Abstract

On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, together with Israeli Foreign

Minister, Peres and PLO negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed a Declaration of

Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as

the “Oslo Accords,” at the White House. Israel accepted the PLO as the

representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and

recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian

Authority (PA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. Then, permanent status talks

on the issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be held. Over a decade

later, the peace process has stalled and the US has proposed a ‘constructive

disengagement’ from the region. This policy is now being seen as a way of

promoting the interests of the United States, but is argued to be beneficial as

well as those of the people of the Middle East

In this paper, I aim to show that the continuous failure of United States led talks

to secure peace in the Middle East is explained through Hans Morgenthau’s

principles, whose realist approach contends that states are the most important

actors in the international arena. Hence agreements between nations that

involve making compromises over their core national-security interests and

values will never be achieved through outside pressure.

The time has come for a serious debate on the future involvement of the United

States in the Middle East and only original and provocative analysis of the

parties national interests, can challenge the prevailing idealism of the

Washington foreign policy establishment

INTRODUCTION

In order to appreciate the path to peace, one must review

the history of conflict. The realization that no two states

are the same, and this will result in conflict has to be a

significant consideration in any discourse on international

relations. The global movement to expand interdependence

between states further makes it important to advocate for

flexibility for the sake of co-existence. The culture of

peace is hence one that welcomes differences, acknowledging

them as a starting point for the progress from potential

sources of conflict

Several conceptions and ideas on international relations

have been suggested as conceptual frameworks within which

peace may prosper.

Realism, which has shaped Hans Morgenthau’s principles of

political realism, has a tradition of international theory

that is centered upon four propositions.1 Realism posits

that;

1. States are the most important actors

2. The primary concern of all states is survival

3. There is no actor above states that is capable of

regulating their interactions

4. States are unitary, rational actors that tend to pursue

self interest

The fundamental construct in realism is that sovereign

states are the principal actors in the international arena

and the authority and influence is ascribed to large powers.

International institutions and other sub state or trans

state actors are viewed as having less influence.

States are viewed as inherently aggressive with territorial

expansion forming their ambitions, and are described as

being engaged in offensive realism, with their major

concerns being their security. The latter is termed as

defensive realism. Within these frameworks, states can

create conflict and instability due to their efforts in

territorial expansion. However, this can be constrained by

the opposing power(s) or a large power.

Realists believe that there no universal principles that

states use to guide all their actions, instead states must

always be aware of the powers and actions of states around1 Morgenthau, Hans. (1946) "Scientific Man versus Power Politics" University of Chicago Press.

it and use a pragmatic approach to ascertain the threat

levels and resolve them as they arise

The main argument against realism is ‘realpolitik’2. This is

considered as a prescriptive guideline. It is limited to

policy making on issues of international relations,

developing foreign policy among states. Realism, however, is

a descriptive paradigm aimed at describing, explaining and

eventually predicting events in the international relations

domain with a wider theoretical and methodological

framework.

Morgenthau’s realism thus marks the beginning of the wisdom

that even such benign developments as advocacy for

democratic peace will continue to rest heavily on the

robustness and credibility of the large (in this case;

United States’) power. Yet any sound theory of international

relations with reliable policy implications also must guard

against Morgenthau’s excessively pessimistic vision of man’s

moral and political possibilities.

Although the relative anarchy of international relations and

the imperfectability of man often limit the range of moral

choice in international politics, the failure in the record

of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East

demonstrates the need for U.S. ideals and self-interest to

recede and pave way for defined democratic regime change as

2 Von Rochau, Ludwig. ‘Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands.’

the main agenda in conducting peace talks in the region. The

spread of stable liberal democracy can ameliorate, if not

eliminate, in theory, the drawn out Israeli-Arab conflict

Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Principles

In consideration of realism as an explanation to actions

taken by states, Morgenthau’s realist principles are asserts

that it is the desire to dominate among nations that causes

conflict.3 He draws this from the theological and political

writings of Hobbes, to identify human desire for power.

’International politics like all politics is a struggle for

power’ (Hans. M, 1948 p.25).

In his principles, Morgenthau opposes scholars who tried to

reduce the discipline of international relations to

behavioral science. He states that politics, like society in

general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots

in human nature which is unchanging (Hans. M, 1948 p.4). It

is possible then to develop realism into both a rational

theory of international politics that reflects these

objective laws and a political art, which is a useful tool

of foreign policy.

The foundation in Morgenthau’s realist theory is that the

state’s interest is defined in terms of power. The ‘concept

of power’ informs his second principle; the assumption that

3  Morgenthau, Hans J. (1954) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

political leaders ‘think and act in terms of interest

defined as power’ (Hans. M, 1948 p.5). The main signpost of

political realism is the concept of interest defined in

terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject

matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical

understanding of politics possible. Political realism

stresses the rational, objective and unemotional.

This concept outlines political autonomy and allows

evaluation of foreign policy without consideration of moral

and intellectual dispositions of the individual politicians.

This makes analysis of states actions on the basis of

political leaders’ actions be evaluated regardless of

different preferences or motives at the time of decision

making

The third principle decodes that various things can be

associated with interests and power at different times and

in different circumstances. The validity of interest being

defined as power is essential as an element of politics but

its content and the matter of its use are also dictated upon

by the political and cultural environment.  Realism assumes

that interest defined as power is an objective category

which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is

fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man

(Hans. M, 1948 p.5).

The significance of ethics in political action creates a

tension between the fundamental foundations of realism and

morality. Morgenthau considers this relationship and he

asserts that realists are also aware of the tension between

requirements of successful political; action and morality.

Political realism is aware of the moral significance of

political action. It is also aware of the tension between

moral command and the requirements of successful political

action.  “Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot

be applied to the actions of states in their abstract

universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through

the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Hans. M, 1948

p.9)

The emphasis of prudence is underscored in his fifth

principle as he emphasizes that all state actors must but

seen as political entities pursuing their respective

interests defined in terms of power. Hence it’s not

conviction of one’s moral or ideological superiority that

should guide political action, but prudence.

In his discussion of power or interest defined as power,

Morgenthau defines that politics is an autonomous sphere

that cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics still

plays an important role in politics “A man who was nothing

but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be

completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was

nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be

completely lacking in prudence” (Hans. M, 1948 p.12).

Connecting Morgenthau’s principles of realisms, one obtains

the picture of interest defined as power to be the defining

factor in the creation of the autonomous nature of politics.

Rationality will hence dictate that the political leaders

with influence over their states’ actions to be directed

such that they protect their national interests. The

effective concern in international relations is hence to

look for compromise only in circumstances that mutual

interests will be satisfied. In order to avoid conflicts,

states should avoid ideological confrontations and where

they exist, maximize and form agreements on the points that

they relate on similar grounds

Using Morgenthau’s concepts, realism as a way of thinking,

can be applied to international relations as a useful devise

for forming foreign policies. However, his arguments on the

nature of human desire being a struggle for power, a view

that he shares with Hobbes, is questionable as one cannot

scientifically observe this. It is inculcated as a matter of

belief or education but as a fundamental concept, it is

ambiguous.

Morgenthau introduces a normative aspect of his theory,

which is rationality. In his definition, rationality

consists of counting the cost and benefits of all

alternative policies to ascertain their relative utility.

This is considered as their ability to maximize power.

Morgenthau classifies ‘a good foreign policy’ to be a

rational one (Hans. M, 1948 p.7). However, the painting of

pursuit of power as being the norm does not present the

actual portrait of human affairs which is dynamic. In

political terms, this can explain the result of policies

that deviate from aiming to minimize risks and maximizing

benefits as would be considered rational

The major basis of the criticisms to Hans Morgenthau’s

fundamental concepts of realism is that is they can either

be a means, or an end in politics. If power would be the

sole means of gaining something else, it would not define

international relations as Morgenthau asserts. The actions

of states cannot be understood while disregarding the

ideologies of the political leaders. This cannot serve as

the basis for describing politics as an autonomous sphere.4

The role of realism is as a useful practical and cautionary

theory, which depends on the actual historical and political

conditions of international relations. It warns against

moralism, legalism and other orientations that can cause the

acting parties to lose touch with the reality of self-

interest and power.

4 Williams, Michael C. (ed.), (2007). ‘Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Its emphasis on national interest can be used illegitimately

to justify aggression. Hence, additional international

relations theories that take account of the changing nature

of world politics should be stressed to accompany its

relevance in making political decision.5

In analysis of US policy in the middle east and Israel ,

Hans Morgenthau’s principles show that attempts to sever

domestic from international politics and to minimize the

impact of ideology on the global system renders the United

States less capable of understanding the ideological,

ethical and geo-political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli

conflict.

On the basis of these principles, Morgenthau concludes that

the creation of a world state overseeing perpetual peace is

“unattainable under the moral, social, and political

conditions in the world at our time.” Instead, he advocates

the primary method to mitigate the inevitable struggle for

power in international politics as diplomacy, devoid of a

crusading spirit, through which states de ne their foreignfi

policies in terms of concrete conceptions of the national

interest, readily compromise on issues not vital to them,

and strive empathetically to view foreign policy from the

point of view of other nations, not just their own.

The Oslo Accords5 Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, (2013)"Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition)

The Oslo Accords were bilateral agreements signed in

Washington on the 13th September, 1993, following

negotiations between Israel and PLO. The signed agreement

was entitled ‘ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

Government Arrangements’ It was mainly concerned with the

Israeli withdrawal from the territories of Judea, Samaria

and the Gaza Strip in order to allow for the establishment

of a Palestinian Authority for an interim period until

permanent arrangements would be established.6

The signing of the declaration had dramatic consequences for

the policy of Israel towards the PLO. Israel acknowledged

the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and

announced on its intent to begin negotiations, as a part of

a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. Arafat, in

the name of the PLO, acknowledged Israel’s right for a safe

and peaceful existence. Arafat committed himself to the

peace process and to work towards a peaceful solution to the

conflict; he obliged to abstain from the use of terror and

violent acts; he acknowledged the United Nations’ Security

Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and had guaranteed to

approve the necessary changes in the Palestinian manifest in

the Palestinian National Council – mainly concerning

chapters contradicting the declaration or disapproving of

Israel’s right for independence

6 Knesset, (2015) Oslo Accords https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/oslo_eng.htm

Oslo sketched out a peace process with a two-phase

timetable. During a five-year interim period, Oslo

envisioned a series of step-by-step measures to build trust

and partnership. Palestinians would police the territories

they controlled, cooperate with Israel in the fight against

terrorism, and amend those sections of the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) charter that called for

Israel's destruction. Israel would withdraw almost entirely

from Gaza and in stages from parts of the West Bank. An

elected Palestinian Authority would take over governance of

the territories from which Israel withdrew.

The Land-for-Peace policy, incorporated in UN Resolution 242

of November 1967, has its origins in the negotiations after

the Six-Days War of June 1967 where Israel withdrew from

territories that it won in the war. The territories are West

bank and Gaza. The historical significance lies in it being

one of the options that Israel had for peace, that is,

territorial withdrawal for peace with hostile Arab

populations7

However, the principle bore huge risk and this was

particularly due to the history of Israel returning the

Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1957 under US pressure, after

the Suez Crisis, only to watch as the Egyptians attacked

Israel from the same territory ten years later.

7 Yitzhak Rabin (1979), ‘The Rabin Memoirs’, Boston Mass. Little, Brown and Co., p. 334.

For decades, the case of territorial withdrawal relied

heavily on the availability of a credible and authoritative

Arab negotiator offering Israel peace and security. From

Sadat to Arafat, to the investment of a Jordanian option,

the absence of a suitable partner led to the formation of

the Labor Party’s policy. The principle was that Israeli

concessions should follow, not precede a formal peace

agreement

However, in Israel, the withdrawal also relied on a

demographic argument. The proponents of territorial

concession insisted that holding on to the territories would

render Israel un-democratic and the state would cease to be

Jewish.

The Land for peace policy though noble, has not succeeded in

eliciting the good faith, in the Arab counterparts. Peace

has not been entirely within the Israeli’s sole control and

they cannot identify a solution devoid of the Arab

participation. Hence Palestinian Arabs must develop

frameworks for peace and democratic institutions that have

the authority to ensure mature political leadership there,

for peace to exist

Israel’s political interests within the Oslo Accords

In 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian interim Agreement on the

West Bank and Gaza, dubbed Oslo II, stipulated the second

phase of self-rule, including provisions of elections of the

Palestinian National Authority, a gradual withdrawal of

Israeli military and handing over power to the Palestinians

in the occupied territories, and the "prohibition of any

change in the status of the West Bank and Gaza pending the

outcome of final status negotiations." The West Bank was to

be divided up into Areas A, B, and C, under Palestinian

Authority. control, joint control, and Israeli control,

respectively.

The most important aspect of the Oslo Accords, dealt with

economic policy. It was explicitly recognized that no peace

could endure, unless there were cooperation among the former

adversaries around economic development, for mutual benefit.

Various Palestinian institutions were foreseen, to regulate

water, energy, transportation, finances, etc. Two annexes to

the accords were drawn up, protocols on joint cooperation

for economic and regional development, which specifically

identified a number of great projects: the Gaza Sea Port,

the "Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal," "regional desalination

and other water development projects," agriculture, energy,

and industrial development

However, the strategic nature of the talks bears its history

in the political uniqueness of Israel’s decision to hold

direct talks with the PLO. This constituted a revolution in

its foreign policy, a revolution that paved the way to the

Oslo accord. Three men, all members of the Labour Party,

were primarily responsible for this decision: Yitzhak Rabin

who was defence minister as well as prime minister, his

foreign minister and political rival, Shimon Peres, and

Yossi Beilin, the youthful deputy foreign minister.

Rabin, a former Chief of Staff, had always belonged to the

hawkish wing of the Labour Party. For him Israel's security

took precedence over peace with the Arab neighbours. On

being elected, he assumed personal charge of the bilateral

talks and left only the much less important multilateral

talks to his foreign minister. 

Peres and Beilin not only recognized the need to talk to the

PLO but had a clear and coherent long-term strategy for

directing the talks8. They realized at the outset that to

achieve a peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israel

would have to pay a high price: a return to the pre-June

1967 borders with only minor modifications, an independent

Palestinian state, the dismantling of Jewish settlements,

and the granting to the Palestinians of functional control

over East Jerusalem.

Rabin, on the other hand, had no clear idea of the final

shape of the settlement with the Palestinians. His thinking

8 Yoel Marcus, `Three Comments on the Situation', Ha'aretz, 19 September 1993.

was largely conditioned by the Allon Plan, by the Jordanian

option and by the idea of territorial compromise over the

West Bank. Nor did Rabin appear to have any coherent long-

term strategy. In the past, especially during his first term

as prime minister from 1974 to 1977, Rabin's only strategy

in the peace talks with the Arabs was to play for time. Now,

aged 71, in his second and probably last term as prime

minister, he seemed anxious to enter history as a peacemaker

but without incurring the opprobrium involved in the

dismantling of settlements. Hence the attraction of the idea

of Palestinian self-rule for an interim period of five years

during which the settlements would stay in place. It was

this policy vacuum at the heart of the government that

enabled Beilin to take the lead, to exert an influence that

was out of all proportion to his junior position.9

Altogether, fourteen sessions of talks were held over an

eight-month period, all behind a thick veil of secrecy.

Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Johan Joergen Holst and

social scientist Terge Larsen acted as generous hosts and

gentle mediators. The key players were two Israeli

academics, Dr Yair Hirschfeld and Dr Ron Pundak, and PLO

treasurer Ahmed Qurai, better known as Abu Alaa. Away from

the glare of publicity and political pressures, these three

men worked imaginatively and indefatigably to establish the

9 Avi Shlaim, 1994 ‘The Oslo Accord’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:3 (Spring 1994), pp. 24-40.

conceptual framework of the Israel-PLO accord. Their

discussions ran parallel to the bilateral talks in

Washington but they proceeded without the knowledge of the

official Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

The participation of Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak was

critical to the success of the Oslo channel. As Uri Savir

acknowledged: `They are, in a sense, so removed from the

customary manner in which international diplomacy is shaped,

that this is what enabled them to be so successful. The very

unorthodox nature of their mission was a basic element of

our success.’10

 A broad view of the peace policy of the Labour government

when it came to power in 1992 reveals an odd combination of

strategy and tactics, Peres's strategy and Rabin's tactics.

Peres's strategy aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the

Arab-Israeli conflict while Rabin's tactics aimed at playing

the Arabs off against one another in order to reduce the

pressure on Israel to make concessions. When these tactics

ended in deadlock on all fronts, Rabin was forced to go

along with the Beilin-Peres strategy of direct negotiations

with the PLO. The result was the Oslo accord. After the Oslo

accord was signed, Rabin reverted to his customary tactics

of divide and rule. This tactic is sensible enough when

10  Jerrold Kessel, `Professors Clinch Deal', The Guardian, 18 September 1993.

waging war against several enemies; it is much more

problematic when waging peace. To attain comprehensive peace

in the Middle East, the Arab world needs to be united rather

than divided. Peres's strategy is calculated to promote

comprehensive peace whereas Rabin's tactics are liable to

frustrate it. Rabin is bound to discover sooner or later

that he cannot implement only half of his foreign minister's

strategy. The choice for Israel is between going forward at

full speed on every front at the same time and losing

momentum on every front at the same time. The choice is

between forging a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-

Israeli conflict on the anvil of the Oslo accord and

allowing inter-Arab rivalries to nullify this historic

breakthrough. And the choice for the 71-year old Rabin is

between going down in Israel's history merely as a great

soldier or also as a great statesman and peace-maker.

For the Israeli government the accord made the provision for

an interim arrangement which carries only the most general

implications for the permanent transfer of territory or

power.  However, For the PLO the accord is the first step

towards full statehood. The two sides could not march

forward together because they were intent on marching in

different directions.

Palestine Authority and PLO interests and subsequent non-

compliance to Oslo

The Oslo "Peace" accords did not lead peace.11 The number of

terror attacks against Israel and the number of Israelis

killed by Arab terror bombings greatly escalated after Oslo

to a level that had not been seen since 1948. The chart

below shows the number of Israelis killed each month in

Palestinian terrorist attacks from the start of the intifada

riots in December 1987 through August 1998. Terrorism shot

up again after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September

1993. In the 30 months after that date, more Israelis were

killed by terrorists (213) than in the preceding decade (209

from January 1983 to September 1993).It is divided into

segments marking significant changes in the political

situation. The red line shows the average level of

fatalities within each political period.

11 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli-Conflict, 2nd ed. (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1993)

Sources: Peace Watch, Shalem Center, Yesha Council, Jewish

Action Initiative Reports

 The most obvious breach of the Palestinian commitments

involved the direct participation of its armed forces and

the various security organs - in armed clashes with the IDF

or in attacks on Israeli citizens, even in places where only

hours earlier some of them participated in the Joint Patrols

with the IDF, according to the Interim Agreement.

The very nature of the Oslo Process assumed that over time,

if not overnight, a new reality of bilateral relations would

be created on the ground, with an open prospect to

Palestinian Sovereignty in sight. This would lead Arafat

away from the option of violence and "struggle" 

However, to Muslim audiences, such as the one he had in a

mosque in Johannesburg in May 1994 (one of the first such

speeches in the post-Oslo phase) Arafat - a former Muslim

Brother, forced to leave Nasser's Egypt for that reason in

the 1950's - spoke in the familiar idiom of Islamic

radicalism, through repeated references to the Treaty of

Hudaybiyyah. This reference to the treaty signed by the

Prophet Muhammad with his Meccan enemies when they were

still stronger than him, and then abandoned (as he conquered

the city) within a much shorter time than the Treaty itself

warranted is crucial in understanding his political

interests then, as it legitimized him as the founding leader

of the Palestinian people. (Israeli Government White Paper,

Nov 2000)

In essence, this reference was a rationale offered to the

Palestinian people for accepting Oslo Accords and the place

of the PLO at the negotiations, and the various commitments

involved, not as the building blocks of trust and

cooperation but as temporary measures, to be shed off when

circumstances allow. However, to more secular audiences he

offered a possible argument for the conditional or temporary

nature of his commitments by addressing them in the context

of the "Strategy of Stages" for the Liberation of Palestine,

as endorsed by the PNC in 1974. (Orbit Television, April 18,

1998)

Arafat publicly accepted Israel’s right to exist, but it is

not clear whether he saw the two-state solution as a final

settlement, or a mere stepping stone to a unified Palestine

under Arab rule. Netanyahu, Sharon, and Barak refused to

freeze the expansion of settlements, and blamed Arafat for

terrorism while they crippled the Palestinian Authority’s

infrastructure, fulfilling their own prophecy that it was

incapable of governing.

The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and his

replacement by Benjamin Netanyahu led to renewed conflict,

due to the latter’s provocative policies, including

expansion of the Jewish settlements. Israel lagged behind

its withdrawal commitments, while Arafat seemed at times to

have a laissez faire attitude toward Palestinian terrorism.

Stated interests vs. Real interests

Two decades later, the ongoing reality of Israeli occupation

of the territories denotes the Oslo accords as having

failed. However, in consideration of interests the Israeli

government, at the time was seeking for a more functional

role in the peace process rather that ending the occupation.

As it may be seen from the earlier explanation, portraying

itself as a partner to Palestinian sovereignty was a key

factor for Israel in engaging in the talks. Ending the

occupation and addressing issues of dispossession were to be

discussed over the period of time during the agreement

Oslo helped strengthen Israel’s regional position while

weakening the Palestinian movement. Under Oslo, the then

newly established Palestinian Authority and PLO drew

international legitimacy as their mission of ‘building an

independent Palestinian state’ became a key political

strategy. However Oslo ideologically disarmed the Palestine

political movement seeking the return of Palestinian

refugees from the 1947-48 War. Its replacement of this key

Palestinian aspiration, whose solidarity had been built

during the first intifada, was by providing a faith in a

peace process steered by Western governments.12

In the wake of Oslo, the illusion of peace prompted Arab

governments led by Jordan and Egypt to renew economic ties

with Israel. The Arab boycotts had cost Israel an estimated

$ 40 billion from 1948-1994. Under American and European

goodwill, international firms now investing in Israel could

allay their fears of attracting secondary boycotts from Arab

countries.

In the analysis of the process, similarly noting that the

Nobel peace prize, awarded jointly to Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and

PLO leader Yasser Arafat in 1994, mythologized this event in

historical records, one question goes unaddressed.

12 Adam. H, (2013), ‘The Oslo Illusion; The Historical Accords between Palestine and Israel.’ Center for Research on Globalization

Why is the Palestinian leadership a willing partner to this

‘Instrument of Palestinian Surrender, A Palestinian

Versailles?’13

The honest acknowledgment in Palestinian intellectual

circles is one of regret at the outcomes of the talks. Said,

remarks that the ‘gains of the intifada were squandered.’

The intifada, he posits, was the embodiment of Palestinian

rights to exist, not violence. He further goes on to show

his annoyance with the constant terming of the agreement as

a ‘victory’ by Palestinian leadership and their

intellectuals.

The supposition is that the agreement, as Arafat’s

recognition of Israel’s right to exist renounced a numerous

resolutions that had disallowed or censured annexation and

territorial expansion of Israel through settlements.

This was in return for Israel’s recognition of PLO which is

not as significant as the land and Palestinian sovereignty

question which was being postponed until status negotiation.

Thus, Palestinians see that the West bank and Gaza, rather

than remaining their internationally recognized territories,

become ‘disputed territories’

In an attempt to answer this question, I shall posit that

the Palestinian leadership faces this dilemma, among others13 Said, Edward. (1993) "The Morning After." London Review of Books 15 no. 20 (1993): 3-5

as a result of having to make political decisions with

limited options due to the difficult international context

they find themselves in.

However, my conclusion is that one should acknowledge the

collaboration within the Palestinian leadership within the

prevailing conflict situation. Thus, a blunt fact is that

some Palestinians have a significant interest in seeing a

continuation of the status quo.

Over the past two decades after Oslo, the evolution of the

Israeli rule has resulted in immense changes in the nature

of Palestinian society. However, these changes have been

experienced far more in the West Bank which explains the

socio-economic catalyst in the Palestinian leadership

incorporation into comprehensive system of Israeli control.

These benefits far outweigh the excesses of the decades-long

suffering hence inviting cooperation in matters of

administration and security

American interests in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been doted by

significant American mediation efforts that it seems that

the United State wants peace more than the parties

themselves.

Indeed, there are ramifications on vital U.S national

interests, and the viability of Israel as a sole democracy

in the Middle East. However, the persistent failure of

peace efforts is a reflection of the complexity of the

issues at stake in the conflict and the reflection of

successive US administrations political interests regarding

the region as a whole.

The US lends it leadership to bring the two sides together

as the difficult compromises make the two parties unable to

get to agreements on their own. The broad-based consensus on

most of the points in the permanent status agreement doesn’t

however, simply produce the way forward.

The conviction that the United States comes with in its

efforts to launch newer Palestinian negotiations will only

bear fruit when the two sides are able to take this effort

as their key national interest as well. Presently, this does

not seem to be the case for both.

The complex conditions of the Middle Eastern players also

seem to re-assert traditional international roles that local

moves towards peace, run against the balance of power that

has been produced by the new global configuration. This

affirms the US position

Historically, this resembles the British and French attempts

to regain the imperial position they had over Egypt in 1956

and is an examples of ‘diplomatic regression’ 14

14 Leon. H (1994), The Real Lesson of The Oslo Accord; ‘Localize’ the Arab-Israeli conflict.’ Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No.31

A prominent American role in the Arab Israeli peace process

would be in Morgenthau’s analysis, a departure from their

key national interests. In view of the emphasis of geo-

economic, rather than strategic priorities, the United

States should have little reason to commit so much to the

negotiations.

Rather than micromanage Arab-Israeli process, the United

States should encourage regional prosperity through economic

cooperation between Israel and Arab states. This would

advance peace far more effectively than Washington’s

marginal position currently.

Conclusion

The Arab-Israeli Conflict is one of the most bitter,

protracted and intractable conflicts of modern times. In

analyzing the international relations within the Middle

East, it is a dominant theme that can produce two levels to

the conflict; the interstate level and the Israeli-

Palestinian level. However, problem over the land of

Palestine still remains the core of this conflict. The

search for a settlement is complicated by involvement of

outside powers whose interests oppose those of both

Palestinian and Jewish national movements15

15 Avi Shlaim, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process.’ p. 241-258 United States Institute of Peace

The Oslo Accord did not address the core issues of the

conflict, and the use of diplomacy was ineffectual against

hard stands taken by both side when it came to these matters

as national interests were not entrenched in the talks.

America is seen to have failed by not exerting sufficient

pressure on the parties, for Israel to withdraw from the

occupied territories and demand the ceasing Palestinian acts

of terror and violence against Israel

Under current circumstances, such U.S. leadership is vital.

There is no option of putting peace "on hold" until

circumstances are more promising; in the absence of tangible

progress toward peace and a political horizon for an end to

the conflict, developments every day on the ground and in

the political sphere render circumstances ever-more

antithetical to peace. Likewise, there is no serious option

to simply "manage" a conflict that has continued to inflame

the region and beyond with a rise in levels of anti-Semitism

Likewise, the two-state solution - the only viable solution

to this conflict and a solution that is vital both to

Israel's survival and to U.S. national security interests -

won't survive indefinitely. The absence of a credible peace

process leaves the door open to violence, emboldening both

those who advocate unilateral action and those who support

the use of force over negotiations. As importantly, it

permits developments on the ground - like settlement

expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem – a clear

invitation that will lock the two societies in the dance of

death

Time Line of the Oslo Process and Arab-Israeli Conflict and

Peace Process

2 Aug. 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait.

16 Jan.–28 Feb. 1991 The Gulf War.

30–31 Oct. 1991 Middle East peace conference convenes in

Madrid.

10 Dec. 1991 Bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks begin in

Washington.

23 June 1992 Labour defeats Likud in Israeli elections.

19 Jan. 1993 Knesset repeals ban on contacts with the PLO.

10 Sept. 1993 Israel and PLO exchange letters formally

recognising each other.

13 Sept. 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on

Palestinian self-government is signed in the White House.

4 May 1994 Israel and PLO reach agreement in Cairo on the

application of the Declaration of Principles.

25 July 1994 Washington Declaration ends state of war

between Israel and Jordan.

26 Oct. 1994 Israel and Jordan sign a peace treaty.

28 Sept. 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the

West Bank and the

Gaza Strip (Oslo II) is signed.

4 Nov. 1995 Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated and Shimon Peres

succeeds him as prime minister.

21 Jan. 1996 First Palestinian elections.

24 April 1996 The Palestinian National Council amends the

Palestinian National Charter.

29 May 1996 Binyamin Netanyahu defeats Shimon Peres in

Israeli elections.

15 Jan. 1997 The Hebron Protocol is signed.

23 Oct. 1998 Binyamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat sign the

Wye River Memorandum

17 May 1999 Ehud Barak defeats Binyamin Netanyahu in Israeli

elections.

4 Sept. 1999 Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat sign the Sharm el-

Sheikh accord.

11–25 July 2000 Camp David summit.

28 Sept. 2000 Ariel Sharon visits Temple Mount. Outbreak of

the Al-Aqsa intifada.

23 Dec. 2000 President Clinton presents his ‘parameters’.

18–28 Jan. 2001 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Taba in

Egypt.

6 Feb. 2001 Ariel Sharon defeats Ehud Barak in Israeli

elections.

2002 Israel Begins Constructing West Bank Security Barrier

March 2002 Arab Peace Initiative Is Proposed, Beirut Summit

2003 Roadmap for Peace is proposed by United States, Russia,

EU and UN

2005 Israel Disengages from Gaza

2006 Hamas is Elected

2006 2006 Hezbollah-Israel Lebanon War / Second Lebanon War

2007 Battle of Gaza

2008 -2009 The Gaza Conflict Operation Cast Lead

2012 Gaza-Israel Conflict Operation Pillar of Defense

2014 Gaza-Israel Conflict and Operation Protective Edge

REFERENCES

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3. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1954) Politics among Nations: The Struggle

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4. Williams, Michael C. (ed.), (2007). ‘Realism Reconsidered:

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Online references. (Accessed Jan 2015)

1. Knesset, Lexicon of Terms ‘The Oslo Accords’

http://knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/oslo_eng.htm

2. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel

Government White Paper, 2000’

http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearb

ook13/Pages/200%20%20Israel%20Government%20White

%20Paper%20regarding%20Pales.aspx