Peacemaking Role of the Church in a Situation of Armed

Conflict:

A Philippine Experience

Victor R. Aguilan, Th.D.Divinity School Silliman University

Dumaguete City 6200Philippines

Introduction

Across the Philippines and Asia, religious institutions

have been encouraging men and women to work for peace in the

midst of armed conflicts. They have mobilized activists,

bishops, congregations, and ordinary members to overcome

violent conflicts, to establish and to build communities where

peace is a reality.

This paper analyzes the role of the Philippine Protestant

Church in peacemaking as a third party intervener. Churches

have been active in the search for peace. Church leaders have

been invited to participate in various national consultations,

fora, and peace negotiations. Meanwhile rebel groups (i.e.

Communist and Muslim) have recognized the significant moral

1

influence of Church leaders in peace-making and have requested

them to act as mediators, observers or third-party

facilitators.

The involvement of Churches in peace-making is a

phenomenon that requires a serious study. This paper will focus

on the experience of a Protestant Church in Philippines

specifically the United Church of Christ in the Philippines

(UCCP) as a case study. The research will be limited to the

official actions, statements, resolutions and pastoral letters

produced by the UCCP.

The United Church of Christ in the Philippines is the

largest and most widespread Protestant church in the country.

It was organized in 1948 when the Presbyterian,

Congregational, Methodist and Episcopalian churches came

together to established a single denomination.1 Today, it is

one of the mainline Protestant Churches in the Philippines.2

Citizen Approach to Violent Conflict and Peacemaking

This study uses a citizen-approach to peacemaking

developed by John Paul Lederach and William Ury. Church and

2

religious groups are viewed as “third party” to the ongoing

conflict between the state and the non-state armed group and

are, therefore, in a better position to engage in intermediary

peace building basically on account of their established

neutrality, credibility and non-antagonistic relationship with

the state and non-state armed actors. Citizens and non-

government organizations are in fact an increasingly noted

feature of the landscape of conflict resolution and

peacemaking efforts.

The role of the Church people can be located in the

expanding conceptual terrain of citizen peacemaking. Church

people are also citizens. Citizen efforts seeking to address

deadly and violent conflict can now thus be seen as part of

peacemaking. Several practitioners and scholars have developed

overarching perspectives on the roles that citizens, which

include religious people, can play to help ensure prospects

for peace. John Paul Lederach, for one, offers a model which

he calls “conflict transformation.”3

3

Conflict transformation is different from "conflict

resolution" or "conflict management." Lederach argues that

“conflict transformation” understands better the nature and

dynamics of conflict itself. “Conflict resolution" implies

that conflict is not good bad--hence something that should be

ended. It also viewed conflict as a short term phenomenon that

can be "resolved" permanently through mediation or other

intervention processes. While “conflict management”

acknowledges that conflicts are long-term processes that often

cannot be quickly resolved. However notion of "management"

suggests that people can be controlled or manipulated as

though they were physical objects. Management tends to focus

on the technical side of peacemaking, while ignoring the

cultural and relational issues. In addition, the notion of

management overlooks the root causes of the problem.

The “conflict transformation” approach focuses on the

dialectic nature of conflict. It sees conflict across four

dimensions: personal, relational, structural, and cultural. 4

In this regard, John Paul Lederach asserts that in order to

effectively address conflict, efforts often need to shift away

4

from the issues of the conflict and towards a focus on

reconciling and rebuilding relationships.5 And in order to

make peace, negative or destructive interaction patterns need

to be transformed into positive or constructive relationships.

Lederach focuses on both structural and cultural aspects of

the relationships. It is a strategy that places an emphasis on

conscientization: raising awareness about the inequities of

power and the injustices that people experience as a result of

these inequities.6

William Ury has developed systemic frameworks that map

the overall collective potential of private humanitarian

agencies, human rights advocates, and individual NGOs. He

develops the notion of the Third Side in the conflict.7 In a

conflict it is a commonly held view that there are two sides,

two protagonists, or two parties involve in the conflict.

However in reality there is a third party or a third side.

What is the third side? Ury says this:

The third side is people – from the community – using a

certain kind of power – the power of peers – from a

5

certain perspective – of common ground – supporting a

certain process - of dialogue and non-violence-and aiming

for a certain product-a “triple win.”8

In another work, Ury writes,

[T]he third side is the community itself taking

responsibility for its own conflicts. It’s the community

forming what might be called a ‘winning alliance’ against

violent conflict. It’s the community learning to serve as

a container for contention, a container within which

conflict can be transformed from destructive ways like

violence and war, into constructive ways like dialogue,

negotiation, and democracy.9

His concept of the Third Side places emphasis on the role of

the community members with regard to steering conflicts away

from violence and towards just and lasting peace. Ury

describes ten basic roles of the Third Side:

1. The Witness - The witness watches out for early warning

signals, goes on patrol and reports violent incidents,

and calls for the attention of other community members.

6

2. The Bridge Builder - The basic role of the bridge

builder is to bring people together and help establish

personal relationships.

3. The Equalizer - The central role of the equalizer is to

empower the weak and unrepresented so that they can

negotiate a fair and satisfactory resolution. This

involves helping to bring the powerful to the table,

building collaborative democracy, and supporting

nonviolent action.

4. The Healer - The role of the healer is to help parties

overcome their feelings of anger, fear, humiliation,

insecurity, and grief. This includes listening to

people's grievances, acknowledging hurt feelings, and

encouraging parties to apologize and make reparations.

5. The Mediator - The central roles of the mediator are to

bring the parties to the table, facilitate

communication, and help people to search for a

solution.

7

6. The Arbiter - Whereas a mediator can only suggest a

solution, this person can decide what is right.

Resolving disputes, promoting justice, and encouraging

negotiation are the arbiter's central roles.

1 T. Valentino Sitoy Jr, Several Springs, One Stream: The United

Church of Christ in the Philippines, Vol.Ii: The Formative Decade (1948-1958).

(Quezon City: United Church of Christ in the Philippines,

1997).

2 The mainline Protestant denominations in the country are

the United Church of Christ (UCCP), the United Methodist Church

(UMC), the Iglesia Evangelica Unide de Cristo (UNIDA), the

Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF),

Lutheran Church, Salvation Army, and Convention of Philippine

Baptist Churches.

3 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation

across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).

and John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided

Societies. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace

Press, 1997).

8

7. The Peacekeeper - The central role of the peacekeeper

is to provide protection. This includes interposing

between parties, enforcing the peace, and preempting

violence before it starts.

8. The Provider - The basic roles of the provider are to

share resources and knowledge, give others a sense of

4 Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided

Societies., 82.

5 Ibid., 24.

6 Ibid., 64.

7William Ury, The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop. (New

York: Penguin Books, 2000). William Ury, Getting to Peace:

Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the World, (New York:

Viking, 1999).

8 Ury, Getting to Peace: Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the

World,, 14.

9 William Ury, Must We Fight? From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard-a

New Perspective on Violent Conflict and Its Prevention (San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass., 2002), 78.

9

security, and help ensure that basic human needs are

met.

9. The Referee - The referee establishes rules for fair

fighting, takes away dangerous weapons, and strengthens

defenses.

10. The Teacher - Sometimes people fight simply because

they know of no other way to react when a need is

frustrated and a serious difference arises. The roles

of the teacher are to delegitimize violence, teach

tolerance, and expose people to practical ways of

solving their problems.10

From a Third Side perspective, the community includes any

group or organization performing roles that serve to contain,

resolve or prevent a conflict. The Third Side shares, in common

with other citizen peacemaking approaches, the idea that

peacemaking is a set of processes that requires the engagement

of every dimension of society. The Church as a peacemaker

could be viewed as a Third Side in the conflict. 10 Ury, Getting to Peace: Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the

World,, 114-195.

10

This present study looks at one particular example of a

citizen-approach to peacemaking, the Peacemaking Role of the United

Church of Christ in the Philippines. The researcher believes that the

continued presence of armed conflicts in many parts of the

country has generated the need for more sustained peacemaking

initiatives as well as support from a much broader peace

movement. This study brings into focus the role that the

Church plays in the country’s struggle for genuine peace.

Church and religious groups are viewed as “third party” to the

ongoing conflict between the state and the non-state armed

group and are, therefore, in a better position to engage in

intermediary peace building basically on account of their

established neutrality, credibility and non-antagonistic

relationship with the state and non-state armed actors. The

rationale of the entire research is reflected in this

framework.

UCCP Understanding of Peace

In this study, the term peace includes both “positive”

and “negative” meaning. The negative aspect of peace means the

11

absence of armed conflict and human rights violations. It

focuses on the reduction of the incidence of war and the

prevention of deadly conflict. Negative peace refers to the

absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is

reached, a negative peace will ensue. Positive peace is filled

with positive content such as the restoration of

relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the

needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution

of conflict. The concept of positive peace involves the

elimination of the root causes of war, violence, and injustice

and entails the conscious effort to build a society that

reflects these commitments.11 In the UCCP perspective on peace

and peacemaking both “positive” and “negative” meaning could

be found.

In addition, the term shalom is used in the UCCP official

documents to express this notion of “peace based on justice.”

In the statement, Peacemaking: Our Ministry, the Bishops said: “The

ministry of peacemaking is an imperative of the faith we

11 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,"

Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-193.

12

profess. The Statement of Faith of the United Church of Christ

in the Philippines calls us to participate in the establishment of a

meaningful and just social order.” A significant point mentioned by

the bishop in the Statement was the close connection between

peace and justice. The Church declared that peacemaking was a

concrete expression of justice. It asserted that there can be

no peace without justice. Justice was understood in terms of

meeting the basic needs of people.

For as long as peasants remain landless

For as long as laborers do not receive just wages

For as long as we are politically and economically

dominated by foreign nations

For as long as we channel more money to the military than

to basic social services,

For as long as the causes of social unrest remain

untouched,

There will be no peace.12

The bishops believed that the root of insurgency was the

structures of injustice. 13

13

Major Rebel Groups in Peace Talks with Government

An armed conflict is defined as “a contested

incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory

where the use of armed force between two parties of which at

least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25

battle-related deaths.”14 Another definition of a major armed

conflict is stated as “prolonged use of armed force between

the military forces of two or more governments, or one of one

government and at least one organized armed group, incurring

the battle related deaths of at least 1000 people during the

entire conflict and in which the incompatibility concerns

government and/or territory.”15 This study focuses on intra-

state armed conflict which is defined as an armed conflict

between two groups, of which one is the state, in which

12 Council of Bishops, "Peacemaking: Our Ministry, 21

August 1986," in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia

N. Niguidula (Quezon City: Education and Nurture Desk, United

Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990), 148.

13 Ibid., 147.

14

violence has been used by either or both parties resulting in

human and material casualties.

In the Philippines there are two major armed rebellions.16

One is led by the Communist Party of the Philippines; its

united front-the National Democratic Front and its armed wing

- the New People Army (CPP-NDF-NPA).17 The CPP was established

in 1969 under the chairmanship of Jose Maria Sison after

splitting from the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). During

the founding congress the CPP declared the reestablishment of

the Party as the climax of “long, persistent and arduous

efforts to put Mao Tse-tung’s thought in command among old and

new cadres.”18 From its meager start in 1969 with 35 guerillas,

the NPA grew to 23,000-25,000 full-time fighters in 1985.19 The

underground Communist movement suffered a series of crises. In

1985 and in 1988 the CPP-NDF-NPA carried out internal purges

to neutralize alleged military spies. The purges killed more

than 1,000 of their members. Many of those killed were found

out afterward to be innocent.20 Another crisis was a major

split in the communist movement between “re-affirmists” (RA)

and “rejectionists” (RJ) because of ideological differences

15

and anti-democratic policies of the party. The RJ factions

broke away and went their own paths. Some remained in armed

struggle, others did not.21

One of the factions of the CPP-NPA-NDF established the

Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa–Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian

Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP-RPA-ABB) in 1998. In December

1999, Pres. Estrada met with the leaders of the RPMP-RPA-ABB

in Baguio City to start the formal peace talks. Eventually a

peace agreement and ceasefire was signed on December 6, 2000

in Negros Occidental. The RPMP has about one-third of the

14 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollengberg, "Armed

Conflict, 1989-2000," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2001).

15 Margareta Sollenberg, Peter Walensteen, and Andres

Jato, "Major Armed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments,

Disarmament and International Security( Oxford University Press,

1999), 15. See also Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and

Peter Wallensteen, "Definitions, Sources and Methods for the

Conflict Data. Appendix 2b," in SIPRI Yearbook 2003, ed. SIPRI.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute( Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2003).

16

communist guerillas in the southern regions of Mindanao and

the Visayas islands.22

The other armed rebellion is the Muslim rebellion in

Mindanao as cited in the study of Hilario Gomez.23 The history

of armed conflict in southern Philippines is over three

decades old. Hostility between the Muslims and the Government

of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH)) intensified in the

seventies when the Muslims were subjected to cruel

discrimination by the Marcos dictatorship and led to a violent

uprising among the Moro groups led by the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) who demanded independence. The Moro

National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Bangsa

Moro Army was founded in 1968 under the chairmanship of Prof.

Nur Misuari. The MNLF issued a manifesto in Tripoli, Libya in

1974 declaring the goal of an independent Bangsa Moro

Homeland. Their envisioned independent state is composed of 13

Islamized ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao, Sulu and

Palawan. MNLF membership in 1973 was reported at 15,000. On

September 2, 1996 the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines (GPH)) and the MNLF entered into a peace agreement

17

which also created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM).

Autonomy did not appease a faction within the MNLF who in

1984 had broken away to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

(MILF). The MILF whose leadership is derived from the

16 Paz Verdades M. Santos and others, Primed and Purposeful :

Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small

Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and

Development Studies, 2010).

17 Joel Rocamora, Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist

Party of the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1994);

Alfredo Saulo, Communism in the Philippines : Introduction (Manila:

Ateneo de Manila Univ. Press, 1990); Kathleen Weekley, The

Communist Party of the Philippines 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice

(Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001).,

Patricio N. Abinales, Fellow Traveler: Essays on Filipino Communism

(Quezon City:: University of the Philippines Press, 2001);

Victor N. Corpuz, Silent War (Quezon City: VNC Enterprises,

1989).

18 Saulo, 101-102.

18

traditional, aristocratic and religious elites in Maguindanao

viewed the MNLF as secular and left-leaning. As their name

suggests, their demand was independence to establish an

Islamic State. Its main goals are the promotion of Islam and

the preservation of Moro society. Its presence is

traditionally dominant in North and South Cotabato, Lanao Sur

and Norte, and Maguindanao provinces. It is now the strongest

rebel group in the Southern Philippines.24 GPH and MILF have

been engaged in an on-and-off peace talks for 16 years.

A Historical Overview: From Pres. Marcos to Pres. Benigno

Aquino

Even before Martial Law, as early as in the 60’s the UCCP

was in the forefront in safeguarding the principles of

religious freedom and the separation of Church and State.25 The

19 Corpuz, 22.

20 Abinales, 153-192.

21 Rocamora.

22 RPMP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, "RPM-P: Brief Profile", RPMP

http://www.angelfire.com/rpg2/rpmp/profile.htm (accessed 16

August 2013).

19

General Assembly of 1960 took a definite stand on each of the

following social concerns: economic development, agricultural

development, population trends, modern technology,

industrialization, urbanization, unemployment, trade union

movement and management relation, and responsible laity.26 It

was only during Martial Law that the Church began to speak

about human rights and militarization. In early years of

Martial Law the UCCP with the other religious institutions

were willing to give Pres. Marcos a chance. They thought that

Martial Law would solve the problem of lawlessness,

criminality, violence and poverty. Eight heads of Churches

belonging to the National Council of Churches in the

Philippines (NCCP) even issued a “Resolution of Support”27

Pres. Marcos promised that Martial Law would bring peace and

23 Hilario. Gomez Jr., The Moro Rebellion and the Search for Peace: A

Study on Christian-Muslim Relations in the Philippines (Zambonga: Silsila,

2001). Salah Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 2nd ed. (Lahore:

Islamic Research Academy., 1997).

24 Gomez Jr.

20

order, economic development and an improvement in social

conditions.

But in 1974 the General Assembly of the UCCP issued a

Statement on National Issues, which warned the members and the

government on the danger of military abuses under Martial

Law.28 Within the next four years (1974-1978) of Martial Law,

Marcos revealed its authoritarian and dictatorial character

through questionable referenda and elections in order to

create a semblance of legitimacy as he continued to hold on to

power, confirming the opposition’s allegation that Marcos

declared martial law just to remain in power.29 The Marcos

regime could not tolerate dissent from religious people. The

military raided the offices and homes and arrested the leaders

and staff of the National Council of Churches in the

Philippines (NCCP), which included UCCP members.30

The perspective of the UCCP towards the Martial Law began

to change in 1978. During the first quadrennium of General

Assembly of the UCCP, the Assembly demanded for the

restoration of civil and political liberties and the

25 Sitoy Jr, 1015.

21

dismantling of the martial law making it the first and only

Protestant Church to have issued such statement. The Church

also approved the creation of a Human Rights Desk. The

establishment of the Human Rights Desk of the UCCP and the draft

statement of faith under the Marcos Martial law regime seemed

to indicate a head-on collision course with the Marcos Martial

Law regime.31

And when Pres. Marcos ended Martial Law and lifted it

with Proclamation No. 2045 on 17 January 1981 the UCCP

leadership could not hide their misgivings on the genuineness

of the lifting of martial. To some the Proclamation 2045 did

not really dismantle the machinery of martial law and one-man

rule. But President Marcos retained the machinery of martial

law such as the dreaded Arrest-Search-Seizure-Order (ASSO) and

the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore,

26 General Assembly, "A Statement of Social Concern ,

July 31-August 1, 1970, Appendix Ii 275-291b.," in the Workbook

Twelfth Biennial General Assembly, May 24-28 (1970).

27 Estanislao Abainza and et al, "Resolution of Support,"

NCCP Newsletter, January 1973.

22

Pres. Marcos could still rule as a one-man ruler through his

emergency powers.

From 1981 to 1986, the Church came to conclusion that

peace was not possible in a political context wherein the

State failed to uphold human rights. Worst when the State

became the violator of human rights. Human rights and

democracy were two important themes in the statements issued

by the UCCP under the Marcos regime. The leaders of the UCCP

were not hopeful that under the Marcos regime human rights

violations and militarization would stop. In fact the UCCP

leadership was convinced that the Marcos dictatorial rule had

contributed to the increasing violence and armed conflicts in

Philippine society. Thus the solution to end violence and

armed conflict was to end the dictatorship.

And the people spoke in 1986 in EDSA when million people

gathered and peacefully forced Pres. Marcos to relinquish

power. Mrs. Corazon Aquino succeeded Mr. Marcos and began the

restoration of democracy. The UCCP welcomed the change in

leadership and expressed hope that any changes in the

23

government must include the protection of human rights and

full restoration of democracy. These two elements are

necessary to bring about peace and justice in Philippine

society.

28 Minutes of the Fourteenth General Assembly of the United Church of Christ

in the Philippines, May 16-20, (Cebu City, 1974), 152-153.

29 Ferdinand Marcos, The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines

(Manila: 1972). Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Dictatorship and Martial

Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972 (Quezon City: Great Book

Publishers, 1987).;Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship (San

Francisco, California: Union Square Publications, 1976). Civil

Liberties Union of the Philippines, Three Years of Martial Law

(Makati: 1975). and 9) Conrado De Quiros, Dead Aim: How Marcos

Ambushed Philippine Democracy (Pasig City: Foundation for

Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1997).

30 Victor R. Aguilan, “A Critical-Historical Analysis of

the Church-State Relations under Martial Law from the

Perspective of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines”

(South East Asia Graudate School of Theology, 2003). See also

24

From 1986 to 1992 the UCCP was supportive but critical of

the Aquino government. Commitment to human rights and

restoration of democracy were the priorities of the Aquino

government. The Church believed that to have peace in the

country it would require a legitimate government. And the

Church was committed to work within the framework of the new

Constitution in building a meaningful and just social order.

It was a clear rejection of armed struggle or coup d’etat to

overthrow of a legitimate government. The UCCP had recognized

the necessity of a government to maintain order, resolve the

armed conflict and established just and lasting peace.32

Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos against the Church: Economic Development and

Political Repression in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publisher,

1993).

31 Alvaro Senturias Jr. and others, eds., Human Rights, Justice

and Peace: Manual of References (Quezon City: UCCP, 1989).

32 Council of Bishops, "Statement on the Plebiscite,

January 1987," in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed.

Lydia N. Niguidula (Quezon City: Education and Nurture Desk,

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).

25

When the Aquino government announced its plan to

negotiate with the communist armed group and ordered the

release of political prisoners the UCCP expressed full support

to the government. But when the peace talks failed the

government launched the “total war” against the rebel groups

resulting to gross violations of human rights. The UCCP became

very critical of the government counter-insurgency approach.

The Church officials rejected the militarist solution in

addressing the armed conflict. It consistently denounced

alleged human rights violations committed by soldiers.

Eventually some Church members became victims to increasing

human rights violations. Some were killed by the military.

Other killings were perpetrated by the rebels. But the Church

was perceived to be biased against government soldiers in its

human rights advocacy. Military intelligence had even accused

the UCCP as a communist front and its leaders as communist

sympathizers. This was strongly denied by the Church

officials.33

33 Petz Guerrero, "Twenty-One Days under the "Red-Front"

Label," The United Church Letter, Nov-Dec 1987, 1, 9, 3.

26

The UCCP issued documents34 which revealed the consistent

position of the UCCP in linking peace with human rights

advocacy. There could never peace without upholding human

rights. Even in the midst of armed conflict the Church has

asked the warring parties, rebels and soldiers, to respect

human rights of combatant and non-combatant, women and

children. The Church has rejected the militarist approach or

total war strategy in resolving the armed conflict. The root

cause of armed conflict is the unjust structures which must be

addressed by the State.35 The Church had repeatedly called all

parties to return to the negotiation table and to cease all

hostilities for the good of the country. It has also supported

the formation of peace zones or peace sanctuary. It has even

offered its buildings, premises, and churches as sanctuary or

zone of peace.36 But that NPA rejected any call for a ceasefire

and criticized the any attempt to localize peace talks. While

the government thought that only through a total defeat of the

NPA could there be peace and order.

Under Pres. Ramos, the UCCP expressed its critical

support to peace initiatives of the government. The UCCP

27

leaders participated in the National Unification consultation

(NUC) and peace efforts of the government. The NUC recommended

six paths to peace.37 The first was pursuit of social,

economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root

causes of armed struggle and social unrest. The second path

was consensus building and empowerment for peace through

continuous consultation at the national and local levels. The

third was peace negotiations with armed groups. The fourth

path was implementing measures for reconciliation,

34 Officials documents of the UCCP can be found in Lydia

Niguidula, ed. UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990) (Quezon

City: United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).

35 Council of Bishops, "Peacemaking: Our Ministry, 21

August 1986."; UCCP Executive Committee, "Statement on

Peacemaking, September 1991," The United Church Letter, March 1992.

36 UCCP Executive Committee, "A Declaration of UCCP

Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace, 23 February 1990,"

in UCCP Statements and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia

Niguidula(Quezon City: United Church of Christ in the

Philippines, 1990), 199-200.

28

reintegration of former combatants and rehabilitation of those

affected by the conflict. The fifth was conflict management

and protection of civilians. The sixth path aimed to build,

nurture and enhance a positive climate for peace.

One concrete result of the Ramos peace initiatives was

the peace agreement between the GRP (GPH) and MNLF, which

included the creation of the SPCPD. The UCCP gave a critical

support to the GRP (GPH) and MNLF peace accord. Since the 70’s

the Church has expressed solidarity with the Muslims and

indigenous people of Mindanao. The UCCP has recognized that

the conflict in Mindanao was a result of a long historical

process of marginalization, and discrimination of Muslims and

indigenous groups. The first step to resolve the conflict in

Mindanao, which the UCCP has always believed, was through

dialogue of all stakeholders in Mindanao to find a common

solution.

37 Fidel Valdez Ramos, "Let Us Give Peace a Chance, (Part

I) ", Manila Bulletin Online. http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-

150178456/let-us-give-peace-a-chance-first-of-three-parts

(accessed 12 September 2013).

29

With regard to the armed conflict between the GRP (GPH)

and CPP-NPA-NDF the UCCP tried to convince the parties to

resume peace talks. The UCCP joined the International Peace

Advisory Committee as a third-party group along with the

officers of the National Council of Churches in the

Philippines and some Roman Catholic bishops to persuade the

NDF panel to return to the negotiation table. In spite of the

initiative of the Ramos government the peace effort failed to

resolve the communist armed rebellion. The CPP-NDF-NPA

remained suspicious of the government. The leaders of the CPP-

NPA-NDF had re-affirmed its position that just and lasting

peace could be won only after the complete victory of the

national democratic revolution through armed struggle.

Under Pres. Estrada and Pres. Macapal-Arroyo, the

government took a mailed-fist policy against the insurgent

groups. No ceasefire between the government and the CPP-NPA.

The Arroyo government was putting military action over peace

negotiations in dealing with the CPP-NPA. This militarist

approach promotes anti-democratic values and practices.

Participation of people in politics is viewed as one-sided,

30

i.e., people in conflict areas must show overt support to

soldiers. Groups or individual who do not support the soldiers

were perceived to be supporting the rebels. Dissent is not

tolerated. There is a resurgence of "red-labeling" or

“communist bogey.” Even religious institutions such as the

Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) , UCCP,

Philippine Independent Church, and the NCCP were labeled as

communist fronts. Militarism has led to extrajudicial killings

or political killings. Many of those killed were activists or

militants from different left-leaning political groups.38 The

UCCP has recorded that some twenty (20) members of the Church

have been murdered.39 Human rights groups have accused the

government complicity in the extrajudicial killings.40 The

Arroyo government has denied that it is a State policy. But

the approach chosen by Pres. Arroyo in resolving the armed

conflict, like her predecessor, is the militarist solution or

total war strategy. And the UCCP has consistently reminded the

government that the total war strategy would never solve the

armed conflict and bring about lasting peace in the country.

31

In addition militarism has created a “culture of

impunity” under Arroyo’s government. The term “culture of

impunity” refers to a situation in which people in power in a

society have come to believe that they can do whatever they

want and free from punishment.  In the realm of human rights

law, it refers to the failure to bring perpetrators of human

rights violations to justice. The term gained currency during

her administration because of continuing human rights

38 Amnesty International, "Philippines: Political

Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process", Amnesty

International

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA35/006/2006/en/6d1f

080e-f774-11dd-8fd7-f57af21896e1/asa350062006en.pdf (accessed

16 August 2013).

39 CONTAK Philippines, "21 Church People Killed as of 20

June 2006", CONTAK Philippines

http://contakphilippines.tripod.com/speaknow/id7.html

(accessed 21 August 2013).

40 Miriam Coronel Ferrer, "National Security: The

Invincible Code?," (photocopy, 2006).

32

violation by the military and police and the high number of

unsolved killing of media practitioners, with political

warlords suspected to be the masterminds.41 The Church realized

that the “culture of impunity” undermines the effort to create

a culture of peace

In 2010 ushered the regime of Pres. Benigno “Noynoy”

Aquino. Human rights and peace activists have expressed hopes

that the Aquino government would include peace and human

rights in the major programs of government. The President has

promised to end culture of impunity in the Philippines and end

armed conflicts before 2016. Hence, on June 16, 2011, the

United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) filed a

P5.4-M damage suit against former-president and now Pampanga

Representative Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) her for command

responsibility in connection with murder and abduction of its

member during her term as president. UCCP filed the complaint

41 JM Villero and Bernardo D. Larin, eds., Under the Seal of

Impunity: The State of Human Rights During the Arroyo Administration, vol. 9

January-June 2009 (Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Human

Rights Information Center).

33

through its general secretary Bishop Reuel Norman Marigza.

According to the 18-page complaint, “numerous church pastors

and leaders were liquidated, harassed, unlawfully detained or

tortured with impunity by military agents and operatives, who,

by law, were then all under her ultimate control and command

responsibility.”42

Furthermore the current government has resumed peace

talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) / New People’s Army

(NPA) / National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP).

The government hopes to complete implementation of signed

Final Peace Agreements with the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF) and a closure to the peace negotiations with

Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa – Pilipinas (RPM-P) /

Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA) / Alex Boncayao Brigade

(ABB).43

But last April 2013, the GPH unilaterally terminated the

peace negotiations. Alex Padilla, chief government negotiator,

42 United Church of Christ in the Philippines, "Arroyo Had

Command Responsibility of AFP, Impunity Must End!," (2011).

34

said the presumed “death” of the peace process between the GPH

and NDFP is the result of “endless roadblocks thrown by the

NDF.”44 The UCCP responded to the impasse by joining with the

other Churches and ecumenical bodies to ask the Aquino

government and the NDF to return to the peace talks.

Some UCCP engagements

1. Human Rights Advocacy

The response of the UCCP to the peace and conflict issues

was to engage the government and rebels. The strategies

adopted by the Church in its peacemaking role were many and

varied depending on the conditions and opportunities that43 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

(OPAPP), "Peace and Development Tracks"

http://opapp.gov.ph/peace-and-development-tracks (accessed 10

August 2013).

44 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

(OPAPP), "Remarks of Gph Panel Chair Alexander Padilla: May 6,

2013", Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines

http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/remarks-gph-panel-chair-

alexander-padilla-focap-media-forum (accessed 10 August 2013).

35

prevailed in the different jurisdictions or conferences. To

address peace and human rights problems, some of the

activities of the Church were participation in public

hearings, consultation, dialogues with government agencies.

The UCCP provided legal aid and campaigned for the

indemnification of human rights violation victims. It has

participated in exposing and denouncing human rights

violations in the media and other public forums. On the other

hand, continuing education and organizing work including

networking with other people’s organizations (POs) were

launched as means to sustain the peacemaking role of the UCCP.

This section will discuss selected official responses of the

Church to peace and conflict issues. It will focus on the

efforts of the national leadership.

The years 1986 to 1992, President Aquino’s term, was a

period for restoration of democracy. The UCCP was supportive

of the Aquino government. But the Church human rights advocacy

through the Human Rights Desk (HRD) did not stop. Corruption,

exploitation, oppression and human rights violations continued

to be rampant. In one report to the Executive committee, Mr.

36

Alvaro Senturias, Jr., HRD national coordinator, said “For as

long as society is not transformed we must continue with our

education, organization, mobilization, services and research,

documentation and publication work.”45

In 1989 the HRD work was broadened through the creation

of the “Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Program

Unit.” The Church realized that peace, justice and human

rights are intertwined. The Church renamed the HR Desk to

Justice, Peace and Human Rights Program (JPHR). Much of the

work of the JPHR has been focused on data gathering and

monitoring about cases related to human rights violations

especially committed against members of the Church.

The HRD used to publish a monthly newsletter, The Human

Rights Advocates and Bible study guides. The goal of these

publications was to raise the level of awareness of local

church members on the issue of human rights.46 The UCCP also

conducted various fact-finding missions (FFM) organized with

45 Alvaro Senturias, Jr. “HRD Report of the National

Coordinator of the period July 1986 to January 1987” in the

Minutes of the Exe Com February 25 -28, 1987, QC. UCCP

37

assistance from various international partners and local non-

government organizations (NGOs). The FFM have documented the

failure of the government to uphold human rights of its

citizens and the continuing human rights violations resulting

from the worsening conflict between the government forces and

the rebels specifically in the Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao

regions.47 Civilians perished and properties were destroyed as

government soldiers conducted the dreaded “search and destroy”

operations. 48

The UCCP has also denounced human rights violations

committed by rebel forces. In 1989, the UCCP—through the

initiative of the Human Rights Desk—issued a statement holding

the National Democratic Front and the New People’s Army

accountable for having committed gross human rights violations

against civilians who were members of the UCCP in Binaton,

Digos City, Mindanao where more than 40 people, including

women and children, were killed by the New People’s Army. The

UCCP in an open letter addressed to the Philippine Government

and the National Democratic Front wrote:

38

We condemn this heinous act, and in the name of the

victims, demand justice. Yet in this time of grief, we

recognize that we must not succumb to hate and vengeance.

Such will only serve to further the bloodshed. As a

church committed to a just and lasting peace, we call on

the National Democratic Front to acknowledge full

responsibility for the massacre and to ensure that such a

tragedy will never again occur. We also remind the

Philippine Government that its military approach to

46 Alvaro Senturias Jr., "Inextricably Linked: A

Historical Development of the Program Thrust of the Human

Rights, Justice and Peace Desk of the United Church of Christ

in the Philippines," in Human Rights, Justice and Peace: Manual of

References, ed. Alvaro Senturias Jr. et al.(Quezon City: UCCP,

1989).

47 Furrer Roger, Brenda Gonzalez, and Emily See, eds.,

Mountain Tempest (Quezon City: UCCP, 1991).

48 Senturias Jr. and others, eds., Human Rights, Justice and

Peace: Manual of References.

39

solving insurgency inevitably leads to the escalation of

the level of human suffering in this country.49

The UCCP has acknowledged in that human rights ministry must

always take the side of the victims and should hold the

violators accountable whether perpetrated by rebels or

government soldiers.

2. Peace Zone and Sanctuary

In 1990 during the height of the armed conflict between the

New Peoples Army rebels and soldiers that resulted in the

massive displacement of people the Executive Committee issued

two statements: A Statement of Concern For Internal Refugees, and A

Declaration of UCCP Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace. The church

declared its church buildings, parsonages and lands, hospitals

and schools, and other church-owned institutions and their

premises as “sanctuaries and zones of peace.” “These places49 Erme Camba and others, "Justice Not Vengeance: An Open

Letter to the National Democratic Front and the Government of

the Republic of the Philippines, 3 July 1989," in UCCP Statements

and Resolutions (1948-1990), ed. Lydia N. Niguidula (Quezon City:

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 1990).

40

and premises are open to all people—regardless of color and

creed, sex and status, and of political and religious

affiliation—at all times in all circumstances of need.” Those

places designated as “zones of peace” should be “used for

activities that build community and contribute to a deeper

understanding of and commitment to peace and justice.” Zones

of peace are demilitarized areas. “No arms…and weapons of war

should be brought to nor stored in these church places and

premises.” 50

One case involved 1,300 internal refugees who came down

to Dumaguete City from the hinterland of Negros Oriental in

the Central part of the Philippine to avoid the conflict

between the government soldiers and NPA rebels. 51 Silliman

University, a UCCP related institution, was the only

institution with a big compound to accommodate the internal

refugees. Some faculty members of the Divinity School

50 UCCP Executive Committee, "A Declaration of UCCP

Churches as Sanctuaries and Zones of Peace, 23 February 1990."

41

requested the Administration to allow these people to use the

grandstand and ballfield as evacuation areas.52

4. Peace Education

Some of the engagements of the UCCP on peace where

carried out by the Church-related educational institutions.

The Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. (DCFI) where 99 percent

of the students are Muslims is a UCCP-related institution in

Marawi City, Lanao.  “DCFI is recognized as a partnership of

Christians and Muslims in confronting the challenges brought

about by historical tensions, conflicts and wars.”53 The

Southern Christian College (SCC) has taken initiatives to

promote peace and development in Midsayap, Cotabato that has

been divided by historical conflicts and wars.54 The UNESCO has

selected SCC as a pilot school for tertiary education on

51"Evacuees," The Negros Chronicle, 3 November 1991.

52. Noriel Capulong, "Forum on the Internal Refugees," The

United Church Letter, March 1992.

53 Edna J. Orteza, "The Quest for Lasting Peace: The UCCP

Experience," (photocopy, 12 December 2005).

54 Ibid.

42

peace, human rights, and tolerance.  Other peace activities of

SCC include, the creation of the Community Peace Advocates of

Cotabato (COMPAX) in 1998; the setting up of the Institute for

Peace and Development Studies (IPDS) in 1999; the launching of

Kapihan sa Kalinaw in November 1999; the Paaralang Pangkapayapaan in

2002, and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with

the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation (RPDEV) involving

the sharing of information, studies and research on peace and

development, finding ways to contribute to the peaceful

resolution of the conflict in Mindanao, and monitoring the

implementation of the terms of the peace accord between the

GRP (GPH) and the MNLF.55 In the Visayas, UCCP has ongoing

cooperation with the Justice and Peace Center (JPC) of

Silliman University in Dumaguete. The JPC has developed

training program for pastors and members on building peace and

transforming conflicts. The JPC has linked with the Mennonite

Central Committee (MCC) and the Mindanao Peace Institute

(MPI).56

55 Ibid.

56 Peace Resource Center Brochure

43

5. Third Party/Civil Society Representative

In 1996 the UCCP played another important role in the

peace talks between the GRP (GPH) and the CPP-NPA-NDF. The

General Secretary, Bishop Gomez, was invited to join the

International Peace Advisory Committee as a third-party group

along with the officers of the National Council of Churches in

the Philippines and some Roman Catholic bishops. Bishop Gomez

explained that a third-party for the UCCP would show that “The

Church is church for all and of all both in government and out

of government.” He further added that “As a third party the

UCCP once more shall underscore that the mercies of God are

like rains from heaven, they fall on both, the sinner and the

sinless, the poor and the rich, Communists and non-Communists,

rebel groups and established governments.”57 Bishop Gomez was

also chosen as the civil society representative to peace talks

between the GPH and RPMP-RPA-ABB.

57 Hilario Gomez Jr. , "Building up the Church: Continuing

Task, Pressing Challenge: A Report to the General Assembly

Executive Committee,," in the Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive

Committee November 6-8 (Quezon City: UCCP, 1996), 14.

44

6. Solidarity and Peace Linkages

The UCCP also used its partnership with other churches

and ecumenical bodies to bring to the wider public its human

rights, peace and justice concerns. One major involvement was

with “the Peace for Life (PfL)” a multi-religious, inter-

cultural movement for global justice and peace, which calls

for action, building people’s solidarity, and mobilizing

faith-based resistance to the US war on terror and destructive

forces of corporate globalization. The PfL is supported by the

National Council of Churches in the Philippines and World

Council of Churches.58 There are also individual UCCP members

and leaders who have joined other progressive national

ecumenical organizations such as the Ecumenical Bishops’ Forum

(EBF), Ecumenical Women’s Forum (EWF), and Promotion of Church

People’s Response (PCPR).59

In 2010, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines

with other leaders from the Roman Catholic, Protestant and

Evangelical Churches form the Philippine Ecumenical Peace

58 Orteza.

59 Ibid.

45

Platform (PEPP) to encourage the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines and the National Democratic Front to return to

the negotiating table to talk peace and to stop extrajudicial

killings.

Issues related to Peacemaking

This research has identified two issues connected with

the peacemaking role of the UCCP. These are human rights and

militarization.

Human Rights

The Church has consistently emphasized that the

protection of human rights is integral to its peacemaking

role. Promotion of human rights and democracy is one important

practice in a just peacemaking approach. According to Stassen,

“Extensive empirical evidence shows that the spreading of

democracy and respect for human rights, including religious

liberty, is widening the zones of peace.”60 To remain as a

credible “third-side” in the conflict, the Church should

include in its monitoring the human rights violations

committed by all parties-both State and non-State - in the

46

conflict. It serves as a plumb line for evaluating the

behavior of governments, political movements and members of

society. The UCCP believes that the Christians must stand

firm in defending human rights. Monitoring of human rights

violations should include violations perpetrated by either

government forces or rebels. The Church must take the side of

the victims.

Militarization

Another issue related to peacemaking is militarization.

The role of the Philippine military is now of serious concern

in the light of its role during and following martial law.

What is the role of the military in a democratic society?

Militarization has been defined or described as “the process

whereby military values, ideology and patterns of behavior

60 Glen H Stassen, Just Peacemaking : The New Paradigm for the Ethics of

Peace and War, New ed. (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008).; and

Glen H. Stassen, "New Paradigm: Just Peacemaking Theory"

http://www.fullerseminary.net/sot/faculty/stassen/cp_content/h

omepage/Resource_files/1what_is_just_peacemaking_.htm

(accessed 10 August 2013).

47

achieve a dominating influence on the political, social and

economic, and external affairs of the State and as a

consequence the structural ideological and behavioral patterns

of both society and government are militarized.”61 It is a

political process whereby the military plays an active role in

the formulation and implementation of national policies, thus

undermining civilian supremacy.62

The UCCP clearly rejects militarization because it will

not bring about just and lasting peace. Militarization is a

political process whereby the military plays an active role in

the formulation and implementation of national policies, thus

61 Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, Iron Hand, Velvet

Glove: Studies on Militarization in Five Critical Areas in the Philippines (Geneva:

Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, World

Council of Churches, 1980), 1. Ecumenical Movement for Justice

and Peace, "Primer on Militarization," (Manila: Ecumenical

Movement for Justice and Peace, 1988).

62 Mathews George Chunakara, The Militarisation of Politics and Society:

Southeast Asian Experiences (Hong Kong SAR: DAGA Press

Documentation for Action Groups in Asia (DAGA),, 1994).

48

undermining civilian supremacy.63 The Church considers this

issue as a major threat to peace and peacemaking.

Militarization destroys democracy, civilian rule and violates

human rights. It siphons society’s resources which are needed

for social services. It prevents genuine peace-talks with

rebels and insurgent groups to settle armed conflicts.

Militarization thrives on fear, thus it perpetuates wars

and conflicts. Militarization has been proven in the past to

have contributed to the increasing human rights violations.

The militarist solution has in fact fueled the insurgency.

Human rights violations, not ideology, recruit more people to

support the armed rebel movements. But the UCCP recognizes the

legitimacy of having soldiers and police in society. The fact

that the UCCP has the biggest number of Protestant chaplains

in the AFP validates this position.

63 See the following: Carolina Hernandez, "The Role of the

Military in Contemporary Philippine Society," Diliman Review 32,

no. 1 (1984); Viberto. Selochan, Could the Military Govern the

Philippines. ( Quezon City New Day Publishers, 1989). and

Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, 1.

49

Conclusion

This research has shown that the UCCP as a Third Side in

peacemaking has played several roles such as witnessing,

bridge-building, mediating and teaching. Many of the issues or

campaigns of the UCCP were conflict de-escalation activities

such as monitoring of, exposing, protesting against, and legal

measures to address human rights violations resulting from

insurgent and/or counter-insurgency operations; calling for

the resumption of peace talks and forging of ceasefires;

relief and rehabilitation for internal refugees and other

victims caught in the crossfire; the establishment of peace

zones or sanctuaries to demilitarize the armed conflicts; and

the campaign to observe international humanitarian law in the

conduct of the war. The Church believes that there is no

lasting peace without upholding human rights.

The Church has consistently emphasized that the

protection of human rights is intertwined with peacemaking.

Even in the midst of armed conflict the Church has asked the

warring parties, rebels and soldiers alike to respect human

50

rights of combatants and non-combatants especially the women

and children. In addition, the Church continues to denounce

militarization as a major threat to peace. Militarization

destroys democracy, civilian rule and the rule of law.

51

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