Millet System is Alive:

Path-dependency in Turkish and Cypriot minority incorporation patterns

Huseyin Alptekin, University of Texas at Austin

I. Introduction

This study elaborates on the relationship between the institutional patterns of

minority incorporation/exclusion and minority formation/mobilization in Cyprus and

Turkey. It demonstrates that ethnic divisions in Cyprus and Turkey have been

(re)produced by the institutional design going back to the Ottoman millet1 system. Yet,

there seems to be an increasing gap between the popular demands and institutional

provision. While cultural groups have increasing internal heterogeneity and diversifying

demands, political institutions are unable to satisfy these demands. This paper argues that

this institutional inefficiency is a result of an inherent inertia of the political designs in

Turkey and Cyprus going back to the original millet system.

The millet system divided the groups based on religious lines. The following

political regimes up to day have kept this division as the primary indicator of majorities

and minorities in respective societies. As a result of this process, Turkish and Cypriot

political systems have been resistant to the societal demands for greater diversity within

the broad Muslim and non-Muslim groups and for further interaction demands between

Muslims and non-Muslims.

1 Although ‘millet’ is used as the equivalent of ‘nation’ in contemporary Turkish, the term referred to religious divisions rather than ethno-linguistic divisions in the Ottoman era.

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II. Minority-incorporation patterns

Scholars distinguish between different ways of incorporating minority groups.

Roger Brubaker’s distinction between French and German types of citizenship

demonstrates the different isntitutional patterns of incorporating or excluding minorities.

Soysal (1994) also distinguishes between corporatist, liberal, statist, and fragmental

regime types in terms of organizational configuration (centralized vs. decentralized) and

locus of action and authority (state vs. society). Weldon (2006) also distingusihes

between collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic, and individualistic-civic regimes

regarding different political and social tolerance levels of each. Following this line of

categorizations, I distinguish between different forms of minority incorporation patterns.

In the Turkish and Cypriot cases, these patterns seem highly durable.

I define ‘minority-incorporation patterns’ as the ‘patterns of inclusion-exclusion

carried out by the state for minority groups’. Minority incorporation patterns differ, first,

in terms of their level of inclusion. Hence, some minority incorporation patterns are more

inclusive for minority groups than others. Yet, the level of inclusion-exclusion might also

differ between individual and group levels as well as between social, cultural, economic,

and political spheres. A minority-incorporation pattern may include minorities on

individual-level (e.g., equal voting rights) but not on the group level (e.g., denying legal

recognition for minority groups). A minority-incorporation pattern may also include a

group culturally (e.g., supporting multi-lingual education), but not politically (e.g.,

banning ethnic political parties). Although a clear-cut distinction is hard to draw in many

cases, the conceptual distinctions between individual and group levels and between socio-

cultural and political spheres are discussed further below.

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I group minority incorporation patterns into four broad categories: liberal

multiculturalism, civic assimilationism, millet system/consociationalism, and ethnic

nationalism. Liberal multiculturalism values individuals more than the overall political

society or cultural communities. This emphasis on individuals leads liberal

multiculturalists to value culture and cultural communities, because culture is seen as a

context which provides existential stability and autonomous life choices for individuals

(Kymlicka, 1995; Tamir, 1993). Hence, culture is seen more or less instrumental to the

individual well-being. While recognizing cultural rights2, liberal multiculturalists either

do not tolerate cultural communities which oppress individuals or tolerate these groups to

some narrowly limited extent, but with the condition of ‘right to exit’ for individual

members. Hence, under liberal multiculturalist regimes, faith communities need to

moderate their illiberal practices and/or provide a fair opportunity of exit to their

members, whereas language and/or racial communities benefit from liberal

multiculturalism to the fullest extent.

Civic assimilationist regimes incorporate all the minority community members

within the country in a single way with no group-differentiated rights. The minority

group members are expected to assimilate into the mainstream society and minority

groups are expected to dissolve. When minority groups prove to be relatively persistent,

minority group members are expected to identify themselves with ‘the nation’ first, and

then with their particular communities.

The millet system incorporates minority communities as unitary and fixed blocs

without paying attention to individual demands. Accordingly, the Muslim and non-

2 Kymlicka (1995) lists cultural rights as self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. Young (1989) also supports group-differentiated rights.

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Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were divided strictly. Yet, the millet system in the

Ottoman Empire and, to a great extent, in Cyprus and Turkey suffered from various

problems. The milet system (1) does not appreciate the inherent value of diversity, but

accepts it as an inevitable fact; (2) defines diversity narrowly along a single spectrum; (3)

does not recognize intra-community diversity; and (4) promotes strict authority

hierarchies within and between ethnic groups. While consociationalism follows the millet

system in many aspects, it often provides a more egalitarian relationship between

majority and minority groups. Hence, it resembles the millet system except for the latter

half of the fourth (4) characteristic (promoting strict authority hierarchies between ethnic

groups).

Ethnic nationalism denies equal status, perhaps even citizenship, to the members

of minority groups. The policies range from the most brutal forms of ethnic cleansing to

denial of political rights.

Table 1: Four regimes of minority inclusion-exclusion by the majority: Characteristics Regimes

Individual-level inclusive

Group-level inclusive

Priority

Liberal multiculturalism

Yes Yes3 Individual

Civic assimilationism

Yes No Political community

Millet system/ consociationalism

No Yes4 Cultural community

Ethnic nationalism

No No Cultural community

None of these four regimes appear in pure forms in reality. States adopt different

patterns of incorporation for different minority groups. Therefore, we should examine

3 It should be noted that this inclusion has certain limits. Some illiberal groups are denied recognition and support even in the most open liberal multiculturalist systems. 4 As it will be explained below, millet system/consociationalism is not inclusive for all groups, but for the major ones.

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minority incorporation patterns ‘in pairs’. For instance, France has a consociational

regime for some national minorities (Corsica) while having a civic assimilationist regime

for current and/or recent immigrants (France-Moroccan immigrants). The United States

has a liberal multiculturalist regime for indigenous (native American) and some faith (the

Amish) groups, while it has long adopted a civic assimilationist regime (melting pot) for

immigrants. Turkey adopts a civic assimilationist regime for Kurds, and a mixture of

millet system and ethnic nationalism for non-Muslim minorities. Following Chandra and

Wilkinson’s (2008) structure-practice distinction,5 there will always be unrecognized

minority communities in every society. Therefore, even a relatively pure consociational

regime like Lebanon will exclude some groups which lack ‘practice’ or self-

consciousness and/or ascription. The opposite is also possible. For instance, while being

one of the most exclusive regimes, the ethnic nationalist regime of Germany from the

early 1930’s to mid-1940’s included some minority groups such as Catholic Germans.

Table 2: Patterns of minority inclusion-exclusion Pattern Paired examples Liberal multiculturalism

Australia-Aborigines; The US-the Amish and native Americans.

Civic assimilationism

France-immigrants; The US-immigrants; Turkey-Kurds.

Millet system/ consociationalism

Ottomans-Non-Muslims; Lebanon-the Druze; Cyprus (1960-1974)-Turkish Cypriots, Switzerland-French-speakers.

Ethnic nationalism

Germany (3rd Reich)-Jews, Gypsies, Slavs; Ottomans (1915-1923)-Armenians

5 Ethnic structure-practice distinction which distinguishes between all the ethnic categories and the categories activated in different contexts. Accordingly, ethnic structure refers to the distributions of attributes (e.g., language, skin color) in a given population whereas ethnic practice refers to activation of one or more of these attributes by agents as the defining characteristic ethnic identity (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008).

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III. Path-dependencies in Cyprus and Turkey

The legacy of the Ottoman period was neither a common life based on shared

social, judicial and moral grounds nor an antagonism having the potential for violent

conflicts (mainly in the classical era until the 19th century). It was the peaceful coexistence

of separate/segregated communities, even in the same villages with very limited

interaction across communities. Muslim-Turkish and Orthodox-Greek identities in Cyprus,

and Muslim and non-Muslim identities in Turkey have remained as the legal distinction

between majorities and minorities up to day. However, the durability of the identities has

not stuck to single, one-dimensional patterns. Until recent periods, religious roots of the

identities were more significant than ethnic-linguistic roots. Yet, the picture has changed

significantly in the recent history with increasing heterogeneity within the ‘meta’

communities of Muslims and non-Muslims. While some previously silent cultural groups

have increasingly mobilized (e.g. Alevites and Kurds in Turkey), secular political

movements also have increasingly had differing attitudes (the leftist, pro-integrationist

Turks in Cyprus). Yet, the institutional designs of respective regimes have long resisted to

this internal diversification.

III.a. Enduring Identity Distinctions in Cyprus

III.a.1. The British rule

The division of the millet system in Cyprus continued in a different form under

the British administration period in Cyprus. “Village administrative councils were

segregated and handled community affairs separately, with specially formed Joint

Councils for the adjudication of matters common to both groups”( Calotychos, 1998: 5-

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6). For linguistic and religious reasons, the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had

been separate before the British rule and remained so during it (Bryant, 1997: 56). Eighty

two years of British rule had taken no significant step to create harmony from separate

Greek and Turkish identities. It, rather, strictly followed the Ottoman way of communal

segregation.

The annexation of the island by the British in 1878 bolstered the demands of

enosis (the ideal of unification with the mainland Greece) by Greek Cypriots. In the year

of 1900, there were seven newspapers printed on the island and the newspapers were

yearning for the motherland Greece. Even the name of the most liberal one of the seven

was Enosis (Kızılyürek, 2002: 79). Although the motherland relinquished Megali Idea6

for a while after the Minor Asian Catastrophe (1919-1922), Greek Cypriots lost nothing

from their enthusiasm for enosis under the British administration.

The intensifying anti-colonial demands of the Greek population of the island and

violent acts of EOKA (National Organization of Freedom Fighters, Ethniki Organosis

Kyprion Agoniston) pushed the Turkish population closer to the British administration.

The millet system had already divided the two societies of the island, but the increasing

demands for enosis created a new phenomenon, antagonism, between the two societies.

Turkish Cypriots developed their nationalism as a defensive contra-nationalism against

enosis demands and soon ended up with their own violent organizaions. TMT (Turkish

Defense Organization, Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı) was formed to retaliate against the

EOKA operations.

Together with changing international circumstance, escalated inter-communal

violence and violent acts against British administration obliged Britain to accept the 6 Megali Idea means the Great Idea in Greek and refers to the aim of the uniting all Greeks.

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independence of Cyprus. Cyprus was recognized as a sovereign state by virtue of a

constitution and three treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the

Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on August 16, 1960. “Drafted by

the Greek and Turkish governments, and not by the Cypriot themselves, it [1960

constitution] contained in it provisions for segregation at all levels between the Greek and

Turkish communities, thus making the constitution virtually unworkable” (Zarocostas,

1980: 108).

III.a.2. Post-Independence developments: one state, two nations

The 1960 constitution has in fact a sui generis form when compared to the

constitutions of other countries over the world. Its durability was guaranteed by the

guarantor countries, namely Turkey, Greece and Britain according to the Treaty of

Guarantee which was accepted as having the same authority as that of the constitution.

These countries recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and

security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic

Articles of its Constitution.7 Moreover, the first subsection of the Article 182 of the

Constitution does not allow any amendments of the Basic Articles. 8 Thus the only

possible way to change the Basic Articles of the Constitution is an agreement of the sides

of the 1959-60 Agreements. The Basic Articles of the Constitution have both a national

and international character because of the references from the constitution to Zurich,

Guarantee, Alliance Treaties and from these treaties to the Constitution. Thus, the

7 Treaty of Guarantee Article 2. 8 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 182-1: “The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal.”

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making, change, abolishment and implementation of Cypriot constitution were

internationalized (Özersay; 2002: 46).

The Constitution does not emphasize a Cypriot nation or public, instead it

mentions about Greek and Turkish communities. While the Greek community comprised

“all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek

or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox

Church”9, the Turkish community comprised “all citizens of the Republic who are of

Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural

traditions or who are Moslems”.10 In the third subsection of the Article 2, the remaining

population of the Republic had individually been allowed to choose one of these

communities to participate in.

The Communal Chambers were formed regarding the divided histories of the

communities. The Chambers have both executive and legislative powers which are shared

with the House of Representatives and Ministries. Thus, the Republic is compared to the

federal states because of the fact that the real balance was between Community Chambers

and the institutions at the center in a similar situation to the balance between the

executive and legislative branches in federal states (Özersay: 2002: 46). This federation

was basically on a communal basis, but there were also some regional regulations in the

Constitution such as the creation of separate municipalities for the Turkish inhabitants in

9 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-1. 10 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-2.

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the five largest towns of the Republic (Nicosia/Lefkoshe, Limassol,

Famagusta/Gazimagusa, Larnaca and Paphos).11

The political division in Cyprus was not just insular and it linked the divided

communities to the ‘motherlands’, namely Turkey and Greece. According to the

Constitution, the official languages are Greek and Turkish.12 Although the Republic had

its own flag of neutral design and color, “the Communal authorities and institutions shall

have the right to fly on holidays together with the flag of the Republic either the Greek or

the Turkish flag at the same time”.13 “The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have

the right to celebrate respectively the Greek and the Turkish national holidays”. 14

Moreover, each of the Greek or Turkish Communities have the right to receive subsidies

from the Greek or the Turkish Government for institutions of education, culture, athletics

and charity belonging to communities respectively.15 Also “where either the Greek or

the Turkish Community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters,

professors or clergymen for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall

have the right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to

meet its needs as the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively may provide”.16

The political order built by the mentioned treaties and the constitution did not

endure very long. While the violence is continuing in Cyprus, three guarantor states and

two communities declared their demands at a conference in London. President Makarios

proposed minority rights for Turks and the Turkish side claimed that the December 11 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 173-1 (the continuation of the separate municipalities would have been decided by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic within four years according to the same Article). 12 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 3-1. 13 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 4-3. 14 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 5. 15 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-1. 16 The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-2.

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fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. These opposing

demands naturally could not meet on a point and there was no agreement in London.

III.a.3. 1974 military operation: From enosis to taksim

On April 21, 1967 a group of colonels took over power in Greece and democracy

was overthrown. The 1974 Turkish military operation following the coup in Cyprus

changed the Cypriot politics dramatically by creating two de facto political authorities in

the island for the first time in its history. The Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish

Federated State of Northern Cyprus in 1975 and Rauf Denktas was elected President. In

1983, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared to the world (yet, has still not

recognized by a single country except for Turkey). Its main two differences from the

Republic of Cyprus formed in 1960 were its secular character and nearly mono-ethnic

demographic structure. It is a democratic and secular republic according to its

constitution of 1985.17 The Citizenship Law which was accepted by the Republican

Assembly of the TRNC during its session on May 21, 1993 shows the impact of

memories of the pre-1974 period on the northern part of the island. “Persons who have

made investment … and have performed or likely to perform, extraordinary services in

science, politics and cultural sectors; … who have taken part in 1974 Peace Operation

and their spouses and children; and the widows and children of those killed in the Peace

Operation; … who have rendered services after August 1, 1958 in the cadres of the

Turkish Resistance Organization in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”18 shall

17 The Constitution of TRNC, Article 1. 18 The Citizenship Law of the TRNC, Article 9/1.

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become citizens of the TRNC without requiring the satisfaction of conditions such as

residence or good conduct under previous paragraphs.

The Turkish Cypriot economy, after the division of the island, had many problems

despite the direct and indirect economic aids of Turkey. Turkish immigrants from

Anatolia to the island in the post-1974 period, created a division in the Turkish part of the

island. Now being Cypriot or not was a defining difference among the Anatolian rooted

Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots began to underline their Cypriot identity

(Kızılyürek, 2005: 20). CTP (Republican Turkish Party, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi), the

first opposition party of Turkish Cypriots which has existed in the political arena since

December 27, 1970, became the voice of anxious and unsatisfied Turkish Cypriots.

While the intra-communal dissent in increasing in the northern and southern parts

of the island, The General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan wanted a meeting of the

sides in Cyprus without any preconditions in a report presented to the UNSC on June, 22,

1999. UNSC drew up the general solution framework consisting of unique sovereignty,

unique citizenship, and unique representation in the international arena in the decision of

1250 and invited the sides of the problem to start the negotiations in the decision of 1251.

Although the Turkish side voted in favor of the Annan Plan in the referendum of April

24, 2004, the Greek side rejected it with 76 percent of votes and joined the European

Union after one month.

The two alternatives for a solution for the problems in Cyprus are partition or

reintegration. The second alternative is much more probable, but in which form? A

unitary state is not acceptable in any form by Turkish Cypriots and does not have an

institutional predecessor in the island. A reintegration with a confederal structure is not

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acceptable to any Cypriot Greek political party. The remaining option is a federal

reintegration, but its content is disputed as it is in the Annan Plans. No matter which

option is chosen, both sides still rely on the dualistic identity structure going back to the

millet system.

III.b. Continuity in the Turkish Politics

III.b.1. Laicism

Turkey adopted laicism in 1937, but even before this date, it is very hard to call

Turkey and the preceding Ottoman Empire as a theocracy. Religion and the state were

not separate until 1937, but the dominant one had always been the state, not the religious

authority. Örf-i Sultani was the will and decisions of the Sultan as a secular leader. The

religious codes were sometimes manipulated and sometimes totally ignored for the sake

of the state interests (Heper, 2006: 55). On the other hand, the state had not allowed an

independent Sunni authority. The Sultan was the caliphate. The head of the religious

affairs, sheikh-ul Islam, was an officer who was appointed by the Sultan. Even after the

secularization attempts of the 19th century, the sheikh-ul Islam stayed in the cabinet of

ministers until 1916 (Keyder, 2001: 123-124).

The new Turkish Republic did not break the asymmetrical dependency between

the state and religion. Despite the harsh secularizing reforms, religious authority has been

controlled and monopolized by the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Thus, religion has

remained integrated to the state. However, what the state understands from the religion

vastly differs from the image of Islam in the minds of large social segments. While state

bans religious activity in the public sphere -which is defined very largely-, the religious

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demands of the periphery increasingly politicized and came to the peak especially in the

period between 1994 and 1997. 19 The religion as it is practiced by the public was

primitive and a barrier for the Turkish modernization in the eyes of the political elite. In

practice, the headscarf ban is being used in reference to a symbol of backwardedness

juxtaposed to the public sphere (Sözen, 2006: 274). Yet, the formal definition of religion

was relevant only for Islam. The minority religious communities (e.g. Orthodox Greek

Christians, Jews) were ignored and not interfered by the governments.

III.b.2. Nationalism

A taxonomy of nationalism draws the boundaries of the nation as either flexible or

immutable, or in a point between the two margins. When shared practices (mostly in a

given territory) are privileged in the definition of nation, a nation can include diverse

ethnic origins in our perceptions and understandings. When the ethnic origin is privileged

in the definition, only sharers of the common descent are entitled to be accepted into the

volk. The first kind of definition might be labeled as the French conception of nation

which entails a universalist, rationalist, assimilationist, and state-centered account. The

second kind of definition might be labeled as the German conception of nation which

entails a particularist, organic, differentialist, and Volk-centered account (Brubaker,

1998: 138). While the French model requires assimilation, the German model applies a

strict exclusion.

Turkish nationalism in this taxonomy is very close to the French model in terms

of Kurds and close to the German model in terms of non-Muslims. While Kurds have

19 The Welfare Party won the municipal elections in many cities including Istanbul and Ankara in March 1994 election. The coalition of Welfare and True Path Parties was removed from the government in the process of 28 February 1997 soft coup.

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been tried to be assimilated into the larger society, non-Muslim population has

consistently been excluded from the Turkish-Muslim majority. The organic vision of

society has defined the society not with reference to such categories as class or

individual, but on the basis of the duties and services of different occupation groups to

the state (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005. 6). The current problem of this policy is the

assimilation of various identity groups within the larger society from a multiculturalist

perspective, and the assimilation of the individual within the larger society from a liberal

perspective. Once the public is seen as a unique totality, various impositions in the name

of the nation are legitimized at the cost of the individual and identity groups. Yet, again,

this ‘totality’ consisted of Muslims only. Non-Muslims have never been the target of

assimilation projects.

III.b.3. Centralism

The Turkish state has never trusted to the periphery. Therefore, the peripheral

actors are suspected when they have acquired political and/or economic power. The

belief of the backwardedness of the society and the lack of trust for the peripheral actors

led to the newly emerged state to adopt centralist policies. The strong-state tradition in

Turkey has operated almost completely independently from the society and assumed the

capacity to transform the society from above. In this process, it has been the state, not the

government, that has constituted the primary context of politics, defined its boundaries,

and decided who can or cannot participate in it (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 5). Thus, the

state has produced a fixed ‘imagined consensus’ and imposed it to the society, because

the public was not capable of defining a development path for itself in this thought

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(Heper, 2006: 29, 97). While Muslim -but not Turkish speaking minorities- were linked

to the center through inclusive (but assimilationist) linkages, non-Muslims were often left

alone in their very limited autonomous social spheres.

IV. Theorizing continuity

The Ottoman millet system provided recognition to religious groups only. This

preference over religion continued under the Republics of Cyprus and Turkey, with

varying forms. Eventually the majorites and minorities of the new republics have been

created on the same lines drawn by the millet system. For instance, Turkey denied asylum

to Gagauz refugees during the first quarter of the Republic. These people are Turkish

speakers and believed to have Turkish-descendant, but are predominantly Orthodox

Christian. Turkey denied asylum right to these self-claimed ethnic Turks because of their

religion while accepting hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian, Macedonian, and

Bosnian immigrants. This latter group was seen as Turkish by the state due to their

religion (Sunni Muslim). The institutional design led these people to assimilate into the

Turkish nation. Same is true for the mutual exchange of minority populations between

Turkey and Greece in 1920’s. Greeks of Turkey (except for Istanbul residents) were sent

to Greece, Turks of Greece (except for Western Thrace residents) were sent to Turkey.

Yet, each country defined Greeks and Turks based on religion, not native language.

Hence, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians (especially from Karaman area) were

counted as Greek and sent to Greece. Same thing happened for Greek-speaking Muslim

populations (especially on the Aegean islands). They were counted as Turkish and sent to

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Turkey. Hence, institutional exclusion of non-mobilized groups resulted in peaceful and

centripetal minority attitudes.

Then, the question becomes how such a continutiy could exist despite numerous

critical junctures (e.g., devastating wars, coups, revolutions, boundary changes)

experienced in Cyprus and Turkey. This question requires an analysis of the insitutional

continutity. This paper’s position, on this subject, is in line with historical institutionalist

(HI) accounts of instituions rather than rational choice-based institutionalist (RCI)

analyses. The RCI approach in defining institutions focuses more on the ‘strategic’ role

of institutions than HI theorists’ focus on endurance and internalization of institutions.20

According to the RCI school, institutions seem like a strategic context including

arrangements that allocate de jure political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006),

games and equilibria of games (Shepsle, 1978; 1989), and solution to collective action

problems (Olson, 1982; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). A clear demonstration of this

approach could be seen in North’s (1990) definition of institutions as “ex ante agreements

over cooperation among politicians”, which “facilitate exchange among bargaining

parties” and “reduce uncertainty by creating a stable exchange structure”. In other words,

institutions are the “rules of the game” (North, 1994: 8), and instrumental products

serving for “the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals” (North, 1981:

202).

HI scholarship goes one step further in assigning a constitutive role to institutions.

I believe this is an important and fruitful difference of HI. HI seems to be advantageous

20 According to the HI school, institutions shape not only strategies for given preferences, but also shape the preferences, interests, goals, and/or objectives (Hall, 1986; 1992; 1993: 292; Ikenberry, 1988; March and Olsen, 1984: 739; 1996: 249; Skowronek, 1992; Steinmo, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Waldner, 2002: 25; Weir, 1992).

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in explaining bounded nature of change. Path dependence (which is not determinism

given the contingency and unpredictability of the processes) explains why similar social

structural changes lead to different political outcomes. It also tells us why institutions

remain sticky for long periods of time even though they operate inefficiently. Pierson

(2000) lists various factors to explain this situation: (a) large set-up and fixed costs; (b)

learning effects, knowledge gained in the operation; (c) coordination effects, a linked

infrastructure; (d) adaptive expectations, self-fulfilling, projections about future. As Hall

and Taylor (1996: 938) demonstrates path dependency leads to unintended consequences

which may likely to be inefficient. In sum, political change is often bounded, because

institutions do not only shape strategies, but also preferences; those in charge of

institutions resist change to protect their advantageous status; and political change is

often thought to be costly given the uncertainty of alternatives.

I believe the bounded nature of change matters because as Skocpol (1985)

underlines, change never occurs from scratch. Even the collapsed regimes may leave their

legacies behind. Turkey and Cyprus could keep their institutional legacies despite

numerous revolutions, devastating wars, coups, and sharp regime changes in their modern

histories.21 Similarly, the minority incorporation patterns in Turkey and Cyprus could

stay quite stable up to date. The changes in the peripheral demands are currently

challenging the legal structures of the given regimes. Yet, the incorporation regimes in

Cyprus and Turkey are quite resistant given the reasons above, despite the ‘inefficiency’

of Cypriot and Turkish minority incorporation regimes.

21 For instance, Turkey pursued the Ottoman minority policy (assimilating Muslim subjects and excluding non-Muslims), state control of religion (Directorate of Religious Affairs has still more budget and personnel many ministries), and top-down modernization process. Cyprus also has never questioned the communal distinction drawn by the Ottoman millet system.

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V. Concluding Remarks

The mentioned state policies of laicism, nationalism and centralism are far from

satisfying peripheral demands today in Turkey. Similarly, Cyprus’ ‘sticky’ institutional

design relying on Muslim-non-Muslim divide is quite inefficient. The new and

strengthening diverse societal demands pose serious challenges not only to particular

policies of the ruling governments, but also, and more significantly, to the founding

principles of the existing minority incorporation/exclusion regimes in Cyprus and

Turkey.

This paper sees the roots of the inefficient minority policies (in terms of satisfying

societal demands) in the historical legacy of the millet system. The change is not

impossible, but needs patience, and a careful and dedicated institutional engineering to

succeed given the insensitivity and inflexibility of the current institutional frameworks as

well as the high level of institutional autonomy from the societal segments in Cyprus and

Turkey. Given the resistance of current institutional setting and high level of state

autonomy in both Cyprus and Turkey, the change is likely to be initiated and supported

by the international actors, most importantly the European Union.

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