STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGICA XIV (2014) 215–235

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature: An Ecological Perspective

on Being and Time

Vincent BlokWageningen University / Radboud University Nijmegen

Abstract: Because the status of nature is ambiguous in Being and Time, we explore an ecological perspective on Heidegger’s early main work in this ar-ticle. Our hypothesis is that the aff ordance theory of James Gibson enables us to a) to understand being-in-the-world as being-in-nature, b) reconnect man and nature and c) understand the twofold sense of nature in Being and Time. After exploring Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world and Gibson’s con-cept of being-in-nature, we confront Heidegger’s and Gibson’s conception of being-in-the-world and being-in-nature. It will become clear that Gibson’s af-fordance theory enables an ecological reading of Being and Time, in which the relational character of being-in-the-world is stressed and the exceptional posi-tion of human being-in-the-world has to be rejected. Moreover, it becomes clear that an ecological reading of Being and Time enables us to reconnect being-in-the world with being-in-nature (unconcealment), which is rooted in “primordial” nature as its infi nite origin (concealment).

Keywords: Marin Heidegger, James Gibson, Being-in-the-World, Being-in-Nature, Aff ordance Th eory.

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is clearly an attempt to provide an alternative for classical dichotomies like men and world, body and soul, sub-ject and object etc.; human being is always already intentionally involved in a meaningful world. In Being and Time, it becomes clear that the world is primarily understood in terms of its serviceability (Dienlichkeit) and usability (Verwendbarkeit).

216 Vincent Blok

Th e status of “Nature” is however ambiguous in Being and Time. On the one hand, nature seems to be part of the world of practice: “Th e forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’” (SZ: 70). Heidegger’s “practical” or “instrumental” account of being-in-the-world is extended here to the natural world. On the other hand, nature is already diverted from the world of practice in Being and Time. Heidegger states for instance: “‘Nature’, which ‘surrounds’ us, is indeed an innerworldly being, but it shows neither the kind of being of handiness nor of objective presence as ‘natural things’” (SZ: 211). Heidegger’s claim that nature is not ready-at-hand suggests at least that originally, nature does not belong to the world of practice. A few years later, in a lecture On the Essence of Ground from 1930, Heidegger argues that nature in a ‘primordial sense’ can-not be understood as ready-to-hand, nor as a present-to-hand object of the natural sciences (GA 9: 155).

Although Hubert Dreyfus acknowledged the ambiguity of Heidegger’s concept of nature in Being and Time, in the end he supposed that Heidegger subscribes to a practical or instrumental understanding of nature.1 According to Dreyfus, Heidegger’s practical account of being-in-the-world shows that Being and Time bears witness to a proto-technological metaphysics, of which he was so critical in his later work (Dreyfus 1991: 175; cf. Ihde 2010: 47–48; Blok 2011b). By stressing the practical or instrumental account of nature in Being and Time, the ambiguity of nature is solved by Dreyfus.

Bruce Foltz, on the contrary, stressed precisely the “primordial sense” of nature in Being and Time. Although he acknowledged that nature primarily appears as useful or ready at hand, this doesn’t mean that nature inherently belongs to the world of practice. “To the extent that the things of nature are dealt with in this way, and only to this extent, they are tools quite as much as is the hammer or the saw, and they are close at hand in just the same man-ner” (Foltz 1995: 30). In itself, however, natural things are not just either ready to hand or objective: it is also the great outdoors (die Natur draußen) or the power of nature (Naturmacht). According to Foltz, the primacy of the practical in Being and Time is not an expression of Heidegger’s preference for the practical or instrumental but is intended strategically to emphasize our involvement with nature and how involvement alone discloses it—practical nature as well as primordial nature—as meaningful (Foltz 1995: 32). By em-bedding Heidegger’s practical or instrumental account of nature in his con-cept of primordial nature, the ambiguity of nature is solved by Foltz (cf. §1).

Th ere seems to be a fundamental tension, however, between Heidegger’s practical account of nature and his eff orts to exclude his concept of nature

1 “In Being and Time we fi nd no place for the resistance and the reliability of equipment—only its on-going functioning or its breakdown. Th ere is no mention of ‘the hidden riches of nature’” (Dreyfus 1992: 177).

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 217

from the world of practice on the one hand and from the scientifi c world of natural objects on the other. Th is tension cannot be solved by downplaying primordial nature (Dreyfus), nor by downplaying practical nature (Foltz)2. We can frame this tension in the following way: If the practical account of being-in-the-world is extended to our being-in-nature, there seems to be no room for nature in this primordial sense. But if we have to conceive nature in this primordial sense, it is unclear how this concept of nature is related to the natural world which is part of the world of practice. Th is tension leads to the following question we would like to address in this article: Is it possible to conceive the natural world not as an extension of the practical world but the other way around, in other words, being-in-the-world as being-in-nature? In such an “eco-logical” reading of Being and Time, our being-in-the-world of practice is conceived as embedded in our dwelling in nature3. Such a reading enables us not only to conceive the relation between the practical and the primordial sense of nature in Being and Time, but enables us to eliminate Karl Löwith’s “classical” critique, that human being seems to be completely lifted out of his natural preconditions in Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world, as well (Löwith 1989). An eco-logical perspective on Being and Time may en-able us to reconnect man and nature without naturalizing him.

In this article, we explore such an ecological perspective on Being and Time. Our hypothesis is that the aff ordance theory of the American psychologist and founding father of the ecological psychology, James Gibson (1904–1979), en-ables us to (a) to understand being-in-the-world as being-in-nature, and with this, (b) reconnect man and nature on the one hand and (c) understand the pri-mordial sense of nature in Being and Time on the other. Heidegger anticipated the work of Gibson in many ways (Kader & Eff ken 1994); like Heidegger, also Gibson rejected dichotomies like subject and object, and like Heidegger, also Gibson provided a phenomenological account of our being-in-the-world; or-ganisms are always already involved in a meaningful eco-system.

After exploring Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world in section one and Gibson’s concept of being-in-nature in section two, we will confront Heidegger’s and Gibson’s conception of our being-in-the-world/nature in sec-tion three. It will become clear that Gibson’s aff ordance theory enables an

2 Foltz states for instance: “[…] for Heidegger, the primacy of the practical in this case (and elsewhere) is intended strategically to emphasize our involvement with nature and how involve-ment alone discloses it as meaningful […] not as an expression of preference for the ‘utilitarian and instrumental’ […]” (Foltz 1995: 34; my emphasis).

3 In this, we follow Hanspeter Padrutt’s concept of ecology. Ecology does not only concern the relationships of the organism to its surrounding environment but the ecosystem of the world as a whole (Padrutt 2009: 18). Ecology refers to our dwelling in the natural world—comprising both practical nature as well as primordial nature, as we will see—and an eco-logical reading of Being and Time conceives our being-in-the-world as embedded in our being-in-the-natural-world or, in short, in our being-in-nature.

218 Vincent Blok

ecological reading of Being and Time, in which the relational character of our being-in-the-world is stressed and the exceptional position of human being-in-the-world has to be rejected. In §4, it will become clear that an ecological reading of Being and Time enables us to reconnect our being-in-the world with our being-in-nature (unconcealment), which is rooted in primordial na-ture as its infi nite origin (concealment).

1. Being-in-the-world as being-in-nature in Being and Time

In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that we fi rst and mostly exist in associa-tion with innerworldly beings which we use and take care of. In our dealings in the world and with entities within the world—writing, hammering, opening, building etc.—things become accessible and are understood as useful things or equipment (Zeuge); they encounter our “practical” behaviour in dealing with the world as equipment “in-order-to” hammer, write etc. (SZ: 66–69).

A fi rst distinction between equipment and mere things is, that items of equipment are not autonomous or independent, but are understood (Seins-verständnis) out of a world of equipment (Zeugganzheit). Pencil, table, lamp, room etc. form an environment or a context in-order-to write, and the meaning of the pencil as equipment is dependent on this context for writing; without a table and a paper for instance, the pencil is not equipment, i.e. not in-order-to write. Th e meaning of equipment has to be understood in a contextual way, i.e. as dependent on a context of interrelated equipment.

A second distinction between equipment and mere things is, that useful things never stand in front of us like objects. On the contrary, our being is primarily involved in this world of practice and reciprocal to it. Heidegger speaks for instance about our “dealing geared to equipment” (auf das Zeug zugeschnittenen Umgang), which shows that human Dasein is primarily adap-tive to the world of practice4:

In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the equipment we are employ-ing at the time; […] Th e hammering itself uncovers the specifi c “manipulability” of the hammer. Th e kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call “readiness-to-hand.” (SZ: 69)

4 Although it is clear that Dasein doesn’t concerns humans as a specifi c type of beings, we speak of human Dasein in this article. On the one hand, Dasein concerns a particular way of existence or Seinsweise and on the other hand, only human Dasein can be responsive to the call of Being according to Heidegger. In this respect, human Dasein is a proper translation of “das Dasein im Menschen” (GA 3: 234). See section 3 for a further discussion of the exceptional position of human Dasein.

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 219

Items of equipment are useful in reference to our dealings with them. Our involvement in or reciprocity to this world of practice shows that human Da-sein is not a subject in front of an object, but being-in-the-world.

We can conceive this world of practice as an ecosystem. Oikos originally means “home” or “household” in which organisms live in conjunction with the environment. Although Heidegger doesn’t refer to the concept of ecosys-tems himself, it can help to conceptualize our being-in-the-world, in which human existence and the world interact together as a system; “Da-sein is ini-tially and for the most part together with the ‘world’ that it takes care of” (SZ: 175). Th is means, that the readiness-to-hand of equipment is understood in a re-lational way, as the way the world appears as ready-to-hand for handling or manipulatory people.5

Our involvement in the world of practice shows that Heidegger’s concep-tion of the ready-to-hand world of practice cannot be understood as an early conception of pragmatism (cf. Gethmann 1989). Th e meaning of the world of practice is not primarily derived from their utility or usefulness for us, because ‘we’ are involved in this world of practice as well; our involvement with the world of practice discloses it as meaningful from the beginning, i.e. as an eco-system of interrelated items of equipment in which we are at home (cf. Foltz 1995: 27). “Th is is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is” (SZ: 87).

A third distinction between equipment and mere things is that what is ready-to-hand—equipment—withdraws in its character of readiness-to-hand in order to enable us to focus on the work of our everyday dealings; writing a letter for instance. Our concernful dealings do not focus on the writing ma-terials in writing for instance, but primarily concern the work itself; the letter I have in mind. Equipment withdraws in our bringing forth of the work they are used for. But insofar each work—in Being and Time at least6—can be un-derstood again as equipment (the letter is the work of writing on the one hand and on the other itself equipment in-order-to apply for a job for instance), all works are characterized by this double movement of their withdrawal as equipment in favour of their presence as work. Th is withdrawal of equipment

5 Weberman has shown that for Heidegger exactly this relational aspect of the Sachverhalt is the reason to reject the ontology of objective precense: “… an important and perhaps primary reason for Heidegger’s rejection of Vorhandenheit is that it contradicts what I call the relation-ality thesis. Th e relationality thesis holds that, contrary to fi rst impressions and too much of the philosophical tradition, entities are not self-contained. Th ey are not self-contained because entities are what they are partly in virtue of their relations to entities outside of themselves, whether spatially or temporally” (Weberman 2001: 109).

6 While Heidegger in Being and Time argues that every work as such can be understood as ready-to-hand (SZ: 70), this is no longer the case in his Origin of the Work of Art from 1935–36. Th e further exploration of this change in Heidegger’s thought is beyond the scope of this article (cf. Blok 2011a).

220 Vincent Blok

in favour of its presence as work, which withdraws itself again in favour of the next work etc., is characteristic for the world of practice we are dealing with.

Th e scope of the world of practice becomes clear if we take an example. Th e work of a shoemaker—new work boots for instance—is itself a useful thing in-order-to wear it, which withdraws itself in ploughing and sowing for instance. First of all, that what the work is useful for belongs to the world or ecosystem we are associated with; the ploughed land is useful for a rich harvest, the harvest is useful for the animals, the animals are useful for their hides, their hides are useful for the bringing forth of work boots etc. All these items of equipment/work belong to the world as the ecosystem we are associ-ated with. Secondly, the materials the works are produced from belong to the ecosystem we are associated with; work boots are dependent on leather, leath-er is produced from hides, hides are taken from animals, animals are raised by farmers, farmers are dependent on footgear and so on. All these items of equipment/work belong to the world as the ecosystem we are associated with. Also human beings belong to the ecosystem we are associated with, as the one who wears and uses these works. According to Heidegger, this world includes the whole of nature, i.e. being as a whole:

Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with the public world, the environing Nature is discovered and is accessible to every-one. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as hav-ing some defi nite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specifi c changes in the presence or absence of daylight—the “position of the sun.” (SZ: 71)

Nature appears here in its serviceability and usability, just as the world of practice; it is part of the meaningful world which we have always already un-derstood (Seinsverständnis) and in which we are always already intentionally involved.

Do we have to conclude that nature and world coincide in Heidegger’s analysis of the world of practice? On the one hand, nature indeed appears as ready-to-hand and therefore, has to be understood in terms of its serviceabil-ity and usability: “Th e forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’,” Heidegger argues in Being and Time (SZ: 70). Nature appears here in its serviceability and us-ability and therefore, belongs to the world of practice we are associated with. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger’s practical account of being-in-the-world shows that he has a proto-technological concept of nature (cf. Dreyfus 1992).

But nature is not limited to the world of practice in Being and Time. Hei-degger states for instance: “As the ‘surrounding world’ is discovered, ‘nature’

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 221

thus discovered is encountered along with it” (SZ: 70). Th is is a confi rmation of the idea that nature belongs to the world of practice. But he continues:

If its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this “Nature” itself can be discovered and defi ned simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which “stirs and strives,” which assails us and enthrals us as landscape, remains hidden. (SZ: 70)

Nature as what “stirs and strives” cannot be understood as pure objective presence according to Heidegger, but neither as equipment which is ready-to-hand. Why not? What assails us and enthrals us as landscape does not appear in its serviceability and usability:

Th e “Nature” by which we are “surrounded” is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as “Th ings of Nature”. No matter how this Being of “Nature” may be interpreted, all the modes of Being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. (SZ: 211)

Here, Heidegger claims again that nature can neither be understood as present-at-hand nor as ready-to-hand. Nature itself is not part of the world of practice, but our interpretation or understanding of nature reduces it to an innerworldly being which is characterized by readyness-to-hand. In a lecture of 1927, Heidegger states:

It [nature] is, even if we do not uncover it, without our encountering it within our world. Being within the world devolves upon this being, nature, solely when it is uncovered as a being. Being within the world does not have to devolve upon nature as a determination... Of nature uncovered—of that which is, so far as we comport toward it as an unveiled being—it is true that it is always already in a world; but being within the world does not belong to the being of nature. (GA 24: 240)

According to Heidegger, our being-in-the-world is characterized by the reduction of nature to an innerworldly being (unconcealment) which stays surrounded by nature as that which “stirs and strives,” which assails or over-comes us (concealment).

Th e involvement of human Dasein in the world of practice prevents a subjective interpretation of this reduction of nature. Dasein is for the most part together with the world it takes care of (SZ: 175), i.e. reciprocal to the world of practice/practical nature as practitioner. Heidegger experiences that the world of practice/practical nature does not belong to the being of nature; nature is without our understanding, without our discovery of innerworldly natural beings (cf. Oudemans 1998: 90–91). “[…] nature does not let itself be

222 Vincent Blok

encountered either within the sphere of the environing world, nor in general primarily as something toward which we comport ourselves” (GA 9: 155).7

Th is twofold character of nature in Being and Time is not only in line with Heidegger’s characterization of the essence of truth as un-concealment as well as phusis as self-emergence and self-witholding (GA 9: 354) in his later work. It is also in line with Heidegger’s basic experience in Being and Time. As I have explained elsewhere, Heidegger’s basic experience is that the essence of man and world cannot be projected entirely in a projection (Entwurf ) of thinking, i.e. in a philosophy of being (Blok 2012). Heidegger introduces this basic experience right at the beginning of Being and Time. He claims there “that we live already in an understanding of being and that the sense of being is at the same time shrouded in darkness” (SZ: 4). Heidegger speaks explicitly of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis), which means that it must not be confused with our understanding of beings. Understanding of Being does not mean that “being” is somehow available in the world and can then be under-stood. Seinsverständnis is about the being of our understanding, i.e. the “how” of our understanding of man and world. How are man and world primarily understood in Being and Time? As a world of practice/practical nature for handling, manipulatory, practicing human Dasein.

According to Heidegger, in our self-evident understanding of the world/nature as ready-to-hand (Seinsverständnis), the sense of being (Sinn von Sein) remains hidden. Th is concealment cannot be projected in a projection of thinking, nor can it be understood. Heidegger calls the sense of being the pro-jection-domain (Entwurfsbereich), “that wherein the intelligibility of some-thing maintains itself ” (SZ: 151). Th is domain is the space between being and thinking, the openness I have to stride through to reach things in the world. Our understanding of the world of practice/practical nature presupposes this projection-domain, which cannot be projected in a projection of thinking; on the contrary, it withholds itself in every thinking projection. Heidegger experiences, in other words, an incommensurability or twofold between our understanding of the world of practice/practical nature (unconcealment) and the sense of Being (concealment), something beyond thinking which is un-reachable for understanding. Th e twofold character of nature we identifi ed earlier in this section—the unconcealment of the world of practice/practi-cal nature which stays surrounded by nature as that which “stirs and strives”

7 It is not the case that the withdrawal of equipment provides access to nature, as Foltz seems to claim. Not only is it questionable whether I am “aware” of the withdrawal of practical nature as Foltz suggests (Foltz 1995: 39)—our concernful dealings do not focus on equipment at all but are absorbed by the work itself—but also whether we can assume a continuity between the self-withdrawal of the world of practice/practical nature and primordial nature (Foltz 1995: 40–42). In its brokenness, we can have an experience of the world of practice/practical nature as ready-to-hand, while primordial nature is not something “toward which we comport ourselves” according to Heidegger.

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 223

(concealment)- corresponds with Heidegger’s basic experience of the twofold between our understanding of being and the sense of Being.8

We have to conclude, therefore, that nature as that which “stirs and strives” on the one hand resists our human eff orts to reduce it to an innerworldly be-ing. On the other hand, it means that human Dasein, which is characterized by being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature, is excluded from primor-dial nature: “Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them, Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature” (GA 9: 139). Dasein always already transcends primordial nature in its projection of the world of practice/practical nature.

Is this the context of Löwith’s later critique, that Heidegger emphasized the diff erence between human Dasein and nonhuman nature so strongly in Being and Time, that human Dasein seems to be completely lifted out of its natural preconditions? (cf. Safranski 1994). Based on our analysis of the twofold of nature in Being and Time, we can nuance Löwith’s criticism; my body belongs to the world of practice/practical nature, just like the other natural precondi-tions of life. In this respect, being-in-nature is part of being-in-the-world. But if nature as that which “stirs and strives” is excluded from being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature, the question remains whether it is possible and necessary to reconnect human Dasein with primordial nature. Before answer-ing this question, we fi rst introduce James Gibson’s aff ordance theory in the next section.

2. Being-in-nature according to James Gibson

James Gibson is considered one of the most infl uential psychologists in the fi eld of visual perception in the 20th century. In Th e Perception of the Visual World of 1950 and Th e Ecological Approach of Visual Perception of 1979, he de-veloped an explanation of how the sense or meaning of things and organisms in the environment could be perceived directly (Gibson 1950; Gibson 1979).

According to Gibson, we do not perceive stimulus information from the outside world, which we process consciously or unconsciously, but aff ordances in the environment. Th e word “aff ordance,” coined by Gibson himself, indicates the meaning of a thing or organism in the environment, which is detected or picked up by the perceiver and allows him to perform a specifi c kind of action; air aff ords breathing and water aff ords drinking for example, a chair aff ords sit-ting and a hammer aff ords hammering. According to Gibson, “the aff ordance of anything is a specifi c combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal” (Gibson 1977: 67). If a substance

8 In this respect, Pöggeler’s criticism that Heidegger’s world-analysis in Being and Time is one-sided because it doesn’t provide access to primordial nature, can be put in question (Pög-geler 1994: 208).

224 Vincent Blok

is rigid, horizontal and extended for instance, then it aff ords support; it is the ground or fl oor we are walking on. If a substance is an elongated object of mod-est size and weight, it aff ords wielding. If it is used to hit another object, it is a hammer.

It is not only the physical environment which harbours aff ordances ac-cording to Gibson: “Th e other animals of the environment aff ord, above all, a rich and complex set of interactions, sexual, predatory, nurturing, fi ghting, play, cooperating, and communicating. What other persons aff ord, for man, comprise the whole realm of social signifi cance” (Gibson 1977: 68). A beauti-ful butterfl y aff ords her predator to hunt for it and dispatch it. A big man in a dark alley aff ords us to cross the street. Even cultural phenomena like poetry or works of art off er aff ordances for organisms able to listen or read them and so on.9

Th e butterfl y aff ords hunting, but this meaning of the butterfl y for the predator cannot be understood as the intrinsic value of the butterfl y. Th e af-fordance is taken with reference to an animal: A rigid and horizontal surface aff ords support for men for instance, but not for fi sh. In the same way, water aff ords swimming for fi sh but not for cats. Th is relativity of the aff ordance doesn’t mean that the meaning or value of the butterfl y depends on the valu-ation of this object by the subject. According to Gibson, aff ordances come up in the reciprocity of animal and environment or other animals:

What the male aff ords the female is reciprocal to what the female aff ords the male; what the infant aff ords the mother is reciprocal to what the mother af-fords the infant; what the prey aff ords the predator goes along with what the predator aff ords the prey; what the buyer aff ords the seller cannot be separated from what the seller aff ords the buyer, and so on. Th e perceiving of these mu-tual aff ordances is enormously complex but it is nonetheless lawful... (Gibson 1977: 76).

Th e aff ordance points two ways and therefore, cannot be understood as a value (property of an object) nor as the product of valuation (property of the subject).

Although an aff ordance consists of physical properties taken with reference to a certain animal it does not depend on that animal. In this respect an aff or-dance is not like a value which is usually supposed to depend on the observer

9 Cf. “Just as caves aff ord hiding and chairs aff ord sitting, just as electronic microscopes may aff ord holding open the door or winning the Nobel Prize, symbolic entities—words, concepts, notions, theories, and the like—off er a variety of aff ordances for organisms able to notice them and whose experience prepares them to perceive their potential. Th e environment in which aff ordances present themselves to human beings is thus extraordinarily complex, and includes not only a physical component but symbolic components, even purely imaginative and concep-tual components” (Sanders 1997: 108).

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 225

nor is it like a meaning which is almost always supposed to depend on the observer. An aff ordance is not what we call a ‘subjective’ quality of a thing. But neither is it what we call an “objective” property of a thing if by that we mean that a physical object has no reference to any animal. An aff ordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. (Gibson 1977: 69–70)

What is the ontological status of the aff ordance, if it is not a property of an object nor a property of a subject?10 It is clear that Gibson rejected the natural-istic “dichotomy between mental (subjective, meaningful) and physical (objec-tive, meaningless) properties, in favour of the concept of an ecological level of reality at which meanings and purpose are as real as bodies” (Gibson 1982: 408). Gibson’s rejection of any dualism between subject and object does not only imply that aff ordances cannot be understood as a property of the environ-ment. It even implies that “things” and “organisms” cannot be the “fundamental entities in our ontology, because they are detached and inherently carry the burden of an objective-subjective dichotomy” (Kadar  &  Eff ken  1994: 313). As a consequence, we discard any kind of dualist ontology, i.e. any posting of a mental (subject) as opposed to a natural (object) (cf. Gibson 1979: 141). Th e aff ordance points two ways, which means that the aff ordance itself receives on-tological primacy.11

Th e ontological primacy of the aff ordance means that prey and preda-tor for instance do not fi rst exist separately from each other as “things” or “organisms” in the environment, and then have an aff ordance on each other; if the aff ordance is not a property of the object nor of the subject, then the mutual aff ordance comes fi rst, in which the prey becomes the prey for the predator and vice versa.12 Th e aff ordance is in other words not a disposition of an entity, but the identity of this entity as prey or as predator.13 With this, it becomes clear that prey and predator are constituted by their mutual aff or-

10 Several authors have argued that the ontological status of the aff ordance remains implicit in the work of Gibson, and that “time has arrived for another round of theorizing about af-fordances” (Kadar & Eff ken 1994: 229; cf. Turvey 1992: 173–187; Sanders 1997). In what follows, we provide an ontological reading of Gibson’s aff ordance theory in order to explicate the ontological status of the aff ordance in his work.

11 Also Sanders has pointed at the ontological primacy of the aff ordance. While he con-ceives “things” as “coalescences of aff ordances present in the environment: (Sanders 1997: 97), we conceive them as the product of the mutual aff ordance between animal and environment in this article.

12 Here we see why aff ordances are ontologically prior to and not only together with the be-ings which are connected in the mutual aff ordance. Th e mutual aff ordance between prey and predator is ontologically prior, since the prey fi rst becomes the prey for the predator in their mutual aff ordance.

13 An aff ordance cannot be understood as a disposition of an entity, because the aff ordance has to be understood in an ontological way, i.e. as concerning the identity of an entity which is reciprocal to the aff ordances in the environment.

226 Vincent Blok

dances and not the other way around; in the mutual aff ordances of prey and predator, the prey aff ords hunting and the predator aff ords hiding. And in the mutual aff ordances, the prey becomes the one who’s hiding for the predator and is looking for shelter in holes and caves, while the predator becomes the one who is hunting for the prey. In hunting and hiding, prey and predator are interdependent and interconnected.

With this, it becomes clear how the aff ordance has to be understood. Be-cause aff ordances point two ways and the mutual aff ordance is prior to prey and predator, the aff ordance cannot be understood as an intrinsic or extrinsic value nor as a property of the object or subject. Th e aff ordance is better un-derstood as the sense or (non-subjective) meaning of the prey and the predator. Th is sense or meaning comes up in the reciprocity between prey and predator; both butterfl y and predator live already in a meaningful world in which they are what they are, i.e. perform hiding and seeking. Th e ontological status of the aff ordance is that it articulates a meaningful world for an organism and allows him to perform its specifi c behaviour as prey, as predator etc.

How do we have to conceive the concept of nature from a Gibsonian perspective14? To explain the reciprocity of animal and environment, Gibson makes use of the ecological concept of a niche. A niche can be seen as a set of environmental features which are suitable for a specifi c species and in which this species fi ts: “I suggest that a niche is a set of aff ordances. Th e natural en-vironment off ers many ways of life and a way of life is a set of aff ordances that are utilized” (Gibson 1977: 69). Gibson’s concept of the niche shows that the aff ordance ontology concerns the natural environment, i.e. nature, which is understood in a non-dualistic and non-anthropocentric way. Organisms “that utilize” the natural environment are constituted by their reciprocity to these aff ordances in the environment, for instance the mutual supportive realities of the environment (materials for making a nest) and the bird which settles itself in this environment to build his nest. “We all fi t into the substructures of the environment in our various ways for we were all, in fact, formed by them. We were created by the world we live in” (Gibson 1977: 71).

Furthermore, this Gibsonian concept of nature is eco-centric, i.e. nature itself is the origin of the aff ordance:

Th e reciprocity of animal and environment is implied by this theory for the niche implies a certain kind of animal and the species implies a special niche. But the independent existence of an unlimited environment is also implied,

14 It is clear that Gibson’s primary goal was to develop an ecological physics and was not interested in the development of a concept of nature. Nevertheless, there is no principled reason why his analysis of the aff ordance cannot be applied at the level of specifi c eco-systems—Kadar & Eff ken (1994) developed for instance such a regional ontology—and at the level of the eco-system of the earth or nature as a whole. Sanders for instance developed such a general ontology (Sanders 1997: 108).

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 227

for the niches must be available before animals can begin to exploit them. Th e aff ording of life by the environment is presumably of unlimited richness and complexity. (Gibson 1977: 69)15

Contrary to the mutual reciprocity of prey and predator, organisms are re-ciprocal to the aff ordances in the environment and not the other way around. Th e eco-centrism of a Gibsonian concept of nature therefore shows itself not only in the concept of the niche, in which environment and animal fi t in each other. It shows itself also in the fact that the “independent existence of an un-limited environment” is assumed (Gibson 1977: 69), i.e. nature itself as the origin of the aff ordance.

3. Heidegger and Gibson on the relationality of our Being-in-the-World

If we compare Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world with Gibson’s aff ordance ontology, the similarities are striking. Both reject dichotomies like object and subject and both draw our attention to a meaningful world or eco-system we are already involved in. We can easily rephrase Heidegger’s “dealing geared to equipment” in terms of Gibson’s aff ordance ontology: the hammer is equipment in order to hammer (Heidegger’s example), i.e. it aff ords ham-mering. If the chair or bench aff ords sitting-on (Gibson’s example), we can understand this aff ordance of the chair in terms of its readiness-to-hand (cf. SZ: 149–150).

Although Gibson’s orientation seems to be the natural order while Hei-degger’s orientation seems to be the practical order, this distinction is only secondary, because the natural world (practical nature) is an extension of the world of practice as we have seen. While for Heidegger, the world of practice constitutes a context of interdependent equipment in which practical nature is included (fi rst distinction between equipment and mere things) (cf. §1), for Gibson, the concept of a niche comprises the whole realm of social and technological signifi cance as well (in case of human being at least) (cf. §2). While human Dasein is already involved in and reciprocal to the manifold ref-erences of the in-order-to which constitute an ecosystem of equipment (sec-ond distinction between equipment and mere things according to Heidegger), Gibson’s organism is primarily involved in and reciprocal to aff ordances in the environment which constitute a niche. In this respect, we can conclude that Heidegger’s eff orts to capture the relational character of being-in-the-world

15 Th is quote is an indication that the ontological status of the aff ordance remains implicit in the work of Gibson. On the one hand, it became clear already that Gibson rejects a dualist ontology and on the other hand, he still frames the aff ordance ontology in terms of an animal which begins to exploit nature (niches). In this article, we stress the ontological reading of Gibson’s aff ordance theory.

228 Vincent Blok

corresponds with Gibson’s eff orts in this direction (cf. Kadar & Eff ken 1994: 314).We can even say that Gibson’s concept of the mutual reciprocity between organism and environment can help us to better understand Heidegger’s rela-tionalism in Being and Time. In this early main work namely, human Dasein has an ambiguous role. In order to see this ambiguity, we return for a moment to Being and Time.

In section one it became clear that human Dasein is primarily under-stood out of its relation with the world of practice, i.e. as reciprocal to the world in which it is involved. When Heidegger for instance argues, “open-ness (Entschlossenheit) does not fi rst take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As disclosed, Dasein is already taking action”(SZ: 300 [adjusted])16, human Dasein is understood as dis-closed or opened (Ent-schlossen), i.e. as being already out-side in-the-world of practice as the one who is taking action. Th is openness of human Dasein cannot be understood within the categories of activity or passivity according to Heidegger (SZ: 300)17; it concerns the mutual reciproc-ity between the world as ready-to-hand (equipment) and human Dasein as “dealing geared to equipment”. Th is world of practice is only disclosed in our taking action in it or, as Heidegger puts it, “the hammering itself uncovers the specifi c ‘manipulability’ of the hammer”. Th e readiness-to-hand is understood (Seinsverständnis) here in a relational way, as the way the world of practice ap-pears as ready-to-hand for handling or manipulatory people.

But at the same time, Heidegger claims an exceptional position of human Dasein in Being and Time. According to Heidegger, the chain of related items of equipment and works ultimately leads back to a towards-which, which “is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defi ned as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs” (SZ: 84). Th e readiness-to-hand of the world leads back to a towards-which, which cannot be understood as work or equipment in-order-to…:

But that for which something environmentally ready-to-hand has thus been freed (and indeed in such a manner that it becomes accessible as an entity within-the-world fi rst of all), cannot itself be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of Being. (SZ: 85)

16 Although Entschlossenheit is translated as resoluteness in most translations, it is increas-ingly acknowledged that the translation with “openness” is more accurate (cf. Dallery et al. 1990: 134).

17 Th is concept of dis-closedness corresponds with the literally meaning of existence—ek-sistere—as Dasein’s fundamental characteristic according to Heidegger. For Heidegger’s concept of Entschlossenheit, see Blok 2012: 116.

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 229

Human Dasein is in other words not only not conceivable as equipment according to Heidegger. Moreover, this for-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen) is the relational point to which all determinations of the particular use or ser-vice of equipment relates:

Th e “for-the-sake-of-which” signifi es an “in-order-to”; this in turn, a “towards-this”; the latter, an “in-which” of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the “with-which” of an involvement. Th ese relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signify-ing in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as some-thing to be understood. (SZ: 87)

Gibsons perspective on our being-in-the-world does not help to solve this ambiguity with regard to the role of human Dasein in Being and Time. Th is is also not necessary, because Heidegger himself rejected this ex-ceptional posi-tion of human Dasein as well in his later work, and insisted on the ek-sisten-tiality or mutual reciprocity of human Dasein’s responsiveness to the Anspruch des Seins18.

Nevertheless, Gibson’s aff ordance ontology enables a relational reading of Being and Time. Seen from Gibson’s aff ordance ontology, human Dasein’s dis-closedness to the world has to be understood as Dasein’s reciprocity to the aff or-dances in the environment, in which the world is constituted as ready-to-hand for human Dasein as the one who is dealing with this world of practice. With this, it becomes clear that human Dasein and world of practice are constituted by their mutual aff ordance and not the other way around; in the mutual aff or-dance of human Dasein and world, Dasein aff ords the world as ready-to-hand and the world aff ords Dasein’s dealing geared to equipment. From the perspec-tive of Gibson’s aff ordance ontology, we can even conceive Heidegger’s later conception of an Anspruch des Seins as an aff ordance of Being, in which human Dasein and the language of Being become mutual responsive.19

Th e ambiguous role of human Dasein in Being and Time confronts us how-ever with a huge diff erence between Gibson and Heidegger as well. For Hei-degger, only human Dasein is characterized by being-in-the-world. Although Heidegger in his early work explored the understanding of being (Seinsverständnis) of animals (cf. Kuhlken 2012), he stressed the fundamental diff erence be-tween Dasein’s being-in-the-world and non-human beings which are “poor

18 “Th inking, in its essence as thinking of being, is claimed by being. Th inking is related to being as what arrives (l’avenant). Th inking as such is bound to the advent of being, to being as advent. Being has already been destined to thinking. […] To bring to language ever and again this advent of being that remains, and in its remaining waits for human beings, is the sole mat-ter of thinking” (GA 9: 363).

19 Th e further exploration of the applicability of Gibson’s aff ordance ontology on Hei-degger’s later thought is beyond the scope of this article (cf. Blok 2014).

230 Vincent Blok

in world” in his later work (GA 29: 247–248). Seen from the perspective of Gibson’s aff ordance ontology, however, all living beings are reciprocal to the aff ordances of the environment; not only human Dasein but also animals have an understanding of the meaningful world (Seinsverständnis), in which they live and act accordingly (cf. §2). A Gibsonian reading of Being and Time does therefore not only have to reject human Dasein’s exceptional position in the world in favour of a relational conception of our being-in-the-world, but also Heidegger’s exclusion of non-human beings of our being-in-the-world. Because the main question of this article concerns human-being-in-the-world and in-nature, we leave the discussion of Heidegger’s concept of animal exis-tence and return in the next section to the main question of this article.

4. Conclusions: Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature

In section one, it became clear that practical nature is included in the world of practice. In this respect, we can conclude that from a Heideggerian perspective already, being-in-the-world includes our being-in-nature. Point of departure of Heidegger’s analysis is however the world of practice (equip-ment), which is extended to the natural world (practical nature). Gibson’s af-fordance ontology, however, enables us to conceptualize Heidegger’s world of practice as an extension of the natural world. In section two, it became clear that the aff ordance ontology is rooted in but not restricted to natural phe-nomena; it includes artefacts (chairs, hammers etc.), works of art and in the end, it comprises the whole of social and technological signifi cance (cf. §2), i.e. the world of practice; storm and rain aff ords seeking shelter for various animals, but also the building of a house by men for instance. Th e diff erence between both natural and artifactual phenomena is only gradual; both are aff ordances in the environment relative to an organism, and there is no prin-ciple diff erence between both types of aff ordances. Seen from the perspective of Gibson’s aff ordance ontology, therefore, our being-in-the-world has to be understood as an extension of our being-in-nature. We call this an ecologi-cal perspective on our being-in-the-world, because our being-in-the-world of practice is embedded here in the natural world (oikos) in which we are at home; practical nature (cf. Introduction). Being-in-nature means our responsiveness to practical nature which is extended to the world of practice.

Th e advantage of such an ecological reading of Being and Time is that it enables us to reconnect the world of practice/practical nature and primor-dial nature as well. In the introduction, we identifi ed a tension with regard to Heidegger’s concept of primordial nature in Being and Time. Th ere, we framed this tension in the following way: If the practical account of being-in-the-world is extended to our being-in-nature, there seems to be no room for nature in this primordial sense. But if we have to conceive nature in this pri-mordial sense, it is unclear how this concept of nature is related to the natural

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 231

world which is part of the world of practice. With our ecological perspective on our being-in-the-world, we do no longer have to see the natural world as an extension of the world of practice, but the other way around; the world of practice is an extension of the natural world (practical nature) in which we are at home (being-in-nature). Th ere is therefore still room for a conceptualiza-tion of primordial nature, and Gibson’s aff ordance ontology provides us also a way to conceive this primordial nature as the origin of our being-in-nature.

In §2, we have seen that Gibson characterized nature as an unlimited rich-ness and complexity:

Th e environment aff ords many diff erent kinds of food and many diff erent ways of getting food. […] Th ese off erings have all been taken advantage of, which is to say that the niches have been occupied. But, for all we know, there may be many off erings of the environment that have not been taken advantage of, that is, niches not yet occupied. (Gibson 1977: 69)

Besides the actual fi t between human Dasein and nature in our being-in-nature, we have to acknowledge the principle possibility of another possible aff ordance of nature according to Gibson.

With this principle possibility of another aff ordance, we encounter fi rst of all the contingency of the current fi t between human Dasein and the world of practice/practical nature; the meaning of a piece of wood in the workplace seems to be self-evident(it is there in-order-to make a piece of furniture for instance)but may be unsuitable or may provide another aff ordance in another time and place, in a diff erent situation. It is for instance possible that we are responsive to aff ordances which are not or no longer there or that we hold on specifi c aff ordances while others already occurred (cf. SZ: 136–138); this con-tingency is the condition of the possibility of a misfi t between human Dasein and the natural environment (the world of practice/practical nature).

Th e principle possibility of another aff ordance means, secondly, that nature always transcends our actual responsiveness to the world of practice/practi-cal nature. Th e “unlimited richness and complexity” of “the aff ording of life” means that no environment is ever absolutely limitable according to an eco-logical perspective on our being-in-the-world (Gibson 1977: 69); the infi nity and complexity of nature consist in the fact that nature is never exhausted by its aff ordances, is always “richer” and “more complex” than any actual af-fordance of nature, transcends all actual and possible aff ordances of nature.

Seen from an ecological perspective on our being-in-the-world as embed-ded in our being-in-nature, nature has to be understood therefore as the two-fold of the aff ordances of nature (the world of practice/practical nature) on the one hand and the origin of actual and possible aff ordances (primordial nature) on the other; the infi nity of nature. How can we characterize this twofold of nature?

232 Vincent Blok

Based on our previous analysis, we can argue in a formal way: the origin of the aff ordances of nature (world of practice/practical nature) transcends all actual and possible aff ordances. Th erefore, we can draw the formal con-clusion that the origin of the aff ordances of nature itself has no aff ordance on us, do not belong to the world of practice/practical nature. Because the infi nity of the origin of the aff ordances of nature is in this way contrary to the aff ordance, we can characterize it formally in opposite terms. Th e aff ordances of nature are characterized by their demanding character and therefore, the origin of the aff ordance can be characterized by opposite terms as refusal or even repulsion. Th e origin of the aff ordances of nature has to be found in the refusal of nature. In a formal way therefore, we can characterize the twofold of nature as the twofold of the aff ordance and the refusal of nature. With this, we encounter an ecological conceptualization of Heidegger’s concept of the twofold of nature in general and primordial nature in particular (cf. §1). In section one, we characterized the twofold of nature as the twofold of the world of practice/practical nature (unconceal-ment) which stays surrounded by primordial nature as that which “stirs and strives” (concealment). Seen from an ecological perspective on our being-in-the-world, we can conceptualize this twofold of nature in Being and Time as the twofold of the current fi t between human Dasein and its natural envi-ronment (being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature) and the origin of our being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature (primordial nature) on the other. In this way, primordial nature can be conceptualized as the origin of our being-in-nature, which is characterized by its infi nity; our being-in-the-world is not only an extension of our being-in-nature (unconcealment), but our being-in-nature is rooted in primordial nature as its infi nite origin (concealment). In this way, our being-in-the world of practice/practical na-ture is connected to primordial nature.

But what is the nature of this connection and how do we have to concep-tualize this connection of our being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature with primordial nature? Although Dasein’s being-in-nature is reciprocal to the aff ordance of nature (world of practice/practical nature) and in this respect, is in fact a “natural being” (cf. §1), the origin of our being-in-the-world of prac-tice/practical nature (primordial nature) is without our understanding and responsiveness, i.e. is our understanding refused. Th is corresponds with Hei-degger’s basic experience that the world of practice/practical nature does not belong to the Being of nature. But if this is the case, primordial nature is not primarily excluded from our being-in-the-world as Löwith seems to suggest (cf. §1) but the other way around; our being-in-nature (the unconcealment of our understanding of being) is excluded by nature (concealment as the sense of Being). And if human Dasein’s being-in-nature is excluded by primordial

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 233

nature, we are connected and not connected with primordial nature, being-in-nature and not-being-in-nature at the same time.20

It seems obvious to identify the infi nity of nature (concealment) with Heraclitus’ famous phrase that nature has the tendency (fi lein) to conceal her-self 21. However, we must be careful here. In fact, an ecological perspective on our being-in-the-world prohibits the application of anthropocentric terms like fi lein in the domain of nature. If human Dasein consists in our reciprocity to the aff ordance of nature and nature itself transcends all actual and possible aff ordances, this “origin” of the aff ordance cannot be object of direct human experience22. But Heraclitus’ famous phrase should also not seduce us to the hasty conclusion that the refusal of nature is a privation of the aff ordance of nature; the infi nity of nature is not the privation of the aff ordance of nature, but as the origin of actual and possible aff ordances, it is that which allows or grants the aff ordances of nature.

And yet, it seems to be a typical human question how to connect to the twofold of nature. Although we had to reject Heidegger’s exclusion of non-human beings as being-in-the-world of practice/practical nature, here we are at least confronted with a typical human question. Th e specifi c humaneness of this questioning-in-nature and the development of a philosophical method which is able to experience the infi nity of nature (cf. Blok 2013)—a phe-nomenology of the impossible experience of nature, which is an im-possible phenomenology23—have to remain open for future research.

Dr. Vincent BlokWageningen University

Hollandseweg 16706 KN Wageningen (Th e Netherlands)

info@vincentblok.nl

20 In this respect, our conclusion is contrary to the work of Bruce Foltz, who claims that the immediacy and originality of our being-in-the-world provides access to primordial nature (Foltz 1995: 50).

21 Cf. “φύσις δ� καf’ ‘Ήράκλειτον κρύπfεσfαι φιλε‹” (Heraclitus, fragment 123).22 James’ eff ort to develop a ‘thing-centered’ holism ignores this fundamental methodical

question. He presupposes that nature discloses itself entirely within the things we experience: “Th e sense here is that there is nothing ‘behind’ the thing, no antecedent reality of which the thing is a mere appearance or a partial manifestation. Neither is there any place for holism from this perspective, for there is no wider whole of which the thing is a mere part. From this per-spective, the thing is simply the whole story, intrinsically valuable because it embodies reality entire” (James 2000: 369). We presume that the origin of the aff ordance is better understood in terms of Levinas, as an idea of the infi nite (cf. Levinas 1961: xv–xvi). Th e further elaboration of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.

23 For an in depth attempt of such an impossible phenomenology, see the inspiring article of Toadvine 2003.

234 Vincent Blok

Acknowledgement

Th e author would like to thank the reviewers of Studia Phænomenologica and my colleague Wybo Houkes for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Works cited

GA 3 = Heidegger, Martin. 1998. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann.

GA 9 = Heidegger, Martin. 1976. Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann; Pathmarks, trans. McNeill, W. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1998.

GA 24 = Heidegger, Martin. 1997. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, ed. Fried-rich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann; Th e Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Hofstadter, A.Bloomington & Indiana: Indiana UP 1998.

GA 29 = Heidegger, Martin. 1983. Grundbegriff e der Metaphysik, ed. Friedrich-Wil-helm von Herrmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann.

SZ = Heidegger, Martin. 1993. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag; Be-ing and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2008.

Blok, Vincent. 2011a. Establishing the Truth: Heidegger’s Refl ections on Gestalt. Heidegger Studies 27: 101–118.

Blok, Vincent. 2011b. An Indication of Being—Refl ections on Heidegger’s Engage-ment with Ernst Jünger. Th e Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42(2): 194–208.

Blok, Vincent. 2012. Naming Being—Or the Philosophical Content of Heidegger’s National Socialism. Heidegger Studies 28: 101–122.

Blok, Vincent. 2013. Towards the Rehabilitation of the Will in Contemporary Phi-losophy. Heidegger’s Phenomenology of the Will Revisited. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 44(3): 286–301.

Blok, Vincent. 2014. Reconnecting with Nature in the Age of Technology. Th e Hei-degger and Radical Environmentalism Debate Revisited. Environmental Philoso-phy (forthcoming).

Dallery, Arleen B., Scott, Charles E., Roberts, P. Holley (eds.). 1990. Crisis in Conti-nental Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1991. Being-in-the-world. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1992. Heidegger’s History of the Being of Equipment. In Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. H. Dreyfus and H. Hall, 173–185. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Being-in-the-World as Being-in-Nature 235

Foltz, Bruce V. 1995. Inhabiting the Earth. Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature. New York: Humanity Books.

Gethmann, C.F. 1989. Heideggers Konzeption des Handelns in Sein und Zeit. In Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert, O. Pöggeler, 140–176. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Gibson, James. 1950. Th e Perception of the Visual World. Boston: Houghton Miffl in Company.

Gibson, James. 1977. Th e Th eory of Aff ordances. In Perceiving, Acting and Knowing, ed. R. Shaw, J. Bransford, 67–82. Hillsdale, New Jersey: LEA.

Gibson, James. 1979. Th e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston: Houghton Miffl in Company.

Gibson, James. 1982. Reasons for Realism: Selected Esays of J.J. Gibson, edited by E. Reed & R. Jones., R. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Ihde, Don. 2010. Heidegger’s Technologies. Postphenomenological Perspectives. New York: Fordham UP.

James, Simon P. 2000. “Th ing-centered” Holism in Buddism, Heidegger and Deep Ecology. Environmental Ethics 22: 359–375.

Kadar, Andre, Eff ken, Judith. 1994. Heideggerian Meditations on an Alternative On-tology for Ecological Psychology: A Response to Turvey’s (1992) Proposal. Eco-logical Psychology 6(4): 297–341.

Kuhlken, Julie. 2012. A Heideggerian Ethics of Being-with-Non-Human-Others. Work-ing paper.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1961. Totalité et Infi ni. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff .Löwith, Karl. 1989. Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht.

Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.Oudemans, Wouter. 1998. Ernüchterung des Denkens oder der Abschied der Onto-the-

ologie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.Padrutt, Hans-Peter. 2009. Heidegger and Ecology. In Heidegger & the Earth. Essays

in Environmental Philosophy, ed. L. McWhorter, G. Stenstad, 17–44. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Pöggeler, Otto. 1994. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Stuttgart: Günther Neske.Safranski, Rudiger. 1994. Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit.

München/Wien: Carl Hanser.Sanders, John T. 1997. An Ontology of Aff ordances. Ecological Psychology 9(10):

97–112.Toadvine, Ted 2003. Th e Primacy of Desire and Its Ecological Consequences. In Eco-

Phenomenology. Back to the Earth itself, ed. C.S., Brown, T. Toadvine, 139–154. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Turvey, M.T. 1992. Aff ordances and Prospective Control: An Outline of the Ontol-ogy, Ecological Psychology 4(3): 173–187.

Weberman, David. 2001. Heidegger’s Relationalism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 1(9): 109–122.