A Thorny Issue in Turkish-EU Relations: Minority Protection

Özden Zeynep Oktav

Abstract

Minority protection is a sensitive issue not only for EU itself but also for the candidate

states because minority protection condition for EU membership expresses a norm that has

no solid foundation within the Union. While some member countries have ratified

constitutionally guaranteed protection for minority cultures and languages, others, like

France, does not even recognize any minorities and has neither signed nor ratified the most

important international conventions on minority protection. In this context, minority

protection condition for EU membership exacerbates the feelings of mistrust towards EU and

enhances the fears that EU is encroaching on Ankara’s sphere of influence. Ankara’s strong

opposition to the categorization of the Syriacs, Kurds, Alevis, Romas and Circassians as

minority is a facet of these fears and feelings of suspicions about EU’s hidden agenda. The

Sevres syndrome of Turkey becomes most evident when the above-mentioned groups are

considered as minority by the Copenhagen criteria because Ankara insistently defends the

idea that these groups are Muslims and therefore cannot be categorized as minority in

accordance with the treaty of Lausanne. Much more interesting is that the members of the

above-mentioned groups generally refuse to be considered as minority and their ideas about

minority definition is not so much contradictory with that of official circles in Ankara.

Generally speaking they demand enhancement of their rights in terms of non-discrimination

or equal citizenship and they assume not just a leading role in Turkey but also that of a

patron over it. They strongly believe that minority status is not a suitable one in order achieve

this goal under the current conditions of Turkey.

Key Words

Minority, discrimination, equal citizenship, constituent people, multiculturalism,

assimilation.

Associate Professor, Yıldız Technical University, Pol. Science and Int. Relations Dept. 34349 Besiktas İstanbul ozoktav@yahoo.com / alantar@yildiz.edu.tr

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Introduction

With the declaration of Turkey‟s candidate status to the full membership to the

European Union (EU) during the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999, a series

of political reforms were implemented by Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The

Helsinki Summit, thus, “placed Turkey within the stream of conditionality-compliance

principles.”1 Some analysts argue that the influence of European conditionality has been

overestimated; however, those reforms have led to a transformation of Turkish politics so as

to create new dynamics driving democratization in Turkey. Most important of all, the reforms

initiated a hot debate about Turkey‟s most sensitive issue, minorities‟ protection which has

become a major bone of contention between Turkey and EU.

The foremost reason why minorities protection issue has always become a barrier in

Turkey‟s relations with the EU is that Turkey‟s integration with Europe or „Europeanization‟2

automatically led to a social transformation and reformulation of the state in Turkey.

The confusion over the very definition of the term “minority” between Turkey and EU

mainly stems from the fact that Ankara sees the criteria taken into consideration by the EU in

determining which groups constitute minorities as an attempt to encroach on Ankara‟s sphere

of influence because Turkey takes the view that there is no need to grant minority status to

people of different ethnic origin because they already constitute the Turkish nation and enjoy

equal rights and are not the “outsiders” in the Turkish society whereas the Greeks, Armenians

and Jews are minority and “outsiders” and therefore can enjoy minority rights.

Put differently, Ankara has been at loggerheads with the idea that the nation no longer fits into

the sphere of the state, namely the logic of Europeanization when it comes to its Muslim

groups such as Alevis, Romas, Circassians, the Kurds and the Syriacs (who are Christians but

not officially recognized as minority in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty). Ankara rejects

a definition of minority based on language or ethnicity, instead, recognizes only religion as a

valid basis in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty. Thus, in Turkey, non-Muslims are

viewed as minorities and are called not Turks but Turkish citizens whereas Muslims are called

Turks. This approach of Ankara has been at odds with the dominant international view on the

issue.

1 Kıvanç Ulusoy, Turkey’s Reform Effort Reconsidered, 1987-2004, European University Institute Robert

Schumann Center for Advanced Studies Mediterranean Programme Series, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No

2005/28 http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/05_28.pdf. 2 Gerard Delanty & Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization,

London, Rutledge, 2005, p.6.

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In this context, the question of vital importance is whether the minority group

members will be subject to state definitions or not. For example, although linguistic minority

rights were granted under article 39/a of the Lausanne Treaty, 3 Ankara did not fully

acknowledge those rights to Turkish citizens of-for instance-Kurdish origin, until the adoption

of the EU reform packages in 2002-2003 because of the constitutional stipulations which

prioritized national integration over minority and cultural rights. “The Turkish nation-

building process which has involved cultural homogenization and the introduction of a super

culture at the expanse of differences among the society” 4

has always been a source of fissure

in Ankara‟s relations with the EU.

Another area of friction is EU‟s dilemma of implementation and dispute over what

constitutes a national minority in international politics. The absence of a minority rights

regime and an internal consensus on norms and practices in this field lead to decreasing

credibility of the EU in the eyes of third countries such as Turkey. “The practices of the

current member states range from elaborate constitutional and legal means for minority

protection and political participation to constitutional unitarism and outright denial that

national minorities exist.” 5

Another issue that added to the complexity of relations is that “while in its external

policy, the EC/EU spread the concept of positive protection through specific rights of persons

belonging to national minorities, in its internal agenda the EC/EU continued to promote the

negative protection through the principle of non-discrimination.”6 Put differently, minority

protection has not been considered by EU as suitable for its domestic use on the contrary, it

has been viewed as an export article.7 For example, while only prohibition against

discrimination is seen as a panacea in EU‟s internal policy, Turkey has been strongly advised

to apply specific, positive rights that enable the members of minorities to receive preferential

3 “The Report for Minority and Cultural Rights”(Summary), Sabah, October 2004,

http://www.sabah.com.tr/ozel/azinlik194/dosya_194.html. 4 Şule Toktaş, “EU Enlargament Conditions and Minority Protection : A Reflection on Turkey‟s Non-Muslim

Minorities”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 489-490. 5 Gwendollyn Sasse, „Minority Rights and EU Enlargement: Normative Overstretch or Effective Condionality?‟ ,

in G. N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward,

Hungary, Creatch, 2004, p. 65. 6 Ivo Pospsil, Protection of National Minorities and the Concept of Minority in the EU Law, A Paper to be

Presented at the ECPR 3rd Pan-European Conference, Bilgi University, İstanbul, 21-23 September 2006, p. 4. 7 Brunu de Witte, The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority Protection Policy, Minority Protection and

Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward, ed by Gabriel Toggenburg, Open Society Institute, 2004, p. 107.

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treatment.8 This became another source of friction which hinders the mutual trust between

Turkey and the EU.

In sum, apart from analyzing the obstacles to effective solutions to minority protection

issue between the EU and Turkey, this study mainly aims to give an insight about the views

and demands of different ethnic and religious groups such as the Kurds, Alevis, Circassians,

Syriacs and the Romas who are considered by the EU as minorities but are not given minority

rights by Ankara. Both the EU officials and Turkish decision makers prefer to remain

indifferent to perceptions and demands of these groups regarding their status in Turkish

society.

In this research, the views and opinions of parliamentarians, policy-makers,

academicians, representatives of non governmental organizations and other decision- makers

who belong to those non-Muslim groups, Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, Syriacs and the Romas

have been analyzed in order to understand whether they want to be considered as minority

like the Jews, Armenians and Greeks. This case study does not claim to be representative of

all members of the the Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, Syriacs and the Romas. However, the field

study is expected to provide us with at least some insight into what they think about being

categorized by the EU as minorities. Also, this case study can be a vantage point through

which one can initiate further questions. The field research was made in İstanbul, Diyarbakır,

and Mardin. It employed field survey along with qualitative data collection from in-depth

interviews in villages and city centres. Each group was asked various questions; however, the

interviews were made mainly under two headlines: Do they consider themselves as a

minority? What kind of solutions to their problems do they formulate?

The Kurds

According to many in Turkey, the Kurds are portrayed as minorities for the sake of

entering the EU and this is considered by some official circles including public officials at

highest levels as conspiracy and betrayal of the state. For example, the then Chief of Staff

Yaşar Büyükanıt blamed the EU for creating new minorities in the Republic by calling ethnic

and religious communities, such as the Alevis and Kurds, minorities.9 This openly shows that

debating the definition of minority or minority protection is a taboo and stand as a domestic

issue rather than a foreign issue in Turkey‟s relations with the EU.

8 Ivo Pospisil, „The Protection of National Minorities , and the Concept of Minority in the EU Law‟, A Paper to

be Represented at the ECPR3rd Pan-European Conference Bilgi University, İstanbul, 21-23 September 2006. 9 Minority Rights Group International, “A Quest for Equality:Minorities in Turkey,” p. 7 in

http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/MRGTurkeyReport%5B1%5D.pdf.

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Most important of all, Kurds vehemently reject the minority tag because according to

them, “minority status, although guaranteeing full democratic rights, imply less than full

equality as co-founders and co-owners of the Republic of Turkey.”10

Almost all of the Kurds I

interviewed decline to pursue official minority status. Instead they seek to be recognized as a

“constituent people”, prefer to be stakeholders in the Republic of Turkey along with the ethnic

Turks. Most of the Kurds agree that a civilian constitution accepting and respecting all the

cultural differences so as to create a democratic atmosphere would be an absolute solution to

the existing problems because the real problem in Turkey is the stereotypes and prejudices

concerning Kurdish culture and language and its perception by majority of the Turks as a

threat to the territorial and national unity. 11

Some Kurds assert that Kurds‟ enthusiasm to be seen as “constituent people” is a

demonstration of Kurds‟ inferiority feelings. According to them, the Kurds should cope with

such feelings and formulate new policies so as to adapt the UN definition of minority.12

If the

Kurds were given minority rights, it would mean the promotion of the existing rights of the

Kurds and therefore those minority rights should not be rejected by the Kurds.13

Similarly, a prominent Kurdish researcher and intellectual, Tarık Ziya Ekinci, refuses

the idea that the Kurds are “constituent people” in Turkey on the ground that the Kurds are

not sovereign people and they do not have equal constitutional rights with the majority Turks

and Kurdish is not an officially recognized language. The Kurds have never been officially

recognized by the state and their rights have never been included into the constitutional

documents such as 1921 and 1924 constitutions. From Ekinci‟s perspective, insistence on

being the „constituent people‟ strengthens the rhetoric of some Turkish officials and serves the

interests of those people whose ultimate aim is the Turkification of all the Kurds. He adds that

the Kurds are a minority and they should not view the minority status as a humiliating one. It

10 Michael M. Gunter, „Turkey‟s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem‟, Middle East Policy, Vol.

XIV, No. 1, Spring 2007, p. 122. 11 Interview with Abdullah Demirbaş, the previous mayor of Sur (Central Diyarbakir) (he was dismissed from

office in June 2007 by the Council of State and the Municipal Council was dissolved for providing multilingual municipal services.. The case is now before the ECtHR. 27 October 2008, Diyarbakır. After local elections were

held in March 2009, Demirbaş was reelected by taking 70 percentage of total votes.. 12 „Article 27 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR, which prohibits States Parties

from denying national minorities in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own

culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.‟ Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev. 1) Minority Rights,

http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs18.htm. 13 Halil Aksoy, chairman of DTP İstanbul Organization, „Birleşmiş Milletlerin Azınlık Tarifi ve Kürt Sorunu‟,

NavKurd, Nevroza ve Piroz be, January 2006, http://www.navkurd.net/nivisar/aksoy/kurt_sorunu.htm.

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should be borne in mind that the factors determining the status of a nation are sociological and

historical facts rather than individual intentions. 14

Now the Kurds voice their demands more loudly than ever before for a new

constitutional resettlement in which the existence and rights of the Kurds are recognized

before Turkey can legitimately accede to the EU.

The sole Kurdish ethnic party in the parliament, the Democratic Society Party (DTP)15

members put forward “Democratic Autonomy Project” as a solution to the Kurdish question.

According to this Project, what is meant by democratic autonomy is transcending the

current hard line, centralist, bureaucratic and clumsy administrative structure. The Project

mainly aims to form 20-25 autonomous regions all over Turkey so as to strengthen local

administrations. The Project does not accept the concept of nation based solely on ethnic

origin, on the contrary, it defends a different perception of nation based on different cultural

characteristics with a special emphasis on a feeling of belonging to Turkey (Türkiyelilik)

rather than being Turkish. In addition, the DTP members16

emphasize that this project has not

been formulated as a solution not only for the Kurds themselves but also for other groups

belonging to different ethnic and cultural groups such as Laz, Circassians and Alevis. 17

On the other hand, the Kurds favoring the ruling party, the Justice and Development

Party (AKP) policies in the region generally have similar demands to those of DTP

parliamentarians but they harshly criticize DTP‟s way of solution to the Kurdish question on

the ground that they put emphasis on their dependency to the PKK and Öcalan rather than

formulating new policies which take the Kurds‟ real practical problems into consideration

without resorting to war.

Another point worth to be mentioned is that Public services are not provided in any

language other than Turkish, even in areas populated predominantly by the Kurds in eastern

and south-eastern Turkey. This effectively disqualifies those Turkish citizens who have not

received any formal education and thus cannot speak Turkish from receiving any public

14 Interview with Tarık Ziya Ekinci, 24 November 2008, “İstanbul and „Avrupa Birliği ve Kürtler‟”, Bağımsız

İletişim Ağı haber merkezi, 28 December 2004.

15 The Constitutional Court decided to close down pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for "becoming focused on terroristic activities" on 11 December 2009 and soon it was replaced by BDP (Peace and Democracy

Party).”, “The Pro-Kurdish Party Closed Down by the Constitutional Court”, Bianet, 14 December 2009,

http://bianet.org/english/minorities/118850-pro-kurdish-dtp-closed-down-by-constitutional-court.

16 Interview with Gülcihan Şimşek, mayor of Van, Bostaniçi, 20 November 2008, İstanbul and Necdet Atalay,

chairman of DTP Diyarbakır Organization , 27 October 2008, Diyarbakır. 17 Demokratik Toplum Partisinin Kürt Sorununa İlişkin Çözüm Projesi, Gün Matbaacılık, September 2008, pp.

3-20.

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services. Another Kurdish intellectual from the ruling party, AKP believes that Turkish

should be the official language but demands that Kurdish be valid language in some places

like hospitals, post offices, and courthouses so that the Kurds can have access to public

services He emphasizes that the Kurds do not demand the Kurdish language to be recognized

as a second official language because there are many other ethnic languages such as Laz,

Circassian, Georgian and Bosnian. But he adds that there are millions of people of Kurdish,

Syriac and Arab origin who cannot speak Turkish in the south eastern Anatolia. 18

The

Provincial Administrative Law of 1949 allows the Ministry of Interior to change „village

names that are not Turkish and may give rise to confusion‟.19

In the past decades, particularly

during late 1920s and 1930s, and after the military intervention in 1980, the names of scores

of Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian villages and towns were changed into Turkish. However,

the original names of these places remained in the collective memory of the local population

and are used by many Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians in daily life. Today especially the

Kurds who constitute the most populous minority group among the others and according to

the estimated numbers, range from 10 to 23 per cent of the population demand government

revise this policy stemming from the Cold War period.

All the Kurds from both the AKP and the DTP/BDP strongly believe that a general

amnesty for the PKK militants will ensure the peace. However, the Kurds generally have been

very pessimistic about the future solution to the Kurdish issue and the ruling party‟s goodwill

on the ground that the AKP realized only cosmetic changes with the “democratic opening”

initiated in 2009.20

They also note that the AKP is unable to enact such a law in a war

atmosphere which exacerbates the existing polarization among the society and many believe

that the DTP/BDP agitates this atmosphere and therefore does not make any contribution to

the restoration of the peace.

Despite many bold steps taken by the AKP government such as lifting the ban on the

public use of Kurdish, enacting a new law allowing for private institutions to teach Kurdish

and founding a new channel (TRT Şeş) broadcasting in Kurdish as a result of “Democratic

Opening”, current situation concerning the rights of the Kurds is quite negative and not

promising due to several reasons. One is the deep cleavage and lack of trust between the

18Interview with Muhammed Akar, lawyer, the vice chairman of AKP Diyarbakır organization, 28 October

2008, Diyarbakır. 19 Law on Provincial Administration, No. 5442, 10 June 1949, Official Gazette, no. 7236, 18 June 1949, Art.

2(d)(2) in Minority Rights Group International, “A Quest for Equality:Minorities in Turkey,” p. 18 in

http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/MRGTurkeyReport%5B1%5D.pdf.

20 For further information see Levent Köker, “A Key to the „Democratic Opening‟: Rethinking Ethnicity,

Citizenship and Turkish Nation State”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 49-69.

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ruling party, AKP and the most popular Kurdish ethnic party, the BDP seen by many as

representing the outlaw separatist organization, the PKK. Second, the 10 percent threshold in

Turkey for parties to enter parliament still stand as a barrier especially for the BDP. For

example, 12 Kurdish politicians registered as independent candidates in an attempt to get over

the 10 percent threshold and join the elections of 12 June 2011. Turkish electoral board,

however, blocked those Kurdish politicians on the ground that they were ineligible to run for

parliament because of their prior terrorism-related convictions.21

This exacerbated the existing

situation and led to the street demonstrations of the PKK in south eastern Anatolia and big

cities.

In a nutshell, the Kurds‟ current status in Turkey is quite blurry and far from being

scrutinized by the EU mainly due to the fact that the EU harmonization process is no longer at

the top of the Turkish government‟s agenda.

Alevis

The basic reason why Alevis reject minority status is the fact that they have been

culturally and historically very deeply rooted population in Anatolia. All they want is to have

equal citizenship status, not to be discriminated, to be recognized and respected by the state as

well as the Sunni members of the society.22

According to some, although minority status is

not so much favored by the Alevis, their current status is lower than minority status. The

Alevis are not even granted with equal citizenship status. 23

From Alevis‟ perspective the issue is related to the ideology lying behind the nation-

building project which was based only with the idea of Turkishness with its Sunni-Hanefi

pillars.24

Therefore, those who are not Turkish and Sunni have been further alienated not only

from public sphere of life but also from state and its institutions. For example, among the 81

cities all over Turkey, there is only one governor (Çankırı governor) who is of Alevi origin.25

21 “Turkish Election Board Blocked Independent Candidates” Sabah, 19 April 2011.

22 Interview with Ali Rıza Erkan, manager of Radio Barış (Pecae), May 2008, İstanbul and interview with Ali

Balkız made by Cem Gurbetoğlu, „Alevis Want Equal Citizenship‟, Evrensel 21 June 2008,

http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4151&Itemid=50. 23 Interview with Fevzi Gümüş, lawyer and chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Organization, 23 November

2008, İstanbul. 24 In the 1980s, leaders of military coup introduced the „Turkish-Islamic synthesis‟ as semi official doctrine to

contain the revolutionary left which Alevis represented. 25 Interview with Feyzi İşbaşaran, Elazığ MP from Justice and Development Party, 22 September 2008, Ankara.

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In this context, what Alevis generally seek is “a revised citizenship model in terms of rights

assuring the condition of neutrality among culturally diverse individuals”26

Another point worth mentioning is that with the emergence of Kurdish issue, although

a big percentage of Alevis are of Kurdish origin “they tend towards the principle of unity and

stress their religious identity and affiliation as Alevi.”27

For example, a university professor of

Alevi and Kurdish origin emphasizes his Alevi identity over his Kurdish one and fears that

categorization of Alevis as a minority group might lead to a partition of Turkey. 28

As

socialism lost its former importance as an ideology, Alevis rediscovered Aleviness as an

ideology and began to redefine themselves as egalitarian and libertarian rather than socialist.

For example, Çamuroğlu defines himself as libertarian having a socialist Marxist background

and because small micro powers create barriers, construct new walls within the society, he

does not favour multiculturalism.29

When it comes to Alevis‟ demands and the ways of solutions to their problems, the

Alevi Associations Federation within Turkey (which includes almost all Alevi associations in

Turkey), for example, demand total elimination of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the

Turkish Republic (Diyanet) 30

According to Alevis, the existence of the Department31

clashes

with the concept of laicism. Moreover, they reject their priests (dedes)32

to be paid by the

26 G. Koçan and A. Öncü, „Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial‟, Journal of Historical

Sociology. Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004 p. 464 in Bedriye Poyraz, “EU Minority perspective and the Case of Alevilik in

Turkey”, European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Mediterranean

Programme Series, EU Working Paper RSCAS No. 2006/24, p. 2. 27 Reha Çamuroğlu, “Alevi Revivalism in Turkey” in T. Olsson, E. Özdalga, and C. Raudvere (eds), Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998, p. 100 in

Poyraz, EU Minority perspective and the Case of…..p.4. 28 Interview with Prof. Dr. K. E., 2 December 2008, İstanbul. 29 Interview with Reha Çamuroğlu, MP from Justice and Development Party , 28 May 2008, İstanbul.

30 “Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkish: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) is an official institution established in 1924 after the abolition of the caliphate. Founded by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as a

successor to Shaikh al-Islam, it represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. As specified by

law, the duties of the Diyanet are to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam,

enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places. The Diyanet had an

allocated budget of 1,308,187,000 YTL or USD $0.9 billion for the year 2006. The number of staff of the

Directorate is 117.000” For further information see www.diyanet.gov.tr .

31 “There are a lot of different interpretations of Aleviness. For example, Cem Vakfı (one of the Alevi

associations) demands representation within the Directorate of Religious Affairs.” Oral Çalışlar, Aleviler Ne

İstiyor?, Radikal, 13 November 2008. 32 “A member of a hereditary priestly caste, they lead the Alevi religious ceremony, the cem. During these

ceremonies, religious poems in Turkish are sung, and men and women perform ritual dances (semah).”

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Diyanet on the ground that it clashes with secularism33

and some believe that it will lead to

Sunnization of the Alavis.34

According to Bardakoglu (the head of Diyanet) “Alevism is a cultural system, a sect

within Islam, and Alevis are de facto Sunni Muslims.”35

This is perceived by many Alevis as

reflecting assimilation policy of the state which favors mainly the interests of the Sunnis, the

major Islamic sect and dominant culture. According to some Alevis, Aleviness is a separate

religion; they do not fast, do not pray five times a day, do not go to pilgrim (hac), and do not

believe in fate. Although they do not fulfil the above-mentioned requirements of Islam,

official perception of Aleviness as a sect or subculture within Islam is met with a cold

response by many Alevi intellectuals. According to them, this official posture of Turkish state

stems from policy of undermining the differences so as to create a homogenous society rather

than a multicultural and pluralistic one.36

In this context, despite the softening of state policies, together with EU-induced

reforms, the Alevis, to a large extent, have been reluctant to turn a new leaf in their relations

with the AKP which they view its ideology and policy are largely irreconcilable with Alevi

notions of ethic and justice. Because they have not believed that the AKP with its Islamist

roots could overcome and find a modus Vivendi with the Alevis, without subjecting them to

assimilation. For example, AKP‟s initiatives for the enhancement of the rights of Alavis were

not welcomed. For example fast breaking (iftar/ dinner) organization by Reha Çamuroğlu37

was met with little support. From leftist, anti-Islamist and secular Alevi organizations‟

perspective, the ruling party‟s iftar mainly aimed at appeasing the European Union in its

33

Ali Balkız, Head of the Alevi Associations Federation, “Alevis Want Equal Citizenship”, Evrensel, 21 June

2008 in Alevi News Agency,

http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4151. 34 Interview with Ali Rıza Erkan, manager of Radio Barış (Peace), May 2008, İstanbul. 35 Milliyet, 2 February 2004 and Refwold, The UN Refugee Agency, “Turkey: Situation of Alevis”, (2005-May

2008), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 27 May 2008, [accessed 14 November 2008],

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4885a91a2e.html. 36 Interview with Ali Yıldırım, Vice-Chairman of Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Organization and Publisher of the

journal “Yol” and lawyer, 23 November 2008, İstanbul. 37 Çamuroğlu resigned from his position as a consultant to the Prime Minister in June 2008 on the ground that

his reform package was not put into practice. Sabah, 13 June 2008.

“He wanted to take some reformative steps such as three-staged project and prepared a report in which cemevi

(house of worship for Alevis) would be officially recognized and these reforms would include a publicly

financed Alevi version of the Diyanet as well as funding for some Alevi organizations. Çamuroğlu‟s proposal

also includede the provision of land and funds for cemevi construction , as well as the broadcasting of Alevi

cultural programs in the state media. Alevi dedes would be state officials and be paid by state like imams.”

“Three Staged Reform Package for the Alevis”, Milliyet, 24 November 2007.

11

demands for more inclusive policies. Some went further to say that iftar was a plot to destroy

Alevi identity through assimilation into the Sunni mainstream.38

Apart from their demand for the total elimination of the Diyanet which has the

monopoly over official religion, the Alevis demand that „Cem Evis‟ be officially recognized

as houses of worship and be supported by the funds of the state budget just like the mosques

. For example, while the electricity and tap water expenditures of mosques are paid by the

state, the cem evis are not supported in the same way for the above-mentioned reason.

Ina addition, Alevis‟ demand to have their children excluded from obligatory religious

classes has fallen on deaf ears. This is another acute problem between the Alevis and the

government. For example, Hasan Zengin, an Alevi living in Istanbul, after exhausting all

internal legal means, petitioned to the ECHR in Strasbourg on 2 January 2004.39

In July 2006,

the ECHR ruled in favour of the Alevi family, saying that Sunni religious class violated

article 9 of the European Charter on Human Rights regarding freedom of thought, conscience,

and religion.40

The court ruling prompted defensive statement from AKP education minister

Huseyin Celik, who said that an Alevi citizen does not have the luxury to exempt himself

from religion classes.41

Although the education minister officially agreed to allow schools to

teach Alevism42

, the government has failed to include any of Alevi doctrines or beliefs in

religious instruction classes so far. The Alevi philosophy which defends the idea that religion

is a personal matter and not something that should influence state makes it evident that the

Alevis represent the bedrock of Turkey‟s secular block.

The Romas

Although Romas in Turkey are articulate in their claims to be citizens of the Republic

and loyal to the state, almost all of them have been excluded from the society in their daily

life experience and are often confronted with treatment as second-class citizen. 43

The most

important problem of Romas in Turkey is the inadequate housing ranging from forced

evictions and demolition of entire communities to exposure to extremely substandard living

conditions. For example, with the „urban transformation project‟ (kentsel dönüşüm projesi) in

Sulukule where the Romas live intensively since Byzantine period, the Romas are subjected

38 Radikal, 11 January 2008 in Kerem Öktem, “Being Muslim at the Margins and the AKP”, Middle East

Report, June 2008, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer246/oktem.html. 39 Radikal, 6 June 2004, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=121424&tarih=06/07/2004. 40 Rıza Türmen, “Compulsory Religious Course and the Ambivalence of Little Eylem”, Milliyet, 10 November,

2008. 41 Milliyet, 7 September 2006. 42 Turkish Daily News, 25 February 2004. 43 Interview with the chairman of Organization for the Development of Roman Culture, Ş. P., 15 November

2008, İstanbul.

12

to forced evictions and sent to Taşoluk, a place 40km far from İstanbul where they face added

hardships. In Sulukule, there were 300 musicians living in the district in the past and Sulukule

was the center of entertainment, music and tourism. But today, due to the “urban

transformation project”44

being conducted by the Fatih municipality, Sulukule is on the brink

of demolition.

According to Sulukule Romas, after transformation project was initiated in 2005 by

the AKP government, they felt themselves as minority. Because formerly they used to live in

their own ghettos and they had never felt as discriminated. They view minority status as

humiliating and they define themselves primarily as Muslims and after that as Turks and

Roma.

Because access to secure, permanent employment that enjoys social insurance cover

and contractual security is entirely absent, they generally work in the unskilled manual labour

such as basket production, with little opportunity in semi-skilled or skilled artisan

occupations.45

Although there are many examples of individuals who work as police officers,

engineers or university lecturers, these are exceptional and these individuals keep their Roma

identity as a secret. Generally speaking, because Romas are not so much aware the content of

minority term and because it conjures up associations of partition of Turkey, they do not

accept to view themselves as a minority.46

However, some view Romas in Turkey as a

minority on the ground that Romas have a distinct culture, language and deep rooted

traditions as ancient as Turkish, Kurdish, Greek and Armenian ones. 47

Currently, the Roma rights movement in Turkey is developing as a struggle for equal

citizenship and because they are loyal to the notion of “Turkishness”, they are not considered

as a specific problem by the state elite.

What Romas basically want is non-discrimination and to be treated equally in public as

well as official life. They want to be able to speak their native language freely because since

their childhood they have been warned by their parents not to declare their ethnic origin and

not to speak the Roma language in public places. 48

44 “An Urgent Expropriation Decree” applicable to some certain natural disasters was issued for Sulukule in

2006. It means, 3.500 residents in the region will be evicted.” Turkish Daily News, 22 March 2008. The enactment in 2005 of the Urban Renewal Law no 5366 gave impetus to a number of urban transformation

projects, many of which resulted in massive destruction and dislocation of Roman communities throughout

Turkey. For further information see, Urban Renewal or Ethnic Relocation Roma Foundation, July 2008.

http://www.rroma.org/reports/sulukule.html.

� Interview with Hacer Foggo, Member of Sulukule Platform, 30 October 2008, İstanbul. 46 Interview with Neşe Ozan, member of Sulukula Platform, 30 October 2008, İstanbul. 47 Interview with Bayram Karakaş, Chairman of the Organization for Balıkesir Romas, 20 November 2008,

İstanbul. 48 Interview with Ş. P. And Mr. Şenol from Sulukule, 15 November 2008.

13

Romas complain that Roma children are excluded by school principals, teachers and

parents of other students. They are urged to attend some certain schools where they can not

receive a quality education. They also emphasize that there is no legal barrier for the Romas

to be president, prime minister, medical doctor, professor etc. but according to them,

discrimination is major reason why Romas cannot enter universities and have access to

secure, permanent employment. Another important example for discrimination against

Romas by the law is the Law of Settlement (iskan kanunu) which passed in 1934. It forestalls

the granting citizenship to foreign Roma, together with “anarchists, spies and those who do

not belong to the Turkish culture.” And article 134 of the Police Service Regulations (Polis

Karakolları Teşkilati ile Vazifelerine Dair Talimatname) describes the Roma in general in

Paragraph 9.5 as “prone to commit crimes” and classifies the whole group as a security risk.

Although Enis Tütüncü, MP from Republican Peoples‟ Party (CHP) of the province Kırklareli

in Eastern Thrace where 40.000 Roma live, proposed a motion to remove the discriminating

clause, it is still kept in the Regulation. Romas think that the establishment of Roma

organizations is an effective way of eliminating prejudices against themselves.49

The Syriacs

The Syriacs (Süryani) group is a very unique one because although the Syriacs are

Christian, they were not included in the Lausanne treaty as a minority group. Unlike the

Armenians, Greeks and Jews, they have not been granted with the right of founding,

administering their own schools and having education in their own languages in accordance

with the 40 th article of the Lausanne agreement so far.50

It is reportedly said that the

patriarch of the Syriacs did not demand the above-mentioned rights, however, as Syriac

intellectuals emphasize that minority rights are granted to individuals, not to the groups and

they are not collective rights, therefore, a metropolitan or patriarch does not have the right to

refuse these rights.51

Another explanation is that because a great percentage of Syriacs used

to live in the rural places of Eastern Anatolia during the 1920s and they were a homogeneous

and isolated group, they could not seek their rights efficiently and did not demand their

minority rights.

49 Today there are more than 40 associations in 16 different cities of Turkey, however, only few of them are

active. 11 Roma associations established the Federation of Roma Associations (Roma Federasyonu Dernekleri

/ROMDEF) under the leadership of EDROM in order to unite their powers and to create effective policies. 50 For further information see Baskın Oran, “Ulusal Egemenlik Kavramının Donüşümü, Azınlıklar ve Türkiye”,

http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/anyarg20/b_oran.pdf. 51 Interview with Erol Dora, Syriac lawyer, and member of Mezoder (an İstanbul based organization with the

aim to introduce the Syriac identity and culture, it was founded in 2004.), 8 November 2008, İstanbul.

14

Generally speaking, the Syriacs feel extremely discriminated and leaving minority

rights aside, they think that they are not even granted common citizenship rights. There is a

big diversity of opinion over their status among the Syriacs themselves. Some automatically

refuse to be called minority on the ground that the Syriacs are the oldest group having deep

rooted history in the region. For example, a Syriac respondent says: “we are few in number

and in accordance with the Lausanne agreement we are minority but regarding the history of

the Syriacs in this territory, we are not minority, on the contrary, we are the oldest owners of

this region”. 52

Some emphasize that the Syriacs are de jure minority in accordance with the Lausanne

agreement but they are not viewed as a minority in practice and they insist that Syriacs be

granted with minority rights by the state.53

In accordance with the articles 37 and 45 of the

Lausanne agreement, those who live in Turkey and are not Muslim are categorized as

minorities, the Treaty does not specifically name the non-Muslim groups as Greeks,

Armenians and Jews. Thus, the Syriacs should also be viewed as a minority.54

The Syriacs draw attention to the point that they enjoyed their rights freely during the

Ottoman period. However, they lost their independence and autonomy due to modernization

and nationalization process of the Turkish Republican period. During the Ottoman period, the

Syriacs were seen as a part of the Armenian millet, that is, religiously defined people or a

religious community. Individuals of millet were treated as members of the community rather

than as individuals.55

The multiculturalism of the Ottoman period was replaced by the

principle of equality and the universal citizenship which addressed all citizens as an equal

subject category during Turkish Republican period.56

Due to the changing conditions after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the

Syriacs fled to different parts of world. Today, the Syriacs live throughout Europe, North

America, and Australia and in the Middle East. There are approximately 2000 Syriacs left in

Mardin (Turabdin) region. Currently, they are approximately 10.000-15.000 in İstanbul. The

Syriacs find it unfair that their status differ from one unit of state to another. For example,

52 Interview with Yusuf Beğtaş, general secretary of Meropolit, 28 October 2008, the monastery Deyrulzaferan (it is near Mardin and the residence of the Syriac-Orthodox Patriarchs of Antioch for 630 years and it is one of

the most important Christian buildings of Tur Abdin. An archbishop resides in the monastery since 2003). 53 Interview with Erol Dora, 8 November 2008, İstanbul. 54 Şabo Boyacı, „The EU Harmonization Process and the Syriacs‟, date of the article is not available on internet,

http://www.suryaniler.com/konuk-yazarlar.asp?id=319. 55 Jenny Thomsen, „Assyrians/Syriacs of Turkey a Forgotten People‟ , university essay from Malmö,

http://www.essays.se/about/Jenny+Thomsen/. 56 Şule Toktaş, “EU Enlargement Conditions and Minority Protection: A Reflection on Turkey‟s non-Muslim

Minorities”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2006, p. 490.

15

while the Foreign Ministry does not see Syriacs as a minority group, the Diyanet does and

therefore Syriacs do not have access to state. 57

Syriacs, like Alevis, are not happy with the

identity card given by the state to all Turkish citizens in which their religion is specified.

According to them, this is not democratic and should be changed.58

The shared identity among the Syriacs is primarily based on the fact that they are

Christians but cultural factors and Syriac language also play a role in their identity.

Previously, intermarriages were not so common between the Syriacs and the Muslims

especially in rural areas, but as more Syriacs immigrated to the big cities, they have integrated

into Turkish society and, now they are aware that other factors than religion, such as language

and culture constitute their identity.

After the PKK‟s leader was captured in 1999, the war came to an end. Many Syriacs

living abroad wanted to visit their villages. However, because they were viewed as a potential

threat to Turkey they were covertly prevented from returning to their villages. 59

The very

fact that the then Prime Minister Ecevit felt the necessity of issuing a declaration60

stating that

there are no legal obstacles preventing the Syriacs from visiting their homes and villages

clearly shows the negative image of the Syriacs in the eyes of the Turkish officials as well as

the general population. In this context, the Syriacs want an appropriate land registry to be kept

for the Syriac settlements. Another demand is that the necessary preparations be made for the

return of the Syriacs to the region by Turkey in cooperation with the EU.

Indeed, what worries the Syriacs is not so much whether they are considered as a

minority or not. Instead, what really concerns them is their negative image in Turkey and the

general perception that the Syriacs are outsiders and a potential threat. For example, although,

the Syriacs are not even aware of the location of Denmark on the map, the local ethnic Turks

protested the Danish journalists who made the cartoon of Hz. Mohammed in a place called

Estel near Mardin where many Syriacs live because the Syriacs are Christians and are

perceived as responsible for the insult by Danish journalists on Islam. 61

What the Syriacs are

basically concerned about is the fact that the majority of people are not familiar with the

57 Interview with Beğtaş, 28 October 2008. 58 Interview with Y. A., priest in Diyarbakır, 26 October 2008. 59 For example, they were not allowed to spend night in the region, they were able to visit their homes only under

the supervision of tour guides and they had to inform the officials about their visits beforehand (48 hours

before their arrival), Baskın Oran, „Süryani Genelgesi ve Paranoya‟, Agos, June 2001,

http://www.ba.metu.edu.tr/~adil/baskin/index51-100.html. 60 Bartın İnanç, Milliyet, 15 June 2001. 61 Interview with Gabriel Akyüz, Priest of the Kırklar church and the leader of the Syriac society (cemaat ),

Nagehan Alçı, „Barışın Başkenti Diken Üstünde', Akşam, 11 February 2006, Mardin,

http://www.aksam.com.tr/haber.asp?a=27257,3&tarih=11.02.2006.

16

Syriacs‟ culture, language and history. According to them, this ignorance is the basic reason

why they are seen as outsiders within Turkish society and why only 2000 out of 58.000

Syriacs live in Mardin, their traditional homeland, and why many of them emigrated to

Europe and the United States.

When it comes to broadcasting in Syriac language, they generally watch Suroyo TV

and Suroyo SAT, two TV channels broadcasting from Sweden and they also prefer programs

broadcasted in the Syriac language on the state administered radio and television channels.

The opening of schools where the medium of instruction is Syriac is another demand of the

Syriacs.

Although there are no legal barriers preventing the Syriacs from having a position in

the army, security and diplomacy, practically none of the them have had access to the above-

mentioned jobs so far. What they demand is positive discrimination for the minorities. The

election of Obama to the American presidency is given by the Syriacs as a very impressive

example because it helps everyone understand that non-discrimination policy is to the benefit

of all in a country. 62

Seen from a different angle, unless Turkish officials accept the idea that

the recognition of Syriacs as a minority is not the prelude to disintegration of the state, it can

be said that the existing problems, not only with Syriacs but also with other minority groups,

will continue to exist.

The Circassians

The Circassian group is the only one among those discussed in this paper which

became subject to forced migration from the north Caucasus to Anatolia63

and therefore they

call themselves a diaspora. Although there are no official figures, it is said that there are

approximately 2 or 2.5 million of Circassians in Turkey. Because the Circassians were not

allowed to form a geographical unity in the regions but were dispersed across different

regions and even different countries as a result of the Ottoman settlement policy, their culture

tended to disappear. Furthermore urbanization has also been viewed as another factor having

negative impact on Circassian culture.

Within the last two decades, however, there has been resurgence within Circassian

diaspora, and the Circassians have been able to articulate their own identity. What worried

the Circassians is not so much Turkey‟s policy of seeing the Circassians as a part of Turkish

heritage, or as some related Turkish tribes. Of special concern is the ambivalence of the

62 Interview with Tuma Özdemir, Erol Dora, 8 November 2008, İstanbul. 63 “Russian attrocities led to a series of refugee waves in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, by boats,

carts and foot, from North Caucasia to the Ottoman Empire. The refugees arrived in waves between 1860-64/65

and, again, following the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78.”

17

official circles in Ankara stemming from seeing the Circassians both as a part of the Turkish

heritage and as a potential threat to Turkey. For example, during the national struggle in the

1920s the Circassians gave support to the resistant armies (Kuvay-ı Milliye) of Mustafa

Kemal, however, one prominent Circassian figure named Ethem Bey who fought to rescue

Turkey from the occupation forces and then rebelled against the armies of Mustafa Kemal

was immediately declared a traitor.

From that time onward, Ethem Bey was called Circassian Ethem. After the

proclamation of the Republic, in all primary school history books, Circassian Ethem was (and

still is) presented as an example of traitors during the National Struggle. The Circassians

emphasize that this has created a fear of being seen as a traitor by the majority of Turks just

because they are Circassian and therefore they have long been cautious of declaring their

ethnic identity especially during their school years. 64

Thus, after having suffered such a categorization, the Circassians have strived to

dispel the image of them as traitors and also to show that they are different from the majority

in their culture, language and ethnicity. Many Circassian organizations strived mainly to

preserve and promote their distinct identity. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that

there are various Circassian tribes having distinct cultural identities, however, regardless of

their distinctions, all Circassians have strong feelings of belonging to their motherland in

Caucassia, therefore, they see themselves as a diaspora and a generation of exile. After the

collapse of the Soviet Union, it became possible for them to invest in Caucasia, join trips to

the homeland in order to find their family roots and villages and to build up closer cultural

and social links with the indigenous people. 65

Seen from a different angle, the return to the homeland has been a central issue for all

Circassians in the diaspora and is perceived as crucial for the maintenance of their identity. 66

Because the diaspora is far exceeding the number of indigenous people living in the

homeland, it is a duty for them to return. Generally speaking they view themselves as a

different group in culture, language and in many other aspects from the majority. When it

comes to minority status, they emphasize that because the word „minority‟ connotes partition

and destabilization; they have always avoided the minority label. Instead, they have preferred

official circles to be neutral and not to ignore the Circassian culture and language.

64 Interview with H. Yaşar Nogay, chairman of Organization of Caucasian Culture, 6 December 2008, İstanbul. 65 Interview with Nihat Yılmaz , member of İstanbul Caucassia-Abhazia Culture Organization, 3 December

2008, İstanbul. 66 Interview with S‟ejoque Zafer, Circassian language teacher but he does not have a license given by the state,

10 December 2008, İstanbul.

18

All they want is to be given their cultural rights by the state and they want the state

and the government not to cover up their identity. Most important of all, they mostly see

themselves as a minority group having distinct features therefore they demand, for example,

that state funds be provided for the promotion of Circassian language and culture. Another

point worth mentioning is that because the Circassians are not concentrated in some regions,

they want language courses to be made available in all parts of the country by the state.

Furthermore they began to voice more frequently that Circassian language courses should be

integrated into the mass education system.67

However, as some emphasize, although Circassians constitute a minority group with

its distinct features, most of them are not so conscious of being a member of a minority group.

68

This clearly explains why the Circassian people are not organized enough yet to voice

their demands to the state. Here, what Circassians basically want is a dramatic change of state

ideology and the „identity projection‟ 69

based on fear that enhancement of the rights of ethnic

groups would lead to a partition of Turkey. 70

For example, they wish to watch on TV not

only Turkish folk music programs but also, Circassian, Kurdish, Syriac and other ethnic

groups‟ folk music programs. Ankara‟s pretension to initiate TV broadcasts and education in

minority languages explain the above-mentioned fear of the state because, although the

amendments of the Turkish language policy is met with approval, the problems concerning

the implementation and the limited time and boring content of TV programs in Circassian

language prove that the latest language policy entailed only cosmetic changes. 71

The Circassians emphasize that they have never been discriminated within the society,

on the contrary, Circassians have got the chance of having important positions but those

Circassians who became president, diplomat, army officer have never openly voiced their

ethnic identity in order to keep their position.

67 Interview with Sezai Babakuş, journalist and previous consultant to Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, 28

May 2008, Kuzguncuk, İstanbul. 68 Interview with Erol Açiyba, member of Caucasian Federation Organization and member of editorial board of

Circassian Journal, Nart, 15 December 2008, İstanbul. 69 Burcu Toksabay, Conflict Over Language Rights: The Case of Circassians and Kurds in Turkey, unpublished

MA Thessis, Spring 2005, p. 74. 70 Interview with H. Yaşar Nogay, 6 December 2008, İstanbul. 71 “For example, The setting where the education will be given must be prepared considering Private Education

Institutions Regulations conditions. According to the Regulation, the people who will be hired as teachers need

to have completed their education in the language they will be teaching and ought to have pedagogic formation.

This is a compelling condition since there is no institution giving Circassian education. TV programs are so

boring that they sometimes watch the same program numerous times.”, Interview with Rahmi Tuna, previous

chairman of Organization of Caucasian Culture, 6 December 2008, İstanbul.

19

Conclusion

Unquestionably, Turkey‟s ability to handle its minority issues will determine its future

relations with the EU to a great extent. Despite some positive developments in the past few

years, the protection of Turkey‟s minority groups still falls seriously short of European and

other international standards. One reason is the fact that there is no universally

agreed definition of the term “minority”. Minorities are not defined by a universally given set

of criteria.

Another reason is relevant with the notion of citizenship. As Gülalp notes that

“citizenship specifically identifies who is in, as a member of the national community, and

who is out.”72

When the Alevis, Romas, Circassians, the Kurds and the Syriacs are asked

whether they see themselves as a minority or not, they generally adopt a negative attitude

towards being categorized as minority because what “minority” connotes since the Ottoman

Empire is to be “out.” The main concern of the non-Muslim minority groups is to be seen as a

legitimate part of the national community in which the dominant political ideology mainly

aims to restore the coincidence of nation and state. Put differently since the minority is seen as

a potential divergent element so as to pose a threat to the national and territorial unity of

Turkey, on psychological level the Kurds, Circassians, Syriacs, Romas, and Alevis

automatically refuse minority status for themselves with a few exceptions on the ground that

they are the “real owners” of the country.

Here the issue is that the term „minority‟ had to be rescued from the negative

connotation it had gained since the Ottoman era because according to this system although the

non-Muslim millets enjoyed a considerable autonomy, they were seen as socially and

politically inferior by the Muslims. This perspective has resulted in the conception of

minorities as a second-class citizen. Notion of minority has connoted nothing but partition of

nation-state founded after the proclamation of Turkish Republic in 1923.

The cultural transformation of national identity as a result of globalization, however,

made the concept of nation more fragile, and contested category. This inflamed the debates

concerning Turkey‟s notion of citizenship based solely on nation remaining from the 1920s.

This is not to say, of course, that the nation is an exhausted category; “what it means is that

72 Haldun Gülalp, „Citizenship vs. Nationality?‟, Gülalp (ed), Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict Challenging the

Nation State, London, Routledge, 2006, p.2.

20

nation has become pluralized and open to new imaginaries about belonging, community and

identity.”73

In this context, Turkey‟s negotiation process with the EU has urged Ankara to

revise its notion of citizenship so as to give up its monist understanding under the guise of

unity. What really alarmed Turkey was that those groups would lose their sense of belonging

to Turkey and would be outside the control of deliberate state policies to fix identities so as to

incorporate all ethnic and religious identities.

Irrespective of whether the respondents consider themselves as minority or not, the

claims they put forward coincide with the rights they would enjoy if given minority status.

Here, the basic fear shared by all respondents is to be seen as minorities. This is partly due to

what kind of identity they want to adopt. For example, although the Circassians, as a non-

territorial group, are seen as assimilated into Turkish identity to a great extent, they generally

consider themselves as a distinct culture and not belonging to Turkey. On the other hand, the

Kurds, who are seen by Ankara as the most problematic group among the others, want to be

seen as „constituent people‟ rather than a minority. The „constituent people‟ rhetoric is

perceived by many as Kurds‟ feeling of belonging to Turkey. For example, during his visit to

Ankara, the chairman of the French senate, Gerard Larcher apologized because of his

statement of „Kurdish minority.‟ The Muş deputy member of parliament from the ethnic

Kurdish party, DTP/BDP Sırrı Sakık strongly objected to Larcher‟s words on the ground that

the Kurds are constituent people but not a minority and he said: “we have problems but we are

trying to solve them” The chairman of Turkish Assembly, M. Ali Şahin also supported Sakık

and said that the Kurds are constituent people of Turkey, we are not different from each

other.” 74

Interestingly, this definition of the Kurds is compatible with Ankara‟s official rhetoric.

For example, in the indictment prepared against the minority report, 75

it says: “In Turkey

minorities are the non-Muslim citizens. Apart from them, there are no other minorities based

on ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds. All citizens who are outside of the scope of the

mentioned group, who have played a role in the establishment of this State and who are within

73 Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe Social Theory and the Implications of

Europeanization, London, Routledge, 2005, p.88. 74 “Sakık‟tan Azınlık Sözüne Tepki”, Milliyet, 17 September 2009. 75 The report was prepared by the “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Right” committee working under

the office of the Prime Minister. But the members of the committee, İbrahim Kaboğlu and Baskın Oran were

tried for, and acquitted of “inciting to hatred and hostility” with the publication of the report. For full text of the

Report see: Baskın Oran, “Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Raporu‟nun Bütün Öyküsü”, Birikim, No. 188

2004.

21

these borders are the “constituent elements of this State and not “minorities.” 76

All the demands and distinctive characteristics of these groups make it evident that

they exist as minority groups sociologically, historically and in accordance with the

international standards, however, because their status have not been officially recognized by

the state they have not been categorized as minorities so far. Most important of all, the general

fear to be seen as a minority makes it evident that those groups, except the Circassians, also

tend to see themselves through the lenses of the official circles partly because they desire to

have full respect and legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, partly because they see the

members of the officially recognized minority groups such as the Armenians, Jews and

Greeks as second class citizens of Turkey. The „constituent element‟ rhetoric of the Kurds is a

very striking example of this. As Oran states, defining the Muslim citizens as a „constituent

element‟ is an indirect definition of non-Muslim citizens as „subsidiary‟ elements. He claims

that this is a crime of separatism. 77

This study shows that the main concern of almost all respondents is to be

misrecognized or not to be recognized as a distinct ethnic and cultural entity by the state as

well as the majority “in terms of worth, status and reciprocity.” 78

For example, the members

of the groups except Syriacs, and some Kurds have been to some degree recognized as first

class citizens as long as they accept the main principles of the Turkish state and identify

themselves as Turks rather than declaring their ethnic and cultural origin.The issue is that to

what extent the state will recognize the differences and will be coercive in shaping the

contours of the nation. Will the sense which people share a common culture be a thin or thick

one? In liberal democracies according to Kymlicka, this sense is a very thin one, “since it

does not preclude differences in religion, personal values, family relationships, or lifestyle

choices.”79

In this context, EU‟s critiques concerning the role of army in political life, the

inefficiency of Turkey‟s human rights regime, Ankara‟s policy of not applying Copenhagen

76 Republic of Turkey, Ankara Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor, Bureau of Press, Press Investigation No: 2004/2868, Press Case No: 2005/815, Press Indictment No: 2005/250, Indictment, to the Ankara Penal Court of

First Instance, p. 4. 77 See Baskin Oran, Counter Indictment, 15 February 2006, available at

www.armnews.com/IMG/doc/Baskin_Oran_Counter_Indictment_full_text.doc. 78 Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe Social Theory and the Implications of

Europeanization, London, Routledge, 2005, p.21.

79 Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and

Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 25.

22

criteria regarding minority protection80

have been viewed by many in Turkey as undermining

the legitimacy of the strong centralist state understanding as a legacy of the Kemalist regime.

These critiques would challenge one type of legitimate culture and language, the Turkish one.

Put differently, these critiques would make the sense which people share a common culture

thinner so as to encourage the state to be more generous to ethno-cultural differences.

Another reason why Turkey has been suspicious of the reliability of EU‟s minority

protection policy is the fact that the EU seems highly cautious to formulate its definition of

the links between the Union and its citizens. Put differently, when the 1993 Copenhagen

criteria were defined, a much higher normative standard was set for the candidate states than

the EU had ever been able to agree on internally.81

This has been the most important factor

which has a negative impact on Turkey-EU relations because much higher normative standard

of minority rights have been considered by Turkish officials as well as public as a hidden

agenda of the EU to disintegrate the territorial unity of Turkey.

Given this background, it can be said that applying Western models of liberal

pluralism has little applicability to Turkey, which is rooted in very different political

traditions, with its own distinct notions of nationhood and statehood. Another point worth

mentioning is the fact that the sorts of ethno-cultural groups in Turkey are often very different

from those in the West. However, this is not to say, of course, that the Turkish state will

continue to have a different and separate identity from its people. The above-mentioned

different ethno-cultural groups‟ demands for multiculturalism will bring about true

democracy. In this context, Ankara‟s negotiation process with the EU has made a great

contribution to the improvement of true democracy in Turkey so far.

However, it should be borne in mind that economic prosperity, personal or state

tolerance for ethno-cultural diversity which Turkey is expected to gain with its commitment to

EU values will not solve Turkey‟s ethno-cultural diversity issues. On the contrary, as

Kymlicka puts emphasis that denial or denigration of the seriousness of ethno-cultural

identities on the ground that minority issue is a by- product, not the real one and the demands

80 European Comission 2008Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament and the

CouncilEnlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, pp 11-19. 81 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, 2003, “Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality

and Minority Protection in the CEECs”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 1, No. 8.

23

of those groups will fade once real democracy, economic development and rule of law are

established is the biggest mistake which Western democracies have made again and again.82

In sum, Turkey currently needs to balance its nation-state understanding and minority

protection policy. In order to achieve this, Ankara should first consolidate its democracy so as

to facilitate transition to liberal pluralism.

82 Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic

Relations in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.84.

24

Bibliography

Books and articles

Baskın Oran, “Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Raporu‟nun Bütün Öyküsü”,

Birikim, No. 188 2004.

Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe Social Theory and the

Implications of Europeanization, London, Routledge, 2005.

Gwendollyn Sasse, „Minority Rights and EU Enlargement: Normative Overstretch or

Effective Condionality?‟ , in G. N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority Protection and the Enlarged

European Union: The Way Forward, Hungary, Creatch, 2004.

Haldun Gülalp, „Citizenship vs. Nationality?‟, Gülalp (ed), Citizenship and Ethnic

Conflict Challenging the Nation State, London, Routledge, 2006.

James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, 2003, “Monitoring the Monitors: EU

Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs”, Journal on Ethnopolitics

and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 1, No. 8.

Levent Köker, “A Key to the „Democratic Opening‟: Rethinking Ethnicity, Citizenship

and Turkish Nation State”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 49-69.

Michael M. Gunter, „Turkey‟s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem‟,

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2007.

Reha Çamuroğlu, “Alevi Revivalism in Turkey” in T. Olsson, E. Özdalga, and C.

Raudvere (eds), Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. İstanbul: Swedish

Research Institute, 1998.

Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western

Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford University

Press, 2001.

Şule Toktaş, “EU Enlargament Conditions and Minority Protection : A Reflection on

Turkey‟s Non-Muslim Minorities”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, December

2006, pp. 489-490.

Newspaper articles

Ali Balkız, Head of the Alevi Associations Federation, “Alevis Want Equal

Citizenship”, Evrensel, 21 June 2008.

Rıza Türmen, “Compulsory Religious Course and the Ambivalence of Little Eylem”,

Milliyet, 10 November, 2008.

“Sakık‟tan Azınlık Sözüne Tepki”, Milliyet, 17 September 2009.

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“The Report for Minority and Cultural Rights”(Summary), Sabah, October 2004.

“Turkish Election Board Blocked Independent Candidates” Sabah, 19 April 2011.

Electronic sources

Baskın Oran, „Süryani Genelgesi ve Paranoya‟, Agos, June 2001,

http://www.ba.metu.edu.tr/~adil/baskin/index51-100.html.

Baskın Oran, “Ulusal Egemenlik Kavramının Donüşümü, Azınlıklar ve Türkiye”,

http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/anyarg20/b_oran.pdf.

Jenny Thomsen, „Assyrians/Syriacs of Turkey a Forgotten People‟, university essay

from Malmö, http://www.essays.se/about/Jenny+Thomsen/.

Kerem Öktem, “Being Muslim at the Margins and the AKP”, Middle East Report,

June 2008, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer246/oktem.html.

Kıvanç Ulusoy, "Turkey‟s Reform Effort Reconsidered, 1987-2004”, European

University Institute Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies Mediterranean

Programme Series, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No 2005/28 http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-

Texts/05_28.pdf.

Minority Rights Group International, “A Quest for Equality:Minorities in Turkey,” p.

7 in http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/MRGTurkeyReport%5B1%5D.pdf.

Nagehan Alçı, „Barışın Başkenti Diken Üstünde', Akşam, 11 February 2006, Mardin,

http://www.aksam.com.tr/haber.asp?a=27257,3&tarih=11.02.2006.

Şabo Boyacı, „The EU Harmonization Process and the Syriacs‟, date of the article is

not available on internet, http://www.suryaniler.com/konuk-yazarlar.asp?id=319.

Urban Renewal or Ethnic Relocation Roma Foundation, July 2008.

http://www.rroma.org/reports/sulukule.html.

Interviews

Abdullah Demirbaş, the previous mayor of Sur (Central Diyarbakir) (he was

dismissed from office in June 2007 by the Council of State and the Municipal Council was

dissolved for providing multilingual municipal services.. The case is now before the ECtHR. ,

Diyarbakır, 27 October 2008, personal interview.

Ali Rıza Erkan, manager of Radio Barış (Peace), İstanbul, May 2008, personal

interview.

Bayram Karakaş, Chairman of the Organization for Balıkesir Romas, İstanbul, 20

November 2008, personal interview.

Erol Açiyba, member of Caucasian Federation Organization and member of editorial

board of Circassian Journal, Nart, İstanbul, 15 December 2008, personal interview.

26

Erol Dora, İstanbul, 8 November 2008, personal interview.

Fevzi Gümüş, lawyer and chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Organization,

İstanbul , 23 November, 2008, personal interview.

Feyzi İşbaşaran, Elazığ MP from Justice and Development Party, Ankara, 22

September 2008, personal interview.

Hacer Foggo, Member of Sulukule Platform, İstanbul, 30 October 2008, personal

interview.

H. Yaşar Nogay, chairman of Organization of Caucasian Culture, 6 December 2008,

personal interview.

Muhammed Akar, lawyer, the vice chairman of AKP Diyarbakır organization,

Diyarbakır, 28 October 2008, personal interview.

Neşe Ozan, Member of Sulukula Platform, İstanbul, 30 October 2008, personel

interview.

Nihat Yılmaz, member of İstanbul Caucassia-Abhazia Culture Organization, İstanbul,

3 December 2008, personal interview.

S‟ejoque Zafer, Circassian language teacher but he does not have a license given by

the state, İstanbul, 10 December 2008, personal interview.

Sezai Babakuş, journalist and previous consultant to Autonomous Republic of

Abkhazia, Kuzguncuk, İstanbul, 28 May 2008, personal interview.

Tuma Özdemir, Erol Dora, İstanbul, 8 November 2008, personal interview.

Yusuf Beğtaş, general secretary of Meropolit, 28 October 2008, personal interview.

Ş. P. And Mr. Şenol from Sulukule, İstanbul, 15 November 2008, personal interview.