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This edited volume empirically examines key theoretical and practical issues relevant to the promotion of local ownership in contemporary international peacebuilding.
This book attempts to provide comprehensive understanding of the issue of local ownership in international peacebuilding. By providing an empirical anal-ysis of nine case studies, the volume aims to supplement contemporary aca-demic discussions on local ownership, which have thus far focused mainly on its normative or theoretical dimensions. The case studies included here examine the peace operations in a wide range of countries – Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cyprus, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka. The book seeks to address the weaknesses of conventional studies by empirical review of the achievements and limitations of previous attempts to promote local ownership; examination of the key concepts of local ownership; and analysis of structural and practical challenges. The volume concludes by presenting practical proposals for addressing the limitations of contemporary local ownership promotion. Through these means, the book aims to explore a key research question from both theoretical and empirical perspectives: how can international peacebuilding facilitate effective, active local community participation?
This volume will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, development studies, global governance, peace and conflict studies, security studies, and IR.
Sung Yong Lee is Lecturer at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand.
Alpaslan Özerdem is Co-Director of the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK. He is author or editor of eight books, including most recently Turkey and Human Security: Challenges of the 21st Century (Routledge, 2013).
Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding
This series publishes innovative research into the connections between insecurity and under-development in fragile states, and into situations of violence and inse-curity more generally. It adopts a multidisciplinary approach to the study of a variety of issues, including the changing nature of contemporary armed violence (conflict), efforts to foster the conditions that prevent the outbreak or recurrence of such violence (development), and strategies to promote peaceful relations on the communal, societal and international level (peacebuilding).
Series: Studies in Conflict, Development and PeacebuildingSeries Editors: Keith Krause, Thomas J. Biersteker and Riccardo Bocco Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
The Political Economy of PeacemakingAchim Wennmann
The Peace In BetweenPost-war violence and peacebuildingEdited by Mats Berdal and Astri Suhrke
Local and Global Dynamics of PeacebuildingPostconflict reconstruction in Sierra LeoneChristine Cubitt
Peacebuilding, Memory and ReconciliationBridging top-down and bottom-up approachesBruno Charbonneau and Geneviève Parent
Peacebuilding and Local OwnershipPost-conflict consensus-buildingTimothy Donais
Stabilization Operations, Security and DevelopmentStates of fragilityEdited by Robert Muggah
Controlling Small ArmsConsolidation, innovation and relevance in research and policyEdited by Peter Batchelor and Kai Michael Kenkel
An Ethnographic Approach to PeacebuildingUnderstanding local experiences in transitional statesGearoid Millar
Peacebuilding and Ex-CombatantsPolitical reintegration in LiberiaJohanna Söderström
Local Ownership in International PeacebuildingKey theoretical and practical issuesEdited by Sung Yong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem
Local Ownership in International PeacebuildingKey theoretical and practical issues
Edited by Sung Yong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem
First published 2015by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2015 selection and editorial material, Sung Yong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book has been requested.
ISBN: 978-1-138-78754-4 (hbk)ISBN: 978-1-315-76638-6 (ebk)
Typeset in Timesby diacriTech, Chennai
Contents
List of figure and tables viiAcknowledgements viiiList of contributors ix
1 Introduction 1ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM AND SUNg YONg LEE
PART I
Local ownership: development and challenges 17
2 Local ownership as a strategic guideline for peacebuilding 19HIDEAKI SHINODA
3 Operationalising local ownership 39TIMOTHY DONAIS
4 Complex challenges facing contemporary local ownership programmes: a case study of South Sudan 55ALEX MACKENZIE-SMITH
5 Hybrid local ownership in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: from discursive to material aspects of ownership 74STEFANIE KAPPLER AND NICOLAS LEMAY-HéBERT
PART II
Practice of local ownership promotion 93
6 The dilemmas of local ownership of upper-level and grassroots peace processes in Afghanistan 95CHUCK THIESSEN
vi Contents
7 Peacebuilding and local ownership: who owned the reconciliation process in post-conflict Nicaragua? 116MANUELA NILSSON
8 Nurturing local voice: the UNDP’s local empowerment programmes in Cambodia 135SUNg YONg LEE AND WOOKBEOM PARK
9 Ownership of international peacebuilding programmes by local governance institutions: case study of gulu district in Northern Uganda 156ADOLF NORBERT gERSTL
10 Challenges to promoting local ownership in post-war Sri Lanka 178RAHMATHULLAH MOHAMED
11 Conclusion 195SUNg YONg LEE AND ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM
Index 209
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THE DILEMMAS OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF UPPER-LEVEL AND GRASSROOTS PEACE PROCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN1
Chuck Thiessen
Introduction
This chapter investigates the dilemmas that result from the competition for ownership of peace,
reconciliation, and justice processes in Afghanistan. This ‘ownership’ competition has intensified
in the current post-2014 transition to local control, and has exposed an array of dilemmas that are
complex, thorny, and difficult to engage with. These dilemmas are experienced on a number of
levels, and have resulted in a tug-a-war for control between foreign and domestic actors, and
between elite-upper level and grassroots actors (Thiessen 2014b). These actors hold competing
conceptions of what sorts of peace and reconciliation methodologies are necessary to ensure a
sustainable and locally experienced peace across Afghanistan.
Two streams of peace and reconciliation activities are currently evident in the Afghan context.
First, elite upper-level peace processes in Afghanistan are attempting to engage with the Taliban,
and include the activities of the High Peace Council (HPC) and the reintegration work of the
Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP). As top-down processes, this stream
of activity is, first and foremost, interested in achieving some sort of agreement with the Taliban
and its constituent fighters to end the direct violence suffered by the Afghan population. Second,
grassroots bottom-up peace and reconciliation activities are focused on community conflict
resolution, peace education, and on addressing the predominant culture of violence, but are much
1 In Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues, Edited by Sung Yong Lee & Alpaslan Özerdem, London: Routledge.
© 2014 Chuck Thiessen
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more ad hoc and small scale than upper-level counterparts. Further, these bottom-up activities
have received minimal attention from the international community.
The discussion in this chapter can be situated in a maturing international debate that is exploring
the meaning and practice of local ownership of peacebuilding project work in the midst of post-
war international interventions (Chesterman 2007; Donais 2012; Narten 2008; Narten 2009;
Richmond 2011; Thiessen 2014b). This discussion also responds to prominent policy directives
such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005), the Accra Agenda for Action
(OECD 2008) and the Busan Partnership document (OECD 2011), which have responded to
dissatisfaction from both donors and recipients with aid delivery and performance by requiring
increased local ownership over aid design, implementation, and evaluation. However, despite
advances in our understanding of the dynamics of the international-domestic relationship and a
strong formulation of the goals of local ownership in these policy instruments, practitioners
continue to struggle with how to ensure local ownership of their project initiatives.
This chapter provides evidence of this struggle, and illustrates how difficult it is to move beyond
simple ‘buy-in’ of externally designed processes and ensure fuller ownership of activities where
war-torn countries and their populations decide for themselves what sort of peacebuilding
activities are prioritised and implemented. In fact, this chapter evidences that peacebuilding
practitioners in Afghanistan remain sceptical that fuller conceptions of local ownership are even
realisable given the power dynamics inherent to international-domestic relationships in
Afghanistan. As a result, programme implementation in Afghanistan that achieves literal local
ownership is rare (Goodhand and Sedra 2010; International Crisis Group 2007). Thus, it remains
unclear how international commitments to increased local ownership of peacebuilding in
Afghanistan can actually be achieved in practice.
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This struggle for local ownership certainly exists inside of upper-level and grassroots peace
processes in Afghanistan. One of the fundamental flaws to both streams of peace processes
which is preventing the realisation of sustainable peace in Afghanistan is a failure to engage
local populations and leaders in peace process design and implementation. However, addressing
this flaw is, perhaps, more difficult than initially meets the eye. Significant dilemmas must be
faced head-on before such ownership might be realised.
In order to engage with this ‘ownership’ competition and explore the resulting dilemmas, the
discussion that follows relies on a series of face-to-face interviews with sixty-three local and
international peacebuilding leaders working in Afghanistan. Interview participants worked for a
variety of organisations including the United Nations, the Afghan and foreign governments, local
and international NGOs, a broad range of civil society groups, international donors, and the
international military and police forces. The majority of interviews were conducted in two urban
centres, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, during 2011-2012. A majority of interviewees were Afghan.
As such, this chapter explores the dynamics and dilemmas of Afghan ownership by deferring to
the voice of on-the-ground international and local peacebuilders. The peacebuilders accessed
through this research carry a wealth of hard-earned knowledge regarding the difficult journey
towards local ownership of peace processes, and this chapter makes efforts to transmit this on-
the-ground knowledge to the reader.
The discussion in this chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores upper-level
peace and reconciliation processes and the research participants’ critique of their outcomes. As
such, this section is particularly interested in perceptions of the future role of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The second section turns its attention to grassroots peace and reconciliation work,
summarises what sorts of peace and reconciliation activities are being attempted, and describes
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the barriers that these efforts face. Finally, a discussion and conclusions section overviews and
summarises the broad dilemmas faced by peacebuilders in Afghanistan on their journey toward
increased local ownership of both upper-level and grassroots peace process activities.
Upper-level Peace Processes
Because of triumphalist post-invasion visions of pervasive change the Taliban were completely
excluded from the negotiation table during the 2001 Bonn Conference in Germany. As a
consequence, the beaten, but not spent, Taliban held no voice in how the transition government
and state were constructed leading up to the first democratic election in 2004 (Coady and
Solomon 2009). A resurrected, splintering, and more violent Taliban movement quickly
resurfaced and, by 2006, had succeeded in establishing an active insurgent resistance across
much of Afghanistan. During this time it became clear that the Taliban was not a monolithic foe
but had developed several faces – the notoriously violent Haqqani Network, operating out of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, the Quetta Shura under the direction of former
Taliban ‘head of state’ and spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, also operating out of
Pakistan, and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami political party, which is loosely affiliated
with the Taliban and considered a terrorist organisation by the U.S. government (Pickering
2011).
Virtually no political or diplomatic outreach occurred towards the Taliban in the first decade of
international intervention in Afghanistan. However, during 2009-10 the deepening crisis of
violence at the hand of the insurgency motivated a distinct change of rhetoric and practice within
the foreign intervening community in regards to the Taliban. Of primary importance were
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avenues created to facilitate discussion with the Taliban. For example, beginning in late 2007 the
UN leaders in Afghanistan began to emphasise ‘political reconciliation’ and dialogue and the UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) undertook a variety of tentative
confidence-building initiatives including meeting directly with Taliban representatives
(Harpviken 2013). Next, U.S. president Obama began to publically endorse “talking to the
Taliban” in 2009 (Harpviken 2013). However, only in June 2011 did Afghan president Hamid
Karzai publically reveal that the U.S. had been secretly negotiating with the Taliban for some
time. There have also been other feeble but largely unsuccessful attempts to include Taliban
leaders in public discussions, including the December 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.
As a result of these initiatives the Taliban temporarily opened an official office in Doha, Qatar,
from where attempts at dialogue could be initiated. However, the office was quickly closed under
protest from President Karzai over the flag and sign on the new Taliban office that identified it as
the embassy of the Taliban government-in-exile.
The attempted inclusion of the Taliban represents a dramatic change of face for the international
community who, by following U.S. leadership, had previously banned any contact between
international peacebuilding organisations and the Taliban as part of its War on Terror. However,
a new openness to dialogue and contact with the Taliban has strengthened ongoing upper-level
peace processes in Afghanistan under the auspices of the HPC. The HPC was commissioned by
tribal religious and political leaders at the June 2010 national ‘Peace Jirga’ held in Kabul. This
Peace Jirga was comprised of Afghan leaders and elders who were tasked with developing a
framework and strategy for talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The HPC was
provided with substantial international funding to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan
government and international community. To this end, the HPC has sent delegations to the
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Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba to work for the release of Taliban detainees, and has
called on the international community to remove some Taliban leadership from terrorist
blacklists.
For its part, the APRP is a major component to the overarching ‘peace’ strategy of the Afghan
government and the international community that lays out a framework for reintegrating former
Taliban fighters into local communities, and develops strategies to lure Taliban fighters away
from the militancy with employment opportunities and financial incentives. The APRP, too,
develops strategies for political discussions with Taliban leadership. As a government-led
process, the APRP is intended to continue on with the work of the UN-led Afghanistan’s New
Beginnings Programme (ANBP) established in 2003 to undertake disbandment, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR) processes for the post-2001 Afghan militias. Its mandate has since
evolved into efforts aimed at the ‘Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups’ (DIAG), weapons
destruction, and continuing DDR activities.
The Challenges to Local Ownership of Upper-Level Peace Processes
Peacebuilding leaders in this research project were questioned about the challenges and barriers
faced by efforts aimed at building local ownership of top-down peace work in Afghanistan. To
clarify, local ownership of upper-level peace processes refers to the apparent ability of the
Afghan national government, Afghan civil society, and local populations across Afghanistan to
initiate, direct, and implement peace process activities in the face of significant external power
and influence, be it from the international peacebuilding community or regional nations such as
Pakistan. To summarise, the participants in this study were quite sceptical of any sort of
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meaningful local ownership by the Afghan national government of current efforts at achieving
‘upper-level’ peace through the initiatives and activities described in the previous section. The
critiques raised by participants emerged from a variety of peacebuilding sectors and at all levels,
and are as follows.
Who are the Taliban?
Local ownership of a peace process requires a clear understanding of who the process is
engaging with. However, the Afghan people are increasingly finding it difficult to define who the
Taliban are. The Taliban movement is fractured due to international and government repression,
and has splintered into several groups on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, as well
as into several affiliated, but non-Taliban, anti-government groups. Major Pakistan-based
Taliban groups such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqanni Network are more ideologically based,
randomly destructive, responsible for the majority of destructive suicide bombings, and beyond
the control of the Afghan people. Afghanistan-based groups were perceived as responding more
to grievances against the Afghan government, having local community support, and having
distinct political objectives in Afghanistan.
The fragmentation of the Taliban poses a significant challenge for the Afghan government and
the international community. Of primary concern is reaching out to the Taliban groups that are
situated inside Pakistani territory. The APRP is largely unable to reach Taliban fighters that are
situated in Pakistan. This lack of reach invites the involvement of other actors such as the
Pakistani Intelligence Services (ISI), which is generally considered by Afghans to be a
destructive influence in Afghan affairs. However, the HPC has claimed that it has been accessing
Taliban leaders inside of Pakistan.
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The splintering of the Taliban movement makes it exceedingly difficult for the Afghan national
government to embrace ownership over peace process work. Dialogue with one Taliban group
may be resisted by counterparts, and an absence of a clear chain of command makes it difficult to
communicate with the entire movement. Further, the dispersion of the Taliban across
Afghanistan-Pakistan border places components of the Taliban under the direct influence of
Pakistani authorities, who are often not supportive of any sort of ownership by the Afghan
government.
Are the Taliban ‘Upset Brothers’ or ‘Enemies’?
Before local ownership of upper-level peace processes is achieved, there needs to be some sort of
broader consensus on how the Taliban are characterised. While the international community has
carefully labelled the post-2001 reincarnation of the Taliban as clear enemies and terrorists,
President Karzai has at times labelled them with the term ‘upset brothers’. This designation is
politically meaningful, and perhaps recognises that the Taliban have legitimate political
aspirations behind their violent front. This message inherently works against the broad exclusion
of the Taliban from reconciliation initiatives and dialogue. Participants in this research also
debated potential political roles for the Taliban during the current transition to local control.
While some participants provided strong justifications for Taliban involvement in government
structures, others were quite cautious of considering any political role for the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
One Afghan participant involved in the upper-level peace process made the case that the Taliban
should be allowed entry into Afghan political structures and processes and be given official
status as a party. He compared the Taliban to other religion-based parties in other countries, and
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argued that the Taliban should be recognised and treated as a legitimate political party. As such,
he contended that the Taliban were fundamentally interested in actively participating in “the
peace and stability in this country”.i He believed that any stability in Afghanistan relied on their
political inclusion, and that civil war could only be averted through the provision of power and
opportunity for them in government structures. His arguments resonated with the words of a
couple of other Afghan participants who, when viewing post-Soviet Afghan history, believed
that the Taliban had provided a credible respite from the chaos and destruction of the
Mujahideen wars in the early 1990s that destroyed so much of Kabul. He was willing to overlook
the Taliban’s previous abuses in the name of stability.
Conversely, a strong majority of research participants who addressed this topic were very
sceptical of and quite opposed to any significant Taliban involvement in Afghanistan’s
government. They insisted that inviting the Taliban into power was venturing down a destructive
path for several reasons. An Afghan civil society leader believed that “you cannot change their
mentality,” and that inclusion would produce difficulty for Afghans. Another Afghan NGO
official feared that the Taliban would establish their political control following the withdrawal of
U.S. troops in 2014, which would likely make it impossible for him to continue his advocacy
work. He believed his work would prove virtually impossible in a non-democratic state. He,
along with another participant, believed that the Taliban’s brutal suicide bombings against the
Afghan people had decimated any trust in their potential leadership. Another concern was the
conservative and restrictive views of women held by the Taliban. An Afghan woman participant
believed that Afghan women “doubt very much that [the Taliban] have changed much” and, thus,
was opposed to HPC efforts at building bridges with the Taliban.ii
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Thus, some participants voiced alternative strategies in dealing with the Taliban resistance and
its political demands. A couple of Afghan participants insisted that the Afghan government and
the international community need to engage the insurgency and Taliban with an iron fist, and
show no weakness by offering concessions and political opportunity. One Afghan academic
stated strongly that he supported the strong presence of international military forces, and hoped
that the Taliban would be “crushed”. For him, integration and reconciliation were unnecessary
activities and stated, “I don't think that [the Taliban] understand this, I don't think that they are
for it, I don't think that they can be deceived and appeased with these kind of approaches…they
are your enemy, they don't accept the independent state of Afghanistan, they want to destabilise
it, they are savage, they are murderers”.iii He, along with another academic believed that any
resistance by insurgents must be quashed in order to not lose sight of the desired goal of a
violence-free developed Afghanistan.
From the above discussion it is immediately evident that Afghans have deeply divided views of
the political inclusion of Taliban ‘upset brothers’. This disagreement is evident within the
government and in its broader constituency. The divergence of opinion reduces the odds of
mounting a legitimate effort to seize Afghan government ownership over peace process
activities. For example, this research reveals that a significant number of peacebuilding leaders
are very wary of any dealings with the Taliban ‘enemy’ whatsoever.
Who is given a voice in peace process design?
Peacebuilding leaders in Afghanistan accused both the HPC and the APRP of lacking any
meaningful local ownership for significant sectors of society. In regards to ownership of the
activities of the HPC, research participants believed that the voice of civil society was being
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excluded from the HPC. While there are HPC members representing civil society and women’s
groups, these members are not perceived as having the power or ability to highlight and address
grassroots concerns. Some participants believed that the HPC was dominated by a small core
group of ex-Warlords who broadly excluded civil society members. Another Afghan NGO
official believed that civil society representatives on the HPC were handpicked to ensure their
limited involvement. Thus, there was a distinct concern amongst participants that any agreements
made by the HPC with the Taliban would counter the wishes and best interests of the wider
grassroots population in Afghanistan. Thus, Afghan ownership of the HPC appears to be
restricted in key dimensions, which will certainly limit the realisation of an ‘everyday’ peace for
a majority of the Afghan population.
Critiques of the APRP in terms of Afghan ownership followed a different path. Several research
participants believed that the Afghan government and local populations have been excluded from
design processes for the APRP as a consequence of the dominant stance of the international
community in the security sector. A foreign embassy participant described how foreign embassy
personnel had largely designed the APRP, and then packaged it for the Afghan public as an
Afghan-designed programme. He stated, “That program is a silly one I have to say, if I'm being
completely frank here, yes, it is not Afghan, it's a façade of Afghan ownership”.iv He also
described how granting blanket amnesty for Taliban fighters, many of whom may have
committed murder and other atrocities against the Afghan people, was avoiding any sense of
ownership (and justice) for the grassroots Afghan population. He asserted, “There are millions of
people here who have suffered from 30 years [of war]. They should be writing that policy, not
some young guy [from a foreign embassy].” This sort of foreign control over policy design is
disconcerting when taken alongside other participants’ comments regarding the ineffective
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“textbook” foreign strategies that fail to “address the real situation” and reveals a lack of
“deeper understanding” (Afghan government participant).v These sorts of responses reveal that
the international community, while recognising the necessity of local perceptions of Afghan
ownership, continues to insist upon a working relationship with the Afghan government that
ensures foreign control over local processes.
Is the High Peace Council designed to fail?
The journey towards local ownership of peace processes in Afghanistan involves extensive
interaction between competing interested parties, and will require that these parties act in good
faith with the ultimate goal of meaningful and sustainable peace for the Afghan people. This
does not appear to be the case with public perceptions of the work of the HPC. For example, it is
quite alarming to note that several respondents believed that the HPC was subject to
premeditated failure for a couple of reasons. Participants doubted that a HPC dominated by
‘former’ warlords would be able to garner the trust of Taliban counterparts in order to achieve
meaningful advances in peace. In some cases these Warlords were the direct enemies of the
Taliban during their conquest of Afghanistan during the mid-1990s. For example, the former
head of the HPC, Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated by the Taliban in September 2011) was the
representative of the Northern Alliance and interim president of Afghanistan when the Taliban
conquered Kabul in 1996. Forces under his control killed many Taliban, and are purported to
have committed many atrocities against the Taliban and their supporters.
Other participants believed that the self-interests of HPC members would block any sort of
meaningful success. An Afghan NGO official believed that current HPC members could never
muster the confidence and trust required for any peace deal or power-sharing agreement given
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the dominance of self-interested Warlords who have positioned themselves throughout all levels
of Afghan government. Instead, he believed that HPC members were simply positioning
themselves to serve their own interests. Another participant believed that President Karzai was
closely controlling peace negotiations, and is prepared to trump any HPC decision in order to
ensure that his interests, tribal affiliations and concerns are cared for. An Afghan government
official believed that underneath the conciliatory public ‘talk’ of members lurked deep divisions
that would ultimately lead to back room conspiring, sabotage, and ultimately peace process
failure.
Several of the participants believed that upper-level peace processes were particularly
susceptible to corruption and, ironically, could serve as a deterrent to sustainable peace. As was
discussed earlier, identifying the Taliban is difficult and ambiguous, which makes it very
difficult (and probably impossible) to deal directly with representatives of the overall Taliban
movement. Three participants used the same story as evidence to illustrate this point. They
shared that an ordinary non-insurgent shopkeeper from Quetta, Pakistan had recently met with
representatives from the international military and had convinced them that he was a Taliban
leader with influence. He was believed by the international representatives, given a significant
amount of money, and sent home, from where he revealed that he was just a shopkeeper who had
swindled the international community. Other stories were shared of insurgent fighters who would
submit their weapons before winter, receive their benefits, only to re-join the insurgency for the
spring fighting ‘season’.
Participants also questioned the wisdom of releasing detainees accused of insurgency crimes
from prison in response to HPC requests, and granting amnesty to insurgents in ‘reintegration’
programming. Several issues were raised. An Afghan human rights official believed that offering
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amnesty destroyed the legitimacy of wider attempts at peacebuilding in the eyes of local
Afghans. He believed that basic human rights principles were violated in these processes.
Another participant believed these types of activities were void of many key conflict resolution
activities, and were attempting to buy off fighters without addressing many of the key grievances
that will have driven them to the insurgency in the first place. Finally, others believed that these
types of activities are difficult to isolate from personal and political interests, difficult to monitor,
and mostly lack any sort of transparency.
Collectively, the four challenges as described by participants and outlined above reduce the odds
that upper level Afghan peace processes can be comprehensively owned by diverse sectors of
Afghan society including the grassroots level and civil society. However, the transformation of
war-torn Afghan society requires a significantly broader process than offered by high level
official negotiations as practiced by the HPC and APRP (Schirch 2011). A comprehensive,
locally owned, and sustainable peace process must also incorporate a range of peace activities at
the grassroots/civil society level. This next section will delve into the practice and dilemmas of
local ownership of peace work at this more local level.
Grassroots Peace and Reconciliation Work
The participants revealed the vital role of grassroots peace work and civil society efforts at
encouraging reconciliation across Afghanistan. When compared to the interview narratives that
were summarised in the preceding ‘upper-level’ section, the participants’ words as reported
under this ‘grassroots’ section were much more positive, contained greater hope, and
significantly less criticism. This section will first survey participants’ perceptions of grassroots
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and civil society peacebuilding needs, the opportunities provided to civil society peace and
reconciliation initiatives that respond to these needs, and the barriers currently blocking civil
society peace process success. Then, this section will overview two broad dilemmas faced by
grassroots peace and reconciliation initiatives which centre on competing conceptions of peace
between the upper and lower levels of society, and between the international community and
Afghans.
Decades of war, external interference, and political turmoil in Afghanistan have resulted in an
intense need for thoughtful civil society peace and reconciliation work in Afghanistan. When
asked to justify grassroots peace work in Afghan communities, research participants identified
two primary factors that must be addressed in peace programming - a prevalent culture of
violence and lingering ethnic division in society. The participants argued that a culture of
violence had been nurtured in Afghanistan as a result of both its history of war and the
continuing insurgency. The highly visible and commonplace acts of violence and destruction in
virtually every Afghan community have redirected cultural development down violent paths, and
have eroded traditional social processes that resolve local conflict in (mostly) non-violent ways.
One Afghan NGO director remarked that “killing does not have that much meaning” in
Afghanistanvi, and that the prevalence of soldiers, weapons, suicide bombings and threats, and
military activity had numbed and blunted Afghan perceptions to the point where the current
militarisation of society seemed almost normal. In addition, the active insurgency and anti-
insurgency warfare has penetrated every corner of Afghanistan. Remote mountain villages
experience the threat of insurgent intimidation and unexpected night helicopter searches and
raids. City dwellers in Kabul constantly fear the threat of suicide bombings and attacks, and live
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under the watchful eye of high power cameras aboard dirigible airships that float above the city
24/7 and scour the city below for any perceived threat to its security.
The participants perceived that the Afghan government was struggling to address these violent
threats. And worse, in some cases the government itself was perceived as an abusive perpetrator
of people’s suffering on par with, or worse than, insurgent groups. Many Afghans believe that
they have nowhere to turn for reprieve, support, and protection. This sense of insecurity has
sometimes necessitated vigilantism and other means of informal but violent social protection. An
Afghan government official described how communal emotional health has deteriorated. He
believed that people are increasingly jumpy, insecure, irritable, and are making inappropriate and
socially destructive assumptions.
Inside of this violent milieu, ethnicity has developed into a key fault line defining violence and
insurgency warfare in Afghanistan. Stemming from traditional ethnic separation in Afghan
communities that turned increasingly violent through fighting between ethnically based militias
in the early 1990s, the potential escalation of ethnic conflict was viewed by participants as a
serious threat to sustainable peace and Afghan ownership of peacebuilding. An Afghan
government official argued that the extensive civil warring during the 1990s had remained
unresolved, and that ethnic identities developed during the civil wars continue to hinder political
progress, motivate acts of vengeance, and could quickly result in a resumption of civil war. Other
participants gave examples of how the ethnic issue is continuing to hinder peacebuilding
progress. Pashtun/non-Pashtun conflict and separation runs deep in many communities, and has
served to bolster the insurgency problem. For example, a foreign UN official noted that
grievances based on ethnic violence are a primary driver in Taliban recruitment amongst
Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan. On the political front, ethnic self-interests, jockeying for
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position, and power plays have ensured the dominance of ethnic-based political parties, have
stifled the work of the Afghan Parliament, and prevented any cohesion at the upper levels
amongst cabinet ministers and the country’s vice presidents.
To address this prevalent culture of violence, militarisation of society, and continuing ethnic
division, participants described a diverse, ad hoc, but emergent civil society programme of peace
activities underway throughout Afghanistan. They described activities in four key areas. First,
the participants believed that development activities and the provision of jobs to unemployed
Afghans would reduce the risk of recruitment into the insurgency. The participants sympathised
with poverty-inflicted Afghans who struggled to provide the means for their family’s survival.
Many international donors including DFID, USAID and the World Bank have recognised (at
least rhetorically) that their programming must respond to the ongoing unemployment crisis in
Afghanistanvii since unemployment, poverty and inequality are proposed as primary reasons for
the radicalisation of young men in Afghanistan and a motivating factor for joining the Taliban
insurgency (Ladbury 2009).
Second, participants argued that the provision of education had a conflict-dampening effect on
local conflict in Afghan communities. Numerous participants described how educating youth can
potentially alter the destructive trajectory of the prevalent culture of violence. The provision of
educational opportunity can nurture an ethnically tolerant climate, can ‘de-segregate’ the minds
of the population (Fanon 1968), cultivate a more inclusive population, and even embolden the
population to advocate for their rights (Thiessen 2008). The participants described a piecemeal
ad-hoc programme of peace education activities including some curriculum materials, films,
magazines, and books. However, a senior Afghan government official noted a lack of any
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national peace programme in schools, despite the fact that initial evaluations of small-scale peace
programmes in schools found transformed thinking and action in student participants.
Third, several participants believed that local community empowerment is both central to
peacebuilding success and to Afghan ownership of peace processes. Undergirding community
empowerment is community building and community organisation. Numerous participants talked
about the inherently decentralised nature of traditional Afghan governance and the resulting
weight and authority given to traditional community leadership. While perhaps seen as a barrier
to current peacebuilding efforts focused on strengthening central government structures, the
inherent propensity for organisation at the local level can be leveraged towards grassroots
peacebuilding progress. There are some prominent examples. The UN has shown itself
increasingly willing to directly support local justice structures such as community shuras and
jirgas, and the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National Solidarity
Programme has utilised vast networks of Community Development Councils in Afghan
communities to prioritise and implement development project work.
Fourth, work supporting communal conflict resolution and social justice processes is necessary
to address grievances that are firing violent conflict at the community level and driving
recruitment efforts by the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Grievances stemming from war-
induced communal violence and injustice linger on in the minds of many Afghans and, in many
cases, entire tribes, clans, villages, ethnic sub-sections of villages or families remain in bitter
conflict with competing groups for long periods of time. Disputes inside of the local community
include a range of issues such as land rights, returnee reintegration issues, and water rights. A
strong majority of these grievances or disputes are dealt with informally, either within the
‘private’ sphere of the Afghan extended family, or through ‘public’ informal structures such as
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community jirgas or shuras (Wardak 2004). Some peacebuilding initiatives have focused on and
supported these informal methodologies and structures (Waldman 2008). For example, three
Afghan NGOs, Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), The Liaison Office (TLO), and the
Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) have created and supported hundreds of ‘peace’
shuras, which are local gatherings of community elders who ensure forms of ‘restorative justice’
are practiced. Although predominantly populated by men, these three NGOs have also supported
the formation of female ‘peace’ shuras. However, the interview narratives made it clear that
there appear to be very few communal conflict resolution activities that are sponsored by the
international community.
The path travelled by grassroots peacebuilders is certainly difficult in the context of Afghanistan.
They face many significant challenges and barriers. In addition to incessant insecurity, grassroots
peace work faces a critical shortage of both resources and support from within the broader
international community and from upper-level Afghan actors. Resource shortages for grassroots
peace work are evident in terms of human and funding resources. Given that training peace
workers is not quickly accomplished, the shortage of peace workers needs to be addressed
quickly. Grassroots peacebuilders also struggle to secure adequate funding, even for small-scale
projects. Some participants commented on why funding and general support for grassroots peace
work was hard to come by. Longer-term and ambiguous peace work is side-lined in favour of
more visible, tangible, and short-term project work such as infrastructure development. Many
large donors such as USAID have favoured this approach and value clear tangible outputs over
intangible outcomes that are harder to perceive. Further, the practice and methodology of
community peacebuilding remains foreign to many people. Peace work is mostly defined as
attached to upper-level processes such as peace negotiations and accords between warring
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factions. Finally, grassroots peace work in Afghanistan remains largely unstudied, indicating that
it is unproven and largely experimental.
However, given these challenges, several foreign participants who had worked in various war-
torn and underdeveloped contexts around the globe commented that the Afghan people and their
civil society leaders were particularly eager and keen to achieve ownership over peace initiatives.
They did not perceive the intense dependency and unwillingness on the part of civil society
leaders to take the necessary steps towards true ownership as experienced in other contexts.
The Dilemmas of Ownership of Grassroots Peace and Reconciliation Work
In addition to the difficult barriers faced by peace and reconciliation initiatives are some deep
dilemmas that must be grappled with before local leaders and populations can realise any sense
of ownership. Participants in this research study revealed two major dilemmas. First, must
peacebuilders insist upon justice alongside peace in their work? Second, what are the appropriate
and efficacious roles for both informal and formal peace and justice processes?
Does peace require justice?
When trying to end decades of violent conflict in Afghanistan and provide a peaceful stable
society for Afghans to grow and develop in, should peacebuilders be prioritizing peace or
justice? One side of the argument favours peace at all costs. Proponents of this view believe that
the provision of justice to violent perpetrators is a secondary concern, and should only be
pursued if the provision of justice does not reduce the likelihood of ‘peace’. Upper-level peace
processes that grant immunity to former insurgent fighters have largely adopted this approach.
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The primary goal is stability and an end to violent hostilities. Some participants agreed with this
stance, and shared that they longed for simply a ‘negative peace’ (an absence of violent conflict
and fighting), even if structural and cultural violence and injustice continues. They focused on
security, and insisted that the Afghan people are starving for the opportunity to move forward
with their lives unafraid of fighting, bomb attacks, or war. A fuller ‘positive’ peace can wait in
their opinion.
Conversely, while upper-level research participants generally did not engage with this dilemma,
civil society participants in this study were generally quite concerned with sidelining justice in
order to increase the odds of achieving peace. They insisted that impunity must be resisted, and
any national peace should be should emerge from the local level where the concerns of victims
are considered. In this way they believed that sustainable peace in Afghanistan should be
‘positive’ and just in nature. As an example, an Afghan civil society representative questioned
whether the 2011 Taliban attacker on a Jalalabad bank who executed, in cold blood, dozens of
unarmed people, could ever be provided amnesty for his heinous crimes.viii The legitimacy of the
entire peacebuilding mission rests on the willingness to bring perpetrators like this murderer to
justice, not simply in granting amnesty and in reintegrating the perpetrator back into the
community. The provision of justice ensures that the Afghan population can avoid resorting to
violent conflict resolution strategies such as revenge and vigilantism, and encourages the
entrenchment of a culture of peace and a resistance to any local insurgency. As such, transitional
justice should ensure that those people who have destroyed the lives of many are held
accountable. In contrast, the majority of Afghans see Warlords and other violent perpetrators
becoming exceedingly wealthy and being rewarded with power.
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It thus becomes obvious that this ‘ownership’ dissonance revolves around the upper-level-
grassroots axis, with the grassroots level very much concerned with the provision of justice on
the path to peace. The stakes are high for both sides. If peace is to be owned by Afghans, what
sort of future would this lead too? Should ownership revolve around traditional ways that side-
line the poor and women in some cases? Should the pursuit of peace be inclusive and inviting of
former oppressors and violent groups such as the Taliban? Research participants concluded that
the grassroots are very interested in justice for perpetrators. Thus, any grassroots ownership of
peace processes would ensure a harsher stance toward insurgents in any new political structures,
and ensure that appropriate retribution occurs.
Conversely, upper-level leaders are interested in maintaining their hold on power and wealth and
staying out of jail. If impunity cannot be assured, they could lose everything on account of their
violent past. There are likely very few top leaders in Afghanistan who would be immune from
prosecution for war crimes. Reduced immunity for the political elite would certainly affect the
peace process in Afghanistan. Upper-level perpetrators feel they cannot allow a culture of
impunity to disintegrate in their dealings with the Taliban for fear that they, too, will one-day
face justice if the grassroots ever does achieve greater ownership over peacebuilding efforts in
Afghanistan.
However, the ownership story becomes even more complex with the presence of the
international community. The home populations of intervening Western nations are increasingly
resisting the rapidly mounting peacebuilding costs in the face of worldwide economic struggle.
This resistance is forcing many intervening nations to hasten their exit from peacebuilding
responsibilities. They are, thus, desperate to define ‘Afghan peace’ according to their self-
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interests, which has required them to settle for a ‘negative peace’ and ignore local demands for
justice for offenders.
Informal vs. formal paths towards justice and conflict resolution
Peacebuilding actors interested in securing justice in Afghanistan have realised that informal
justice structures and processes continue to play a prominent role in conflict resolution inside of
Afghan communities (Thiessen 2014a). Peacebuilders have traditionally conceived of their
justice reform work as traveling down two possible paths, one focusing on the creation or
rebuilding of formal justice structures, and the other focusing on strengthening informal justice
and conflict resolution structures. Choosing between these divergent paths is creating difficult
dilemmas for many peacebuilding actors. Only recently have leading peacebuilding
organisations such as the UN begun to seriously engage with these dilemmas in Afghanistan.
At the heart of the formal-informal debate are dissonant cultural practices and priorities between
international peacebuilders and their local grassroots counterparts. A foreign UN official argued
that informal justice systems are primarily focused on communal, as opposed to individual,
concerns. He believed that informal systems look “at the integrity of the community, the integrity
of the relationships”.ix In contrast, Western conceptions of individual human rights do not
necessarily mesh with communal conceptions as found in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas.2
The development of a formal justice system is a difficult and complex task in Afghanistan. Many
observers feel the process has achieved little in the last ten years. The legal system is
underdeveloped in both its inherent capacity and human resources. The Afghan people are
finding it extremely difficult to gain entry into the system, and find that it is unpredictable and
2 See Merry (2006) for an in depth discussion of this theme.
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does not instil confidence in clients. Worse, formal justice systems are seen as corrupt, failing to
provide adequate ‘justice’, catering to the rich because of the prohibitive costs involved, and
unable to provide timely services. In response, one Afghan human rights worker stated, “formal
injustice is promoting informal justice”.x
And so, informal systems of justice and conflict resolution are gaining recognition, legitimacy,
and support from peacebuilding actors in Afghanistan (Coburn and Dempsey 2010). Because
these systems are embedded in traditional Afghan culture, they can be quickly developed to
effectively supply justice and conflict resolution services across Afghanistan’s diverse regions.
However, these cultural systems have faced severe disapproval from Western critics, who insist
that they will inherently fail to ensure fundamental human rights, and will be unable to provide
adequate services to women and other marginalised groups. However, on the other side of the
coin, a foreign UN official argued that UN leaders such as Kofi Annan have endorsed
alternative/traditional dispute resolution and mediation systems. He believed it would be
“culturally presumptuous” to eradicate traditional systems in favour of formal counterparts. He
stated, “Justice derives from the consent of the people, and if they feel that the traditional
systems were representing their communal values, who are we as Westerners to say otherwise”.xi
He argued that the choices of local people must take precedence over Western desires. Enabling
local groups to make these sort of decisions is certainly democratic in nature, albeit in a
communal as opposed to individualistic sense.
So how is the international community dealing with this dilemma? As mentioned earlier,
informal systems are increasingly being validated and recognised by peacebuilding actors in
Afghanistan. For example, the Dutch and French Embassies in Kabul have supported justice
work across Afghanistan that links formal and informal justice institutions, ensuring local
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populations of access to justice through a more homogenized system, which will hopefully align
more closely with national and international legal frameworks (Netherlands Embassy Kabul
2011; Yang 2013).
However, it appears that the Afghan government is struggling to integrate informal and formal
justice systems. One contentious result is the attempt by the Afghan government to regulate the
provision of informal justice in rural Afghan communities. Traditional authorities have viewed
any such regulation as coercive, and as attempting to formalise informal processes. The research
participants believed that formal and informal systems could not be “married”, but should coexist
and enjoy helpful linkages, perhaps with clearly defined mandates. However, in all this, it is
widely understood within the international community that the overall justice reform movement
in Afghanistan needs to be directed down ‘formal’ paths. Thus, in their mind the informal system
serves a short-term purpose.
When incorporating and supporting informal systems, peacebuilding actors are finding it
necessary to ensure adherence to international human rights norms, non-violent conflict
resolution methodologies, and the inclusion of women and other marginalised groups. Thus, the
UN and international NGOs have prioritised the training of local shuras, jirgas, and other
traditional or religious leaders in methodologies based on revised contextual norms that are
shaped by international standards. The provision of outside funding is used as a carrot to shift
traditional thinking and practice in this regard. It is yet to be determined how sustainable these
changes will be.
This informal-formal dilemma has significant ownership implications, and puts government
elites in direct competition with grassroots and traditional leadership. A possible solution (at
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least for this generation) might lie in the development of both routes, i.e. a parallel and
complementary system that addresses justice and conflict resolution needs. Parallel justice
systems are certainly challenging for Western peacebuilding actors to fathom. It is difficult for
them to envision Afghanistan as effectively meshing with the world community as an active
member if it does not noticeably strengthen its formal institutions. The global community has
propped up formal systems at the expense of informal (and often indigenous) justice structures
across the developed world. Thus, the development of informal systems poses a dilemma for
Western interveners as they are, in a sense, admitting defeat in their attempts to mesh
Afghanistan into the wider global system, and are allowing the reversion to traditional and tribal
structures at the expense of democratic reform. Informal structures will likely defy control in
areas deemed to be a threat to the overall global system such as anti-Western security threats.
Discussion - Local Ownership of Peace Work in Afghanistan
This chapter has summarised the collective voice of peacebuilders working on the ground in
Afghanistan regarding the ownership of upper- and grassroots level peace processes in
Afghanistan. Two tracks of peace process activity were explored; one top-down track is
interested in reaching an upper-level agreement with the insurgency, and the other bottom-up
track is aimed at addressing conflict and grievances at the local community level.
What emerges from the discussion in this chapter is a set of dilemmas that revolve around the
ownership of these upper-top-down and grassroots bottom-up tracks of peace work. This section
will briefly survey and summarise these dilemmas. First, peacebuilding leaders and local
populations are wrestling with competing conceptions of the necessity of justice in the search for
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positive peace. In other words, granting ownership to particular segments of Afghan society (e.g.
grassroots vs. the government) results in different requirements in terms of justice for violent
perpetrators. Grassroots community peacebuilders pushed for positive peace that includes justice
for Warlords and Taliban offenders who have caused so much destruction. Yet, in response,
upper-level peace processes are concerned (and justifiably so) that a focus on justice for all
offenders will derail their activities by eliminating the motivations for insurgent leaders to
engage with them.
Both paths were justified by various participants. On the one hand, many participants were
willing to settle for even a negative peace (an absence of direct violence and war) after so many
years of horrific violence. On the other hand, the ‘peace-with-no-justice’ approach is, in fact, the
path that the international community has preferred to travel. However, this approach is now
starting to reap destructive consequences since the legitimacy of the overall intervention is
wearing thin due to perceptions of impunity for violent offenders.
Second, the Afghan population is struggling to connect with formal structures and processes such
as formal justice institutions and continues to rely upon informal justice structures and processes.
However, international peacebuilders have, for the most part, remained faithful to the formal
path alone. However, recent policy revisions and consequent adaptations to practice have
revealed an awakening to the power and efficacy of informal structures and processes. It appears
that a complementary relationship must be built between informal and formal routes, which will
require exceptionally creative leadership amidst the ambiguity and uncertainty that will result.
Even though it appears that the majority of the population prefers informal structures (Thiessen
2014a), the interview narratives reveal significant support for the development of formal
structures. Peacebuilding for the current generation will likely require parallel and compromising
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structures and processes. Perhaps roles can be clarified, and areas of deficiency in each path can
be supplemented by strengths in counterpart structures and processes.
Third, it appears that ordinary Afghans are struggling to identify what ownership means in the
context of upper-level peace processes. Of primary concern is the widespread perception that the
grassroots level and civil society leaders and groups are broadly excluded from these processes.
They feel disconnected, powerless, unable to provide input, and deeply concerned regarding the
decisions and directions of peace programming. In this case Afghan ownership is limited to
upper levels and foreign organisations, while excluding the very people the process is supposed
to serve.
Participants in this research revealed that civil society leaders (along with the broader grassroots
community) do not comprehend the methodology or goals of upper-level peace processes. There
exists little hope, significant cynicism and criticism, and a general belief that the process is a
farce and doomed to failure. These beliefs have led to widespread dismissal of the process. This
is certainly alarming, especially since this fact has apparently evaded the view of the
international community and the Afghan elites to a large extent. In the meantime the
Taliban/insurgency is morphing, splintering, and growing in influence, which is complicating
efforts by the international community and the Afghan government to reach out to them.
Fourth, there appears to be significant disagreement over whether the Taliban should be
negotiated with or excluded from future political structures in Afghanistan. It is difficult to
envision any scenario leading to increased Afghan ownership and control over peacebuilding that
will not have to address the concerns of the Taliban. The Taliban have evidenced incredible
resilience under intense pressure and are not likely to disappear into the background as
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international forces exit the country in the post-2014 context. Thus, the Afghan people and
government leadership are forced to adapt their conceptions of Afghan ownership to include the
Taliban and their conservative supporters, of which there are many. The possibility of renewed
Taliban political power is probably one key reason why many of the participants were in no
hurry to see the exit of international groups, and were willing to sacrifice increased ownership
for elevated but temporary freedoms.
Fifth, while this chapter has described a programme of peacebuilding at the grassroots
community level, it is conspicuous and worrisome that the study’s participants did not describe,
after more than a decade of post-2001 peacebuilding, any grassroots programmes with a national
scope focused on the peaceful resolution of conflict at the community level or that address the
prevalent culture of violence in Afghanistan. Instead what exists are a series of disjointed and
isolated projects, which are mostly small scale in nature and cover a couple of villages or
perhaps a couple of districts. Thus, it appears that grassroots conflict resolution and peace work
is largely forgotten or, more likely, ignored and suppressed in favour of upper-level or military-
led strategies. This void of grassroots activity is indicative of a failure of the grassroots level to
achieve ownership over peacebuilding in Afghanistan.
However, there is sporadic and disconnected community peacebuilding, justice, and
reconciliation work occurring in some parts of the country. The participants were very positive
and optimistic regarding these efforts, and believed that it must be quickly bolstered and
supported at the national level through nation-wide programming. Both grassroots and upper-
level processes must be built up conjointly to provide a wider range of voices in order to ensure
legitimacy and sustainability (Schirch 2011). And there must be significant cross-pollination
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between the two, which is dependent upon more than a modicum of trust for each other and
recognition that the short term will certainly require compromises.
Sixth, it has been very difficult for the international community to legitimately support grassroots
peace work while actively fighting a war in rural areas. Before grassroots empowerment work,
reconciliation activities, and community peacebuilding can occur, the international and Afghan
community should find a way to terminate the war. Rather, the insurgency might be resisted at
local levels by local populations using locally mandated (ideally non-violent) methodologies.
The presence of a powerful international community is perhaps suppressing the creative
solutions that might otherwise emerge from the desperate struggle at the grassroots level when
forced to own the achievement of security at the village level. It should be noted, however, that I
put forward these recommendations very tentatively and with trepidation since this route will
likely be very bloody and difficult. Yet, one must keep in mind that the route taken by the
international community so far has also been very bloody in terms of Afghan civilian casualties.
Conclusions - Moving Forward with Increased Local Ownership of Peace Work
So what needs to be done to advance efforts leading to increased local ownership of upper- and
grassroots level peace work in Afghanistan? As outlined above, there are legitimate concerns
with ownership at both the grassroots and upper-political levels. However, despite the criticisms
voiced against each level, progress, activity, and ownership at each level is fundamental for
peacebuilding advances in Afghanistan. As evidence, participants in this research did not
recommend abandoning either top-down or bottom-up peace processes, but believed that the two
tracks must achieve mutual support and involvement, and should be simultaneously
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strengthened. Thus, it seems necessary to end the strict division in both rhetoric and practice
between the grassroots and upper levels and, rather, promote integration of both levels through
increased openness and trust, bolstered cooperation and coordination, and jointly run activities.
Practically, this will require widespread civil society participation in official peace processes,
and will also require the involvement and support of upper-level leaders in civil society and
grassroots peacebuilding at the community level.
Increased cross-pollination between levels by peacebuilding leaders will certainly create
significant challenges. Both sides must put their houses in order. Civil society work is still
hindered by fragmentation and division, the exclusion of certain segments of society, and
dependency on international funders (Thiessen 2014b). Low capacity, ineffective and self-
interested leaders, and rampant corruption are stalling upper-level progress. There are certainly
dilemmas concerning ownership of this process. Which comes first, putting one’s house in order
and then being granted increased ownership over peacebuilding, or vice versa? Most likely the
process will evolve similar to a rolling snowball, with both components of the dilemma gaining
momentum based on progress on the other side. Key leaders within each level must emerge to
lead this difficult process. The job of the international community must be to steer the rolling and
progressive process away from uphill sections that may stall or terminate important progress.
There must also be a willingness to trust the ‘other’. For example, elite government leaders must
trust that civil society groups are in tune with the population and will act in the best interests of
the country as a whole. Civil society leaders must recognise that elite peace processes are
inherently messy, and gradual and incremental improvements may only be possible in a process
that is necessarily long-term in nature. However, these long-term requirements raise a whole new
set of dilemmas regarding doing what is possible as opposed to ideal in many cases. Focusing on
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doing what is actually possible and realistic at the moment, while being more attuned to short-
term concerns, can achieve essential short-term gains that might lead to longer-term and deeper
reform. However, critics argue that a compromised position on peace and justice will lead to
compromised ends, and that it is better to confront the difficult peacebuilding journey head-on
and battle through the pains of real justice before a sustainable and authentic positive peace can
be achieved.
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i Interviewee 26 – 23 February 2011, Kabul – Senior Afghan civil society member ii Interviewee 5 – 10 February 2011, Kabul – Female Afghan civil society project manager iii Interviewee 8 – 13 February 2011, Kabul – Senior Afghan civil society member iv Interviewee 35 – 27 February 2011, Kabul – Male foreign embassy official v Interviewee 59 – 20 March 2011, Kabul – Senior Afghan government official vi Interviewee 23 – 13 February 2011, Kabul – Senior Afghan civil society official vii The Asia Foundation reports that 25% of Afghans in 2013 identified unemployment as one of the most significant problems facing Afghanistan as a whole - http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2013AfghanSurvey.pdf. viii In February 2011 a gunman, dressed as a policeman, entered a bank in the city of Jalalabad and shot dead 42 Afghans. The perpetrator subsequently showed no remorse for the crime and told the BBC that he would commit similar crimes again if he was given the chance. He also told the media that he had enjoyed the killing. ix Interviewee 15 – 17 February 2011, Kabul –Senior foreign UN official x Interviewee 37 – 28 February 2011, Kabul – Senior Afghan human rights official