The Land, the Name, the Identity
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Question of Identity
1990-1991 is period when Georgia gained the state independence
and when the former Soviet Socialist Autonomous District of Georgia
called ‘South Ossetia” started to move towards separation from
Georgia.
Here we discuss the particular case of media signification,
determining the large identity meaning and media/national/political
context. The mediated name of the land of so-called ‘South
Ossetia’ in the early 1990s became the conceptual element of the
issues of mass communications concerned with the questions of the
state and politics, national ideology and national identity, peace
and war in Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The signification of that part of the Georgian state in the
media could be considered as ‘the message within the message’ by
physical manifestation of which were created the phenomena of
national and cultural belonging and attributions connected with it,
having gathered crucial importance for the perception of the whole
content of the message.
1
The history of the name and identity of this territory is
paradoxical and contradictory: till 1922 it was one of the region
of inner Georgia, from 1922 to 1990 it was called South Ossetian
Soviet Socialist Autonomous District. From 1990 its name and status
have been permanently questioned in armed conflicts, in failed
processes of negotiations and failed efforts of identification
(Darchiashvili, D. at al., 2005). Today this territory in the
Georgian and international media is called ‘so-called South
Ossetia’, or ‘Tskhinvali Region’.
In 1990-1992 on the territory of Georgia two armed ethno-
national and political conflicts occurred: on the territory of the
former South Ossetian District and on the territory of the former
Abkhazian Soviet Autonomous Socialist Republic. Despite the certain
degree of similarity in dynamics of processes in the both
autonomous units (such as: creating a concern for separation from
Georgia – establishing organizational and institutional structures
for separating – seeking for a new status – getting ‘awarded
separatism’ by the third side (Russia) – armed conflict between the
sides resulted in de facto separation from Georgia), there were two
essential differences between these two conflicts, concerning two
the most important phenomena: signification/nomination of the part
2
of land and identity attached with it. With the very first evident
signs of the conflict in the former South Ossetian District, the
term ‘South Ossetia’ (in its political-administrative meaning)
started to be lost from the Georgian political and public discourse
and started to be replaced by the alternative terms that carried in
themselves different categories for identity.
In case of Abkhazia there was no conflict with nomination of
that part of land. In fact, this land was medially represented as a
place of Georgian identity but at the same time it was recognized
as the background of Abkhazian identity. However, there often were
direct or indirect references to non-residency of the Abkhaz on
this land, i.e. mass settlement of Apsuas since the 17th century.
The paradox was that Abkhazian and Georgian identities, mediated in
periods of conflict aggravations as ‘hostile’, were represented in
historical discourse as the identical identities. In this regard the quote
by well-known Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili is
noteworthy, ‘Abkhazia’ is a synonym of the word ‘Georgia’… To tell
a Georgian that Abkhazia can withdraw from Georgia (I mean the
structure of nations but not reality) is almost the same as to tell
him/her that Georgia may withdraw from itself.’ (Droni, August,
1991).
3
The start of the armed ethno-political conflict in the
Autonomous District of South Ossetia and formation of the further
conflict design in Abkhazia, strengthening of separatist attitudes
sharpened the representation of patriotic attachment to the
homeland in the Georgian media. The mediation was directed to show
that losing at least one inch of the homeland threatened the
existence of a nation for Georgians. For examples: ‘When a Georgian
would lose … even a little piece of the Georgian land, … existence
of him/her as a nationality was impossible’( Moambe (XIX century
newspaper), cited in Mamuli, December 1990).; or: ‘Georgian land for
a Georgian is a whole body and we will not let anyone cut part of
this body’ (Mamuli, January 1991); or: ‘This land is Georgian, and
Ossetians want to take it away’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 13 March 1991).
Media representation of the ethno-political conflicts on the
Georgian territory indicated that it was particularly painful to
lose not the territory tout court, but the territory inside the
imagined homeland. Ernest Gellner said that in today’s world ‘a
man. . . . must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two
ears’1. Losing a part of the imagined homeland is worse than losing
an ear: in case of the territory ‘the lost ear’ will be found at
someone else’s face (Gellner, 1983). For the Georgians the land of
4
‘South Ossetia’ was a piece of his imagined homeland, which under
certain conditions, became a victim of the historical injustice.
The phenomenon of the national territory, homeland with its
complexity has always had crucial importance for the Georgian
conscience. The most popular explanation imprinted in this
conscience belongs to Ilia Chavchavadze (the famous Georgian writer
and philosopher of XIX-XX centuries). According to it, national
territory, equally with language and faith, is one of the most
important components of the concept of a nation – ‘Land, language,
faith.’ Well-known Georgian thinkers: Mikhako Tsereteli, Archil
Jorjadze (in the beginning of 20th century) et al. wrote about the
crucial importance of territory for the development of a nation. In
the beginning of the 1990s, of course, there was a return to the
already written and said, but realization of all this was to take
place with new conscious refraction of the national space.
‘Patrimony,’ ‘homeland’ – was this a national territory or a state
territory? T.K. Oommen considers territory to be common for a
nation and a state but there is one significant difference between
the national territory and state territory; the first one is a
moral unity, the last one – legal2.
5
In Georgia of the 1990s the certain factors – not having a
full-fledged state for 200 years, weekly formed state conscience –
developed mostly primordialist and not modernist views of a nation.
As noted Ghia Nodia, the Georgian political scientist, ‘Georgians,
as is often true in Eastern Europe, have defined belonging to a
nation in an ethnically exclusivist way… Georgian political
nationalism was also ethnic.’ (Nodia, G. (2005) ‘Dimensions of
Insecurity’, in ‘Statehood and Security: Georgia after ‘Rose
Revolution’, Coppieters, B. (ed): 45)
Nations, nationalities and ethnicities – on the crossroad of
Modernity and Post-Modernity, or the End of ‘Happy Family’
In the beginning of 1990s the ‘family’ living in the
‘Fatherland’, Georgia, didn’t look like a happy one. The ‘joyful
and careless’ life of Soviet Georgia with three autonomous units,
with the representatives of more than 35 nationalities and
ethnicities (according to Census 1989, ethnic minorities in Georgia
made approximately the third of the whole population) came to the
end. Fear, doubt, suspicion, inconvenience created the fruitful
background for the political and social disintegration. In 1990
independent Georgia got by legacy from the Soviet Georgia two
6
autonomous republics and an autonomous district. The legal
formation and constitutional establishing of each of them was
determined by the specific and particular historical, ethno-
national, political and legal pre-requisites. Two autonomous units
were ethnic-based (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and one was a
religious-based (Ajara). The Soviet Regime awarded the autonomous
units with certain administrative privileges. The autonomy of
Abkhazia and Ajara were recognized by the Constitution of
Independent Georgia (1918-1921), but Autonomous District of South
Ossetia was established in 1922 by the Decree of the Soviet Regime
(ethnic Ossetians were in minority in the ethnic structure of the
district). So, the autonomies in Georgia in the early 1990s might
be grouped according to three characteristics: the first, by the
administrative status, the second – by the base and background for autonomy,
and the third, by the attitude towards them on the side of Independent Georgia’s
Constitution (1918-1921).
The processes having taken place in the early 1990s: the
beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the actions and rhetoric of
the National Liberation Movement in Georgia, the policy having been
realized by Kremlin towards the autonomous units and national
minorities in former Soviet Georgia strengthened and re-enforced
7
all the negative layers of the relationship between the Georgians
and the Ossetians, the Georgians and the Abkhazians.
The state sovereignty of the developing Georgian nation-state
didn’t spread all over the legally demarked territory of Soviet
Georgia, because Georgians, Abkhazians, Ossetians recovered to
carry the different interpretation of nationalism, as ideology, as
national identity, and as ‘the tradition of argumentation’3. Not only ‘the
tradition of argumentation’ was recovered, but also was recovered
the will to arrange beyond argumentation the certain political and
psychological phenomena: a nation, a state, a national place,
language, shared sense of identity. For example, in the very same
time, in March, 1991, in Tskhinvali (the capital city of South
Ossetia) and in Sukhumi (the capital city of Abkhazia) there were
held two radically differently aimed referenda: the first, on 17th
of March, so-termed Union referendum aimed to maintain the Soviet
Union, and the second, on 31st of March, referendum with the
question concerning the state independence of Georgia. At the same
1 Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 6
2 Oommen, T.K. (1997) Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Polity
Press: 185
3 Shotter, J. (1993a) The Cultural Politics of Everyday Life. Milton Keyness:
Open University Press: 200
8
time on the same places two different legitimate regimes were co-
existing and two sovereignties were functioning.
The end of the Cold War in the certain meaning led to the end
of Marxist and Modernists eras. Michael Billig analyzed the process
of fragmentation of the Soviet Union in the prism of inter-
relatedness of nationalism and postmodernism: ‘If new, smaller
nations succeed in gaining their independence, they do not enjoy
the sovereignty which nations were said to possess in heyday of
nationalism. These new states must seek admittance to supranational
organizations. In addition, they are threatened by the very sub-
national processes which permitted their own birth. Having come
into existence through processes of national fragmentation, they
are liable to be threatened by the imagining of other identities,
claiming their own even smaller homeland space’4 – having discussed
the links between the nationalism and post-modernity Michael Billig
put forward the case of the Post-Soviet and Post-Communist space,
and cited J. Breully: ‘The USSR embodied Russian hegemony over the
other 14 legally constituted republics, with over a hundred
‘nationalities’ also legally recognized’.5 Billig predicted the
9
nature of the places, having born in the process of fragmentation:
‘Just as the republics have moved for national independence, so
some of the ‘nationalities’ now move against the newly independent
republics’.6
In 1990 in South Ossetia as in conflict area there was shaped the
conflict on the four levels: the first, legal – so-termed ‘decree
war’ between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi concerning the legal status of
the district and the status of the state language (it began in
1989, and involved the declaration by the Ossetian Authorities
state independence of the former autonomous district with the
status of democratic republic, and responses from the side of the
Supreme Council of Georgia, abolishing the decrees of the Ossetian
Government); the second, discursive, in structure of which one of the
leading component was media discourse; the third, ethno-national,
containing quite high degree of criminal component, and the fourth,
armed one. Some of these levels existed at the same time as
parallel ones, some were followed as the different stages of the
conflict. 4 Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. Thousand Oaks, London: SAGE Publications:
133-134
5 Breuilly, J. (1992) Nationalism and the State. Manchester University Press
6 Billig, M. (1995): 133
10
The questions of territory, language, cultural identity and
group loyalty became the leading topics in media representation of
the ethno-political conflict.
What did the national newspapers remind about?
It is widely assumed that the argument that the ‘newspapers
which have more than a local remit can encourage their readers to
see the world in specifically national terms and ‘remind’ them of
their own nation in particular and help them to think in patriotic
terms about it, is so self-evident that it has not been deemed
worthy of much investigation’ (Rosie, M., et al., 2004:437).
This idea is based on the links between the media and three of
the most influential opinions articulated in early 1990s: the
first, the phenomenon of a ‘daily plebiscite’, or a psychology of
the conscious will to be a nation (Renan, Ernest, 1990), the
second, the phenomenon of the psychology of imagination to be a
nation (Anderson, Benedict, 1991) and the third, the phenomenon of
the psychology of reminding (Billig, Michael, 1995).
To create homeland by every word, even if least significant
one, to indicate the existence of the world of nations constantly,
this was the challenge of the Georgian media in the early 1990s,
11
when reading newspapers was a very important segment of common
social and cultural life. Literacy rate in Georgia, according to
Census of 1989, was more than 90%. The audience research and rating
researches of the Georgian media in 1990-1992 argued that the
audience trusted much more to the diverse printing sources than to
the only state-owned TV broadcaster (sources: media ratings of the
program 'Meotkhe' (1990-1992), research by Sakvarelidze, R.,
Karaulashvili, D. (1990)). This challenge would be resulted in
every person reading a newspaper would accept imagined homeland and
become a member of the nation, national community.
What changed in the media of the 1990s in Georgia? Because of
depth of this question here I have to stress the most important
characteristics of the transitional period. It is widely known that
with the gradually collapse of the Soviet-Communist system, the
functioning model of the media started to be changed some years
earlier prior to the official abolishing of the USSR. In 1987-1990,
by the admission of the Soviet Government, the control of media
content for political and cultural reasons changed its nature. This
change is known under the name of glasnost. For the phenomenon of
glasnost, it was characteristic to maintain the main features of
the Soviet-Communist model of press. That model was characterized
12
by a large-scale society, an atomized public, a centralized media,
one-way transmission. Moreover, there was a top down perception
that the receivers depend on media for identity. Media was used
for manipulation and control. Glasnost partly solved the problem of
the lack of coverage of tabooed themes in the late Soviet media.
This circumstance (being planned or unplanned by the initiators of
glasnost, under their control or out of it) changed the impression
about the receiver and attitude towards him. The receiver was less
considered as an individual unable to act or to make a decision
independently.
In light of the question of ideological domination it is very important to underline
that the Georgian media of the early 1990s existed in parallel to Soviet media which played
an important role in the whole post-Soviet society and which provided anti-Soviet and anti-
Stalinist discourses. This paradoxical ideological characteristic of the
media highlighted the conflict between the name (Soviet) and its
context, valence and directionality of the media activities (anti-
Soviet and anti-Stalinist).
The most visible change was the change of the space. It
narrowed down, from scales of the Soviet homeland to the new
nation-state of Georgia. The Soviet space was divided into the
different components in the Georgian public conscience and
13
reflected in identical duality, here and there, ours and theirs. The
process of disintegration, distancing from the space that was close
and accessible (naturally or artificially) yesterday, demanded
precise orientation in the new space by the media. The media was to
turn into the kind of ideological labor which would create the
definition of a nation and nationality, a definition of nationalism
as an ideology and as a phenomenon of identity for its readers, and
the starting point for that would be signification of space. The
specific areas were signified in media coverage. The communication
in a given location reflected the features of that context. In that
period of the co-existence of the Soviet Union and independent
Georgia, the media named Georgia as ‘home’, Moscow was signified as
‘the Center’, the Metropolis’, indicating by this a colonial status
of Georgia in the USSR. Emphasis upon the collective identity in the media
moved from class (workers) solidarity onto national solidarity. Individual and
collective confessions of nationalism held the media’s attention
completely.
The process of replacing official history with unofficial one in the media gained
particular importance for the ex-colonial countries in the first years
of their independence. Soviet versions of history gave way to the
14
alternative history, description of past events and processes which
were radically different from the Soviet version.
Even till the elections of 28 October, 1990, resulted in
coming to the power of the National political forces, in the
Autonomous District of South Ossetia, one of the administrative-
territorial unit of Soviet Georgia, were taking place the processes
directed towards separating and disintegrating from Georgia. From
summer of 1989 till November-December of 1990, i.e. till the armed
and forced conflict between the Georgians and Ossetians on the
surface of the relationship there was the discursive conflict,
which along the other issues, concerned the nomination
(signification) of ‘South Ossetia’ and its political and
administrative status. The problem of nomination concerned not only
terminological aspect of the question but all the aspects of the
phenomenon of signification and nomination: what was the signifier of the
territory of ‘South Ossetia’ and what kind of signified concept it defined. This problem
was the most actual in media representation.
Here I have to emphasize the very important aspect in media-
society perspective, specifically, the role of the media to tie
dispersed citizens with symbolic discourse of the nation: aftermath
developing separating processes and separatists mood in South Ossetian Autonomous
15
District the Tbilisi-based newspapers lost ‘national range’. Despite their
circulation didn’t face to distribution problem in ‘the rebellious
regions’, but the need for them as for the socially required
cultural content among the certain part of the population (in
‘South Ossetia’ and Abkhazia) was descending. Individuals of
Ossetian and Abkhazian nationalities were grouped around local
Ossetian/Abkhazian- and Russian-language publications depended on
them for their identity.
‘Georgia for Georgians?’, or Ethnic and Citizenry Dilemmas.
These words are ascribed to the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Evidently it is not proved anywhere that the President articulated
these words. There is no source that would indicate for certain
where, when and for which audience the phrase ‘Georgia for
Georgians’ was stated. The reason why this paraphrase of the Monroe
Doctrine does not lose its ‘authenticity’ should be searched in the
dominant political context of that period. This context is read
differently from the different perspectives. The first, ‘It
[‘Georgia for Georgians’ – K.M.] can be considered adequate to his
[Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s – K.M.] true position’ (Нодия, Г. (1998)
Конфликт в Абхазии: национальные проекты и политические
16
обстоятельства. Centrum voor Politicologie Vrije Universiteit.
Brussel). The second, ‘Georgia for Georgians’ is a phrase, term,
slogan, which anti-national forces are slanderously ascribing to
Zviad Gamsakhurdia ‘to justify and prove his ‘extreme nationalism’
(Gugushvili, B., in Akhali 7 Dghe , 6-12 April 2007). There was
an article of Zviad Gamsakhurdia himself, in which he wrote, ‘the
western media fully repeated the well-developed lie of the Soviet
propaganda, among them it spread my image of the terrible dictator
of Georgia, someone like Saddam Hussein, who was interested in full
suppression of private freedom, imprisonment of political
opponents, mass violations of human rights, oppression of national
minorities and waging ‘fascist war’ against them through the
calling ‘Georgia for Georgians’ (Gamsakhurdia, Z. (1993) The
Nomenclature Revenge in Georgia, in ‘Soviet Analyst’, Christopher
Story (ed.), vol.21, N 9 – 10). The Georgian researchers Zaal
Andronikashvili and Giorgi Maisuradze consider Zviad Gamsakhurdia
‘a product of philological discourse’ (in the certain way, its
carrier and continuer) and creator of the ‘alternative’ political
mythology. ‘This mythology was created not on the basis of
political theory but philology on the grounds of quite a variety of
the text conglomerate. Among the texts the tenth century author
17
Ioane Zosime and his ‘Kebai da Didebai Kartulisa Enisai’ [Praising
and Glory of the Georgian Language] has to be particularly
outlined… [For Gamsakhurdia] the issue of the ethno-genesis of
Georgians is not only directly linked to their spiritual mission,
but this entire link is built upon the complex ideas of ‘esoteric
knowledge’, initiation, pre-Indo-European traditions, kinship of
Tampliers and Georgian knights, etc. Gamsakhurdia also connected to
each other language and nation and, unlike the secular concept of
Ilia Chavchavadze, returned to the mystic doctrine of ‘chosen-
ness’, but this time not of the Bagrationi (the Georgian royal
family) dynasty (like in Georgian political theology of the middle
ages) and homeland (as with Ilia Chavchavadze), but of the Georgian
nation. This logic has quite naturally brought Gamsakhurdia to the
doubtless superiority of the Georgian ethnos over the national
minorities of Georgia and formed his ethnic policy, which had
direct impact on aggravating conflict first with Ossetians, then
with Abkhazians in 1990.’(Andronikashvili, Z., Maisuradze, G.
(2007)).
In the early 1990s the Georgian nation was not formed as a
political union – there was no constitution that would present the
Georgian nation as a declared political community. But there was a
18
factual national communion that consisted of individuals belonging
to different ethnos and nationalities.
The Georgian national identity-related themes, ethnicity and
citizenry-related themes in the Georgian media of that period might
be discussed in the following references: a) ethnic
discourse/inequality on ethnic ground and b) citizen-state
discourse/equal rights despite ethnic belonging. None of them could
be judged as straight-linear. For example, ethnicity-affirming
reference included two sub-references: a) representation of a
Georgian, as a representative of the dominant nation, and his/her
superiority on his/her own national territory; and b)
discrimination of a Georgian in Georgia as a practice, experience
of the Soviet internationalism and its inertia as a problem. Such
as: ‘Georgia is a state, which consists of Georgians’(Komunisti, 8
November, 1990); ‘Only Georgian breed… should save the Georgian
land from destruction’(Sakartvelos Respublika, 16 December, 1990), and,
the second, ‘If before in Georgia there was discrimination of the
Georgian people, now interests of the Georgian population should be
protected prior to all, but by this we do not exclude care for the
rights of the national minorities’( Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January
1991); or: ‘Internationalist course has strengthened: incredible
19
expansion of non-Georgians in Georgia, draconian law against
Georgians’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 22 February 1991).
In many cases the media samples contained in themselves ‘we’
and ‘they’, 'the host' and 'the guest': ‘Georgia for them [for the
non-Georgian population – K.M.] became a home, it warmed them with
its sun, fed them with its bread and its springs’ (Sakartvelos
Respublika, 13 December 1990; the typical relationship between ‘the
host’ and ‘the guest’; ‘the host’ is a permanent donor for ‘the
guest’). The perspective of realization of the national unity as a
political principle was represented in the media on the background
of the whole set of pre-requisites and pre-agreements. The chain of
doubts and presumptions towards ethnically non-Georgians was read
in the sub-texts: whether they are full-fledged participants of the
new state of Georgia; whether they said equally and together with
Georgians, ‘We do not want to be part of the Russian Empire’; what
did they sacrifice, equal to Georgians, for the independence of the
Georgian state?
But nevertheless there were messages and comments with clear
content as follows: ‘Let’s become a modern nation-state, which is
not an ethnos but a unity of individuals who have abilities and
qualities to be citizens, i.e. carriers of developed legal
20
consciousness and ability’(7 Dghe, 6 December 1990); ‘There is no
oral or written order about discrimination of non-Georgians
(including Ossetians)! The slogan – Ossetians, go away from
Georgia! – is an invention of those people who cannot credit
themselves without such misanthropic actions (’7 Dghe, 19 January
1990). Noteworthy citizenry-affirming discourse was noticed in the
media sample of Mamuli: ‘Independent Georgia is created not by the
Georgian ethnos, but by the whole Georgian nation, entire
population of Georgia in the face of every ethnos and citizens. …
Homeland of the Abkhaz and the Ossetians are shaped not by the
borders drawn by Stalin, but comprises the whole republic from the
river Psou (west of Georgia - K.M.) to the river Alazani (east of
Georgia - K.M.), from the springs of Liakhvi (north of Georgia -
K.M.) to Chorokhi’(south of Georgia - K.M.). Threat for the
national unity, according to this media sample, was that Ossetians
and Abkhazians themselves had chosen the territories “drawn by
Stalin” as their homeland, and not the whole territory of Georgia,
that the future nation-state of Georgia called them for the new
state reintegration.
The Theoretical Argument
21
It’s my view that in the Georgian media of 1990-1991 the core
element of the media coverage and media representation of the
Georgian-Ossetian ethno-political conflict was terms (words, signs,
concepts, constructs) which replaced the term South Ossetian Autonomous
Soviet Socialist District. This replacement seemed likely to serve at least
four purposes. First, these terms were likely national identity-
affirming symbols, a stimulus requiring some response and actions
on the side of receivers. The second, it helped to mobilize public
support for the ‘just struggle against separatism’. Third, it
served as an example of the process of inter-replacement official
and unofficial histories. The forth, the amount of the words and
signs having replaced ‘South Ossetia’ was one of the crucial factor
of national identity-affirming discourse.
To be specific, these terms could be categorized as: a)
toponyms which had replaced the topos of ‘South Ossetia’, and b) terms
impressed in utilization of specific languages, images and valences
to represent the nature of ‘autonomy’ of ‘South Ossetia’. The category ‘a’
was suggested to include all the geographical and historical names
used in the media as a signifier of the land of ‘South Ossetia’.
The category ‘b’ was suggested to include the following:
22
emphasis on the legal dimensions and nature of the
autonomy;
affirmation of Georgia’s inseparability;
affirmation of oppressions of the rights of ethnic
Georgians in the District;
shifting of blame for the Georgian-Ossetian conflict onto
Russia.
All sets of the above-mentioned reasons provide guiding the
research question:
What is the extent and range of the terms that replaced in the Georgian printed
media the term ‘South Ossetia’ and how large is volume of valences that replaced in the
Georgian newspapers ’autonomous’ status of the District?
Method
The aim of this article is to examine national identity
language (in reference of signifying of the land of ‘South
Ossetia’) by the Georgian newspapers of the different ownership
structures. As it was mentioned above, according to the media
researches and polls of 1990-1992 Georgian media (sources: media
rating of TV program ‘Meotkhe’ (1990-1992), ‘Survey on the Freedom
of Press in Georgia. 1990-1995’ by ‘Open Society – Georgian
23
Foundation’), the characteristic of the printing media of that
period was that the readers considered them to be able to provide
more in-depth analysis than television news programs and seemed to
be more likely to reflect the patterns of the communication
strategies of the mediated sources of the messages.
The analysis of this paper includes all the editions of five
Georgian newspapers during the period: from October 1990 (28
October 1990, the day of the first multi-party democratic elections
in Georgia) through January 1992, when an armed rebellion against
the government of President Gamsakhurdia started and President of
Georgia was forcefully ousted from. All the stories dealt in some
way with the conflict in ‘South Ossetia’ were included in analysis.
Research method is cultivation analysis.
The quantitative analysis is based on content analysis of 1800
media samples from five Tbilisi-based, the most influential and
highly-circulated all over Georgia newspapers: Komunisti, an
official body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Georgia; Sakartvelos Respublika, an official body of the Supreme Council
of Georgia Republic, Mamuli, a bi-weekly of Rustaveli Society (one
of the structures of the National Liberation Movement of Georgia),
‘7 Dghe’, a printing body of the Independent Union of Journalists of
24
Georgia, and Droni, a private publication. The unit of analysis is:
any sign, word, image, metaphor, connotation, concept or construct
that had replaced term 'South Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist District'.
This is because of my interest in showing the particular aspects
of: a) the signification of the land of ‘South Ossetia’ with
purpose to examine its national identity-related meaning, and b)
the valence (i.e., directionality) of the media references of that
part of Georgia to examine its valence-carrier meaning. As it was
mentioned these units were categorized as: a) toponyms which had
replaced the toponym of ‘South Ossetia’, and b) terms impressed in
utilization of specific languages, images and valences to represent
the nature of ‘autonomy’ of ‘South Ossetia’.
Two persons were conducting the process of the content
analysis coding, with an overlap of 12 % of units. For the first
(a) category (coded as ‘1’) 1032 was the number of coding
decisions on which the coders agreed , 1135 referred to the total
number of the coding decisions made by the first and second coders
respectively. The coders agreeing yielded .91 reliability
coefficient which was determined to be 92 % greater than by chance.
For the second (b) category (coded as ‘2’) the coders agreed on 568
25
of 665 incoming codings, so yielding a 0.85 reliability
coefficient, which was defined to be 86% greater than by chance.
Upon completing process of coding the additional variable was
constructed. This variable is an amount of the unit of analysis,
regardless of whether it indicates name or valence, in one media
comment or statement. The variable was collapsed into two
categories: ‘1’= one sign/or valence presented in one comment; ‘2’=
two or more signs/valences presented in one comment. For example,
the following statement is a sample containing more than one unit
of analysis: ‘I am forced to prove, my homeland, that one beautiful
area of your northern slope, Samachablo, ancient Samachablo, is
inseparable part of Georgia;’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 7 January 1991; three
units: ‘Samachabo’ as a name-carrying term and, ‘ancient
Samachablo” as name- and evaluation-carrying term, ‘inseparable
part of Georgia’ as valence-carrying term). Or: ‘It can be said
clearly that our government made a rough mistake having responded
to an apparently non-constitutional act of Ossetian separatists of
Shida Kartli by abolishing the autonomy of so-called ‘South Ossetia’ that
should have been done in totally different political conditions’
(Mamuli, March 1991) and so on. The second variable were the
26
publications analyzed: ‘Kommunisti’, ‘Sakartvelos Respublika’, ‘Mamuli’, ‘7 Dghe’,
‘Droni’.
The structured interviews with 18 respondents (publishers,
editors-in-chief, editors, chiefs of departments, reporters) also
covered the basic area of the research, such as question of media
representation and signification of the territory of so-called
South Ossetia and valences and context connected with signifiers of
‘South Ossetia’. The structure of respondents was following: the
respondents were chosen with mixed principle in order to represent
all the hierarchical levels and competencies: editor-in-chief (2),
editor (1), deputy editor-in-chief/deputy editor (2), co-editor
(2), publisher/ member of the board of the publishing body (2),
head of department (3), reporter (6).
Statistics: percentages, contingency table analysis.
Results
Analysis is presented in three stages. At the first stage of
analysis each word, sign, image, or metaphor, indicating the
territory of former South Ossetian Autonomous District, whether the
specific indicator reflected name or status, or any other valence
27
of it, was coded separately. A total of 1800 samples were grouped
across the categories presented in the Table 1.
Table 1. The signifiers of the territory of former South
Ossetian Autonomous District (content-analysis)
Signifying of the territory of former
South Ossetian Autonomous District In percent P
Historically Georgian land/inseparable
part of Georgia 21%So-called South Ossetia 5%Illegal/artificial autonomy 2%Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli) 21%Samachablo 35%
Tskhinvali 2
%Tool in Russia’s hands
8%The place where Georgian’s rights are
oppressed
5%The victim of the ‘war of decrees’
1%
For examining the research question I suggest running
contingency table analysis, or cross-tabulation between these two
new variables, publications and intensity of national identity-
affirming discourse (one or more units in one comment).
Table 2. Presence of national identity-affirming name-carrying and
valence-carrying terms in each publication
28
# National
identity
signs and
valence
‘Komunisti’(%) ‘Sakartvelos
Respublika’(%
)
7 Dghe
(%)
‘Droni’ (%) ‘Mamuli’(%)
1 One 62 34 49 53 42
2 Two or more 38 56 51 47 58
X2 =63.70,
df=4, p<.05
100 (n=
126)
100
(n=940)
100
(n=28
1)
100
(n=262)
100
(n=191)
On the next stage of analysis in the empirical data (the
interviews with the publishers, editors and journalists) were
identified all the most typical, used and valid as externally so
internally (by the opinions of the respondents) references of the
land, territory, administratively called as ‘South Ossetia.’
Table 3. The signifiers of the territory of former South
Ossetian Autonomous District (interviews).
Signifying of the territory of former
South Ossetian Autonomous District In percentTemporary occupied 8.7%So-called South Ossetia 4,3%Ossetia 8,7%Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli) 17,4%
29
Samachablo 26,1%
Inseparable part of Georgia 21.8%
Illegal unit 4,3%
Tskhinvali 8,7%
Discussion
a. Name-carrying terms: History, Geography, Politics, Identity
As it’s shown from the analysis the most typical, used and
valid quantitatively sufficient name-carrying units are the
following ones: ‘Samachablo’, ‘Shida Kartli’ and ‘so-termed South
Ossetia’.
In the Georgian media of 1990-1991 total replacement of the
political-administrative unit ‘South Ossetia’ with traditional
‘Samachablo’ is noteworthy. ‘Samachablo’ is more historical and
cultural term than geographical one. The name of ‘Samachablo” is
associated with the name of the Georgian princes Machabeli, the
possessors (till early 1920s of the XX century) of the biggest part
of the land later called as ‘South Ossetia’. Despite the fact that
the Autonomous District of South Ossetia comprised bigger territory
than the lands of the Machabelis in Shida Kartli, ‘Samachablo’
was an example of replacement of the Soviet typos with traditional
Georgian typos, which in itself carried elements that have turned
30
into the symbols of nationality, existence as a nation: association
of Georgian Nobility (The Machabelis – noblemen from that area
repressed by the Soviet regime); historical-cultural heritage, and
due to these very circumstances the term ‘North Kartli’ several
times unsuccessfully used in media and speeches of politicians
could not establish itself. ‘Samachablo’ – this was an ideological-
propagandistic term.
For a comparison: in 1995-2007 the Georgian media preferred to
use the term ‘Tskhinvali region,’ ‘so-called South Ossetia,’ etc.
These terms emerged after the June 24 1992 Sochi Agreement on the
ceasefire in the conflict region. At that time the country was led
by the government, the name of which was connected with the ousting
of Zviad Gamsakhurdia from Georgia and whose political orienteer
had never been openly ‘ hot nationalistic’; in the settlement of
conflict, in the process of negotiations, European institutions are
enrolling; OSCE was represented in the negotiations format as ‘a
facilitator’ – all this was reflected on the nomination of the
former Autonomous District space of South Ossetia and comes to a
pure geographical term, without any history and politics. Following
8 August 2008 – occupation of Georgia by Russia wrapped as a peace
mission in the Tskhinvali region – in order to mark the Tskhinvali
31
region, i.e. former space of South Ossetia in the Georgian media,
media was trying to have represent this space in relevance with
ongoing historical-political events. There was talk not about the
nomination of this specific space by media, but by actualization of
the discourse topic by media: how to call the territory of the
former Autonomous District of South Ossetia? Sometimes such
striving results in creating ridiculous examples: ‘Occupied
territory of North Kartli,’ ‘State created on the Georgian
territory and through the genocide and ethnic cleansing of
Georgians. (Georgian Times, 4-11 September 2008).
As for the second most frequently used term in 1990-1991 -
‘Shida Kartli’(Inner Kartli) - it can be discussed as just a
geographical name of one of the regions of Georgia, like ‘Kvemo
Kartli’ (Lower Kartli), but the term itself can reflect dominance
of the Georgian identity with regards to that territorial unit:
Kartli is a name which derives from the name of Georgia (in
Georgian – Sa-katr-velo) Vitality of these terms, their ‘mediated
experience’ stood different periods of time.
The component ‘Ossetia’ was preserved in only term: ‘so-called
South Ossetia,’ in which ‘so-called’ directly indicates to the
32
conflict between the subject-matter and its nomination in the
Georgian public conscience.
As for term ‘Tskhinvali’, it was used as a name of
administrative center of South Ossetian Autonomous District, the
place of residency of the separatist government, the place, where
the political decisions were made.
b. Valence-carrying terms: Politics, Justice, Rights, Identity
The results of analysis show how the particular signs and
factors inside messages create the certain meanings outside the
messages potentially able to be generalized and be formed by
summarizing content-analyzed identity and valence-related
observations. I discuss concept of ‘something between’ inside and
outside factors of the messages. Each message dealt in some way
with representation of ‘South Ossetia’ at the same time represents
more abstractive references and constructs than particular aspects
of coverage.
Thus, the concrete content of the message ‘Samachablo along with
the whole Kartli is a backbone of entire Georgia’ (Sakartvelos
Respublika, 12 April 1991) could be generalized in reference ‘The land
of ‘South Ossetia’ is inseparable part of Georgia’. This discourse brings
33
recipients of such messages to the historical discourse: ‘Ossetian
extremists want to create a new Ossetian state on the territory of
Georgia and further joining that ‘republic’ with North Ossetia,
i.e. seizure of Georgia’s historical lands through Soviet tricks.
(’ Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January 1991).
Media representation of the ‘war of decrees’ between Tskhinvali and
Tbilisi represents several layers of this war: a) justification of
abolishing the district on the side of Tbilisi – ‘when the new government cancels
the Autonomous District of South Ossetia, it is protecting
interests of the Georgian people (’ Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January
1991); b) adequacy of actions of official Tbilisi – ‘As for the declaration of
September 20 1990 on sovereignty of the Ossetian SSR, this illegal
act was directed against territorial integrity of Georgia.
Elections of December 9 1990 were illegal, ...which violated rights
and interests of the Georgian people living on the territory of
this region’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 5 January 1991); c) inconsistent policy
of the Georgian government towards national minorities and autonomous formations:
‘Having come to power the block ‘Round Table - Free Georgia’ gave
up its initial demand and stated that autonomies will be preserved
on the territory of Georgia. However, it did not last long. On
December 11 Georgia’s Supreme Council adopted the law on abolishing
34
Autonomous District of South Ossetia. This step can be followed by
aggravation of conflict in South Ossetia, big clashes between
nations ‘ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 6 January, 1991; sender of the
message is a Russian journalist); and second: ‘It can be said
clearly that our government made a rough mistake having responded
to an apparently non-constitutional act of Ossetian separatists of
Shida Kartli by abolishing the autonomy of so-called ‘South
Ossetia’ that should have been done in totally different political
conditions’ (Mamuli, March 1991; source of the message here is a
Georgian politician in opposition towards Gamsakhurdia
Government); these media samples presented the autonomous district,
its territory, population as a deplorable result and victim of the ‘war of
decrees.’ As mentioned above, in the process of fighting for
independence and in the first years after gaining it ex-colonial
countries are characterized with the process of replacing official
histories with unofficial ones, search and creation of a ‘genuine’
history, even at the expense of myths and mystified stories.
‘Awakening of Ossetian self-determination’ could not avoid the
process; the myth about powerful state of Alans (ancient ancestors
of Ossetians – K.M.) was invented to overweigh the official
35
history: ‘The state of undefeatable tribe Alans cherishing freedom
all through the tempests of millennium’ (Mamuli, October 1990).
Messages compiled in this superlative style are opposed by ‘another
historical truth,’ in which South Ossetia as a political formation
is discussed in the discourse of historical illogic and absurd
almost: ‘Autonomous District of South Ossetia is an administrative-
cultural formation that was formed on the enemy-rich Georgian land
despite the will of the Georgian people. It rose upon heads of the
Georgian people as the Sword of Damocles in swaddles of Communist
dictatorship’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 10 January 1991).
What does the autonomy of South Ossetia represent in media
representation?
South Ossetia is illegal autonomy – ‘We abolished illegal autonomy of
so-called ‘South Ossetia (Sakartvelos Respublika, 1 January 1991); or:
’During the 25-century history of Georgian statehood there had
never been Ossetian state formations on the territory of Georgia’
(Sakartvelos Respublika, 6 February 1991); or: ‘This illegal territorial
formation was created by the Bolsheviks in 1922 on the historically
Georgian land ( Sakartvelos Respublika, 13 March 1991); or: ‘…Stinking
landmine of halted action, set on by Lenin, Stalin and Orjonikidze
( Sakartvelos Respublika, 26 March 1991).
36
South Ossetia is artificial autonomy – ‘Author argues (Grigol
Gvelesiani, a Georgian historian – K.M.) that on this small part of
the territory within Georgia Ossetians have no power and material
means necessary for the existence of an independent political unit;
(Sakartvelos Respublika, 19 January 1991); or: ‘Autonomy grown in
contemporary Ossetian conditions will dissolve and wither from
birth (Ibid); or: ‘Ossetians on our territory – this is a classic
example of a national minority, that is why they cannot have claims
of forming an autonomous district… We would have stood it
[district] today, we would not have abolished it in current
conditions, but categorical and cynical confrontation of the
district authorities to decisions of Georgia’s former as well as
current Supreme Council cannot be taken for granted, especially
that it had been happening with support of the center’ (7 Dghe,
December 1990).
South Ossetia is a tool in the hands of USSR/Russia. ‘Evaluation of the
January 7 decree of President Gorbachov as an intrusion into
Georgia’s domestic affairs, as an encouragement of extremist
forces’ ( Sakartvelos Respublika, 10 January 1991); or: ‘Conflicts that …
did not start on ethnic grounds… War between brothers in Samachablo
is provoked by the third power’ (Sakartvelos Respublika, 16 March 1991);
37
or: ‘Metropolis has found shackles to all nations fighting for
freedom-independence. The issue of Ossetians turned to be one for
Georgians’ ( Mamuli, January 1991); or:
‘They will make a decision not only to unite North Ossetia and so-
called South Ossetia, but to declare independence of united
Ossetia. Then president of this Ossetia will be elected. Afterwards
independent Ossetia, similar to Karabakh, will submit a request to
be included in ‘sodrujestvo’ (commonwealth)….’ (Mamuli, December
1991).
Conclusion
Upon summarizing results of both directions of analysis, we can posit that the
Georgian printed media by the usage of numerous names, having indicated the land of
‘South Ossetia’, carrying in itself Georgian national identity-affirming signs, clearly confirm
Georgian origins of that land. Based on this background, the communication strategy of
the Georgian printed media of early 1990s was directed to construction patriotic
motivation on side of Georgians and to destruction nationalist/patriotic attachment to that
land on the side of Ossetian separatists. This communication strategy included the
following: if South Ossetia, as an autonomous formation, is a result of the Bolshevik
regime, creation of which was not pre-determined by the dominant state of ethnic
Ossetians in the population structure of the district, and if the territory of the Autonomous
38
District of South Ossetia is not connected with the Ossetian ethnos, Ossetian nationality,
either through long historical experience, or cultural heritage, or history of statehood, and
if all toponyms on that land have Georgian origins, then there can be no Ossetian identity
link towards that land; then no action on their side can be determined by patriotic
motivation, love for specifically this part of land, as a special land - homeland.
This conclusion could be collapsed in three sub-conclusions.
The first concerns the importance of creation of the national
identity in the media by the particular semiotic materials, by
every meaningful sign. The Georgian newspapers in transitional
period from Soviet Georgia to the independent nation-state
implicitly echoed to this task of the time. They could provide
daily indexes, daily symbolic discourse of being a nation for their
readers.
The second conclusion is seeing the name and identity of the
land of so-termed South Ossetia in media-centric perspective
because of its representation in the dimension of spreading
knowledge by the media. Learning from the newspapers became typical
for that period. Notably, it was spreading of socially important
educational, analytical and not informational content,
comprehension and recall of which depend on sender factors and
audience factors in this concrete transitional period. The
39
knowledge spreading framework was also largely based on assumption
that the media captured ‘a given, finite and knowable reality’ of
the identity conflict between the Georgians and Ossetians, dealt
with the institutional issues and having derived from the conflict
between the ideal and political identities. But however this
knowledge couldn’t be considered as ‘the naturally occurring
product’ of the political environment and visible content of events
(Manheim, 1998). Following this, we can discuss the mediation
strategy of spreading knowledge by the media as story-cultivation
strategy referring to the ‘beat system’ for gathering issues and
topics for coverage. The knowledge spreading framework is largely
influenced by the ideological and socio-cultural factors in society
providing the value system for the media products.
The third conclusion is prevalent nature of Georgian-centric
dimension in media as a specific project of that transitional
period for reproduction and evolution national identity.
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