Dynamics of Religious Extremism - Discussion and Clinical Illustration

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Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 1 Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Religious Extremism Andrew (Nachum) Klafter, MD --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Background: Halakha, Jewish Law, has historically operated as a safeguard against both religious laxity as well as religious extremism. The halakha developed in phases of Jewish history where Jews, in order to have a normal economic and social existence, had to function as part of a traditional, religious community, within the constraints of that community’s cultural and social norms. A major component of those social norms were religious, as governed by the halakha. This means that rulings in Jewish law were not simply a private matter between an individual Jew and his or her rabbi, as it is nowadays. Rulings in Jewish law, depending on the issue involved, could potentially impact the lives of literally everyone in a city or region and change the expectations or social norms of the entire community. Before the Emancipation (which is when participation with or assimilation into the surrounding Gentile culture became a practical possibility), there was a great reluctance among halakhists to innovate stringent rulings. Poskim were guided, and constrained practically, by the dictum of our Sages: אין גוזרי ן גזרה על ה ציבור אלא אם כן רוב הציבור יכול ין לעמוד ב ה(‘We do not impose decrees upon the community unless we are confident that at least the majority

Transcript of Dynamics of Religious Extremism - Discussion and Clinical Illustration

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 1

Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Religious Extremism

Andrew (Nachum) Klafter, MD

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Background:

Halakha, Jewish Law, has historically operated as a safeguard against

both religious laxity as well as religious extremism. The halakha developed in

phases of Jewish history where Jews, in order to have a normal economic and

social existence, had to function as part of a traditional, religious community,

within the constraints of that community’s cultural and social norms. A major

component of those social norms were religious, as governed by the halakha.

This means that rulings in Jewish law were not simply a private matter between

an individual Jew and his or her rabbi, as it is nowadays. Rulings in Jewish law,

depending on the issue involved, could potentially impact the lives of literally

everyone in a city or region and change the expectations or social norms of the

entire community. Before the Emancipation (which is when participation with

or assimilation into the surrounding Gentile culture became a practical

possibility), there was a great reluctance among halakhists to innovate stringent

rulings. Poskim were guided, and constrained practically, by the dictum of our

Sages: הב לעמוד יןיכול הציבור רוב כן אם אלא ציבורה על גזרה ןגוזרי אין (‘We do not impose

decrees upon the community unless we are confident that at least the majority

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 2

of the community will be able to fulfill it.’). Although this Talmudic rule strictly

refers to the gezerot and takkanot of the Sanhedrin (see Mishneh Torah,

Mamrim, chapter 2 for an overview of this rule), this also served as a general

principle for halakhists in later peroids. To issue rulings in Jewish Law which a

substantial portion of the community might not accept would actually

constitute a grave threat to the integrity of the Torah by undermining the

authority of Jewish Law. Non-compliance with halakhic rulings would render

the religious leadership impotent, and the halakha irrelevant or at best optional.

It is therefore quite understandable that innovative stringent rulings in

Jewish law were far less frequent from the closing of the Talmud through the

Medieval period and early modern period, through the 18th century. But

starting in the 1800’s, chumrot become much more common. By the 20th

Century, promulgation of chumrot has increased to such an extent that we

see that cities that distinguish themselves as being bastions of Torah

scholarship (Bnei Brak and Lakewood being prime examples) are equally

distinguished in their tendency toward chumra. We also see that in the

traditional Sefardic communities, which did not go through the same

process of Emancipation, chumrot were far less common until their

transplantation to the Land of Israel, where they are influenced by the

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 3

Ashkenazim, and also where they are susceptible to assimilation within the

State of Israel’s larger, secular, liberal society. Until the late 20th century,

Sefardic poskim took responsibility for all members of their communities,

from the least observant to the most pious, and therefore the tendency

toward chumra was curtailed.1

In liberal, Western democracies, things are very different. The individual

autonomy enjoyed by Jews residing in the West has led to a bifurcation of the

Jewish world into those with little or no connection to traditional religious life,

and to an Orthodox community which is more punctiliously observant and

stringent than ever before in our history. The majority of Jews do not see

themselves as bound by the mitzvot. They observe only what they wish to

observe, and have no relationship with halakhists. Therefore, the audience of

today’s poskim is limited to only the most pious Jews who are seek guidance

from their religious authorities, and who are equally as likely to accept a

1 A common explanation for the advent of innovative stringency in halakha is that it is a reaction to the haskala (Jewish enlightenment) heterodox Jewish movements (i.e., Reform Judaism, Conservative Judaism, and secular Jewish movements such as secular Zionism or Bundism). An analysis of halakhic stringency after the Shoah has been discussed by Haym Soloveitchik in his important essay, “Rupture and Reconstruction” (Tradition 28:4, 1994). Soloveitchik attributes the popularity of halakhic stringency in the late 20th Century Orthodox Jewish world as a paradoxical result of the loss of our mesorah (‘mimetic tradition’), and the resulting shift from a mesorah/tradition-based faith community where people learn their religious practices from their parents and grandparents, to a text-based community where people learn their religious practice from books. Solovetchick’s compelling and influential thesis, which I have no doubt is precisely correct regarding the shift to the right during the late 20th Century, cannot account for the rise in stringency which had already began in the 1800’s.

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 4

stringent ruling as a lenient one. With regard to contemporary halakhists,

another interesting phenomenon is observed: it is well known that major

poskim nowadays are badgered and pressured into issuing prohibitions and

bans. Those who have spent significant time in the administrative offices of the

our generation’s leading halakhists report that that these leaders are inundated

with literally hundreds of requests each year by extremists who are lobbying

them to issue prohibitions. In these scenarios, it is not halakhic scholars

themselves who sense, for example, that a particular book should be banned, or

that a certain Haredi musical artist’s recordings and performances are

inappropriate. Nor are these instances where pious individuals feel their own

personal discomfort or conflict while listening to music or reading certain

material and understandably seek their own spiritual guidance. Rather, zealots,

who have already made up their minds that the religious community is

engaging in an inappropriate practice, launch a campaign against to put an end

to some perceived spiritual breach or threat. The zealot will typically travel to

as many influential leaders as he can contact, lobbying all of them to issue a

ruling against a book, musician, institution, food, fashion, or whatever

phenomenon has come into their radar. When an authority disagrees and

refuses to issue the requested ruling, the zealot may turn against that posek. It

is also significant to note that when a zealot has successfully persuaded a posek

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 5

to issue a ruling, it is the zealot and not the posek who will publicize the

prohibition in the form of advertisements in religious periodicals and pashkevils

[broadside posters which condemn or ban an individual or practice] in public

places frequented by observant Jews. Therefore, no one has can really be sure,

nowadays, exactly what rulings were given, in what language, and in what

context. Sometimes, directly conflicting rulings are attributed to the same

authority, and in general we now suffer from great confusion about the

authenticity of opinions reported in a scholar’s name.

Let me cite an example from the 16th century which will illustrate how

much things have changed. The city of Tzefat in the 1500’s was the center of a

fantastic religious renaissance, marked by an explosion of spiritual revival,

creativity, and scholarship. A religious controversy (one of many, actually) was

caused by a group of scrupulous, pious extremists, who took upon themselves a

stringency in the observance of terumot and maasarot. The Torah requires that

we separate tithes from produce grown in the land of Israel. The settled

halakha follows the Rambam, who rules that there is no requirement to

separate teruma and ma’aser from produce grown on lands owned by non-Jews.

Rabbi Yitzchak Ben Asher HaLevi (‘Rib”a’, one of the ba’alei Tosfos, who I

believe was one of Rashi’s personal students) had ruled stringently in this issue,

but the settled halakha did not follow his view. This group of scrupulous

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extremists wished to take upon themselves the strict ruling of Riba as a chumra.

All evidence would suggest that their motivations were interpreted to be

sincere and pious. However, the leading rabbis of the day ruled that they were

not permitted to follow this strict opinion. Rabbi Yosef Karo, author of the

Shulchan Arukh, declared that this group of pious individuals were extremists,

that their pious act would weaken the authority of the Torah by rejecting legal

precedent in halakha, and that they threatened the cohesiveness of the Jewish

community. Rabbi Karo censured them for their “slight to the honor of our

ancestors” and for their “transgression of the Biblical commandment of lo

titgodedu” (see the Kesef Misnha to Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teruma 1:11).2

Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine that Rabbis would ban a group of

pietists who would take this or a similar chumra upon themselves for sincere

religious motivations. Our rabbis are dealing with a totally different reality.

Their rulings are sought by two groups of people: (1) zealots who really are not

interested in their opinion or guidance, but are seeking their support for a

position they have already made up their minds on, and (2) pious Jews who are

seeking their guidance and who will mostly likely be willing to follow a strict

2 Explanation: Lo titgodedu (Devarim 14:1) is the prohibition against ritual self-mutilation, which was a pagan mourning practice among the ancient Canaanites. In the Midrash and Talmud, lo titgodedu is homiletically interpreted to mean that one may not publicly display acts of religious piety which undermine the majority view and which may lead to disunity in the community. Such behavior will ‘cut the community into different factions’.)

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opinion. Today’s halakhists simply do not take responsibility in their rulings

for the entire Jewish people. Even if the wished to, they have no contact with or

means to communicate with the majority of Jews, who have no connection to

them or interest in their guidance. This trend is not limited to halakhists. The

most influential Orthodox leaders of the 20th Century took responsibility only

for adherents of Orthodox Judaism. Those who were not Orthodox were simply

not part of their flock. (Notable exceptions to this model would be the late, 7th

Lubavitcher Rebbe ל"צז who issued very few rulings in Jewish Law, but directed

his efforts as a spiritual leader toward all Jews; םייבדל בין החיים ובין חחי , Rabbi

Jonathan Sacks א"טשלי , former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, whose intellectual

and philosophical scholarship is focused on the totality of Klal Yisrael; and

Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook ל"זצ , the first Chief Rabbi of the Land

of Israel and outstanding halakhist of his generation, whose halakhic rulings

were concerned equally with the non-religious majority in the Land of Israel. I

believe that Rabbi Kook is the only major halakhist since the 19th century who

stands against this general trend.)

What is Extremism, and what is Not Extremism:

I will use the terms “extremist” and “zealot” interchangeably. Two,

related components qualify a belief or practice as extremist. (1) It is expression

of an ideology or religious value in a manner which shows a more zealous

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concern than what is shared by the mainstream faith community and its

religious leadership. (2) The extremists are deliberately distinguishing

themselves from the mainstream community and leadership. In other words,

the zealots and extremists are rejecting the ethos of the mainstream religious

community and refuse to submit to the authority of its leadership.

Stringency is not equivalent with extremism. When two poskim

[authorities in Jewish religious law] arrive independently at two different

conclusions on a different issue, it may be that one is more stringent than the

other. It may also be the case that if we would study their rulings on a variety

of issues, we will discern a pattern that of a tendency in one more than the

other toward stringency on a variety of issues, revealing a general trend in his

religious philosophy or legal methodology. However, that is not a

manifestation of extremism. Shammai and Hillel tended, respectively, toward

rigidity and accommodation. We typically rule like Beit Hillel, but we do not

believe that Beit Shammai were extremists. To the contrary, Beit Shammai also

represented a normative view. (In fact, according to some traditions, we will

rule like Beit Shammai in the Messianic era in the particular. We also say

regarding their disputes, ‘eilu ve-eilu...’, i.e., both are legitimate expressions of

God’s Will.) In trying to define extremism, it is easy to slip into a subjectivity

trap, and label any expression of religiosity which is more severe than our own

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personal instincts to be a manifestation of extremism. If it “feels” too extreme

to me, I may label it as extremist. Let’s call this a “subjective definition of

extremism.” Although many people probably think about extremism in this

manner, I want to emphasize that I think this approach is incorrect and will not

help us understand the phenomenon. People raised according to a religious

community’s normative values cannot be concerned extremists as they are

reflective of the norm, not rebelling against it. And when we look judgingly at

other Orthodox communities, it would be wise to remember that outsiders

often look at all of us as extremists.

The definition of extremism I have offered above is not subjective. But it

is somewhat “relativistic” in the sense that extremism cannot occur in a

vacuum. Extremism is always a reaction to the norm. This means the norm

must exist before the extremist can react to it. The very definition of the word

“extremist” implies a form of comparison. It is extreme, at the edge, at the

boundary, pushing the limits. It implies that there is a center or norm that we

are measuring against. This definition is concerned with the process rather

than the content of the issue at hand. In other words, we need not make a

value judgment about the actual ideology that someone espouses. We are

simply noting that a given ideology or position on a specific issue is more

extreme than the majority’s beliefs, and that this person is rejecting the

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majority’s ideology as being inadequate. To an outsider, I’m sure that the

lengths to which observant Jews go to avoid chametz on Pesach would be seen

as fanatical and extremist. But learned Orthodox Jews are aware that this is the

mesorah we have followed for 2,00o years (if not longer). Let’s imagine,

however, that a zealot would decide that we need to also conduct an annual

search of our property in order to get rid of any books or magazines which

express Zionist beliefs, and that the next morning we ritually burn all of this

literature in the same way be burn our chametz. To an outsider who knows

nothing about Orthodox Judaism, this would look no more extreme than

burning chametz. But those who are knowledgeable about Judaism see this for

what it is: It is an act of protest and rejection, against the mainstream. This

individual could find support in the rabbinic literature (‘sifrei ha-minim’). But

this individual’s views are far more extreme than the norm of his religious

community, and his position is also a protest statement against his

community’s religious leadership, whom he believes have been negligent.

Two different motivations for extremism:

To review, extremism is both relative and objective. It’s relative in the

sense that it is only ‘extreme’ in comparison with a more normative mainstream

that the extremist wishes to distance himself from. However it is not

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subjective. I cannot label a view as extremist just because I am personally

uncomfortable with it. It must be actually deviant from the mainstream, and,

as explained above, it must but deliberately fashioned as a rejection of the

mainstream. Zealots are saying, “You are not good enough,” or “Your position

is too lenient or soft.”

I wish to submit the following idea: I think are basically two pathways by

which extremist practices come into circulation: I will call these pathways (1)

Scrupulous Extremism and (2) Narcissistic Extremism. While these pathways

are not mutually exclusive, I think they are exhaustive, and explain all religious

extremism. I find support for my in the following concepts which are

frequently cited in the halakhic literature regarding motivations to take on

stringencies beyond the normative requirements of the law: יחמיר נפש בעל

(translation: ‘a scrupulous individual is should follow the more stringent

ruling’) and יוהרא (loose translation: ‘adopting the stringent ruling rather than

the more lenient, majority opinion is an act of pompous grandstanding’). The

Sages respect and support the fear of sin, but they have no tolerance for

pomposity and arrogance.

1. Scrupulous extremism:

All human beings have conflicting motivations which pull them toward

obedience and closeness to G-d and away from sinfulness on the one hand, and

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toward individual freedom and pleasure on the other. These tensions are

present in every religious person, to greater or lesser degrees. Scrupulosity is a

desperate fear of sinfulness. (This may often be a symptom of Obsessive

Compulsive Disorder, though for the purposes of this essay it is not important

whether a clinical diagnosis is present.) Normal human experience (like sexual

longing, or hunger, or even boredom during tefillot) for scrupulous individuals

can become a wave of terror or horrifying guilt. In order to cope with these

unpleasant emotions, individuals afflicted with scrupulosity often adopt

safeguards against sin which are outside the parameters of the requirements of

Jewish Law. As mentioned above, the halakha allows, in some situations, for

scrupulous individuals who are intensely distressed about sinfulness to take

upon themselves a more stringent halakhic opinion, even though the settled

halakha is more lenient. However, the halakha does not allow people to willy-

nilly fabricate stringencies for themselves. It would not, for example, be

appropriate for someone to decide that after eating fleishigs he must not only

wait 6 hours before eating milchegs, but also change his clothing and recite

viduy. That is not an accepted opinion and such behavior would have no

validity in the halakhic system. In other situations, even well-known stringent

minority opinions are not tolerated due to social considerations for the rest of

the community. The example given above from 16th century Tzefat is an

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example of this, where the rabbis acted to prevent the emergence of a sectarian,

extremist group.

The progression from scrupulosity to extremism is mediated both

psychologically as well as socially and politically. The scrupulous individual

seeks to change the outside world in order to spare him the afflictions of his

scrupulosity. For example, there is a group of individuals in certain cities in

Israel who have attempted to coerce women on public buses to sit in the

back. The same individuals have also attempted to bar women from walking

on public sidewalks in their neighborhoods. This is lead to violent

confrontations with the police in many cases, and physical altercations with

women riding buses and with their husbands who have accompanied them.

I am not referring to culturally insensitive, irreligious women who are

immodestly dressed, but fully observant, Haredi women who are simply

riding the buses that serve their religious neighborhoods. These practices

are condemned by all mainstream Haredi religious leaders. It is not a

reflection of a particular stream of Orthodox Judaism. Such individuals are

unsatisfied with the directives of the mainstream religious leadership. Note

this comment by the most authoritative posek of the late 20th Century, Rabbi

Moshe Feinstein, ל"זצ , who ruled that not only is it entirely permissible to

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ride on public transportation with mixed genders, but those who experience

this as sexually provocative have a responsibility to try to change their own

internal reaction pattern (rather than attempt to impose a change on the rest

of the world).

ולכן לא שייך לחוש מללכת בסאבוויי ובאסעס בשעת הליכה לעבודה שדחוקים ודחופים אנשים ונשים אף

דהנגיעה בלא מתכוין מחמת שא"א לו ליזהר אין זה דרך תאוה וחבה. ,שלא יוכל ליזהר מנגיעה ודחיפה בנשים

ליכא איסור מהאי טעמא גם לישב אצל אשה כשליכא מקום אחר דג"כ אין זה דרך תאוה וחבה... אבל אם וכן

יודע שהוא יבוא לידי הרהור יש לו למנוע מללכת אז אם אין נחוץ לו, ואם מוכרח לילך אז ג"כ לעבודתו אין

שם הי"ט וע"ז יוכל הרמב"םלאסור לו אף בכה"ג, ויתחזק להסיח דעתו מהן ולהרהר בדברי תורה כעצת

לסמוך ולילך לעבודתו. ואם יודע שטבעו רע ויבוא מזה לידי קישוי אבר אסור לו לילך אז גם לעבודתו. אבל

שה וה"ה על האיש וצריך לעסוק בתורה ח"ו לאדם להיות כן דבא זה מבטלה כדאיתא בכתובות דף נ"ט על הא

.ובמלאכה ולא יהיה כך

Therefore, there is no need to refrain from traveling on subways and buses during rush hour, when people are crowded together, even if it is impossible to avoid physical contact with women. This is because contact without intent for pleasure that results from the inevitable crowding and pushing is not done in an affectionate (chiba) or licentious (ta’ava) manner…. Similarly there is no prohibition, for this same reason, to sit next to a woman when there is no other place available, because this is also not done in an affectionate or licentious manner…. However if one knows that he will experience arousing sexual thoughts, then he should refrain from commuting if it is not absolutely necessary. But if he absolutely must travel in such a situation in order to get to his place of work, then it is permitted for him to do so even if [he will experience sexual thoughts]. But he must fight to divert his mind from such thoughts, and instead think about words of Torah, as the Rambam advises (Issurei Bi’ah 21:19), and he can rely on this and continue to travel to work. However, if one knows that he has a lustful nature and that he will become sexually aroused – then it is prohibited even if he needs to travel on the buses and subways for his job. But Heaven forbid that a person should be that way! This is a result of idleness, as discussed on Ketubot 49, which discusses women, but this applies equally to men. Therefore one needs to be involved in Torah study and in work, so he will no longer be like this.

The individuals who engage in this behavior have been shown these sources,

and simply reject them as inadequate. When such individuals attract like-

minded following and dig in their heels against the mainstream, an extremist

faction is born. Sometimes, these confrontations become violent. Another

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modern day extremist group refer to themselves as Sikrikim. This small

group, numbering perhaps a few hundred families in Jerusalem, have

claimed responsibility for arson and assault against individuals and

institutions which they believe are too moderate in their opposition to

secular Zionism. Oddly, the group most frequently targeted by the Sikrikim

are the Gerrer Hassidic community because of their historical affiliation with

Agudath Israel and, in the estimation of the Sikrikim, their inadequate stance

against secularism. The Rabbis of 16th Century Tzefat sensed the danger of

factions which define themselves by extremist ritual practice and therefore

took steps to nip what they believed was a noxious branch in the bud.

2. Narcissistic Extremism:

All human beings have a need to cultivate a positive sense of self. Positive self-

regard, often referred to as ‘self-esteem’ is a vital capacity for normal

relationships, impulse control, and social responsibility. Individuals who are

extraordinarily sensitive to slights, criticism, and rejection are thought of as

‘narcissistically vulnerable’. ‘Narcissistic personalities’ are personality

configurations which are organized around protecting the individual from

shame, evaluation, rejection, and a sense of inadequacy. One such personality

type is referred to in the last three editions of American Psychiatric

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Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) as the ‘Narcissistic

Personality Disorder’.3 Such individuals cope with their narcissistic

vulnerability by cultivating an arrogant, haughty, imperious persona. The

rabbinic literature refers to such individuals as ‘בעלי גאווה’. When I refer to some

zealotry as ‘narcissistic’, what I mean is that the underlying motivations behind

embracing an extremist ideology is that it gives the zealot a sense of mission,

importance, self-worth, and significance. By ‘narcissism’, I mean those mental

activities which have as their primary motivation the cultivation of a strong,

vibrant, sturdy, and emotionally positive sense of oneself. It is typically a

coping strategy to undo or repress an enfeebled, unstable, insignificance,

devalued, impotent sense of self.

There are some individuals who wish to distinguish themselves by ‘out-

frumming’ the most pious influential religious leaders of our generation. I

recently read a nasty essay mocking the leadership of the Mo’etzet Gedolei

HaTorah of the American Agudath Israel Organization. The author wrote that

council’s president, “Under his Homberg is a kippa sruga.” (Translation: He

gives an outward appearance of traditional piety, but he is covertly a religious

3 It is important, however, to note that the originator of the concept of Narcissistic Personality Disorders, Heinz Kohut, used the term more inclusively to refer to all ‘disorders of the Self’, i.e., any personality disorder which has at its core a wish to protect the individual from shame and narcissistic injury. Many individuals afflicted with the avoidant traits, for example, could also be described as having a narcissistic personality disorder, with very similar underlying dynamics and fears when compared with the haughty and arrogant individuals portrayed in the DSM. The difference would be in their defensive style.

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liberal.) Such individuals are motivated not by piety but by a need for

influence, power, fame, and admiration. Sometimes, such individuals have

more intricate political motives, are seeking to be appointed to important

leadership positions, or are posturing for some other political or social purpose.

But, again, the driving motivation is not piety; rather, it is a form of

grandstanding. Again, in the halakha, this is referred to as yuhara. Our Sages

have no tolerance for grandstanding and pompousness. Such behavior is

forbidden because it is (a) inherently inappropriate to conduct oneself in an

arrogant manner, (b) unbecoming to exploit religious symbols for one’s

narcissistic agenda, and (c) will often set up a dynamic of competition and

intolerance.

Yir’at Shamayim, Scrupulosity, or Extremism?

I wish to distinguish between pathological scrupulosity and yir’at

shamayim. Individuals who are suffering from scrupulosity/OCD are, in fact,

truly suffering. The overall motivation is not a principled, rational, deliberate

attempt to cultivate a closer relationship with HaShem. Rather, it is an act of

desperation against a pathological fear of sin which produces symptoms of

mental illness. They need help ending the distress they feel from their anxiety.

In most cases, it is probably not possible to distinguish between these two

phenomena without hearing what the person’s subjective experience. And the

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two are not mutually exclusive. I have heard reliable testimony about a famed

sage, who was no doubt a saintly and humble leader in addition to being one of

the greatest rabbinic scholars of his generation. He appears to have suffered

from an obsession with Christian religious symbols. Specifically, he was

troubled that telephone poles in Israel are constructed in a way which he felt

may resemble a cross, and he attempted persuade the telephone company to

design a different form for their telephone poles. The phone company did not

comply with his request. However, he did not wage a campaign to force them

to do this. In other words, he suffered from scrupulosity, but was not an

extremist. I once consulted with a yeshiva student who suffered a similar

obsession – he would scan houses and buildings and look for doorways or trim

which resembled a cross. He typically immersed himself in a mikvah after he

saw what he believed was the form of across. He had a pathological,

unreasonable fear of being contaminated with Christian theology. His roshei

yeshiva attempt to reassure him that there was no such danger of spiritual

contamination, and when the saw they were unable to console him they

referred him for treatment. Again, this individual suffers from scrupulosity, a

sub-type of OCD, but he is not an extremist. He is not trying to coerce others

to adopt his practice, or demanding that the construction of his parents’ home

be altered to alleviate his fears.

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 19

Clinical Illustration of Narcissistic Extremism

A 35 year old convert to Judaism consulted with me for depression. He

resided in another city and sought consultation with due to his confidentiality

concerns with anyone local. Although he had converted to Judaism under the

auspices of the Rabbi of an Ashkenazi congregation, and resided in an

Ashkenazi community. He was recognized as a talented chazzan, and was

periodically asked to lead the tefillot in his congregation. A capable Torah

student, he felt that he was constantly under-recognized and under-

appreciated. He independently studied Rabbi Yaakov Chaim Sofer’s entire Sefer

Kaf Ha-Chaim (similar in format and purpose to the Mishnah Berura but based

on Sephardic religious custom and precedent), an impressive feat for a convert

with no yeshiva training, and faithfully adhered to its rulings. He wanted to

give classes on Judaism in his community, but there was little interest. He

switched his custom to the Sephardic rite. Then, attempted to imitate the

Sephardic pronunciation and melody when he led the prayers. As a result, he

was no longer asked to lead the prayer service. He complained that he was

being discriminated against for being Sephardic. He also protested against

what he perceived as inappropriately lenient practices of the local Va’ad

HaKashrut which had been followed for many decades at local kosher

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 20

establishments. He attempted to form a break-off minyan [congregation] in his

home, and advertised a prominent Sephardic Hakham [rabbi] in Israel as its

halakhic authority. He attracted some individuals, and began giving classes

which were critical of the local rabbis. He attempted to recruit non-Jews for

potential conversion, planning for them to be converted by a Sefardic Beit Din

in Israel. He also began studying for rabbinic ordination. After the local rabbis

could no longer tolerate his disruptiveness, they contacted the Hakham in

Israel and shared their narrative of the troublemaker’s activities, and their

assessment of his character. That Hakham immediately withdrew all support

and sternly chastised him to submit to the authority of his communal rabbis.

He fell into a depression.

It was clear after a few appointments by phone that this man is suffering

from a very fragile and unstable sense of self. He defends against feelings of

inadequacy and emptiness by cultivating grandiose fantasies. His grandiosity

leads him to always adopt a contrarian or unpopular view. His contrarian view

allows him to feel that he is the only one who is correct, and to fantasize that he

will persuade others to see the correctness of his vision. He believed he was on

the verge of creating an alternate Sephardic community, which he would lead.

He adopted extremist positions on a number of issues, fancying himself a zealot

on one issue or another. In a very preliminary countertransference reaction, I

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 21

felt personally tempted to show him how preposterous many of his positions

were, including but not limited to the notion that he could ‘become’ a Sefardi.

When talking about his feelings of disappointment and abandonment by his

synagogue, and more recently by his beloved Sefardic Hakham, he became less

arrogant, softer, and more open to the perspectives of others. I referred to a

capable psychotherapist in his city who is not a member of the Orthodox

community, but is culturally informed and respectful. I have not heard a follow

up or update on his situation. He was considering leaving Judaism altogether at

the time of his consultation with me, and I do not know what he decided to do.

On the one hand, his own experience of the rabbis of his community is that

they were very dismissive and disrespectful to him. However, it is not difficult

to imagine how they became angered by his provocative communal activities.

Moreover, I do believe that had he been successful in creating his alternate

community, this individual would have been dangerous for anyone who joined.

As a narcissistic leader, the spiritual needs of his followers would have been

entirely subordinate to his own narcissistic agenda. Such leaders, as we know,

can to great harm to their follows. Therefore, I believe that the rabbis of his

community were correct to neutralize him.

Concluding thoughts

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 22

Religion is a complex interface of intrapsychic, interpersonal, communal,

and spiritual forces. As religious psychotherapists, we are natives, totally

immersed in our communal and personal religious experiences. Yet, we are

simultaneously outsiders, called upon to step back from our subjective religious

instincts and to examine and analyze the psychological needs of our religious

brethren. As religious Jews, we admire the spiritual heights attained by

tzaddikim and the austere sacrifices made by our finest scholars and leaders.

But as psychotherapists, we also wish to care for people who are needlessly

suffering from psychological disorders.

An ironic consequence of the enlightenment is that radical religious

groups who wish to impose their religious views on others have more latitude

in liberal democracies than in theocracies. The Western, liberal, democratic

right to freedom from religion protects zealots as well as secularists.

Psychotherapists who work in devout populations routinely evaluate

patients who suffer from pathological scrupulosity, and frequently encounter

the consequences of religious extremism. All psychotherapists routinely

encounter patients with narcissistic problems. Narcissism will always

become invested into the values and status symbols of the narcissistic

individual’s surrounding culture. In Orthodox communities which value

Klafter – Dynamics of Religious Extremism p. 23

piety and scholasticism, it makes good intuitive sense that narcissistically

vulnerable individuals will exhibit their exhibitionistic grandiosity in

scholarship and piety.

Many of our internal debates on this list serve revolve around the

difference between piety and scrupulosity. Our religious sensibilities are

offended when we sense that a cherished religious value has been demeaned or

pathologized. Conversely, we wish to point out when harmful psychopathology

is rationalized or excused in the name of spirituality. Reasonable people can

and do disagree about such matters. However, when extremist religious

believes become a protest against the mainstream community, and results in

bullying or even violence, the lines between piety and extremism are no longer

unclear.

- - - - Nachum Binyamin Klafter, MD

קלאפטער בנימין נחום דר' 7502 State Road, Suite 2800 Cincinnati OH 45255-2800 Phone (513) 474-8900 Fax (513) 233-6693 [email protected]