Published in Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, Issue 7: 505-522

Agenda-setting Dynamics at EU Level: the Case of the

EU’s Cultural Policy

Introduction

A new discourse, in which cultural policy is increasingly

integrated in a broader policy agenda dealing with cohesion

policy, innovation policy and the fostering of growth and

economic competitiveness more generally, has recently gained

ground at the EU level. In 2007, head of governments within the

European Council acknowledged the potential of the ‘cultural

and creative industries’ to contribute to the aims of the

Lisbon Agenda, giving culture full horizontal recognition at

intergovernmental level for the first time. It is,

surprisingly, the Directorate-General for Culture Youth and

Education (‘DG Culture’) of the European Commission, which has

initiated and promoted this policy agenda. The new agenda

differs quite radically from programmatic discourses formerly

defended by DG Culture (and still upheld in certain EU states),

which, laid the emphasis on the specificity of the cultural

sector. Culture indeed used to be perceived as a key element in

the definition process of regional, national and European

identities which, as such, deserved exemption from the

application of free trade principles. Thus, while other DGs of

the European Commission favored a wide application of

competition rules and single market considerations, DG Culture

distinguished itself by promoting an agenda which supported

market-correcting mechanisms and subsidies to the cultural

sector. However, in the absence of EU competence in the field

of culture before the Maastricht Treaty (and because of a

strict application of the subsidiarity principle since then),

DG Culture has always been constrained by a narrow remit and a

marginal share of the EU budget. Since the late 1980s, it has

essentially been in charge of a handful of support programmes

in the fields of literature, living arts and cultural heritage,

which have now been grouped under the Culture Framework

Programme since 2000. In this context, it has always been

difficult for DG Culture to justify EU intervention in the

cultural sector. Its agenda has oscillated between an economic

approach, which could better be justified under the EU Treaty

2

principles, and promoting a cultural policy in its own name.

With the launch of the ‘creativity’ frame, a clear paradigmatic

change has taken place and economic concerns became the core of

the justification for the EU’s cultural policy. This article

aims to explain the drive behind the paradigmatic shift which

characterized the agenda of DG culture and what has made it

possible for DG Culture to assert the new frame within the

Commission, at intergovernmental level, and amongst cultural

actors themselves.

Elucidating how certain policy issues get on top of political

agendas - defined here as the set of issues that receive

serious attention in a polity (Kingdon 1995, p.3) - has been

the object of considerable scholarly attention. Agenda-setting

processes are indeed crucial, since they determine which issues

are to be dealt with and in what terms. Dynamics of agenda-

setting have usually been explained in terms of conflict

expansion. New issues can make it onto political agendas when

the proponents of a given policy frame act as ‘advocates’

(Baumgartner 2007) and succeed in extending the conflict to a

wider circle of actors, so as to redefine the line between the

3

proponents and opponents of the proposal (Princen 2007). Thus,

the constellation of participants to a policy debate impacts on

programmatic possibilities. In studies of agenda-setting,

conflict expansion strategies have usually been understood as

an attempt to expand conflict from a narrow circle of experts

to the public at large (Schattschneider 1960, p.3). The key

element in conflict expansion processes is the way an issue is

defined. The process of framing is therefore central to much of

the agenda-setting literature. Whether authors refer to the

ability of a frame to create a convincing link between

‘problem’ and ‘solution’ (Kingdon 1995; Princen 2007; Rochefort

and Cobb 1994), or to the necessity for the frame to refer to a

familiar and tried strategy, or to the heuristics of the frame

itself (Kohler-Koch 2000, p.521), the nature of the discourse is

taken to matter. Scholar’s interest for issue definition is

based on the simple assumption that depending on how policy

problems are portrayed, or on the qualities of a given ‘policy

frame’ (Schön and Rein 1994), certain actors get empowered,

while others loose control over policy. From the framing

perspective, frames ‘affect which interests play a role during

policy drafting and deliberation and what type of political

4

conflicts and coalitions are likely to emerge as a result’

(Daviter 2007, p.654). Studies on framing also point that for

new frames to gain ground on political agendas, they need to

refer to ‘meta-cultural frames’ which operate at a broader

level (Schön and Rein 1994). The influence of specific ideas is

indeed related to their resonance with broader values, whether

they are termed as ‘worldviews’ (Goldstein 1993), ‘public

moods’ (Jacobsen 1995) or ‘wider societal concerns’ (Rhinard

2010). Besides the definition of policy issues, agenda-setting

studies have also looked at conflict expansion in relation to

institutional factors. The institutional and political

framework within which polities operate has been conceived as

favoring the consideration for some issues while discouraging

consideration for others (Bachrach and Baratz 1962;

Schattschneider 1960). Thus, the rise of issues on political

agendas also depends on the availability of institutionally

favorable conditions within the political system.

EU agenda-setting dynamics have not been the object of

systematic attention (but see Peters 2001), but interesting

insights have come to light in recent years. In particular,

5

recent research has identified the specificities of the EU’s

agenda-setting dynamics, in relation to the existing insights

of the comparative politics literature on agenda-setting

(Princen and Rhinard 2006; Princen 2007). To begin with,

agenda-setting tactics at EU level differ from those at

domestic level in that political actors need to frame their

issues in such a way that they fit the EU’s remit (Princen

2007, p.34). Thus, ‘framing’ is not only about the content of

the policy issue, but also about the scope of policy

intervention. In terms of institutional and political

constraints, studies of EU agenda-setting dynamics find that

neo-liberal policy solutions have a better chance of making

their way on top of political agendas. Baumgartner has argued

that in the EU context, ‘because of the history of ‘market

integration’ as a driving force, terminology associated with

harmonization and free exchange may more often find its way in

the policy process’ (2007, pp.485-486). Finally, another

interesting finding by Princen concerns the process of conflict

expansion at EU level. He explains that the shift of policy

issues to the EU level may lead to a contraction of conflict,

since, in the absence of genuine European public sphere, public

6

mobilization becomes more difficult and less relevant once

policy debates are Europeanized (Princen 2007, p.32). This

leads him to conclude that conflict expansion is not the

dominant process at EU level.

In this article, those findings are examined in relation to the

European Commission’s agenda-setting strategies. While EU

politics scholars have long portrayed the Commission as the

main agenda-setter in EU policy-making, research on the

European Commission does not connect systematically to the

insights of the agenda-setting literature, which has pointed to

a diverse range of conditions for paradigmatic changes to take

place. Scholars have looked at the Commission as an actor,

pointing to the way it makes use both formal and informal

strategies, such as using small-scale actions or building

coalitions with subnational interests, in order to influence

the policy agenda (Cram 1997; Pollack 1997). In studies

focusing on competition between different Directorate-Generals

(DGs) within the Commission, agenda-setting insights have

seldom been used as an analytical tool (but see Harcourt 1998

and Mörth 2000). The need, thus, consists in placing the

analysis of the Commission’s agenda-setting tactics within a

7

broader context of processes and factors that shape the

political agenda at EU level.

The argument, here, is that DG Culture could further its new

policy agenda owing to a conjunction of different factors.

First, the programmatic discourse promoted by DG Culture was

successful in articulating a convincing link between economic

‘problems’ in the EU and culture as a potential ‘solution’

(section 1). This was, however, made possible only because of

the pre-existing power of a broader discursive framework, which

had asserted itself in academic, and policy circles, and which

upheld the knowledge economy and creativity as the cornerstones

of all economic competitiveness strategies (section 2). Second,

the characteristics of the ‘creativity frame’ made it an

efficient tool of mobilization of interests that were formerly

opposed (section 5) and allowed its tenants to overcome

opposition from the arts sector (section 3). The nature of the

frame itself, sufficiently vague to appeal to diverging

interests, allowed DG Culture to succeed in its conflict

expansion strategy, and thus redefine the line between the

proponents and opponents of its agenda (section 4). Here, the

8

argument is that conflict expansion does mater in the EU

context, but conflict expansion strategies are targeted towards

organized interest groups, rather than the ‘public at large’.

Finally, the tenets of the discourse resonated well with the EU

political and institutional context. Thus, if DG Culture could

impose a new policy agenda, the agenda was fine-tuned to become

acceptable by other DGs of the European Commission. DG Culture

could raise the profile of culture, but for doing so it

abandoned its own rhetoric and adjusted to the broader

discursive context of the European Commission. Studying the

processes via which policy agendas are formed is, therefore,

uncovering some of the structural and political biases which

exist in the EU institutional context.

A Paradigmatic Shift: Expansion of the ‘Creativity’ Frame at EU

Level

The ‘creativity frame’ presents culture as an asset, in terms

of its potential to promote European growth and

competitiveness. If this discourse is not new, its dominance of

the EU agenda, the strength with which it is asserted, and the

rhetoric to which it refers are unprecedented. Until less than

9

ten years ago, DG Culture had put forward a dual rationale in

its attempts to justify the existence and the promotion of EU-

level cultural policies. In the absence of any treaty

competence for culture before the introduction of Article 128

in the Maastricht Treaty (now Article 151), finding

justification for EU intervention in the field had always

preoccupied the relevant units of the European Commission. The

European Commission and the European Parliament have indeed

intervened in the cultural field far ahead of Treaty reforms.

Several actions have been introduced in the 1980s, such as the

‘European city of Culture’, the European sculpture competition,

and the access of young people to museums and cultural events

(Littoz-Monnet 2007). The setback in fact persisted even after

the introduction of a Community competence. The Maastricht

approach indeed aimed at providing safeguards for national

autonomy, which is ensured, essentially, with the principle of

subsidiarity. In this context, EU institutions first presented

the developing of EU cultural activity as a political

imperative. If the European Union was to succeed as an entity,

European citizens should be made aware of their belonging to a

common culture. The 1985 Adonnino Reports on a People’s Europe

10

contained specific sections devoted to culture, suggesting the

introduction of concrete ‘European’ symbols to which citizens

could relate - such as the European Flag and the European

anthem (Adonnino 1985). The notion of a People’s Europe was

fairly well established within the European Community of the

late 1980s. At its core was the idea that the integration

project should not be primarily concerned with market-making,

but also with a more ‘fundamental’ project of community

building. Thus, the promotion of cultural policies at EU level

was presented as part of a broader project, the objective of

which was to foster a sense of European identity amongst

Community citizens.

Second, the European Commission placed emphasis on the economic

and social potential of the cultural sector. Linking cultural

policies to the achievement of broader economic objectives is

therefore nothing novel. In the 1977 Communication on Community

Action in the Cultural Sector, which for the first time enounced

proposals for EU-level interventions in the field, the cultural

sector was defined as ‘the persons and undertakings involved in

the production and distribution of cultural goods and services’

11

(European Commission 1977, p.5). The main objectives as set out

in the Communication consisted, essentially, of ensuring free

trade in the cultural sector. In its 1987 Communication A fresh

boost for Culture in the European Community, the Commission asserted

that ‘increased cultural activity is now a political as well as

a social and economic necessity, given the twin goals of

completing the internal market by 1992 and progressing from a

People’s Europe to European Union’ (European Commission 1987,

p.6). Thus, EU intervention in the field of culture has always

oscillated between the application of general free-trade

principles to the cultural sector and promoting a cultural

policy in its own name, justified by the need to make European

citizens aware of the existence of a common identity. With the

launch of the ‘creativity’ frame, the twist was made to make

economic concerns the core of the justification for the EU’s

cultural policy. The horizontal economic potential of culture,

as a factor of economic boost in all sectors of the economy,

had indeed never been the central axis of DG Culture’s

discourse. In particular, no effort had been invested by the

Commission services in framing the specific mechanisms through

12

which the cultural sector could offer a solution to broader

economic concerns.

The take-off of the ‘creativity frame’ came about in the 2006

study The Economy of Culture in Europe carried by KEA European

Affairs, a Brussels-based consultancy which specializes in the

cultural, media and entertainment sectors, for the European

Commission. The rationale subsequently adopted by DG Culture is

largely inspired by the KEA study, which points to the fact

that ‘culture and creativity suffer from an image problem and

their economic role needs to be articulated if the sector is to

gain better exposure amongst decision makers’ (KEA 2006, p.31).

The study provided the Commission services with the data,

discursive arguments and programmatic solutions that were

necessary to the framing of culture as a source of

competitiveness, and, as such, as a key axis of the Lisbon

Strategy.. The 2007 Communication A European Agenda for Culture in a

Globalized World institutionalizes and gives visibility to the

‘creativity frame’. Arguments of the 2006 KEA study are

reiterated, the Communication stating that ‘the cultural sector

contributed around 2.6% to the EU GDP in 2003’ (European

13

Commission 2007b, p.9). The Commission presents culture as a

direct source of creativity, defining creativity in terms of

its potential for social and technological innovation, and thus

as an ‘important driver of growth, competitiveness and jobs’

(2007b, p.9). DG Culture has in fact articulated a conceptual

link between the cultural sector and broader economic concerns

such as growth, employment and social cohesion, through the

fashioning of an ad hoc conception of creativity. The terms

culture, creativity and innovation are used as one being the

source of the other in a rather artificially articulated

triadic relationship between 1) culture as a source of

creativity 2) creativity as a necessary factor for

technological innovation 3) technological innovation as

conducive to growth and competitiveness.

The ‘creativity frame’ promoted by DG Culture has now obtained

recognition at the highest political level. Within the

Commission, the ‘creativity frame’ has gained support from

Commission President José Manuel Barroso. In his speech at the

press conference on the European Manifesto for Creativity and

Innovation in November 2009, he explained that it is important

14

‘to link participants from science to art and culture […] and

put innovation and creativity at the heart of tomorrow's

policies’ (Rapid Press Release 2009). This discourse directly

referred to the core concepts of the knowledge economy agenda.

The discourse fostered by DG Culture has also been adopted at

intergovernmental level. In 2007, the Culture Council has

issued its Conclusions on the contribution of the cultural and creative sectors to

the achievement of the Lisbon objectives, in which the agenda developed

by the Commission is fully endorsed (Culture Council 2007). A

few months later, head of governments within the European

Council acknowledged the potential of the ‘cultural and

creative industries’ as contributing to the aims of the Lisbon

Agenda, giving culture full horizontal recognition at

intergovernmental level. In March 2008, the European Council

also mentioned that the potential for innovation and creativity

of European citizens, built on ‘European culture and excellence

in science’ is a key factor for future growth (European Council

2008). Thus, DG Culture could impose the ‘creativity frame’

within the Commission, which then promoted it as a workable

programmatic solution at intergovernmental level.

15

When the Contours of the Debate frame ‘new’ Agendas

Not any discursive shift could have been successful. The

propagation of the ‘creativity frame’ as a programmatic

solution could be secured only in the presence of an already

established discursive context. On the one hand, the background

was one of perceived failure, by policy-makers at national and

EU level, of past solutions dealing with unemployment, slow

growth and low investment levels. On the other, and as a

response to the former, a paradigmatic shift had already taken

place both in academia and policy circles, shifting us away

from a discourse in which the goals of an economy consist in

producing at the lowest possible cost, to one in which the main

objective is to produce more ‘qualitatively’. DG Culture could

ideally frame culture as an answer to broader economic

challenges in this discursive context. Quoting the words of an

official from DG Culture, ‘there is now a perception that we

are switching to an economy in which the differentiation of

products and all the ‘soft’ elements integrated in the concept

become more important than the functionality of the product

itself’ (Interview with Xavier Troussard, 17 March 2009). In

fact, this reasoning echoes the rationale which lies at the

16

heart of the knowledge economy concept, and which suggests that

in a post-industrialized economy like ours, knowledge, know-

how, and other investments in intangibles, are at least as

important as other economic resources. It is within this

broader discursive shift, which frames ‘intangibles’ as

crucial, yet under-exploited, economic resources, that has

taken place a more specific reframing process, by which the

concept of ‘cultural industries’ has been progressively

replaced by that of ‘creative industries’. ‘Cultural

industries’ was a term put forward in the 1980s in order to

designate the commercial industry sectorsi, such as film,

television, book publishing and music, which also delivered

fundamental popular culture to a national population. However,

despite continuities between cultural and creative industries,

the creative industries concept is ‘trying to chart a

historical shift from subsidized ‘public arts’ and broadcast

era media, towards new and broader applications of creativity’

(Cunningham 2004, p.6). Some academics and policy analysts,

acting as frame entrepreneurs, articulated and propagated this

i The term was coined for the first time by Adorno and

Horkheimer (1979), in their endeavour to highlight what they

saw as a paradoxical linkage between culture and industry.

17

discourse. Howkins has defined the creative industries as

encompassing any industry where ‘brain power is preponderant

and where the outcome is intellectual property’ (2002, p.2). In

The Rise of the Creative Class, Richard Florida (2002) has disseminated

this discourse in policy circles in ways unprecedented. The

2006 Study on the Economy of Culture is straightforwardly inspiring

itself from Florida’s thinking, explaining that ‘the immaterial

dimension generated by creative people, skills, ideas and

processes; in other terms, creativity’ is a specific

competitive parameter (KEA 2006, p.38). Thus, several frame

entrepreneurs have invested the discourse on creative

industries of multifaceted positive undertones, evoking, in

particular, possibilities for a liberating form of work and

lifestyle. Portraying culture as a potential solution to

economic challenges was one rhetorical step away in this

broader discursive context.

The knowledge economy rhetoric has provided DG Culture with a

conceptual arsenal. It was also a discourse that benefited from

a high level of institutionalization at EU level, essentially

since the establishment of the Lisbon Strategy. The ‘knowledge-

18

based economy’ was the watchword of Lisbon and the basic

conceptual lens through which the future model of development

for the EU was conceived (Daly 2006). All policies included in

the Lisbon strategy are envisaged with regard to their

potential for reaching competitiveness objectives. Whereas

ii

19

education, for instance, had already made its way into the

Lisbon strategy, culture was still considered a laggard. An

official from DG Culture explains that ‘the Lisbon strategy is

the central axis upon which everyone tries to encroach

something … since the link cannot be made artificially, our

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interests encompassing the content-rich service industries such

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http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/35220/12290888881stoc

kholm_actionplan_rec_en.pdf/stockholm_actionplan_rec_en.pdf

UNESCO. (2005) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of

the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Available online at:

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf

Websites:

Europa webpage of the European Year for Creativity and

Innovation, http://www.create2009.europa.eu/about_the_year.html

Website of DG Education and Culture:

http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/

doc1199_fr.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/culture/archive/communication/pdf_word/

participants_1st_meet_industries.pdf

31

with the election of ‘New Labor’ in the U.K. in 1997 that the

decisive shift in terminology occurred (O’Connor 1999). In

1998, the Creative Industries Task Force was set up within

DCMS. In her speech at the Nesta Conference, British Secretary

of State for Culture, Media & Sport Tessa Jowell explained that

‘if we see creativity as divorced from commerce then we will

fall short‘ (Jowell 2008). Thus, British policy-makers have

subsumed the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector within

the wider creative industries’ agenda (Galloway and Dunlop

Interviews:

Anna Athanasopoulou, DG Culture, European Commission, 17 March

2009, Brussels, Belgium.

Anne Branch, DG Culture, European Commission, 17 March 2009,

Brussels, Belgium.

Jean-Marc Leclerc, European Music Office, 3 February 2010,

Brussels, Belgium.

Representative of the arts sector at EU level, 23 February

2010, Brussels, Belgium.

Xavier Troussard, DG Culture, European Commission, 17 March

2009, Brussels, Belgium.

32

2007, p.29). In 1998 and 2001, DCMS published the Creative

Industries Mapping Documents, aimed at emphasizing the economic

significance of the creative industries in the U.K (DCMS 1998;

DCMS 2001). According to the 2001 Mapping Documents, the

creative industries in the U.K. generate revenues of around

£112.5 billion and employ some 1.3 million people (DCMS 2001).

In the 2006 Study on the Economy of Culture, KEA European

Affairs is designating the U.K. as the lead country in the

promotion of the ‘creativity frame’. A Northern-Southern axis

appears rather clearly, with Denmark, the U.K., the

Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, accompanied by two new member

states, Poland and Lithuania, listed in the 2006 KEA Study as

having carried research works on the economic potential of the

cultural sector (KEA 2006). The allocation of responsibilities

amongst different ministries also exemplifies of a divide

between a ‘Northern approach’, in which culture tends to be

encapsulated within an instrumental logic, and a ‘Southern

approach’, in which a degree of resistance to the new agenda

exists. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Culture and the

Ministry of Economic Affairs work in very close partnership

when formulating policy orientations. In Finland, policies

33

related to creative industries lie within the remit of the

Ministry of Employment and Economy. In Germany, the Ministry

for Economic Affairs and Technology is responsible for

implementing the forthcoming national cultural industries

strategy (KEA 2006).

Until a couple of years ago, art professionals opposed

resistance to the ‘creativity frame’. Representatives of the

arts sector are indeed concerned about culture becoming fully

instrumentalized. At EU level, two main organizations, ‘Culture

Action Europe’ and Europa Nostra, represent the arts and

heritage sector. They target their lobbying effort essentially

towards EU institutions. In his speech on the cultural

industries, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, former President of Culture

Action Europe, asked ‘Should all types of cultural production be

justified in terms of economic gain? We may find it tactically

useful to use these arguments in our own rhetoric because it is

the language policy-makers want to hear. The problem though is

that this paradigm obliges us to adopt an essentially neo-

liberal worldview’ (Raj Isar, undated). Generally speaking, the

cultural sector fears that EU-level policies in the field

34

become industrial policies, which would not capture the

necessities of creative environments and would essentially

serve the interests of the cultural industries (Interview with

representative of the arts sector, 23 February 2010). At

institutional level, the French Ministry of Culture most

vividly uphold such views. According to the KEA 2009 Study,

‘France’s focus on culture is a resistance to an exclusively

economic vision and illustrates French policy makers’ belief

that such an approach would have a negative impact on

identities and ‘true’ creation’ (KEA 2009, p.142). French

political actors support the view, indeed, that a so-called

‘cultural specificity’ justifies the exemption of the cultural

sector from market mechanisms (Littoz-Monnet 2007). In 1999,

former Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann explained that

‘liberalization of the audiovisual and cultural sectors will

not bring about any benefits. We need to mobilize everyone to

stop the advent of a mono-culture’ (Trautmann 1999). The

assumption behind this stance is that cultural policy is meant

to ensure a space for different types of cultural expression,

including local, regional and national cultural identities, and

that such cultural expressions may not play to a global market.

35

Thus, officials from the French Ministry of Culture perceive

the encapsulation of cultural activities within the existing

creative industries discourse as detrimental to fulfilling this

vital cultural policy objective. Even if the French position is

also driven by economic interests, the discourse adopted

consistently referred to the specificity of culture. A similar

approach is endorsed by the UNESCO, which argues that cultural

goods ‘embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of

the commercial value they may have’ (UNESCO 2005, p.5). The

UNESCO has however developed a discourse which places culture

at the centre of a development strategy. The focus is on

promoting equal access to culture, protecting the rights of

creators and the role of culture in community building (UNESCO

1998). Culture is perceived as a vector of citizen

participation, democratization and greater access to cultural

resources for everyone. It has therefore been framed as part of

a broader agenda, but not an economic one. Although with

certain nuances in their respective discourses, France, certain

Southern European States, the UNESCO at international level,

and the arts sector at societal level, form a coalition which

has opposed the view that culture could be subdued into an

36

economic agenda. Thus, two different conceptions of cultural

policy existed, and DG Culture had, traditionally, been a

natural ally for the tenants of the ‘specificity of culture’

approach. When DG Culture decided to change its approach

towards cultural policy issues, it has, however, been

extremely successful in devising a rhetorical strategy that

could appeal to stakeholders formerly reluctant to such

proposals. If the position of arts professionals has not

fundamentally changed, as will be discussed below, they now

feel like it would be strategically impossible to overtly

oppose DG’s Culture new agenda.

DG Culture’s Conflict Expansion Strategy

Along with the redefinition of its policy agenda, DG Culture

set in place a ‘reach-out’ strategy, directed at other

Commission services, the cultural sector broadly-defined and

‘civil society’.

To begin with, DG Culture has initiated a bilateral dialogue

with other DGs within the Commission. The 2007 European Agenda for

Culture defined the mainstreaming of culture in all relevant

37

policies as a key objective. To this end, an Inter-service

Cultural Group has been created to allow for a better dialogue

between the different DGs. For DG Culture, the challenge

consists in pointing to the presence of cultural elements in

other, formerly seen as unrelated, policy areas (Interview with

Anna Athanasopoulou, 17 March 2009). DG Culture has for

instance, since 2008, established a joint action plan with DG

Regional Policy (DG Regio). To this end, it has made an effort

demonstrating the interconnection between culture, regional

development and cohesion policy. The DG ordered, for instance,

a study on the contribution of culture to regional development,

specifically produced to justify greater cooperation with DG

Regio (Center for Strategy and Evaluation Services 2010). The

officially stated aim of the study is to demonstrate the rich

variety of impacts arising from culture-based interventions in

regional development processes. Given the weight of DG Regio’s

budget, the partnership certainly represents an access to funds

via the ‘developmental’ door. But it is also a means for DG

culture to influence modes of thinking within other Commission

services (Interviews with officials from DG Culture, March

2009). For the first time in 2009, DG Culture has been invited

38

as a participant to Open days, jointly organized by the

Committee of the Regions and DG Regio. For DG Culture, this

represented a chance to ‘reach a new audience, a new public’

(Interview with Anna Athanasopoulou, ibid). The ‘filtering’

strategy is not as easily set in place with DG Internal Market

and DG Competition, but DG Culture has developed its

communication attempts there too. The launch of the European

Year of Creativity and Innovation (EYCI) in 2009 (Webpage of

the EYCI) institutionalizes the link between culture and

broader economic objectives. DG Culture and DG Enterprise and

Industry are responsible for the implementation of EYCI 2009, a

rather unusual partnership when it comes to the common

management of EU-led initiatives.

The European Agenda for Culture (European Commission 2007b) also

defines the launch of the ‘Structured Dialogue’ with the

cultural sector and civil society as a key operational

objective. DG Culture launched the Structured Dialogue in June

2007 around different thematic platforms. Rather than fostering

a genuine involvement of the civil society, however, the

Structured Dialogue extended policy participation to structured

39

interests in the sector. Three platforms have been set in place

to date: the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, the ‘Access to

Culture’ Platform, and the ‘Potential of Creative Industries’

Platform (Webpage of DG Education and Culture). According to

the Commission, the platforms are aimed at complementing

existing consultation processes, encouraging the cultural

sector to work in a more trans-sectoral way, helping the

cultural sector to formulate policy recommendations, and

provide opportunities for these recommendations to be presented

to the European Commission at the Cultural Forum (European

Commission 2007c). By strengthening networks of actors working

in the cultural sector, DG Culture is, first, building a strong

constituency of support for its actions. The traditional

interlocutors of DG Culture have, traditionally, been those

cultural actors which benefited from the Culture Programme

(Littoz-Monnet 2007). The platforms now allow for the

involvement of organizations which ‘represent if possible a

whole sector and have a certain reach’ and are located beyond

DG Culture’s ‘comfort zone’ (Interview with Athanasopoulou,

ibid). Already in its 2007 Communication, DG Culture had

identified the lack of communication between different cultural

40

actors as a major challenge (European Commission 2007b, p.11).

Thus, the Structured Dialogue represents an excellent tool for

DG Culture’s reach-out strategy, which aims at developing a

coalition of interests between the traditional cultural sector,

grouping essentially musicians, artists and authors, and the

cultural industries. Along with traditional cultural

associations, the platforms also include representatives of the

cultural industries, such as the Independent Music Companies

Association (IMPALA) and the Federation of European Publishers

(FEP) (list of participants, webpage DG Culture). By extending

the traditional realm of participants to the policy formulation

process, DG Culture can more efficiently promote the strategic

role of culture as a potential solution to broader economic

challenges.

The themes along which the platforms are structured also orient

the discussions of the participants in directions which fit in

line with the DG’s agenda. In her speech at the constitutive

meeting of the platform on ‘Access to Culture’, Director-

General Odile Quintin that the work of the platform could feed

into the reflections conducted within the framework of the Year

41

on Creativity and Innovation. DG Culture further specifies in

its description of the work of the ‘Creative Industries’

Platform, that ‘the European Year of Innovation and Creativity’

in 2009 will provide, inter alia, an opportunity to explore how to

reinforce the cultural and creative industries in Europe, in

particular Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), as a force for

both economic growth and cultural diversity’ (European

Commission 2008). DG’s culture effort at involving the civil

society is thus going de pair with an effort at structuring

debates along the Commission’s favored agenda. The

participation of the civil society is in fact narrowly

restricted to professional associations and a handful of

powerful private lobby actors. DG Culture uses civil society as

a legitimizing categorization for labeling its interactions

with interest groups, which represent a strong support

constituency for its new agenda. Conflict expansion was

therefore a key element in the agenda-setting tactics of DG

Culture. At EU level, conflict expansion is a potentially more

efficient tool for gaining control over political agendas,

since EU institutions can better control which participants

enter policy conflict. Governments at domestic level, on the

42

contrary, cannot always predict the preferences of the broader

public.

Converging Interests around the ‘Creativity Frame’

The formulation of the ‘creativity’ frame and its all-

encompassing rhetoric made it a strong tool of mobilization of

what used to be an antagonistic coalition of interests.

Societal actors in the cultural sector had a lot to gain by

forming coalitions with formerly distant interests. Within the

‘Creative and Cultural Industries’ platform, representatives of

the audiovisual and publishing sectors and copyright societies

were brought together (list of participants, webpage DG

Culture). If divergences exist, between copyright societies,

which defend a very strict application of copyright

legislation, and representatives of the cultural industries,

which favor greater flexibility for digital content, all actors

have a strong interest in forming an advocacy alliance. First,

by building a coalition, the different sectors can far more

efficiently demonstrate the economic weight of the cultural

industries. This is perceived as crucial, in so far as the

‘Creative and Cultural Industries’ Platform develops its

43

lobbying strategy not only towards DG Culture, but also towards

DG Industry and DG Internal Market. ‘It is better to be

powerful, when you talk about market shares’, argues a

representative of the European Music Office, which operates as

the Secretariat of the Platform (Interview with Jean-Marc

Leclerc, ibid). Second, a degree of interest convergence exists

amongst actors represented in the ‘Creative and Cultural

Industries’ Platform. All sectoral interests favor the

promotion of a regulatory environment more propitious to the

development of cultural industries (Interviews with officials

from DG Culture, March 2009). In its recommendations to the

Commission, the Platform explains that ‘cultural and creative

industries cannot find a place in the classical scheme of

subsidies but require support measures and incentive mechanisms

adapted to their needs’ (European Commission 2008). Amongst

those are listed demands concerning right holders, such as

ensuring that they all benefit from the revenues of the

exploitation of their works, including online, their right to a

fair private copying compensation, and fair agreements between

the relevant stakeholders in resolving illegal digital uses.

Thus, the publishing and media sector is constructing an

44

alliance with cultural workers, and with small-scale cultural

entrepreneurs, around a strengthening of copyright protection.

Third, by working together with copyright societies,

representatives of the cultural industries are hoping to

reframe the discourse on the protection of copyright along

themes benefiting from a positive aura amongst decision-makers,

such as the protection of artists and creativity. When acting

alone, representatives of the cultural industries’ demands are

perceived as a plea for the interests of big corporations. When

developing a strategy together with authors’ societies, they

can more easily refer to arguments focusing on the interests of

artists and creation (Interview with representative of the arts

sector, February 2010). Authors’ societies, on their side,

accept working together with cultural industry representatives

in order to gain a stronger lobbying power.

The traditional arts sector represented, for its part, within

the ‘Access to Culture’ Platform (list of participants, webpage

DG Culture), feels more ambiguous about the programmatic

priorities set out by DG Culture. First, representatives of the

field are of the opinion that some priorities are missing from

45

the European Agenda for Culture (European Commission 2007b), in

particular the role of culture as a key component of European-

Community building. Second, they are not optimistic about being

able to reach a common position together with representatives

of the cultural industries’, who are also represented within

the ‘Access to Culture’ Platform. To them, the cultural

industries are too closely connected with the interests of

intermediaries which transmit cultural content, rather than the

interests of artists (Interviews with representatives of the

arts sector, February 2010). Generally speaking, art

professionals are critical of the functioning of the Structured

Dialogue, which they do not perceive as a genuine means of

influencing policy formulation at EU level. Convergence is thus

not fully taking place, with the cultural sector expressing a

certain degree of resistance to the ‘creativity frame’. This

said, DG Culture has been successful in ensuring the cultural

sector would not openly oppose its agenda. Whilst the

creativity discourse does not match cultural actors’

objectives, the latter have understood that developing this

rhetoric was the only way for DG Culture to extend its remit

and influence within the European Commission, and, by doing so,

46

obtain greater recognition for the interests of the cultural

sector. Apart from obtaining better budgetary resources, the

sector also aims at acquiring recognition, from the part of the

member states, that cultural policy making must have a European

dimension, in particular concerning artists’ mobility and

artists’ rights. In the context of the enlargement of the EU

eastwards, representatives of the arts sector expect that

artists would benefit from the existence of EU-level minimal

standards (Interviews with several representatives of the

cultural sector, February 2010). Thus, the cultural sector is

not in a position to oppose the agenda defended by DG Culture,

in so far as it is the only agenda which can succeed in giving

culture a higher profile in the EU institutional and political

context. Of course, opponents to the creativity frame may still

fight back and recapture the agenda, in the longer run. Art

sector professionals complain about the difficulties they have

encountered in working together with cultural industry

representatives and bearing actual weight on the policy-

formulation process. It is however unlikely that they will

succeed in imposing an alternative frame as a workable policy

solution in the existing EU political and institutional

47

context. Thus, the success of DG Culture in obtaining

horizontal recognition of its new agenda is double-egged. On

the one hand it could propagate its policy agenda very

successfully, but on the other the discourse was framed within

the contours allowed by the political and institutional context

in which it operated. It could, in fact, give a higher profile

to culture, but not in its own terms

Conclusion

The developments discussed here clearly demonstrated the role

of DG Culture as an ‘advocate’, trying to push public policy in

one specific direction (Baumgartner 2007). But more interesting

was the identification of the factors which enabled a DG

considered small and little influential to reframe culture as a

key factor of economic competitiveness, and impose this

programmatic solution both within the Commission and at

intergovernmental level. In this case, the properties of the

‘creativity frame’ itself were key. First, the ‘creativity

frame’ successfully established a connection between certain

policy problems, such as lack of economic competitiveness and

48

slow growth in the EU, and the potential of culture,

encompassed within a discourse on the role of creativity, as a

successful policy solution. EU officials legitimized the idea

that culture could be a solution to broader challenges by

making use of a diverse range of resources: ordering of

‘independent’ experts studies, use of statistics and appeal to

well-established themes such as the knowledge society and the

power of creativity, which were already associated with

positive undertones.

Second, the properties of the ‘creativity frame’ fitted right

in with the broader EU political context. As predicted by

agenda-setting studies, the choice of rhetoric in advocates’

strategies to influence public policy is crucial to determining

whether they can success in overturning existing understandings

of a given policy issue. As argued by Baumgartner, the cultural

policy case demonstrates that rhetoric of an economic nature

more often makes it way in the EU policy process (2007, pp.485-

486). Thus, the developments examined here concur with existing

research which points to the presence of structural biases in

EU policy-making. Given the centrality of the Lisbon Strategy

49

in current EU level policy debates on the future of the EU,

economic arguments are a quasi must-be, when DGs of the

European Commission aim to give a higher profile to formerly

marginalized policy issues.

Third, the properties of the creativity frame made it a strong

tool of mobilization of formerly opposed interests. The nature

of the creativity frame had an impact on which interests were

able to play a role during policy drafting (Daviter 2007,

p.654). Because the rhetoric of the frame was vague, in terms

of concrete policy objectives, it could appeal to

representatives of the arts sector and the cultural industries

alike. While different interest groups certainly did not see

the advantages to be gained from the new agenda in the same

way, they could all perceive potential benefits in supporting

the programmatic shift. Art professionals also acknowledged

that focusing on the instrumentality of culture was the most

efficient path for obtaining more funds for the sector.

Conflict expansion is, in this light, a key factor of EU

agenda-setting dynamics. In the absence of genuine European

‘public sphere’, EU policy-makers do not extend conflicts to

50

the ‘public at large’ in order to change the balance of support

in favor of their preferred agenda (Princen 2007). They can,

however, mobilize organized interests in a policy sector. Mazey

and Richardson (2001) also pointed that, like all ‘state’

bureaucracies, the Commission has recognised that

institutionalising consultation with interests reduces

resistance to its policy proposals. Conflict expansion is,

arguably, a very efficient tool of policy control, in so far as

it is a targeted process towards specific interests. The EU

institutional setting in fact shapes the conflict expansion

strategies of policy actors in a way which allows them to more

efficiently control agendas - than national policy-makers can

in national contexts. If such dynamics were not outlined in

studies of EU agenda-setting, they echo with the results of

existing research on the involvement of European civil society

in EU policy-making. Scholars examining the participation of

civil society in EU decision-making have understood its

involvement into policy debates as a response to institutional

dynamics. Sismans (2003) explains that for the European

Commission, hopes that this would legitimize its position and

the European construction more generally have motivated its

51

recourse to a discourse on the desirable involvement of civil

society. The argument developed here takes this claim further

by pointing to how the involvement of civil society actors can

be used in order to promote not only a broad legitimization of

EU policies, but a legitimization of specific ways of tacking the

policy problems at stake. This is made possible by the ability

of the Commission – and specific DGs – to structure the

organization of communication platforms with societal

interests, both by structuring the gathering of participants

and by shaping the contours of policy debates along their

favored frames.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Falk Daviter, Alexandra Kowalski, Anand

Menon and Mark Rhinard, as well as two anonymous referees for

their very helpful comments. I also would like to thank the

professionals in the field for answering my questions in great

detail during the interviews we had.

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