municipal (Foundation for Community Development and Municipal Promotion).

BASIC PROJECT DATA:

Initiator: Government of Venezuela

Architect: N/A [Executor: FUNDACOMUN2 ]

Other partners/ actors involved: World Bank

Name: Caracas Slum Upgrading Project

Place: Caracas, Venezuela

Date: 1999-2006

Number of residents/ users catered for:

118,000

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Site

Caracas is a large city, located in a valley surrounded by the Avila

mountain range to the north, separating it from the Caribbean Sea. Due

to these geographical conditions, it lacks flat land for urban

development; and the informal settlements rise on the hillsides in the

urban periphery; where there is high risk to natural disasters and no (or

very limited) access to basic infrastructure services.

Petare Norte and La Vega are two agglomerations part of the

Metropolitan Area of Caracas (MAC) representative of this situation.

Both cover an area of 52.64 km2 and contain twelve distinct barrios with

a total population of 496,479 (INE3, 2011), that at the beginning of the

project represented 15% of the total barrio population in Caracas

(World Bank, 2007).

Historical background

Venezuela is one of the most urbanized countries in Latin America,

with 87% of its total population living in cities (GUTLAB, 2012). Here,

the wave of country-city migration between the 1950-80,

corresponded with an expansion of unplanned settlements in the

capital city. These informal settlements are characterized by a chronic

lack of basic infrastructure and services, like water and sanitation,

electricity and roads. Additionally, the housing is usually built in

environmentally fragile unstable areas (natural risk zones) and

commonly there is no legal tenure to the land that the people occupy.

Simultaneously, the political crisis of the 1980’s and the deterioration

of the economic model developed to date, stimulated more

decentralized forms of government (De la Cruz, 1995; Jungemann,

1996; in Paiva, 2001). One specific important change in the institutional

framework was the creation of the MAC as “a new legal and formal

addition as an intermediate level of government” (Paiva, 2001:12).

From this background, the government started implementing policy

and program initiatives, like the Low-Income Barrios Improvement

Project (PROMUEBA4) from 1993 to 1998, co-financed by the World

Bank. In 1994, the Ministry of Urban Development (MINDUR), unveiled

a new urban poverty strategy specifically for Caracas. The strategy

includes a ‘Plan Sectorial’5 of Incorporation to the Urban Structure of

the Barrios Zones of the MAC. The Plan aimed for physical upgrading

of the squatter settlements and their incorporation to the formal

sector. It called for urbanization at large scale – due to the risk

mitigation required – and small scale – due to the resettlements

required for the infrastructure works execution. When it was designed,

the Plan had an estimated cost of U$ 2.45 billion with an

3 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics). 4 Proyecto de Mejoramiento Urbano de Barrios (Project of Urban Improvement of Barrios). 5 Sector Plan.

Figure 2_ A: Petare Norte and B: La Vega/ Source: Bing Maps.

Figure 4_ Interior of an informal dwelling of Petare Norte/ Source: http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/21136/analisis-en-los-barrios-esta-el-desafio-para-reeleccion-de-chavez/

Figure 3_Social Environment in MAC/ Source: http://guttlab.com/guttlab-01-minnesota-usa/2-informal-settlements-analysis/

implementation time of 20 years. In this context, the proposal of

CAMEBA was developed; and the World Bank (1998) argues that the

conceptual framework of the project and its components were

designed in congruence with the guidelines of this Plan Sectorial and

with the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Venezuela,

discussed on 1997.

Architect

For this project, there was no specific architect-designer of the

proposal and its implementation. Instead, there were many multi-

disciplinary work teams headed by a governmental agency leading the

execution: FUNDACOMUN6. Its task was to manage the resources to

complete the objectives of project management and coordination. It

also was in charge of stablishing the overall policies, execution

strategies, coordination and evaluation of the project.

Many planning firms were hired in order to develop the interventions at

the barrio level. One of these groups was the local firm “Arqui5”, which

developed urban-upgrading proposals for 3 neighborhoods (San Rafael

Unido and Los Cangilones in La Vega, and Julián Blanco in Petare

Norte). Integrated by a group of planners, they define their work goals

as the search for sustainable development through urban interventions

with physical and social impact (ARQUI 5, 2007). They were responsible

for designing the specific mobility, sewage and lightning proposals for

these neighborhoods. The design team also worked as a bridge

between the technicians and the community, because they had to

validate their proposals with the neighborhoods through workshops,

and translate these proposals into concrete interventions that could be

physically developed by the contractors hired by FUNDACOMUN.

Description

The Design of the Project

The initial stage was a preparation phase where a social assessment was

conducted to identify the more important issues for the barrios. In all

the barrios, the top priorities identified by community residents were:

(1) safety; (2) water system improvement; (3) sewage system

improvement; (4) improvement of access to barrios from formal city

areas; and (5) improved pedestrian/ vehicular access (Francis, 2007).

Based on this, the following project objective was settled: “to improve

the quality of life of those living in the informal settlements (barrios) of

the MAC through the development and implementation of a long

term, community driven and sustainable barrio improvement

program” (World Bank, 1998:2).

6 FUNDACOMUN is a semi-autonomous agency created by the government of Venezuela in 1961-2, with the purpose of working with the municipalities in improving conditions in the barrio areas (Childers, 1981).

Figure 8_ View of barrio 24 de marzo in Petare/ Source: https://relatosdepetare.wordpress.com

Figure 6_ typical stairs in La Vega/ Source: http://rsvenezuela.wordpress.com/2009/05/03/una-fabrica-de-oportunidades-en-la-vega/

Figure 5_View of an informal dwelling in risk area of Petare Norte/ Source: http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/21136/analisis-en-los-barrios-esta-el-desafio-para-reeleccion-de-chavez/

Figure 7_Water supply in the hillsides at the beginning of the project/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

INFORMAL | FORMAL

Other key aspects that shaped the proposal where: community

participation and decentralization. The first component was included

because there was the assumption that the involvement of the

community in the decision making would provide a sense of ownership

over the project. Furthermore, that the community participation in the

management and execution of the project works would ensure

sustainability in the process and easier cost-recovery. It was also

assumed that decentralization of the basic infrastructure would

increase accountability and consequently would improve the

governmental institutions’ service quality (World Bank, 1998).

The actors involved in the execution of the intervention

Despite the municipal responsibility of barrio improvement and the fact

that municipal governments are more aware of the needs of their

inhabitants; the project was not assigned to the municipalities of Sucre

and Libertador; but to FUNDACOMUN. This because the municipalities

did not have the experience and the required technical capacity [and

trust] to manage such an ambitious and large scale project.

Nonetheless, cooperative relationships were established with this

municipalities in the context of the project. Also, cooperation

agreements were signed with Miranda State, INAVI7, CONAVI8, and

HIDROCAPITAL9 among others, to get a deep collaboration and

institutional strengthening. In order to manage the task of

implementing CAMEBA, an institutional framework was settled:

7 Instituto Nacional para la Vivienda (National Housing Institute). 8 Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda (National Housing Council). 9 Operadora de Acueductos del Distrito Capital y estados Vargas y Miranda (Operating Aqueduct for Capital District and Miranda and Vargas states)

Advice

Assist

FUNDACOMUN Strategic planning entity.

Role: budget and resource allocation and funding

provision.

Project

Management

Unit (PMU)

Responsible for the daily coordination and

administration of the project.

Technical

Commission

Project technical assistance + procurement-contracting administration and project administration

Physical Planning

Units (UPF-PMU)

Management tasks and coordination of activities at

the neighborhood level.

Like: Resettlement for community residents. Land titling and, Environmental projects

Local Design

Offices (LDOs)

and Local Co-

Management

Groups

Assist the communities in the design and implementation of neighborhood improvement plans (NIP) and serves as representative body for community members.

Provides Advice

Consultive

Committe

Figure 9_Visits of technical team to neighborhoods/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

Figure 10_ Presentation of CAMEBA to a group of inhabitants/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

Political, Economic and Institutional Challenges

The project dealt with a series of political, economic and institutional

barriers that influenced its execution and scope. The first element was

the governmental transition. The first year of its implementation

coincided with the new government of Hugo Chavez10. This one was

focused on constitutional reforms and initially saw the project as a

program of the previous administration. Therefore, there was little

support to start its operation, and its implementation started 1 year

after the loan approval (World Bank, 2007; Francis, 2007); mostly

motivated by the landslides and flooding in Vargas state, where the

government reconfigured the project to address emergency urban

upgrading in Vargas (Francis, 2007).

After this, the project faced more barriers; like “currency devaluation in

2001 and the subsequent economic recession in 2002 to 2003; an

employee strike at PDVSA, the now state-owned petroleum company

in 2003; and a presidential recall referendum in 2004” (Francis,

2007:93). All these challenges were translated in delays in the execution

and many changes in the administration. During the six years of the

project life there were: 7 presidents of FUNDACOMUN, 13 General

Managers of CAMEBA, 7 technical managers and 22 operational

managers among La Vega and Petare Norte (World Bank, 2007).

Changes in the proposal

The factors mentioned above and other socio-ecological aspects

(explained here) provoked some changes during the implementation

of the project, like:

Partial Loan Cancelation: The loan was reduced from U$60.7 to 35.7

million, because of low disbursement capacity of the project,

underestimated implementation periods, over-estimation of prices,

and significant increase in U$/Bs exchange rates among others (World

Bank, 2007).

Extension in the project implementation: owing to the instructional

and political constrains mentioned above, the project experience a two

years delay in its execution.

Reduction in Infrastructure Investments: Instead of large structural

works (like major drainage investments), smaller community-driven

works were dominant in the intervention, due to the local demand on

tertiary roads, retention infrastructure, rehabilitation of footpaths and

recreational facilities.

10 Previous administration (1994-1998), Chavez (1999-2013).

Figure 11_ one of the pedestrian mobility proposals for La Vega/ Source: http://favelaissues.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/amaya-mora-arch-la-vega-2.jpg

Figure 12_ View of the barrios from the "formal city"/ Source: http://elfortindeguayana.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/LaVega-635.jpg

Figure 13_ Inhabitants in pedestrian streets/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

Figure 14_ Streets improvement/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

Reduction in Resettlements: From the original estimate of 2,500

households to 287 units, the resettlement cases changed, because of

the geographical scope, adaptation to time implementation; and

partial loan cancelation outlined above.

Adaptation in Geographical and target scope: Due to the widespread

flooding and landslides in late 1999 in the neighboring Vargas state,

the project included a third community, La Guairá (capital of Vargas

state), in the program (Francis, 2007). This increased the number of

beneficiaries from 184,000 to 197,000. However, the final target

population was around 118,000 (9.8% of barrio population in Caracas

at that time) due to the partial loan cancelation (World Bank, 2007).

Microfinance component: This was not implemented. FUNDACOMUN

argued that the component needed to be adapted to be consistent

with the new Government policy. However, due to the institutional

factors mentioned above, it was not possible to come out with a new

proposal on time.

Overall outcome and Impacts

At the end of its implementation, the project did provide many urban-

upgrading investments that improved the living conditions of 115,000

inhabitants (97.4% of the revised target population), like primary and

secondary access to roads, drainage, water distribution pipelines,

sewage network, risk mitigation, power lines, community service

centers and recreational spaces (most of them focused on the small

scale). The evaluation workshops at the end of the project showed

satisfaction by the inhabitants for the improvement of the life quality

after the execution works (World Bank, 2007).

In terms of community participation; this was expressed in the input

provided by the inhabitants on the development of the NIPs11 and their

participation as neighborhood inspectors, social promotors and

surveyors, who were previously trained by CAMEBA staff (Francis,

2007). The inclusion of the community in the implementation helped to

ensure the credibility among the inhabitants. However, it is

questionable if this social organization turned to be sustainable on

time; since a recent study (Ayala, 2009) has shown that low awareness

and participation (about the planning and implementation process)

exist in one of the participants’ neighborhoods.

In reference to land titling, as of June 2006, for La Vega and Petare

Norte, approximately 46% of land was titled, which represented 63% of

the residents in the agglomerations, most of whom were women

(Francis, 2007). An indirect impact generated was that the ownership

titles helped some inhabitants to obtain small loans for home

improvements (World Bank, 2007).

11 Neighbourhood Improvement Plans.

Figure 15_ Flooding in Vargas State (1998)/ Source: Marín, 2004 in Francis, 2007

Figure 17_ Participatory workshops in La Vega/ Source: http://guttlab.files.wordpress.com/2012

Figure 16_ Before-After of one of the intervention in accessibility/ Source: http://www.mediaglobal.org/2011/10/

Other key objective was institutional strengthening. Here the results

were mixed. As previously mentioned, many cooperation agreements

were established at the beginning of the intervention; however, more

collaboration was held with the municipal and metropolitan

governments and electricity utilities, where the cooperation was

focused on issues of cadastre development and land titling.

After the Project ….

One of the aims of this ambitious project was to be a replicable

infrastructure program for the urban areas of Venezuela. Indeed, in

2004 and 2006 the national government announced that two new

housing programs, [Misión Habitat and Misión Villanueva], oriented to

relocation of barrios into new constructed communities, would be

launched under the structure created by CAMEBA. However, by the

end of 2014 it had not reached the 70% of its settled goal [120.457

housing built of 400.000 targeted] (El Universal, 2014). Also, water service outages for over 30 days in Petare Norte

have been reported in the last year (La Voz, 2014).

Critical evaluation

So far, the Caracas Slum-upgrading project has been the biggest intervention – geared toward improving the lives

of low-income residents – implemented in Caracas. Certainly, the project resulted to be very interesting due to the

ambitious goals set since its formulation. It achieved its aim in improving the living conditions of over 100,000

people living in informal settlements of Caracas through the project infrastructure services and land titling that

were provided to the agglomerations of La Vega and Petare Norte. By providing a combination of services it was

assumed that beyond the improvement in the living conditions, an impact in the poverty reduction of the barrios

would be achieved, by the increase of the added value of the land, due to the upgrading of the urban context.

It can be considered a creative intervention, because despite its top-down approach, the project attempted to mix

it with a bottom-up execution, since community participation was acknowledged as a key aspect in the design and

implementation of the final interventions, as a way to achieve sustainability.

However, to work [or trying to work] closely with the communities has shown how difficult it is to build consensus

about the interventions that are going to be developed. For example, even when the project aimed for large-scale

infrastructure intervention (to have a broad impact); it ended developing more tertiary investment (specially related

to mobility and access); that was more important for the inhabitants, thus contributed to creation of trust in the

project and interest for participation [that was difficult to have at the beginning]; but at the same time, it did not

contribute in a much larger scale impact. In this context, negotiation seems to be a key aspect that depends too

much on institutional capacities.

In this sense, the initial lack of political will and the weaknesses in the governmental capacities impacted

significantly in the performance of the project. As in many other projects, this case study evidences that more than

the scarcity of economic resources for developing an intervention; coordination seems to be the more critical

absent asset in governmental management. Particularly, a key aspect that negatively influenced such a big-scale

project was that no attention was given during the preparation of the project to the ‘political arenas’12 around the

involved stakeholders. For example, the decentralization aspect, key element in the Project, did not match with the

12 Defined as “a place of concrete confrontation between social actors interacting on common issues” (Sardhan, 1998:240 in Bastiaensen et al, 2006).

Figure 18_ Current situation in one of the neighborhoods of Petare/ Source: http://www.diariolavoz.net/2014/07/30/habitantes-de-petare-norte-protestan-por-falta-de-agua-desde-hace-30-dias/

interest of the new administration of Chavez [more interested in a major control of the central government]. This

provoked tensions among the intergovernmental relationships (Paiva, 2001).

Finally, even when adopting a capacity-building approach provided to the municipal and national organizations

with institutional knowledge and technical tools; more attention should have been given to the local capacities. By

this I mean that it is necessary not only to look for the validation of the proposals made, and the inhabitants’

integration in the participation structures created beforehand in the framework of a project. Instead, it is essential to

adopt a capabilities approach, which acknowledges people’s capacities and agency. Implementing this approach

projects like the case study could be translated in proposals that responds directly to people’s needs and that

increase the sense of ownership among the inhabitants, and thus contributing to sustainability. However, this is

easier said than done, because it means a change in the [paternalistic] role that the government has been playing;

and a strong investment of time and other non-economic resources – in order to achieve the empowerment of the

communities – that the format of “project” usually does not provide.

Bibliography

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CAMEBA Upgrading Project (IHS working papers series, no. 21) Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS); 2009

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