Post on 28-Jan-2023
Peacemaking Role of the Church in a Situation of Armed
Conflict:
A Philippine Experience
Victor R. Aguilan, Th.D.Divinity School Silliman University
Dumaguete City 6200Philippines
Introduction
Across the Philippines and Asia, religious institutions
have been encouraging men and women to work for peace in the
midst of armed conflicts. They have mobilized activists,
bishops, congregations, and ordinary members to overcome
violent conflicts, to establish and to build communities where
peace is a reality.
This paper analyzes the role of the Philippine Protestant
Church in peacemaking as a third party intervener. Churches
have been active in the search for peace. Church leaders have
been invited to participate in various national consultations,
fora, and peace negotiations. Meanwhile rebel groups (i.e.
Communist and Muslim) have recognized the significant moral
1
influence of Church leaders in peace-making and have requested
them to act as mediators, observers or third-party
facilitators.
The involvement of Churches in peace-making is a
phenomenon that requires a serious study. This paper will focus
on the experience of a Protestant Church in Philippines
specifically the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(UCCP) as a case study. The research will be limited to the
official actions, statements, resolutions and pastoral letters
produced by the UCCP.
The United Church of Christ in the Philippines is the
largest and most widespread Protestant church in the country.
It was organized in 1948 when the Presbyterian,
Congregational, Methodist and Episcopalian churches came
together to established a single denomination.1 Today, it is
one of the mainline Protestant Churches in the Philippines.2
Citizen Approach to Violent Conflict and Peacemaking
This study uses a citizen-approach to peacemaking
developed by John Paul Lederach and William Ury. Church and
2
religious groups are viewed as “third party” to the ongoing
conflict between the state and the non-state armed group and
are, therefore, in a better position to engage in intermediary
peace building basically on account of their established
neutrality, credibility and non-antagonistic relationship with
the state and non-state armed actors. Citizens and non-
government organizations are in fact an increasingly noted
feature of the landscape of conflict resolution and
peacemaking efforts.
The role of the Church people can be located in the
expanding conceptual terrain of citizen peacemaking. Church
people are also citizens. Citizen efforts seeking to address
deadly and violent conflict can now thus be seen as part of
peacemaking. Several practitioners and scholars have developed
overarching perspectives on the roles that citizens, which
include religious people, can play to help ensure prospects
for peace. John Paul Lederach, for one, offers a model which
he calls “conflict transformation.”3
3
Conflict transformation is different from "conflict
resolution" or "conflict management." Lederach argues that
“conflict transformation” understands better the nature and
dynamics of conflict itself. “Conflict resolution" implies
that conflict is not good bad--hence something that should be
ended. It also viewed conflict as a short term phenomenon that
can be "resolved" permanently through mediation or other
intervention processes. While “conflict management”
acknowledges that conflicts are long-term processes that often
cannot be quickly resolved. However notion of "management"
suggests that people can be controlled or manipulated as
though they were physical objects. Management tends to focus
on the technical side of peacemaking, while ignoring the
cultural and relational issues. In addition, the notion of
management overlooks the root causes of the problem.
The “conflict transformation” approach focuses on the
dialectic nature of conflict. It sees conflict across four
dimensions: personal, relational, structural, and cultural. 4
In this regard, John Paul Lederach asserts that in order to
effectively address conflict, efforts often need to shift away
4
from the issues of the conflict and towards a focus on
reconciling and rebuilding relationships.5 And in order to
make peace, negative or destructive interaction patterns need
to be transformed into positive or constructive relationships.
Lederach focuses on both structural and cultural aspects of
the relationships. It is a strategy that places an emphasis on
conscientization: raising awareness about the inequities of
power and the injustices that people experience as a result of
these inequities.6
William Ury has developed systemic frameworks that map
the overall collective potential of private humanitarian
agencies, human rights advocates, and individual NGOs. He
develops the notion of the Third Side in the conflict.7 In a
conflict it is a commonly held view that there are two sides,
two protagonists, or two parties involve in the conflict.
However in reality there is a third party or a third side.
What is the third side? Ury says this:
The third side is people – from the community – using a
certain kind of power – the power of peers – from a
5
certain perspective – of common ground – supporting a
certain process - of dialogue and non-violence-and aiming
for a certain product-a “triple win.”8
In another work, Ury writes,
[T]he third side is the community itself taking
responsibility for its own conflicts. It’s the community
forming what might be called a ‘winning alliance’ against
violent conflict. It’s the community learning to serve as
a container for contention, a container within which
conflict can be transformed from destructive ways like
violence and war, into constructive ways like dialogue,
negotiation, and democracy.9
His concept of the Third Side places emphasis on the role of
the community members with regard to steering conflicts away
from violence and towards just and lasting peace. Ury
describes ten basic roles of the Third Side:
1. The Witness - The witness watches out for early warning
signals, goes on patrol and reports violent incidents,
and calls for the attention of other community members.
6
2. The Bridge Builder - The basic role of the bridge
builder is to bring people together and help establish
personal relationships.
3. The Equalizer - The central role of the equalizer is to
empower the weak and unrepresented so that they can
negotiate a fair and satisfactory resolution. This
involves helping to bring the powerful to the table,
building collaborative democracy, and supporting
nonviolent action.
4. The Healer - The role of the healer is to help parties
overcome their feelings of anger, fear, humiliation,
insecurity, and grief. This includes listening to
people's grievances, acknowledging hurt feelings, and
encouraging parties to apologize and make reparations.
5. The Mediator - The central roles of the mediator are to
bring the parties to the table, facilitate
communication, and help people to search for a
solution.
7
6. The Arbiter - Whereas a mediator can only suggest a
solution, this person can decide what is right.
Resolving disputes, promoting justice, and encouraging
negotiation are the arbiter's central roles.
1 T. Valentino Sitoy Jr, Several Springs, One Stream: The United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, Vol.Ii: The Formative Decade (1948-1958).
(Quezon City: United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
1997).
2 The mainline Protestant denominations in the country are
the United Church of Christ (UCCP), the United Methodist Church
(UMC), the Iglesia Evangelica Unide de Cristo (UNIDA), the
Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF),
Lutheran Church, Salvation Army, and Convention of Philippine
Baptist Churches.
3 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation
across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).
and John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1997).
8
7. The Peacekeeper - The central role of the peacekeeper
is to provide protection. This includes interposing
between parties, enforcing the peace, and preempting
violence before it starts.
8. The Provider - The basic roles of the provider are to
share resources and knowledge, give others a sense of
4 Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies., 82.
5 Ibid., 24.
6 Ibid., 64.
7William Ury, The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop. (New
York: Penguin Books, 2000). William Ury, Getting to Peace:
Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the World, (New York:
Viking, 1999).
8 Ury, Getting to Peace: Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the
World,, 14.
9 William Ury, Must We Fight? From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard-a
New Perspective on Violent Conflict and Its Prevention (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass., 2002), 78.
9
security, and help ensure that basic human needs are
met.
9. The Referee - The referee establishes rules for fair
fighting, takes away dangerous weapons, and strengthens
defenses.
10. The Teacher - Sometimes people fight simply because
they know of no other way to react when a need is
frustrated and a serious difference arises. The roles
of the teacher are to delegitimize violence, teach
tolerance, and expose people to practical ways of
solving their problems.10
From a Third Side perspective, the community includes any
group or organization performing roles that serve to contain,
resolve or prevent a conflict. The Third Side shares, in common
with other citizen peacemaking approaches, the idea that
peacemaking is a set of processes that requires the engagement
of every dimension of society. The Church as a peacemaker
could be viewed as a Third Side in the conflict. 10 Ury, Getting to Peace: Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the
World,, 114-195.
10
This present study looks at one particular example of a
citizen-approach to peacemaking, the Peacemaking Role of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines. The researcher believes that the
continued presence of armed conflicts in many parts of the
country has generated the need for more sustained peacemaking
initiatives as well as support from a much broader peace
movement. This study brings into focus the role that the
Church plays in the country’s struggle for genuine peace.
Church and religious groups are viewed as “third party” to the
ongoing conflict between the state and the non-state armed
group and are, therefore, in a better position to engage in
intermediary peace building basically on account of their
established neutrality, credibility and non-antagonistic
relationship with the state and non-state armed actors. The
rationale of the entire research is reflected in this
framework.
UCCP Understanding of Peace
In this study, the term peace includes both “positive”
and “negative” meaning. The negative aspect of peace means the
11
absence of armed conflict and human rights violations. It
focuses on the reduction of the incidence of war and the
prevention of deadly conflict. Negative peace refers to the
absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is
reached, a negative peace will ensue. Positive peace is filled
with positive content such as the restoration of
relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the
needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution
of conflict. The concept of positive peace involves the
elimination of the root causes of war, violence, and injustice
and entails the conscious effort to build a society that
reflects these commitments.11 In the UCCP perspective on peace
and peacemaking both “positive” and “negative” meaning could
be found.
In addition, the term shalom is used in the UCCP official
documents to express this notion of “peace based on justice.”
In the statement, Peacemaking: Our Ministry, the Bishops said: “The
ministry of peacemaking is an imperative of the faith we
11 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,"
Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-193.
12
profess. The Statement of Faith of the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines calls us to participate in the establishment of a
meaningful and just social order.” A significant point mentioned by
the bishop in the Statement was the close connection between
peace and justice. The Church declared that peacemaking was a
concrete expression of justice. It asserted that there can be
no peace without justice. Justice was understood in terms of
meeting the basic needs of people.
For as long as peasants remain landless
For as long as laborers do not receive just wages
For as long as we are politically and economically
dominated by foreign nations
For as long as we channel more money to the military than
to basic social services,
For as long as the causes of social unrest remain
untouched,
There will be no peace.12
The bishops believed that the root of insurgency was the
structures of injustice. 13
13
Major Rebel Groups in Peace Talks with Government
An armed conflict is defined as “a contested
incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties of which at
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths.”14 Another definition of a major armed
conflict is stated as “prolonged use of armed force between
the military forces of two or more governments, or one of one
government and at least one organized armed group, incurring
the battle related deaths of at least 1000 people during the
entire conflict and in which the incompatibility concerns
government and/or territory.”15 This study focuses on intra-
state armed conflict which is defined as an armed conflict
between two groups, of which one is the state, in which
12 Council of Bishops, "Peacemaking: Our Ministry, 21
August 1986," in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia
N. Niguidula (Quezon City: Education and Nurture Desk, United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990), 148.
13 Ibid., 147.
14
violence has been used by either or both parties resulting in
human and material casualties.
In the Philippines there are two major armed rebellions.16
One is led by the Communist Party of the Philippines; its
united front-the National Democratic Front and its armed wing
- the New People Army (CPP-NDF-NPA).17 The CPP was established
in 1969 under the chairmanship of Jose Maria Sison after
splitting from the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). During
the founding congress the CPP declared the reestablishment of
the Party as the climax of “long, persistent and arduous
efforts to put Mao Tse-tung’s thought in command among old and
new cadres.”18 From its meager start in 1969 with 35 guerillas,
the NPA grew to 23,000-25,000 full-time fighters in 1985.19 The
underground Communist movement suffered a series of crises. In
1985 and in 1988 the CPP-NDF-NPA carried out internal purges
to neutralize alleged military spies. The purges killed more
than 1,000 of their members. Many of those killed were found
out afterward to be innocent.20 Another crisis was a major
split in the communist movement between “re-affirmists” (RA)
and “rejectionists” (RJ) because of ideological differences
15
and anti-democratic policies of the party. The RJ factions
broke away and went their own paths. Some remained in armed
struggle, others did not.21
One of the factions of the CPP-NPA-NDF established the
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa–Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian
Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP-RPA-ABB) in 1998. In December
1999, Pres. Estrada met with the leaders of the RPMP-RPA-ABB
in Baguio City to start the formal peace talks. Eventually a
peace agreement and ceasefire was signed on December 6, 2000
in Negros Occidental. The RPMP has about one-third of the
14 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollengberg, "Armed
Conflict, 1989-2000," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2001).
15 Margareta Sollenberg, Peter Walensteen, and Andres
Jato, "Major Armed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security( Oxford University Press,
1999), 15. See also Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and
Peter Wallensteen, "Definitions, Sources and Methods for the
Conflict Data. Appendix 2b," in SIPRI Yearbook 2003, ed. SIPRI.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute( Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
16
communist guerillas in the southern regions of Mindanao and
the Visayas islands.22
The other armed rebellion is the Muslim rebellion in
Mindanao as cited in the study of Hilario Gomez.23 The history
of armed conflict in southern Philippines is over three
decades old. Hostility between the Muslims and the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH)) intensified in the
seventies when the Muslims were subjected to cruel
discrimination by the Marcos dictatorship and led to a violent
uprising among the Moro groups led by the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) who demanded independence. The Moro
National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Bangsa
Moro Army was founded in 1968 under the chairmanship of Prof.
Nur Misuari. The MNLF issued a manifesto in Tripoli, Libya in
1974 declaring the goal of an independent Bangsa Moro
Homeland. Their envisioned independent state is composed of 13
Islamized ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao, Sulu and
Palawan. MNLF membership in 1973 was reported at 15,000. On
September 2, 1996 the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GPH)) and the MNLF entered into a peace agreement
17
which also created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).
Autonomy did not appease a faction within the MNLF who in
1984 had broken away to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF). The MILF whose leadership is derived from the
16 Paz Verdades M. Santos and others, Primed and Purposeful :
Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small
Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, 2010).
17 Joel Rocamora, Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist
Party of the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1994);
Alfredo Saulo, Communism in the Philippines : Introduction (Manila:
Ateneo de Manila Univ. Press, 1990); Kathleen Weekley, The
Communist Party of the Philippines 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001).,
Patricio N. Abinales, Fellow Traveler: Essays on Filipino Communism
(Quezon City:: University of the Philippines Press, 2001);
Victor N. Corpuz, Silent War (Quezon City: VNC Enterprises,
1989).
18 Saulo, 101-102.
18
traditional, aristocratic and religious elites in Maguindanao
viewed the MNLF as secular and left-leaning. As their name
suggests, their demand was independence to establish an
Islamic State. Its main goals are the promotion of Islam and
the preservation of Moro society. Its presence is
traditionally dominant in North and South Cotabato, Lanao Sur
and Norte, and Maguindanao provinces. It is now the strongest
rebel group in the Southern Philippines.24 GPH and MILF have
been engaged in an on-and-off peace talks for 16 years.
A Historical Overview: From Pres. Marcos to Pres. Benigno
Aquino
Even before Martial Law, as early as in the 60’s the UCCP
was in the forefront in safeguarding the principles of
religious freedom and the separation of Church and State.25 The
19 Corpuz, 22.
20 Abinales, 153-192.
21 Rocamora.
22 RPMP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, "RPM-P: Brief Profile", RPMP
http://www.angelfire.com/rpg2/rpmp/profile.htm (accessed 16
August 2013).
19
General Assembly of 1960 took a definite stand on each of the
following social concerns: economic development, agricultural
development, population trends, modern technology,
industrialization, urbanization, unemployment, trade union
movement and management relation, and responsible laity.26 It
was only during Martial Law that the Church began to speak
about human rights and militarization. In early years of
Martial Law the UCCP with the other religious institutions
were willing to give Pres. Marcos a chance. They thought that
Martial Law would solve the problem of lawlessness,
criminality, violence and poverty. Eight heads of Churches
belonging to the National Council of Churches in the
Philippines (NCCP) even issued a “Resolution of Support”27
Pres. Marcos promised that Martial Law would bring peace and
23 Hilario. Gomez Jr., The Moro Rebellion and the Search for Peace: A
Study on Christian-Muslim Relations in the Philippines (Zambonga: Silsila,
2001). Salah Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 2nd ed. (Lahore:
Islamic Research Academy., 1997).
24 Gomez Jr.
20
order, economic development and an improvement in social
conditions.
But in 1974 the General Assembly of the UCCP issued a
Statement on National Issues, which warned the members and the
government on the danger of military abuses under Martial
Law.28 Within the next four years (1974-1978) of Martial Law,
Marcos revealed its authoritarian and dictatorial character
through questionable referenda and elections in order to
create a semblance of legitimacy as he continued to hold on to
power, confirming the opposition’s allegation that Marcos
declared martial law just to remain in power.29 The Marcos
regime could not tolerate dissent from religious people. The
military raided the offices and homes and arrested the leaders
and staff of the National Council of Churches in the
Philippines (NCCP), which included UCCP members.30
The perspective of the UCCP towards the Martial Law began
to change in 1978. During the first quadrennium of General
Assembly of the UCCP, the Assembly demanded for the
restoration of civil and political liberties and the
25 Sitoy Jr, 1015.
21
dismantling of the martial law making it the first and only
Protestant Church to have issued such statement. The Church
also approved the creation of a Human Rights Desk. The
establishment of the Human Rights Desk of the UCCP and the draft
statement of faith under the Marcos Martial law regime seemed
to indicate a head-on collision course with the Marcos Martial
Law regime.31
And when Pres. Marcos ended Martial Law and lifted it
with Proclamation No. 2045 on 17 January 1981 the UCCP
leadership could not hide their misgivings on the genuineness
of the lifting of martial. To some the Proclamation 2045 did
not really dismantle the machinery of martial law and one-man
rule. But President Marcos retained the machinery of martial
law such as the dreaded Arrest-Search-Seizure-Order (ASSO) and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore,
26 General Assembly, "A Statement of Social Concern ,
July 31-August 1, 1970, Appendix Ii 275-291b.," in the Workbook
Twelfth Biennial General Assembly, May 24-28 (1970).
27 Estanislao Abainza and et al, "Resolution of Support,"
NCCP Newsletter, January 1973.
22
Pres. Marcos could still rule as a one-man ruler through his
emergency powers.
From 1981 to 1986, the Church came to conclusion that
peace was not possible in a political context wherein the
State failed to uphold human rights. Worst when the State
became the violator of human rights. Human rights and
democracy were two important themes in the statements issued
by the UCCP under the Marcos regime. The leaders of the UCCP
were not hopeful that under the Marcos regime human rights
violations and militarization would stop. In fact the UCCP
leadership was convinced that the Marcos dictatorial rule had
contributed to the increasing violence and armed conflicts in
Philippine society. Thus the solution to end violence and
armed conflict was to end the dictatorship.
And the people spoke in 1986 in EDSA when million people
gathered and peacefully forced Pres. Marcos to relinquish
power. Mrs. Corazon Aquino succeeded Mr. Marcos and began the
restoration of democracy. The UCCP welcomed the change in
leadership and expressed hope that any changes in the
23
government must include the protection of human rights and
full restoration of democracy. These two elements are
necessary to bring about peace and justice in Philippine
society.
28 Minutes of the Fourteenth General Assembly of the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines, May 16-20, (Cebu City, 1974), 152-153.
29 Ferdinand Marcos, The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines
(Manila: 1972). Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Dictatorship and Martial
Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972 (Quezon City: Great Book
Publishers, 1987).;Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship (San
Francisco, California: Union Square Publications, 1976). Civil
Liberties Union of the Philippines, Three Years of Martial Law
(Makati: 1975). and 9) Conrado De Quiros, Dead Aim: How Marcos
Ambushed Philippine Democracy (Pasig City: Foundation for
Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1997).
30 Victor R. Aguilan, “A Critical-Historical Analysis of
the Church-State Relations under Martial Law from the
Perspective of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines”
(South East Asia Graudate School of Theology, 2003). See also
24
From 1986 to 1992 the UCCP was supportive but critical of
the Aquino government. Commitment to human rights and
restoration of democracy were the priorities of the Aquino
government. The Church believed that to have peace in the
country it would require a legitimate government. And the
Church was committed to work within the framework of the new
Constitution in building a meaningful and just social order.
It was a clear rejection of armed struggle or coup d’etat to
overthrow of a legitimate government. The UCCP had recognized
the necessity of a government to maintain order, resolve the
armed conflict and established just and lasting peace.32
Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos against the Church: Economic Development and
Political Repression in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publisher,
1993).
31 Alvaro Senturias Jr. and others, eds., Human Rights, Justice
and Peace: Manual of References (Quezon City: UCCP, 1989).
32 Council of Bishops, "Statement on the Plebiscite,
January 1987," in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed.
Lydia N. Niguidula (Quezon City: Education and Nurture Desk,
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).
25
When the Aquino government announced its plan to
negotiate with the communist armed group and ordered the
release of political prisoners the UCCP expressed full support
to the government. But when the peace talks failed the
government launched the “total war” against the rebel groups
resulting to gross violations of human rights. The UCCP became
very critical of the government counter-insurgency approach.
The Church officials rejected the militarist solution in
addressing the armed conflict. It consistently denounced
alleged human rights violations committed by soldiers.
Eventually some Church members became victims to increasing
human rights violations. Some were killed by the military.
Other killings were perpetrated by the rebels. But the Church
was perceived to be biased against government soldiers in its
human rights advocacy. Military intelligence had even accused
the UCCP as a communist front and its leaders as communist
sympathizers. This was strongly denied by the Church
officials.33
33 Petz Guerrero, "Twenty-One Days under the "Red-Front"
Label," The United Church Letter, Nov-Dec 1987, 1, 9, 3.
26
The UCCP issued documents34 which revealed the consistent
position of the UCCP in linking peace with human rights
advocacy. There could never peace without upholding human
rights. Even in the midst of armed conflict the Church has
asked the warring parties, rebels and soldiers, to respect
human rights of combatant and non-combatant, women and
children. The Church has rejected the militarist approach or
total war strategy in resolving the armed conflict. The root
cause of armed conflict is the unjust structures which must be
addressed by the State.35 The Church had repeatedly called all
parties to return to the negotiation table and to cease all
hostilities for the good of the country. It has also supported
the formation of peace zones or peace sanctuary. It has even
offered its buildings, premises, and churches as sanctuary or
zone of peace.36 But that NPA rejected any call for a ceasefire
and criticized the any attempt to localize peace talks. While
the government thought that only through a total defeat of the
NPA could there be peace and order.
Under Pres. Ramos, the UCCP expressed its critical
support to peace initiatives of the government. The UCCP
27
leaders participated in the National Unification consultation
(NUC) and peace efforts of the government. The NUC recommended
six paths to peace.37 The first was pursuit of social,
economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root
causes of armed struggle and social unrest. The second path
was consensus building and empowerment for peace through
continuous consultation at the national and local levels. The
third was peace negotiations with armed groups. The fourth
path was implementing measures for reconciliation,
34 Officials documents of the UCCP can be found in Lydia
Niguidula, ed. UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990) (Quezon
City: United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).
35 Council of Bishops, "Peacemaking: Our Ministry, 21
August 1986."; UCCP Executive Committee, "Statement on
Peacemaking, September 1991," The United Church Letter, March 1992.
36 UCCP Executive Committee, "A Declaration of UCCP
Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace, 23 February 1990,"
in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia
Niguidula(Quezon City: United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, 1990), 199-200.
28
reintegration of former combatants and rehabilitation of those
affected by the conflict. The fifth was conflict management
and protection of civilians. The sixth path aimed to build,
nurture and enhance a positive climate for peace.
One concrete result of the Ramos peace initiatives was
the peace agreement between the GRP (GPH) and MNLF, which
included the creation of the SPCPD. The UCCP gave a critical
support to the GRP (GPH) and MNLF peace accord. Since the 70’s
the Church has expressed solidarity with the Muslims and
indigenous people of Mindanao. The UCCP has recognized that
the conflict in Mindanao was a result of a long historical
process of marginalization, and discrimination of Muslims and
indigenous groups. The first step to resolve the conflict in
Mindanao, which the UCCP has always believed, was through
dialogue of all stakeholders in Mindanao to find a common
solution.
37 Fidel Valdez Ramos, "Let Us Give Peace a Chance, (Part
I) ", Manila Bulletin Online. http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-
150178456/let-us-give-peace-a-chance-first-of-three-parts
(accessed 12 September 2013).
29
With regard to the armed conflict between the GRP (GPH)
and CPP-NPA-NDF the UCCP tried to convince the parties to
resume peace talks. The UCCP joined the International Peace
Advisory Committee as a third-party group along with the
officers of the National Council of Churches in the
Philippines and some Roman Catholic bishops to persuade the
NDF panel to return to the negotiation table. In spite of the
initiative of the Ramos government the peace effort failed to
resolve the communist armed rebellion. The CPP-NDF-NPA
remained suspicious of the government. The leaders of the CPP-
NPA-NDF had re-affirmed its position that just and lasting
peace could be won only after the complete victory of the
national democratic revolution through armed struggle.
Under Pres. Estrada and Pres. Macapal-Arroyo, the
government took a mailed-fist policy against the insurgent
groups. No ceasefire between the government and the CPP-NPA.
The Arroyo government was putting military action over peace
negotiations in dealing with the CPP-NPA. This militarist
approach promotes anti-democratic values and practices.
Participation of people in politics is viewed as one-sided,
30
i.e., people in conflict areas must show overt support to
soldiers. Groups or individual who do not support the soldiers
were perceived to be supporting the rebels. Dissent is not
tolerated. There is a resurgence of "red-labeling" or
“communist bogey.” Even religious institutions such as the
Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) , UCCP,
Philippine Independent Church, and the NCCP were labeled as
communist fronts. Militarism has led to extrajudicial killings
or political killings. Many of those killed were activists or
militants from different left-leaning political groups.38 The
UCCP has recorded that some twenty (20) members of the Church
have been murdered.39 Human rights groups have accused the
government complicity in the extrajudicial killings.40 The
Arroyo government has denied that it is a State policy. But
the approach chosen by Pres. Arroyo in resolving the armed
conflict, like her predecessor, is the militarist solution or
total war strategy. And the UCCP has consistently reminded the
government that the total war strategy would never solve the
armed conflict and bring about lasting peace in the country.
31
In addition militarism has created a “culture of
impunity” under Arroyo’s government. The term “culture of
impunity” refers to a situation in which people in power in a
society have come to believe that they can do whatever they
want and free from punishment. In the realm of human rights
law, it refers to the failure to bring perpetrators of human
rights violations to justice. The term gained currency during
her administration because of continuing human rights
38 Amnesty International, "Philippines: Political
Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process", Amnesty
International
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA35/006/2006/en/6d1f
080e-f774-11dd-8fd7-f57af21896e1/asa350062006en.pdf (accessed
16 August 2013).
39 CONTAK Philippines, "21 Church People Killed as of 20
June 2006", CONTAK Philippines
http://contakphilippines.tripod.com/speaknow/id7.html
(accessed 21 August 2013).
40 Miriam Coronel Ferrer, "National Security: The
Invincible Code?," (photocopy, 2006).
32
violation by the military and police and the high number of
unsolved killing of media practitioners, with political
warlords suspected to be the masterminds.41 The Church realized
that the “culture of impunity” undermines the effort to create
a culture of peace
In 2010 ushered the regime of Pres. Benigno “Noynoy”
Aquino. Human rights and peace activists have expressed hopes
that the Aquino government would include peace and human
rights in the major programs of government. The President has
promised to end culture of impunity in the Philippines and end
armed conflicts before 2016. Hence, on June 16, 2011, the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) filed a
P5.4-M damage suit against former-president and now Pampanga
Representative Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) her for command
responsibility in connection with murder and abduction of its
member during her term as president. UCCP filed the complaint
41 JM Villero and Bernardo D. Larin, eds., Under the Seal of
Impunity: The State of Human Rights During the Arroyo Administration, vol. 9
January-June 2009 (Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Human
Rights Information Center).
33
through its general secretary Bishop Reuel Norman Marigza.
According to the 18-page complaint, “numerous church pastors
and leaders were liquidated, harassed, unlawfully detained or
tortured with impunity by military agents and operatives, who,
by law, were then all under her ultimate control and command
responsibility.”42
Furthermore the current government has resumed peace
talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) / New People’s Army
(NPA) / National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP).
The government hopes to complete implementation of signed
Final Peace Agreements with the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) and a closure to the peace negotiations with
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa – Pilipinas (RPM-P) /
Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA) / Alex Boncayao Brigade
(ABB).43
But last April 2013, the GPH unilaterally terminated the
peace negotiations. Alex Padilla, chief government negotiator,
42 United Church of Christ in the Philippines, "Arroyo Had
Command Responsibility of AFP, Impunity Must End!," (2011).
34
said the presumed “death” of the peace process between the GPH
and NDFP is the result of “endless roadblocks thrown by the
NDF.”44 The UCCP responded to the impasse by joining with the
other Churches and ecumenical bodies to ask the Aquino
government and the NDF to return to the peace talks.
Some UCCP engagements
1. Human Rights Advocacy
The response of the UCCP to the peace and conflict issues
was to engage the government and rebels. The strategies
adopted by the Church in its peacemaking role were many and
varied depending on the conditions and opportunities that43 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP), "Peace and Development Tracks"
http://opapp.gov.ph/peace-and-development-tracks (accessed 10
August 2013).
44 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP), "Remarks of Gph Panel Chair Alexander Padilla: May 6,
2013", Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/remarks-gph-panel-chair-
alexander-padilla-focap-media-forum (accessed 10 August 2013).
35
prevailed in the different jurisdictions or conferences. To
address peace and human rights problems, some of the
activities of the Church were participation in public
hearings, consultation, dialogues with government agencies.
The UCCP provided legal aid and campaigned for the
indemnification of human rights violation victims. It has
participated in exposing and denouncing human rights
violations in the media and other public forums. On the other
hand, continuing education and organizing work including
networking with other people’s organizations (POs) were
launched as means to sustain the peacemaking role of the UCCP.
This section will discuss selected official responses of the
Church to peace and conflict issues. It will focus on the
efforts of the national leadership.
The years 1986 to 1992, President Aquino’s term, was a
period for restoration of democracy. The UCCP was supportive
of the Aquino government. But the Church human rights advocacy
through the Human Rights Desk (HRD) did not stop. Corruption,
exploitation, oppression and human rights violations continued
to be rampant. In one report to the Executive committee, Mr.
36
Alvaro Senturias, Jr., HRD national coordinator, said “For as
long as society is not transformed we must continue with our
education, organization, mobilization, services and research,
documentation and publication work.”45
In 1989 the HRD work was broadened through the creation
of the “Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Program
Unit.” The Church realized that peace, justice and human
rights are intertwined. The Church renamed the HR Desk to
Justice, Peace and Human Rights Program (JPHR). Much of the
work of the JPHR has been focused on data gathering and
monitoring about cases related to human rights violations
especially committed against members of the Church.
The HRD used to publish a monthly newsletter, The Human
Rights Advocates and Bible study guides. The goal of these
publications was to raise the level of awareness of local
church members on the issue of human rights.46 The UCCP also
conducted various fact-finding missions (FFM) organized with
45 Alvaro Senturias, Jr. “HRD Report of the National
Coordinator of the period July 1986 to January 1987” in the
Minutes of the Exe Com February 25 -28, 1987, QC. UCCP
37
assistance from various international partners and local non-
government organizations (NGOs). The FFM have documented the
failure of the government to uphold human rights of its
citizens and the continuing human rights violations resulting
from the worsening conflict between the government forces and
the rebels specifically in the Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao
regions.47 Civilians perished and properties were destroyed as
government soldiers conducted the dreaded “search and destroy”
operations. 48
The UCCP has also denounced human rights violations
committed by rebel forces. In 1989, the UCCP—through the
initiative of the Human Rights Desk—issued a statement holding
the National Democratic Front and the New People’s Army
accountable for having committed gross human rights violations
against civilians who were members of the UCCP in Binaton,
Digos City, Mindanao where more than 40 people, including
women and children, were killed by the New People’s Army. The
UCCP in an open letter addressed to the Philippine Government
and the National Democratic Front wrote:
38
We condemn this heinous act, and in the name of the
victims, demand justice. Yet in this time of grief, we
recognize that we must not succumb to hate and vengeance.
Such will only serve to further the bloodshed. As a
church committed to a just and lasting peace, we call on
the National Democratic Front to acknowledge full
responsibility for the massacre and to ensure that such a
tragedy will never again occur. We also remind the
Philippine Government that its military approach to
46 Alvaro Senturias Jr., "Inextricably Linked: A
Historical Development of the Program Thrust of the Human
Rights, Justice and Peace Desk of the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines," in Human Rights, Justice and Peace: Manual of
References, ed. Alvaro Senturias Jr. et al.(Quezon City: UCCP,
1989).
47 Furrer Roger, Brenda Gonzalez, and Emily See, eds.,
Mountain Tempest (Quezon City: UCCP, 1991).
48 Senturias Jr. and others, eds., Human Rights, Justice and
Peace: Manual of References.
39
solving insurgency inevitably leads to the escalation of
the level of human suffering in this country.49
The UCCP has acknowledged in that human rights ministry must
always take the side of the victims and should hold the
violators accountable whether perpetrated by rebels or
government soldiers.
2. Peace Zone and Sanctuary
In 1990 during the height of the armed conflict between the
New Peoples Army rebels and soldiers that resulted in the
massive displacement of people the Executive Committee issued
two statements: A Statement of Concern For Internal Refugees, and A
Declaration of UCCP Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace. The church
declared its church buildings, parsonages and lands, hospitals
and schools, and other church-owned institutions and their
premises as “sanctuaries and zones of peace.” “These places49 Erme Camba and others, "Justice Not Vengeance: An Open
Letter to the National Democratic Front and the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, 3 July 1989," in UCCP Statements
and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia N. Niguidula (Quezon City:
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).
40
and premises are open to all people—regardless of color and
creed, sex and status, and of political and religious
affiliation—at all times in all circumstances of need.” Those
places designated as “zones of peace” should be “used for
activities that build community and contribute to a deeper
understanding of and commitment to peace and justice.” Zones
of peace are demilitarized areas. “No arms…and weapons of war
should be brought to nor stored in these church places and
premises.” 50
One case involved 1,300 internal refugees who came down
to Dumaguete City from the hinterland of Negros Oriental in
the Central part of the Philippine to avoid the conflict
between the government soldiers and NPA rebels. 51 Silliman
University, a UCCP related institution, was the only
institution with a big compound to accommodate the internal
refugees. Some faculty members of the Divinity School
50 UCCP Executive Committee, "A Declaration of UCCP
Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace, 23 February 1990."
41
requested the Administration to allow these people to use the
grandstand and ballfield as evacuation areas.52
4. Peace Education
Some of the engagements of the UCCP on peace where
carried out by the Church-related educational institutions.
The Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. (DCFI) where 99 percent
of the students are Muslims is a UCCP-related institution in
Marawi City, Lanao. “DCFI is recognized as a partnership of
Christians and Muslims in confronting the challenges brought
about by historical tensions, conflicts and wars.”53 The
Southern Christian College (SCC) has taken initiatives to
promote peace and development in Midsayap, Cotabato that has
been divided by historical conflicts and wars.54 The UNESCO has
selected SCC as a pilot school for tertiary education on
51"Evacuees," The Negros Chronicle, 3 November 1991.
52. Noriel Capulong, "Forum on the Internal Refugees," The
United Church Letter, March 1992.
53 Edna J. Orteza, "The Quest for Lasting Peace: The UCCP
Experience," (photocopy, 12 December 2005).
54 Ibid.
42
peace, human rights, and tolerance. Other peace activities of
SCC include, the creation of the Community Peace Advocates of
Cotabato (COMPAX) in 1998; the setting up of the Institute for
Peace and Development Studies (IPDS) in 1999; the launching of
Kapihan sa Kalinaw in November 1999; the Paaralang Pangkapayapaan in
2002, and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with
the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation (RPDEV) involving
the sharing of information, studies and research on peace and
development, finding ways to contribute to the peaceful
resolution of the conflict in Mindanao, and monitoring the
implementation of the terms of the peace accord between the
GRP (GPH) and the MNLF.55 In the Visayas, UCCP has ongoing
cooperation with the Justice and Peace Center (JPC) of
Silliman University in Dumaguete. The JPC has developed
training program for pastors and members on building peace and
transforming conflicts. The JPC has linked with the Mennonite
Central Committee (MCC) and the Mindanao Peace Institute
(MPI).56
55 Ibid.
56 Peace Resource Center Brochure
43
5. Third Party/Civil Society Representative
In 1996 the UCCP played another important role in the
peace talks between the GRP (GPH) and the CPP-NPA-NDF. The
General Secretary, Bishop Gomez, was invited to join the
International Peace Advisory Committee as a third-party group
along with the officers of the National Council of Churches in
the Philippines and some Roman Catholic bishops. Bishop Gomez
explained that a third-party for the UCCP would show that “The
Church is church for all and of all both in government and out
of government.” He further added that “As a third party the
UCCP once more shall underscore that the mercies of God are
like rains from heaven, they fall on both, the sinner and the
sinless, the poor and the rich, Communists and non-Communists,
rebel groups and established governments.”57 Bishop Gomez was
also chosen as the civil society representative to peace talks
between the GPH and RPMP-RPA-ABB.
57 Hilario Gomez Jr. , "Building up the Church: Continuing
Task, Pressing Challenge: A Report to the General Assembly
Executive Committee,," in the Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive
Committee November 6-8 (Quezon City: UCCP, 1996), 14.
44
6. Solidarity and Peace Linkages
The UCCP also used its partnership with other churches
and ecumenical bodies to bring to the wider public its human
rights, peace and justice concerns. One major involvement was
with “the Peace for Life (PfL)” a multi-religious, inter-
cultural movement for global justice and peace, which calls
for action, building people’s solidarity, and mobilizing
faith-based resistance to the US war on terror and destructive
forces of corporate globalization. The PfL is supported by the
National Council of Churches in the Philippines and World
Council of Churches.58 There are also individual UCCP members
and leaders who have joined other progressive national
ecumenical organizations such as the Ecumenical Bishops’ Forum
(EBF), Ecumenical Women’s Forum (EWF), and Promotion of Church
People’s Response (PCPR).59
In 2010, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
with other leaders from the Roman Catholic, Protestant and
Evangelical Churches form the Philippine Ecumenical Peace
58 Orteza.
59 Ibid.
45
Platform (PEPP) to encourage the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front to return to
the negotiating table to talk peace and to stop extrajudicial
killings.
Issues related to Peacemaking
This research has identified two issues connected with
the peacemaking role of the UCCP. These are human rights and
militarization.
Human Rights
The Church has consistently emphasized that the
protection of human rights is integral to its peacemaking
role. Promotion of human rights and democracy is one important
practice in a just peacemaking approach. According to Stassen,
“Extensive empirical evidence shows that the spreading of
democracy and respect for human rights, including religious
liberty, is widening the zones of peace.”60 To remain as a
credible “third-side” in the conflict, the Church should
include in its monitoring the human rights violations
committed by all parties-both State and non-State - in the
46
conflict. It serves as a plumb line for evaluating the
behavior of governments, political movements and members of
society. The UCCP believes that the Christians must stand
firm in defending human rights. Monitoring of human rights
violations should include violations perpetrated by either
government forces or rebels. The Church must take the side of
the victims.
Militarization
Another issue related to peacemaking is militarization.
The role of the Philippine military is now of serious concern
in the light of its role during and following martial law.
What is the role of the military in a democratic society?
Militarization has been defined or described as “the process
whereby military values, ideology and patterns of behavior
60 Glen H Stassen, Just Peacemaking : The New Paradigm for the Ethics of
Peace and War, New ed. (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008).; and
Glen H. Stassen, "New Paradigm: Just Peacemaking Theory"
http://www.fullerseminary.net/sot/faculty/stassen/cp_content/h
omepage/Resource_files/1what_is_just_peacemaking_.htm
(accessed 10 August 2013).
47
achieve a dominating influence on the political, social and
economic, and external affairs of the State and as a
consequence the structural ideological and behavioral patterns
of both society and government are militarized.”61 It is a
political process whereby the military plays an active role in
the formulation and implementation of national policies, thus
undermining civilian supremacy.62
The UCCP clearly rejects militarization because it will
not bring about just and lasting peace. Militarization is a
political process whereby the military plays an active role in
the formulation and implementation of national policies, thus
61 Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, Iron Hand, Velvet
Glove: Studies on Militarization in Five Critical Areas in the Philippines (Geneva:
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, World
Council of Churches, 1980), 1. Ecumenical Movement for Justice
and Peace, "Primer on Militarization," (Manila: Ecumenical
Movement for Justice and Peace, 1988).
62 Mathews George Chunakara, The Militarisation of Politics and Society:
Southeast Asian Experiences (Hong Kong SAR: DAGA Press
Documentation for Action Groups in Asia (DAGA),, 1994).
48
undermining civilian supremacy.63 The Church considers this
issue as a major threat to peace and peacemaking.
Militarization destroys democracy, civilian rule and violates
human rights. It siphons society’s resources which are needed
for social services. It prevents genuine peace-talks with
rebels and insurgent groups to settle armed conflicts.
Militarization thrives on fear, thus it perpetuates wars
and conflicts. Militarization has been proven in the past to
have contributed to the increasing human rights violations.
The militarist solution has in fact fueled the insurgency.
Human rights violations, not ideology, recruit more people to
support the armed rebel movements. But the UCCP recognizes the
legitimacy of having soldiers and police in society. The fact
that the UCCP has the biggest number of Protestant chaplains
in the AFP validates this position.
63 See the following: Carolina Hernandez, "The Role of the
Military in Contemporary Philippine Society," Diliman Review 32,
no. 1 (1984); Viberto. Selochan, Could the Military Govern the
Philippines. ( Quezon City New Day Publishers, 1989). and
Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, 1.
49
Conclusion
This research has shown that the UCCP as a Third Side in
peacemaking has played several roles such as witnessing,
bridge-building, mediating and teaching. Many of the issues or
campaigns of the UCCP were conflict de-escalation activities
such as monitoring of, exposing, protesting against, and legal
measures to address human rights violations resulting from
insurgent and/or counter-insurgency operations; calling for
the resumption of peace talks and forging of ceasefires;
relief and rehabilitation for internal refugees and other
victims caught in the crossfire; the establishment of peace
zones or sanctuaries to demilitarize the armed conflicts; and
the campaign to observe international humanitarian law in the
conduct of the war. The Church believes that there is no
lasting peace without upholding human rights.
The Church has consistently emphasized that the
protection of human rights is intertwined with peacemaking.
Even in the midst of armed conflict the Church has asked the
warring parties, rebels and soldiers alike to respect human
50
rights of combatants and non-combatants especially the women
and children. In addition, the Church continues to denounce
militarization as a major threat to peace. Militarization
destroys democracy, civilian rule and the rule of law.
51
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