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Nazarbayev University

Astana, 2014

2008 Georgia Sugar Refinery Explosion

Aidyn Myltykbayev1, Rassul Bairamkulov1, Saken Sagadiyev2, Sanzhar Askaruly1, Shakarim Irmukhametov2, Zhaksylyk Kazykenov1

1Students, Nazarbayev University, School of Engineering, Electrical Engineering Department, 53 Kabanbay Batyr Ave., Astana, 010000, Kazakhstan 2Students, Nazarbayev University, School of Engineering, Mechanical Engineering Department, 53 Kabanbay Batyr Ave., Astana, 010000, Kazakhstan Contributors list: Group#11

Aidyn Myltykbayev – Root causes and circumstances. Rassul Bairamkulov – Consequences and effects. Saken Sagadiyev – Background information and chronology. Sanzhar Askaruly – Biography of the accident. Actions taken immediately after the accident. Shakarim Irmukhametov – Introduction. Risk assessment Zhaksylyk Kazykenov - Lessons learned.

Abstract:

This report will investigate the accident that has occurred at Imperial Sugar production

Company. As a consequence of the sugar dust explosion that took place at isolated conveyor

belt which was located below bunker that stored the granulated sugar. There was a chain of

enormous auxiliary dust blasts spread through the whole silos that were packing powdered

sugar. This report will include a brief review of background information and chronology of the

cases, causes and effects that were brought as a result of the explosions. Additionally, it will

comprise the actions taken and lessons learned after the accident in order to prevent such

failures in the future. Investigations made after the accident have shown that the root cause of

explosions was the accumulation of sugar dust in a confined area where the role of an incident

played the fault made by the company workers who did not take into their consideration the

explosive effects of powdered sugar by designing sugar conveying apparatus which was not

able to control and minimize the amount of released sugar dust. Accident that occurred at the

Imperial Sugar production facility was the first huge accident in sugar refining industry which

had significant economic losses, harmed the reputation and impacted on human lustiness.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….1

1.1. Risk assessment ……………………………………………………………………….1

2. Accident analysis………………………………………………………………………………...3

2.1. Background information and chronology……………………………………………3

2.2. Root causes and circumstances……………………………………………………...5

2.3. Consequences and effects……………………………………………………………6

2.4. Biography of the accident……………………………………………………………...8

3. Actions taken and lessons learned …………………………………………………………..9

3.1. Actions taken immediately after the accident……………………………………….9

3.2. Lessons learned………………………………………………………………………10

4. Reference List…………………………………………………………………………………..11

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1. Introduction

On February 7, 2008 at the Imperial Sugar plant in Port Wentworth, Georgia a number of sugar dust explosions killed 14 workers (CSB, 2009). The newly steel cover panels on the belt conveyor did not prevent explosive concentrations of sugar dust to store in the enclosure, ignited by an unknown source and as result, causing a violent explosion (ibid). A huge dust explosion and fires all over the packing buildings was started by the explosion in silos beneath (Prezi, 2013). Secondary blasts happened in the package facility, bulk sugar loading buildings and other places of the refinery. Other reasons of the explosion could be the absence of emergency fire system and that the building was mostly made from wood (Prezi, 2013). The package facility, pelletizer facility and parts of the refinery were destroyed and damaged by these explosions. In accordance with the U.S. safety and hazard investigation board, the sugar dust explosion in Georgia was absolutely preventable (CSB, 2009).

1.1. Risk assessment In this section qualitative risk matrix analysis was applied to evaluate the risk level of the Sugar Dust Explosion in Georgia. The analysis includes 5 levels of accident severity and 5 levels of risk probability that are provided in the risk matrix below in Table 1.1.

Risk probability Severity of the accident

Extreme A=5

Crucial B=4

Moderate C=3

Insignificant D=2

Negligible E=1

5-Frequent 5A=25 5B=20 5C=15 5D=10 5E=5

4-Likely 4A=20 4B=16 4C=12 4D=8 4E=4

3- Occasional 3A=15 3B=12 3C=9 3D=6 3E=3

2-Rare 2A=10 2B=8 2C=6 2D=4 2E=2

1-Almost impossible 1A=5 1B=5 1C=3 1D=2 1E=1

Table 1. Risk Matrix

In the Table 1.2, 4 risk labels are described for the sugar refinery accident ordered by quantities of multiplication of risk probability with accident severity (Inglezakis V.J., 2014).

Assessment Risk Index Criteria

5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A (15≤𝑥 ≤25)

Unacceptable risk level Requires immediate action under existing circumstances

5D, 4C, 4D, 3B, 3C, 2A, 2B

(8≤ 𝑥 ≤12)

Unsatisfactory risk level Manageable under risk control & mitigation. Requires Risk Analysis Board & management decision

5E,4E, 3D, 2C, 1A, 1B (4≤𝑥 ≤6)

Acceptable after review of the operation. Requires continued tracking and recorded action plans.

3E, 2D, 2E, 1C, 1D, 1E (1≤𝑥 ≤4)

Acceptable risk level Acceptable with continued data collection and trending for continuous improvement.

Table 2. Risk Indexes’ criteria

The frequency and risk severity definitions are shown in the Tables 1.3 and 1.4 respectively.

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Frequency Definition

Frequent (5) > 1 in 10 years

Probable (4) 1 in 10 years to 1 in 100 years

Occasional (3) 1 in 100 years to 1 in 1000 years

Remote (2) 1 in 1000 years to 1 in 10000 years

Improbable (1) < 1 in 10000 years

Table 3. Risk frequency index definitions

Severity of Occurrences

Risk Severity Meaning Value

Extreme Dozens of deaths

Equipment destroyed

Financial losses > $10M

Big impact on environment

Potential for uncontrollable public discontent

A

Crucial Serious injury or death

Accident or Serious Incident with injuries and/or major to moderate equipment damage

Financial losses > $100k

Medium environmental impact

B

Moderate Accident or Incident with minor injury and/or minor plant damage

Financial losses from 0$ to $100k

Small environmental impact

C

Insignificant No deaths

No equipment damage to slight damage – no operational impact

$0 regulatory fines

No environmental impact anticipated

No public relations impact

D

Negligible

No regulatory violation

Equipment is safe. No equipment damage - no operational impact

$0 regulatory fines

Negligible environmental impact

No public relations impact

E

Table 4. Severity of Occurrences

Risk severity of the Sugar Dust Explosion in Port Wentworth, Georgia is assessed as extreme since all impacts are suitable to our criteria:

14 workers killed and 42 injured.

The packaging area of the refinery was totally destroyed, 12% of the plant was razed by the explosion (Chapman, Dan. 2008).

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The Imperial Sugar Company announced a $15.5 million loss in the first quarter of 2008.The loss, according to company`s report was primarily due to the explosion ("Ga. sugar refinery demolishing blasted silos").

The particles produced after the explosion produced air pollution as well as settlement everywhere near the place. Also, emission of airborne pollutants was the impact of electricity generation on environment.

Moreover, the probability of the Imperial Sugar Refinery incident was found as 0.0376 (Abuswer M.A., Amyotte P.R., Khan F.I., 2011). That matches to Probable. Therefore, by means of qualitative risk analysis the risk level corresponds to 4A, which is unacceptable. Thus, the required actions should be taken to minimize the risk.

2. Accident analysis

2.1. Background information and chronology The Imperial Sugar Company was founded in 1924 and has the main quarter in Sugar Land, Texas. Savannah Foods and Industries sold the Wentworth facility to this company. This happened in December, 1997 (CSB, 2009).

The Imperial Sugar manufacturing production is the refining facility where the raw cane sugar is converted into granulated sugar. With the help of various belt conveyors and screw systems, also working bucket elevators were all in process of transferring granulated sugar to sugar storage bunkers (silos). After that the sugar reached special area where it was processed and packed. Then the railcars loaded it and tanker trucks transported in the bulk sugar loading area.

The companies and firms that purchased sugar from it were in common industrial bakeries and grocers. The production of sugar in 2007 comprised 1.3 million tons. Such an achievement brought the Imperial Sugar into the list of the largest sugar refining companies in U.S. The number of employees and contractors exceeds 350 personnel who worked at Port Wentworth facility. Annually sugar production comprised 700 thousand tons (ibid).

February 7, 2008

7:15 PM The sugar dust explosion took place at isolated conveyor belt which was made from steel and located below bunker that stored the granulated sugar. All these facilities were situated at the Imperial Sugar Company in Port Wentworth, Georgia (CNN, 2008).

Few seconds later Enormous auxiliary dust bang spread through the whole bunkers that were packing granulated and powdered sugar. Then it distributed to the constructions which held bulk sugar and other subsystems that belonged to raw sugar refinement system. Afterwards, the cement floors which were 3-inch in thickness experienced buckling and heaving from the force that came from the explosion. The reason is that fact that this explosion transferred from 4-story construction in the southern and eastern directions of the silos (CSB, 2009).

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Another few seconds later

The plank roof that was made from wood on the palletizer construction was blown and transmitted into the area where the bulk sugar railcar was loaded. According to cameras that were placed to the north, south and west of the incident, there were violent fireball eruptions that occurred suddenly. They took place out of the main building on the upper part of the bunkers (Reuters, 2008).

Few minutes later

February 8, 2008 Morning The next 4 months, 2008

There already was huge amount of dense smoke. Garden City and Port Wentworth fire department workers came at that moment. When they arrived quick fire had spread throughout the territory and many constructions were involved. The facility personnel were searching for injured people and also tried to rescue those who were near the fire (SCIEH, 2009). The CSB investigation personnel came to the Imperial Sugar facility. Also the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Georgia State Fire Marshal’s office conducted activities in order to recover victims of the explosion. The CSB workers checked and took photos of the inside space of seriously damaged constructions and devices. Also they talked with eyewitnesses who safely escaped the place of fire. These people included injured personnel and contractor employees who were there at the night of incident (ibid.).

The result of this explosion is that eight workers died at the place. This number includes four people who left under the debris that collapsed and floors which also did not withstand fire and collapsed. Moreover, two of these personnel tried to rescue own colleagues by reentering the construction; however, they were not able to rescue even themselves and did not escaped the fire and death afterwards. The Savannah Memorial Hospital received 19 of the 36 personnel. Workers who were burned significantly were sent to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center in Augusta, Georgia. There six workers were not able to withstand with injuries; therefore, the overall number of deaths comprised 14 personnel. The last fatality was recorded at the burn center after half a year (CSB, 2009). This explosion lead to 36 personnel who were seriously injured; however, they left with permanent and life changing injuries. During the incident about 85 people were not injured. The small fires were not stopped and burned for several days. But the major fires in the constructions were stopped after 24 hours (ibid.). The commercial industrial firefighting firm stopped the fire of granulated sugar in the bunker that was 105-foot tall building and the fire was not extinguished for a week. As a result, the destructions happened at palletizer room, granulated sugar silos and packing buildings. In addition, the area that was loaded by bulk sugar and other subsystems of the refinery were dramatically damaged by the explosion (ibid).

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2.2. Root causes and circumstances

Inadequate equipment

One of the main causes of the incident Georgia was inadequate design of the equipment. New equipment which was used for sugar conveying did not control sugar dust release in working area. Transportation of sugar by tunnel near tankers 1 and 2 produce sugar dust. Sometimes sugar pieces blocked movements of steel conveyer belt, which results in sugar dust spreading in to the air. Before 2007 sugar dust were spilling out into the whole volume of the tunnel. Flow of the air in the tunnel helped to control sugar dust concentration in the air under the minimum ignitable level. In 2007 steel conveyer belt and tunnel near the tankers 1 and 2 were closed. Imperial Sugar did not estimate risk and hazard which can appear due to dust accumulation of sugar dust in the new isolated system. Imperial Sugar did not install any equipment to take out sugar dust and keep it level under minimum explosible concentration. The new volume of conveyer belt was only 10 percent of the old one, which means it is easier to accumulate sugar dust above the minimum explosible concentration. In addition to this there were not installed deflagration vents which are used to direct explosion out of the factory (John B., 2010).

Not appropriate housekeeping of the factory

In the history of the factor for over 80 years there were no cases of such disruptive dust explosions. However, there was dating of sugar dust release in packing buildings in the period from 1970 to 2007. Spilling out of sugar dust was a long term problem, in 2007 it was reported that in some places deed of spilled sugar dust reached to knee distance. According to US Chemical Safety and Hazard investigation Board some time fires take place in the factory yet they were quickly prevented. In the February of 2008 two weeks before incident, at the roof of packing building there was an explosion in collector which was directed out by deflagration panels. At the time of incident collector had not yet repaired (CSB, 2009).

Overheated bearing

In the reports of the Chemical Safety and Hazard investigation board there is information that before an incident small fire took place in the factory when sugar dust was ignited by overheated materials. Yet no one from these small fires resulted in major sugar dust explosion and people’s death. In the day of incident first sugar dust explosion occurred in steel conveyer belt which was caused by overheated bearings (John B., 2010).

First dust explosion

First sugar dust explosion which occurred in the steel conveyer belt facilitated to sugar dust accumulation at the upper floors and triggered second explosion. Secondary explosion covered packing building, loading building and partially damaged refinery. Pressure wave which was caused by secondary explosion destroyed floors and walls. Caving of the wall blocked all exit routes. Roof of the palletizer building was destroyed, fire blown by wind reached from palletizer building to loading building. Fire caused by secondary explosion brought to ruin packing building, loading building, tankers and palletizer building. 14 people death were the result of the second explosion. (John B., 2010).

Inadequate emergency evacuation plan

According to emergency plan all workers should use an intercom communication in order to inform about an accident. Chemical safety and hazard investigation board found that worker

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not used intercom in the packing building. Furthermore in case of emergency workers used to rely on cell phones and personal announcements. Moreover any visual or sound alarm were absent in the packing building. Imperial Sugar provided workers with evacuation routes, however do not conduct training sessions of evacuation. Emergency evacuation lights were installed in the building, however after explosion emergency light failed and workers had to found the way out of factory in the dark. In addition to this, large sized equipment interrupted quick evacuation in the dark (CSB, 2009).

2.3. Consequences and effects The explosion has led to the severe consequences for the company. 8 people were killed and 40 more were injured during the explosion and the subsequent fire (Muller, 2013; Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2008). Four more victims died in the hospitals in February, one more in March and the last victim died in August (ibid). After the accident, the population made a very significant response to the situation. Several donation campaigns started in Georgia to help families of the refinery employees. Many people have expressed their willingness to help victims and their families. A total of $914,000 was raised as a result of the fundraising campaigns (ibid). From the economic perspective, the explosion resulted in a large negative effect on the Imperial Sugar business. Due to explosion, the sugar refining facility was severely damaged, the company was subjected to the large fines and numerous lawsuits from families of killed and injured employees. Governmental response to the incident was immediate. After the incident, the governmental institutions such as «Chemical Safety Board» (CSB), «Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms» (ATF) and «Occupational Safety and Health Administration» (OSHA) conducted inspections on the Imperial Sugar refineries (Hazardex, 2013). Severe violations were found during those inspections. According to OSHA (2008), severe safety violations were present at the Port Wentworth plant in Georgia and the Gramercy plant in Louisiana. A total of 124 safety violations found by inspectors included the large concentrations of small explosive sugar dust particles at the electric equipment and working areas (Seward, 2013). Furthermore, it was found that these violations were clearly known and accepted by the company administration (OSHA, 2008; CSB cited in Dewan, 2009). For such practice that led to the ‘entirely preventable’ deadly explosion (Dewan, 2009), a large fine for the Imperial Sugar Co. comprising $8,777,500 was proposed by OSHA (ibid.). For two years, from July 2008 to July 2010, OSHA and Imperial Sugar were in litigation process (Muller, 2013). According to Bauerlein (2010), in July 2010 Imperial Sugar agreed to pay $4mln for the violations found at the Port Wentworth plant and $2mln for the violations found on the Gramercy plant. Nevertheless, it was noted that the company did not admit any guilt for the explosion. During the explosion and the subsequent fire, almost the whole refinery was destroyed. Bauerlein (2010) noted that: “The explosion had a dramatic impact on Imperial's business as it took one of the company's two refining plants offline for 18 months.”. In order to speed up the recovery process, 275 out of 371 employees were recruited back for help with elimination of the incident consequences and reconstruction of refinery (Imperial Sugar Company, 2008). In second quarter of 2008, the company suffered severe losses comprising $15.5mln and the revenue drop that comprised 32% (Muller, 2013). March 17, 2008, the plant in Gramercy was shut down for more than a week after hazards were found on the refinery (ibid.).

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Overall, in the end of 2008, the company losses due to the sugar dust explosion amounted over $60mln. The economic effect coming from the lawsuits with the explosion victims was difficult to estimate. However, it was found that a total of 44 suits were made by victims of the explosion and their families (Skutch, 2010) and 18 of them were resolved by the end of September 2010. Besides the economic damage, the company’s reputation was damaged either. This fact has contributed to the company losses. As it is seen on the Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the company stocks continued rapid falling after the explosion resulting in the minimum stock level of $5.35 in March 6, 2009. Although, it cannot be concluded from the figures that the explosion was the main reason for the IPSU stock prices fall, the fact that the company’s stocks have never exceeded the late 2007 level demonstrates that the company was not restored to the pre-explosion level.

Figure 1. Imperial Sugar stock prices from late 2002 to early 2012 (adapted from Google

Finance)

Figure 2. Imperial Sugar stock prices from 2008 to early 2009 (adapted from Google

Finance)

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2.4. Biography of the accident The summary of Georgia sugar refinery explosion is illustrated in the Figure 1. The table shows the accident biography describing the relationship between defined threats, the top event, aftermath consequences as well as risk management procedures.

One of the main threats was accumulation of combustible sugar dust. Frequent controlled dust control procedures would minimize the risk. However, poor housekeeping procedures led to serious accumulations of combustible sugar dust on the floors and elevated surfaces. Specifically, the workers report (CSB, 2009) they sometimes used water and industrial vacuum cleaners in order to remove sugar dust from equipment. They also treated compressed air to extract accumulated granulated sugar or sugar dust from packaging equipment. As a result, compressed air cleaning later accumulated dust on horizontal surfaces in the area. Therefore, there had to be more frequent cleaning to remove dust from the work areas, before it accumulated to hazardous levels. Moreover, workers reported that despite having clear written policies including planned housekeeping procedures, they were not effectively implemented due to human incompetence and lack of trainings.

Besides, static electricity was also considered as a threat, since it is a potential source of spark ignition. Hence, static electricity should have been eliminated by appropriate equipment grounding in the hazardous area and electrical systems had to be carefully inspected on a regular basis. However, according to the report, a few electrical devices in dusty areas were poorly maintained, specifically, missing covers, open doors on some breaker panels and other electrical enclosures (ibid).

Moreover, high temperature caused by overheated bearing in the steel belt conveyor most likely ignited a primary dust explosion. Operators reported investigators that sometimes bearings on steel belt got heated and malfunctioned. Not only a heated bearing inside the steel belt conveyer could ignite, but also the long-time contact of hot surface with granulated sugar could make it smolder. Consequently, the mixture of released combustion gases with airborne sugar dust decreases the ignition temperature below the standard ignition temperature required for pure sugar dust ignition (Eckhoff, 2003). Utilization of “flameless venting” and ducting to atmosphere would remove combustion products to atmosphere to keep generated pressure within safe design limits, however was not effectively implemented.

Due to above mentioned potential spark ignition sources, equipment had to be isolated and spark to be detected. Flame propagation could be prevented using rotary air locks, screw conveyors, pinch valves, knife gate valves and chemical isolation, suitable for large ducting (Bsbipd.com, 2013). Moreover, heated particles in conveyor belt could be detected optically before they became a source of ignition. Implementation of the barriers would minimize the risk of developing the dust explosion into more severe or multiple events.

Intercom systems that should be used on emergency were not functioning inside the refinery and packing buildings. Workers, according to CSB investigators, relied on radios and cell phones to alert emergency. Therefore, due to absence of alarm systems, workers could not notify about the emergency in time (CSB, 2009).

Even though the company had evacuation routes posted, evacuation trainings were not provided to all personnel. Moreover, emergency evacuation lights provided poor illuminations due to the explosions and fires. Therefore, a few workers were in difficulty finding the way out of dark areas of building (ibid).

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Fire suppression sprinkler system was designed to preserve every floor of packing building. The city main and onsite firewater tank as well as emergency pumps to yield sprinkler heads. But the heavy damage that occurred in piping system due to initial explosions made the fire suppression system perform ineffectively. Resultant lack of water could not aid to subsequent firefighting efforts. Despite having 16 portable fire extinguishers on the third floor, workers reported the fire was rapidly progressing and already covering the packing building, so that the fire extinguishers were useless (ibid).

The failure in preventing the sugar dust explosion led to damage to people, where 14 were killed and 42 were injured. Apart from that, asset was severely harmed: packing buildings, granulated sugar silos and palletizer room were destroyed with sugar loading area and parts of refinery heavily damaged. Imperial informed about $15.5 million loss, primarily due to explosion (Ga. sugar refinery demolishing blasted silos). The airborne particles produced from dust explosion also created air pollution, settling all around the place. Finally, the explosion happened in Georgia sugar refinery showed poor safety management carried in the refinery, resulting in the loss of reputation of Imperial Sugar Company. Consequently, Port Wentworth lost many customers suffering economic depression after the disaster happened.

Figure 3. Biography of the accident

3. Actions taken and lessons learned

3.1. Actions taken immediately after the accident

Another sugar refinery, situated in Louisiana was closed after six weeks since Port Wentworth accident. Occupational safety and health administration fined Imperial Company $36000 for safety legislation violations (Chapman, Dan. 2008).

Cleanup and demolition of the refinery parts, that were impossible to salvage, planned. The decision of rebuilding was taken on April 18, 2008. The demolition procedure of sugar silos started on June 24, 2008 with a wrecking ball (Chapman, Dan. 2008). By summer of 2009, replacement of packaging buildings and new sugar silos were planned to be completed (“Ga. sugar refinery demolishing blasted silos”).

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In a period of month, occupational safety and health administration sent a letter to 30000 employees working in similar facilities, informing of the dust explosion, fearing their unawareness. Also, OSHA later introduced Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act of 2008, which aim was to introduce regulations and to reduce the risk of dust explosions (Testimonial record, 2008).

3.2. Lessons learned Dust explosion at Imperial Sugar Company had become the first large accident at sugar producing plant, which exhibited that several parties of process, control and communal issues should be reexamined and ameliorated. Specifically, in order to prevent prospective accidental events it is required to make changes to parties that may include training of personnel involved in process and developing practice instructions, broad communication between agencies and workers about the lessons learned from the accident, safety regulations, emergency evacuation plans.

Control combustible dust accumulation quantity

According to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2009), the thorough examinations made showed that the root reason of the explosion was an accretion of combustible powdery sugar dust. The cornstarch and sugar facilities were not constructed to lessen the amount of powder in it (ibid). Therefore, it became required to implement across - the - board ménage program to monitor inflammable dust congestion which will ensure sugar and cornstarch dust or other ignitable dust does not gather to unsafe quantities on overhead landscape sides, packaging equipment and flooring (ibid).

Improvement of training of operating personnel

According to CSB (2009), after the sugar dust explosion accident happened, the detailed study showed that preparation and abilities of the workers in sugar plant were not satisfactory. Despite the fact that the company has posted up evacuation pathway, the workers were failed to be trained and were not able to react quickly due to lack of urgent evacuation practices (Hardy T., 2013). Therefore, it became required that the workers have to be more organized in such situations, more trained and be more acquainted with the procedure and safety regulations for sugar plant’s process (CEMA, 2008) . Additionally periodic prompt training of the workers and contractors programs such as the Safety and Health Management Systems training should be integrated in order to enhance perception of hazard from sugar dust with continual check of their learning degree (Hardy T., 2013). These trainings may include information about the features of the combustible dust; particularly lower flammability limit, ignition energy, and best solutions to decrease the amount of accumulated dust on flat surfaces (CSB, 2009).

Emergency planning should be well-organized

The emergency evacuation plans of the Imperial Sugar Company were maladaptive (CSB, 2009). According to written emergency procedure, workmen should use an intercommunication system in case of an incident (ibid). However, this intercommunication system was not accessible inside sugar packaging structures, so some of the workers who were inside the sugar plant heard emergency notice by means of mouth and were not outright notified of emergency situation (ibid). Therefore, it became clear that emergency alarm system should be implemented in all buildings of the sugar plant (ibid). Furthermore, it was understood to require regular emergency evacuation exercises and reviews (Hardy T., 2013).

Amelioration of communication between different agencies and workers

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According to written emergency procedure, workmen should use an intercommunication system in case of an incident, but in some areas of the plant this communication system was not available (CSB, 2009). Therefore, it is suggested to use additional radios, batteries and charges in case of an urgent situation (CEMA, 2008).

Own safety standards should be applied

Investigating the accident and its reasons it was established that substantial changes have to be produced to the safety regulations of the sugar plant. The new sugar plant should meet the standards written by National Fire Protection Association Occupational Safety and Health Administration, American Bakers Association, and AIB International for different categories of security and extensive revision of sugar producing plant should be made against the norms mentioned. (CSB, 2009).

Overall, it can be stated that the explosion happened at Imperial Sugar Company conduced to better reconsideration of the overall process and controlling of the sugar producing company and the sugar companies in general. Based on the recommendations made by CSB and other safety agencies, subsequent modifications were instigated at Imperial Sugar Company (ibid):

Control combustible dust accumulation quantity Improvement of training of operating personnel Emergency planning should be well-organized Amelioration of communication between different agencies and workers Own safety standards should be applied

4. Reference List

Abuswer M.A., Amyotte P.R., Khan F.I., 2011. Quantitative Risk Management for Dust and Hybrid Mixture. Explosions: Framework and Application. Retrieved March 19, 2014 from http://www.ishpmie.gig.eu/files/file/konferencje/IXISHPMIE/ish001.pdf

Bauerlein V., 2010. Imperial Sugar to Pay Fines in Deadly Georgia Explosion Case. [Online] Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 22, 2014 from http://goo.gl/I9kzxg

Bsbipd.com, 2013. Sugar Dust Explosion Prevention & Protection [online]. Retrieved March 20,

2014 from http://www.bsbipd.com/sugar_dust_explosion_prevention_protection.html

CEMA (2008) Imperial Sugar Dixie Crystal Plant, 124 Bull St., Suite 140, Savannah, GA 31401. Retrieved March 17, 2014 from http://www.lepc.com/pdf/AAR%20Full%20Size.pdf

Chapman, Dan. 2008. "Sugar refinery near Savannah determined to rebuild". The Atlanta Journal Constitution, 04-13 (secondary source).

CNN, 2008. 4 killed in Georgia refinery blast; at least 4 people missing. Retrieved March 13, 2014 from http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/02/08/refinery.blast/index.html#cnnSTCText

Csb.gov, 2009. Imperial Sugar Company Dust Explosion and Fire – Investigations | the U.S. Chemical Safety Board [online]. Retrieved March 20, 2014 from http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/imperial_sugar_report_final_updated.pdf

Dewan S., 2009. Report Cites Lack of Precautions in 2008 Sugar Plant Fire. [Online] The New York Times. Retrieved March 24, 2014 http://goo.gl/bEcgoU

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Eckhoff, R., 2003. Dust Explosions in the Process Industries, 3rd ed. Gulf Professional Publishing, Houston, TX

"Ga. sugar refinery demolishing blasted silos". Associated Press. Secondary Source [Wikipedia]. Retrieved March 19, 2014 from http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jnqlRpUoRXY_jeSCqw3lhlRbB3AD91GK8SG1

Google Finance (n.d.) Information regarding Imperial Sugar Company [Online]. Retrieved March 24, 2014 from http://goo.gl/UUnPd5

Hardy T., (2013). New Emergency Management Lesson Learned: Explosions in Georgia. Available at: Retrieved March 26, 2014 from http://community.fema.gov/connect.ti/readynpm/messageshowthread?threadid=21774.

Imperial Sugar Company, 2008. Imperial Sugar Board Affirms Intention to Rebuild Damaged Areas of Its Port Wentworth Refinery. [Press release]. Retrieved March 23, 2014 from http://goo.gl/epmdsn

Inglezakis V.J., 2014. Sample Risk Matrix. Retrieved March 14, 2014 from http://moodle.nu.edu.kz/mod/folder/view.php?id=59373

John B., 2010. Imperial Sugar Refinery Combustible Dust Explosion Investigation. Retrieved March 16, 2014 from http://www.allriskengineering.com/library_files/AIChe_conferences/AIChe_2010/data/papers/P177210.pdf

Muller J., 2013. TIMELINE: Imperial Sugar explosion from 2008 until today. [Online] SavannahNow. Retrieved March 22, 2014 from http://goo.gl/pjCpc4 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2008. Federal OSHA issues third largest fine in history following sugar refinery explosion. [Online] Retrieved March 22, 2014 from http://goo.gl/E6YNcA

Reuters, 2008. Four dead in sugar refinery blast. Retrieved March 23, 2014 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/08/us-usa-explosion-sugar-idUSN0743207120080208?feedType

Seward C., 2013. No criminal charges for Imperial Sugar in deadly blast. [Online] The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved March 25, 2014 from http://goo.gl/Vphh36

Skutch J., 2010. Appellate court rejects pre-trial appeal in Imperial Sugar case [Online]. SavannahNow. Retrieved March 23, 2014 from http://goo.gl/K95Xww Sugar Company Ignored Explosion Hazards, Investigation Concludes, 2009. Retrieved March 20, 2014 from http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/10428

Testimonial record on the "Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act of 2008". Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Retrieved March 21, 2014 from https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=TESTIMONIES&p_id=4332008-06-22

Wikipedia, 2013. 2008 Georgia sugar refinery explosion [online]. Retrieved March 20, 2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Georgia_sugar_refinery_explosion