1

August 2010

Hazim Hodžić1

Lieutenant Colonel

Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Afghanistan – The War for Perceptions?

„I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.“2

Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

„...Winning the trial of strength will not deliver the will of the people, and at the base that is the only true aim of any use of force in our modern conflicts.“3

General Rupert Smith

Introduction

As a retired British general observed in his book on the utility of force, the current

fighting against Iraqi or Afghan insurgents, are about winning the will of the domestic

population. Though this is known to members of the Coalition Forces, there is still a

long way to go before we overcome difficulties that make our approach to “winning

people’s hearts and minds” more comprehensive and less reactive in countering

insurgents’ propaganda. Why is that?

This article encapsulates observations and experience gained during my tour of duty

on NATO’s International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) mission in southern

1 The author of this article is an instructor at the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC)

in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was deployed on ISAF Mission with Danish Army Battle Group (DABG) in the Southern Afghanistan in 2009. The author would like to thank colleagues for their frank inputs and feedbacks on this article. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official policy or position of Ministry of Defence of BiH, DABG or PSOTC. This article has been cleared for public release. 2 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005 at

http://www.weeklystandard.com accessed on 17 August 2010.

3 Smith, R., The Utility of Force (Penguin Books Ltd: London, 2006).

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Afghanistan in 2009, where I was serving as an Information Officer at Danish Army

Battle Group Headquarters. In its first part, the article will discuss some Afghan

insurgents’ propaganda techniques and ways of influencing local population. The

second part of the article will cover possible problem areas that make NATO ISAF

less effective in influencing Afghan population. The third part of this article brings

some observations and experience from the field with regard to planning and

executing influence activities at the tactical level. At the end, the elaboration will be

finished by several conclusions.

Afghan Insurgents’ Influence Techniques – From Forceful Intimidation to Job

Opportunities

When discussing insurgents’ propaganda effectiveness, some authors claim that it is

just a perception that insurgents’ propaganda is functioning well. For example,

Floxely points out that:

„International analysts and media alike often claim that current Taliban propaganda efforts are winning

over the population in Afghanistan and that this is tipping the balance in favour of the insurgency.

Such claims are exaggerated...“4

Floxely’s observation that assessments on the effectiveness of Taliban’s propaganda

are too exaggerated might be true. However, in the field, it can be observed that their

approach to propaganda has its impact among the local population. So what makes

insurgents’ propaganda seemingly effective?

The partial answer could be found in Kilcullen’s classification of the insurgents: “They

are essentially armed propaganda organizations”5. Through different forms of threat

to use force or use of force itself, the insurgents intimidate local population, spreading

fear in order to stop cooperation with NATO and Afghan Security forces. While on

one hand insurgents’ propaganda techniques have some effect on local population,

on the other hand those techniques have some weaknesses as well.

4 Tim Foxley, „The Taliban’s propaganda activities: how well is the Afghan insurgency communicating

and what is it saying?“ (SIPRI Project Paper, June 2007). 5 George Packer, “Knowing your enemy”, New Yorker, 18 Dec 2006.

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An example of the forceful intimidation took place in a village in northern Helmand in

the summer of 2009. The insurgents killed a number of villagers who were

cooperative towards ISAF. Quickly, they have realized that this manner of “wining

hearts and minds” of the local population could be counterproductive. The local

insurgents’ leadership started propaganda campaign, accusing NATO forces that

they have massacred the villagers. For this, like in many other propaganda

campaigns, the insurgents spread misinformation through word of mouth, sending

messengers or armed patrols in surrounding villages to “inform” the local people.

Besides the fear spreading, the insurgents use “night” letters to intimidate local

population. The “night letter” is a written message to an individual or group of

villagers which are left during a night on a door of targeted person or local leader.

The content of those letters is mostly intimidating, threatening a target to stop

activities which are supportive to ISAF or Afghan government. Whether this method

of influencing local population was effective or not, during a campaign of the local

officials in the town of Gereshk I witnessed a situation when they tried to hire local

teachers to support establishment of the local primary school north of the town in the

spring of 2009. Soon after an announcement for the local teachers to come and work

in newly established primary school, they have started to find “night letters” on the

doors of their houses. The local school was not operating even in autumn 2009 due

to the lack of teachers, which was a direct result of the Taliban intimidation campaign

by the method of “night letters”.

Attacks on Afghan Security Forces as well as on NATO forces by suicide bombers in

the town of Gershk and in its vicinity were not unusual. In the period from May to July

2009, the insurgents conducted five suicide attacks. However, the victims of the

attacks were mostly civilians; more than 50 civilians were killed and more than 100

were injured. In order to minimize the collateral damage and mitigate negative

effects of suicide bombing, which local Pashtun tribe do not accept as an honourable

way of conducting warfare, the insurgents decided to warn local population prior to a

possible suicide attack. The information was circulated through written or oral

messages delivered by the insurgents themselves. The message would usually warn

the local population not to be present at certain place and certain period of time due

to a possible suicide attack. This example of influencing local population by

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informing them about possible suicide attacks illustrates that insurgents have realized

the importance of communication and to show that they care about the local people,

even if taking a risk that such information could be passed to the NATO or Afghan

Security Forces. However, based on local population’s reactions, those warnings

have a no long-term impact on their perception regarding justifiable ways of fighting a

war. The local population still sees attacks by suicide bombers as something which is

against their tradition.

With the aim to refrain the local population from engaging in legal economy, the

insurgents stimulate poppy production by providing access to the black market,

protecting poppy harvest and providing jobs for hundreds of jobless people in the

southern Afghanistan. The purpose of stimulating poppy production is multifaceted.

First of all, the stimulation of the poppy production supports insurgents’ funding

through a steady supply of the raw opium which is in later stage processed into drugs

and smuggled outside Afghanistan. In several raids conducted by Afghan and NATO

Security Forces on insurgents’ illegal drug production facilities, tenth of tons of raw

opium and hundreds of kilos of high value drugs were destroyed in the valley of the

river Helmand north of Helmand’s provincial capital from the period of April to August

2009. However, another insurgents’ objective to stimulate illegal poppy production is

to gain and keep popular support from the local population by providing job

opportunities to thousands of jobless people. By doing so, the insurgents portray

Afghan Government incapable of providing jobs and better living for the population.

Similarly, the insurgents conduct “armed propaganda” outside of the theatre of

operations in order to ruin credibility of the ISAF forces and decrease the support of

the people in countries that send troops on the mission. The insurgents do not make

an ambush to degrade NATO forces physically, they do it to make a spectacular

media coverage and in that way influence people outside Afghanistan. Due to the

global media reach, such footage goes out almost in real time and soon, after it can

be found on YouTube or any other internet site accessible to the insurgents. There

are many preconditions to get the propaganda footage out quickly, but the main one

is that insurgents’ command structure is flat, so in order to make the decision on

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getting something out into the global information domain is not very time consuming.

As Kilcullen says it is a “Classic armed information operation”.6

Even though the insurgents in Afghanistan continue to fight against Afghan and

NATO security forces traditionally, by using the “hard” power, they have also realized

the importance of the use of the “soft” power, as well, in order to achieve their goals.

In their battle for “hearts and minds” of the local population the insurgents use

different techniques to influence the local population; from forceful intimidation to

more complex and profound methods of communicating their cause. However, many

of those techniques, besides positive, render some negative aspects which should be

exploited through ISAF and Afghan security forces’ influence activities.

ISAF Influence Activities - Doctrinal Ambiguities?

The second part of this article will present a snapshot of problem areas, which make

ISAF influence activities less effective in winning “hearts and minds” of the local

population. The first issue is related to doctrinal understanding of the terminology:

Information Operations and Influence Activities. Another problem area that will be

examined is related to the functional set up – the structure of the Influence Activities

staff function at the tactical level headquarters.

The precondition for any multinational operation is to have a doctrinal interoperability

on subject in question. In the case of Information Operations and Influence Activities,

it means to, at least, have a common understanding of their terminology and

application of those concepts among ISAF troop contributing nations. However, as

Neil Chuka rightly points out that “...Information operations (Info Ops) doctrine has

probably produced more disagreement and confusion amongst the nations…,

academics, and the media, than any other military doctrine subject…"7

The main problem is that some NATO nations (USA, Denmark) use Information

Operations construct and terminology, while for example UK use construct of

Influence Activities. In the case of Information Operations, the term “Information

Operations” is defined by NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.10 as:

6 George Packer, “Knowing your enemy”, New Yorker, 18 Dec 2006.

7 Neil Chuka, Canadian Army Journal, Volume 12.2. Summer 2009.

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“A military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities

in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of

adversaries and other NAC [North Atlantic Council] approved parties in support of

Alliance mission objectives.”8 The main tools and capabilities that comprise the

Information Operation concept include Psychological Operations (PSYOPS),

Presence Posture and Profile (PPP), Operational Security (OPSEC), Information

security, Military deception, Electronic Warfare (EW), Physical destruction, Key

Leader Engagement (KLE), Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Civil Military

Cooperation (CIMIC). The Public Affairs (also known as Media Operations) is a

separate but related function that must be coordinated at all times with alliance

Information Operations.9 This NATO publication does not define Influence Activities

or their relationship with Information Operations.

In the case of the construct of Influence Activities, the term “Influence Activities” is

defined in the British Defence Doctrine as “…the capability, or perceived capacity to

affect the character or behavior of someone or something...”10 The elements and

capabilities of the construct of Influence Activities are: Information Operations, Media

Operations, CIMIC and OPSEC. As shown in Figure 1 below, in the Influence

Activities construct, the Information Operations are functionally subordinated to the

Influence Activities, consisting of PSYOPS, CNO, EW, Military deception, KLE and

PPP. Secondly, in this construct CIMIC, OPSEC and Media Operations (NATO’s

Public Affairs) are at the same doctrinal level in support of Information Operations.

8 NATO, AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Ratification Draft 1, (Brussels:

NATO, 2008).

9 NATO, AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Ratification Draft 1, (Brussels:

NATO, 2008).

10

British Defence Doctrine (August 2008)

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Figure 1: UK Influence Activities Concept

The doctrinal differences explained above, unavoidably lead towards confusion and

friction in application of Information Operations or Influence Activities concepts on

multinational missions. Prior to deployment into the mission area, the Danish Battle

Group Headquarters’ staff members had the training in planning and conducting

Information Operations, using its national doctrine which is in line with NATO’s

Information Operation doctrine. However, the Battle Group was deployed into UK’s

area of responsibility in the southern Afghanistan. The UK unit Headquarters (being

superior to the Danish Battle Group) used the concept of the Influence Activities.

Misinterpretations of terminology, staff structure and planning procedures related to

Information Operations/Influence Activities led to daily confusion and, consequently

to frustration between these two headquarters. The side effect of this functional

confusion was that we were more reactive than proactive towards insurgents’

propaganda. It took almost a month before these, doctrinally caused, problems were

sorted it out.

Doctrinal differences that subsequently lead to confusing situations, directly

influencing operational effectiveness in the critical functional areas, such as

Information Operations in multinational counterinsurgency campaign in the southern

Afghanistan, should be avoided at any price. A possible solution to this problem

could be to have those nations that will work together on a mission, to be trained

together as well.

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In the case of Danish Battalion, we have used Information Operations concept in the

initial phase. However, later on, we have adjusted more towards the Influence

Activities concept. This was mainly for the fact that our concept was not compatible

with the concept of our superior unit and, secondly, it has been assessed that the

Influence Activities concept is more effective than the Information Operations one.

The reason for this assessment comes out of the fact that Influence Activities concept

includes and coordinates Information Operations, CIMIC and Media Operations. In

this way, the Influence Activities construct centralize all available non – kinetic assets

and through their synergic use creates a precondition for the effective influence on

the behaviour of the target audience. However, regardless of which concept is used,

when a multinational operation is concerned, it is important that these concepts are

understood and interoperable in order to avoid misunderstandings and operational

ineffectiveness.

The second problem area in Influence Activities concept is the staff structure of this

function at the tactical level headquarters. The structure of the tactical level (in this

case a) depends on the role and mission of a unit and it varies from nation to nation.

When it comes to the specific function, here we are focused on the Information

Operation/Influence Activities; the structure of such staff function should be more or

less similar, in order to be operable and effective on a multinational mission.

However, this is not a case in reality; even the functional structure might differ from

unit to unit even if the units have the same mission and they belong to the same

nation. During my tour of duty, the Information operations function was belonging to

the department of operations (Figure 2) with PSYOPS function subordinated to it.

Other related functions, CIMIC and Media Operations were belonging to other

departments.

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Figure 2: Danish Battle Group Staff Structure of the Information Operations

This structure reflects the application of the Information Operations doctrinal concept

which served as basis for the staff pre-deployment training. The reason for having

Information Operations within Operations Department was that in this case, the

Information Operation Officer was able to monitor the operational situation,

coordinate the use of lethal (Fires) assets to influence the target audience and to

provide timely inputs to planning of the future operations. While this structure

facilitated the use of lethal assets to achieve an effect in the Information domain, it

created certain difficulties to coordinate the use of other non-lethal assets (CIMIC and

Media Operations) since they were situated in other staff departments. The second

problem was that such structure was not operable to one that was set up in the UK

(superior) headquarter. The UK headquarters used Influence Activities construct

where all the non-lethal assets were within Influence Cell.

In order to create a better synergy of lethal and non-lethal assets and to increase

operability with our superior headquarters, we had to find out the solution that would

meet those requirements. After the initial difficulties, we created a permanent

Information Operations Working Group consisting of the representatives from CIMIC,

Media Operations, PSYOPS, Fires, Operations and Intelligence department. The task

of the Working group was to plan and monitor the execution of the Information

Operations within the Battle Group’s area of operation.

The creation of the Working Group has had a positive impact on the planning related

to the Information Operations. However, it did not improve the information flow on a

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daily basis regarding current operations, since the Working Group had weekly

sessions, and secondly, it had little impact on our interoperability with the superior

headquarters. Based on the lessons identified, it is recommended to apply Influence

Activities construct and to establish separate department – Influence Cell within the

staff, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: A Possible Influence Activities Staff Structure

By bringing all key non-lethal assets together, negative organizational aspects,

mentioned for the Information Operation construct, are minimized. The information

Operations within the Influence Activities construct retain coordination function of the

other assets. Besides that role, the Information Operations function would have a

leading role in planning of the future Influence Activities. However, two points have

to be emphasised: the first one is related to the relationship between Information

Operations, PSYOPS and Media Operations function and the second point is related

to relationship between the Influence cell and other staff departments.

The Media Operations functions within Influence cell has to retain its independence

from PSYOPS in order to preserve its integrity and neutral nature. The Media

Operations should be coordinated by the Information Operations as well as PSYOPS,

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but in any way the Media Operations function cannot be used as a supplement to

PSYOPS function. An example of the media abuse, CNN in particular, took place in

preparations for the attack on Fallujah in Iraq in 2003 by US Marine Core unit

commander. In short, the commander abused CNN news to disseminate PSYOPS

message that the attack on Fallujah had been started. Afterwards, it was verified that

the attack mentioned in the news started three weeks later. 11

However the key non – lethal assets are in the same cell, the coordination between

the Influence cell and the other departments has to be very close in order to

synchronize the use of other, lethal, assets in order to achieve the desired effect on

the target audience. On the other hand, close cooperation and coordination between

the Influence cell and Operations department, for example, is a precondition for the

synergy of Influence Activities and combat operations.

Planning and Executing Influence Activities at the Tactical Level – Notes from

the Field

At this point of the article, we will present some observations related to the planning

and execution of the Influence Activities which were collected during the author’s tour

of duty.

In counterinsurgency operations, such as one currently being conducted in the

southern Afghanistan, the main objective is to win over the local population in order

to mobilize them in the struggle against the insurgents. Even though the offensive

operations against the insurgents cannot be excluded from the list of the ways and

means fighting an insurgency, they should not be considered as the main way of

defeating the insurgents. When discussing what constitutes the victory in the

counterinsurgency war, David Galula says that

“...Victory is won and pacification ends when most of the counterinsurgent forces can safely

be withdrawn, leaving the population to take care of itself with the help of a normal contingent

of police and Army forces. It is therefore necessary to make the population participate

actively in the counterinsurgent effort, to mobilize it in the struggle.”12

11

Transcript of CNN News aired on 4 Dec 2004 at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS accessed on 20 August 2010.

12 Dave Galula “Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958”, RAND Corporation, 1963, USA, p. 168

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In the initial phase of the deployment of our battalion, we planned and used the

Influence Activities as a supporting effort to the combat activities and once an

offensive operation was over, the Influence efforts would die out as well. However,

we have realized that the Influence Activities must have their continuity – The

Influence Activities have to be planned well in advance to be executed in shaping

(preparatory), executing and sustaining phase of an offensive campaign in order to

gain the support of the local population. Therefore, it is vital for successful

preparation and execution of a camping to involve Influence staff officers in planning

of such camping from an early stage of the planning process in order to achieve

effective synergy of non – kinetic efforts through preparation, execution and post

kinetic (combat) efforts.

In our further discussion, we will be elaborating practical examples of the application

of Presence, Posture and Profile, Key Leader Engagement and Psychological

Operations, as well as the Influence Activities tools and capabilities, in the area of

responsibility of our battalion.

The Presence, Profile and Posture (PPP) are Influence Activities that, if properly

applied, can have significant influence on local population. These activities are

described in NATO Information Operations doctrine AJP 3.10 as follows:

“Deploying even limited capability to the right place at the right time can add substantial

credibility to messages being delivered through other channels and provide a major

contribution to deterrence. The posture of troops on the ground can demonstrate both

commitment and intent and must be considered and balanced with the requirements of force

protection. The decision to wear berets instead of combat helmets and body armour can

make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both the adversary and local people.” 13

Initially, the operational pattern of units in our battalion was that they were patrolling

during the day through different villages in our area of responsibility and then, at the

end of the day, patrols would come back into their camps. After the analysis of our

13

NATO, AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Ratification Draft 1, (Brussels:

NATO, 2008).

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patrolling plans we have identified that our patrols were out in the villages during a

certain period of a day, without being present in the villages during the night. Such

operational pattern had several negative consequences. First of all, it gave a window

of opportunity to the insurgents to operate during the night; to come to villages, seek

for logistic support and intimidate the villagers. By giving an opportunity to the

insurgents to operate during night, our operational pattern produced the second order

effect on the local population. The population did not feel safe and their perception on

our forces was negative because they perceived our forces as incapable to protect

them. It was more than obvious that our operational pattern should not give an

opportunity to the insurgents to operate not only during the day. In accordance with

our conclusions, we have changed our patrolling plan, sending out patrols randomly

during the day and setting ambushes during the night.

The posture of a unit is related to its task, associated assets to conduct a task and its

protection. These elements have to be balanced in order not to offend the local

population, on one side and, on the other, not to endanger soldiers of a unit. For

example, when patrolling through areas which were known as supportive to the ISAF

and Afghan Government and where there were no signs of insurgents’ presence,

weapons on our combat vehicles would be pointed down to the ground. Secondly,

during meetings with the local population in those areas, our soldiers would not wear

helmets and their weapon would not be in an offensive posture. However, the

balance of unit’s offensiveness and its force protection is driven by good intelligence

and the risk assessment by unit’s commander.

When talking about the profile of our patrols, it means if they are accompanied

(combined) by the members of Afghan Security Forces (Police or Afghan National

Army) or not. Having in mind that the mission of NATO forces is to assist Afghan

Government and its forces in establishing a legitimate control over the country,

whenever the situation allowed our patrols were combined. We did not have any

major problems of having a unit of Afghan National Army attached to our units since

its soldiers are professionals and dedicated to win over the insurgents (except

occasional logistical problems that those units experienced and when our logistical

support had to be provided). However, when it comes to forming a combined patrol

with Afghan Police, we have encountered number of issues. First of all, the Police

have a very bad reputation in the eyes of the local population due to their

background, poor professionalism and presence of high level of corruption among its

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members. Many Police members are used to be the members of different private

militias which were ruthlessly fighting each other for the domination and control over

the local population prior and during the establishment of the Taliban regime. The

local population has no positive memories about these militias form the time when

they were torturing villagers and collecting illegal taxes. Our unit received many

complaints against the local Afghan Police. Those complaints were related to the

illegal taxation at Police checkpoints and intimidation of the villagers if they do not

provide goods to police members.

We were aware of the importance of having combined patrols with the Police. The

main goal was to promote them in front of the local nationals and in that way to

influence them to accept the Police as Governmental and their own security forces.

However, by promoting the Police with bad reputation we could endanger our own

credibility. Therefore, the decision was made to train the local police by our Military

Police, on one side, and on the other, to launch a Psychological Operations

campaign (through Battalion owned radio station, posters and handbills delivered to

the population) in order to increase awareness of the Police members as well as of

the local people about Police members code of conduct. In the aftermath, the

number of complains, received from the local nationals against the Police, was

decreased, but still worrying somehow. Therefore, our next step was to request from

the Police authorities to screen members of the Police and to replace those with

compromising background with the new, trained recruits. However, due to the fact

that even local high ranking Police officers are not immune to the corruption the

screening process did not provide expected results.

Key Leader Engagement is an Influence tool for planning and coordination of the

engagement of the key personalities in the area. The main goal of the key Leader

Engagement is to identify key leaders, synchronize the engagement of commanders

and units at different levels with key leaders and to provide coordinated framework

for common themes and messages to be communicated across different target

audiences.

There are many preconditions for successful Key Leader Engagement. First of all, a

key leader has to be identified. Secondly, the cultural awareness is a precondition

that can win or ruin whole activity. It was not the case, until recently, that some

nations would form a team of specialists – anthropologists (Human Terrain Mapping

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Team) and send out into the mission area in order make an anthropological survey

that would provide valuable information on all cultural aspects related to the human

terrain in the area of interests. Thirdly, planning has to be centralized and all assets

used for messaging have to be coordinated by one staff function. When talking about

messaging assets, they range from the commanders and soldiers to different

Psychological Operations tools (radio, handbills, newspapers etc.).

The planning and coordination of the Key Leader Engagement should be done by

Influence Activities Cell for framework (everyday) and deliberate operations, as well

as for contingency situations. In the case of our battalion, for the planning and

coordination purpose of the Key Leader Engagement we would have a weekly

coordination meeting, in order to identify the engagements of the target audience

(villagers and their leaders), messages to be passed and assets which will

disseminate messages in the upcoming week. As a result, an Influence officer would

publish an annex to weekly operational order that would consist of all these details.

However, for a deliberate operation it would take several coordination meetings,

before producing a final plan for the engagement of the key leaders in the area. The

planning and subsequent coordination of the Key Leader Engagement is necessary

in order to have control over the dissemination of the consistent and coordinated

messaging. In reality, it would mean that all the personnel who has a contact with the

local population and its representatives (either face by face or through other media)

know what messages are supposed to be passed across, by whom, at which place

and what time.

Here we have mentioned the contingency planning for the Key Leader Engagement

in cases such as flooding, large scale forest fire or suicide bomber attack, for

example. It is worth to elaborate an example of my battalion Key Leader Engagement

in several suicide bomber attacks that produced massive scale of civilian causalities.

The first suicide bomber attack took place in the downtown of Gereshk several weeks

after our arrival to the area. Seemingly, the target was Afghan Police patrol in the

area of the local market. However, the result of the attack was dozens of civilian

casualties. The local town hospital could not accept all the casualties, so in minutes

after the attack, casualties were being transported to the medical centre in the camp

where battalion’s HQ was situated. In such situation, where we did not have a unit

available on the camp to assist the process of casualty security screening on the

main gate, transport from the main gate to the medical centre and transport of

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causalities from the centre to the local helipad for air evacuation and follow on

treatment in the hospital 40 kilometres away, the battalion’s HQ staff had to be

engaged.

The situation way quite confusing, with plans in place not rehearsed to the

satisfactory level. While majority of the staff was focused on what was going on and

around the camp, there was no action taken to reassure the local authorities and

population that we were there to help them. This means that we did not dispatch a

patrol even close to the spot to observe and assist Afghan Army or Police in case

they needed support in follow-up of the security operation.

From the point of Key Leader Engagement, we did not contact local authorities

(though we could do it over a cell phone): Mayor of Gereshk town, District Governor,

Police or Afghan Army local commanders; director of the local hospital in order to ask

if any kind of assistance is needed and show that we care. We also did not

communicate, over battalion’s radio station, to the local population in order to show

empathy with those who lost their loved ones, on one hand, and on the other hand to

discredit the insurgents and exploit the situation in our favour.

Based on after action analyses, we have produced a contingency Key Leader

Engagement Plan in case of suicide bomber attack and mass civilian causality

situations. Unfortunately, we had the opportunity to exercise the Plan on several

occasions triggered by suicide bomber attacks in and around the town of Gereshk

during the rest of our tour. In those cases that followed, immediately after a suicide

bomber attack, the meeting would be conveyed involving key personnel involved into

the Key Leader Engagement. The meeting was chaired by an Influence officer. After

an initial update on the situation by an operational officer, other staff members would

start contacting key leaders in the area. The feedback and requirements received

form the key leaders would have been exchanged on the following meeting and

necessary actions undertaken. Parallel to that, we would also contact the local

people over the radio and provide them with necessary information on available

medical treatment at our medical centre, if the local hospital cannot handle all

casualties or other information of similar nature.

In this way we have provided coordinated and controlled actions of the staff involved

in the Key Leader Engagement and more importantly, by communicating with the

local leaders and population, we have influenced the perception of those people of

being alone in such convoluted situations.

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Psychological operations (PSYOPS) as one of Influence Activities and for NATO

“The primary purpose of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is to influence the perceptions,

attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with North Atlantic

Council approved PSYOPS objectives, to induce or reinforce behaviours favourable to

overall Alliance objectives.“14

Earlier in this article, we have elaborated on a relationship between Media

Operations (Public Affairs) and Psychological Operations. However, there is a need

to point out the difference between these two types of operations. The Psychological

Operations are aimed at the specific approved target audience; their messages are

controlled, they have to be truthful and credible and disseminated in order to

influence the behaviour of the target audience.

However, the Media Operations is focused on dissemination of uncontrolled

information in the form of news to the wider audience, with an aim of informing the

audience without being expected to change their behaviour.

There are many ways to disseminate a message to the target audience such as

printed products, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, telephone and

the Internet.

In countries like Afghanistan where literacy is low, where information infrastructure is

poor and where the most common way of disseminating information is face to face;

the planers and executors of Psychological Operations have to find a balance

between available and the most effective assets to achieve the desired effect. In the

case of our battalion, we had some designing and printing capacities which were

used to produce handbills in order to disseminate messages. Taking into account

literacy constrains, it is of critical importance to make a message on a handbill

understandable without being overly descriptive, but rather more pictorial in order to

communicate effectively. The printing capacity at the battalion, proved to be very

important in cases when there was no time to obtain products produced by superior

HQ due to long delivery time. However, the design of those in-house manufactured

14

NATO, AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Ratification Draft 1, (Brussels:

NATO, 2008).

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products had to be approved by the superior unit. That’s why it is important to have a

stock of pre-approved handbills with long-term lasting messages such as those

related to mine awareness.

The most effective method of conveying a message in our area of responsibility was

a standalone FM radio station. It is mission critical assets in a counterinsurgency

campaign, conducted in areas where there was a very limited number of public radio

stations that could be hired for Psychological Operations. The effectiveness of using

a radio station depends on proper planning, programming and management of the

daily broadcast. When it comes to the planning of Psychological Operations and

particularly using a radio station, we have to emphasise that plans are made not only

for deliberate operations, but also for the framework operations (every day routine

security operations; i.e. patrolling, check points, meetings with key leaders etc.) in

order to provide continuous communication with the target audience and influence

their behaviour.

When it comes to the planning of deliberate combat operations, it is critical to involve

Psychological Operations Officer from the early beginning into the planning process

in order to provide advice on how a radio station could be used during an operation.

Secondly, plans for using a radio station, in order to support a deliberate combat

operation, have to be synchronized with plans of using manoeuvre combat units. This

is not only critical from operational security perspective but also from the perspective

to achieve the synergy of all operational efforts. For example, in one of deliberate

operations that my battalion has conducted, it was planned that once the manoeuvre

units start with the operation that battalion’s radio station would broadcast pre-

recorded message by the battalion commander in order to inform the villagers why

the operation was being conducted in that particular village and to encourage them to

cooperate with ISAF and Afghan Security Forces and resist to the insurgence. In this

case, the Psychological Operation Officer was monitoring the development of the

situation on the ground and once the conditions were met, he gave the green light to

the radio operators to broadcast the message.

On planning framework Psychological Operations, the planning span would go from

two weeks to a day. The product of the bi-weekly planning was a plan that covered

what messages, to whom, with what aim was to be broadcasted by our radio station.

The daily planning was more related to the exploitation of daily events in order to

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promote Afghan Government, Afghan Security Forces or discredit the insurgents in

the eyes of the local population by broadcasting ad-hoc generated messages.

The inputs for messages were coming from different sources: patrol reports,

intelligence reports, meetings with local leaders etc. Is important to mention that

broadcasted messages had to be truthful, credible and based not only on generic,

overall mission narratives, but specific enough to reflect events from the local area

and in that way to be more acceptable by the local population (i.e. it is not enough to

broadcast only messages which in nature promote strategic objectives of the Central

Afghan Government and ISAF, but to broadcast messages which are anchored in the

events, relationships of the local nature, but still fitting in into the overall mission

narrative). The main challenge, at early beginning, for Psychological Operations

Officer was to convince the unit commanders and the staff how important it was to

report to him all potentially exploitable events.

When mentioning programming, it usually means putting together a daily broadcast

programme for a radio station. One of the general observations regarding the

content of radio programmes owned by ISAF forces around the area where my

battalion was stationed was that radio stations broadcast local music most of the

time. A radio programme should be based on needs of the local population in order

to become listened and received by the people.

In the creation of the programme of our radio station we used cultural knowledge of

the local interpreters who were working as radio operators. The second source

consulted in making the programme was the local population itself, since parts of the

programme were designated for live interaction with the local population using mobile

phones. So, the feedback received from the local population was used in order to

improve our programme.

When it comes to the management of daily broadcast, it included manning of the

radio station with skilful radio operators and managing guest speakers on the radio.

As already mentioned, the radio operators were local interpreters with no skills and

knowledge about journalism. The first step that had to be done was to train them in

basic reporter’s skills; how to prepare and make an interview, how to draft a news

report etc. The training was done by a professional journalist working for the office of

Media Operations. Second step was to change their working culture in a way to

understand the importance of timely broadcast of events that were programmed.

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The best way to communicate a message or news over the radio station to the local

population is through their leaders and local authorities. However, in our case, before

we could get a message or news communicated to the population through the local

leaders we had to meet some preconditions.

First of all, we had to make some of the local leaders aware of the importance to

communicate to those to whom they are responsible to – the local people. On the

other hand we also had to break domination over the radio station by those local

leaders who knew how communication with the local population through the radio is

influential and how they could use for their own political gain. Therefore, we

scheduled addresses of local leaders to the population in our radio programme

regularly, on weekly basis, observing the principle of equal opportunity. Then we

asked ourselves how credibly are messages delivered by the leaders (i.e. district

governor) who had never visited villages in the area and who are literally unknown to

the people. In order to overcome this problem, some of them were asked to give a

video statement (most of the rural population has no TV). Video statements, along

with some local entertaining movies made up a package of a mobile cinema. A

mobile cinema consisted of simple components: laptop, beamer, screen and

electrical generator. The cinema was operated by soldiers in different companies.

The content of the mobile cinema was presented in villages across our area of

responsibility. It was very well received by the villagers. After the initial success with

the first package for the adult audience, the packages have been created in order to

entertain the children in villages in our area of responsibility.

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Conclusion

The insurgents in Afghanistan have realised the importance of using results of the

global information revolution for their own causes. The insurgents use an indirect

approach to achieve their strategic political objectives: the use of the armed

propaganda to discredit ISAF and Afghan Security Forces with the final goal to

undermine the Afghan Government’s efforts to bring better life to Afghan people. By

doing so, they try to create perception amongst the population that their actions are

legitimate (though not legal); therefore they should support the insurgents’ struggle.

In their battle for “hearts and minds” of the local population the insurgents use

different techniques to influence local population. Weaknesses of insurgents’

propaganda should be exploited through ISAF and Afghan security forces’ influence

activities. The main opportunities to be exploited are related to: illegitimacy of Afghan

insurgency, atrocities that the insurgents make towards civil population, suicide

bomber attacks which are not supported by majority of Afghans, failure to run the

country during Taliban period and drug production and support to poppy production

which is not Islamic.

Doctrinal differences existing in the area of Information Operations and Influence

Activities unavoidably lead towards confusion and friction in application of Information

Operations or Influence Activities concepts on multinational mission. Regardless of

the concept used, in a multinational operation, it is important that these concepts are

understood and interoperable in order to avoid misunderstandings and operational

ineffectiveness. Another possible way to avoid problems in this area on a

multinational mission is to have staff to train together prior the deployment.

For the effectiveness of Influence Activities, it is critical to group Information

Operations, Media Operations, Psychological Operations and Civil Military Operation

under one functional umbrella – cell. However, the distinctive relationship between

Media and Psychological Operations has to be made so that Media Operations would

retain its independence and objectivity. On the other hand, close coordination

between the Influence cell and other departments has to be kept in order to

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synchronize the use of other assets to achieve the desired effect on the target

audience.

The Influence Activities must have their continuity – The Influence Activities have to

be planned well in advance to be executed in preparatory, executing and sustaining

phase of an offensive campaign in order to gain the support of the local population.

Therefore, it is vital for successful preparation and execution of a camping to involve

Influence staff officers in planning of such camping from early stage of the planning

process in order to achieve effective synergy of non – kinetic efforts through

preparation, execution and post kinetic (combat) efforts.

Key Leader Engagement is a tool that could contribute to the overall success of a

counterinsurgency effort if planned, properly executed and coordinated by the

Influence Cell/officer. Contingency plans should be developed for those cases where

the local authorities might not be able to cope with the complexities of the situation.

The application and coordination of the Presence, Profile and Posture, as an

Influence Activity is very important in a counterinsurgency campaign. The presence

of a unit among local population means having an influence of the population.

However, patrolling plans have to be periodically analyzed in order to avoid patrolling

patterns. Whether a unit is in an offensive or defensive posture does influence a

perception of the local population. Therefore, the commander has to make risk

assessment, based on available intelligence, on force protection.

For the success of the Psychological Operations not only the continuous planning

and coordination is required, but the balance of various methods of application

regarding the spread of information and target audience’s capabilities to receive and

understand the messages as well. At the tactical level, besides dissemination of

generic messages to achieve operational and strategic objectives, it is important to

communicate messages which are anchored in the context of local events. In the

absence of doctrinal procedures, techniques and technical capabilities an initiative

and improvisation efforts have to be undertaken in order to overcome those shortfalls

and achieve the desired effect by Psychological Operations.