Post on 17-Jan-2023
U M TA-M A-06-0049-87-3
Departmentof Transportation
Urban MassTransportationAdministration
Airport Shared-Ride Taxi
Programs in New York,
Chicago and Boston
UMTA/TSC Evaluation Series Final Report
December 1987
UMTA Technical Assistance Program
r
NOTICE
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of
Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States
Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.
NOTICE
The United States Government does not endorse products of manufacturers.
Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are con-
sidered essential to the object of this report.
Technical Report Documentation Page
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
s•7
r-
T/\-
-Sr
J-
1. Report No.
UMTA-MA-06-0049-87-3
2. Government Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Airport Shared-Ride Taxi Programs in New York,
Chicago and Boston,
5. Report Dote
December 19876. Performing Organization Code
DTS-49
7. Authors)
Michael Clarke* and Joel Freilich
8. Performing Organization Report No.
DOT-TSC-UMTA-87-8
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
COMSIS Corporation*11501 Georgia AvenueWheaton, MD 20902
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
UR752/U22011 1 . Contract or Grant No.
D0T-TSC-1753
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
U.S. Department of TransportationUrban Mass Transportation AdministrationOffice of Technical AssistanceWashington, DC 20590
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Final ReportSep 1978 - June 1982
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
URT-3015. Supplementary Notes
*Under contract to
U.S. Department of TransportationResearch and Special Programs AdministrationTransportation Systems CenterCambridge
,
MA 0214216. Abstract
This report summarizes the development and operation of three shared-ride
taxi operations at major U.S. airports. These are: New York's LaGuardia Airport
Share-A-Cab ;Super Saver Taxi in Chicago; and Share-A-Cab service at Boston's
Logan Airport. The Chicago operation provided service from O'Hare and Midway
Airports and also, for a short time, within three downtown zones.
The report presents information on ridership, costs, and special operating
characteristics derived from personal interviews, on-site observations, and review
of accumulated data. Special attention is paid to the institutional environment in
which the services were implemented, and the special role played by institutional
and operational factors in the success or failure of the services.
1
ShaVe'cf-lfide Taxi, Airport Transportation,Private Transportation Services, AirportGround Access , Service and MethodsDemonstration Program
18.
Distribution Statomont
DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLICTHROUGH THE NATIONAL TECHNICALINFORMATION SERVICE, SPRINGFIELD,VIRGINIA 22161
19.
Security Classif. (of this roport)
UNCLASSIFIED
20.
Security Classif. (of this pago)
UNCLASSIFIED
21. No. of Pages
134
22. Price
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
PREFACE
This report summarizes the development and operation of
three shared-ride taxi services. These are New York's LaGuardia
Airport Share-A-Cab, Super Saver taxi service in Chicago, and
Share-A-Cab service at Boston's Logan Airport. It was prepared
by COMSIS Corporation under contract to the Transportation
Systems Center, U.S. Department of Transportation. The authors
of the report were Michael Clarke of COMSIS and Joel Freilich of
TSC
.
Acknowledgements for the information on the LaGuardia
service provided in this report are given to Mr. Bernard Lerner
and Ms. Betty Lawrence of the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade, Mr. Jay Turoff of the Taxi and Limousine Commission for
the City of New York, Mr. Edward Zarr of Local #33 of the Taxi
Union, and Mr. Tom Lewandowski of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey.
Information on the Chicago service was provided by Mr. Stan
Weseman, Mr. Roy Bell, Mr. Joseph Ligas, Mr. Edward Christopher
all of the Chicago Area Transportation Study, Ms. Susan Mazako of
the City of Chicago Department of Consumer Services, Ms. Bette
Barrett of the Airport Statistics Division of the City of
Chicago, Ms. Cheryl Mruczek of the Chicago Department of
Aviation, and Mr. Jerry Feldman of Checker Taxi Company.
Mr. Joseph E. Green, Manager of Ground Transportation
Services at Logan Airport, Mr. James E. White, Coordinator of
Ground Transportation Services, Ms. Kathleen Scannell, Staff
Member of Ground Transportation Services, Mr. Peter Sheinfeld and
Mr. Norman Faramelli of the Massachusetts Port Authority, Mr. Ted
Kline of Taxi News Digest, Mr. Victor Nieb of Town Taxi, Mr. Pat
Russell of Checker Cab, and Mr. Stephan Chait, a Boston-area
transportation consultant, all provided information on the Logan
service
.
We are grateful for the interviews, documents, and published
papers supplied by these individuals, which have provided an
extensive information base for the writing of this report.
in
Also, the authors extend thanks to Mr. Bruce Spear of the
Transportation Systems Center, Mr. Larry Bruno, Mr. James Bautz,
and Mr. Philip Hughes all of the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration, and to Mr. Richard Kuzmyak of COMSIS for their
assistance in review and modification of the report.
iv
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1 SHARE-A-CAB TAXI SERVICE - NEW YORK'S LAGUARDIAAIRPORT 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Background 3
1.2.1 Reduce Energy Consumption 4
1.2.2 Improve Taxicab Operators' Image 4
1.2.3 Provide a Service that Captures aLarger Share of the GroundTransportation Market 5
1.3 System Operations.... 5
1.4 Impact and Performance Data 13
1.4.1 Level-of-Service 131.4.2 Ridership 141.4.3 Operator Incentives and Participation.. 141.4.4 Administrative Costs 161.4.5 Institutional Impacts 17
1.5 Conclusions 18
1.5.1 LaGuardi Airport Lends Itself to theEstablishment of a Shared-RideProgram 18
1.5.2 Share-A-Cab was Approached with a Setof Realistic Objectives 18
1.5.3 Limited Destination Area 191.5.4 Market Development 201.5.5 Appropriate Amounts of Government
Regulation were Imposed on theOperation..... 20
1.5.6 Undersupply of Taxicabs at LaGuardia... 20
1.6 Service Expansion 21
2 SUPER SAVER TAXI SERVICE - CHICAGO. 23
2.1 Introduction 232.2 Background 25
v
CONTENTS (Continued)
Chapter Page
2.2.1 Inefficiently Used Taxi Fleet 252.2.2 Demand for Shared-Ride Service Exists.. 282.2.3 Improve Taxi Driver Income 332.2.4 Regulatory Reform 332.2.5 Federal Transportation Policies........ 34
2.3 System Operations 34
2.3.1 O' Hare/Midway Service 342.3.2 Downtown/Loop Service 40
2.4 Impact and Performance Data 42
2.4.1 Ridership 422.4.2 Operator Incentives and Participation.. 452.4.3 Operational Costs 472.4.4 Institutional Impacts 48
2.5 Conclusions 49
2.5.1 Airport Service 492.5.2 Downtown/Loop Service 50
3 SHARE-A-CAB SERVICE - BOSTON'S LOGAN INTERNATIONALAIRPORT 51
3.1 Introduction 513.2 Background 533.3 Share-A-Cab Operations and Performance 58
3.3.1 Phase I - April 1977 to July 1977 583.3.2 Phase II - July 1977 to August 1978.... 643.3.3 Phase III - September 1978 to June 1982 70
3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 74
REFERENCES 77
APPENDIX A - RESOURCE CONTACTS A-l
APPENDIX B - MISCELLANEOUS BACKGROUND LITERATURE RELATEDTO LAGUARDIA ' S SHARE-A-CAB PROGRAM B-l
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1-1 SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONES - EFFECTIVE DATE:JULY 1979 2
1-2 SHARE-A-CAB OPERATIONS AT EASTERN AIRLINESSHUTTLE TERMINAL 7
1-3 SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONES:JULY 1979 - OCTOBER 1980 8
1-4 SHARE-A-CAB VOUCHERS: IN USE FROM JULY 1979UNTIL MAY 1980 9
1-5 SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONES: NOVEMBER 1980 -
PRESENT . . . 11
1-6 PRESENT SHARE-A-CAB DISPATCHING AREAS 12
1-
7 SHARE-A-CAB RIDERSHIP 15
2-
1 TAXICAB SHARED RIDING ZONES 24
2-2 TOTAL ANNUAL VEHICLE MILES OF CHECKER TAXI COMPANY. 27
2-3 ANNUAL MILEAGE PER VEHICLE 29
2-4 MAP OF CATS TAXI ANALYSIS ZONES 30
2-5 DISTRIBUTION OF TAXI ORIGINS . 31
2-6 DISTRIBUTION OF TAXI DESTINATIONS. 32
2-7 O' HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT... 35
2-8 LAYOUT OF MIDWAY AIRPORT TAXI STAGING AREAS 38
2-9 SUPER SAVER SIGN DISPLAYED IN EVERY TAXI 39
2-
10 SUPER SAVER TAXI RIDERSHIP 43
3-
1 SHARE-A-CAB PASSENGER FARES 52
3-2 BOSTON-LOGAN AIRPORT LOCATIONS 55
3-3 SERVICE AREA - PHASE 1 59
3-4 SHARE-A-CAB DAILY RIDERSHIP - PHASE I 63
Vll
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued)
Figure Page
3-5 SHARE-A-CAB SERVICE AREA - PHASE IIJULY 1977 TO AUGUST 1978 66
3-6 SHARE-A-CAB DAILY RIDERSHIP - PHASE IIJULY 1977 TO AUGUST 1978 68
3-7 SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATIONS - PHASE IIJULY 1977 TO AUGUST 1978 69
3-8 SHARE-A-CAB MATCHING AREA - PHASE IIISEPTEMBER 1978 - JUNE 1982 71
3-9 DAILY SHARE-A-CAB RIDERSHIP(QUARTERLY AVERAGE) 73
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
ES-1 CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL AIRPORTSHARED-TAXI PROGRAMS XV ii
ES-2 TAXICAB MODE SHARE AT LAGUARDIA AIRPORT (1978) xix
ES-3 LAGUARDIA MODE SPLIT BY TRIP ORIGIN (1978) xxi
ES-4 O'HARE MODE SPLIT BY TRIP ORIGIN (1977) . . xxii
ES-5 LOGAN MODE SPLITS BY PURPOSE AND ORIGIN xxiv
ES-6 ORIGINS OF TAXICAB TRIPS TO O'HARE (1977) xxv
ES-7 CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE AIRPORT SHARED-RIDE TAXIPROGRAMS . xxv i
ES-8 SECOND CHOICE MODE OF SHARE-A-CAB USERS xxxvi
ES-9 NECESSARY CONDITIONS REVISITED . . xxxvii
1-1 PASSENGER FLOW ON AVERAGE DAY OF YEAR (1978)...... 22
3-1 ACCESS MODE TO LOGAN 54
3-2 SHARE-A-CAB ATTRIBUTES BY PHASE 75
ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background: Airport Access
During the past 25 years, as the number of air travelers
nationwide increased, causing roads in and around big-city air-
ports to become increasingly congested, airport authorities have
begun to devote more attention and resources to ground transpor-
tation alternatives. While airport access studies during the
1960s had examined capital-intensive transportation improvements,
the focus shifted during the 1970s to making more efficient use
of existing transportation facilities. The efficiency
objective—namely, reducing the number of vehicle trips and on-
airport parking spaces required by each air passenger journey
—
required the development and encouragement of higher-occupancy
transportation services. Aware of the evidence that conventional
mass transit would never capture a large share of air travelers'
airport trips, airport authorities began to look more carefully
at opportunities to shift air travelers from private automobiles
and exclusive-ride taxicabs into limousines and "Airporter"
coaches. Airports with parking shortages also explored private
for-profit "Park-Shuttle-n-Fly" (remote parking) facilities.
An air traveler has the following ground access options. He
can drive to the airport and park there. He can drive his car
(or a rental car) to a privately operated remote parking facility
and ride a shuttle bus to the terminal. He may be driven to the
airport by someone, or he may travel by "Airporter" bus or
limousine. In a few cities, rail transit serves the airport. In
most cities, conventional taxicab service is available.
Each of the above alternatives has its own impact on traffic
flows in and around the airport, depending on how many vehicle
trips are required and on whether those vehicles are shared with
other air travelers. For example, driving to the airport and
parking there results in one unshared vehicle trip inside the
airport and one unshared vehicle trip on adjacent roads. It also
requires one long-term airport parking space. Driving to a
remote parking facility and riding a shuttle bus to the terminal
x
results in one unshared and one shared vehicle trip on the
approach roads, but only a shared vehicle trip inside the air-
port. Thus the remote parking option shifts congestion out of
the airport and onto adjacent roads.
Being driven to the airport by someone who is not traveling
results in two unshared vehicle trips inside the airport, and two
unshared vehicle trips on the adjacent roads. If the companion
stays with the passenger until take-off, the "kiss-ride" mode
also requires one short-term airport parking space. A trip to
the airport via bus or limousine results in one shared vehicle
trip inside the airport and one shared vehicle trip on the
adjacent roads. The rail transit mode relieves congestion on the
approach roads, but still requires a shared vehicle (shuttle bus)
trip inside the airport, except in those few cases (e.g.,
Chicago's O'Hare Airport) where rail transit vehicles go directly
into terminal buildings.
From a traffic viewpoint, the efficiency of traveling by
taxicab, even considering only exclusive-ride taxicab, depends on
the prevailing taxicab regulations and supply/demand conditions.
In most cities (e.g.. New York), a taxicab driver who brings an
enplaning passenger into the airport usually departs with a
deplaning passenger. In these cities, the taxicab mode uses
airport facilities and adjacent roadways almost twice as effi-
ciently as the "kiss-ride" mode, since the taxicab, while more
likely to use a short-term parking space, generally serves at
least two passengers. In other cities, taxicab regulations
induce so much dead-heading that, despite multiple loadings on
some trips, the average taxicab round trip into and out of
Boston's Logan Airport served only 1.84 air passengers in 1979.
Although taxicabs represent a significant proportion of
vehicle-trips to and from the big-city airports (19% for Boston
air passengers in 1979), and although airports had long asserted
the right to control airport taxicab operations, the potential
for shared-ride taxi service has been largely ignored. The fact
that shared-ride taxi service is prohibited by ordinance in most
U.S. cities is not sufficient to explain the neglect of this
option, because exceptions for airports can be made when all
xi
interested parties agree. Rather, the airports and the taxicab
industry each had a different reason for ignoring the potential
for shared-ride taxi service.
The airport authorities implicitly assumed that taxis were
inherently a low-occupancy mode, and therefore, that the way to
develop high-occupancy services was to initiate discussions with
existing and potential limousine operators outside the taxi
industry. Also, the taxi industry is such a loosely connected
group that airport authorities felt it would be difficult to
organize an unconventional service. The taxicab operators, on
the other hand, while aware of their ability to provide shared-
ride service, assumed that offering such service would not bring
them new passengers, but would only reduce revenues and threaten
jobs by pooling existing taxi passengers into fewer cabs.
Viewing the status quo as in their best interests, taxi operators
made no effort to develop and legalize shared-ride taxi service;
they hoped tnat neither limousines nor shared-ride taxis would
proliferate. Thus, for different reasons, the taxi industry and
the airport authorities ignored the potential for shared-ride
taxi service, even where supply and demand conditions might have
supported it.
Background; Taxicab Role in Airport Access
In most U.S. cities, the taxicab's share of ground trips to
and from airports has declined during the last 25 years.
Increasing urban sprawl has given the "unlimited mileage" pricing
of rental cars a definite advantage over the taxicab's mileage-
based fares. Stiff competition among rental car companies has
necessitated efficient operations and effective marketing (e.g.,
f ly-and-dr ive packages), and has held prices down relative to
quality of service. In contrast, local taxicab regulations
generally prohibit price competition within the taxicab industry,
and virtually no form of competition occurs among taxicabs at
airports, where dispatching is on a first-in, first-out basis,
and customers must take the first cab in line, regardless of its
appearance or the conduct of its driver.
xii
The general decline of mass transit, and increased travel by
private automobile, has also made it more difficult for taxicabs
to compete with rental cars at U.S. airports. As travelers
become more accustomed to driving in their home cities, the
driving task becomes ever less onerous, and the immediate service
availability associated with having a car at one's disposal seems
less a luxury and more a necessity. Thus, for more and more
Americans, driving a rental car becomes the natural choice to
make for local travel in a distant city.
For intercity travel as a whole, the decline of intercity
rail and bus transportation in favor of air travel has also given
rental cars the edge over taxicabs. Taxicabs have the edge at
downtown rail and bus terminals, where high-density development
means short trip distances, and where the storage of rental cars
is expensive. Most airports, on the other hand, are far enough
from downtown that car storage costs are low, and taxicabs can
not offer long trips at prices competitive with those of rental
cars
.
For business travel, the rental car has some more subtle
advantages over the taxicab. Corporate travel departments see it
as an advantage to know in advance the cost of local travel in a
distant city. Rental car companies' acceptance of credit cards
is also counted a plus. Finally, business travelers are pleased
that evening recreational trips are not separately itemized in
the case of rental cars.
Reducing the taxicab's share of non-business airport trips
is a change in the profile of the non-business air traveler. Due
to the recent decline in airfares relative to income, today's air
travelers are less likely to be affluent and more likely to
belong to the budget-conscious middle class. Rather than take a
taxicab in their home city, they are more likely to ask a ftiend
or family member to drive them to the airport and pick them up
there. At their destination, they are more likely to be picked
up by a friend or relative, or to be met by a chartered bus
included in a package tour. A greater number of families are
taking vacations involving air travel, and families find renting
a car in the destination city far more convenient and economical
than calling a taxicab for each local trip there.
In some cities, the growth of air travel has been sufficient
to offset the taxicab's loss of market share, with the result
that the number of taxi trips to and from airports has held
nearly constant (or even increased). And since the related
factors of urban sprawl, increasing auto ownership, and the
decline mass transit patronage have reduced the overall demand
for taxicab service, airports still account for a large fraction
of all taxicab trips.* In most cities with any taxi service, the
airport is well supplied with taxicabs, and passengers rarely
have to wait for service.
Having read the preceding background information, readers
may well understand why the taxicab industry has generally not
developed or promoted shared-ride taxi service, at airports or
anywhere else. The supply of taxi service, especially at air-
ports, already exceeds the demand. The potential benefit of
pooling two taxicab patrons is that the "first" taxicab and
driver can serve both customers profitably and free the "second"
taxicab and driver for other profitable work (either inside or
outside the taxicab industry). From an economic point of view,
the benefit is achieved if either of the following occurs:
(a) The "second" driver carries a patron who otherwise
would not have been served, or
(b) The "second" driver finds profitable work outside the
taxi industry.
From the taxicab industry's point of view, the shared-ride taxi
program is beneficial only if (a) occurs.
In U.S. cities, other than New York, (a) would not usually
occur. However, it might occur during peak demand periods, and
would certainly occur during a period of unusually high demand,
*The only growth areas in the taxicab industry are packagedelivery and contract services: carrying elderly and handi-capped persons under transit agency contracts, school childrenunder contract to local educational agencies, etc.
xiv
such as a rainy rush hour or weekday blizzard, or an unusually
big conference or tourist event. In fact, Chicago's within-
downtown shared-ride taxi service, generally viewed as a failure,
worked very well during a mid-December snowstorm in 1981.
Ingredients of Successful Shared-Ride Taxi Programs
Shared-ride taxi service, compared with exclusive-ride taxi
service, involves several costs or penalties, each of which must
be addressed in the design of a shared-ride taxi program:
1) Transaction costs: someone has to figure out who
should ride with whom.
2) Wait time penalty: passenger's time is consumed when
the departure must be delayed until a match is found.
3) Collection time penalty: except where all passengers
being matched begin their trips at a single point,
passenger's time is consumed while the taxicab picks up
other passengers who are to travel together.
4) Collection cost: extra operating (especially labor)
cost is required for the taxi to pick up other
passengers who are to travel together, except where all
passengers being matched begin their trips at a single
point
.
5) Distribution time penalty: passenger's time is
consumed while the taxi drops off all the passengers at
their respective destinations.
6) Distribution cost: extra operating (especially labor)
cost is required for the taxi to drop off all the
passengers at their respective destinations.
7) Privacy loss: passengers must share the space in the
cab.
Under certain conditions, these drawbacks may be offset by
shared-ride taxi service's advantages over exclusive-ride taxi
service
:
1) reduced operation (especially labor) cost per
passenger-mile on the line-haul portion of the trip,
thus allowing for lower fares.
xv
2) slightly reduced traffic congestion, and
3) improved taxicab availability and reduced wait time if
there is a shortage of taxicabs.
Only the first of these benefits acts as a direct incentive to a
passenger to choose shared-ride service. He will reap the other
two benefits of the shared-ride taxi program even if he elects
exclusive-ride service.
In many ways, the trade-off outlined above is similar to the
trade-off between carpooling to work and driving alone. In
either comparison, the success of the shared-ride mode depends on
the line-haul travel time being long enough that the resulting
cost savings offsets the transaction cost, the wait-time penalty,
the collection and distribution times and costs, and the privacy
loss
.
But certain elements are more significant in the shared-ride
taxi trade-off than the carpool trade-off. The higher operating
costs of taxicabs add both to the advantage of shared riding and
to the costs of collection and distribution. But transaction
costs are potentially much higher per trip, since taxi passengers
must be matched for each trip, while carpoolers can spread
matching costs over many trips. Likewise, wait-time penalties
are probably less tolerable because they are not scheduled.
Finally, the loss of privacy may be more onerous in the taxicab
case because the passengers are unacquainted with each other.
To be successful, a shared-ride taxi service must minimize
the inherent disadvantages of shared riding while maximizing its
comparative advantages. Most importantly, since wait time for a
match is a critical disadvantage, airport shared-ride taxi
programs must serve destination zones with a high density of
trips, i.e., a large number of person-trips per day (by all modes
of transportation) per square mile of the zone. These densities
can usually be estimated by means of an air passenger survey.
Since per-pas senger line-haul cost savings are a key
advantage of shared-riding, the average travel time to each zone
should not be too short. Also, no shared-ride taxi program will
succeed without effective marketing and the support of the taxi
xvi
industry. The most important prerequisites are summarized in
Table ES-1; other factors contributing to the success of a
service are found in the conclusion.
The Airports
Comparison of LaGuardia, O'Hare and Logan Airports reveals
differences that help to explain the different degrees of success
realized by the three shared-ride taxi programs. In 1984,
Chicago's O'Hare International Airport served 45.6 million air
passengers; New York's LaGuardia Airport served 20.3 million; and
Boston's Logan International Airport served 19.2 million.
But the number of ground trips made by air passengers is not
all that different for the three airports. O'Hare's passenger
volumes overstate its ground transportation needs because its
connecting passengers, most of whom do not make ground access
trips, represent between 45 and 50 percent of all air passengers.
Logan's transfer rate, by contrast, is about 17 percent, and
LaGuardia's is well below 10 percent. Thus non-transfer air
passengers trips number about 24 million at O'Hare, about 19
million at LaGuardia, and about 16 million at Logan.
The proportions of business travelers, while not very
different at the three airports, is highest at LaGuardia; 60
percent at LaGuardia in 1978, 57 percent at Logan in 1979, and 47
percent at O'Hare in 1977. Table ES-2 (Laguardia data) shows
that business travelers are more likely to use taxi-cabs,
although this trend is less pronounced in Manhattan, where taxi
use is high among all traveler groups.
What distinguishes the three airports is the density of
their service areas. Logan Airport, being the major airport for
the New England region, serves a wide geographical area including
parts of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Maine. Only a third of
air passenger trips originate in the five "core cities" (Boston,
Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, and Chelsea), while 46 percent
originate in 152 surrounding cities and towns, and fully 21
percent originate still farther away.
xvii
TABLE ES-1. CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL AIRPORT SHARED-TAXI PROGRAMS
Condition Reason
1. Trip Density: Many person-trips 1 per day per squaremile of destination zone
Minimizes detours and pre-trip delays
2. Long line-haul travel time,unless density is excep-tionally high
Maximizes per-passengercost savings
3. Taxi industry support forthe program
Needed for customer service
1 Total person-trips (all modes of transportation)
xviii
TABLE ES-2. TAXICAB MODE SHARE AT LAGUARDIA AIRPORT (1978) 1
Trip Purpose and Residency of Traveler
BusinessAll
AllNon-res
.
BusinessNon-res
.
AllAll
Trip Origin 74.2 69.1 74.3 68.2
Below 60th Street 74.2 68.8 74.1 67.5
All Manhattan 49.1 52.4 62.1 40.9
Metro Area
^Source: Port Authority Airports: Origin by Mode, 1972 and1978.
xix
LaGuardia, on the other hand, is one of metropolitan New
York's three airports; it ranked second during 1974-83, serving
less than a third of the city's air passengers. A 1978 survey of
enplaning passengers showed that only 10 percent began their
journeys more than 50 miles from Manhattan. Using the remaining
90 percent as a base for other calculations, 49.7 percent
originated in Manhattan, with most of these (37.5%) in lower or
midtown Manhattan (defined as Manhattan south of 60th Street).
These data show that LaGuardia draws virtually all its passengers
from a small, densely developed area.
O'Hare is one of Chicago's two airports, but the other,
Midway Airport, has not carried more than six percent of
Chicago's total in any year since 1962, when O'Hare became the
dominant airport. However, Midway does draw a disproportionate
share of travelers to and from the downtown. Like LaGuardia,
O'Hare serves the central business district of a major commercial
center, but like Logan, O'Hare also serves a wider region. A
1977 survey of passengers enplaning at O'Hare showed that 5
percent of ground person trips to O'Hare originated in the cen-
tral business district (CBD), 34 percent outside the CBD but
within the city limits, 55 percent in the suburbs, and 6 percent
farther away.
At any airport, the taxicab's mode share depends largely on
which part of the airport's service area is examined. Since the
taxicab mode share is greatest downtown, an airport which serves
many downtown trips is likely to show a larger taxicab mode share
overall. For example, as shown in Table ES-3, the taxicab mode
share for travel to LaGuardia is extremely high (67.5%) in
Manhattan, but only 14.6 percent in the rest of the New York
metropolitan area (delineated along county lines approximating a
50-mile radius from Manhattan). But Manhattan's dominance gives
LaGuardia a 40.9 percent taxicab mode share for the metropolitan
area as a whole, which is very high compared to other U.S.
airports
.
Assuming that the mode split of enplaning passengers is not
radically different from that of deplaning passengers. Table ES-4
shows that mode choice at O'Hare, too, depends on the passenger's
xx
TABLE ES-3. LAGUARDIA MODE SPLIT BY TRIP ORIGIN (1978) 1
Taxi Auto Limo Bus Rental. o
Air*6 Total
Below 60th Street 68.2 10.7 9.0 8 .7 3.3 0.2 100.1
All Manhattan 67.5 12.4 8.3 8.9 2.8 0.14 100.0
Metro Area 40.9 38.6 10.6 5.4 4.4 0 . 07 100.0
All 37.8 35.7 10.1 5.2 4.2 6.8 99.8
Iport Authority Airports: Origin by Mode, 1972 and 1978, p. L 1
(1978).
oIncludes helicopter passengers and air transfers.
xxi
TABLE ES-4. O' HARE MODE SPLIT BY TRIP ORIGIN (1977) 1
Auto Taxi Bus 2 Rental Limo 2 Other Total
CBD 23.3 33.9 32.2 4.5 2.9 3.3 100.1
City/Not CBD 51.2 19.8 12.9 3.7 7.5 4.8 99.9
Suburbs 75.8 4.5 3.3 5.2 9.9 1.3 100.0
Elsewhere 50.8 0.3 22.4 15.5 7.6 3.5 100.1
Composite 63.3 10.9 9.2 5.3 8.6 2.7 100.0
^From CATS Planning Working Paper # 83 - 7 , Table 4. Excludes airtransfers
.
^Fixed-route services (includes Chicago Transit Authority).
^Door-to-door services (includes suburban limos and hotelcourtesy cars).
xxii
destination. The private auto predominates for all destinations
except the CBD, where the taxicab ranks first. Taxicabs carry
about a third of CBD-bound passengers, about a fifth of
passengers bound for points within the city limits but outside
the CBD, and about one in twenty suburban passengers. But since
the CBD draws such a small share of O'Hare passengers, the
composite taxicab mode share at O'Hare is only 10.9 percent.
In Boston (see Table ES-5), taxis carry a large fraction
(45%) of the passengers from the core cities, but only a small
fraction (7.9%) from the 152 surrounding cities and towns, and a
still smaller fraction (4.0%) from more distant points. As a
result, Logan's composite taxicab mode share is 19.7 percent.
Finally, Table ES-6 displays the distribution of trip
origins of taxi passengers arriving at O'Hare Airport. To the
extent that these reflect the destinations of passengers entering
taxicabs at O'Hare, they are of critical importance to taxi
drivers. Table ES-6 also indicates that 15.5 percent of taxi
passengers had origins in the CBD; this figure will be used later
to estimate the mode share of O'Hare's shared-ride taxi program.
The Experience of Three Cities
Table ES-7 summarizes the design and impacts of the airport
shared-ride taxi programs in New York, Chicago, and Boston.
These programs are briefly described in the sections which
follow.
New York's Share-A-Cab service, initiated in July, 1979,
carries passengers from LaGuardia Airport to lower and midtown
Manhattan, and upper Manhattan below 96th Street, a total land
area of 14 square miles. Fares (as of 1984) are $6 and $7,
depending on the zone, of which one dollar goes to the service
operator. Taxicab Dispatch Service, Inc. (TDS) . TDS was founded
and is funded by the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade (MTBOT),
a trade association representing the city's large fleet owners.
Share-A-Cab operates daily except Saturday, and daily ridership
xxiii
TABLE ES-5. LOGAN MODE SPLITS BY PURPOSE AND ORIGIN
1
Transit Limo Taxi Rental AutoTotalTrips
RowPercent
All Trips 6.3 8.4 19.7 11 .
2
54.4 34,150 100.0
By Purpose:
Business 5.5 7.8 23.0 15.1 48 .
5
19,275 56.5
Pleasure 5.9 8.7 14.5 4.8 66.1 11,025 32.3
Other 10.5 9 .
4
18.9 11.3 49.8 3,850 11.3
34,150 100.0
By Origin:
Core Cities 3 13.4 5 .
6
45.0 6.9 29.1 11,375 33.3
Other EMRPP 3 2.6 6.5 7.9 12.3 70.7 15,575 45.6
Other 1.8 14.9 4.0 17.2 62.0 7,200 21.1
34,150 100.0
1 Source: Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Logan Airport Master PlanStudy: Ground Traffic and Transportation, April 10, 1980, p.13.
^Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, and Chelsea.
3 The 152 suburbs bounded roughly by the outer belt highway (I-495 ).
xxiv
TABLE ES-6 . ORIGINS OF TAXICAB TRIPS TO 0' HARE (1977) 1
CBD City/Not CBD Suburbs Elsewhere Total
15.5 61.6 22.7 0.2 100.0
^From CATS Planning Working Paper #83-7, Table 4.
xxv
TABLE ES-7. CHARACTERISTICSPROGRAMS
OF THREE AIRPORT SHARED-RIDE TAXI
New York Chicago Boston
Trips Served From airport Airport to CBDCBD to airportWithin CBD
Airport to suburbs
AdministeringAgency
Taxi industry Chicago Dept, ofConsumer Services
Port Authority
Main Objective Improve imageand market share
Aid ailing taxiindustry
Allow taxis to can-pete with limos
Taxi Participa-tion required?
Yes No No
Best SustainedDaily Ridership 700 (6-11/82)
O'Hare—2201
Midway—120 300 (1st half 1978)
Best Mode Splitfor Area Served
About 7% O'Hare—16-22% About 3% in largerservice area
Second-ChoiceMode of Users
No data No data 42-60%—regular taxi20-29%—automobile19-27%—limo/transit
Subsidy/User Zero in best year No data $3.18 to $4.682
Successful? Yes Yes from airports No
Reason ForSuccess OrFailure
Cab shortageFocused trip endsLong line-haulOnly 1 taxi queue
Focused trip endsLong line-haul
Oversupply of taxisDispersed trip endsDowntown excludedSeparate taxi queueOver-staffed program
^Average of 12-month period from April 1982 through March 1983.
2Based on Port Authority estimate-see discussion.
xxvi
averaged about 700 during its high 6-month period (June through
November, 1982). Data limitations preclude a precise estimation
of mode share, but 700 daily passengers is probably between 7 and
7.5 percent of all daily person trips to the Share-A-Cab service
area on the days Share-A-Cab operates.
Share-A-Cab service is provided only at certain high-volume
terminals. Riders are matched by a TDS dispatcher at the
terminal, and matching is limited to passengers arriving at that
terminal. Signs in the terminals direct prospective passengers
to the TDS stand, located in most cases just a few steps from the
regular taxi stand. Some travelers go directly to the Share-A-
Cab stand; others are recruited from the regular stand by the TDS
dispatcher. Since both stands are served by a single taxicab
queue, all New York City taxicabs who pick up passengers at
LaGuardia are likely to carry a Share-A-Cab trip occasionally.
The Share-A-Cab program was established with three
objectives in mind: to increase the taxicab's share of the
airport ground transportation market, to improve the industry's
image in the eyes of the Port Authority and the public, and to
use gasoline more efficiently. The industry's concerns about its
image arose from the fact that there is frequently a shortage of
taxicabs at New York City airports. This shortage results from a
strong demand for taxicabs in Manhattan, and a tightly binding
regulatory constraint on the total number of taxicab operating
permits in the city.
Due to the shortage of taxicabs at the airports, and the
profitability of other markets in the city, the MTBOT was not
worried that Share-A-Cab would leave some drivers without
passengers. The MTBOT correctly assumed a high service
elasticity of demand for taxicab service in New York City; if the
supply of taxi service in the city increased, so would consump-
tion. Any drivers no longer needed at the airport would serve
passengers who would otherwise not have been served.
Though generally successful, Share-A-Cab has experienced two
problems. The first was solved in May 1980, when, in response to
driver complaints, the voucher payment system originally used was
replaced with a cash system. The second problem, which began in
xxvii
1983, was a gradual dispersion of air passengers from the busiest
terminals to the other terminals. For example. New York Air now
shares with Eastern Airlines the market which Eastern's Air
Shuttle formerly cornered. Share-A-Cab ridership at the Air
Shuttle terminal fell, and since New York Air passenger volumes
cannot support a Share-A-Cab stand, the program has suffered. At
the main terminal. Eastern and Delta Airlines were near each
other, and together they fed a successful stand. On June 19,
1983, as Delta inaugurated a new terminal, TDS opened a stand
there while also staying open at Eastern. Both the new stand and
the old one had to be closed due to insufficient volumes. (In
1984, Eastern was reopened at reduced hours.)
Faced with declining patronage, TDS cut service hours in
order to contain costs. During the program's zenith in 1982,
three Share-A-Cab stands each operated 82.5 hours per week. By
June 1985, weekly service hours had been cut 66 percent from
247.5 to only 84 hours, split (unequally) among the three stands.
Keeping Share-A-Cab as close as possible to a break-even opera-
tion is important to TDS because it is funded (through the MTBOT)
by the owners of only 1700 (14%) of the city's 12,000 taxicabs.
Unrecovered costs represent a subsidy to non-member competitors.
No user surveys have been conducted, so ridership can be
discussed in aggregate terms only. Due to the airline changes
discussed above, and the resulting reductions in service hours,
average daily ridership gradually declined from its 1982 peak of
700 to below 200 in the first half of 1985. It later rose and
leveled off at about 325 in the first quarter of 1986.
For two months in mid-1980, the MTBOT experimented with a
shared-ride taxi service to all three airports from two downtown
points, selected on the basis of a survey of Share-A-Cab users.
Despite fairly substantial advertising of the service, successful
matching rarely occurred. Average daily ridership was about
four. Realizing that the service was not viable, the MTBOT
promptly discontinued it.
Chicago's Super Saver Taxi program, inaugurated on December
7, 1981, at O'Hare International Airport's Terminal 3, and on
xxviii
April 26, 1982, at O'Hare's Terminal 2 and at Midway Airport,
carries passengers to a 2.8 square mile destination zone corres-
ponding very closely to the Chicago CBD. The city Department of
Consumer Services, which administers Super Saver, set fares at
$12 per person from O'Hare and $8 from Midway--about 60 percent
of exclusive ride fares. Each taxicab carries either two or
three passengers. Daily ridership in September 1982 was 310 at
O'Hare and 160 at Midway. The highest daily ridership figures
sustained as an average for a six-month period were 220 at O'Hare
and 120 at Midway.
Super Saver had its origins in December 1979 , when, at the
suggestion of Checker Cab Company, the city council passed an
ordinance authorizing the Commissioner of Consumer Services to
implement shared-ride services. In 1981, the metropolitan
planning organization, known as CATS (Chicago Area Transportation
Study) published a report which concluded that the taxi industry
was ailing due to declining demand for service. The report
suggested that shared-ride service might improve the industry's
economic state, and that there was a demand for such service in
the CBD and at O'Hare Airport. While the program adopted had
three components, including a downtown-to-airport service and a
within-downtown service, only the airport-to-downtown service
discussed here met with any success.
Signs in the airport terminals direct riders to the Super
Saver taxi stand, located just ahead of the regular cab line.
Officially, service is offered only when Super Saver dispatchers
are on duty--at Midway from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. weekdays, and at
O'Hare from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. daily. In practice, the drivers
usually recruit their own customers both within and outside of
the official service hours. Service is not guaranteed; a driver
will not carry a lone passenger at the reduced fare. However, a
driver is not supposed to wait more than ten minutes for a third
passenger, and the dispatchers seem to view enforcement of this
rule as their prime function.
A key operational difference between the two airports is
that at O'Hare, a driver must choose between Super Saver and
regular service upon arrival at the taxi pool, while at Midway,
xxix
drivers do not make that choice until they are within two or
three cabs of the head of the queue. Because Super Saver trips
are much more lucrative than regular service in terms of fare-
per-mile, mileage, and prospects for business near the dropoff
location, drivers elected the Super Saver queue at O'Hare even
though it was more than twice as long a wait as the queue for
regular service. The system at Midway had the advantage of
allocating taxicabs more efficiently to the two services and
avoiding the extremely long waits experienced in the shared-ride
queue at O'Hare.
Super Saver's 220 daily passengers from O'Hare is 8.2
percent of the 2,669 passengers estimated by the CATs to leave
O'Hare by taxicab. Super Saver's mode share can be estimated
very tentatively by combining that estimate with the not-
directly-comparable data on enplaning passengers in Tables ES-4
and ES-6. Dividing 8.2 percent by 15.5 percent (the CBD's share
of taxi passengers shown in Table ES-6), one concludes that Super
Saver at O'Hare carried about 53 percent of those traveling by
taxicab to the area it served. Multiplying that 53 percent by
33.9 percent (the taxi's share of CBD trips shown in Table ES-4),
one arrives at the most important conclusion: that during the
sample period. Super Saver at O'Hare carried about 18 percent of
all travelers to the area it served.
The above estimates are sensitive to the asymmetry of travel
to and from airports. While the taxi's share of CBD trips in
Table ES-4 is probably similar for enplaning and deplaning
passengers, the CBD's share of taxi passengers (Table ES-6) is
probably not. The availability of taxicab service to enplaning
passengers varies greatly according to their trip origins; it is
highest for trips originating in the CBD. Service availability
for deplaning passengers is less dependent on their destinations.
Thus, the CBD's share of enplaning passengers is probably larger
than its share of deplaning passengers. This means that both
mode share estimates in the preceding paragraph are more likely
to be too low than too high. One can be fairly confident that
xxx
Super Saver at O'Hare carried between 50 and 63 percent of those
traveling by taxicab to the area it served and between 16 and 22
percent of all travelers to the area it served.
Boston's Share-A-Cab service, initiated on April 26, 1977,
carries passengers from Logan International Airport to 138 cities
and towns in eastern Massachusetts. Fare zones are drawn along
municipal boundaries, and fares are set at about one-half the
exclusive-ride fare to the center of the zone. The Massachusetts
Port Authority (Massport) is responsible for service design and
operations. In its best six-month period, Share-A-Cab carried
300 daily person trips, roughly 3 percent of daily person trips
by all modes from Logan to points in the Share-A-Cab service
area
.
Prospective passengers are directed by signs to the place in
each terminal where they obtain information and request service.
When the program began, this was a staffed booth with a tele-
phone, but later it was a self-service courtesy phone. Use of
telecommunications allows the Share-A-Cab dispatcher to group
passengers deplaning at different terminals into the same
taxicab
.
Share-A-Cab' s chief design flaw is that its service area
excludes the whole city of Boston, where the trip density, and
hence the potential for quick and convenient matches, would be
highest. The matching problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the service area extended far beyond the Boston urbanized area,
covering about 2000 square miles of suburban and rural territory.
Another critical error was that 23 full-time personnel were
assigned to administer Share-A-Cab and were instructed to charge
all their time to the program. Had these individuals been given
other work to perform during slow periods, administrative
inefficiency and the resulting service cutbacks might have been
avoided.
The indirect cause of Share-A-Cab' s creation was Massport's
concern with traffic congestion in and around the airport. To
address the problem, Massport began actively to encourage the
development of limousine services connecting the airport with key
Boston-area destinations, most of them in the inner suburbs. The
xxxi
taxi operators became alarmed by the rapid growth of limousine
services, especially since most of the new services offered door-
to-door service. This led to a week-long airport taxi strike
(which eventually spread throughout the city), designed to force
Massport to ban the limousines. Suddenly faced with a ground
transportation crisis, Massport decided to negotiate with the
taxi industry. Still unwilling to reverse its policy toward
limousines, Massport agreed instead to develop and administer a
shared-ride taxi service, thus allowing taxis to compete more
effectively with limousines.
The compromise worked out between the taxi industry,
Massport, and the Massachusetts Executive Office of
Transportation and Construction called for the following:
o At the industry's insistence, Share-A-Cab would not
carry passengers to the city of Boston; both downtownBoston and the city's residential areas were excluded.
The taxicab operators believed that Share-A-Cab service
to Boston would draw the vast majority of its ridership
from among regular taxicab customers, resulting in
revenue losses for the taxi industry as a whole.
o Share-A-Cab service would be offered in only one
direction: from the airport to 21 suburbs (land area:
287 square miles) which together accounted for one
quarter of all passenger destinations. Service to the
airport was proposed but not implemented, apparently
because of an administrative problem: such a service
would have to involve a multitude of suburban taxicab
companies
.
o Massport would organize and pay for service design and
administration, dispatching, and advertising.
o In exchange for Massport's acceptance of Share-A-Cab
costs, the industry agreed to accept (and pass on to
passengers entering taxicabs at the airport) a larger
share of Massport's costs attributable to taxicab ser-
vice as a whole. Thus, the administration fee paid to
Massport for admission to the taxicab pool (queue) was
increased from $.10 to $.50, and Massport's annual
taxi-related deficit increased just $900 (0.3%) to
$287,150. (Greenbaum, p. 138).
Within the first few months, two changes were made to Share-
A-Cab service to carry out other terms of the original com-
promise. On July 19, 1977, despite Massport's misgivings, the
service area was enlarged from 21 communities to 138, in order to
accommodate the industry's desire to serve the communities where
taxis had low market penetration. Beginning on September 19,
1977, despite the industry's reluctance, Share-A-Cab drivers were
required to carry a lone passenger at the shared-ride fare if no
match had been made within 15 minutes. Though aware that average
revenue per taxicab trip would suffer in the near term, Massport
staff nevertheless felt that in the long run, the increased
service reliability afforded by the 15-minute wait-time guarantee
would build ridership, thus increasing taxicab load factors and
per-trip revenues.
Although the increase in the taxicab pool fee for all
taxicabs nearly offset Share-A-Cab expenses, Massport preferred
to evaluate the program's cost-effectiveness separately from
regular taxi service. Multiplying the $.50 per-cab fee by the
number of Share-A-Cabs dispatched, subtracting only those paltry
revenues from the program's enormous administrative expenses, and
dividing the resulting net cost by the number of Share-A-Cab
riders, Massport calculated per-passenger subsidies as high as
$4.68. No subsidy data for other ground transportation modes
were available for comparison.
Since 1978, Share-A-Cab service has been cut back to reduce
administration costs. In November, 1978, by curtailing operating
hours at certain booths, the staff was reduced from 23 to 13,
without any major service or ridership impacts. In November,
1979 , a staff cut from 13 to 3 was coupled with a service
change—Share-A-Cab taxis would no longer pick up passengers at
xxxiii
all terminals. Instead, passengers deplaning at terminals other
than D would ride a free shuttle van to Share-A-Cab's control
center in Terminal D.
In August, 1981, in a final cost-cutting measure, Share-A-
Cab was all but destroyed. Service hours were cut by half--the
7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift was dropped; only the 3:30 to 11:30
p.m. shift was retained. The 15-minute service guarantee was
eliminated, so that passengers no longer had any assurance of
traveling at the shared-ride fare. Also, the shuttle van was
eliminated, and passengers not deplaning at Terminal D had to
travel at their own expense (by bus or taxicab) to the control
center
.
Ridership responded fairly predictably to service changes.
Addition of 117 communities in 1977 produced only a slight
increase in ridership; later surveys showed that most users went
to the original 21 cities and towns. The 15-minute guarantee
boosted patronage by at least 60 percent; average daily ridership
topped 300 during each of the first two quarters of 1978.
Ridership figures for that season in 1979-1982 suggest that
institution of the shuttle van in November 1979 cost Share-A-Cab
only about one-eighth of its riders, while the cutback in service
hours in August 1981, accompanied by the withdrawal of the
shuttle van, drove away nearly two-thirds of the remaining users.
These two loses, combined with a 10 percent drop in patronage
between 1978 and 1979 , and an unexplained 30 percent drop in mid-
1980, reduced average daily ridership to about 50 in 1982, an
aggregate loss of over 80 percent for the four-year period.
Shared-ride service is not viable at this low volume; wait-times
and cancellation rates have increased geometrically, and
ridership has continued to decline.*
Conclusions on diversions from other modes are based on two
surveys: one conducted in July 1977, when only the 21 inner
suburbs were included in the service area, and one the following
*As of mid-1986, Massport was working on a possible restructuringof Share-A-Cab. Among the options being considered were theinclusion of downtown Boston and the exclusion of the moreremote suburbs.
xxxiv
winter, when 138 communities were included. As shown in Table
ES-8, the results are very different, reflecting the fact that
regular taxicabs carry a significant share of airport trips from
the inner suburbs, while private and rented automobiles dominate
in the farther-away communities. The first row of Table ES-8
indicates that the industry correctly perceived its self-interest
when it pressed for a wide service area. On the other hand, the
airport's primary interest—reducing congestion by drawing riders
from low-occupancy modes (including exclusive-ride taxicabs) into
shared-ride cabs—was in the smaller service area, where only
18.8 percent of Share-A-Cab uses were drawn from the highest-
occupancy modes, MBTA rapid transit and bus/limo. In the larger
service area, the comparable figure was 27.2 percent.
Conclusion
The shared-ride taxi services from New York's Laguardia and
Chicago's O'Hare Airports proved much more successful than the
service at Boston's Logan Airport. One apparent explanation for
this difference is that the LaGuardia and O'Hare services went
only downtown, while the Logan service went only the suburbs.
The key difference between the downtown and the suburbs, trip
density, played a critical role in the performance of the three
services
.
Table ES-9 describes the shared-ride taxi programs at
LaGuardia, O'Hare and Logan Airports in terms of the three
"necessary conditions for successful shared-taxi programs" copied
from Table ES-1. The second row of Table ES-9 allows for the
fact that Boston's Share-A-Cab service pooled passengers from all
terminals, while the other two programs matched riders at each
cab stand. Table ES-9 shows that LaGuardia's and O'Hare's
programs passed all tests, while Logan's program failed the
density test. These observations substantially account for the
differences in success.
Reviewing the numbers in Table ES-9, and the experience of
the three shared-taxi programs, one can draw some tentative
numerical conclusions:
xxxv
TABLE ES-8 SECOND-CHOICE MODE OF SHARE-A-CAB USERS
ModeSummer 1977
(21 communities) (138 communities)
Regular Taxi 59.7% 41.7%
Private Auto (Picked Up) 12.4 15.5
Private Auto (Parked) 3 .
5
6.2
Rental Car 4.1 7.0
MBTA Rapid Transit 10.5 12.3
Bus/Limo 8.3 14.9
Other 1.5 2.4
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0%
xxxvi
TABLE ES-9. NECESSARY CONDITIONS REVISITED
Element
Many person-tripsper day per squaremile of destinationzone
Many person-tripsper day per squaremile of destinationzone
Long line-haultravel time
LaGuardia
YES ( 68Q1 )
YES (200+) 2
YES (20-40 min)
0' Hare
YES (43Q1 )
YES (100+) 2
YES (20-40 min)
Logan
NO (51 )
NO (51 )
YES (15-90 min)
Taxi industry YES YES YESsupport
1By
2By
all modes of transportation
all modes of transportation
from the entire airport
from each shared-ride taxi stand
xxxvii
1) Airport shared-ride taxi programs must serve
destination zones with at least 100 person-trips per
day (by all modes of transportation) per square mile of
the zone. If a high-density zone is small enough (in
terms of within-zone travel time) that any two passen-
gers going to that zone can share a cab withoutincurring excessive distribution time, it is a viable
destination zone. If it is too large, it should be
divided into smaller zones, and those withoutsufficient trip density should be dropped.
2) If one plans to match passengers from all terminals,
then the density test may be applied to the airport as
a whole. But if one wishes to avoid the staffing costs
and complexity of inter-terminal matching, the density
test must be applied to each dispatch point being
served.
3) Average travel time to each zone should be at least 15
minutes, unless the trip density to that zone is
extremely high, in which case the travel time may be
shorter
.
Besides pointing to the rudimentary pre-requisite for a
successful airport shared-ride taxi program--a high volume of
passengers traveling a considerable distance to a focused set of
dest inations--the experience of the three cities suggests some
institutional and operational conclusions:
1 ) The support of the taxicab industry is crucial. This
has three more specific implications:
(a) A shortage of taxicab service is helpful. From an
institutional point of view, shared-ride taxi
programs are at a disadvantage where there is an
oversupply of taxicabs. In such cases, taxi
operators see the program as a threat--they fear
that their customers will pool their trips in
xxxviii
fewer cabs, new customers will not materialize to
fill the void, and total industry revenues will
decline
.
(b) The shared-ride service should be marketed to
users of all modes, not just taxi users. Taxi
industry support depends on attracting new
customers rather than simply reshuffling existing
ones
.
(c) The taxi industry should be involved in planning
and day-to-day operations. The most successful
program (LaGuardia) was the only one administered
by the taxi industry. However, care must be taken
to ensure that the public objectives of the
program are not abandoned.
2) Disincentives for automobile use contribute to the
program's success. Disincentives such as traffic con-
gestion and high parking costs tend to increase the use
of shared-ride taxi by discouraging the park-and-fly
and "kiss-ride" modes. However, these conditions are
usually present whenever the required density exists.
3) Shared-ride taxi programs should be initiated in the
most promising destination zone(s) first. Initial
destination zones should be those having the highest
product of density and line-haul travel time. This
strategy allows one to test the market and iron out any
problems. It also maximizes the chance of a successful
start, which is important for taxi industry acceptance
and favorable publicity.
4) Pooling passengers from several terminals is difficult.
Unless one bears the expense of a shared-ride taxi
agent in each terminal, one must rely on signs and
courtesy phones to promote the service. Given the very
high visibility of regular taxi service at airports,
passengers are not likely to elect a shared-ride
service represented only by a red telephone.
xxxix
5 ) The physical layout of the dispatch area must be
considered. Addition of a shared-ride service can
complicate curb-side operations; the space for queuing
and loading both regular and shared-ride taxicabs must
be carefully planned.
6 ) A completely separate taxi queue for shared-ride is not
advisable. Taxi drivers complain when the shared-ride
queue is much longer than the regular queue. From an
economic perspective, such complaints are not really
legitimate, since drivers themselves set the queue
lengths in proportion to the expected payoffs of the
two types of services. Nevertheless, such complaints
can still be potent in a political system. Further-
more, driver frustration can lead to discourteous
service and public dissatisfaction with the program.
One disadvantage of the single queue used at LaGuardia is
that some drivers might resent being "forced" to provide shared-
ride service. While this is perhaps an equal specious complaint
in an environment which outlaws all forms of service refusal, it
is wise to sidestep such pitfalls whenever it is easy to do so.
The system used at Midway Airport seems very clever; drivers
there form a single queue, but as they near the head of the line,
they choose between the Share-A-Cab loading area and the regular
stand
.
Future Developments
Airline deregulation and the accompanying fare reductions
are likely to increase air travel, while the development of hub-
and-spoke route networks may cause travel to become increasingly
concentrated at the busier airports. Given these trends, shared-
ride taxi programs may well be appropriate for more airports in
the future.
xl
1. SHARE-A-CAB TAXI SERVICE - NEW YORK'S LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes a shared-ride taxi program in New
York City known as Share-A-Cab. The program, operational since
July of 1979, was developed and is administered by the Metro-
politan Taxicab Board of Trade (MTBOT), a local trade association
which represents the large taxicab fleet operators in New York
City. Share-A-Cab provides door-to-door service from LaGuardia
Airport to three zones in Manhattan south of 96th St. (see Figure
1-1) between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 10:30 p.m., Monday
through Friday, and from 3:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on Sundays.
Service from Manhattan to LaGuardia is not provided.
The MTBOT began the service in order to:
o reduce the total amount of fuel used by fleet taxis in
New York City,
o establish a better image with the Port Authority by
providing better taxi service at LaGuardia, and
o capture a larger share of the ground transportation
market
.
In addition, MTBOT persuaded the Federal government to
return (beginning in 1983) $.04 of the $.09 per gallon Federal
gasoline tax to the region's taxicab operators. A Federal law
allows taxicab operators a rebate of $.04 of the federal gasoline
tax if the city in which the taxicab operator is licensed has a
viable shared-ride taxi service and the operator does not
prohibit his drivers from providing shared-ride services. The
MTBOT received a ruling stating that Share-A-Cab qualifies as a
shared-ride taxi service and that all operators not prohibiting
their drivers form participating qualify for the $. 04/gallon
rebate
.
Data for this case study of the Share-A-Cab service were
obtained from sources contacted during site visits and
interviews
.
1
LaGuardiaAirport
Queens
FIGURE 1-1. SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONESEFFECTIVE DATE: JULY 1979
96th Street j
59th Street :;|i£
CD5th
Ave. A
1 23rd Street
Brooklyn
2
The chapter is organized as follows:
o Section 1.2 describes the background and development of
the program.
o Section 1.3 describes the operation of the program.
o Section 1.4 provides a summary of basic performance and
impact data associated with the program.
o Section 1.5 provides some conclusions.
o Section 1.6 discusses attempts to expand the service.
1 . 2 BACKGROUND
The MTBQT is the operating agency for the Share-A-Cab
program. This agency works as a trade association and represents
the large fleet owners of the city. The MTBOT forecast that many
other taxi companies would want to contribute to the Share-A-Cab
system, and created a corporation known as the Taxicab Dispatch
Service so other cab companies could aid in the financial support
of the program. Although other owners have not participated
financially. Taxicab Dispatch Service is the actual operator of
Share-A-Cab. However, since it is totally supported by and acts
only as an operating arm of MTBOT, this report will refer to
MTBOT as the operator/administrator of Share-A-Cab.
Fleet owners constitute about 15 percent of the 11,780
taxicab medallions in New York City. Individual owner-operators
possess approximately 4,900 medallions, and the remaining 5,000
are used by what has been termed "mini-fleets," which consist of
two or more cabs. Some "mini-fleet" owners operate their own
cabs, while others lease all the taxicabs and medallions to
drivers. Within the large fleets, those represented by MTBOT,
approximately one-half of the drivers are paid on a commission
basis, while the remainder of the drivers lease the taxicab and
medallion from the large fleet owner.
As stated previously, MTBOT set up the Share-A-Cab program
with the following objectives in mind:
o Reduce the amount of fuel consumed by fleet taxicabs in
New York City.
3
o Improve taxicab operators' image with the PortAuthority.
o Capture a larger share of the ground transportation
market
.
The following sections will provide more in-depth descriptions of
these objectives.
1.2.1 Reduce Energy Consumption
At the time that this program was considered by MTBOT
(1979), gas lines and rapidly increasing fuel prices were common.
Members of MTBOT voiced their concerns over the gas lines and
price increases and were hoping to implement the Share-A-Cab
program to reduce fuel consumption and therefore reduce their
operating costs.
1.2.2 Improve Taxicab Operators' Image
Although it is easy for a passenger to hail a taxicab at
most airports in the United States, this is not always the case
at LaGuardia. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has
had problems encouraging enough taxicab operators to provide
service to the airport, especially on Friday and Sunday nights
when passenger arrivals at LaGuardia are very heavy due to high
amounts of business and pleasure travel. This has been
attributed to two factors:
1. Taxicab operators prefer to work the theater district
on Friday nights, where trips are shorter, easier to
come by, and tips tend to be higher; and
2. Many of the owner-operators prefer to remain home on
Sunday evenings with their families.
The result of the situation has been a total lack of
taxicabs at the airport at certain times. Although the situation
was not viewed as critical by the Port Authority, it damaged the
taxicab industry's reputation with both the Port Authority and
with the public.
4
1.2.3 Provide a Service that Captures a Larger Share of theGround Transportation Market
LaGuardia Airport is used heavily by business travelers,
primarily due to the large number of shuttle flights arriving
from Boston and Washington. High volumes of business travelers
arrive at LaGuardia and desire quick, cost-effective transporta-
tion to Manhattan, specifically the mid-town and financial
districts. Since the supply of taxicabs at LaGuardia can some-
times be low, shared-riding was considered likely to succeed,
since passengers would be provided service faster by sharing the
ride. Adding to this theory was the fact that no other competi-
tive form of transportation existed or was expected to be
initiated at the airport. Commercial limousine services do not
offer door-to-door service, private limousines cost $25.00 or
more per hour, and use of the transit system would involve infor-
mation needs, several transfers, a great amount of time, and
often difficulties with baggage handling.
Complaints often voiced by taxicab drivers in other cities
are that instituting shared-ride services reduces taxicab turn-
over at the airport, and a few drivers take many passengers,
leaving some drivers with no fares. But this was not a concern
at LaGuardia, due to the shortage of taxicabs there.
Since the stimulus for shared-riding was present, MTBOT
initiated a series of meetings with the Port Authority and the
Taxi and Limousine Commission (the local regulatory body) to
determine the location of the matching area and to set the hours
of operation. The MTBOT also conducted a small survey to aid in
their decisions. Both the Taxi and Limousine Commission and the
Port Authority viewed the system favorably, and easily came to
agreement on a service area, fare structure, operating policy,
and an area to set up operations at LaGuardia.
1.3 SYSTEM OPERATIONS
Share-A-Cab began in July of 1979, with a single matching
area at the Eastern Airlines Shuttle Terminal. During the first
5
16 months of operation, Share-A-Cab operated in the following
fashion.
Passengers seeking any kind of taxi service would gather at
the taxi dispatching area. Once here, they would notify the
taxicab dispatcher, an employee of the Port Authority, of their
intended destinations. Alongside the Port Authority dispatcher
was a separate facility where the Share-A-Cab service was con-
tained (see Figure 1-2). A separate dispatcher (hired and paid
by MTBOT ) located in this area would then talk to travelers
awaiting a taxi in the exclusive ride area, explain the financial
savings involved with the program, and inquire as to whether
anyone desired to share-a-r ide. Once a group of three to four
passengers was formed, the Port Authority dispatcher would for-
ward a taxicab out of the queue to the Share-A-Cab area. The
MTBOT dispatcher decides whether three or four passengers will
ride together depending on the demand for the service. Taxi
queues at LaGuardia are formed near each dispatching area. Each
of these queues has one line. Therefore, if a shared-ride has
been formed, then the taxicab next in line must take the shared-
ride .
Meanwhile the Share-A-Cab dispatcher would sell prenumbered,
color-coded vouchers of either $5 or $6 to the passengers,
depending upon the zone to which they desired to travel. Zones A
and B ran as far north as 59th Street split by 5th Avenue, and
went as far south as 23rd street. Zone C covered the area south
of 23rd Street. Fares for Zones B and C were $6. 00/passenger
,
and for Zone A $ 5.00/passenger (see Figure 1-3). Passengers
would use this voucher as cash and present it to the driver
once they reached their final destination. Drivers could
exchange these vouchers for cash with $.50 of the value retained
by MTBOT to support the program (see Appendix B, p.l). The
voucher system was employed to serve the receipt needs of both
the taxicab operator and passenger by being a two section
coupon--one-half retained by each (see Figure 1-4). Tips were
not included in the price. According to informal discussions
with taxicab drivers, tips per passenger for Share-A-Cab average
$1.00 to $2.00.
6
EASTERN AIRLINES
SHUTTLE TERMINAL
-Exclusive RideDispatching Area
Share-a-CabMatching andDispatcher Area
FIGURE 1-2. SHARE-A-CAB OPERATIONSAT EASTERN AIRLINES SHUTTLETERMINAL
7
Hutfa&rt
Rlv«r
FIGURE 1-3. SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONESJULY 1979 - OCTOBER 1980FARES APPLICABLE UNTIL MAY 1980
8
m ==3C=~-- IE
A 5105IE=SI3£r^|
Zone B - 23-601h St. Zone B - 23-60th St.
West Side West Side
$6 REDEEM Wf DAYS
Group Ride Vouchers Group Ride Vouchers
Tips and Tolls not included. Tips and Tolls not included, r
IS— II -Til- --ir==n- ic=—ii==» ii=M
FIGURE 1-4. SHARE-A-CAB VOUCHERSIN USE FROM JULY 1979UNTIL MAY 1980
9
The program did not work well at the beginning; drivers
disliked the voucher system, and ridership levels were very low.
For the period July 1979 through April 1980, average monthly
ridership was 4,666.^ Although drivers could exchange the
vouchers for cash at many points in the city, including MTBOT
headquarters, MTBOT taxi dispatchers and large fleet taxicab
companies, they disliked the time and effort required for the
voucher exchange. In May 1980, MTBOT instituted a cash payment
policy along with a fare increase (see Appendix B, p.2). Fares
for Zone A went from $5.00 per passenger to $6.00, and for Zones
B and C, the fare per passenger rose from $6.00 to $7.00. Also,
instead of $.50 of the fare going to the support of the service,
$1.00 of the fare was dedicated. The taxi dispatcher is paid
$1.00 by each passenger at the airport. The remainder is passed
directly to the driver. Operators were pleased with the new fare
procedures, since the new payment method eliminated the need to
cash vouchers and the fare increase resulted in a $.50 per
passenger increase in income for the driver. No effects were
noted on tipping.
At the end of October 1980, an additional matching area was
opened at American Airlines in the main terminal. Also, the
upper boundary of destination Zones A and B was moved from 59th
street to 96th street (see Figure 1-5). Ridership levels were
not satisfactory at American, and MTBOT decided to move the
matching area from American to United Airlines in January
1981. At the same time, one other matching area was opened at
Eastern Airlines at the main terminal. These changes resulted in
a substantial increase in total ridership. MTBOT staff was
unable to explain the increase or the reason for the low levels
of ridership experienced at American except that American is
located at the far end of the terminal, while Eastern and United
are more centrally located in relation to the entire airport
layout (see Figure 1-6). This may have allowed the program
greater visibility and have led to higher ridership.
^Taxi Dispatch Service, Fact Sheet , May 31, 1982.
10
96th Street
LaGuardiaAirport
Queens
Street
Brooklyn
FIGURE 1-5. SHARE-A-CAB DESTINATION ZONESNOVEMBER 1980 - PRESENT
11
t
N
O Exclusive Ride
Dispatching Area
Share-a-CabDispatching Area
FIGURE 1-6. PRESENT SHARE-A-CABDISPATCHING AREAS
12
1.4 IMPACT AND PERFORMANCE DATA
1.4.1 Level-of-Service
LaGuardia Airport has two terminals. The first of these,
the main terminal, handles the majority of passenger travel.
These terminals consists of four "fingers" or piers. From the
far left (as shown in Figure 1-6) finger one contains American
Airlines and several regional commuters. Finger two contains Air
Canada, Allegheny Commuter, Braniff, Republic, United, and US
Air. Finger three contains Delta and Trans World Airlines and
finger four supports Delta in addition to Eastern, Northwest, and
Piedmont. Eastern Airlines operates a separate terminal for its
shuttle flights between Boston and Washington, D.C.
Share-A-Cab has dispatching areas located in the taxicab
dispatching areas outside of fingers two, three, and four of the
main terminal and one located outside of the Eastern Shuttle
terminal. These dispatching areas provide access to approxi-
mately 80 to 90 percent of all deplaning passengers.
Wait time at LaGuardia for Share-A-Cab varies upon the
volume of passengers demanding taxi service. If a large number
of passengers desire taxi services, generally, Share-A-Cab
service wait time is the same as with single rider taxi service.
If taxi demand is low, Share-A-Cab wait times can be substan-
tially higher than single ride service, since the ability to
match riders in a timely manner is reduced. Both single rider
and shared-ride taxi service offer wait time savings over
transit
.
Shared-ride travel time for a particular traveler can be
increased by 5 to 30 minutes over an exclusive ride given the
order in which passengers are dropped off, the distances within a
zone that must be traveled, and the traffic conditions that
exist
.
Share-A-Cab fares are two to three times less than exclusive
ride fares. Average exclusive ride taxi fares from LaGuardia to
Manhattan are in the neighborhood of $12.00, exclusive of tip.
13
1.4.2 Ridership
The LaGuardia based shared-ride taxi service experienced
increases in ridership during its first 3 1/2 years. When the
system was implemented in July of 1979, ridership during the
first full month totaled 5,299 passengers. Total monthly rider-
ship peaked near 19,000 in November 1982. This rise in patronage
followed forming a fairly steady pattern of increase (see Figure
1-7). During the winter months, ridership has tended to be lower
than the yearly average, while during the late summer and fall
seasons ridership has been above average. This corresponds to
total passenger plane movements at LaGuardia.
There is limited evidence of ridership response to fare and
service changes. In May 1980, the change from a voucher payment
mechanism to a cash payment, coupled with a $1 fare increase
(from $5 and $6 to $6 and $7), caused no discernable change in
ridership. This change may have affected the total number of
taxicabs supplying service at LaGuardia, but no data are avail-
able to support this conclusion. When service was expanded to
additional matching areas, total ridership soared, and ridership
per matching area remained relatively constant. This shows that
additional demand was present for the service, and when the new
areas were opened, MTBOT succeeded in tripling its patronage. As
shown in Figure 1-7, the air traffic controllers strike had a
devastating effect on patronage. This can be attributed to the
lower volumes of air travelers and a resultant increase in the
ratio of taxis to deplaning passengers.
1.4.3 Operator Incentives and Participation
Taxicab operators who serve LaGuardia Airport may not refuse
a shared-ride. Any New York City medallion taxicab may serve
LaGuardia and, hence, participate in the service. The MTBOT and
non-MTBOT member cabs pay the same per passenger fee. Several
attributes make the service attractive to the driver or company
owner. First, only one queue is formed for both shared and
2Ridership counts supplied by Taxicab Dispatch Service.
14
TOTAL RIDERSHIP
EASTERN SHUTTLE
AMERICANUNITED
EASTERN MAIN
MONTHLY PLANEMOVEMENTS (x 1000)
FIGURE 1-7. SHARE -A-CAB RIDERSHIP
Source: Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
2 1
20
1 9
1 8
1 7
1 6
1 6
1 4
1 3
1 2
1 1
1 0
0
8
7
e
6
4
3
2
1
15
exclusive ride, therefore the wait time is identical for both,
and the chances of obtaining a shared-ride fare is equal for all
of the drivers. Secondly, the fare structure (since May 1980)
appears to offer an incentive for shared ride. Since 3 or 4
passengers are needed to constitute a shared-ride, the driver is
guaranteed a minimum payment of $15 plus tips and a maximum of
$24 plus tips. As estimated by MTBOT the average exclusive ride
fare to the financial district is $12 plus tip. Therefore, the
shared-ride driver is guaranteed a better fare. Third, addi-
tional driving time and distance encountered by the drivers
taking shared rides is kept to a minimum. Though the three-zone
area is quite large, dispatchers attempt to match rider destina-
tions as much as possible. According to MTBOT, dispatchers have
been successful in minimizing the operator's overall trip length,
such that the extra stops made by the driver are compensated by
the extra revenue. Fourth, taxicab owners receive a four-cent
gasoline tax rebate as described in Section 1.1.
The taxicab industry likes Share-A-Cab because it transports
more airport passengers, generating more revenue while leaving
more taxicabs available for non-airport fares. Drivers are
generally tolerant of Share-A-Cab. Of the drivers that were
interviewed, all complained about the Share-A-Cab system to some
extent. However, most of these complaints were minor and
centered on downtown Manhattan traffic congestion. All of the
drivers saw a purpose in having Share-A-Cab, namely to increase
driver revenues and to better serve the public, and were satis-
fied with the additional fare which they gained by providing
shared-ride services.
1.4.4 Administrative Costs
All operating and start-up costs have been paid for by
MTBOT. The first year's cost was approximately $50,000, with
much of this amount spent on the production and display of adver-
tising materials. The MTBOT pays only for its dispatchers and
advertising and limited overhead costs attributed to office space
rental and administrative time. No fees are paid to the Port
16
Authority for curb space. Since the average ridership per month
for the first year was 4,900, and a $.50 per passenger charge was
collected, that means that in the first year of operation Share-
A-Cab lost approximately $20,600. This does not take into
account any costs for loans, etc., and as such is limited. The
MTBOT has estimated that since early 1982 they have begun to
break even on the service, which requires a monthly ridership
average in the 10,000 to 12,000 range. Since a $1.00 per
passenger charge is now provided to MTBOT, that means that
MTBOT's estimate of yearly operating costs (mainly dispatchers'
wages) is on the order of $120,000 to $144,000.
1.4.5 Institutional I mpacts
Share-A-Cab is a privately operated business overseen by the
local regulatory body—the New York Taxi and Limousine Commis-
sion. The commission has had little input into the Share-A-Cab
operation except for the establishment of the following policies:
1. All New York City medallion taxicabs must be allowed to
participate in the service,
2. Taxicab operators who service LaGuardia may not refuse
a shared-ride, and
3. Fares and the portion of the fare used by MTBOT for
Share-A-Cab support will be determined by the commis-
sion .
All other elements of operation are determined by MTBOT,
hours of operation, number of passengers required to constitute a
shared-ride, destination areas, etc. The commission also makes
sure that passengers are served properly and that all complaints
are reviewed. Fewer than 15 complaints about the system were
registered between July 1979 and December 1985. ^ All of these
have been resolved by the commission and have concerned
individual drivers.
oInterview, Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, December 6,1985.
17
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
The LaGuardia Share-A-Cab program has proven to be a
success. Much of this can be attributed to the operational
procedures employed by the administering/operating company, the
MTBOT. Some of the success must also be attributed to the trip
characteristics of LaGuardia users and to the layout of the
airport itself. What follows is a series of reasons for the
success. These will be described as they appear.
1.5.1 LaGuardia Airport Lends Itself to the Establishment of aShared-Ride Program
According to Port Authority statistics, 60 percent of
passengers using LaGuardia Airport in 1978 were businesstravelers. Furthermore, 42 percent of these travelers (i.e., 25%
of all LaGuardia passengers) had destinations in Manhattan south
of 60th Street. This explains the strong demand for taxi service
to the financial and business centers of Manhattan.
LaGuardia also has a relatively small terminal that forces
all deplaning passengers through several exit doors, which are
located near each other. By virtue of this layout, LaGuardia
needs only a few taxi dispatching areas. This allows not only
for lower startup costs for shared-ride services and relatively
simple service operation, but also funneling of passengers into
more efficient matching groups.
1.5.2. Share-A-Cab was Approached with a Set of RealisticObjectives
Often, programs are established with far reaching, all-
encompassing objectives. What MTBOT did was to set three
realistic objectives:
1. Reduce fuel used by fleet taxis,
2. Establish a better image with the Port Authority, and
3. Capture a larger share of the ground transportation
market at LaGuardia.
18
The MTBOT has achieved the first two of these threeobjectives. According to its figures, over 300,000 gallons of
gasoline were saved during the first three years of operation.
The MTBOT assumed that during this three year period, approxi-
mately 200,000 passengers did not use exclusive ride taxis, each
of these saving 1.5 gallons of gasoline. There were 307,496
Share-A-Cab passengers during the first three years. MTBOT
assumes an approximate occupancy rate of three passengers per
Share-A-Cab taxi resulting in the 200,000 passengers/ Use of
this figure concludes that Share-A-Cab attracted mainly exclusive
ride taxi users and not limousine, auto, or transit users. This
is a reasonable assumption as is the 1.5 gallon per passenger
figure
.
Based on discussions with the Port Authority and the Taxi-
Limousine Commission, both are pleased with the service, and it
has improved the availability of taxi service at the airport.
1.5.3 Limited Destination Area
Prior to the start of Share-A-Cab, a small survey was
conducted to help establish a limited destination area and to
determine what method of ground transportation airline travelers
use to get to New York. A limited destination area was an
important feature of the plan. A compact destination is much
more economical to serve, as evidenced by Boston's (Logan
Airport) lack of success with a network of widely dispersed
destinations. The high volume of passengers allowed dispatchers
to group travelers to nearby destinations. This kept drivers and
passengers happy by keeping travel times to a minimum. In
addition, the program was phased in, beginning with the terminal
having the highest density of travelers desiring travel to the
established destination zone.
4Taxicab Dispatch Service, Inc. , Fact Sheet
,
May 31, 1982.
19
1.5.4Market Development
Advertising was conducted both prior to the program's
opening and in the first months of operation. Advertising added
legitimacy to the service and to the dispatcher asking for Share-
A-Cab participation. Advertising has been reduced as ridership
increased and the system accepted. The MTBOT found that once
they had gained their first riders, the program soon developed
through word-of-mouth advertising instead of requiring continued
high cost publicity.
1.5.5 Appropriate Amounts of Government Regulation were Imposedon the Operation
A large amount of the credit for the establishment of a
successful program must go to the local Taxi and Limousine
Commission and to the Port Authority. Fares have been set at
levels which allow both passengers and operators to gain the
benefits of using the shared-ride alternative. The program
evolved into an easy self-supporting payment system for passen-
gers, drivers, and MTBOT. Additionally, the Port Authority has
allowed Share-A-Cab to locate its matching areas adjacent to the
Port Authority dispatcher, therefore providing high visibility
and an opportunity to enlist prospective passengers into a shared
ride group. Also, the Port Authority has remained with a single
taxi queue policy, which forces drivers to take a chance at
obtaining either a shared or exclusive ride. This has
eliminated any concern that too few operators would participate,
and also prevented the problem of separate queues with the
resulting disparate wait times experienced in both Boston and
Chicago
.
1.5.6 Undersupply of Taxicabs at LaGuardia
The impetus for Share-A-Cab was the limited amount of
taxicabs available at LaGuardia during peak periods. Had there
been an oversupply, the taxicab industry would not have supported
the program, since grouping passengers would have left some
drivers without passengers.
20
1.6 SERVICE EXPANSION
In June 1980, MTBOT attempted to start a downtown to airport
service. The MTBOT conducted a small survey (Appendix B, p.3),
which was used to determine hours of operation and the location
for pick-up points. (Fares and selected departure areas are
shown in Appendix B, p.4.) The MTBOT advertised the system
heavily through the use of posters and through the mailing of
over 20,000 fliers describing the program to travel agencies and
large businesses located around the country. However, the
program carried an average of 4.1 passengers per day in the first
two months of service. 5 The program was discontinued shortly
thereafter
.
The MTBOT attributes the failure of the downtown-to-airport
service to several elements. Primary was the fact that passen-
gers had to go to one of two departure areas where a group was to
be formed. Groups were not easily formed due to the random
arrival of passengers, unlike what occurs at an airport when many
prospective users deplane at essentially the same time. Also,
travelers going to the airport tended to be under greater time
pressure than passengers traveling from an airport.
The MTBOT explored the possibility of expanding the service
to Kennedy International Airport. Kennedy Airport has several
separate terminal buildings, and MTBOT believes that no single
terminal could support Share-A-Cab service. Recognizing that
interterminal communication would make the program more complex
and costly, MTBOT is hesitant to expand service to JFK. Figures
comparing LaGuardia and JFK passenger flow are shown in Table
1 - 1 .
CJTaxicab Dispatch Service Memorandum: Group Ride Program,Downtown Manhattan, August 25, 1980.
21
TABLE 1-1. PASSENGER FLOW ON AVERAGE DAY OF YEAR (1978)*
All Modes Taxi
From All Manhattan
To LAG 10,542 7,119To JFK 7,612 3,151
From Manhattan South of 60th St.
To LAG 7,974 5,414To JFK 5,086 1,975
Also, business travelers are:
60% of LAG'S 23,555 daily passengers34% of JFK's 32,090 daily passengers
*"Train-to-the-Plane" (New York City Transit Authority Service toJFK from Manhattan) opened since 1978 survey.
Source: PANYNJ data based on 1978 survey.
22
2. SUPER SAVER TAXI SERVICE - CHICAGO
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes a shared-ride taxi program in Chicago
known as Super Saver Taxi. The program, operational since
December of 1981, was developed and administered by the City of
Chicago Department of Consumer Services. Shared-ride service is
provided within three downtown zones (see Figure 2-1), as well as
from O'Hare International and Midway Airports to downtown
Chicago. Twenty-four hour service is provided to passengers
having both their trip origins and destinations within the down-
town zones, while airport service is available seven days per
week between the hours of 6 a.m. and 11 p.m.
Super Saver was conceived mainly as a result of the Chicago
Area Transportation Study's (CATS) comprehensive review of the
regional taxi industry. CATS concluded that the city's taxi
fleet was inefficiently used, that a demand for shared-ride
service existed, that improvements to taxi driver income were
needed, and that many of the current taxicab regulations were in
need of review and possibly revision. In addition, both CATS and
the city were aware of federal policies which required localities
to fully consider the inclusion of private transportation
providers in the transportation planning process and of the
possibility of federal grants to support the operation and
implementation of shared-ride services.
Super Saver Taxi required that a set of separate shared-ride
taxi rules and regulations be implemented by the Chicago
Department of Consumer Services to cover operating hours, service
areas, fares, and guidelines regarding the number of passengers
denoting a shared-ride.
CATS has served as the major evaluator of the project in
conjunction with the Department of Consumer Services.
Preliminary results of the CATS evaluation were that each
ai rpor t-t o-downtown service had been successful, due to the
concentration of trips, attraction to drivers/operators, and
23
attraction to passengers from the standpoint of ease of use, and
competitive cost and travel time.
The downtown service was judged a failure, with operator
participation and ridership levels steadily falling since its
inception. Failure of the downtown Super Saver was attributed to
two factors: lack of financial incentives for operators and
consumer confusion over usage of the system.
Data for this case study of the Super Saver Taxi program
were data obtained from sources contacted during site visits and
interviews
.
The chapter is organized as follows:
o Section 2.2 describes the background and development of
the Super Saver program.
o Section 2.3 describes the operation of the program.
o Section 2.4 provides a summary of basic performance and
impact data associated with the program.
o Section 2.5 provides conclusions summarizing the data
available from contacts.
2 . 2 BACKGROUND
Prior to the inauguration of the Super Saver Taxi program,
CATS undertook a comprehensive study of the Chicago region's taxi
industry.-*- CATS serves as the metropolitan planning organization
for Chicago. It does not oversee any highway or transit opera-
tions. The CATS study resulted in several reports which recom-
mended installation of a shared-ride taxi program. These recom-
mendations were based on the following factors:
2.2.1 Inefficiently Used Taxi Fleet
Based on three indicator s--coverage ratio (taxicabs per
person), time that taxis operated empty, and taxi vehicle miles
of travel (VMT)--CATS concluded that "slack" existed in the taxi
^Chicago Taxi Industry: Financial Structure and Operations,Chicago Area Transportation Study, Chicago, Illinois, November,1981
.
25
market, which they felt had been promoted by the growth in rental
automobile availability and the growing use of government
subsidies for mass transit travel, particularly by low-income,
elderly and handicapped individuals.
2. 2. 1.1 Increases in the Coverage Ratio - In 198 0 , 4,600
taxicabs operated in the City of Chicago, with 10,000 to 12,000
drivers employed to drive these vehicles. This corresponds to a
coverage ratio of 1.53 taxis per 1,000 population in 1980, which
was an 1 increase over the 1970 average of 1.36. (Chicago's popu-
lation declined from 3,369,359 in 1970 to 3,005,061 in 1980, and
the number of taxi medallions remained constant.) Although the
increase in the coverage ratio was not viewed as abnormally high,
the data showed that a "slack" in the taxi market has come in a
decade of tremendous growth in rental car availability, growth in
government subsidies for mass transit, and a decline in Chicago's
population.
2
2. 2. 1.2 Increases in the Percent of Empty Operation - In
addition to the increase in the taxi coverage ratio, it was found
that the amount of time that taxis operated empty had also
increased, from 41 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1980,
suggesting that the taxicabs were not being fully used and, in
fact, use was declining. Additional data showed that the average
passenger load for taxi trips was 1.45. CATS staff felt that
this was low, considering that taxis could carry 4 to 5 people.
According to U.S. Department of Transportation figures, average
taxi passenger loads on a national scale were 1.6 in 1973, 1.46
in 1975, and 1.56 in 1981. 4
2. 2. 1.3 Changes in Taxi VMT - Taxi vehicle miles traveled for
the Checker Taxi Company, a major taxi operator in Chicago,
showed major growth between 1974 and 1978 (see Figure 2-2).
2 Ibid . , p. 3
.
^Ibid . , p. 4
.
^Transit Operation Characteristics , Gilbert, Gorman, et al..Report #DOT-I-83-55 , September 1982, pp. 27-28.
26
Total
Annual
Vehicle
Miles
(in
millions
of
miles)
FIGURE 2-2. TOTAL ANNUAL VEHICLE MILES OF CHECKER TAXI CO.
SOURCE: CHICAGO TAXI INDUSTRY : FINANCIAL STRUCTUREAND OPERATIONS, CATS, NOVEMBER 1981
27
Since that time, Checker's VMT has remained at a high level in
relation to the 1970-1973 period. This growth has been
attributed to the rise in the number of leased taxicabs and the
decline in cabs operated on a commission basis. This trend is
shown in Figure 2-3. By leasing the cabs, drivers are released
from any mileage controls and, therefore, have tended to roam the
CBD in search of fares instead of queuing in taxi stands.
2.2.2 Demand for Shared-Ride Service Exists
CATS gathered data, which led to the following conclusions
concerning potential demand levels for shared-ride service:
o Seven percent of all trips within the Chicago downtown
are presently made by taxi.
o The majority (approximately 60%) of Chicago taxi users
are affluent or out-of-town travelers. (CATS defined
affluent as "people who are not financially burdened by
the regular use of taxicabs and take advantage of the
personalized, luxury nature of the door-to-door service
offered by this mode.")
o Sixty-three percent of all City of Chicago taxi trip
destinations lie within a small area (approximately 4
sq. mi.) comprised of the loop and near northside,
areas considered to be in the downtown.
o Seven percent of all taxi trips in the City of Chicago
begin or end at O'Hare Airport.
These data are presented graphically in Figures 2-4, 2-5, and
2 - 6 .
Based on its analysis of the New York and Boston airport
shared-ride services, CATS felt that shared-ride services could
successfully transport business travelers, the affluent, and the
^Chicago Taxi Industry: Financial Structure and Operations,Chicago Area Transportation Study, Chicago, Illinois, November,1981.
28
Annual
Vehicle
Miles/Vehicle
i
|
i
50,000 r
45,000 -
40,000 -
35,00077 79 30
FIGURE 2-3. ANNUAL MILEAGE PER VEHICLE
SOURCE: CHICAGO TAXI INDUSTRY: FINANCIAL STRUCTUREAND OPERATIONS, CATS, NOVEMBER 1981
29
FIGURE 2-4. MAP OF CATS TAXI ANALYSIS ZONES
SOURCE: CHICAGO TAXI INDUSTRY: FINANCIAL STRUCTUREAND OPERATIONS, CATS, NOVEMBER 1981
30
35 -
co
a•H5-i
H
X
U-t
o
C<U
os-l
0)
Ph
30-
25
20
15-
10
10 11 12
Zone Number
FIGURE 2-6. DISTRIBUTION OF TAXI DESTINATIONS
(REFER TO MAP ON p. 30 )
32
transportation disadvantaged (the poor, the disabled, students,
housewives, and others who did not have access to the
automobile )
.
CATS subsequently reviewed 1970 home interview survey data
to determine who uses Chicago taxi service, and estimated that
business travelers and affluent residents constituted 60 percent
total taxi ridership. Combined with the high volume of business
travelers coming to Chicago (no specific data available), the
fairly uniform locations of their destinations, and CATS's
knowledge of other shared-ride services, CATS believed that
demand for shared-ride taxi service in both the downtown and at
O'Hare was evident.
2.2.3 Improve Taxi Driver Income
As part of its research, CATS confirmed its belief that taxi
operators were earning very low incomes. A CATS survey found
that drivers averaged 120 to 140 miles per day and $70 to $90 in
daily revenue. Subtracting fuel expenses (average of $16.06 per
day) and leasing charges (average of $43.00 per day), the driver
was left with a daily income of $26.00. Given an average shift
length of 8 hours, this amounts to $3.25 per hour. Based on
these data and projected increases in fuel price and leasing
rates, CATS felt that increases in taxi fares or improvements in
the present competitive environment were necessary.
2.2.4 Regulatory Reform
The majority of Chicago's taxi regulations were implemented
in the 1920's and 1930's and were directed toward the protection
of trolley car and streetcar operations from the competition of
taxi and jitney services. These regulations restricted market
entry and generally affected the manner in which taxis could
conduct business. The result was the typically narrow definition
of the market available to taxi operators.
33
2.2.5 Federal Transportation Policies
Plans for cutbacks in federal transit assistance encouraged
CATS and the City of Chicago to explore less costly forms of
transportation. Also, federal regulations (Section 8e of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act as amended - 1983) require local
planning agencies to include private transportation providers in
the transportation planning process. Finally, the availability
of federal aid for this type of project enabled CATS and others
to gain local support for the implementation of shared-ride
services. After CATS and the city decided on a shared-ride plan,
they applied for and were granted funding from the Federal High-
way Administration ($60,000 from the National Ridesharing
Discretionary Fund) and from the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration ($72,000 from the Section 4(i) Innovative Methods
Grant Program). Additionally, local funds totaling $38,000 were
obtained to support start-up and the operation of the program for
a one-year period.
2.3 SYSTEM OPERATIONS
There are two distinct service areas associated with the
Super Saver Taxi program:
1. O'Hare and Midway Airports to and from the downtown/
loop region, and
2. The downtown/loop region.
These were different types of services, the characteristics
of which are described below.
2.3.1 O 1 Hare/Midway Service
2. 3. 1.1 Travel Originating at the Airports - The Super Saver
Taxi service, which carries people from O'Hare International
Airport to downtown Chicago, operates in the following fashion.
Passengers proceed to the ground transportation areas of either
Terminal 2 or 3 (see Figure 2-7) and are directed by signs to the
34
Super Saver service area. There they notify the taxi starter of
their desire to be matched and to participate in the service.
If a shared-ride taxi is already present, the passenger is loaded
into that cab. If not, the taxi starter tells the taxi
dispatcher in charge of the taxi pool to send a Super Saver taxi
to the terminal. Originally, the intent of the program was to
have the taxi starter gather and load the Super Saver passengers.
In practice, the drivers themselves "hustle" riders until a full
load is acquired. The starter will, on occasion, make sure that
the driver does not wait too long looking for a third passenger
once he has two. When a minimum of two and a maximum of three
passengers are present, the passengers are transported to the
downtown/loop region. The destination is defined as one singular
zone for the inbound service and is comprised of the downtown
zones shown previously in Figure 2-1. According to the rules, if
a driver is able to .find only one Super Saver passenger within a
10-minute period, that lone passenger may demand to be taken to
his destination at the taximeter fare. In practice, the rule is
often ignored by cab drivers. Since the average wait in the
Super Saver pool was estimated by CATS at 3-4 hours, while the
exclusive-ride pool wait averages 1-2 hours, drivers generally
wait until a multiple-ride arrangement materializes. Complaints
regarding this practice have been minimal. Fares for the O'Hare
service have remained constant since the beginning of operation
at $12.00 per passenger. This fare is the same for all
travelers, since there is only one destination zone.
Taxicab drivers enter a separate shared-ride pool at O'Hare
and, once they have entered, must remain and take a shared-ride
load as the need arises. A taxi dispatcher is on duty during
hours of taxi operations and, according to the Super Saver rules,
has complete authority over decisions made concerning Super Saver
operations and receives all passenger and driver complaints.
Complaints are forwarded to the Department of Consumer Services,
which may impose penalties on drivers up to a maximum of a 29-day
license suspension. In addition, passengers may report
complaints directly to Consumer Services using a phone number
written on a sign located in the back of every cab.
36
The Midway service operates under the same rules as the
O'Hare service. However, taxis at Midway queue in one single
line with no separation provided between exclusive ride and Super
Savers except at the head of the queue. As Super Savers are
needed (the starter hails a cab when a person notifies him of his
interest in sharing), they pull out of the taxi queue and park in
a Super Saver loading area. This loading area and the Midway
terminal configuration are diagramed in Figure 2-8.
As of July of 1983, four dispatchers were the only full-time
employees of the airport services, and their salaries were paid
with the federal grant money. At one time, the major cab
companies. Yellow and Checker, provided the dispatchers, but the
companies cut funding for the dispatchers. Once federal monies
were exhausted, the city supported their salaries.
Advertising for the O'Hare and Midway service has been
directed toward informing the deplaning passenger of the
existence of the service, the fare, the location of the loading
point, and the general operational procedures. However, the only
media used at the airport are large sign boards located in the
ground transportation areas. Individual taxis registered in the
City of Chicago must display a sign in the back seat describing
the service (see Figure 2-9).
2. 3. 1.2 Airport Travel Originating in the Downtown/Loop Area -
Service originating in the downtown area was operated in the
following manner. Travelers using this service had to begin
their taxi trips in one of the three downtown zones—most trips
began at the major hotels and convention areas. Prospective
users were normally matched or loaded by the doormen stationed at
these facilities, who obtained shared-ride taxicabs from nearby
taxi stands. Taxis participating in the shared-ride program
mounted an orange pennant which notified prospective riders that
the cab was operating in the shared-ride mode. The driver was
responsible for loading a minimum of two and a maximum of three
passengers, and could load from any location within the downtown/
loop zones. Once the mandatory number of passengers had been
picked up, the cab proceeded to either O'Hare or Midway Airport.
37
The fare was identical to the inbound service, as were the hours
of operation. If the driver could not find more than one
passenger in 10 minutes, the passenger had to ride at the metered
rate. Passenger complaints for this service were given either to
the doorman, who reported them to the Department of Consumer
Services for action, or to the department directly.
CATS staff observed the operation of the downtown to airport
service for several days and concluded that although the concept
was good, operational deficiencies caused the program to fail.
Strongly related to its failure has been what CATS terms the
"dependency on coincidence flaw." According to CATS, "For a taxi
destined to either of the airports to successfully group load
required at least two passengers, each traveling separately,
meeting the same taxi at the same origin point within ten minutes
of each other."* In addition, this portion of the program relied
on the availability of Super Saver taxis in the downtown. As
will be described in the following section, driver participation
in the downtown was poor. Lastly, CATS staff observed that since
curb space at the hotels is at a premium, hotels prohibit taxis
from waiting for a second passenger. This effectively eliminated
the drivers" ability to form a group within the prescribed 10
minutes
.
2.3.2 Downtown/Loop Service
The downtown/loop service is operated in the following
manner. Travelers using the downtown service of the Super Saver
program must begin their taxi trip in one of the three downtown/
loop zones or at McCormick Place (Convention Center), as shown in
Figure 2-1. Normally, the destination is also located in one of
these three zones, but it may be located outside of this area.
Travel outside the shared-ride zones is charged the normal
metered fare from the point it leaves the zone area in addition
to the shared-ride fare. Regular shared-ride travel remaining
within any one zone is priced at $1.50 per person, while travel
Based on interview conducted with CATS staff, September, 1982.
40
to additional zones boosts the fare an additional $.50 per
person, per zone. Travel to or from McCormick Place is priced at
$2.50 (loop zone), $3.00 (near north zone) and $3.50 (gold coast
zone). Fares have not changed since the program's inception. As
with the downtown-to-airport Super Saver, operators are required
to display an orange flag notifying prospective customers that
the taxi is operating in the shared-ride mode.
When the program first began, the Department of Consumer
Services required all taxis to participate in the downtown
service. This regulation remained in effect for approximately 30
days, when the city changed the policy to voluntary participa-
tion. This change was precipitated by the claims from taxi
drivers that they were losing money. Cab drivers staged an
informal boycott of the system by refusing to provide a shared-
ride fare to passengers. Drivers complained that it was too
difficult to find additional passengers. According to Jerry
Feldman of Checker Taxi Company, the mandatory system worked well
on only one day, and that was due to a heavy snowfall when many
people desired cabs and the slow-moving traffic effectively
reduced taxicab supply.
According to Office of Consumer Services records,
passengers, especially out-of -towners , were often exploited.
Drivers would pick up a party of five passengers traveling as a
group and charge them individual shared fares which, when summed,
could be up to four times the meter fare. Some out-of-towner
s
did not know enough about the program to decide when to share or
when to request the meter. (Newspaper articles which detail this
period of the service are provided in Appendix B.) Presently,
drivers load riders as they proceed around the zones, attempting
to garner as many riders as possible up to a maximum of five.
However, if the driver can find only one passenger, then the
lone passenger is required to pay only the applicable shared-ride
fare
.
The service is in effect 24 hours a day, seven days per
week. Drivers cruising in the downtown zones may operate as
shared-ride cabs at their own discretion, but when the orange
flag is displayed, the drivers cannot refuse any person
41
transportation in a shared-riding zone unless that person is
traveling in the opposite direction of the passengers in the
taxicab
.
Advertising prepared by the Department of Consumer Services
in this phase was increased because of the poor ridership. When
the program was implemented, advertising consisted of newspaper
advertisements, which the city now views as poor and non-
informative. Since that time, radio commercials have been used,
and half-time announcements have been made at Chicago Bears'
football games.
An additional problem was that there was an oversupply of
cruising cabs downtown. A passenger wishing to go downtown-to-
downtown would wait for a Super Saver taxi to come by, and look
in the window to see if a passenger was already in the cab. If
there was a passenger, he would not hail the cab, knowing that he
would be able to find another empty Super Saver taxi quickly.
The passenger also realized that other passengers were equally
smart so that no one would hail the cab once he was in it. In
this manner, the passenger would get an exclusive ride at a
discount fare.
2.4 IMPACT AND PERFORMANCE DATA
2.4.1 Ridership
2. 4. 1.1 Airport Service - Service from O'Hare International
Airport to the downtown/loop region has been characterized by
CATS as being moderately successful, with ridership from O'Hare
to the loop steadily increasing during 1982 from an average daily
ridership of 110 in January to 310 in September* (see Figure 2-
10). CATS concluded that the number of trips originating from
the downtown/loop region and terminating at O'Hare was not signi-
ficant and terminated this portion of the service in 1986.
Although no specific data were gathered, CATS staff reached this
conclusion through review of driver surveys and field checks.
Interview conducted with CATS staff, October 1982.
42
CATS conducted a study to determine what percentage of the
taxi market the O'Hare Super Saver Taxi service had captured. To
do this, CATS tabulated records from the Department of Consumer
Services and made field checks to determine the number of metered
and Super Saver taxis passing through the taxi pool during three
one-month periods. The months observed were January 1982, July
1982, and January 1983. Of all the taxis departing O'Hare, 3.8
percent were Super Savers. CATS observed an average passenger
load of 2.8 for Super Saver and 1.44 for metered taxis. Using
these load figures, CATS concluded that the O'Hare Super Saver
program accounts for 7.1 percent of taxi passengers. This has
reduced total taxi vehicle trips by 3.5 percent, assuming all
Super Saver patrons formerly used regular taxicabs at the regular
observed taxicab occupancy of 1.44. (This assumption under-
estimates VMT reductions because most Super Saver patrons would
have traveled in a taxicab with occupancy 1.0.) No specific data
concerning trips from O'Hare to downtown were collected using
CATS's conservative assumption. Super Saver at O'Hare saves
26,500 gallons of gasoline and reduces VMT by 285,800 and carbon
monoxide emissions by 6.2 tons per year.
The airport-to-downtown service initiated at Midway Airport
in April 1982 reached a high of 160 passengers per day in
September 1982. No specific data have been collected on exact
downtown origins or destinations, nor on rider profiles. How-
ever, CATS conducted an analysis of metered and Super Saver
departures similar to the O'Hare study and determined that Super
Saver taxis account for 20 to 26 percent of the taxi vehicles and
30 to 42 percent of taxi passenger departures at Midway. CATS
partially explained the difference in Midway and O'Hare market
shares by determining that 69 percent of the total passengers at
Midway were traveling alone, as compared to 48 percent at O'Hare.
(Super Saver taxis are more attractive to passengers traveling
alone.) However, even if only passengers traveling alone are
considered, the Super Saver mode splits are still very different:
15 percent at O'Hare and approximately 50 percent at Midway. No
further explanation was provided by CATS.
44
Deplaning passengers at both airports have several modes
other than Super Saver available for transportation to downtown.
These include rental cars, being picked up by others, Chicago
transit service, limousine/bus, and exclusive ride taxi services.
The impact of Super Saver on these modes has not been studied,
but CATS staff members believe it to be minimal.
2. 4. 1.2 Downtown/Loop Phase - Data collection concerning this
operation has been minimal. No ridership data have been
collected, and therefore an analysis of the market penetration
cannot be made. The consensus is that ridership has been
minimal
.
2.4.2 Operator Incentives and Participation
2. 4. 2.1 Airport Service - Operator participation at the airport
Super Saver has been estimated at 400 to 1,800 of the approxi-
mately 4,600 Chicago-licensed taxicabs. An average of 88 taxis
per day were dispatched in April 1982, at O' Hare; this figure
rose to 112 in September. Midway service began with an average
of 38 taxis dispatched per day, rising to 60 per day in
September. More recent figures are not available, and no data
have been collected concerning the number of taxis dispatched
from the downtown hotel and convention centers.
The time spent in the taxi queues at O'Hare was estimated by
city officials at one-half hour for exclusive ride service and
two hours for Super Saver taxi service. CATS observed the queue
at O'Hare during the month of January 1983. During that time,
exclusive-ride cabs waited an average of 2.6 hours while Super
Savers waited 5.8 hours. Discussions with CATS concluded that
the actual wait time is probably somewhere in between what the
city estimates and what CATS observed. This conclusion was based
on the small sample used by CATS due to funding limitations. A
wait time of one hour was estimated by CATS staff to have existed
at O'Hare prior to implementation of Super Saver. Since taxi
drivers are free to choose between the two queues, the longer
waits for Super Saver are apparently compensated for by the
higher revenues.
45
Driver participation has been good at both airports due to
the guarantee of getting a trip downtown and $24 to $36 in
revenue (exclusive of tip) for O'Hare service and $16 to $24 for
Midway. At O'Hare, CATS estimates the average passenger load at
2.8 for Super Saver taxis, which means an average fare of $33.60
per trip. An additional benefit is the high probability of
quickly obtaining another fare downtown, after dropping off the
Super Saver passengers. Exclusive-ride service averages $20-$22
per trip from O'Hare and $14-$16 from Midway to the downtown, but
not all of these trips are going downtown, thus adding the risk
to the driver of obtaining a small fare to an area where there is
little demand for taxicabs. Based on informal interviews with
taxi operators, the guarantee of a large fare serves as an
effective incentive for participation in Super Saver.
CATS undertook a survey of taxi drivers to determine their
views of the Super Saver airport service. CATS interviewed 96
taxi drivers at four locations in the downtown zones. When asked
whether Super Saver Taxi works at the airports, 39 percent
answered yes, 38 percent answered no, and the remaining 23
percent had no opinion. In addition, CATS asked participating
drivers whether the program had increased their revenues.
Thirty-six percent answered yes, 32 percent answered no, and 32
percent had no opinion.
2. 4. 2. 2 Downtown/Loop Service - Operator participation levels
fell sharply after the mandatory participation policy was dropped
by the city. The only data available on participation are
informal visual surveys of the percentage of taxis in the down-
town displaying the orange shared-ride flag. Soon after the
mandatory participation policy changed, a participation level of
11 percent was recorded. In October 1982, this figure had fallen
to less than 1 percent, and as of January 1983 a slight rise to 2
percent was observed by CATS.
The lack of operator participation has been attributed to
the following factors:
46
o Drivers had difficulties obtaining passengers at the
beginning of the program, and this created a pessi-
mistic attitude among the operators.
o The set fare often caused drivers to realize a loss in
revenue due to the lack of compensation for wait time
caused by traffic congestion. (When the cab is in a
metered operation, delay charges are added to the fare
on a time basis.
)
CATS surveyed taxicab drivers and determined that 19 percent
of taxi drivers participate in Super Saver. The city has given
out pennants to all drivers who requested them. As of September
1982, 25 percent of the licensed drivers had been supplied a
pennant. Therefore, it appears that drivers participate in the
program only some of the time.
Some drivers have abused the program by charging fares which
maximize revenue in the given situation. Based on newspaper
articles and a review by CATS of complaints filed at the
Department of Consumer Services, the number of abuses of the fare
policies was significant. Generally, most of the complaints
concerned the downtown fare problems. The most common problem
(60 percent of complaints) was a group of passengers each being
charged Super Saver fares for a trip which would have been
cheaper on the meter. CATS contrasted these figures to 1976-1979
complaints (before Super Saver) and determined that only 31
percent of all complaints were fare-related in that earlier
period.
2.4.3 Operational Costs
No specific cost or salary data were available from CATS or
the Department of Consumer Services. The program employed four
full-time dispatchers, with funds for their salaries obtained
from federal grants. When these funds were exhausted, dispatcher
salaries were picked up by the city. Total costs for 1982 were
established by the grant budgeting as follows:
47
Federal funds FHWA: $60,000UMTA: $72,000
Local funds $38,000
TOTAL $170,000
2.4.4 Institutional Impacts
The Super Saver Taxi program was, in part, implemented to
take advantage of the available federal monies and as a method to
gain private involvement in the Chicago transportation planning
process, as per federal regulations.
2. 4. 4.1 Airport Service - The Department of Consumer Services
designed a program responsive to the needs of the riders as well
as taxicab operators. Since the airport matches and loadings are
handled by either a dispatcher (at a cost to the city) or doorman
(at no incremental cost), the program allows for great flexi-
bility and quick rider matches. Therefore, riders are processed
quickly and at low cost, pleasing both operators and users. In
addition, CATS staff feels that no major changes have occurred in
transit, rental car, limousine, and exclusive-ride taxi rider-
ship, and hence no special interest group has been opposed to the
program.
2. 4. 4. 2 Downtown/Loop Service - The downtown/loop phase has been
characterized by periods of government and operator failures.
These problems began early in the program's introduction. For
example, the service was announced by the Commissioner of the
Department of Consumer Services prior to the originally planned
date. This resulted in the introduction of a disorganized
program, which lacked proper advertising and operational equip-
ment. Advertising to inform the Chicago public about the down-
town service was placed in newspapers throughout the city but was
unclear and confusing. As a result, taxi drivers found it
necessary to inform riders about the program, which led to
official rules and operating procedures not being effectively
transmitted. In addition, a shortage of orange flags occurred.
48
leaving the taxi operators without their visual signals to inform
prospective riders of the cabs' mode of operation.
CATS erroneously forecast, based on its studies of other
shared-ride services, that the high proportion of upper-class and
business travelers would generate sufficient demand to support
shared-ride services. In fact, however, cab users in central
business districts generally value their time more than the small
cost savings ($2-$3) that downtown shared-ride service has over
exclusive-ride
.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Chicago's Super Saver Taxi service is segmented into two
distinct services. The Airport Service (O'Hare and Midway) has
proven to be moderately successful. The Downtown Service has
been characterized as a failure. Presented below are conclusions
drawn about each service.
2.5.1 Airport Service
Most of the acceptance and success of this part of the Super
Saver program can be attributed to:
o A simple operating structure : One distinct origin and
closely situated destinations, one dispatcher to handle
both loading and matching, and only one fare.
2. Suf f icient_advertisin2 : Located at the Ground
Transportation area with a sign that describes the
service in an attractive and easily comprehended
manner
.
3. Driver acceptance : Due to the guarantee of a fare
which is better or at least competitive with exclusive
ride operation, and the amount of compensation received
in turn for the greater wait in the taxi pool.
4. Low fares : Provides the public with a 40 percent
savings compared with exclusive-ride service.
The downtown/loop outbound service to the airports has been
largely abandoned as troublesome logistical characteristics
49
caused drivers and passengers to avoid the service: hotel door-
men did not allow cabs to wait for additional passengers, and it
proved difficult to find several passengers going to the airports
in a reasonable period of time. In addition, when shared-ride
service was offered, it was used by taxi drivers as a means for
charging higher fares to pre-formed groups who were unfamiliar
with the Super Saver program and metered fares.
2.5.2 Downtown/Loop Service
This phase of operation failed. Ridership and operator
participation levels continually declined, with the failure
attributed to both basic operational and institutional problems.
These problems are:
o A poorly prepared program was implemented, leading to
poor advertising and education of the public on
operations. The requirement that drivers participate
alienated drivers from participating,
o Too small a difference between exclusive ride fares and
Super Saver fares caused most taxi users in the down-
town—including wealthy or business travelers--to avoid
using the program since they tend to place a higher
value on their time than on the cost of service.
Though no specific data are available concerning
average time trip lengths, CATS staff maintained that
the difference in travel time between exclusive ride
and shared-ride was significant,
o A lack of incentive to taxi operators led to declining
rates of participation. Drivers recognized that the
time needed to locate several riders was high, and that
the time cruising or sitting in traffic to pick up and
deliver several passengers was not compensated for by
the multi-rider revenue. Drivers felt that profits
were better in the metered, exclusive-ride market,
o Drivers abused the progra m by charging uninformed
riders the fare which increases their revenue.
50
3. SHARE-A-CAB SERVICE - BOSTON'S LOGAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Inaugurated in April 1977, Boston's Logan Airport Share-A-
Cab service was implemented as a strategy to preserve the via-
bility of taxi service while reducing the volumes of traffic
using the access tunnels under Boston Harbor. The service was
initiated and is administered by the Massachusetts Port Authority
(MASSPORT). Though the system has been modified in various ways
since its inception, many aspects of the operating plan have
remained unchanged. The service is available only to travelers
wishing to travel from Logan to destinations outside the City of
Boston. Arriving air travelers notify a dispatching agent of
their final destination and their desire for Share-A-Cab service.
The agent logs them into the system and then relates instructions
on where to await the Share-A-Cab service, the number of the cab,
and the approximate waiting time. By sharing a ride, taxi users
obtain a significantly reduced fare. Fares are fixed by destina-
tion and displayed in a schedule at the Share-A-Cab request booth
(see Figure 3-1). The service objectives of the system are: to
provide travelers with a convenient and less costly method of
transportation to their final destination, to improve vehicle
occupancy and reduce traffic congestion to Logan, to improve
taxi operations at Logan, and to minimize the price advantages
which limousine services have over taxicabs, thus preserving the
viability of taxi service.
This chapter provides a description of the Share-A-Cab
service, supported by existing information on operations,
ridership levels, operator participation, costs, and institu-
tional issues obtained through site contacts.
The chapter is organized as follows:
o Section 3.2 describes the background and development of
the program.
51
!
Share-A-Cab
Per Passenger Fare
Abington SI 5.95 Haverhill S24 35 Randolph S 13 85Acion 19 45 Hingham 13.15 Reading 11 05
Amesbury 26.15 Holbrook 14 20 Revere 3 75
Anoover 17.35 Hollistoh 19.30 Rockland 13 85Arlington 8.25 Hopkinton 20.70 Rockport 27.90
Ashland 17.80 Hudson 23 50 Rowley 20 55
Avon 13 85 Hull 16.65 Salem 10 05
Bedford 13.15 Ipswich 18 45 Salisbury 25 45
Bellingham 24.35 Kingston 25.05 Saugus 6.55
Belmont 8 95 Lawrence 20 85 Scituate 18 75
Berlin 25.30 Lexington 11.75 Sharon 17.35
Beverly 12.85 Lincoln 14 55 Sherborn 16 40
Billerica 15.25 Lrttleton 21 55 Somerville 4.75
Bolton 24 35 Lowell 22 25 Soutnborough 22.10
Eoxborough 21.55 Lynn 5.85 Stoneham 10.70
Eoxford 19.15 Lynnfield 9.35 Stoughton 14.55
Bramtree n.05 Malden 6 55 Slow 19 45
Briooewaier 20 85 Manchester 19.50 Sudbury 17 05
Brockton 17.35 Manslield 20 85 Swampscott 9.70
Brookline 6.85 Marblehead 12.85 Tewksbury 18 05
Burlington 13 15 Marlborough 22.10 Topsfield 14 25
Cambridge 6.15 Marshlield 22.25 Wakefield 8 65
Canton 15.25 Maynard 17.35 Walpole 15.95
Carlisle 19 45 Medtield 18.50 Waltham 11.45
Chelmsford 19 45 Medtord 6.15 Watertown 8.25
Chelsea 2.70 Medway 18.50 Wayland 13.60
Cohasset 15.95 Melrose 6.85 Wellesley 12.75
Concord 15.95 Merrimac 25 45 Wenham 14.95
Danvers 13.20 Methuen 21.55 Westborough 25.25
Dedham 11.75 Middleton 16.35 W.Bndgewater 19.45
Dover 13.70 Milford 22.70 Westford 22.95
Duxbury 25.05 Millis 17.35 W Newbury 25.45
E. Milton 7.20 Milton 8.60 Weston 12.75
E Bridgewater 19 45 NaLant 9.35 Westwood 12.45
Easton 21.55 'Jatck 15 00 Weymouth 12 45
Essex 22.65 Needham 13 55 Whitman 17.70
Everetf 4.80 Newbury 22.30 Wilmington 13.15
Foxboro 20.15 Newburyport 23 35 Winchester 8 60Framingham 17.20 Newton 10.30 Winthrop 3.40
Franklin 24.35 Norfolk 20 85 Woburn 10.70
Fort Devens No Anoover 22 25 Wrentham 22.95
(Ayer) 27.85 No Oumcy 6 85
Georgetown 19.15 No. Reading 12.45
Gloucester 22.30 Norwell 17.70
Groveland 20.55 Norwood 13.50
Halifax 24.70 Peabody 12.85
Hamilton 19.15 Pembroke 20.15
Hanover 18.75 Plainville 22.95
Hanson 19.45 Plympton 27.15
Harvard 23 65 Ouincy 8.95
FIGURE 3-1. SHARE-A-CAB PASSENGER FARES
52
o Section 3.3 traces the operation of the program from
its inauguration through June 1982 and summarizes basic
performance and impact data associated with each phase.
o Section 3.4 provides conclusions.
3 . 2 BACKGROUND
A wide range of ground transportation services are available
to and from Logan Airport: MASSPORT shuttle bus service to the
MBTA subway and regional transit network, private bus lines,
scheduled limousine service, shared-ride and exclusive-ride taxi
service, rental cars, parking and dropoff areas for private
autos, and military transportation. Passenger enplanements and
deplanements have risen steadily except for slight drops in
fiscal 1980 and 1981, from approximately 12 million airline
passengers in fiscal 1977 to almost 16 million in fiscal 1982. An
estimated 35.2 million person-trips per year are generated
between the airport and the surrounding areas, 76.9 percent of
which are by private automobile (including rental car), 10.9
percent by taxicab, 6.4 percent by bus and limousine, and 5.7
percent by subway. A further breakdown of Logan access is shown
in Table 3-1.
^
Due to the geographic location of the airport, approximately
three miles across Boston Harbor from downtown Boston (see Figure
3-2), the majority of trips to and from Logan must pass through
the Sumner/Callahan Tunnels. This traffic contributes to tunnel
congestion, particularly during the afternoon peak travel period.
MASSPORT recognized this as a problem in terms of several
effects
:
o Delays to travelers using the tunnels,
o Diversion of tunnel approach traffic to local streets
in East Boston, and
o Increased levels of air pollution at the tunnels.
^Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Logan Airport Master Plan Study:Ground Traffic and Transportation , April 10, 1980.
53
TABLE 3-1. ACCESS MODE TO LOGAN
Transit
Employees 6.5
Air Passengers 6.3
Companions 2.4
Overall 5.7
Transit
Business 5.5
Pleasure 5.9
Other 10.5
Total 6.3
Bus/Limo TaxiRentalCar
PrivateAuto
5.6 0.2 — 87.7
8.4 19.7 11.2 54.4
2.6 3.8 2.5 88.7
6.4 10.9 6.3 70.6
Bus/Limo TaxiRentalCar
PrivateAuto
7.8 23.0 15.1 48.5
8.7 14.5 4.8 66.1
9.4 18.9 11.3 49.8
8.4 19.7 11.2 54.4
Source: Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Logan Airport Master PlanStudy: Ground Traffic and Transportation , April 10,
1980, p. 12, 13.
54
In response, they initiated a policy, contained in the Logan
Airport Ma ster Plan of 1977, to encourage the enlargement of
multipassenger transportation service. This policy is as
follows
:
The Massachusetts Port Authority will seek to reducebelow present levels the number of airport-destinedvehicles by encouraging people and goods to be carriedin fewer vehicles for trips to and from Logan Airport,and to route vehicles in a manner to minimize disrup-tion to surrounding neighbors. In order to accomplishthis objective, MASSPORT will plan and support thedevelopment of greatly improved bus/ limousine serviceto Logan Airport. It will work with private bus/limousine carriers in support of their efforts toexpand service, initiate new service and to promotethese services.
In addition to the above policy, MASSPORT went on to state
that the limousine improvements " ... may bring a small reduction
of patronage for taxis. As a result of the policy, limousine
operators entered the Logan market. Taxi operators predictably
protested, feeling MASSPORT was treating the taxi industry
unfairly by promoting such a policy. The taxi operators also
protested MASSPORT's decision to construct an additional parking
facility. Sensing a decline in taxi ridership, drivers struck
the airport during a 7-day period, leading to a decision by
MASSPORT to implement the Share-A-Cab service.
Representatives of more than 200 independent owners and
operators of Boston taxicabs participated in the planning and
initiation of the Share-A-Cab service. The strategy of a shared-
ride taxi program was to minimize the price advantages that
limousine services have over taxicabs, and thus preserve the
viability of taxis while continuing to encourage use of high-
occupancy modes.
The Share-A-Cab plan was accepted by MASSPORT, representa-
tives of the taxi industry, the Massachusetts Executive Office of
Transportation and Construction (EOTC), and the City of Boston,
and was inaugurated on April 27, 1977, serving 21 cities and
2Logan Airport Master Plan , Massachusetts Port Authority, April.1976.J Ibid.
56
towns outside the City of Boston. Although service to the city
itself was originally planned, it was never implemented.
Naturally, the exclusion of Boston eliminated much of the Share-
A-Cab market, and also reduced the potential for matching
passengers with suburban destinations. MASSPORT and taxi
industry officials offered the following explanations for the
exclusion of Boston:
o The taxi industry feared that such a service would
cause a drastic reduction in total cabs dispatched at
Logan. (Mr. Ted Kline of Taxi News Digest believes the
demand for taxicabs would have dropped 75 percent at
the airport.)
o A Share-a-Cab service to Boston would lead to
unacceptably long waits in the taxi pool.
o It would prove to be an administrative nightmare due to
the expected volume of travelers and the large numbers
of operators involved.
o It would likely divert high percentages of travelers
from other modes of transportation, especially rapid
transit and limousine.
o There was a strong probability that the taxicabindustry would boycott Share-A-Cab, refusing to supply
cabs on a voluntary basis, thus causing the program to
self-destruct
.
o There was a belief that shared-ride fare would not
offer enough of an increase over exclusive ride fare to
be worthwhile for the taxi operator (i.e., the taxi
industry estimates that a typical exclusive ride fare
to downtown is $6.00, while three-passenger Share-A-Cab
fare is estimated at $8.00).
Although the operation has been reduced in its size and
operating hours since inception, the service has proved to be a
convenient, door-to-door taxicab service for a particular segment
of Logan travelers, namely students and vacation travelers who
have a flexible time schedule and a desire to cut costs as much
as possible. Passengers using the service are charged a flat
57
fare, which is approximately one-half the normal exclusive-ride
fare, and are normally provided service within 15 minutes of
request
.
An oddity of the program, associated with the exclusion of
Share-A-Cab service to Boston proper, was that city regulations
limited participation to taxicabs licensed in the city of Boston,
although Share-A-Cab could not carry passengers from the airport
to Boston, nor could Boston-licensed cabs carry return trips from
the Share-A-Cab communities to Boston. This policy contributed
to empty mileage and to the decline of the service.
One of the major barriers to the development of shared ride
services has been the problem of coordinating the usually high
numbers of small operators relative to registration and enforce-
ment of rules. The Logan Airport Share-A-Cab service incor-
porates several large cab operators and numerous small operators,
without significant administrative difficulty. This has provided
information on resolving another key implementation obstacle.
3.3 SHARE-A-CAB OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE
There have been three phases of Share-A-Cab operation since
its introduction. Phase-to-phase changes have included
broadening of the number of destinations served and reductions in
operating hours and guarantees.
Operator participation in the service is voluntary. The
same restrictions (only City of Boston registered taxicabs may
participate) and entry costs ($.50 per trip charge) apply to the
operators in the Share-A-Cab pool as in the regular taxi pool,
the only difference being that once a driver enters the Share-A-
Cab line, he cannot leave it.
3.3.1 Phase I - April 1977 to July 1977
The original Share-A-Cab was introduced as a service to 21
cities and towns lying northwest and west of Boston (see Figure
3-3). These areas accounted for approximately 25 percent of all
air passengers' destinations, representing the majority of travel
58
outside the Boston city limits and, in the opinion of the
originators of the service, constituted a good core "starter"
system. Boston, which alone accounts for another 25 percent of
air passenger destinations, was excluded at this time for the
reasons described earlier. 4
The initial service provided for no time guarantees to
prospective riders. Taxicabs were dispatched only when a group
of two to four passengers was formed. Deplaning passengers
wishing to use Share-A-Cab would notify a dispatching agent in a
booth in each terminal of their destinations and their desire for
Share-A-Cab service. The agent would log them into the system,
relay the destination to a central dispatching point, and then
instruct the passenger on the approximate waiting time and where
to await the Share-A-Cab service. Travelers were asked every 15
minutes whether they wished to remain in the queue or exit and
secure other means of transportation. This policy was
established with the hope of retaining as many riders as poss-
ible, to encourage operator participation, and to build credi-
bility with passengers until the system reached steady-state
operation
.
Fares for the Share-A-Cab are zone fares, approximately one-
half of the regular taxi fares, and are published in the MASSPORT
Logan Airport Ground Transportation Services guide. Typical
fares are shown in Figure 3-1. This guide is visible to all
airport users. The operator receives the assigned fare for the
trip from each rider, regardless of how many riders he is trans-
porting. The fare is collected at the destination. Share-A-Cab
fares have remained fairly constant since the service began.
MASSPORT is responsible for the administration of the
service, which includes operations and enforcement. Employees
were hired to dispatch vehicles and match riders, and to super-
vise and coordinate the program. Outside agencies or individuals
were hired to handle advertising.
4Greenbaum, Karash, Attanucci, Bornstein, Implementation andPreliminary Impacts of a Shared-Ride Taxi Service for BostonLogan International Airport , January 1978, p. 9.
60
MASSPORT's operation of the Share-A-Cab service involves
labor costs (salaries and benefits) and minor utility and admini-
strative expenses. During Phase I, which lasted twelve weeks,
operating costs were estimated at $67,000. Approximately two-
thirds of these costs were attributed to personnel costs. In
addition to operating expenses, capital outlays peaked during
Phase I. MASSPORT estimated initial capital costs at $130,000.
These outlays funded the design and construction of a special
Share-A-Cab taxi pool holding area, the purchase and furnishing
of a trailer for dispatching, the construction of matching
booths, and the purchase of dispatching equipment including maps,
time clocks, and paging equipment. In addition to these facility
costs, initial marketing costs of approximately $60,000 were
expended
.
Phase I of the Share-A-Cab service raised several opera-
tional and policy issues. Of primary importance were the
exclusion of Boston and the lack of time guarantees to prospec-
tive riders. Although riders were apprised of their status every
fifteen minutes, MASSPORT officials believed riders were
dissatisfied with this facet of the operation. Taxi drivers were
also not pleased with the system. First, the queue in the multi-
ride pool averaged two to three hours compared to only 15-45
minutes in the regular taxi pool. Secondly, even after waiting
for such an extended period, drivers were not guaranteed a full
three- or four-person load. Incidences of drivers being dis-
patched with only one rider were most prevalent during the late
night hours of operation. When drivers were given a load of only
one or two passengers, the fare which they received was often
less than a comparable exclusive ride, taking into account the
distance and time involved in making the trip.
Driver complaints declined as drivers became more familiar
with the system's advantages and disadvantages, payoffs and
risks. Also, as drivers who disliked Share-A-Cab stopped
participating, the wait times in the Share-A-Cab pool decreased.
Advertising in Phase I has been characterized as adequate or
substantial by MASSPORT officials, but poor by taxi industry
representatives. MASSPORT attempted to garner ridership by
61
placing large overhead signs throughout the baggage claim areas.
In addition, Share-A-Cab booths, located in each matching area,
served as a method of advertising in themselves. No definitive
answers were available concerning the quality of the advertising.
Other alternative advertising methods were available to MASSPORT,
such as obtaining an agreement with the airlines to make an
announcement describing the service to arriving passengers; how-
ever, MASSPORT did not, based on discussions with Mr. Ted Kline
of Taxi News Digest and Dr. Stephan Chait, aggressively investi-
gate all of the alternatives. In addition. Dr. Chait stressed
the point that the "gamble" of risking a single fare versus the
opportunity of gaining a full three- or four-passenger load
should have been stressed to the drivers. MASSPORT did not
promote this concept in any phase of the program but instead kept
drivers informed of the rules and regulations to be followed whenr
operating at Logan.
MASSPORT was heavily involved in finding ways to pay for the
Share-A-Cab service. Tied directly to the start-up of the
service in April 1977, was an increase in the taxi pool entrance
fee, which rose from $.10 to $.50. This fee is paid by both
group-ride and exclusive-ride taxis into the airport's general
operating fund. The increased pool fee almost offset the
increased taxi-related expenses due to Share-A-Cab, so that
overall, MASSPORT's annual taxi-related deficit increased only
$900 from $286,250 to $287, 150. 6 Most observers agree that,
politically, MASSPORT could not have raised the pool fee except
by tying it to the negotiations for Share-A-Cab.
Share-A-Cab ridership did not follow any perceptible trends
in its first three months of operation. As shown in Figure 3-4,
airline passenger arrivals gradually rose during Phase I.
^Various interviews conducted in October 1982.
^Greenbaum, et al.. Implementation and Preliminary Impacts of a
Shared-Ride Taxi Service for Boston Logan International Airport,January 1978, p. 17.
62
Exclusive ride taxi tickets sold (a ticket is purchased by each
taxi entering the Logan Airport taxi pool) showed a slight
decline during the phase, while Share-A-Cab held reasonably
steady
.
During Phase I, MASSPORT compiled weekly statistical reports
that included service requests, passengers served and cabs
dispatched, cab occupancy, and frequency of destinations served.
In addition, MASSPORT conducted a short, week-long user survey.
The survey requested information on user mode choice in the
absence of Share-A-Cab, frequency of airport use, and other
items
.
According to the weekly statistical reports, the initial
Share-A-Cab service provided transportation to 4.2 percent of all
air travelers going from Logan to the communities served. An
average of 60 taxicabs per day were dispatched. Combining this
figure with the observed average daily ridership of 174 yields an
average Share-A-Cab occupancy of 2.9.
The survey produced the following results: 52.4 percent of
Share-A-Cab passengers were traveling to a residence, 24.6
percent were going to a hotel, and 15.3 percent had never
traveled through Logan Airport before. If Share-A-Cab had not
been available, 59.7 percent of the respondents would have
traveled by regular taxi, 20 percent by private auto or rental
car, and 18.8 percent by bus, limousine, or transit.
Typical riders using Share-A-Cab were students and other
persons who have a flexible time schedule and a desire to mini-
mize costs. A large portion of total ridership was comprised of
Cambridge area college students. According to Ted Kline of Taxi
News Digest, other riders are often families (it would actually
be cheaper for them to take an exclusive-ride taxi) and salesmen
(who pay a shared-ride fare but put a regular taxi fare on their
expense sheets). Mr. Kline also stated that Share-A-Cab users
tend to be poor tippers.
3.3.2 Phase II - July 1977 to August 1978
On July 19, 1977, just twelve weeks after its inauguration,
Share-A-Cab was enlarged to serve 138 towns and cities outside of
64
the City of Boston (see Figure 3-5). Nine weeks later, a
guarantee of a 15 minute maximum wait period for passengers, a
substantial improvement in the level of passenger service, was
implemented. These two improvements resulted in an increase of
approximately 100 riders per day, raising the daily average to
270 passengers. Share-A-Cab operated in the following manner:
o Share-A-Cab operated 7 days per week outbound fromLogan to 138 towns and cities located outside the Cityof Boston between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 11:30 p.m.
o Individual riders using Share-A-Cab continued to pay afixed, published fee, regardless of the number ofriders assigned to the taxicab. This fare was approxi-mately one-half the average fare for exclusive serviceto the destination.
o Prospective users accessed Share-A-Cab service by noti-fying an attendant at one of the booths located in eachof the five terminal areas of Logan Airport. Theseattendants then relayed the destination to a centraldispatching point where matches were made.
o Taxicabs were dispatched to the various terminal areas,as passengers were matched or when the 15 minute timeguarantee expired.
o Taxicabs that were forced to take a single rider orleft with a single or no passenger due to no-shows weregiven priority upon return to the Share-A-Cab taxipool. This priority ensured the operator that the nexttrip would be a multiple load. This privilege was nottransferable and could be used only on the same day.
o Route and order of drop-off were recommended byMASSPORT staff; however, the ultimate decision was leftto the driver. Passenger complaints, which wereinfrequent, were reported directly to MASSPORTofficials by phone or letter, whereupon operators wouldbe notified and reprimanded if the complaint was valid.
Staffing levels during this phase of operation were
surprisingly high, leading to high costs. Each of the five
Share-A-Cab booths was staffed for a 16-hour operating period (8-
hour shift per attendant). The only exception was the Inter-
national Terminal, where fluctuating demand required shorter
operating hours, resulting in a decrease in the number of attend-
ants needed. In addition to the booth attendants, seven
65
supervisors were hired to oversee daily operations and to make
final matches. One supervisor matched riders' destinations on a
pinboard, while the other supervisors either carried out admini-
strative office tasks or roamed terminal areas, maintaining sur-
veillance and assisting where necessary. Six taxi dispatchers
were also employed, giving the program a total of 23 employees.
According to MASSPORT, all employees performed tasks related
solely to the Share-A-Cab service.
Share-A-Cab ridership levels benefited from the implemen-
tation of the 15 minute maximum wait time. Ridership rose to a
peak of 312 daily riders. During most of Phase II, daily rider-
ship averaged 270 (see Figure 3-6). This is contrasted with an
average daily ridership of 170 in Phase I. The impact of the
growth in service area cannot be determined. Ridership did go to
areas not present in Phase I; however, the subsidy per rider also
rose, and can be tied to the lower density of the increased
service area. According to MASSPORT's weekly statistical re-
ports, Phase II provided transport to 2.7 percent of all air
travelers going from Logan to the destinations served. In Phase
I, the figure was 4.2 percent. In addition, the reports showed
that over 15 percent of all Share-A-Cab vehicle trips were single
rider. Taxi occupancy dropped from an average of 2.9 in Phase I
to 2.16 in Phase II. This is probably due to the higher number
of possible destinations and the resultant lower density service
area
.
For dispatching purposes, the Share-A-Cab service area was
split into seven corridors, emanating radially from Boston's city
limits, as shown in Figure 3-7. Almost two-thirds (60%) of all
trips terminated in one of the two western corridors, which
included such areas as Cambridge, Brookline, Concord and
Framingham; 21 percent of all trips went into the two northern
corridors; and only 14 percent had destinations in the three
southern corridors.
Taxi operators were concerned about the implementation of
the 15-minute passenger guarantee. In practice, drivers were
given more single passenger fares in the Share-A-Cab queue than
67
Airline
Passenger
Arrivals
&
Departures
(x
100,000)
oooo'
oo
0)
EXin
©© J£> O
O XX «UJ (- <
u.
00
Q
O
CO
<
0>
CO <N OO) CO r- CD in CO CM o
68
FIGURE
3-6.
SHARE-A-CAB
DAILY
RIDERSHIP-PHASE
II
JULY
1977
TO
AUGUST
1978
in Phase I. With the increase in the number of single passenger
fares, the gamble taken by the driver when entering the Share-A-
Cab pool shifted away from the chances of obtaining a full load.
The result was an observed decline in the number of drivers
participating in the Share-A-Cab program. A survey undertaken by
the EOTC determined that approximately 60 drivers "played" Share-
A-Cab regularly. However, there was always an adequate supply of
Share-A-Cabs to serve the passengers.
Phase II showed an increase in ridership, a wider variety of
passenger destinations, and passengers more satisfied with the
service, primarily due to the 15 -minute maximum wait guarantee.
MASSPORT was pleased with the gains in ridership but the costs of
the program, specifically the rising subsidy per passenger cost,
led MASSPORT to ask the EOTC to study the program to determine
where budget cutbacks could be made without seriously damaging
the Share-A-Cab service. The EOTC study recommended significant
cuts in staffing and the introduction of telecommunications
equipment. These changes were implemented in Phase III.
3.3.3 Phase III - September 1978 to June 1982
Following the issuance of the EOTC report, Share-A-Cab staff
was cut from 23 employees to 13 by October 1978. Five super-
visors and eight dispatchers were retained. Later the system was
cut down to a skeleton work force of only three full-time
employees. This reduction in force took place through a combin-
ation of attrition and transfer of employees to aid the
exclusive-ride service.
As the number of employees declined, MASSPORT either reduced
the operating hours of individual booths at each terminal, or
suspended their use entirely. Later and most significantly, in
August 1981, the wait-time guarantee was discontinued.
The policy of taxi pickup at each terminal was also replaced
by a single collection area located in Terminal D (see Figure
3-8). Terminal D was where a large fraction of Share-A-Cab
participation had been centered. This was a major change in the
quality of service for passengers deplaning at other terminals.
70
Except for a short time period when a van transported Share-A-Cab
patrons to the Share-A-Cab loading point, riders were responsible
for getting there on their own, using one of three methods:
o Walk : infeasible with baggage, poor sidewalks, and no
signs to indicate which way to go.
o MASSPORT bus : awkward with baggage; need to choose
correct bus from several routes; need to pay $.25 fare
(until bus was made free in November 1984)
o Taxi : cost of about $2.00 and no credit toward Share-
A-Cab fare.
Combined with a lack of guaranteed service, these changes
meant that a traveler with baggage could actually pay more by
choosing Share-A-Cab than choosing regular taxi service. To
choose Share-A-Cab, a traveler might pay a $2.00 cab fare to get
to the loading point, and then, if no match materializes within
an hour or two, take a regular taxi at full fare. The affluent
traveler does not need to share a cab, and the cost-conscious
traveler cannot afford the risk.
In place of the Share-A-Cab booths, several Share-A-Cab
phones, as recommended by EOTC, were installed within each
terminal, and a main matching and departure booth was constructed
in Terminal D. Under this new operation, prospective Share-A-Cab
riders were directed by signs to a Share-A-Cab phone, located in
each of the five terminal lobbies, to call the central
dispatching unit, which would record their destination and
request time and instruct them on where and how to proceed.
Waiting participants were updated on their status every 15
minutes by the dispatcher, and were allowed to withdraw from
participation at any time. Operating hours were cut in half to
3:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. from the previous hours of 7:30 a.m. to
11:30 p.m.
Fares remained steady during Phase III; however, the with-
drawal of the 15-minute time guarantee and the reduction in
operating hours and pick up points delivered a strong blow to
ridership levels. Figure 3-9 shows that ridership fell from a
Phase II daily average of 280 in early 1980 to 82 by late 1981.
72
300
<DCO
03
SfcIBOIH A1IVO 3DVH3AV
E03
0>OCL
73
FIGURE
3-9.
DAILY
SHARE-A-CAB
RIDERSHIP
(QUARTERLY
AVERAGE)
The reduced ridership lengthened the wait for a match, so
ridership continued to decline. As of June 1982, the average
daily ridership had fallen to 58.
Directly tied to the cutbacks in staffing, MASSPORT
operating costs fell to $48,000 for fiscal 1982. MASSPORT
estimated the 1982 per passenger subsidy at $3.18.
Coincidentally, this was the same subsidy level that existed
existed in Phase I.
As a result of dispatching being now limited to one point,
advertising has dropped substantially. Small blue signs
accompanied by telephones are all that remain in terminals other
than at Terminal D where the dispatching area is located.
Table 3-2 summarizes the attributes of each phase of Share-
A-Cab.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
MASSPORT's Share-A-Cab service at Logan Airport was a short-
lived success. It was welcomed by riders who had destinations
outside the City of Boston and saw it as an inexpensive means of
travel. However, the principal shortcomings of the service—no
service to the City of Boston and lack of quick rider matches--
discouraged or ruled out major travel market segments, parti-
cularly business travelers. Also, being a one-way service, it
could not compete with the drive and park mode; to attract
travelers who generally drive to the airport and park there, one
would have to provide an affordable fare in both directions.
Ridership acceptance of Share-A-Cab has been steadily eroded by
budget cuts which caused service reductions, consolidation to a
single terminal, and, most importantly, the abandonment of the 15
minute wait time guarantee. Ridership levels have dropped since
those who were originally attracted to the program by the
exchange of a small amount of time for monetary savings could not
be assured prompt transportation under the new policy. Further-
more, as ridership dropped, the incentive to operators and the
74
TABLE 3-2. SHARE-A-CAB ATTRIBUTES BY PHASE
Phase Dates
WeeklyOperating
Hours
No. ofPickupPoints
No. ofComnunities
Served
15 Min.GuaranteeY or N
Avg.DailyRiders
SubsidyPer
Passenger1
I 5/77-
7/77
7:30 AM -
11:30 PM7 Days
5 21 N 174 $3.18
II 8/77-8/78
7:30 AM -
11:30 PM7 Days
5 138 Y 270 $4.68
III 9/786/82
3:30 PM -
11:00 PM7 Days
1 138 N 82 $3.18
^Subsidy is calculated at MASSPORT in the following manner
Operating Cost - Taxicab Entrance Fees
•
Total Ridership
75
probability of convenient matches has declined as well.
Limousine services have also proven to be competitive to
destinations served by Share-A-Cab.
Share-A-Cab now appears to be the dying ember of what may
have been a good idea, and is likely to be eventually phased out.
Chief among its many problems was the fact that it was not
planned and executed to elicit its full potential, but rather was
the final, filtered-out product which resulted from compromising
diverse institutional interests, chief of which are:
1. city taxi regulations which limited participation in
the program to taxicabs licensed by the city of Boston,
although Share-A-Cab could not carry passengers from
the airport to Boston, nor could Boston- licensed cabs
carry return trips from the Share-A-Cab communities to
Boston; and
2. the taxi industry itself, which resisted limo-type
operations to or from Logan.
In addition, the program was never wholeheartedly supported
or marketed. In some sense, it is surprising that it worked as
well as it did, and that is probably due to the relatively poor
alternatives to and from Logan. Mass transit from Logan to most
destinations served by Share-A-Cab requires three or more
transfers (i.e., four or more vehicles).
76
LAGUARDIA AIRPORT SHARE-A-CAB CONTACTS
o Metropolitan Taxicab Board of TradeMs. Betty LawrenceMr. Bernard Lerner24-16 Queens Plaza SouthLong Island City, NY 11101718-784-4511
o Taxi and Limousine CommissionMr. Jay Turoff, Chairman221 West 41st StreetNew York, NY 10036212-382-9307
o Port Authority of New York and New JerseyLaGuardia Airport, Flushing StationFlushing, NY 11371Attn: Mr. Thomas Lewandowski718-476-5000
A-l
CHICAGO SHARE-A-CAB CONTACTS
o Mr. Jery FeldmanYellow Cab312-421-1300
o Mr. Tom SharpCity of Chicago Department of Consumer ServicesCity Hall121 N. LaSalle StreetChicago, Illinois 60602312-744-5092
o Mr. Joseph LigasChicago Area Transportation Study300 W. Adams StreetChicago, Illinois 60606312-793-3456
o Mr. Roy BellChicago Area Transportation Study300 W. Adams StreetChicago, Illinois 60606312-793-3456
A-2
LOGAN AIRPORT SHARE-A-CAB CONTACTS
o Mr. Ted KlineManager, Taxi News Digest253 Summer St.Boston, Massachusetts 02210617-426-2068
o Ms. Karla KarashExecutive Office of Transportation and ConstructionBoston, Massachusetts 02210617-973-7000
o Dr. Stephan ChaitTransportation Consultant18 Brattle Street, Suite 353Cambridge, MA 02138617-547-3332
o Mr. Les BarenholtzBoston Cab CompanyBoston, Massachusetts617-266-0875
o Mr. Pat RussellChecker Cab CompanyBoston, Massachusetts617-536-7500
o Mr. Joseph GreeneMr. James WhiteMs. Kathleen ScannellMASSPORTBoston Logan International Airport 02128617-561-1617
A-
3
THIS OFFICE IS A
REDEMPTION CENTER
for
GROUP RIDE VOUCHERS
ALL VOUCHERS PRESENTED BY DRIVERS MUST BE REDEEMED AT THEIR
FACE VALUE LESS FIFTY CENTS .
REDEMPTION HOURS:
9:30 A .M. - 3:00 P.M.
MONDAY - FRIDAY
All vouchers to be redeemed must bear a raised seal, as the attached sample
has; you must be able to feel this raised area when you run your fingers overthe voucher. IF SEAL IS NOT PRESENT, please call Taxicab Dispatch Serviceat 784-4511 immediate ly .
B-l
"T
TAXICAB DISPATCH SERVICE, INC.24-16 Bridge Plaza South
Long Island City, New York 11101
212 784-4343
ATTENTION A LL DRIVERS - PLEASE - READ IMMEDIATELY !
EFFECTIVE MONDAY, MAY 19TH, THERE WILL BE AN INCREASE IN THE RATE OFFARE FOR GROUP RIDES. In addition, the METHOD OF PAYMENT WILL BE CHANGEDTO A CASH BASIS
,rather than the current voucher system.
DRIVERS WILL RECEIVE PAYMENT AS FOLLOWS: (Tips and tolls not included)
Zone Current payment New Payment Net fee to driver.
per passenger per passenger Group of 3 passengers
A $4.50 $5.00 $15.00B & C 5.50 6.00 18.00
This means that drivers will receive $1.50 more on each group of three passengers, but
more importantly, because of the change-over to cash payments, your valuable time will
be saved by the elimination of the need for voucher redemption!
The Group Ride Dispatcher at the airport will receive payment from each passenger,will issue the passenger a receipt for their fare, and will then give each driver his
fare IN CASH on the spot, when he has loaded the passengers into your cab. We hope
that this will eliminate the problems you have had in the past with voucher redemption.
However - ALL OUTSTANDING VOUCHERS MUST BE REDEEMED WITHIN THIRTYDAYS; NO VOUCHERS WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR REDEMPTION AFTER JUNE 18TH.
Please be sure to turn in all vouchers in your possession to a Redemption Center prior
to that date .
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you for your cooperation in makingthe Group Ride program the success it has become .
B-2
Dear Share-A-Cab Passenger:
We're very happy that you and over 300,000 other passengers have participated
in our group taxi riding program over the past three years. We've had manypositive comments about this program, and also many requests for comparableservice from Manhattan to the airport.
In response to those requests, we are looking into the feasibility of service fromthe city to the three airports serving the city, and we need your help. You will find
some suggestions for group taxi departure points in Manhattan. We would appreciate
it if you would indicate one or two points which would be convenient for you if you
were taxiing to the airport. Please indicate your first and second choice of location
below by inserting the numeral 1 or 2 on the line next to the location.
46th St. and Park Avenue(Near Grand Central)
38th St. and Broadway(Garment Center)
53rd between 6th & 7th Ave.(Area of Hilton & Sheraton Centre)
One World Trade Center
55 Water Street
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
We'd also like to know the hour you would usually take a taxi to the airport:
1P.M. 2P.M. 3P.M. 4P.M.
5 P.M. 6 P.M. 7 P.M. 8 P.M.
Please hand this form to any Share-A -Cab Dispatcher on your next trip out of
La Guardia Airport before July 10, 1982, or mail to:
B-3
SAVE YOUR VALUABLE TIME !
TAKE A GROUP TAXI RIDE TO THE AIRPORT -
FAST, ON-DEMAND SERVICE !
BEGINNING JUNE 23RDGROUP RIDES DEPART FROM:
1. 55 Water Street (operating hours 2:00 - 6:00 P.M.)
2. Five World Trade Center - Church & Vesey Streets (12 Noon - 6:00 P.M.)
RATE OF FARE STRUCTURE: (Tips and tolls _not included)
De stination # of
passengersgroup rate
per passengerAverage meter
fare
potential savings to
each passenger
La Guardia 3 $ 7.00 $16.50 $ 9.50t 1 2 10.00 16.50 6.50
JFK 3 12.00 29.00 17.001 t 2 16.00 29.00 13.00
Newark 3 13.00 39.00* 26.00I 1 2 17,50 39.00 21 .50
^Average meter fare for Newark Airport reflects double the meter reading, as required
by Taxi and Limousine Commission regulations for out-of-town trips.
ALL FARES BASED ON DROP-OFF AT PASSENGERS' EXACT DESTINATION - I.E.,
TERMINAL OF CHOICE AT THE AIRPORT.
See the Dispatcher at either of the above locations; he will form a group for you and give you
a receipt for your fare when he loads the taxicab.
For further information, call Taxicab Dispatch Service, Inc. - 784-4343
B-4
REFERENCES
1. Cambridge Systematics, Inc., LOGAN AIRPORT MASTER PLAN
STUDY: GROUND TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION, April 10, 1980.
2. Chicago Area, Transportation Study, AN ANALYSIS OF GROUND
TRANSPORTATION TO CH I CAGO-O ' HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,
Planning Working Paper #83-7, March 1983.
3. Chicago Area Transportation Study, CHICAGO TAXI INDUSTRY:
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS, November, 1981.
4. Chicago Area Transportation Study, SUPER SAVER TAXI PROGRAM
EVALUATION REPORT, Technical Memo 83-07, June 1983.
5. Gilbert, Gorman, et al., TRANSIT OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS
REPORT: DOT-I-83-55, September 1982.
6. Greenbaum, Karash, Attanucci, Bornstein, IMPLEMENTATION AND
PRELIMINARY IMPACTS OF A SHARED-RIDE TAXI SERVICE FOR BOSTON
LOGAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, January 1978.
7. Greenbaum, Daniel S., et al., "Implementation and
Preliminary Impacts of Shared-Ride Taxi Service at Boston
Logan International Airport," URBAN TRANSPORT SERVICE
INNOVATIONS, Special Report 184 (Washington: Transportation
Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, 1979), pp.
135-42.
8. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, AviationDepartment, Aviation Economics Division: "Airport
Statistics .
"
9. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, PORT AUTHORITY
AIRPORTS: ORIGIN BY MODE, 1972 AND 1978.
10. Taxicab Dispatch Service, FACT SHEET, May 31, 1982.
11. Taxicab Dispatch Service, MEMORANDUM: GROUP RIDE PROGRAM,
DOWNTOWN MANHATTAN, August 25, 1980.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1 988--5 00-65 3--60 1 5
1
400 copies R-l/R-2