Post on 30-Mar-2023
Abstract
On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, together with Israeli Foreign
Minister, Peres and PLO negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed a Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as
the “Oslo Accords,” at the White House. Israel accepted the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and
recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian
Authority (PA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. Then, permanent status talks
on the issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be held. Over a decade
later, the peace process has stalled and the US has proposed a ‘constructive
disengagement’ from the region. This policy is now being seen as a way of
promoting the interests of the United States, but is argued to be beneficial as
well as those of the people of the Middle East
In this paper, I aim to show that the continuous failure of United States led talks
to secure peace in the Middle East is explained through Hans Morgenthau’s
principles, whose realist approach contends that states are the most important
actors in the international arena. Hence agreements between nations that
involve making compromises over their core national-security interests and
values will never be achieved through outside pressure.
The time has come for a serious debate on the future involvement of the United
States in the Middle East and only original and provocative analysis of the
parties national interests, can challenge the prevailing idealism of the
Washington foreign policy establishment
INTRODUCTION
In order to appreciate the path to peace, one must review
the history of conflict. The realization that no two states
are the same, and this will result in conflict has to be a
significant consideration in any discourse on international
relations. The global movement to expand interdependence
between states further makes it important to advocate for
flexibility for the sake of co-existence. The culture of
peace is hence one that welcomes differences, acknowledging
them as a starting point for the progress from potential
sources of conflict
Several conceptions and ideas on international relations
have been suggested as conceptual frameworks within which
peace may prosper.
Realism, which has shaped Hans Morgenthau’s principles of
political realism, has a tradition of international theory
that is centered upon four propositions.1 Realism posits
that;
1. States are the most important actors
2. The primary concern of all states is survival
3. There is no actor above states that is capable of
regulating their interactions
4. States are unitary, rational actors that tend to pursue
self interest
The fundamental construct in realism is that sovereign
states are the principal actors in the international arena
and the authority and influence is ascribed to large powers.
International institutions and other sub state or trans
state actors are viewed as having less influence.
States are viewed as inherently aggressive with territorial
expansion forming their ambitions, and are described as
being engaged in offensive realism, with their major
concerns being their security. The latter is termed as
defensive realism. Within these frameworks, states can
create conflict and instability due to their efforts in
territorial expansion. However, this can be constrained by
the opposing power(s) or a large power.
Realists believe that there no universal principles that
states use to guide all their actions, instead states must
always be aware of the powers and actions of states around1 Morgenthau, Hans. (1946) "Scientific Man versus Power Politics" University of Chicago Press.
it and use a pragmatic approach to ascertain the threat
levels and resolve them as they arise
The main argument against realism is ‘realpolitik’2. This is
considered as a prescriptive guideline. It is limited to
policy making on issues of international relations,
developing foreign policy among states. Realism, however, is
a descriptive paradigm aimed at describing, explaining and
eventually predicting events in the international relations
domain with a wider theoretical and methodological
framework.
Morgenthau’s realism thus marks the beginning of the wisdom
that even such benign developments as advocacy for
democratic peace will continue to rest heavily on the
robustness and credibility of the large (in this case;
United States’) power. Yet any sound theory of international
relations with reliable policy implications also must guard
against Morgenthau’s excessively pessimistic vision of man’s
moral and political possibilities.
Although the relative anarchy of international relations and
the imperfectability of man often limit the range of moral
choice in international politics, the failure in the record
of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East
demonstrates the need for U.S. ideals and self-interest to
recede and pave way for defined democratic regime change as
2 Von Rochau, Ludwig. ‘Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands.’
the main agenda in conducting peace talks in the region. The
spread of stable liberal democracy can ameliorate, if not
eliminate, in theory, the drawn out Israeli-Arab conflict
Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Principles
In consideration of realism as an explanation to actions
taken by states, Morgenthau’s realist principles are asserts
that it is the desire to dominate among nations that causes
conflict.3 He draws this from the theological and political
writings of Hobbes, to identify human desire for power.
’International politics like all politics is a struggle for
power’ (Hans. M, 1948 p.25).
In his principles, Morgenthau opposes scholars who tried to
reduce the discipline of international relations to
behavioral science. He states that politics, like society in
general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots
in human nature which is unchanging (Hans. M, 1948 p.4). It
is possible then to develop realism into both a rational
theory of international politics that reflects these
objective laws and a political art, which is a useful tool
of foreign policy.
The foundation in Morgenthau’s realist theory is that the
state’s interest is defined in terms of power. The ‘concept
of power’ informs his second principle; the assumption that
3 Morgenthau, Hans J. (1954) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
political leaders ‘think and act in terms of interest
defined as power’ (Hans. M, 1948 p.5). The main signpost of
political realism is the concept of interest defined in
terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject
matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical
understanding of politics possible. Political realism
stresses the rational, objective and unemotional.
This concept outlines political autonomy and allows
evaluation of foreign policy without consideration of moral
and intellectual dispositions of the individual politicians.
This makes analysis of states actions on the basis of
political leaders’ actions be evaluated regardless of
different preferences or motives at the time of decision
making
The third principle decodes that various things can be
associated with interests and power at different times and
in different circumstances. The validity of interest being
defined as power is essential as an element of politics but
its content and the matter of its use are also dictated upon
by the political and cultural environment. Realism assumes
that interest defined as power is an objective category
which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is
fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man
(Hans. M, 1948 p.5).
The significance of ethics in political action creates a
tension between the fundamental foundations of realism and
morality. Morgenthau considers this relationship and he
asserts that realists are also aware of the tension between
requirements of successful political; action and morality.
Political realism is aware of the moral significance of
political action. It is also aware of the tension between
moral command and the requirements of successful political
action. “Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot
be applied to the actions of states in their abstract
universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through
the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Hans. M, 1948
p.9)
The emphasis of prudence is underscored in his fifth
principle as he emphasizes that all state actors must but
seen as political entities pursuing their respective
interests defined in terms of power. Hence it’s not
conviction of one’s moral or ideological superiority that
should guide political action, but prudence.
In his discussion of power or interest defined as power,
Morgenthau defines that politics is an autonomous sphere
that cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics still
plays an important role in politics “A man who was nothing
but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be
completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was
nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be
completely lacking in prudence” (Hans. M, 1948 p.12).
Connecting Morgenthau’s principles of realisms, one obtains
the picture of interest defined as power to be the defining
factor in the creation of the autonomous nature of politics.
Rationality will hence dictate that the political leaders
with influence over their states’ actions to be directed
such that they protect their national interests. The
effective concern in international relations is hence to
look for compromise only in circumstances that mutual
interests will be satisfied. In order to avoid conflicts,
states should avoid ideological confrontations and where
they exist, maximize and form agreements on the points that
they relate on similar grounds
Using Morgenthau’s concepts, realism as a way of thinking,
can be applied to international relations as a useful devise
for forming foreign policies. However, his arguments on the
nature of human desire being a struggle for power, a view
that he shares with Hobbes, is questionable as one cannot
scientifically observe this. It is inculcated as a matter of
belief or education but as a fundamental concept, it is
ambiguous.
Morgenthau introduces a normative aspect of his theory,
which is rationality. In his definition, rationality
consists of counting the cost and benefits of all
alternative policies to ascertain their relative utility.
This is considered as their ability to maximize power.
Morgenthau classifies ‘a good foreign policy’ to be a
rational one (Hans. M, 1948 p.7). However, the painting of
pursuit of power as being the norm does not present the
actual portrait of human affairs which is dynamic. In
political terms, this can explain the result of policies
that deviate from aiming to minimize risks and maximizing
benefits as would be considered rational
The major basis of the criticisms to Hans Morgenthau’s
fundamental concepts of realism is that is they can either
be a means, or an end in politics. If power would be the
sole means of gaining something else, it would not define
international relations as Morgenthau asserts. The actions
of states cannot be understood while disregarding the
ideologies of the political leaders. This cannot serve as
the basis for describing politics as an autonomous sphere.4
The role of realism is as a useful practical and cautionary
theory, which depends on the actual historical and political
conditions of international relations. It warns against
moralism, legalism and other orientations that can cause the
acting parties to lose touch with the reality of self-
interest and power.
4 Williams, Michael C. (ed.), (2007). ‘Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Its emphasis on national interest can be used illegitimately
to justify aggression. Hence, additional international
relations theories that take account of the changing nature
of world politics should be stressed to accompany its
relevance in making political decision.5
In analysis of US policy in the middle east and Israel ,
Hans Morgenthau’s principles show that attempts to sever
domestic from international politics and to minimize the
impact of ideology on the global system renders the United
States less capable of understanding the ideological,
ethical and geo-political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
On the basis of these principles, Morgenthau concludes that
the creation of a world state overseeing perpetual peace is
“unattainable under the moral, social, and political
conditions in the world at our time.” Instead, he advocates
the primary method to mitigate the inevitable struggle for
power in international politics as diplomacy, devoid of a
crusading spirit, through which states de ne their foreignfi
policies in terms of concrete conceptions of the national
interest, readily compromise on issues not vital to them,
and strive empathetically to view foreign policy from the
point of view of other nations, not just their own.
The Oslo Accords5 Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, (2013)"Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition)
The Oslo Accords were bilateral agreements signed in
Washington on the 13th September, 1993, following
negotiations between Israel and PLO. The signed agreement
was entitled ‘ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements’ It was mainly concerned with the
Israeli withdrawal from the territories of Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza Strip in order to allow for the establishment
of a Palestinian Authority for an interim period until
permanent arrangements would be established.6
The signing of the declaration had dramatic consequences for
the policy of Israel towards the PLO. Israel acknowledged
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and
announced on its intent to begin negotiations, as a part of
a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. Arafat, in
the name of the PLO, acknowledged Israel’s right for a safe
and peaceful existence. Arafat committed himself to the
peace process and to work towards a peaceful solution to the
conflict; he obliged to abstain from the use of terror and
violent acts; he acknowledged the United Nations’ Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and had guaranteed to
approve the necessary changes in the Palestinian manifest in
the Palestinian National Council – mainly concerning
chapters contradicting the declaration or disapproving of
Israel’s right for independence
6 Knesset, (2015) Oslo Accords https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/oslo_eng.htm
Oslo sketched out a peace process with a two-phase
timetable. During a five-year interim period, Oslo
envisioned a series of step-by-step measures to build trust
and partnership. Palestinians would police the territories
they controlled, cooperate with Israel in the fight against
terrorism, and amend those sections of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) charter that called for
Israel's destruction. Israel would withdraw almost entirely
from Gaza and in stages from parts of the West Bank. An
elected Palestinian Authority would take over governance of
the territories from which Israel withdrew.
The Land-for-Peace policy, incorporated in UN Resolution 242
of November 1967, has its origins in the negotiations after
the Six-Days War of June 1967 where Israel withdrew from
territories that it won in the war. The territories are West
bank and Gaza. The historical significance lies in it being
one of the options that Israel had for peace, that is,
territorial withdrawal for peace with hostile Arab
populations7
However, the principle bore huge risk and this was
particularly due to the history of Israel returning the
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1957 under US pressure, after
the Suez Crisis, only to watch as the Egyptians attacked
Israel from the same territory ten years later.
7 Yitzhak Rabin (1979), ‘The Rabin Memoirs’, Boston Mass. Little, Brown and Co., p. 334.
For decades, the case of territorial withdrawal relied
heavily on the availability of a credible and authoritative
Arab negotiator offering Israel peace and security. From
Sadat to Arafat, to the investment of a Jordanian option,
the absence of a suitable partner led to the formation of
the Labor Party’s policy. The principle was that Israeli
concessions should follow, not precede a formal peace
agreement
However, in Israel, the withdrawal also relied on a
demographic argument. The proponents of territorial
concession insisted that holding on to the territories would
render Israel un-democratic and the state would cease to be
Jewish.
The Land for peace policy though noble, has not succeeded in
eliciting the good faith, in the Arab counterparts. Peace
has not been entirely within the Israeli’s sole control and
they cannot identify a solution devoid of the Arab
participation. Hence Palestinian Arabs must develop
frameworks for peace and democratic institutions that have
the authority to ensure mature political leadership there,
for peace to exist
Israel’s political interests within the Oslo Accords
In 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza, dubbed Oslo II, stipulated the second
phase of self-rule, including provisions of elections of the
Palestinian National Authority, a gradual withdrawal of
Israeli military and handing over power to the Palestinians
in the occupied territories, and the "prohibition of any
change in the status of the West Bank and Gaza pending the
outcome of final status negotiations." The West Bank was to
be divided up into Areas A, B, and C, under Palestinian
Authority. control, joint control, and Israeli control,
respectively.
The most important aspect of the Oslo Accords, dealt with
economic policy. It was explicitly recognized that no peace
could endure, unless there were cooperation among the former
adversaries around economic development, for mutual benefit.
Various Palestinian institutions were foreseen, to regulate
water, energy, transportation, finances, etc. Two annexes to
the accords were drawn up, protocols on joint cooperation
for economic and regional development, which specifically
identified a number of great projects: the Gaza Sea Port,
the "Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal," "regional desalination
and other water development projects," agriculture, energy,
and industrial development
However, the strategic nature of the talks bears its history
in the political uniqueness of Israel’s decision to hold
direct talks with the PLO. This constituted a revolution in
its foreign policy, a revolution that paved the way to the
Oslo accord. Three men, all members of the Labour Party,
were primarily responsible for this decision: Yitzhak Rabin
who was defence minister as well as prime minister, his
foreign minister and political rival, Shimon Peres, and
Yossi Beilin, the youthful deputy foreign minister.
Rabin, a former Chief of Staff, had always belonged to the
hawkish wing of the Labour Party. For him Israel's security
took precedence over peace with the Arab neighbours. On
being elected, he assumed personal charge of the bilateral
talks and left only the much less important multilateral
talks to his foreign minister.
Peres and Beilin not only recognized the need to talk to the
PLO but had a clear and coherent long-term strategy for
directing the talks8. They realized at the outset that to
achieve a peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israel
would have to pay a high price: a return to the pre-June
1967 borders with only minor modifications, an independent
Palestinian state, the dismantling of Jewish settlements,
and the granting to the Palestinians of functional control
over East Jerusalem.
Rabin, on the other hand, had no clear idea of the final
shape of the settlement with the Palestinians. His thinking
8 Yoel Marcus, `Three Comments on the Situation', Ha'aretz, 19 September 1993.
was largely conditioned by the Allon Plan, by the Jordanian
option and by the idea of territorial compromise over the
West Bank. Nor did Rabin appear to have any coherent long-
term strategy. In the past, especially during his first term
as prime minister from 1974 to 1977, Rabin's only strategy
in the peace talks with the Arabs was to play for time. Now,
aged 71, in his second and probably last term as prime
minister, he seemed anxious to enter history as a peacemaker
but without incurring the opprobrium involved in the
dismantling of settlements. Hence the attraction of the idea
of Palestinian self-rule for an interim period of five years
during which the settlements would stay in place. It was
this policy vacuum at the heart of the government that
enabled Beilin to take the lead, to exert an influence that
was out of all proportion to his junior position.9
Altogether, fourteen sessions of talks were held over an
eight-month period, all behind a thick veil of secrecy.
Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Johan Joergen Holst and
social scientist Terge Larsen acted as generous hosts and
gentle mediators. The key players were two Israeli
academics, Dr Yair Hirschfeld and Dr Ron Pundak, and PLO
treasurer Ahmed Qurai, better known as Abu Alaa. Away from
the glare of publicity and political pressures, these three
men worked imaginatively and indefatigably to establish the
9 Avi Shlaim, 1994 ‘The Oslo Accord’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:3 (Spring 1994), pp. 24-40.
conceptual framework of the Israel-PLO accord. Their
discussions ran parallel to the bilateral talks in
Washington but they proceeded without the knowledge of the
official Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.
The participation of Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak was
critical to the success of the Oslo channel. As Uri Savir
acknowledged: `They are, in a sense, so removed from the
customary manner in which international diplomacy is shaped,
that this is what enabled them to be so successful. The very
unorthodox nature of their mission was a basic element of
our success.’10
A broad view of the peace policy of the Labour government
when it came to power in 1992 reveals an odd combination of
strategy and tactics, Peres's strategy and Rabin's tactics.
Peres's strategy aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict while Rabin's tactics aimed at playing
the Arabs off against one another in order to reduce the
pressure on Israel to make concessions. When these tactics
ended in deadlock on all fronts, Rabin was forced to go
along with the Beilin-Peres strategy of direct negotiations
with the PLO. The result was the Oslo accord. After the Oslo
accord was signed, Rabin reverted to his customary tactics
of divide and rule. This tactic is sensible enough when
10 Jerrold Kessel, `Professors Clinch Deal', The Guardian, 18 September 1993.
waging war against several enemies; it is much more
problematic when waging peace. To attain comprehensive peace
in the Middle East, the Arab world needs to be united rather
than divided. Peres's strategy is calculated to promote
comprehensive peace whereas Rabin's tactics are liable to
frustrate it. Rabin is bound to discover sooner or later
that he cannot implement only half of his foreign minister's
strategy. The choice for Israel is between going forward at
full speed on every front at the same time and losing
momentum on every front at the same time. The choice is
between forging a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict on the anvil of the Oslo accord and
allowing inter-Arab rivalries to nullify this historic
breakthrough. And the choice for the 71-year old Rabin is
between going down in Israel's history merely as a great
soldier or also as a great statesman and peace-maker.
For the Israeli government the accord made the provision for
an interim arrangement which carries only the most general
implications for the permanent transfer of territory or
power. However, For the PLO the accord is the first step
towards full statehood. The two sides could not march
forward together because they were intent on marching in
different directions.
Palestine Authority and PLO interests and subsequent non-
compliance to Oslo
The Oslo "Peace" accords did not lead peace.11 The number of
terror attacks against Israel and the number of Israelis
killed by Arab terror bombings greatly escalated after Oslo
to a level that had not been seen since 1948. The chart
below shows the number of Israelis killed each month in
Palestinian terrorist attacks from the start of the intifada
riots in December 1987 through August 1998. Terrorism shot
up again after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September
1993. In the 30 months after that date, more Israelis were
killed by terrorists (213) than in the preceding decade (209
from January 1983 to September 1993).It is divided into
segments marking significant changes in the political
situation. The red line shows the average level of
fatalities within each political period.
11 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli-Conflict, 2nd ed. (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1993)
Sources: Peace Watch, Shalem Center, Yesha Council, Jewish
Action Initiative Reports
The most obvious breach of the Palestinian commitments
involved the direct participation of its armed forces and
the various security organs - in armed clashes with the IDF
or in attacks on Israeli citizens, even in places where only
hours earlier some of them participated in the Joint Patrols
with the IDF, according to the Interim Agreement.
The very nature of the Oslo Process assumed that over time,
if not overnight, a new reality of bilateral relations would
be created on the ground, with an open prospect to
Palestinian Sovereignty in sight. This would lead Arafat
away from the option of violence and "struggle"
However, to Muslim audiences, such as the one he had in a
mosque in Johannesburg in May 1994 (one of the first such
speeches in the post-Oslo phase) Arafat - a former Muslim
Brother, forced to leave Nasser's Egypt for that reason in
the 1950's - spoke in the familiar idiom of Islamic
radicalism, through repeated references to the Treaty of
Hudaybiyyah. This reference to the treaty signed by the
Prophet Muhammad with his Meccan enemies when they were
still stronger than him, and then abandoned (as he conquered
the city) within a much shorter time than the Treaty itself
warranted is crucial in understanding his political
interests then, as it legitimized him as the founding leader
of the Palestinian people. (Israeli Government White Paper,
Nov 2000)
In essence, this reference was a rationale offered to the
Palestinian people for accepting Oslo Accords and the place
of the PLO at the negotiations, and the various commitments
involved, not as the building blocks of trust and
cooperation but as temporary measures, to be shed off when
circumstances allow. However, to more secular audiences he
offered a possible argument for the conditional or temporary
nature of his commitments by addressing them in the context
of the "Strategy of Stages" for the Liberation of Palestine,
as endorsed by the PNC in 1974. (Orbit Television, April 18,
1998)
Arafat publicly accepted Israel’s right to exist, but it is
not clear whether he saw the two-state solution as a final
settlement, or a mere stepping stone to a unified Palestine
under Arab rule. Netanyahu, Sharon, and Barak refused to
freeze the expansion of settlements, and blamed Arafat for
terrorism while they crippled the Palestinian Authority’s
infrastructure, fulfilling their own prophecy that it was
incapable of governing.
The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and his
replacement by Benjamin Netanyahu led to renewed conflict,
due to the latter’s provocative policies, including
expansion of the Jewish settlements. Israel lagged behind
its withdrawal commitments, while Arafat seemed at times to
have a laissez faire attitude toward Palestinian terrorism.
Stated interests vs. Real interests
Two decades later, the ongoing reality of Israeli occupation
of the territories denotes the Oslo accords as having
failed. However, in consideration of interests the Israeli
government, at the time was seeking for a more functional
role in the peace process rather that ending the occupation.
As it may be seen from the earlier explanation, portraying
itself as a partner to Palestinian sovereignty was a key
factor for Israel in engaging in the talks. Ending the
occupation and addressing issues of dispossession were to be
discussed over the period of time during the agreement
Oslo helped strengthen Israel’s regional position while
weakening the Palestinian movement. Under Oslo, the then
newly established Palestinian Authority and PLO drew
international legitimacy as their mission of ‘building an
independent Palestinian state’ became a key political
strategy. However Oslo ideologically disarmed the Palestine
political movement seeking the return of Palestinian
refugees from the 1947-48 War. Its replacement of this key
Palestinian aspiration, whose solidarity had been built
during the first intifada, was by providing a faith in a
peace process steered by Western governments.12
In the wake of Oslo, the illusion of peace prompted Arab
governments led by Jordan and Egypt to renew economic ties
with Israel. The Arab boycotts had cost Israel an estimated
$ 40 billion from 1948-1994. Under American and European
goodwill, international firms now investing in Israel could
allay their fears of attracting secondary boycotts from Arab
countries.
In the analysis of the process, similarly noting that the
Nobel peace prize, awarded jointly to Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and
PLO leader Yasser Arafat in 1994, mythologized this event in
historical records, one question goes unaddressed.
12 Adam. H, (2013), ‘The Oslo Illusion; The Historical Accords between Palestine and Israel.’ Center for Research on Globalization
Why is the Palestinian leadership a willing partner to this
‘Instrument of Palestinian Surrender, A Palestinian
Versailles?’13
The honest acknowledgment in Palestinian intellectual
circles is one of regret at the outcomes of the talks. Said,
remarks that the ‘gains of the intifada were squandered.’
The intifada, he posits, was the embodiment of Palestinian
rights to exist, not violence. He further goes on to show
his annoyance with the constant terming of the agreement as
a ‘victory’ by Palestinian leadership and their
intellectuals.
The supposition is that the agreement, as Arafat’s
recognition of Israel’s right to exist renounced a numerous
resolutions that had disallowed or censured annexation and
territorial expansion of Israel through settlements.
This was in return for Israel’s recognition of PLO which is
not as significant as the land and Palestinian sovereignty
question which was being postponed until status negotiation.
Thus, Palestinians see that the West bank and Gaza, rather
than remaining their internationally recognized territories,
become ‘disputed territories’
In an attempt to answer this question, I shall posit that
the Palestinian leadership faces this dilemma, among others13 Said, Edward. (1993) "The Morning After." London Review of Books 15 no. 20 (1993): 3-5
as a result of having to make political decisions with
limited options due to the difficult international context
they find themselves in.
However, my conclusion is that one should acknowledge the
collaboration within the Palestinian leadership within the
prevailing conflict situation. Thus, a blunt fact is that
some Palestinians have a significant interest in seeing a
continuation of the status quo.
Over the past two decades after Oslo, the evolution of the
Israeli rule has resulted in immense changes in the nature
of Palestinian society. However, these changes have been
experienced far more in the West Bank which explains the
socio-economic catalyst in the Palestinian leadership
incorporation into comprehensive system of Israeli control.
These benefits far outweigh the excesses of the decades-long
suffering hence inviting cooperation in matters of
administration and security
American interests in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been doted by
significant American mediation efforts that it seems that
the United State wants peace more than the parties
themselves.
Indeed, there are ramifications on vital U.S national
interests, and the viability of Israel as a sole democracy
in the Middle East. However, the persistent failure of
peace efforts is a reflection of the complexity of the
issues at stake in the conflict and the reflection of
successive US administrations political interests regarding
the region as a whole.
The US lends it leadership to bring the two sides together
as the difficult compromises make the two parties unable to
get to agreements on their own. The broad-based consensus on
most of the points in the permanent status agreement doesn’t
however, simply produce the way forward.
The conviction that the United States comes with in its
efforts to launch newer Palestinian negotiations will only
bear fruit when the two sides are able to take this effort
as their key national interest as well. Presently, this does
not seem to be the case for both.
The complex conditions of the Middle Eastern players also
seem to re-assert traditional international roles that local
moves towards peace, run against the balance of power that
has been produced by the new global configuration. This
affirms the US position
Historically, this resembles the British and French attempts
to regain the imperial position they had over Egypt in 1956
and is an examples of ‘diplomatic regression’ 14
14 Leon. H (1994), The Real Lesson of The Oslo Accord; ‘Localize’ the Arab-Israeli conflict.’ Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No.31
A prominent American role in the Arab Israeli peace process
would be in Morgenthau’s analysis, a departure from their
key national interests. In view of the emphasis of geo-
economic, rather than strategic priorities, the United
States should have little reason to commit so much to the
negotiations.
Rather than micromanage Arab-Israeli process, the United
States should encourage regional prosperity through economic
cooperation between Israel and Arab states. This would
advance peace far more effectively than Washington’s
marginal position currently.
Conclusion
The Arab-Israeli Conflict is one of the most bitter,
protracted and intractable conflicts of modern times. In
analyzing the international relations within the Middle
East, it is a dominant theme that can produce two levels to
the conflict; the interstate level and the Israeli-
Palestinian level. However, problem over the land of
Palestine still remains the core of this conflict. The
search for a settlement is complicated by involvement of
outside powers whose interests oppose those of both
Palestinian and Jewish national movements15
15 Avi Shlaim, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process.’ p. 241-258 United States Institute of Peace
The Oslo Accord did not address the core issues of the
conflict, and the use of diplomacy was ineffectual against
hard stands taken by both side when it came to these matters
as national interests were not entrenched in the talks.
America is seen to have failed by not exerting sufficient
pressure on the parties, for Israel to withdraw from the
occupied territories and demand the ceasing Palestinian acts
of terror and violence against Israel
Under current circumstances, such U.S. leadership is vital.
There is no option of putting peace "on hold" until
circumstances are more promising; in the absence of tangible
progress toward peace and a political horizon for an end to
the conflict, developments every day on the ground and in
the political sphere render circumstances ever-more
antithetical to peace. Likewise, there is no serious option
to simply "manage" a conflict that has continued to inflame
the region and beyond with a rise in levels of anti-Semitism
Likewise, the two-state solution - the only viable solution
to this conflict and a solution that is vital both to
Israel's survival and to U.S. national security interests -
won't survive indefinitely. The absence of a credible peace
process leaves the door open to violence, emboldening both
those who advocate unilateral action and those who support
the use of force over negotiations. As importantly, it
permits developments on the ground - like settlement
expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem – a clear
invitation that will lock the two societies in the dance of
death
Time Line of the Oslo Process and Arab-Israeli Conflict and
Peace Process
2 Aug. 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait.
16 Jan.–28 Feb. 1991 The Gulf War.
30–31 Oct. 1991 Middle East peace conference convenes in
Madrid.
10 Dec. 1991 Bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks begin in
Washington.
23 June 1992 Labour defeats Likud in Israeli elections.
19 Jan. 1993 Knesset repeals ban on contacts with the PLO.
10 Sept. 1993 Israel and PLO exchange letters formally
recognising each other.
13 Sept. 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on
Palestinian self-government is signed in the White House.
4 May 1994 Israel and PLO reach agreement in Cairo on the
application of the Declaration of Principles.
25 July 1994 Washington Declaration ends state of war
between Israel and Jordan.
26 Oct. 1994 Israel and Jordan sign a peace treaty.
28 Sept. 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the
Gaza Strip (Oslo II) is signed.
4 Nov. 1995 Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated and Shimon Peres
succeeds him as prime minister.
21 Jan. 1996 First Palestinian elections.
24 April 1996 The Palestinian National Council amends the
Palestinian National Charter.
29 May 1996 Binyamin Netanyahu defeats Shimon Peres in
Israeli elections.
15 Jan. 1997 The Hebron Protocol is signed.
23 Oct. 1998 Binyamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat sign the
Wye River Memorandum
17 May 1999 Ehud Barak defeats Binyamin Netanyahu in Israeli
elections.
4 Sept. 1999 Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat sign the Sharm el-
Sheikh accord.
11–25 July 2000 Camp David summit.
28 Sept. 2000 Ariel Sharon visits Temple Mount. Outbreak of
the Al-Aqsa intifada.
23 Dec. 2000 President Clinton presents his ‘parameters’.
18–28 Jan. 2001 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Taba in
Egypt.
6 Feb. 2001 Ariel Sharon defeats Ehud Barak in Israeli
elections.
2002 Israel Begins Constructing West Bank Security Barrier
March 2002 Arab Peace Initiative Is Proposed, Beirut Summit
2003 Roadmap for Peace is proposed by United States, Russia,
EU and UN
2005 Israel Disengages from Gaza
2006 Hamas is Elected
2006 2006 Hezbollah-Israel Lebanon War / Second Lebanon War
2007 Battle of Gaza
2008 -2009 The Gaza Conflict Operation Cast Lead
2012 Gaza-Israel Conflict Operation Pillar of Defense
2014 Gaza-Israel Conflict and Operation Protective Edge
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Online references. (Accessed Jan 2015)
1. Knesset, Lexicon of Terms ‘The Oslo Accords’
http://knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/oslo_eng.htm
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http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearb
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%20Paper%20regarding%20Pales.aspx