The Land, the Name, the Identity

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Question of Identity

1990-1991 is period when Georgia gained the state independence

and when the former Soviet Socialist Autonomous District of Georgia

called ‘South Ossetia” started to move towards separation from

Georgia.

Here we discuss the particular case of media signification,

determining the large identity meaning and media/national/political

context. The mediated name of the land of so-called ‘South

Ossetia’ in the early 1990s became the conceptual element of the

issues of mass communications concerned with the questions of the

state and politics, national ideology and national identity, peace

and war in Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The signification of that part of the Georgian state in the

media could be considered as ‘the message within the message’ by

physical manifestation of which were created the phenomena of

national and cultural belonging and attributions connected with it,

having gathered crucial importance for the perception of the whole

content of the message.

1

The history of the name and identity of this territory is

paradoxical and contradictory: till 1922 it was one of the region

of inner Georgia, from 1922 to 1990 it was called South Ossetian

Soviet Socialist Autonomous District. From 1990 its name and status

have been permanently questioned in armed conflicts, in failed

processes of negotiations and failed efforts of identification

(Darchiashvili, D. at al., 2005). Today this territory in the

Georgian and international media is called ‘so-called South

Ossetia’, or ‘Tskhinvali Region’.

In 1990-1992 on the territory of Georgia two armed ethno-

national and political conflicts occurred: on the territory of the

former South Ossetian District and on the territory of the former

Abkhazian Soviet Autonomous Socialist Republic. Despite the certain

degree of similarity in dynamics of processes in the both

autonomous units (such as: creating a concern for separation from

Georgia – establishing organizational and institutional structures

for separating – seeking for a new status – getting ‘awarded

separatism’ by the third side (Russia) – armed conflict between the

sides resulted in de facto separation from Georgia), there were two

essential differences between these two conflicts, concerning two

the most important phenomena: signification/nomination of the part

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of land and identity attached with it. With the very first evident

signs of the conflict in the former South Ossetian District, the

term ‘South Ossetia’ (in its political-administrative meaning)

started to be lost from the Georgian political and public discourse

and started to be replaced by the alternative terms that carried in

themselves different categories for identity.

In case of Abkhazia there was no conflict with nomination of

that part of land. In fact, this land was medially represented as a

place of Georgian identity but at the same time it was recognized

as the background of Abkhazian identity. However, there often were

direct or indirect references to non-residency of the Abkhaz on

this land, i.e. mass settlement of Apsuas since the 17th century.

The paradox was that Abkhazian and Georgian identities, mediated in

periods of conflict aggravations as ‘hostile’, were represented in

historical discourse as the identical identities. In this regard the quote

by well-known Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili is

noteworthy, ‘Abkhazia’ is a synonym of the word ‘Georgia’… To tell

a Georgian that Abkhazia can withdraw from Georgia (I mean the

structure of nations but not reality) is almost the same as to tell

him/her that Georgia may withdraw from itself.’ (Droni, August,

1991).

3

The start of the armed ethno-political conflict in the

Autonomous District of South Ossetia and formation of the further

conflict design in Abkhazia, strengthening of separatist attitudes

sharpened the representation of patriotic attachment to the

homeland in the Georgian media. The mediation was directed to show

that losing at least one inch of the homeland threatened the

existence of a nation for Georgians. For examples: ‘When a Georgian

would lose … even a little piece of the Georgian land, … existence

of him/her as a nationality was impossible’( Moambe (XIX century

newspaper), cited in Mamuli, December 1990).; or: ‘Georgian land for

a Georgian is a whole body and we will not let anyone cut part of

this body’ (Mamuli, January 1991); or: ‘This land is Georgian, and

Ossetians want to take it away’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 13 March 1991).

Media representation of the ethno-political conflicts on the

Georgian territory indicated that it was particularly painful to

lose not the territory tout court, but the territory inside the

imagined homeland. Ernest Gellner said that in today’s world ‘a

man. . . . must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two

ears’1. Losing a part of the imagined homeland is worse than losing

an ear: in case of the territory ‘the lost ear’ will be found at

someone else’s face (Gellner, 1983). For the Georgians the land of

4

‘South Ossetia’ was a piece of his imagined homeland, which under

certain conditions, became a victim of the historical injustice.

The phenomenon of the national territory, homeland with its

complexity has always had crucial importance for the Georgian

conscience. The most popular explanation imprinted in this

conscience belongs to Ilia Chavchavadze (the famous Georgian writer

and philosopher of XIX-XX centuries). According to it, national

territory, equally with language and faith, is one of the most

important components of the concept of a nation – ‘Land, language,

faith.’ Well-known Georgian thinkers: Mikhako Tsereteli, Archil

Jorjadze (in the beginning of 20th century) et al. wrote about the

crucial importance of territory for the development of a nation. In

the beginning of the 1990s, of course, there was a return to the

already written and said, but realization of all this was to take

place with new conscious refraction of the national space.

‘Patrimony,’ ‘homeland’ – was this a national territory or a state

territory? T.K. Oommen considers territory to be common for a

nation and a state but there is one significant difference between

the national territory and state territory; the first one is a

moral unity, the last one – legal2.

5

In Georgia of the 1990s the certain factors – not having a

full-fledged state for 200 years, weekly formed state conscience –

developed mostly primordialist and not modernist views of a nation.

As noted Ghia Nodia, the Georgian political scientist, ‘Georgians,

as is often true in Eastern Europe, have defined belonging to a

nation in an ethnically exclusivist way… Georgian political

nationalism was also ethnic.’ (Nodia, G. (2005) ‘Dimensions of

Insecurity’, in ‘Statehood and Security: Georgia after ‘Rose

Revolution’, Coppieters, B. (ed): 45)

Nations, nationalities and ethnicities – on the crossroad of

Modernity and Post-Modernity, or the End of ‘Happy Family’

In the beginning of 1990s the ‘family’ living in the

‘Fatherland’, Georgia, didn’t look like a happy one. The ‘joyful

and careless’ life of Soviet Georgia with three autonomous units,

with the representatives of more than 35 nationalities and

ethnicities (according to Census 1989, ethnic minorities in Georgia

made approximately the third of the whole population) came to the

end. Fear, doubt, suspicion, inconvenience created the fruitful

background for the political and social disintegration. In 1990

independent Georgia got by legacy from the Soviet Georgia two

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autonomous republics and an autonomous district. The legal

formation and constitutional establishing of each of them was

determined by the specific and particular historical, ethno-

national, political and legal pre-requisites. Two autonomous units

were ethnic-based (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and one was a

religious-based (Ajara). The Soviet Regime awarded the autonomous

units with certain administrative privileges. The autonomy of

Abkhazia and Ajara were recognized by the Constitution of

Independent Georgia (1918-1921), but Autonomous District of South

Ossetia was established in 1922 by the Decree of the Soviet Regime

(ethnic Ossetians were in minority in the ethnic structure of the

district). So, the autonomies in Georgia in the early 1990s might

be grouped according to three characteristics: the first, by the

administrative status, the second – by the base and background for autonomy,

and the third, by the attitude towards them on the side of Independent Georgia’s

Constitution (1918-1921).

The processes having taken place in the early 1990s: the

beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the actions and rhetoric of

the National Liberation Movement in Georgia, the policy having been

realized by Kremlin towards the autonomous units and national

minorities in former Soviet Georgia strengthened and re-enforced

7

all the negative layers of the relationship between the Georgians

and the Ossetians, the Georgians and the Abkhazians.

The state sovereignty of the developing Georgian nation-state

didn’t spread all over the legally demarked territory of Soviet

Georgia, because Georgians, Abkhazians, Ossetians recovered to

carry the different interpretation of nationalism, as ideology, as

national identity, and as ‘the tradition of argumentation’3. Not only ‘the

tradition of argumentation’ was recovered, but also was recovered

the will to arrange beyond argumentation the certain political and

psychological phenomena: a nation, a state, a national place,

language, shared sense of identity. For example, in the very same

time, in March, 1991, in Tskhinvali (the capital city of South

Ossetia) and in Sukhumi (the capital city of Abkhazia) there were

held two radically differently aimed referenda: the first, on 17th

of March, so-termed Union referendum aimed to maintain the Soviet

Union, and the second, on 31st of March, referendum with the

question concerning the state independence of Georgia. At the same

1 Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 6

2 Oommen, T.K. (1997) Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Polity

Press: 185

3 Shotter, J. (1993a) The Cultural Politics of Everyday Life. Milton Keyness:

Open University Press: 200

8

time on the same places two different legitimate regimes were co-

existing and two sovereignties were functioning.

The end of the Cold War in the certain meaning led to the end

of Marxist and Modernists eras. Michael Billig analyzed the process

of fragmentation of the Soviet Union in the prism of inter-

relatedness of nationalism and postmodernism: ‘If new, smaller

nations succeed in gaining their independence, they do not enjoy

the sovereignty which nations were said to possess in heyday of

nationalism. These new states must seek admittance to supranational

organizations. In addition, they are threatened by the very sub-

national processes which permitted their own birth. Having come

into existence through processes of national fragmentation, they

are liable to be threatened by the imagining of other identities,

claiming their own even smaller homeland space’4 – having discussed

the links between the nationalism and post-modernity Michael Billig

put forward the case of the Post-Soviet and Post-Communist space,

and cited J. Breully: ‘The USSR embodied Russian hegemony over the

other 14 legally constituted republics, with over a hundred

‘nationalities’ also legally recognized’.5 Billig predicted the

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nature of the places, having born in the process of fragmentation:

‘Just as the republics have moved for national independence, so

some of the ‘nationalities’ now move against the newly independent

republics’.6

In 1990 in South Ossetia as in conflict area there was shaped the

conflict on the four levels: the first, legal – so-termed ‘decree

war’ between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi concerning the legal status of

the district and the status of the state language (it began in

1989, and involved the declaration by the Ossetian Authorities

state independence of the former autonomous district with the

status of democratic republic, and responses from the side of the

Supreme Council of Georgia, abolishing the decrees of the Ossetian

Government); the second, discursive, in structure of which one of the

leading component was media discourse; the third, ethno-national,

containing quite high degree of criminal component, and the fourth,

armed one. Some of these levels existed at the same time as

parallel ones, some were followed as the different stages of the

conflict. 4 Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. Thousand Oaks, London: SAGE Publications:

133-134

5 Breuilly, J. (1992) Nationalism and the State. Manchester University Press

6 Billig, M. (1995): 133

10

The questions of territory, language, cultural identity and

group loyalty became the leading topics in media representation of

the ethno-political conflict.

What did the national newspapers remind about?

It is widely assumed that the argument that the ‘newspapers

which have more than a local remit can encourage their readers to

see the world in specifically national terms and ‘remind’ them of

their own nation in particular and help them to think in patriotic

terms about it, is so self-evident that it has not been deemed

worthy of much investigation’ (Rosie, M., et al., 2004:437).

This idea is based on the links between the media and three of

the most influential opinions articulated in early 1990s: the

first, the phenomenon of a ‘daily plebiscite’, or a psychology of

the conscious will to be a nation (Renan, Ernest, 1990), the

second, the phenomenon of the psychology of imagination to be a

nation (Anderson, Benedict, 1991) and the third, the phenomenon of

the psychology of reminding (Billig, Michael, 1995).

To create homeland by every word, even if least significant

one, to indicate the existence of the world of nations constantly,

this was the challenge of the Georgian media in the early 1990s,

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when reading newspapers was a very important segment of common

social and cultural life. Literacy rate in Georgia, according to

Census of 1989, was more than 90%. The audience research and rating

researches of the Georgian media in 1990-1992 argued that the

audience trusted much more to the diverse printing sources than to

the only state-owned TV broadcaster (sources: media ratings of the

program 'Meotkhe' (1990-1992), research by Sakvarelidze, R.,

Karaulashvili, D. (1990)). This challenge would be resulted in

every person reading a newspaper would accept imagined homeland and

become a member of the nation, national community.

What changed in the media of the 1990s in Georgia? Because of

depth of this question here I have to stress the most important

characteristics of the transitional period. It is widely known that

with the gradually collapse of the Soviet-Communist system, the

functioning model of the media started to be changed some years

earlier prior to the official abolishing of the USSR. In 1987-1990,

by the admission of the Soviet Government, the control of media

content for political and cultural reasons changed its nature. This

change is known under the name of glasnost. For the phenomenon of

glasnost, it was characteristic to maintain the main features of

the Soviet-Communist model of press. That model was characterized

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by a large-scale society, an atomized public, a centralized media,

one-way transmission. Moreover, there was a top down perception

that the receivers depend on media for identity. Media was used

for manipulation and control. Glasnost partly solved the problem of

the lack of coverage of tabooed themes in the late Soviet media.

This circumstance (being planned or unplanned by the initiators of

glasnost, under their control or out of it) changed the impression

about the receiver and attitude towards him. The receiver was less

considered as an individual unable to act or to make a decision

independently.

In light of the question of ideological domination it is very important to underline

that the Georgian media of the early 1990s existed in parallel to Soviet media which played

an important role in the whole post-Soviet society and which provided anti-Soviet and anti-

Stalinist discourses. This paradoxical ideological characteristic of the

media highlighted the conflict between the name (Soviet) and its

context, valence and directionality of the media activities (anti-

Soviet and anti-Stalinist).

The most visible change was the change of the space. It

narrowed down, from scales of the Soviet homeland to the new

nation-state of Georgia. The Soviet space was divided into the

different components in the Georgian public conscience and

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reflected in identical duality, here and there, ours and theirs. The

process of disintegration, distancing from the space that was close

and accessible (naturally or artificially) yesterday, demanded

precise orientation in the new space by the media. The media was to

turn into the kind of ideological labor which would create the

definition of a nation and nationality, a definition of nationalism

as an ideology and as a phenomenon of identity for its readers, and

the starting point for that would be signification of space. The

specific areas were signified in media coverage. The communication

in a given location reflected the features of that context. In that

period of the co-existence of the Soviet Union and independent

Georgia, the media named Georgia as ‘home’, Moscow was signified as

‘the Center’, the Metropolis’, indicating by this a colonial status

of Georgia in the USSR. Emphasis upon the collective identity in the media

moved from class (workers) solidarity onto national solidarity. Individual and

collective confessions of nationalism held the media’s attention

completely.

The process of replacing official history with unofficial one in the media gained

particular importance for the ex-colonial countries in the first years

of their independence. Soviet versions of history gave way to the

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alternative history, description of past events and processes which

were radically different from the Soviet version.

Even till the elections of 28 October, 1990, resulted in

coming to the power of the National political forces, in the

Autonomous District of South Ossetia, one of the administrative-

territorial unit of Soviet Georgia, were taking place the processes

directed towards separating and disintegrating from Georgia. From

summer of 1989 till November-December of 1990, i.e. till the armed

and forced conflict between the Georgians and Ossetians on the

surface of the relationship there was the discursive conflict,

which along the other issues, concerned the nomination

(signification) of ‘South Ossetia’ and its political and

administrative status. The problem of nomination concerned not only

terminological aspect of the question but all the aspects of the

phenomenon of signification and nomination: what was the signifier of the

territory of ‘South Ossetia’ and what kind of signified concept it defined. This problem

was the most actual in media representation.

Here I have to emphasize the very important aspect in media-

society perspective, specifically, the role of the media to tie

dispersed citizens with symbolic discourse of the nation: aftermath

developing separating processes and separatists mood in South Ossetian Autonomous

15

District the Tbilisi-based newspapers lost ‘national range’. Despite their

circulation didn’t face to distribution problem in ‘the rebellious

regions’, but the need for them as for the socially required

cultural content among the certain part of the population (in

‘South Ossetia’ and Abkhazia) was descending. Individuals of

Ossetian and Abkhazian nationalities were grouped around local

Ossetian/Abkhazian- and Russian-language publications depended on

them for their identity.

‘Georgia for Georgians?’, or Ethnic and Citizenry Dilemmas.

These words are ascribed to the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Evidently it is not proved anywhere that the President articulated

these words. There is no source that would indicate for certain

where, when and for which audience the phrase ‘Georgia for

Georgians’ was stated. The reason why this paraphrase of the Monroe

Doctrine does not lose its ‘authenticity’ should be searched in the

dominant political context of that period. This context is read

differently from the different perspectives. The first, ‘It

[‘Georgia for Georgians’ – K.M.] can be considered adequate to his

[Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s – K.M.] true position’ (Нодия, Г. (1998)

Конфликт в Абхазии: национальные проекты и политические

16

обстоятельства. Centrum voor Politicologie Vrije Universiteit.

Brussel). The second, ‘Georgia for Georgians’ is a phrase, term,

slogan, which anti-national forces are slanderously ascribing to

Zviad Gamsakhurdia ‘to justify and prove his ‘extreme nationalism’

(Gugushvili, B., in Akhali 7 Dghe , 6-12 April 2007). There was

an article of Zviad Gamsakhurdia himself, in which he wrote, ‘the

western media fully repeated the well-developed lie of the Soviet

propaganda, among them it spread my image of the terrible dictator

of Georgia, someone like Saddam Hussein, who was interested in full

suppression of private freedom, imprisonment of political

opponents, mass violations of human rights, oppression of national

minorities and waging ‘fascist war’ against them through the

calling ‘Georgia for Georgians’ (Gamsakhurdia, Z. (1993) The

Nomenclature Revenge in Georgia, in ‘Soviet Analyst’, Christopher

Story (ed.), vol.21, N 9 – 10). The Georgian researchers Zaal

Andronikashvili and Giorgi Maisuradze consider Zviad Gamsakhurdia

‘a product of philological discourse’ (in the certain way, its

carrier and continuer) and creator of the ‘alternative’ political

mythology. ‘This mythology was created not on the basis of

political theory but philology on the grounds of quite a variety of

the text conglomerate. Among the texts the tenth century author

17

Ioane Zosime and his ‘Kebai da Didebai Kartulisa Enisai’ [Praising

and Glory of the Georgian Language] has to be particularly

outlined… [For Gamsakhurdia] the issue of the ethno-genesis of

Georgians is not only directly linked to their spiritual mission,

but this entire link is built upon the complex ideas of ‘esoteric

knowledge’, initiation, pre-Indo-European traditions, kinship of

Tampliers and Georgian knights, etc. Gamsakhurdia also connected to

each other language and nation and, unlike the secular concept of

Ilia Chavchavadze, returned to the mystic doctrine of ‘chosen-

ness’, but this time not of the Bagrationi (the Georgian royal

family) dynasty (like in Georgian political theology of the middle

ages) and homeland (as with Ilia Chavchavadze), but of the Georgian

nation. This logic has quite naturally brought Gamsakhurdia to the

doubtless superiority of the Georgian ethnos over the national

minorities of Georgia and formed his ethnic policy, which had

direct impact on aggravating conflict first with Ossetians, then

with Abkhazians in 1990.’(Andronikashvili, Z., Maisuradze, G.

(2007)).

In the early 1990s the Georgian nation was not formed as a

political union – there was no constitution that would present the

Georgian nation as a declared political community. But there was a

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factual national communion that consisted of individuals belonging

to different ethnos and nationalities.

The Georgian national identity-related themes, ethnicity and

citizenry-related themes in the Georgian media of that period might

be discussed in the following references: a) ethnic

discourse/inequality on ethnic ground and b) citizen-state

discourse/equal rights despite ethnic belonging. None of them could

be judged as straight-linear. For example, ethnicity-affirming

reference included two sub-references: a) representation of a

Georgian, as a representative of the dominant nation, and his/her

superiority on his/her own national territory; and b)

discrimination of a Georgian in Georgia as a practice, experience

of the Soviet internationalism and its inertia as a problem. Such

as: ‘Georgia is a state, which consists of Georgians’(Komunisti, 8

November, 1990); ‘Only Georgian breed… should save the Georgian

land from destruction’(Sakartvelos Respublika, 16 December, 1990), and,

the second, ‘If before in Georgia there was discrimination of the

Georgian people, now interests of the Georgian population should be

protected prior to all, but by this we do not exclude care for the

rights of the national minorities’( Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January

1991); or: ‘Internationalist course has strengthened: incredible

19

expansion of non-Georgians in Georgia, draconian law against

Georgians’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 22 February 1991).

In many cases the media samples contained in themselves ‘we’

and ‘they’, 'the host' and 'the guest': ‘Georgia for them [for the

non-Georgian population – K.M.] became a home, it warmed them with

its sun, fed them with its bread and its springs’ (Sakartvelos

Respublika, 13 December 1990; the typical relationship between ‘the

host’ and ‘the guest’; ‘the host’ is a permanent donor for ‘the

guest’). The perspective of realization of the national unity as a

political principle was represented in the media on the background

of the whole set of pre-requisites and pre-agreements. The chain of

doubts and presumptions towards ethnically non-Georgians was read

in the sub-texts: whether they are full-fledged participants of the

new state of Georgia; whether they said equally and together with

Georgians, ‘We do not want to be part of the Russian Empire’; what

did they sacrifice, equal to Georgians, for the independence of the

Georgian state?

But nevertheless there were messages and comments with clear

content as follows: ‘Let’s become a modern nation-state, which is

not an ethnos but a unity of individuals who have abilities and

qualities to be citizens, i.e. carriers of developed legal

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consciousness and ability’(7 Dghe, 6 December 1990); ‘There is no

oral or written order about discrimination of non-Georgians

(including Ossetians)! The slogan – Ossetians, go away from

Georgia! – is an invention of those people who cannot credit

themselves without such misanthropic actions (’7 Dghe, 19 January

1990). Noteworthy citizenry-affirming discourse was noticed in the

media sample of Mamuli: ‘Independent Georgia is created not by the

Georgian ethnos, but by the whole Georgian nation, entire

population of Georgia in the face of every ethnos and citizens. …

Homeland of the Abkhaz and the Ossetians are shaped not by the

borders drawn by Stalin, but comprises the whole republic from the

river Psou (west of Georgia - K.M.) to the river Alazani (east of

Georgia - K.M.), from the springs of Liakhvi (north of Georgia -

K.M.) to Chorokhi’(south of Georgia - K.M.). Threat for the

national unity, according to this media sample, was that Ossetians

and Abkhazians themselves had chosen the territories “drawn by

Stalin” as their homeland, and not the whole territory of Georgia,

that the future nation-state of Georgia called them for the new

state reintegration.

The Theoretical Argument

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It’s my view that in the Georgian media of 1990-1991 the core

element of the media coverage and media representation of the

Georgian-Ossetian ethno-political conflict was terms (words, signs,

concepts, constructs) which replaced the term South Ossetian Autonomous

Soviet Socialist District. This replacement seemed likely to serve at least

four purposes. First, these terms were likely national identity-

affirming symbols, a stimulus requiring some response and actions

on the side of receivers. The second, it helped to mobilize public

support for the ‘just struggle against separatism’. Third, it

served as an example of the process of inter-replacement official

and unofficial histories. The forth, the amount of the words and

signs having replaced ‘South Ossetia’ was one of the crucial factor

of national identity-affirming discourse.

To be specific, these terms could be categorized as: a)

toponyms which had replaced the topos of ‘South Ossetia’, and b) terms

impressed in utilization of specific languages, images and valences

to represent the nature of ‘autonomy’ of ‘South Ossetia’. The category ‘a’

was suggested to include all the geographical and historical names

used in the media as a signifier of the land of ‘South Ossetia’.

The category ‘b’ was suggested to include the following:

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emphasis on the legal dimensions and nature of the

autonomy;

affirmation of Georgia’s inseparability;

affirmation of oppressions of the rights of ethnic

Georgians in the District;

shifting of blame for the Georgian-Ossetian conflict onto

Russia.

All sets of the above-mentioned reasons provide guiding the

research question:

What is the extent and range of the terms that replaced in the Georgian printed

media the term ‘South Ossetia’ and how large is volume of valences that replaced in the

Georgian newspapers ’autonomous’ status of the District?

Method

The aim of this article is to examine national identity

language (in reference of signifying of the land of ‘South

Ossetia’) by the Georgian newspapers of the different ownership

structures. As it was mentioned above, according to the media

researches and polls of 1990-1992 Georgian media (sources: media

rating of TV program ‘Meotkhe’ (1990-1992), ‘Survey on the Freedom

of Press in Georgia. 1990-1995’ by ‘Open Society – Georgian

23

Foundation’), the characteristic of the printing media of that

period was that the readers considered them to be able to provide

more in-depth analysis than television news programs and seemed to

be more likely to reflect the patterns of the communication

strategies of the mediated sources of the messages.

The analysis of this paper includes all the editions of five

Georgian newspapers during the period: from October 1990 (28

October 1990, the day of the first multi-party democratic elections

in Georgia) through January 1992, when an armed rebellion against

the government of President Gamsakhurdia started and President of

Georgia was forcefully ousted from. All the stories dealt in some

way with the conflict in ‘South Ossetia’ were included in analysis.

Research method is cultivation analysis.

The quantitative analysis is based on content analysis of 1800

media samples from five Tbilisi-based, the most influential and

highly-circulated all over Georgia newspapers: Komunisti, an

official body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

Georgia; Sakartvelos Respublika, an official body of the Supreme Council

of Georgia Republic, Mamuli, a bi-weekly of Rustaveli Society (one

of the structures of the National Liberation Movement of Georgia),

‘7 Dghe’, a printing body of the Independent Union of Journalists of

24

Georgia, and Droni, a private publication. The unit of analysis is:

any sign, word, image, metaphor, connotation, concept or construct

that had replaced term 'South Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist District'.

This is because of my interest in showing the particular aspects

of: a) the signification of the land of ‘South Ossetia’ with

purpose to examine its national identity-related meaning, and b)

the valence (i.e., directionality) of the media references of that

part of Georgia to examine its valence-carrier meaning. As it was

mentioned these units were categorized as: a) toponyms which had

replaced the toponym of ‘South Ossetia’, and b) terms impressed in

utilization of specific languages, images and valences to represent

the nature of ‘autonomy’ of ‘South Ossetia’.

Two persons were conducting the process of the content

analysis coding, with an overlap of 12 % of units. For the first

(a) category (coded as ‘1’) 1032 was the number of coding

decisions on which the coders agreed , 1135 referred to the total

number of the coding decisions made by the first and second coders

respectively. The coders agreeing yielded .91 reliability

coefficient which was determined to be 92 % greater than by chance.

For the second (b) category (coded as ‘2’) the coders agreed on 568

25

of 665 incoming codings, so yielding a 0.85 reliability

coefficient, which was defined to be 86% greater than by chance.

Upon completing process of coding the additional variable was

constructed. This variable is an amount of the unit of analysis,

regardless of whether it indicates name or valence, in one media

comment or statement. The variable was collapsed into two

categories: ‘1’= one sign/or valence presented in one comment; ‘2’=

two or more signs/valences presented in one comment. For example,

the following statement is a sample containing more than one unit

of analysis: ‘I am forced to prove, my homeland, that one beautiful

area of your northern slope, Samachablo, ancient Samachablo, is

inseparable part of Georgia;’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 7 January 1991; three

units: ‘Samachabo’ as a name-carrying term and, ‘ancient

Samachablo” as name- and evaluation-carrying term, ‘inseparable

part of Georgia’ as valence-carrying term). Or: ‘It can be said

clearly that our government made a rough mistake having responded

to an apparently non-constitutional act of Ossetian separatists of

Shida Kartli by abolishing the autonomy of so-called ‘South Ossetia’ that

should have been done in totally different political conditions’

(Mamuli, March 1991) and so on. The second variable were the

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publications analyzed: ‘Kommunisti’, ‘Sakartvelos Respublika’, ‘Mamuli’, ‘7 Dghe’,

‘Droni’.

The structured interviews with 18 respondents (publishers,

editors-in-chief, editors, chiefs of departments, reporters) also

covered the basic area of the research, such as question of media

representation and signification of the territory of so-called

South Ossetia and valences and context connected with signifiers of

‘South Ossetia’. The structure of respondents was following: the

respondents were chosen with mixed principle in order to represent

all the hierarchical levels and competencies: editor-in-chief (2),

editor (1), deputy editor-in-chief/deputy editor (2), co-editor

(2), publisher/ member of the board of the publishing body (2),

head of department (3), reporter (6).

Statistics: percentages, contingency table analysis.

Results

Analysis is presented in three stages. At the first stage of

analysis each word, sign, image, or metaphor, indicating the

territory of former South Ossetian Autonomous District, whether the

specific indicator reflected name or status, or any other valence

27

of it, was coded separately. A total of 1800 samples were grouped

across the categories presented in the Table 1.

Table 1. The signifiers of the territory of former South

Ossetian Autonomous District (content-analysis)

Signifying of the territory of former

South Ossetian Autonomous District In percent P

Historically Georgian land/inseparable

part of Georgia 21%So-called South Ossetia 5%Illegal/artificial autonomy 2%Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli) 21%Samachablo 35%

Tskhinvali 2

%Tool in Russia’s hands

8%The place where Georgian’s rights are

oppressed

5%The victim of the ‘war of decrees’

1%

For examining the research question I suggest running

contingency table analysis, or cross-tabulation between these two

new variables, publications and intensity of national identity-

affirming discourse (one or more units in one comment).

Table 2. Presence of national identity-affirming name-carrying and

valence-carrying terms in each publication

28

# National

identity

signs and

valence

‘Komunisti’(%) ‘Sakartvelos

Respublika’(%

)

7 Dghe

(%)

‘Droni’ (%) ‘Mamuli’(%)

1 One 62 34 49 53 42

2 Two or more 38 56 51 47 58

X2 =63.70,

df=4, p<.05

100 (n=

126)

100

(n=940)

100

(n=28

1)

100

(n=262)

100

(n=191)

On the next stage of analysis in the empirical data (the

interviews with the publishers, editors and journalists) were

identified all the most typical, used and valid as externally so

internally (by the opinions of the respondents) references of the

land, territory, administratively called as ‘South Ossetia.’

Table 3. The signifiers of the territory of former South

Ossetian Autonomous District (interviews).

Signifying of the territory of former

South Ossetian Autonomous District In percentTemporary occupied 8.7%So-called South Ossetia 4,3%Ossetia 8,7%Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli) 17,4%

29

Samachablo 26,1%

Inseparable part of Georgia 21.8%

Illegal unit 4,3%

Tskhinvali 8,7%

Discussion

a. Name-carrying terms: History, Geography, Politics, Identity

As it’s shown from the analysis the most typical, used and

valid quantitatively sufficient name-carrying units are the

following ones: ‘Samachablo’, ‘Shida Kartli’ and ‘so-termed South

Ossetia’.

In the Georgian media of 1990-1991 total replacement of the

political-administrative unit ‘South Ossetia’ with traditional

‘Samachablo’ is noteworthy. ‘Samachablo’ is more historical and

cultural term than geographical one. The name of ‘Samachablo” is

associated with the name of the Georgian princes Machabeli, the

possessors (till early 1920s of the XX century) of the biggest part

of the land later called as ‘South Ossetia’. Despite the fact that

the Autonomous District of South Ossetia comprised bigger territory

than the lands of the Machabelis in Shida Kartli, ‘Samachablo’

was an example of replacement of the Soviet typos with traditional

Georgian typos, which in itself carried elements that have turned

30

into the symbols of nationality, existence as a nation: association

of Georgian Nobility (The Machabelis – noblemen from that area

repressed by the Soviet regime); historical-cultural heritage, and

due to these very circumstances the term ‘North Kartli’ several

times unsuccessfully used in media and speeches of politicians

could not establish itself. ‘Samachablo’ – this was an ideological-

propagandistic term.

For a comparison: in 1995-2007 the Georgian media preferred to

use the term ‘Tskhinvali region,’ ‘so-called South Ossetia,’ etc.

These terms emerged after the June 24 1992 Sochi Agreement on the

ceasefire in the conflict region. At that time the country was led

by the government, the name of which was connected with the ousting

of Zviad Gamsakhurdia from Georgia and whose political orienteer

had never been openly ‘ hot nationalistic’; in the settlement of

conflict, in the process of negotiations, European institutions are

enrolling; OSCE was represented in the negotiations format as ‘a

facilitator’ – all this was reflected on the nomination of the

former Autonomous District space of South Ossetia and comes to a

pure geographical term, without any history and politics. Following

8 August 2008 – occupation of Georgia by Russia wrapped as a peace

mission in the Tskhinvali region – in order to mark the Tskhinvali

31

region, i.e. former space of South Ossetia in the Georgian media,

media was trying to have represent this space in relevance with

ongoing historical-political events. There was talk not about the

nomination of this specific space by media, but by actualization of

the discourse topic by media: how to call the territory of the

former Autonomous District of South Ossetia? Sometimes such

striving results in creating ridiculous examples: ‘Occupied

territory of North Kartli,’ ‘State created on the Georgian

territory and through the genocide and ethnic cleansing of

Georgians. (Georgian Times, 4-11 September 2008).

As for the second most frequently used term in 1990-1991 -

‘Shida Kartli’(Inner Kartli) - it can be discussed as just a

geographical name of one of the regions of Georgia, like ‘Kvemo

Kartli’ (Lower Kartli), but the term itself can reflect dominance

of the Georgian identity with regards to that territorial unit:

Kartli is a name which derives from the name of Georgia (in

Georgian – Sa-katr-velo) Vitality of these terms, their ‘mediated

experience’ stood different periods of time.

The component ‘Ossetia’ was preserved in only term: ‘so-called

South Ossetia,’ in which ‘so-called’ directly indicates to the

32

conflict between the subject-matter and its nomination in the

Georgian public conscience.

As for term ‘Tskhinvali’, it was used as a name of

administrative center of South Ossetian Autonomous District, the

place of residency of the separatist government, the place, where

the political decisions were made.

b. Valence-carrying terms: Politics, Justice, Rights, Identity

The results of analysis show how the particular signs and

factors inside messages create the certain meanings outside the

messages potentially able to be generalized and be formed by

summarizing content-analyzed identity and valence-related

observations. I discuss concept of ‘something between’ inside and

outside factors of the messages. Each message dealt in some way

with representation of ‘South Ossetia’ at the same time represents

more abstractive references and constructs than particular aspects

of coverage.

Thus, the concrete content of the message ‘Samachablo along with

the whole Kartli is a backbone of entire Georgia’ (Sakartvelos

Respublika, 12 April 1991) could be generalized in reference ‘The land

of ‘South Ossetia’ is inseparable part of Georgia’. This discourse brings

33

recipients of such messages to the historical discourse: ‘Ossetian

extremists want to create a new Ossetian state on the territory of

Georgia and further joining that ‘republic’ with North Ossetia,

i.e. seizure of Georgia’s historical lands through Soviet tricks.

(’ Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January 1991).

Media representation of the ‘war of decrees’ between Tskhinvali and

Tbilisi represents several layers of this war: a) justification of

abolishing the district on the side of Tbilisi – ‘when the new government cancels

the Autonomous District of South Ossetia, it is protecting

interests of the Georgian people (’ Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January

1991); b) adequacy of actions of official Tbilisi – ‘As for the declaration of

September 20 1990 on sovereignty of the Ossetian SSR, this illegal

act was directed against territorial integrity of Georgia.

Elections of December 9 1990 were illegal, ...which violated rights

and interests of the Georgian people living on the territory of

this region’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 5 January 1991); c) inconsistent policy

of the Georgian government towards national minorities and autonomous formations:

‘Having come to power the block ‘Round Table - Free Georgia’ gave

up its initial demand and stated that autonomies will be preserved

on the territory of Georgia. However, it did not last long. On

December 11 Georgia’s Supreme Council adopted the law on abolishing

34

Autonomous District of South Ossetia. This step can be followed by

aggravation of conflict in South Ossetia, big clashes between

nations ‘ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 6 January, 1991; sender of the

message is a Russian journalist); and second: ‘It can be said

clearly that our government made a rough mistake having responded

to an apparently non-constitutional act of Ossetian separatists of

Shida Kartli by abolishing the autonomy of so-called ‘South

Ossetia’ that should have been done in totally different political

conditions’ (Mamuli, March 1991; source of the message here is a

Georgian politician in opposition towards Gamsakhurdia

Government); these media samples presented the autonomous district,

its territory, population as a deplorable result and victim of the ‘war of

decrees.’ As mentioned above, in the process of fighting for

independence and in the first years after gaining it ex-colonial

countries are characterized with the process of replacing official

histories with unofficial ones, search and creation of a ‘genuine’

history, even at the expense of myths and mystified stories.

‘Awakening of Ossetian self-determination’ could not avoid the

process; the myth about powerful state of Alans (ancient ancestors

of Ossetians – K.M.) was invented to overweigh the official

35

history: ‘The state of undefeatable tribe Alans cherishing freedom

all through the tempests of millennium’ (Mamuli, October 1990).

Messages compiled in this superlative style are opposed by ‘another

historical truth,’ in which South Ossetia as a political formation

is discussed in the discourse of historical illogic and absurd

almost: ‘Autonomous District of South Ossetia is an administrative-

cultural formation that was formed on the enemy-rich Georgian land

despite the will of the Georgian people. It rose upon heads of the

Georgian people as the Sword of Damocles in swaddles of Communist

dictatorship’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 10 January 1991).

What does the autonomy of South Ossetia represent in media

representation?

South Ossetia is illegal autonomy – ‘We abolished illegal autonomy of

so-called ‘South Ossetia (Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January 1991); or:

’During the 25-century history of Georgian statehood there had

never been Ossetian state formations on the territory of Georgia’

(Sakartvelos Respublika, 6 February 1991); or: ‘This illegal territorial

formation was created by the Bolsheviks in 1922 on the historically

Georgian land ( Sakartvelos Respublika, 13 March 1991); or: ‘…Stinking

landmine of halted action, set on by Lenin, Stalin and Orjonikidze

( Sakartvelos Respublika, 26 March 1991).

36

South Ossetia is artificial autonomy – ‘Author argues (Grigol

Gvelesiani, a Georgian historian – K.M.) that on this small part of

the territory within Georgia Ossetians have no power and material

means necessary for the existence of an independent political unit;

(Sakartvelos Respublika, 19 January 1991); or: ‘Autonomy grown in

contemporary Ossetian conditions will dissolve and wither from

birth (Ibid); or: ‘Ossetians on our territory – this is a classic

example of a national minority, that is why they cannot have claims

of forming an autonomous district… We would have stood it

[district] today, we would not have abolished it in current

conditions, but categorical and cynical confrontation of the

district authorities to decisions of Georgia’s former as well as

current Supreme Council cannot be taken for granted, especially

that it had been happening with support of the center’ (7 Dghe,

December 1990).

South Ossetia is a tool in the hands of USSR/Russia. ‘Evaluation of the

January 7 decree of President Gorbachov as an intrusion into

Georgia’s domestic affairs, as an encouragement of extremist

forces’ ( Sakartvelos Respublika, 10 January 1991); or: ‘Conflicts that …

did not start on ethnic grounds… War between brothers in Samachablo

is provoked by the third power’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 16 March 1991);

37

or: ‘Metropolis has found shackles to all nations fighting for

freedom-independence. The issue of Ossetians turned to be one for

Georgians’ ( Mamuli, January 1991); or:

‘They will make a decision not only to unite North Ossetia and so-

called South Ossetia, but to declare independence of united

Ossetia. Then president of this Ossetia will be elected. Afterwards

independent Ossetia, similar to Karabakh, will submit a request to

be included in ‘sodrujestvo’ (commonwealth)….’ (Mamuli, December

1991).

Conclusion

Upon summarizing results of both directions of analysis, we can posit that the

Georgian printed media by the usage of numerous names, having indicated the land of

‘South Ossetia’, carrying in itself Georgian national identity-affirming signs, clearly confirm

Georgian origins of that land. Based on this background, the communication strategy of

the Georgian printed media of early 1990s was directed to construction patriotic

motivation on side of Georgians and to destruction nationalist/patriotic attachment to that

land on the side of Ossetian separatists. This communication strategy included the

following: if South Ossetia, as an autonomous formation, is a result of the Bolshevik

regime, creation of which was not pre-determined by the dominant state of ethnic

Ossetians in the population structure of the district, and if the territory of the Autonomous

38

District of South Ossetia is not connected with the Ossetian ethnos, Ossetian nationality,

either through long historical experience, or cultural heritage, or history of statehood, and

if all toponyms on that land have Georgian origins, then there can be no Ossetian identity

link towards that land; then no action on their side can be determined by patriotic

motivation, love for specifically this part of land, as a special land - homeland.

This conclusion could be collapsed in three sub-conclusions.

The first concerns the importance of creation of the national

identity in the media by the particular semiotic materials, by

every meaningful sign. The Georgian newspapers in transitional

period from Soviet Georgia to the independent nation-state

implicitly echoed to this task of the time. They could provide

daily indexes, daily symbolic discourse of being a nation for their

readers.

The second conclusion is seeing the name and identity of the

land of so-termed South Ossetia in media-centric perspective

because of its representation in the dimension of spreading

knowledge by the media. Learning from the newspapers became typical

for that period. Notably, it was spreading of socially important

educational, analytical and not informational content,

comprehension and recall of which depend on sender factors and

audience factors in this concrete transitional period. The

39

knowledge spreading framework was also largely based on assumption

that the media captured ‘a given, finite and knowable reality’ of

the identity conflict between the Georgians and Ossetians, dealt

with the institutional issues and having derived from the conflict

between the ideal and political identities. But however this

knowledge couldn’t be considered as ‘the naturally occurring

product’ of the political environment and visible content of events

(Manheim, 1998). Following this, we can discuss the mediation

strategy of spreading knowledge by the media as story-cultivation

strategy referring to the ‘beat system’ for gathering issues and

topics for coverage. The knowledge spreading framework is largely

influenced by the ideological and socio-cultural factors in society

providing the value system for the media products.

The third conclusion is prevalent nature of Georgian-centric

dimension in media as a specific project of that transitional

period for reproduction and evolution national identity.

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