Post on 13-May-2023
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 1
Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Religious Extremism
Andrew (Nachum) Klafter, MD
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Background:
Halakha, Jewish Law, has historically operated as a safeguard against
both religious laxity as well as religious extremism. The halakha developed in
phases of Jewish history where Jews, in order to have a normal economic and
social existence, had to function as part of a traditional, religious community,
within the constraints of that community’s cultural and social norms. A major
component of those social norms were religious, as governed by the halakha.
This means that rulings in Jewish law were not simply a private matter between
an individual Jew and his or her rabbi, as it is nowadays. Rulings in Jewish law,
depending on the issue involved, could potentially impact the lives of literally
everyone in a city or region and change the expectations or social norms of the
entire community. Before the Emancipation (which is when participation with
or assimilation into the surrounding Gentile culture became a practical
possibility), there was a great reluctance among halakhists to innovate stringent
rulings. Poskim were guided, and constrained practically, by the dictum of our
Sages: הב לעמוד יןיכול הציבור רוב כן אם אלא ציבורה על גזרה ןגוזרי אין (‘We do not impose
decrees upon the community unless we are confident that at least the majority
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 2
of the community will be able to fulfill it.’). Although this Talmudic rule strictly
refers to the gezerot and takkanot of the Sanhedrin (see Mishneh Torah,
Mamrim, chapter 2 for an overview of this rule), this also served as a general
principle for halakhists in later peroids. To issue rulings in Jewish Law which a
substantial portion of the community might not accept would actually
constitute a grave threat to the integrity of the Torah by undermining the
authority of Jewish Law. Non-compliance with halakhic rulings would render
the religious leadership impotent, and the halakha irrelevant or at best optional.
It is therefore quite understandable that innovative stringent rulings in
Jewish law were far less frequent from the closing of the Talmud through the
Medieval period and early modern period, through the 18th century. But
starting in the 1800’s, chumrot become much more common. By the 20th
Century, promulgation of chumrot has increased to such an extent that we
see that cities that distinguish themselves as being bastions of Torah
scholarship (Bnei Brak and Lakewood being prime examples) are equally
distinguished in their tendency toward chumra. We also see that in the
traditional Sefardic communities, which did not go through the same
process of Emancipation, chumrot were far less common until their
transplantation to the Land of Israel, where they are influenced by the
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 3
Ashkenazim, and also where they are susceptible to assimilation within the
State of Israel’s larger, secular, liberal society. Until the late 20th century,
Sefardic poskim took responsibility for all members of their communities,
from the least observant to the most pious, and therefore the tendency
toward chumra was curtailed.1
In liberal, Western democracies, things are very different. The individual
autonomy enjoyed by Jews residing in the West has led to a bifurcation of the
Jewish world into those with little or no connection to traditional religious life,
and to an Orthodox community which is more punctiliously observant and
stringent than ever before in our history. The majority of Jews do not see
themselves as bound by the mitzvot. They observe only what they wish to
observe, and have no relationship with halakhists. Therefore, the audience of
today’s poskim is limited to only the most pious Jews who are seek guidance
from their religious authorities, and who are equally as likely to accept a
1 A common explanation for the advent of innovative stringency in halakha is that it is a reaction to the haskala (Jewish enlightenment) heterodox Jewish movements (i.e., Reform Judaism, Conservative Judaism, and secular Jewish movements such as secular Zionism or Bundism). An analysis of halakhic stringency after the Shoah has been discussed by Haym Soloveitchik in his important essay, “Rupture and Reconstruction” (Tradition 28:4, 1994). Soloveitchik attributes the popularity of halakhic stringency in the late 20th Century Orthodox Jewish world as a paradoxical result of the loss of our mesorah (‘mimetic tradition’), and the resulting shift from a mesorah/tradition-based faith community where people learn their religious practices from their parents and grandparents, to a text-based community where people learn their religious practice from books. Solovetchick’s compelling and influential thesis, which I have no doubt is precisely correct regarding the shift to the right during the late 20th Century, cannot account for the rise in stringency which had already began in the 1800’s.
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 4
stringent ruling as a lenient one. With regard to contemporary halakhists,
another interesting phenomenon is observed: it is well known that major
poskim nowadays are badgered and pressured into issuing prohibitions and
bans. Those who have spent significant time in the administrative offices of the
our generation’s leading halakhists report that that these leaders are inundated
with literally hundreds of requests each year by extremists who are lobbying
them to issue prohibitions. In these scenarios, it is not halakhic scholars
themselves who sense, for example, that a particular book should be banned, or
that a certain Haredi musical artist’s recordings and performances are
inappropriate. Nor are these instances where pious individuals feel their own
personal discomfort or conflict while listening to music or reading certain
material and understandably seek their own spiritual guidance. Rather, zealots,
who have already made up their minds that the religious community is
engaging in an inappropriate practice, launch a campaign against to put an end
to some perceived spiritual breach or threat. The zealot will typically travel to
as many influential leaders as he can contact, lobbying all of them to issue a
ruling against a book, musician, institution, food, fashion, or whatever
phenomenon has come into their radar. When an authority disagrees and
refuses to issue the requested ruling, the zealot may turn against that posek. It
is also significant to note that when a zealot has successfully persuaded a posek
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 5
to issue a ruling, it is the zealot and not the posek who will publicize the
prohibition in the form of advertisements in religious periodicals and pashkevils
[broadside posters which condemn or ban an individual or practice] in public
places frequented by observant Jews. Therefore, no one has can really be sure,
nowadays, exactly what rulings were given, in what language, and in what
context. Sometimes, directly conflicting rulings are attributed to the same
authority, and in general we now suffer from great confusion about the
authenticity of opinions reported in a scholar’s name.
Let me cite an example from the 16th century which will illustrate how
much things have changed. The city of Tzefat in the 1500’s was the center of a
fantastic religious renaissance, marked by an explosion of spiritual revival,
creativity, and scholarship. A religious controversy (one of many, actually) was
caused by a group of scrupulous, pious extremists, who took upon themselves a
stringency in the observance of terumot and maasarot. The Torah requires that
we separate tithes from produce grown in the land of Israel. The settled
halakha follows the Rambam, who rules that there is no requirement to
separate teruma and ma’aser from produce grown on lands owned by non-Jews.
Rabbi Yitzchak Ben Asher HaLevi (‘Rib”a’, one of the ba’alei Tosfos, who I
believe was one of Rashi’s personal students) had ruled stringently in this issue,
but the settled halakha did not follow his view. This group of scrupulous
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 6
extremists wished to take upon themselves the strict ruling of Riba as a chumra.
All evidence would suggest that their motivations were interpreted to be
sincere and pious. However, the leading rabbis of the day ruled that they were
not permitted to follow this strict opinion. Rabbi Yosef Karo, author of the
Shulchan Arukh, declared that this group of pious individuals were extremists,
that their pious act would weaken the authority of the Torah by rejecting legal
precedent in halakha, and that they threatened the cohesiveness of the Jewish
community. Rabbi Karo censured them for their “slight to the honor of our
ancestors” and for their “transgression of the Biblical commandment of lo
titgodedu” (see the Kesef Misnha to Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teruma 1:11).2
Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine that Rabbis would ban a group of
pietists who would take this or a similar chumra upon themselves for sincere
religious motivations. Our rabbis are dealing with a totally different reality.
Their rulings are sought by two groups of people: (1) zealots who really are not
interested in their opinion or guidance, but are seeking their support for a
position they have already made up their minds on, and (2) pious Jews who are
seeking their guidance and who will mostly likely be willing to follow a strict
2 Explanation: Lo titgodedu (Devarim 14:1) is the prohibition against ritual self-mutilation, which was a pagan mourning practice among the ancient Canaanites. In the Midrash and Talmud, lo titgodedu is homiletically interpreted to mean that one may not publicly display acts of religious piety which undermine the majority view and which may lead to disunity in the community. Such behavior will ‘cut the community into different factions’.)
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 7
opinion. Today’s halakhists simply do not take responsibility in their rulings
for the entire Jewish people. Even if the wished to, they have no contact with or
means to communicate with the majority of Jews, who have no connection to
them or interest in their guidance. This trend is not limited to halakhists. The
most influential Orthodox leaders of the 20th Century took responsibility only
for adherents of Orthodox Judaism. Those who were not Orthodox were simply
not part of their flock. (Notable exceptions to this model would be the late, 7th
Lubavitcher Rebbe ל"צז who issued very few rulings in Jewish Law, but directed
his efforts as a spiritual leader toward all Jews; םייבדל בין החיים ובין חחי , Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks א"טשלי , former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, whose intellectual
and philosophical scholarship is focused on the totality of Klal Yisrael; and
Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook ל"זצ , the first Chief Rabbi of the Land
of Israel and outstanding halakhist of his generation, whose halakhic rulings
were concerned equally with the non-religious majority in the Land of Israel. I
believe that Rabbi Kook is the only major halakhist since the 19th century who
stands against this general trend.)
What is Extremism, and what is Not Extremism:
I will use the terms “extremist” and “zealot” interchangeably. Two,
related components qualify a belief or practice as extremist. (1) It is expression
of an ideology or religious value in a manner which shows a more zealous
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 8
concern than what is shared by the mainstream faith community and its
religious leadership. (2) The extremists are deliberately distinguishing
themselves from the mainstream community and leadership. In other words,
the zealots and extremists are rejecting the ethos of the mainstream religious
community and refuse to submit to the authority of its leadership.
Stringency is not equivalent with extremism. When two poskim
[authorities in Jewish religious law] arrive independently at two different
conclusions on a different issue, it may be that one is more stringent than the
other. It may also be the case that if we would study their rulings on a variety
of issues, we will discern a pattern that of a tendency in one more than the
other toward stringency on a variety of issues, revealing a general trend in his
religious philosophy or legal methodology. However, that is not a
manifestation of extremism. Shammai and Hillel tended, respectively, toward
rigidity and accommodation. We typically rule like Beit Hillel, but we do not
believe that Beit Shammai were extremists. To the contrary, Beit Shammai also
represented a normative view. (In fact, according to some traditions, we will
rule like Beit Shammai in the Messianic era in the particular. We also say
regarding their disputes, ‘eilu ve-eilu...’, i.e., both are legitimate expressions of
God’s Will.) In trying to define extremism, it is easy to slip into a subjectivity
trap, and label any expression of religiosity which is more severe than our own
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 9
personal instincts to be a manifestation of extremism. If it “feels” too extreme
to me, I may label it as extremist. Let’s call this a “subjective definition of
extremism.” Although many people probably think about extremism in this
manner, I want to emphasize that I think this approach is incorrect and will not
help us understand the phenomenon. People raised according to a religious
community’s normative values cannot be concerned extremists as they are
reflective of the norm, not rebelling against it. And when we look judgingly at
other Orthodox communities, it would be wise to remember that outsiders
often look at all of us as extremists.
The definition of extremism I have offered above is not subjective. But it
is somewhat “relativistic” in the sense that extremism cannot occur in a
vacuum. Extremism is always a reaction to the norm. This means the norm
must exist before the extremist can react to it. The very definition of the word
“extremist” implies a form of comparison. It is extreme, at the edge, at the
boundary, pushing the limits. It implies that there is a center or norm that we
are measuring against. This definition is concerned with the process rather
than the content of the issue at hand. In other words, we need not make a
value judgment about the actual ideology that someone espouses. We are
simply noting that a given ideology or position on a specific issue is more
extreme than the majority’s beliefs, and that this person is rejecting the
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 10
majority’s ideology as being inadequate. To an outsider, I’m sure that the
lengths to which observant Jews go to avoid chametz on Pesach would be seen
as fanatical and extremist. But learned Orthodox Jews are aware that this is the
mesorah we have followed for 2,00o years (if not longer). Let’s imagine,
however, that a zealot would decide that we need to also conduct an annual
search of our property in order to get rid of any books or magazines which
express Zionist beliefs, and that the next morning we ritually burn all of this
literature in the same way be burn our chametz. To an outsider who knows
nothing about Orthodox Judaism, this would look no more extreme than
burning chametz. But those who are knowledgeable about Judaism see this for
what it is: It is an act of protest and rejection, against the mainstream. This
individual could find support in the rabbinic literature (‘sifrei ha-minim’). But
this individual’s views are far more extreme than the norm of his religious
community, and his position is also a protest statement against his
community’s religious leadership, whom he believes have been negligent.
Two different motivations for extremism:
To review, extremism is both relative and objective. It’s relative in the
sense that it is only ‘extreme’ in comparison with a more normative mainstream
that the extremist wishes to distance himself from. However it is not
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 11
subjective. I cannot label a view as extremist just because I am personally
uncomfortable with it. It must be actually deviant from the mainstream, and,
as explained above, it must but deliberately fashioned as a rejection of the
mainstream. Zealots are saying, “You are not good enough,” or “Your position
is too lenient or soft.”
I wish to submit the following idea: I think are basically two pathways by
which extremist practices come into circulation: I will call these pathways (1)
Scrupulous Extremism and (2) Narcissistic Extremism. While these pathways
are not mutually exclusive, I think they are exhaustive, and explain all religious
extremism. I find support for my in the following concepts which are
frequently cited in the halakhic literature regarding motivations to take on
stringencies beyond the normative requirements of the law: יחמיר נפש בעל
(translation: ‘a scrupulous individual is should follow the more stringent
ruling’) and יוהרא (loose translation: ‘adopting the stringent ruling rather than
the more lenient, majority opinion is an act of pompous grandstanding’). The
Sages respect and support the fear of sin, but they have no tolerance for
pomposity and arrogance.
1. Scrupulous extremism:
All human beings have conflicting motivations which pull them toward
obedience and closeness to G-d and away from sinfulness on the one hand, and
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 12
toward individual freedom and pleasure on the other. These tensions are
present in every religious person, to greater or lesser degrees. Scrupulosity is a
desperate fear of sinfulness. (This may often be a symptom of Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder, though for the purposes of this essay it is not important
whether a clinical diagnosis is present.) Normal human experience (like sexual
longing, or hunger, or even boredom during tefillot) for scrupulous individuals
can become a wave of terror or horrifying guilt. In order to cope with these
unpleasant emotions, individuals afflicted with scrupulosity often adopt
safeguards against sin which are outside the parameters of the requirements of
Jewish Law. As mentioned above, the halakha allows, in some situations, for
scrupulous individuals who are intensely distressed about sinfulness to take
upon themselves a more stringent halakhic opinion, even though the settled
halakha is more lenient. However, the halakha does not allow people to willy-
nilly fabricate stringencies for themselves. It would not, for example, be
appropriate for someone to decide that after eating fleishigs he must not only
wait 6 hours before eating milchegs, but also change his clothing and recite
viduy. That is not an accepted opinion and such behavior would have no
validity in the halakhic system. In other situations, even well-known stringent
minority opinions are not tolerated due to social considerations for the rest of
the community. The example given above from 16th century Tzefat is an
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 13
example of this, where the rabbis acted to prevent the emergence of a sectarian,
extremist group.
The progression from scrupulosity to extremism is mediated both
psychologically as well as socially and politically. The scrupulous individual
seeks to change the outside world in order to spare him the afflictions of his
scrupulosity. For example, there is a group of individuals in certain cities in
Israel who have attempted to coerce women on public buses to sit in the
back. The same individuals have also attempted to bar women from walking
on public sidewalks in their neighborhoods. This is lead to violent
confrontations with the police in many cases, and physical altercations with
women riding buses and with their husbands who have accompanied them.
I am not referring to culturally insensitive, irreligious women who are
immodestly dressed, but fully observant, Haredi women who are simply
riding the buses that serve their religious neighborhoods. These practices
are condemned by all mainstream Haredi religious leaders. It is not a
reflection of a particular stream of Orthodox Judaism. Such individuals are
unsatisfied with the directives of the mainstream religious leadership. Note
this comment by the most authoritative posek of the late 20th Century, Rabbi
Moshe Feinstein, ל"זצ , who ruled that not only is it entirely permissible to
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 14
ride on public transportation with mixed genders, but those who experience
this as sexually provocative have a responsibility to try to change their own
internal reaction pattern (rather than attempt to impose a change on the rest
of the world).
ולכן לא שייך לחוש מללכת בסאבוויי ובאסעס בשעת הליכה לעבודה שדחוקים ודחופים אנשים ונשים אף
דהנגיעה בלא מתכוין מחמת שא"א לו ליזהר אין זה דרך תאוה וחבה. ,שלא יוכל ליזהר מנגיעה ודחיפה בנשים
ליכא איסור מהאי טעמא גם לישב אצל אשה כשליכא מקום אחר דג"כ אין זה דרך תאוה וחבה... אבל אם וכן
יודע שהוא יבוא לידי הרהור יש לו למנוע מללכת אז אם אין נחוץ לו, ואם מוכרח לילך אז ג"כ לעבודתו אין
שם הי"ט וע"ז יוכל הרמב"םלאסור לו אף בכה"ג, ויתחזק להסיח דעתו מהן ולהרהר בדברי תורה כעצת
לסמוך ולילך לעבודתו. ואם יודע שטבעו רע ויבוא מזה לידי קישוי אבר אסור לו לילך אז גם לעבודתו. אבל
שה וה"ה על האיש וצריך לעסוק בתורה ח"ו לאדם להיות כן דבא זה מבטלה כדאיתא בכתובות דף נ"ט על הא
.ובמלאכה ולא יהיה כך
Therefore, there is no need to refrain from traveling on subways and buses during rush hour, when people are crowded together, even if it is impossible to avoid physical contact with women. This is because contact without intent for pleasure that results from the inevitable crowding and pushing is not done in an affectionate (chiba) or licentious (ta’ava) manner…. Similarly there is no prohibition, for this same reason, to sit next to a woman when there is no other place available, because this is also not done in an affectionate or licentious manner…. However if one knows that he will experience arousing sexual thoughts, then he should refrain from commuting if it is not absolutely necessary. But if he absolutely must travel in such a situation in order to get to his place of work, then it is permitted for him to do so even if [he will experience sexual thoughts]. But he must fight to divert his mind from such thoughts, and instead think about words of Torah, as the Rambam advises (Issurei Bi’ah 21:19), and he can rely on this and continue to travel to work. However, if one knows that he has a lustful nature and that he will become sexually aroused – then it is prohibited even if he needs to travel on the buses and subways for his job. But Heaven forbid that a person should be that way! This is a result of idleness, as discussed on Ketubot 49, which discusses women, but this applies equally to men. Therefore one needs to be involved in Torah study and in work, so he will no longer be like this.
The individuals who engage in this behavior have been shown these sources,
and simply reject them as inadequate. When such individuals attract like-
minded following and dig in their heels against the mainstream, an extremist
faction is born. Sometimes, these confrontations become violent. Another
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 15
modern day extremist group refer to themselves as Sikrikim. This small
group, numbering perhaps a few hundred families in Jerusalem, have
claimed responsibility for arson and assault against individuals and
institutions which they believe are too moderate in their opposition to
secular Zionism. Oddly, the group most frequently targeted by the Sikrikim
are the Gerrer Hassidic community because of their historical affiliation with
Agudath Israel and, in the estimation of the Sikrikim, their inadequate stance
against secularism. The Rabbis of 16th Century Tzefat sensed the danger of
factions which define themselves by extremist ritual practice and therefore
took steps to nip what they believed was a noxious branch in the bud.
2. Narcissistic Extremism:
All human beings have a need to cultivate a positive sense of self. Positive self-
regard, often referred to as ‘self-esteem’ is a vital capacity for normal
relationships, impulse control, and social responsibility. Individuals who are
extraordinarily sensitive to slights, criticism, and rejection are thought of as
‘narcissistically vulnerable’. ‘Narcissistic personalities’ are personality
configurations which are organized around protecting the individual from
shame, evaluation, rejection, and a sense of inadequacy. One such personality
type is referred to in the last three editions of American Psychiatric
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 16
Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) as the ‘Narcissistic
Personality Disorder’.3 Such individuals cope with their narcissistic
vulnerability by cultivating an arrogant, haughty, imperious persona. The
rabbinic literature refers to such individuals as ‘בעלי גאווה’. When I refer to some
zealotry as ‘narcissistic’, what I mean is that the underlying motivations behind
embracing an extremist ideology is that it gives the zealot a sense of mission,
importance, self-worth, and significance. By ‘narcissism’, I mean those mental
activities which have as their primary motivation the cultivation of a strong,
vibrant, sturdy, and emotionally positive sense of oneself. It is typically a
coping strategy to undo or repress an enfeebled, unstable, insignificance,
devalued, impotent sense of self.
There are some individuals who wish to distinguish themselves by ‘out-
frumming’ the most pious influential religious leaders of our generation. I
recently read a nasty essay mocking the leadership of the Mo’etzet Gedolei
HaTorah of the American Agudath Israel Organization. The author wrote that
council’s president, “Under his Homberg is a kippa sruga.” (Translation: He
gives an outward appearance of traditional piety, but he is covertly a religious
3 It is important, however, to note that the originator of the concept of Narcissistic Personality Disorders, Heinz Kohut, used the term more inclusively to refer to all ‘disorders of the Self’, i.e., any personality disorder which has at its core a wish to protect the individual from shame and narcissistic injury. Many individuals afflicted with the avoidant traits, for example, could also be described as having a narcissistic personality disorder, with very similar underlying dynamics and fears when compared with the haughty and arrogant individuals portrayed in the DSM. The difference would be in their defensive style.
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 17
liberal.) Such individuals are motivated not by piety but by a need for
influence, power, fame, and admiration. Sometimes, such individuals have
more intricate political motives, are seeking to be appointed to important
leadership positions, or are posturing for some other political or social purpose.
But, again, the driving motivation is not piety; rather, it is a form of
grandstanding. Again, in the halakha, this is referred to as yuhara. Our Sages
have no tolerance for grandstanding and pompousness. Such behavior is
forbidden because it is (a) inherently inappropriate to conduct oneself in an
arrogant manner, (b) unbecoming to exploit religious symbols for one’s
narcissistic agenda, and (c) will often set up a dynamic of competition and
intolerance.
Yir’at Shamayim, Scrupulosity, or Extremism?
I wish to distinguish between pathological scrupulosity and yir’at
shamayim. Individuals who are suffering from scrupulosity/OCD are, in fact,
truly suffering. The overall motivation is not a principled, rational, deliberate
attempt to cultivate a closer relationship with HaShem. Rather, it is an act of
desperation against a pathological fear of sin which produces symptoms of
mental illness. They need help ending the distress they feel from their anxiety.
In most cases, it is probably not possible to distinguish between these two
phenomena without hearing what the person’s subjective experience. And the
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 18
two are not mutually exclusive. I have heard reliable testimony about a famed
sage, who was no doubt a saintly and humble leader in addition to being one of
the greatest rabbinic scholars of his generation. He appears to have suffered
from an obsession with Christian religious symbols. Specifically, he was
troubled that telephone poles in Israel are constructed in a way which he felt
may resemble a cross, and he attempted persuade the telephone company to
design a different form for their telephone poles. The phone company did not
comply with his request. However, he did not wage a campaign to force them
to do this. In other words, he suffered from scrupulosity, but was not an
extremist. I once consulted with a yeshiva student who suffered a similar
obsession – he would scan houses and buildings and look for doorways or trim
which resembled a cross. He typically immersed himself in a mikvah after he
saw what he believed was the form of across. He had a pathological,
unreasonable fear of being contaminated with Christian theology. His roshei
yeshiva attempt to reassure him that there was no such danger of spiritual
contamination, and when the saw they were unable to console him they
referred him for treatment. Again, this individual suffers from scrupulosity, a
sub-type of OCD, but he is not an extremist. He is not trying to coerce others
to adopt his practice, or demanding that the construction of his parents’ home
be altered to alleviate his fears.
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 19
Clinical Illustration of Narcissistic Extremism
A 35 year old convert to Judaism consulted with me for depression. He
resided in another city and sought consultation with due to his confidentiality
concerns with anyone local. Although he had converted to Judaism under the
auspices of the Rabbi of an Ashkenazi congregation, and resided in an
Ashkenazi community. He was recognized as a talented chazzan, and was
periodically asked to lead the tefillot in his congregation. A capable Torah
student, he felt that he was constantly under-recognized and under-
appreciated. He independently studied Rabbi Yaakov Chaim Sofer’s entire Sefer
Kaf Ha-Chaim (similar in format and purpose to the Mishnah Berura but based
on Sephardic religious custom and precedent), an impressive feat for a convert
with no yeshiva training, and faithfully adhered to its rulings. He wanted to
give classes on Judaism in his community, but there was little interest. He
switched his custom to the Sephardic rite. Then, attempted to imitate the
Sephardic pronunciation and melody when he led the prayers. As a result, he
was no longer asked to lead the prayer service. He complained that he was
being discriminated against for being Sephardic. He also protested against
what he perceived as inappropriately lenient practices of the local Va’ad
HaKashrut which had been followed for many decades at local kosher
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 20
establishments. He attempted to form a break-off minyan [congregation] in his
home, and advertised a prominent Sephardic Hakham [rabbi] in Israel as its
halakhic authority. He attracted some individuals, and began giving classes
which were critical of the local rabbis. He attempted to recruit non-Jews for
potential conversion, planning for them to be converted by a Sefardic Beit Din
in Israel. He also began studying for rabbinic ordination. After the local rabbis
could no longer tolerate his disruptiveness, they contacted the Hakham in
Israel and shared their narrative of the troublemaker’s activities, and their
assessment of his character. That Hakham immediately withdrew all support
and sternly chastised him to submit to the authority of his communal rabbis.
He fell into a depression.
It was clear after a few appointments by phone that this man is suffering
from a very fragile and unstable sense of self. He defends against feelings of
inadequacy and emptiness by cultivating grandiose fantasies. His grandiosity
leads him to always adopt a contrarian or unpopular view. His contrarian view
allows him to feel that he is the only one who is correct, and to fantasize that he
will persuade others to see the correctness of his vision. He believed he was on
the verge of creating an alternate Sephardic community, which he would lead.
He adopted extremist positions on a number of issues, fancying himself a zealot
on one issue or another. In a very preliminary countertransference reaction, I
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 21
felt personally tempted to show him how preposterous many of his positions
were, including but not limited to the notion that he could ‘become’ a Sefardi.
When talking about his feelings of disappointment and abandonment by his
synagogue, and more recently by his beloved Sefardic Hakham, he became less
arrogant, softer, and more open to the perspectives of others. I referred to a
capable psychotherapist in his city who is not a member of the Orthodox
community, but is culturally informed and respectful. I have not heard a follow
up or update on his situation. He was considering leaving Judaism altogether at
the time of his consultation with me, and I do not know what he decided to do.
On the one hand, his own experience of the rabbis of his community is that
they were very dismissive and disrespectful to him. However, it is not difficult
to imagine how they became angered by his provocative communal activities.
Moreover, I do believe that had he been successful in creating his alternate
community, this individual would have been dangerous for anyone who joined.
As a narcissistic leader, the spiritual needs of his followers would have been
entirely subordinate to his own narcissistic agenda. Such leaders, as we know,
can to great harm to their follows. Therefore, I believe that the rabbis of his
community were correct to neutralize him.
Concluding thoughts
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 22
Religion is a complex interface of intrapsychic, interpersonal, communal,
and spiritual forces. As religious psychotherapists, we are natives, totally
immersed in our communal and personal religious experiences. Yet, we are
simultaneously outsiders, called upon to step back from our subjective religious
instincts and to examine and analyze the psychological needs of our religious
brethren. As religious Jews, we admire the spiritual heights attained by
tzaddikim and the austere sacrifices made by our finest scholars and leaders.
But as psychotherapists, we also wish to care for people who are needlessly
suffering from psychological disorders.
An ironic consequence of the enlightenment is that radical religious
groups who wish to impose their religious views on others have more latitude
in liberal democracies than in theocracies. The Western, liberal, democratic
right to freedom from religion protects zealots as well as secularists.
Psychotherapists who work in devout populations routinely evaluate
patients who suffer from pathological scrupulosity, and frequently encounter
the consequences of religious extremism. All psychotherapists routinely
encounter patients with narcissistic problems. Narcissism will always
become invested into the values and status symbols of the narcissistic
individual’s surrounding culture. In Orthodox communities which value
Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 23
piety and scholasticism, it makes good intuitive sense that narcissistically
vulnerable individuals will exhibit their exhibitionistic grandiosity in
scholarship and piety.
Many of our internal debates on this list serve revolve around the
difference between piety and scrupulosity. Our religious sensibilities are
offended when we sense that a cherished religious value has been demeaned or
pathologized. Conversely, we wish to point out when harmful psychopathology
is rationalized or excused in the name of spirituality. Reasonable people can
and do disagree about such matters. However, when extremist religious
believes become a protest against the mainstream community, and results in
bullying or even violence, the lines between piety and extremism are no longer
unclear.
- - - - Nachum Binyamin Klafter, MD
קלאפטער בנימין נחום דר' 7502 State Road, Suite 2800 Cincinnati OH 45255-2800 Phone (513) 474-8900 Fax (513) 233-6693 doctorklafter@cinci.rr.com