APPENDIX 1

US Military and Policy Objectives in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

Strategic Focus

In Afghanistan, the US government worked on the principle of pursuing Al-Qaeda throughout Afghanistan and across the inhospitable border region with Pakistan (Katzman, 2008:7; Carafano and Rosenzweig, 2005:34–35; Goodson, 2004:1–2; Shapiro and Davis, 2003:11–12). This policy, along with the limited number of military personnel initially assigned to Afghanistan (the United States deployed approximately 10,000 troops), delayed the implemen-tation of a strategy to stabilize and grow the Afghan political structures (del Prado, 2008:16; Goodson, 2004:1–2; Else, 2004–118–119; Shapiro and Davis, 2003:19–20; Nardulli, 2003:8–9, 14).

The United States and its international partners have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan since 2001 (Kaplan and Bruno, 2008:4; Katzman, 2008a:2; U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a:30–32; Katzman, 2008:10–11, 13–14; Gootnick et al., 2005:5–7; Roggio, 2005:1–2). In an effort to establish clear and specific US strategic goals, the Obama Administration outlined the US Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009 (Makel, 2011:16; Johnson et al., 2010:5; Armitage et al., 2010:4–6; Dale, 2009:7; Johnson et al., 2009:13–14). This strategy emphasizes a strategic goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and pre-vent its return to Afghanistan (Johnson et al. 2010:5; Armitage et al., 2010:4–6). The strategy was followed by completing the Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan in August 2009 (Makel, 2011:17; Johnson et al., 2010:6). In December 2009, Obama reaffirmed the US strategic goal and underscored the

152 Appendix 1

importance of US efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan (Makel, 2011:16; Johnson et al., 2010:1; del Prado, 2008:16; Goodson, 2004:1–2; Else, 2004–118–119; Shapiro and Davis, 2003:19–20; Nardulli, 2003:8–9, 1).

US Military Objectives

Goals (2001–2006)From 2001 through mid-2006, US forces and Afghan troops fought a low level of insurgency, the remnants of the Taliban and their backers (Katzman, 2009a:25–26; Katzman, 2008:7; Carafano and Rosenzweig, 2005:34–35; Goodson, 2004:1–2; Shapiro and Davis, 2003:11–12). The US government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of dis-rupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime (St. Laurent et al., 2009:1–2; Katzman, 2008:6–7; Terrill, 2006:24–25; McCartney, 2004:412–413). Major combat operations focused on addressing challenges from resurgent Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders who were defeated but not eliminated, and from Afghan local powerbrokers, strengthened by years of battle-hardened autonomy and resistance, who were displeased by the emerging post-Taliban order (Van Evera, 2006:11–12; Serchuk, 2005:1–2; Kagan and Kristol, 2001:1–2).

Strategy ApplicationMilitary operations during this period were characterized by counterinsurgency (COIN) operations borrowed and adapted from Vietnam and Iraq (Bowman and Dale, 2009:28; Biddle, 2009:7–9, Phillips, 2009:25–26, 48). In general, the military objectives of the US military approach of “shape, clear, hold, build” were to work closely with Afghan counterparts to target insurgents; use Afghan or if necessary international security forces to hold an area once it is cleared; and apply coordinated civil-military efforts to build institutions and services (Welle, 2010:58; Bowman and Dale, 2009:28–30). However, in Afghanistan, the military COIN objectives were challenged by the rugged terrain, limited forces, and resources available, and by the need to gain sufficient understanding of local areas to develop situation-specific approaches (Welle, 2010:58; Bowman and Dale, 2009:28).

In addition to US COIN efforts, an objective of the US military was to build capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy(ANP) (Katzman, 2008:20; Wilder, 2007:51–52; Feickert, 2006:11,14, Gootnick et al., 2005:57; U.S. Department of State, 2005:70–72; U.S. Congress, 2003a:14).

Goals (2007–2008)From 2007 to 2008, insurgent attacks against US, international, and Afghan forces increased by 33 percent (Katzman, 2009a: 25–26; Jones, 2008:1;

Appendix 1 153

Esfandiari, 2006; Synovit, 2006). A majority of theses attacks included improvised explosive device (IED), sophisticate ambushes and the use of indirect-fire weapons (Williams-Bridgers et al., 2009:11–12; Morelli and Belkin, 2009: 2–3; Johnson et al., 2009:15–16; Kaplan and Bruno, 2008:5). This increase, along with the Taliban takeover of the Musa Qala district of Helmand province in February 2007, caused US military efforts to refocus on eastern and southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Qandahar provinces (Katzman, 2009a:26). By mid 2008, the US military requested significant additional forces to support additional operations in eastern and southern Afghanistan (Katzman, 2009a: 28; Jones and Pickering, 2008:23; O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008a:1–2, 6). The low-level COIN that character-ized US operations during 2001–2006 was replaced by large and more robust operations (Katzman, 2009a: 28; Jones and Pickering, 2008:23; O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008a:1–2, 6; Cordesman, 2007:2).

Strategy ApplicationAs a further response to expanding Taliban operations, NATO and US forces tried to apply a more integrated strategy involving preemptive combat and increased capacity-building efforts (Johnson et al., 2009:29; Johnson et al., 2008b:10–11; 22; Katzman, 2008:33; Williams-Bridgers et al., 2007:16). Major combat operations in 2007 included US- and NATO-attempted preemption of an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (Operation Achilles, March 2007) in the Sangin district of Helmand province, around the Kajaki dam, and Operation Silicon (May 2007), also in Helmand (Katzman, 2009a:26). Accompanying these efforts were US and NATO efforts to continue approving the capabili-ties of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy (ANP) (Johnson et al., 2009:29; Johnson et al., 2008b:10–11; Katzman, 2008:33; Williams-Bridgers et al., 2007:16; Nawa, 2006:2–4).

Goals (2009–Present)From 2009 through the present, the US military put into operation an objective of protecting the population and helping the Afghan government take steps to earn the trust of the population, rather than to search out and combat Taliban concentrations (Makel, 2011:17, Bowman and Dale, 2009:27–28, 61–62). This change emphasized US military objectives toward close cooperation with local security forces, the use of both kinetic and soft tools, and the incorporation of civilian resources into the stabilization effort (Makel, 2011:17, Bowman and Dale, 2009:27–28, 61–62).

Strategy ApplicationOn March 27, 2009, the Obama Administration initiated a comprehensive strategic review of US Afghanistan policy (Katzman, 2009a:8–9; Reidel et al.,

154 Appendix 1

2009:1–3; Johnson et al., 2009:1–2; Bowman and Dale, 2009:11). The review along with the deployment of additional US forces provide the US military the authorization and resources to focus US COIN efforts toward population secu-rity and reverse the Taliban’s momentum as well as strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government (Katzman, 2009a:29; O’Hanlon, 2009:141–143; Morelli and Belkin, 2009:3–4).

* * *

US Policy Objectives of OEF

GoalsPrior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush Administration decided that the US government, in order to prevent a return of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other militants to Afghanistan, would try to rebuild the country and build a relatively strong central government to resurrect the economy (Katzman, 2008:50–52; Goodson, 2004:2–3; Kunder, 2004:1–2). The core of the US policy has been to expand governance throughout the country (Daggett et al., 2009:34; Birdsall, 2008:284–285; Veillette, 2007:7–8). The key objective of this strategy, particu-larly during 2002–2007, was to strengthen the central government by help-ing President Hamid Karzai curb key regional strongmen and local militias, referred to as “warlords” (Katzman, 2008a:2; U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a:30–32; Katzman, 2008:10–11, 13–14; Gootnick et al., 2005:5–7).

In 2008, there was a major US and Afghan push to build up local gover-nance, reflecting a shift from the 2001–2007 approach of focusing on building up central authority (Daggett et al., 2009:34; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2008b:12; Veillette, 2007:7–8). The approach rep-resents an attempt to rebuild some of the tribal and other local structures, such as “ jirgas” and “shuras,” the traditional local councils, which were destroyed in the course of constant warfare over several decades, as well as to reduce reliance on the central government (Katzman, 2009a:17–18, 49).

The two major US policy reviews in 2009 did not significantly change most of the basic pillars of US and NATO security strategy that have been in place since 2001 (Katzman, 2009a: 28–31; Jones and Pickering, 2008:23; O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008a:1–2, 6; Cordesman, 2007:2). Although the March 27, 2009, “strategic review” of the US Afghanistan policy by the Obama Administration resulted in the narrowing of the official US goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Katzman, 2009a: 23; O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008a:2–5), this review supported the nation-building strategy put in place by the Bush Administration (Katzman, 2009a:29–31; O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008a:2–5).

APPENDIX 2

US Military and Policy Objectives in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom and

Operation New Dawn

US Military Objectives in Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Strategic FocusThe Bush Administration’s short-term goal for OIF was regime removal. Bush stated in his March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation, “It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power” (Dale, 2008b:23–24; Martin, 2006:4; McCarthy, 2004:418–418; Leffler, 2004:24–26; Gaddis, 2002:53–55). In this speech, President Bush declared that the longer term goals of the US would be to help the Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free” (Dale, 2009:31). The initial step toward creating this stable Iraq (with a government that renounces WMD development and support to international terrorism), described by the President was the US military operations in Iraq (Dale, 2009:31).

In the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the Bush Administration stated the long-term goal for Iraq was to bring the country into the international community after the many years of the Hussein dictator-ship and establish the country as a full partner in the global community (Dale, 2008b:23–24; Katzman, 2008c:37–38; Martin, 2006:4). In January 2007, the administration established the New Way Forward National Strategy, which changed US policy toward Iraq.

In this new strategy, the goal of the US government changed from building a new Iraq to establish a sovereign Iraqi government capable of serving as an ally in the war on terror (Dale, 2008b:24, 49, 61; Fitzsimmons, 2008:10–11; Jabor, 2007:1–2; Johnson, 2008a:250–251). In March 2009, in the first Iraq

156 Appendix 2

report issued under the Obama Administration, a revised strategy called the Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq directed the DoD to assist in strengthening Iraqi sovereignty, and support the successful transition to Iraqis’ taking respon-sibility for the security and stability within Iraq (Williams and Guthrie, 2009:3; Forcina, 2009:2; Dale, 2009:4–6; Gilmore, 2009:1–2; Jentleson, 2008:3–4).

US Military Objectives in OIF

Goals (2003–2004)From the outset of OIF, in 2003–2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set eight mission objectives for the operation that supported the stated US strate-gic focus (Dale, 2008b:8–10; Spring, 2003:1–2). The DoD defined initial OIF military objectives as: “destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capa-bility and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq, gather intelligence on global terror-ism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region” (Dale, 2009:31; Spring, 2003:1–2).

Strategy ApplicationTactically, the DoD built its plans around four basic lines of operation: political (governance), economic, essential services, and security (Dale, 2009:60; West, 2009:6, 10; Christoff et al., 2008e:15–16; Kem, 2007:12; US Department of Defense, 2005e, 2–3). In the “security” line of operation, military opera-tions under Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–7 included two major ele-ments, combat operations, focused on “killing or capturing” insurgents and the development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) (West, 2009:10; Young, 2006:36; Schlesinger et al., 2004:28–29, 46; Office of the Inspector General of the Army, 2004:13–15). The US-led combat operations resulted in the detention of a large number of Iraqi and foreign fighters, which became an early and growing source of popular frustration (Young, 2006:36; Schlesinger et al., 2004:28–29, 46; Office of the Inspector General of the Army, 2004:13–15). US effort to develop the ISF focused on mentoring Iraqi military leaders as well as formal military training to develop an Iraqi force, capable of fighting insurgents and securing the country. (Dale, 2009:60, 61–63).

Goals (2005–2006)In the aftermath of the security operations from 2003–2004, US and Iraqi forces established a limited counterinsurgency (COIN) approach with the objective of tightening security within and around cities by using a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents as a means of controlling movement and access (West, 2009:11–12; Dale, 2009:67–68; Polanco, 2007, 3, 4–5, 11; National

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Security Council, 2005:8, 18). This new strategy used between 2005 and 2006, known as “Clear, Hold, Build,” focused on basing Coalition forces among the population (Dale, 2009:67–68; Polanco, 2007, 3, 4–5, 11; National Security Council, 2005:8, 18). Though common in the early days of OIF, most coalition forces in Iraq had been pulled back to relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) by 2005, secure and separate from the local population (Dale, 2009:20; West, 2009:9; Polanco, 2007:22. McGrath, 2006:131).

Strategy ApplicationMilitary operations during this period focused on working closely with their Iraqi security forces under the “Operation Together Forward,” concept (Dale, 2009:68; Katzman, 2009b:33; Polanco, 2007:19–20). In these operations, the Iraqi forces were in the lead, supported by the coalition (Dale, 2009:68; McGrath, 2006:128–131). The effort included clearing operations, as well as a series of new security measures including extended curfews, tighter restrictions on weapons ownership, tips hotlines, and expanded checkpoints and police patrols (Dale, 2009:68; Polanco, 2007:20–25).

Goals (2007–2008)With the Bush administration’s New Way Forward National Strategy initiated in January 2007, the US military objectives shifted to providing “population secu-rity” but also changed the approaches the US forces used to engage with the local populace (Williams-Bridgers et al., 2009:9–10; Christoff et al., 2009:29–30; Dale, 2008b:24, 50, 61; Christoff et al., 2008a: 9–11, 34–35; Jabor, 2007:9, 15–16; Rice, 2007: 2–3). One major emphasis was population control, includ-ing the extensive use of concrete barriers, checkpoints, curfews, and biomet-ric technologies for identification along with fingerprinting and retinal scans (Dale, 2008b:71). The focus on population security marked an important shift from previous years, when the top imperative was transitioning security respon-sibilities to Iraqi security forces (Katzman, 2009b:37–38; Dale, 2008b:63–71; Christoff et al., 2008a:9–11, 18–19).

Strategy ApplicationDuring this period, 2007–2008, military objectives revolved around more robust COIN operations and efforts to continue the training, mentoring, and equipping Iraqi security forces for increased security responsibilities (Katzman, 2009b:37; Christoff et al., 2008a: 17–18, 23–25, 29, 34–35, 43; Christoff et al., 2007:3–4, 18–20). These operations can be characterized by grow-ing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capabilities, and growing assertiveness of the Government of Iraq (GoI) in employing the ISF (Katzman, 2009b:37; Christoff et al., 2008a:9–11, 18–19; Dale, 2008b:24, 61–62; Rice, 2007:3). The objec-tives of these operations have been to carry the war against both the Al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliates in north-central Iraq and extremist Shi’a militia members in

158 Appendix 2

the south and Baghdad (Christoff et al., 2008c:15–17; U.S. Department of Defense, 2008f:2; Johnson, 2008b:260–262, 272–273). The New Way Forward reinforced US military counterinsurgency operations. US Military objectives continued to focus engaging remnant Al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliates and against extremist Shi’a militia (Katzman, 2009b:37–38; Dale, 2008b:63–71; Christoff et al., 2008a:9–11, 18–19).

Operation New Dawn (OND)

Strategic FocusIn early 2009, the Obama administration presented a new strategy to end the war in Iraq (Dale, 2009:4–6; Forcina, 2009:2; Williams and Guthrie, 2009:3). The Administration believed that its strategy, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” would ensure the safe withdrawal of US forces from Iraq while maintain-ing the hard won peace (Forcina, 2009:2; Williams and Guthrie, 2009:3). The objective of “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” oriented around the use of military and diplomatic efforts, designed to strengthen Iraqi sovereignty while maintaining US policy goals (Jentleson, 2008:3–4; Dale, 2009:4–13; Forcina, 2009:2–4; Williams-Bridgers et al., 2009:16). The US military transition from operations under Operation Iraqi Freedom and the start of a new mission under the banner of Operation New Dawn, represented DoD efforts to live up to the tenets of the US–Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 and the president’s strategic vision of the Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq strategy (Dale, 2009:4–13, 132; Jentleson, 2008:3–4; Williams-Bridgers et al., 2009:16; Odierno, 2010, 97–99; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010:48–49).

US Military Objectives for OND

Goals (2009-Present)Operation New Dawn, which took effect on September 1, 2010, marked a dis-tinct change in the US mission in Iraq, specifically the reduced role of US troops in securing the country and the withdrawal of those forces from Iraq (Dale, 2009:25–27; St. Laurent et al., 2009:3–4; Odierno, 2010, 98–100; The White House, 2010). This strategy, which became Operation New Dawn, sought to systematically reduce the US military footprint through a calculated series of troops reduction (redeployment of troops and equipment) and base closing with-out degrading the military capabilities to response to a crisis within the country (Dale, 2009:25–27; Lubold and Arraf, 2009; St. Laurent et al., 2009:3–4).

Strategy ApplicationThe implementation of Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010, marked the official end to OIF and combat operations by US forces in Iraq (Mason,

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2011:10–11; Salazar-Torreon, 2011:7; Odierno, 2010:97–98). Operation New Dawn would “focus on conducting stability operations to achieve U.S. national goal of a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq” (Odierno, 2010:97–98). These operations include missions

to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment through counter-insurgency activities or establishing effective civil security and civil con-trol over the environment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a:2–3; U.S. Department of the Army, 2008c:208; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:I-9, IV-18, V-1 ). In addition stability operations refers to assisting in the establishment of essential governmental services, emergency infrastruc-ture reconstruction, and humanitarian relief where needed (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a:2–3; U.S. Department of the Army, 2008c:208; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:I-9, IV-18, V-1).

Overall, this new military mission signified the end of US combat operation and the transition of the remaining US military forces to an advice and assist mission with Iraq’s security forces, as well as supporting Iraqi troops conducting counterterrorism missions (Odierno, 2010: 97–98; The White House, 2010).

* * *

US Policy Objectives of OIF and OND

GoalsThroughout the war in Iraq, US policy objectives focused on helping Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its territorial integrity. Representative government in Iraq was impossible as long as the Hussein regime remained in power. Removal of the regime by military action was the primary means for facilitating the transition to representative rule (Spring, 2003:2).

Although the US military was not the lead for this effort, the military surge in 2007 included a revitalization of the civilian/military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (Odierno, 2010:99; Dale, 2009:132; Christoff, 2008d:4–5). PRTs were designed to help assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments’ capacity to develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern, while support-ing economic, political, and social development and respect for the rule of law (Odierno, 2010:99; Dale, 2009:127; Christoff, 2008d:4). As security conditions on the ground improved in 2007 and 2008, military units turned a greater share of their own attention to governance and economic activities (Dale, 2009:127; Christoff, 2008d:5).

APPENDIX 3

DoD Policy and Guidelines—Contingency Contracting

Year issued DoD guideline Purpose

April 2010 DoD Instruction(DoDI)No. 1100.22

“Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix”

“Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for determining the appropriate mix of manpower (military and DoD civilian) and private sector support.” “Provides manpower mix criteria and guidance for risk assessments to be used to identify and justify activities that are inherently governmental (IG); commercial (exempt from private sector performance); and commercial (subject to private sector performance).”

July2009

DoD Instruction(DoDI)No. 3020.50

“Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations”

“Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during contingency operations. It also assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC personnel.”

continued

162 Appendix 3

Year issued DoD guideline Purpose

March2009

DoD Directive(DoDD)No. 3020.49

“Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and its Operational Execution”

“Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for program management for the preparation and execution of acquisitions for contingency operations, and for the accountability, integration and management of all contractors supporting the DoD and all USG PSCs operating in an area of contingency operations.”

March 2008

Directive-Type Memorandums(DTM)08–009

“UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel and Other Persons Serving with or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations”

“Established general policies and procedures applicable to DoD and USCG contractor personnel and civilian employees subject to Article 2(a) (10), UCMJ, jurisdiction. In so doing, the Secretary of Defense premised those policies and procedures on the unique nature of the Article 2(a) (10) extension of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians and the Secretary’s assessment that this jurisdiction will require sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is exercised.”

December 2007

Memorandum of Agreement

“Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and Department of State on U.S.G. Private Security Contractors”

“To clearly define the authority and responsibility for the accountability and operations of USG Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly develop and implement core PSC standards.”

May2006

DoD Directive(DoDD)No. 2311.01E

“DoD Law of War Program”

“Update the policies and responsibilities ensuring DoD compliance with the law of war obligations of the United States . . . [and] . . . clarifies the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent for Investigation and Reporting of Reportable Incidents against U.S. personnel”

Appendix 3 163

Year issued DoD guideline Purpose

October 2005 DoD Instruction(DoDI)No. 3020.41

“Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces”

“Establishes and implements policy and guidance, assigns responsibilities, and serves as a comprehensive source of DoD policy and procedures concerning DoD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. This includes defense contractors and employees of defense contractors and their subcontractors at all tiers under DoD contracts, including third country national (TCN) and host nation (HN) personnel, who are authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces under such contracts.”

March 2005 DoD Instruction(DoDI)No. 5525.11

“Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members”

“Implements policies and procedures, and assigns responsibilities, under the ‘Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,’ as amended by Section 1088 of the ‘Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005’ . . . for exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over certain current and former members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and over civilians employed by or accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces outside the United States.”

Glossary

Given the complexity and uniqueness of this research, it is important to provide definitions of key terms that will help the reader under-stand the material presented. The following definitions, established

by military organizations, political bodies, and by legal statute, are used in order to eliminate the confusion of terms that can be taken to have different meanings depending on context.

Area of Combat Operations: An area of operations designated as such by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of this part, when enhanced coordination of Private Security Contractors working for US government agencies is required (US Government, 2011a: 49655; US Department of Defense, 2009b:12).

Area of Responsibility (AOR): “The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:GL-5).

Authorized Strength: “means the largest number of members authorized to be in an armed force, a component, a branch, a grade, or any other category of the armed forces” (US Congress, 2004:13).

Civil Augmentation Program (CAP): Standing, long-term contracts designed to augment service logistic capabilities with contract support in both preplanned and short-notice contingencies. Examples include US Army Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, US Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, and US Navy Construction Capabilities Contract. See also “contingency” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:88).

Civilian Employee: “An individual who works for a federal agency on an appointment without time limitation who is paid from appropriated funds, which includes working capital funds. A foreign national employee, temporary employee, term employee, non-appropriated fund employee, or uniformed per-sonnel are not included in this definition” (Office of Management and Budget, 2003:D2).

166 Glossary

Combat Arms: “. . . are military units and soldiers who close with the enemy and destroy enemy forces or provide firepower and destructive capabilities on the battlefield” (US Department of the Army, 2004:1–34).

Combat Functions: See Warfighting Functions.Combat Support (CS): “Support activities that directly enhance the Combat

Functions of a military force. This support increases the effectiveness of combat platforms by providing intelligence information, security, and communications functions, fire support and operational assistance to combat units” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:GL-5–GL-6).

Combat Service Support (CSS): “The essential capabilities, functions, activi-ties, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to, that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other ser-vices required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:GL-6).

US Army elements responsible for functions, activities, and tasks neces-sary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war (US Department of the Army, 2004:1–36).

Combatant Commanders: “Exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their commands and designate the appropriate level of command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders. The military departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain includes all military forces within the respective Services not spe-cifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007b:I-9).

“Non-transferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), U.S. Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and it is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employ-ing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional

Glossary 167

component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:GL-4).

Congressional Research Service (CRS): A research-based legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress. The Congressional Research Service’s mission is to provide Congress with research and analysis all current and emerg-ing issues of national policy. The Congressional Research Service works exclu-sively for the US Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate (Brudnick, 2008:1–2).

Contingency Contracting: “Contingency contracting is often performed in support of an operation in an overseas location. The contracting process fol-lows the policies and procedures outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulatory System. Contingency contracting may be an effective force multiplier for deployed forces in providing supplies, services, and construction support to augment organic capabilities” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b:I-15–4).

Contingency Contractors: “Defense contractors and employees of defense contractors and associated subcontractors, including U.S. citizens, U.S. legal aliens, TCNs, and citizens of HNs who are authorized to accompany U.S. mili-tary forces in contingency operations or other military operations, or exercises designated by the geographic Combatant Commander. This includes employees of external support, systems support, and theater support contractors. Such per-sonnel are provided with an appropriate identification card under the Geneva Conventions” (US Department of Defense, 2005a:24).

Contingency Operation: “means a military operation that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the U.S. or against an opposing military force” (US Department of Defense, 2009b:12; US Congress, 2004:12).

Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR): An individual designated and authorized in writing by the contracting officer to perform specific technical or administrative functions (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:56).

Contracted Civilian: (Synonymous with “DoD Contractor,” and “Defense Contractor”), this refers to “any individual, that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or construction. This term includes US nationals, local citizens, or third-country nationals (US Department of Defense, 2005a:25; US Department of Defense, 2003:9).

Contractor: “Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or construction. The term ‘DoD Contractor’ may include U.S. nationals, local citizens, or third-country

168 Glossary

nationals, but shall not include foreign governments or representatives of foreign governments that sell to the Department of Defense, a DoD Component, or foreign corporations owned wholly by foreign governments” (US Department of Defense, 2005a:25; US Department of Defense, 2003:9).

Defense Contractor: (A term used by the Department of Defense, synony-mous with the industry term of Private Military Companies.) “Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to fur-nish services, supplies, or construction. For purposes of this definition, foreign governments, representatives of foreign governments, or foreign corporations wholly owned by foreign governments that have entered into contracts with the Department of Defense are not Defense contractors” (US Department of Defense, 2005a:25).

“Defined a defense industry employee, is an individual employed by a private firm that is engaged in providing to the Department of Defense significant and substantial defense-related systems, products, or services” (US Congress, 2004:1699).

Defense Industry: Also referred to as Military–Industrial Complex, or Defense Contractors usually refers to a network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. This network, within a country, typically attempts to marshal political support for continued or increased military spending by the national government. US President Dwight Eisenhower first used the term Military–Industrial Complex (Guay, 2007:6–10; Summers, 2006:80–82).

Delivery Order (DO): An order for supplies placed against an established contract or with government sources (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:56).

Emergency-Essential (E-E): A position-based designation to support the success of combat operations or the availability of combat-essential systems in accordance with section 1580 of title 10, US Code (USC) (US Department of Defense, 2009f:19).

End-strength: “Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for(A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropri-

ated for active-duty personnel, and(B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty per-

sonnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel”

(US Congress, 2004:24–25)

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Essential Contractor Service: A service provided by a firm or an individual contract to the DoD to support vital systems or support activities considered of the utmost importance to the US mobilization and wartime mission where: DoD components may not have military or DoD civilian employees to perform these services and the effectiveness of the system or operations may be seri-ously impaired or interrupted if those services are not immediately available (US Department of Defense, 1990:7).

Executive Agent: A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary’s behalf. Designation as an executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the docu-ment designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions; however, an executive agent may be delegated authority, direction, and con-trol over specified resources for specified purposes (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:56).

Executive Agency: Instrumentality of the US government bound by the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Executive agencies include the executive departments, the military departments, any independent establishment, and any wholly owned government corporation within the meaning of title 31, US Code, Section 102 (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:57).

External Support Contract: Prearranged contingency contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency from service contracting authorities external to the operational area. The largest contracts of these types have been the ser-vices’ civilian/contract augmentation programs (US Department of Defense, 2005a:25).

External Support Contractor: External support contractors, working pursu-ant to contracts awarded under the command and procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater, provide support for deployed oper-ational forces. These may be US or third country businesses and vendors. These contracts are usually prearranged, but may be contracts awarded or modified during the mission based on the commanders’ needs. External support contrac-tor employees can include a mixture of US citizens, TCNs and citizens of HNs. Examples include the Army’s LOGCAP, the Air Force’s AFCAP, the Navy’s CONCAP, CRAF contracts, and war reserve materiel (WRM) contracts (US Department of Defense, 2005a:25).

Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR): The FAR apply to all acquisitions throughout the government. The FAR may be supplemented by various govern-ment agencies to further define the FAR’s agency-specific guidance (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:57).

Force Multiplier: A capability that, when added to and employed by a com-bat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus

170 Glossary

enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:142).

Force Multiplier effect: The effect produced by a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat poten-tial of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO): An abbreviated form of an operations order (OPORD) that is issued as needed after an OPORD to change or modify the OPORD or to execute a branch or sequel to the OPORD (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:57).

Global War on Terrorism: (synonymous with “war on global terrorism,” “war on terrorism,” “war on terror,” and “battle against international terrorism”). The “Global War on Terrorism” is the most often used term to represent US military and diplomat efforts to combat international terrorism (Record, 2003:1; Bush, 2001:3).

The Global War on Terrorism military efforts abroad began October 7, 2001, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) military campaign in Afghanistan. OEF included operations against terrorists operating in East Africa with the establishment of Combined Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) and the Philippines (the U.S. provided training in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism tactics) (Pickup et al., 2008a:9; Feickert, 2005:12–13, 15; Kapp, 2005:1; Bush, 2001:3).

The next phase of the U.S. military efforts abroad began in October 2002 with authorization to use U.S. military forces against Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Grimmett, 2007:8; Ackerman, 2003:19; Heisbourg, 2003:80–82; O’Hanlon et al., 2002:5, 8; Gaddis, 2002:56).

Host Country: “Also known as “Host Nation” (HN) A nation which permits, by either written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:245).

Host Nation (HN) Contract Employees: HN contractor employees are citizens of the host nation where military operations are occurring. They are normally employed via theater support contracts, but may be employed as sub-contractors to external support contracts (Wisniewski et al., 2003:4).

Host Nation Support: Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:248).

Glossary 171

Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, dis-rupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006:II-1–II-10).

Inherently Governmental: There are three main sources for definitions and guidance addressing inherently governmental function used for this study: the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR Act, Public Law 105–270), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) Number 1100.22.

FAIR Act: Inherently governmental functions are functions so “inti-mately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.” These function are “ones that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the mak-ing of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government, including judgments relating to monetary transactions and entitlements.” (US Congress, 1998:2384)

OMB Circular A-76: An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate perfor-mance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the government. Inherently governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements. (Office of Management and Budget, 2003:A2)

DoDI 1100.22: In general, a function is inherently governmental if it is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government personnel. Inherently governmental functions shall include, among other things, activities that require either the exercise of substantial discretion when applying Federal Government authority, or value judgments when making decisions for the Federal Government, including judgments relating to monetary transactions and entitlements. (US Department of Defense, 2010b:13)

Intelligence Operations: The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. Intelligence operations include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dis-semination and integration, and evaluation and feedback (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009:271).

172 Glossary

Low Density: Refers to units or personnel that are in high demand, since their unique capabilities/skills make them essential for a wide range of mili-tary operations. However, there are relative by few of these individuals or units, hence the rate and length of deployments are increased (Bruner, 2004:6).

Mercenary: “Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; [and] is moti-vated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compen-sation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party” (United Nations, 1977).

Military Department: “One of the Departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended: the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:341).

Military Personnel: “Officers [as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(b)(1)] and enlisted members [as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(b)(6)] of the military ser-vices (defined as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps)” (Office of Management and Budget, 2003:D-6).

Military Service: “The Military Services are the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard (when operating as a Military Service in the Navy)” (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:345).

Mission Essential Functions (MEFs): These are functions that are either specified or implied and are required to be performed under all circumstances to achieve DoD Component missions or responsibilities in a continuity threat or event. Failure to perform or sustain these functions would significantly affect the Department of Defense’s ability to provide vital services or exercise author-ity, direction, and control (US Department of Defense, 2009e:2).

Non-combat Functions: These functions have been associated with support missions such as logistics, transportation, and intelligence. These activities and their related functions fulfilling roles, supporting, rather than taking a direct part in the hostilities (Walker, 2003:11).

Outsourcing: Outsourcing is the practice of contracting for support from private firms while retaining responsibility for them within the organization. Similarly, both privatization and outsourcing are viewed as ways to cut costs and increase efficiency (Guay, 2007, 34–35; Markusen, 2003:471; Cameron, 2006:583; Holman et al., 1999:50–51).

Private Military Companies (PMCs): PMCs are private companies that spe-cialize in military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intel-ligence collection, operational support, logistics, training, procurement, and maintenance of arms and equipment. These companies are defined as compa-nies that trade in professional services linked to warfare. The industry is divided into three basic sectors of military provider firms (also known as “private secu-rity firms”), which offer tactical services: military assistance; military consulting

Glossary 173

firms, which employ retired officers to provide strategic advice and military training; and military support firms, which provide logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services to armed forces (Schreier and Caparini, 2005:36; Singer, 2003; Housen, 2002; Goddard, 2001; Howe, 1998).

Private Security Companies (PSCs): Private Security Companies usually provide armed protection, most often for other companies rather than states. This protection can be similar to private security guards common in Western nations, or more likely, a higher level of armed security capable of defending against attacks by guerrilla forces. Some of these companies have contracts guarding embassies and humanitarian operations. Usually the technique is for the company to provide a few managers with Western military backgrounds who then train scores or even hundreds of locals to make up the vast bulk of the work force. These companies do not undertake offensive military actions (Schreier and Caparini, 2005:36).

Private Security Contractors: During contingency operations, Private Security Contractors means a company employed by the DoD performing pri-vate security functions under a covered contract. In a designated area of combat operations, the term Private Security Contractors expands to include all com-panies employed by US government agencies performing private security func-tions under a covered contract (US Department of Defense, 2009b:12).

Private Security Functions: Activities engaged in by a contractor under a covered contract as follows:

(1) Guarding of personnel, facilities, designated sites, or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party.

(2) Any other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in the performance of their duties. For the DoD, DoDI Instruction 3020.41, “Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces,” prescribes policies related to personnel allowed to carry weapons for self-defense.

(US Department of Defense, 2011:225.3–2; US Department of Defense, 2009b:12).

Privatization: “A federal agency decision to change a government-owned and government-operated commercial activity or enterprise to private sector control and ownership. When privatizing, the agency eliminates associated assets and resources (work force for and funding of the requirement). Since there is no government ownership and control, no service contract or fee-for-service agree-ment exists between the agency and the private sector after an agency privatizes a commercial activity or enterprise. Moving work from agency performance with government personnel to private sector performance where the agency still funds the activity is not privatization” (Office of Management and Budget, 2003:D-8).

174 Glossary

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): “An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials” (US Department of the Army, 2004:1–176–1–177).

System Support Contract: System support contracts are prearranged con-tracts awarded by service acquisition program management offices that provide technical support, maintenance support, and, in some cases, Class IX support for selected military weapons and support systems (US Department of Defense, 2005a:26).

System Support Contractors: Contract personnel, normally with high levels of technical expertise, hired to support specific military systems. See also “exter-nal support contractors” and “theater support contractors” (US Department of Defense, 2005a:26).

Systems support contractors logistically support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts awarded by Service program managers or by Military Service component logistic commands. They provide essential support to specific systems throughout their system’s life cycle (including spare parts and maintenance) across the range of military operations. The systems that they support include but are not limited to key weapons systems, C2 infrastructure, and communications systems. System support contractor employees are primar-ily US citizens, but may in some cases may be TCNs. System support contractor employees normally live and work side-by-side with US military members and DoD civilians (US Department of the Army, 2003:5–35–5–37).

Supplemental Appropriation: Also known as “supplemental” funding, it “is the budget authority provided in an appropriations act in addition to regular or continuing appropriations already provided. Supplemental appropriations generally are made to cover emergencies, such as disaster relief, or other needs deemed too urgent to be postponed until the enactment of next year’s regular appropriations act” (US Senate, 2008a).

Theater Support Contract: A type of contingency contract that is awarded by a contracting officer deployed to the operational area and serving under the direct contracting authority of the service component, special operations force command, or designated joint chief of contracting for the designated contin-gency (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:59).

Contracts awarded within the contingency operation area to support deployed operational forces. Military contracting personnel with the deployed force, working under the contracting authority of the theater, component, or joint forces command contracting chief, normally award, and administer these

Glossary 175

contracts. Theater support contracts provide goods, services, and minor con-struction, usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Most of these contracts do not provide essential con-tractor services; however, there are exceptions such as fuel and transportation support (US Department of Defense, 2005a:26).

Theater Support Contractors: Theater support contractors support deployed operational forces pursuant to contracts arranged within the mission area. Military contracting personnel with the deployed force, working under the con-tracting authority of the theater, Service component, or JFC contracting chief, normally award and administer these contracts. Theater support contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Most theater support contracts do not provide mission essential support; however, there are exceptions to this rule such as fuel and transportation support. Theater support contractor employees are HN and TCN workers who normally do not reside in, but may work in, US military facilities and/or controlled areas (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a:555; US Department of Defense, 2005a:26).

Contract personnel hired in and operating in a specific operational area. See also, “external support contractors” and “systems support contractors” (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008:59).

Third Country National (TCN): “Is an individual who meets the following criteria.

(1) Is neither a citizen of the U.S. nor of the country to which assigned for duty.

(2) If employed, is eligible for return travel to the TCN’s home country or country from which recruited at U.S. Government expense.

(3) Is on a limited appointment for a specific period of time.(4) Encumbers a direct-hire, personal service agreement (PSA) or personal

service contract (PSC) FSN position covered under the local compensa-tion plan” (US Department of State, 2001:1).

Third Country National (TCN) Contract Employees: TCN contractor employ-ees are foreign nationals that come from a country other than the host nation. TCN contractor employees are primarily employed via external support con-tracts, but may be utilized in theater support contracts and, occasionally, even system support contracts (Wisniewski et al., 2003:4).

Uniform Code of Military Justice: This is a comprehensive federal statute enacted by Congress to establish procedures, policies, and penalties for the mili-tary justice system. President Truman signed the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) into law on May 5, 1950, as Public Law 81–506. The code supersedes the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard (when it was drafted, there were no

176 Glossary

separate articles governing the Air Force or Marine Corps). In reports compris-ing the legislative history of PL 81–506, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees define the purpose of the bill being reported as the unification, consolidation, revision, and codification of these existing statutes (The Library of Congress, 2003:1–3).

US Government Accountability Office (GAO): Known as the General Accounting Office from 1921 until July 7, 2004, this is an independent, non-partisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the “congressional watch-dog,” GAO investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. The GAO mission is to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the account-ability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. The GAO provides Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced (“About GAO,” GAO website, accessed March 2007).

US Armed Force: Also known as the Armed Forces of the United States, this is a term used to denote collectively all components of the US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard (US Congress, 2004:11).

Warfighting Functions: A warfighting function is a “group of tasks and sys-tems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise battle com-mand. The U.S. Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions.” They also parallel those of the US Marine Corps (US Department of the Army, 2001:4–3, GL-15).

Waste: “Waste involves the taxpayers in the aggregate not receiving reason-able value for money in connection with any government-funded activities due to an inappropriate act or omission by players with control over or access to government resources (e.g., executive, judicial or legislative branch employees; contractors; grantees; or other recipients)” (Walker, 2008:17).

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Currently there are several different labels being used to private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves (United Nations, 2008:6; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009:9). For the purpose of this book, the internally recognized term PMSCs is used to represent two distinct business models that are either directly or indirectly linked to warfare and range from logistical support and technical assistance—Private Military Companies (PMCs) or those that sell security as a commodity and Private Security Companies (PSCs) (Isenberg, 2006:7–8; Wulf, 2005:43–47; Schreier and Caparini, 2005:41–43; Singer, 2003:88–100).

2. “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) [is] the US-led coalition military operation in Iraq, [which] was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development” (Dale, 2009:i).

3. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was a US military mission, initiated in the fall of 2001, with the mission of toppling the Taliban regime and attacking the Al-Qaeda terrorist network hosted by the Taliban. OEF also included operations against ter-rorists in other countries, and training assistance to foreign militaries, which are conducting operations against terrorists (Feickert, 2007:1; Kapp, 2005:1). From 2001 to 2006, military operations under OEF were primarily focused on counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency operations (Ryan, 2009:10–12; Erdelatz, 2008:5–6; Towell et al., 2008:9–10; Daggett et al., 2008:14–15, 18–19; Elsea, 2007:13–14). In 2006, the operational focus of OEF was changed to include conducting integrated US–Afghan civilian–military missions as well as training the Afghan National Security Forces to be self-sufficient (Johnson, 2009:4–5; Katzman, 2008:24–27; Gansler et al., 2007:2, 21–24).

4. The 1990 Base Force review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Bartholomees, 2006:307–308; Kagan, 2006:22; Larson et al., 2001:83–84).

178 Notes

5. The term “end-strength” refers to the US congressionally authorized strength of a specified branch of the US military at the end of a given fiscal year (Congressional Research Service, 2004; Department of Defense, 1981).

6. Nonwarfighting functions have been associated with combat support type func-tions such as logistics, transportation, and intelligence (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001; Department of the Army, 2001; Department of the Navy, 1997).

7. Military–Industrial Complex usually refers to a network of individuals and institu-tions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. This net-work, within a country, typically attempts to marshal political support for continued or increased military spending by the national government. US President Dwight Eisenhower first used the term “Military–Industrial Complex” (Guay, 2007:6–10; Summers, 2006:80–82; Leander, 2005:19).

8. It was during the Vietnam War (1959–1975) that the nature of support to the warfighter meant employing large numbers of PMSCs to the battlefield, pro-viding military logistical capabilities, and supporting sophisticated equipment (Stewart, 2005:285–364; Camm and Greenfield, 2005:XV, 135). As argued by researcher Robert M. Friedman (2002) in “Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield: A Partnership with Commercial Industry or Recipe for Failure?” since the Vietnam War, the US military’s use of PMCs has steadily increased to the point “contractors [PMSCs] on the battlefield had become a major part of the United States Army’s logistical capabilities” (Friedman, 2002:3–5). This shift in doctrine and policy has come to represent the US Armed Forces’ increasing reliance upon the knowledge and skills of the workforce of American PMSCs (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006:5, 7; United States Department of Defense, 2006a:77–79; McGarvey, 2004:1; Woody, 2003:3–4).

9. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) of the United Kingdom (UK) has also contracted for commercial sector support under its “Contractors on Deployed Operations” (CONDO) policy and “public-private partnership” programs. Reflecting DoD trends, the MoD’s objective is to incorporate the private sector so firmly into the doctrine for deployed operations that planning staffs and their commanders will take it for granted that their task force will include a contract support element (Uttley, 2005:1). Between 1980 and 1997, the MoD gradually extended the scale and scope of competitive tendering and private sector involvement in non-deployed defense support under successive Conservative administrations (Uttley, 2005:4). In 1983, the MoD introduced a new competitive procurement policy, embracing competition for equipment and for support services. Some concerns were registered about the implications of contracting services during war or the transition to war and the impact of the policy on Service morale. By 1997, the results of outsourcing policies under the Conservative administrations were that £2.2 billion, or approxi-mately 25 percent of the defense support budget, was market tested, and the MoD realized significant efficiency savings (Uttley, 2005:5; Hartley, 2002:1).

10. “Manning the force” is a human resource core competency. The objective of the manning the force strategy is to ensure that the right people with the right skills are in the right places to fully capitalize on their warfighting expertise. Properly man-ning units is vital to assuring the fulfillment of missions as a strategic element of national policy; it enhances predictability and ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform assigned tasks (Department of the Army, 2010:3–1).

Notes 179

11. In this context, the term “expeditionary approach” refers to the military concept of developing military forces capable of deploying “worldwide into any area of opera-tions and conduct operations upon arrival” as well as have the “ability to conduct sus-tained operations for as long as necessary” (US Department of the Army, 2012:1–7). From the logistics perspective, the “expeditionary approach” means that deployed forces will be constrained by decreased time, vast distances, and limited resources, requiring a logistics system that capitalizes on service interdependencies. Logistic support in this environment must be “operationally linked to maneuver [forces] in order to produce desired operational outcomes” (Brownlee and Shoomaker, 2004:22). These new standards will require an increased logistic capability, neces-sitating a “distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations, one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements” (Brownlee and Shoomaker, 2004:22).

12. The US military operations in the Bosnia, Joint Endeavour (1995–1996); Joint Guard (1996–1998); and Joint Forge (1998–2004) operation relied on America PMCs to not only provided logistical support, but also to provide security service, civil/military planning services, and training to local civilian and military forces (Cancian, 2008:66; Blizzard, 2004:5; Terry, 2003:10). In an attempt to control contingency operations cost in Bosnia, the Department of Defence, initiated the Balkans Support Contract (BSC), which lasted from 1995 to 1997 (Camm and Greenfield, 2005:137–138; Kidwell, 2005:18; Howard et al., 1997:2–3). The Balkans Support Contract required KBR to manage all contractual arrangement with subcontracts or local hires for logis-tics and engineering services related to contingency operations (Kidwell, 2005:18; Croft, 2004:33; Sternlieb et al., 2004:28–29; Bianco et al., 2003:7; Cahlink, 2002:43). During this contract period, KBR managed 49 separate sub-contracting companies, while employing between 5,000 and 20,000 U.S. and local nationals personnel to sup-port 20,000 peacekeeping soldiers (Bailey-Grasso, 2008:2–3; Terry, 2003:10).

In January 1997, DynCorp to over the functions of providing logistical and service support to U.S. force deployed to the Balkans (Bailey-Grasso, 2008:2–3; McCallum, 2007:26). DynCorp was also hired by the U.S. Department of State to provide monitors, in support of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer and the Kosovo Verification Missions (Stanger and Williams, 2004:9–10). This DynCorp contract transitioned into DynCorp being hired to provide trainers and advisors of U.S.-backed international civilian police (CIVPOL) program (Stanger and Williams, 2004:9–10). By June 1999, the KBR regain full control of all logistical, mainte-nance and construction projects designed to support the U.S. forces in Kosovo (Terry, 2003:11–12; Woody, 2003:8–9).

13. PSCs perform functions such as guarding personnel, facilities, designated sites, or property; this can include operations in complex emergencies and similar environ-ments (US Government, 2012:1).

14. Academi was formerly known as Blackwater USA from 1997 to 2007, Blackwater Worldwide from 2007 to 2009, and Xe Services LLC from 2009 until 2011 (Hodge, 2011).

15. PMCs perform functions in support of the military such as logistical support unique to armed forces, maintenance, and operation of weapons systems, or military train-ing (US Government, 2012:1).

180 Notes

16. Winning Hearts and Minds:British model of counterinsurgency: “Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer’s phrase ‘hearts and minds’ has been used to describe the British approach to counter-insurgency.” “This approach emphasizes ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people by using less coercive tactics against insurgents and thereby securing the support of the people. It is usually contrasted with the use of more violent, con-ventional warfare tactics which deploys overwhelming force and is more willing to accept civilian casualties” (Dixon, 2009:354).US model of counterinsurgency: In the US model of the hearts-and-minds maxim, “the phrase ‘hearts and minds,’ . . . comprises [of] two separate compo-nents. ‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless (US Department of the Army, 2006b:A-5). The application of these components is an intended to, in the words of Lieutenant Colonel Karl E. Nell “subjugate[e] the total person by appealing both to the emotions with a positive end-state vision of the future and to the intellect by presenting decisions of immediate consequence and rational self-import” (Nell, 2012:33).

Application in Iraq: The US military version of the hearts-and-minds maxim centered on the application of the “Petraeus Doctrine.” This doctrine had the three objectives of the COIN: creating a secure physical and psychologi-cal environment; establishing firm government control of the population and the terrain; and gaining the support of the population (Forces Employment Doctrine Center, 2012:69–70). “The major tasks . . . consist . . . of bringing about permanent security, ending the insurgent presence, reinforcing ‘politi-cal primacy,’ restoring order by enforcement of the law, and reconstructing the institutions of the host nation, also known as ‘nation building.’ The coun-terinsurgent must take advantage of all opportunities to satisfy the expecta-tions and the basic needs of the population and ensure that their efforts are widely noticed” (Forces Employment Doctrine Center, 2012:70).Application in Afghanistan: The US military hearts-and-minds initiatives center on a “population-centric COIN strategy focused on isolating the insurgents from the Pashto population in the South and East of Afghanistan and on rebuilding the social fabric of communities down to the district level. This strategy also sought to fight corruption and graft at various levels of the administration, and to prevent intimidation and violence by the warlords who undermine the government in Kabul and destabilize certain areas, making them ideal for the Taliban to flourish. It reasserted the priority of better mili-tary and police training for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to prepare them to assume greater operational responsibility in the field” (Forces Employment Doctrine Center, 2012:75).

2 The Impact of the Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Companies on US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

1. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is authorized under §636 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87–195) to contract for personal

Notes 181

services (US Congress, 1961:376–381). The FAR (Part 2.101) defines personal ser-vices contracts as contracts that, by their express terms or as administered, make the contractor personnel appear to be, in effect, government employees (Hutton et al., 2008:34).

2. Northern Alliance: “The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition into a broader Northern Alliance” also known as the United Front (Katzman, 2010:6; International Crisis Group, 2005:2). After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “the United States, several allies, and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe haven to Al-Qaeda terrorists (Williams-Bridgers et al, 2007:10). The Northern Alliance agreed to help coordi-nate US military attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan (Clark, 2010:79). The Northern Alliance force numbered around 50 thousand, and the organization was the largest US-backed militia supporting US operations in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance “became the key player in shaping the Afghan military, with international support and acquiescence, under Defense Minister and Panjshiri loyalist Mohammed Qasim Fahim” (International Crisis Group, 2010:5).

3 Analysis of the Effects of Private Security Companies on US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

1. “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” and “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq” (Bush, 2008b; Bush 2008c).

2. “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” and “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq” (Bush, 2008b; Bush 2008c).

3. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Johnson et al., 2009:29; Johnson et al., 2008b:10–11; Katzman, 2008:33; Williams-Bridgers et al., 2007:16; Nawa, 2006:2–4).

4 The Impact of the Department of Defense’s Use of Private Military Companies on US Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan

1. Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) is a leading defense contractor providing strategy and technology-consulting activities in support of the Department of Defense. BAH services include strategic planning, communications, operational improve-ment, information technology work, systems engineering, program manage-ment, and economic business analysis. For the DoD, BAH is known to provide

182 Notes

subject matter experts (SME) to the US Intelligence Community (IC), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and to multiple US Combatant Commands. BAH to the IC is represented by strategic planning, intelligence management and analysis, information sharing, training, counterintelligence, and other mission sup-port (Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 2009; Snidow et al., 2008: 3; Mattera, 2008:1).

2. Marney Mason served as an interrogator for the US Army from March 1973 until retiring in September 1991. After his retirement, he served as a consultant on intel-ligence-gathering activities. As a consultant, he worked for Premier Technology Group, a company acquired by CACI (Saleh et al., vs. L3-Titan et al., 2004:5).

3. Major General (MG) George R. Fay was appointed by Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), as investigating officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 381–10, Procedure 15. MG Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Specifically, MG Fay was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations (Fay, 2004:i).

4. This “cost savings” is based on the difference between the monthly average salary range of $500 to $700 (average annual salary of $6000 to $8400) paid to non-American drivers and the minimum yearly salary of $80,000 paid to American drivers (Spinner, 2005:1; Miller, 2004:2; Borenstein, 2004:2; Etheridge, 2004:2; Reuters News Service, 2004:1).

5. An ancient practice, known as “bacha bazi” (literal translation: “boy for play”). This illegal practice, in Afghanistan, has exploited orphans and poor boys, some as young as 11, whose parents are paid to give over their sons to their new “masters.” The men dress the boys in women’s clothes and train them to sing and dance for the entertainment of themselves and their friends. According to experts, these men used the dancing boys sexually (Doran et al., 2010).

5 Analysis of the Effects of Private Military Companies on US Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan

1. The Dai’rat at-Mukhabarat al-Amma (General Intelligence Directorate [DGI] or Iraqi Intelligence Service [IIS] or Mukhabarat) was established in 1973; in 1984, the organization was renamed the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), but is most com-monly known as the Mukhabarat (Cordesman, 2003:20; Central Intelligence Agency, 1985:2, 7). The Mukhabarat was responsible for counter subversion over all political security and foreign intelligence collection (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985:5). As a security apparatus for Saddam Hussein, the Mukhabarat was used to control the Ba’ath Party; monitor other governmental organizations, foreign embas-sies; and infiltrate Iraqi opposition groups and investigate, imprison, interrogate, and execute disloyal Iraqis (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985:5, 7; Cordesman, 2003:20–23).

Notes 183

6 Conclusion

1. During the initial build-up to the invasion of Iraq, the US military had only 24 contract management personnel, all operating independently, but responsible for ensuring that the over 120 thousand military personnel in Iraq received needed supplies (D’Angelo et al., 2008:43). This lack of organization among military con-tracting officers further exacerbated the lack of unity of the contracting effort with regard to the management of PMCs throughout Iraq (D’Angelo et al., 2008:43; Lofgren, 2007:12–13; Peltz et al., 2005:20–23, 25). Since 2003, multiple investiga-tions into and studies on the DoD’s handling of PMSCs have identified that lack of trained contract management personnel is a major shortfall in DoD’s oversight efforts (Potter, 2009:2; Bailey Grasso, 2008:5–6, 12–15; Pickup et al., 2005: 6; Stanger and Williams, 2004: 13–16). Based on these investigations and studies, the Department has sought to strengthen its overall oversight capability (D’Angelo et al., 2008:40; Noble, 2006:3; Sternlieb et al., 2004:50–51). With the modification of the responsibilities of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in 2005, the DoD created an office with the responsi-bility to establish and publish policies and procedures governing the operations of the DoD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense contractors (US Department of Defense, 2009c:4; Solis et al., 2008b:14; Bailey-Grasso, 2007:3). By 2007, DoD initiated plans to improve the quality of the contract management by growing its contracting and oversight workforce (Schwartz, 2009:18; Solis et al., 2009:5; Frisk and Trunkey, 2008:19). This new workforce would be used to mitigate the imbalance created by significant outsourcing of acquisition functions. In DoD’s estimate, the development of such a workforce will improve DoD’s oversight capabil-ity and help to identify waste early, and more aggressively combat contract fraud.

2. “Nextgov is the all-day information resource for federal technology decision mak-ers. Through news, analysis, and insights from our award-winning journalists and a nationwide community of expert voices, Nextgov provides the first word on tech-nology and government. Nextgov’s editorial mission is to lead the national discus-sion about how technology and innovation are transforming the way government agencies serve citizens and perform vital functions. Central to this mission is the exploration of emerging technologies and their potential impact on government. Nextgov contributors include influential thinkers across government, academia and the private sector providing fresh and provocative insights on key federal IT topics. Nextgov is produced by Government Executive Media Group, the most trusted information resource serving senior decision makers in government” (Nextgov, http://www.nextgov.com/about/).

3. In February 2003, nearly 4 years before a joint documents was issued, the US Air Force published “Contingency Contracting: A Handbook for the Air Force CCO,” a Contingency Contracting handbook to provide Air Force contingency contracting officer, with a guide to help you meet the needs of those you are supporting and your needs, which are crucial to your success and that of the overall mission.

4. Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316; Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516.

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Abu Ghraib, 81, 83, 86–7, 89–90, 105–6, 112–17, 127, 132–3, 141, 145

abuse scandal, 128–30, 138abuses, 12, 19, 86, 89, 101, 104, 106,

109–10, 113–17, 123, 125, 127, 130, 138, 140

ACA, 108. See also Army Contracting Agency

Academi, 2, 9, 15, 23, 25–7, 29–34, 37, 41, 44–6, 48–9, 51–8, 66–8, 70–1, 74, 136

convoy, 28, 32, 67, 71employees, 25–6, 28, 31–4, 44,

51, 53–4, 67–8, 71, 74personnel, 27, 32, 45, 52, 71security, 27, 35shootings in Iraq, 52

Academi’sactions, 34, 57, 59attitude of ignoring Iraqi law, 32effect on US military activities, 55

accountability, 12, 37, 46–8, 56, 58–9, 76, 129, 140, 161–2

legal, 33–4, 145–oversight, 51–2regiment, 66system, 46, 89

Afghangovernment, 21, 39, 42–3, 45, 60–4,

68, 73, 153

National Army (ANA), 36, 64, 152–3, 181

National Police (ANP), 64, 122, 152–3, 181

National Security Forces (ANSF), 60–1, 63–4, 69, 72–3, 103, 122, 127, 131, 152–3, 180–1

Security Forces, 43, 45–6, 61–3warlords, 38, 42, 59–60, 68

Afghan and Iraqi security forces, 8, 22Afghanistan, 1–2, 7–9, 13–15, 18–24,

33–6, 38–44, 59–62, 64–6, 68–70, 98–9, 101–4, 121–4, 136, 151–2

eastern, 69, 73rebuild, 18, 96, 151southern, 153western, 36, 60, 103–4

Afghanistan contracts, 103Afghanistan’s

Ministry, 64–5Northern Alliance, 42, 181security forces, 105, 154

agreements, 31, 48, 57, 59, 162allegations, 42, 98, 100–3, 106, 117,

121, 123, 138ambush, 26–7, 95ANA, 36, 64, 152–3. See also

Afghan National ArmyAnbar province, 27–9, 44, 54,

67, 71, 88

Index

222 Index

ANP, 64, 122, 152–3, 181. See also Afghan National Police

ANSF, 60–1, 63–4, 69, 72–3, 103, 122, 127, 131, 152–3. See.also Afghan National Security Forces

armed contracted civilians, 19–20, 33–4

armed forces, 4, 141–2, 163ArmorGroup (also ArmorGroup

North America Inc), 8, 22–3, 35–40, 45–6, 49, 51, 59–64, 66, 69–70, 73, 136, 141

activities, 40contracted security, 38hiring practices, 59, 61

Army Contracting Agency (ACA), 108

BAH, 85. See also Booz Allen Hamilton

Balkans, 4, 6, 90Balkans Support Contract (BSC), 90battlefield capabilities, 51–2, 112Blackwater Security Consulting, 26, 30Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), 85BSC, 90. See also Balkans Support

ContractBTG, 86, 88Bush, 5, 17, 155

Administration, 154–5, 157business model, 37, 43

CACI International Inc (also CACI and CACI International ), 1–2, 81–90, 105, 107, 112–13, 116–17, 128–30, 132–3, 138, 141

capacity-building efforts, 7, 44, 52–3, 98–9, 112, 121, 124, 127, 133, 138–9, 147

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 32, 57

Combat Service Support (CSS), 47Command and Control of Contractors

in Iraq, 137Commission on Wartime Contracting,

25, 101, 103, 123, 133

Contingencycontracting, 144, 161operations, 2–3, 48, 76, 80,

100, 106, 118, 146contract management, 51–2, 76,

105–6, 119–20, 144personnel, trained, 144policies, 74, 144, 149structure, 116–17

contract obligations, 69, 74, 106, 109contracted civilians, 3–5, 7, 11–12,

14, 20, 22, 25, 34, 46–7, 49, 59, 78–80, 96, 116–17, 128

contracting, 8contracting officer, 65contractor personnel, 7, 48, 106, 108, 145contractor service, 140contractors, 4, 11, 27, 32, 57, 64, 74,

106, 125, 137contracts

covered, 161lucrative, 40, 87–8, 91, 98–9multiple, 99, 122–4

Control Risk Group (CRG), 27convoys, 10–11, 25, 27, 32, 35, 91–3, 96costs, 12, 21, 37, 41, 80, 91–3, 100,

121, 124–5, 130, 132counterinsurgency, 77, 152counterinsurgency operations, 158CPA, 32, 57. See also Coalition

Provisional AuthorityCRG, 27. See also Control Risk GroupCSS, 47. See also Combat

Service Support

DCAA, 6–7, 78, 99–100, 103, 124–5, 127, 130, 143. See also Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCMA, 93, 100, 125. See also Defense Contract Management Agency

deaths, 26–7, 30–1, 33, 44–5, 52–3, 55–6, 67, 71, 74, 92, 95–6

Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), 6–7, 78, 99–100, 103, 124–5, 127, 130, 143

Index 223

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), 93, 100, 125

defense contractors, 7, 163, 181deployed forces, 4, 6–7, 11, 104,

111–12, 132–3detainee debriefings, 107, 109detainees, 87, 89–90, 105–7, 109,

127, 130, 138, 145DoD Contractor Personnel, 48, 162–3DoD’s failure, 70, 143–4, 147, 149DoD’s use

of PMCs, 52, 77, 79–81, 83, 112of PMSCs, 6, 7, 13, 16, 51,

135, 146–8DoS (Department of State), 2, 6–7, 9,

17, 19, 21, 23–4, 30–1, 34–5, 39, 47–8, 58, 70, 98, 136–7

DoS officials in Iraq, 30–1DynCorp (also DynCorp

International), 1, 9, 41, 82, 98–105, 110, 112, 121–8, 130–3, 138–9

DynCorp employees of, 112, 122–3, 127, 131

DynCorp’scontracts in Afghanistan, 98failure, 98, 121, 123mismanagement, 130–1

ECC, 36. See also Environmental Chemical Corporation

Contract, 38Effects of Private Military Companies

on US Efforts, 111Effects of Private Security Companies

on US Operations, 51employees, 12, 15, 22–4, 33–5, 66–7,

79, 81, 83–4, 86–7, 96–7, 100–1, 112–13, 127–9, 131–3, 149

of CACI, 105, 112, 129–30federal, 9, 19, 75, 141, 147

environment, 13, 18, 24, 32, 35–7, 59–60, 63, 65, 69–70, 89–90, 126–7, 135, 143–4, 159

operating, 19, 70, 99–100

Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC), 36

EOD Technology, 8, 22ESS. See Eurest Support ServicesEurest Support Services (ESS), 25–6expeditionary approach, 5–6

failure, 4, 13–15, 24, 33, 37, 45–6, 53–4, 56, 60–1, 89–91, 94–5, 124, 126–7, 132, 138–9

Fallujah, 25, 27, 29, 44–5, 53–6, 58, 67, 71, 136

city of, 24–5, 28, 30, 52, 67–8, 72financial support, 36, 60, 68First Battle of Fallujah, 25, 28, 31,

44, 54–5, 70–1, 88fuel, 91, 94–5, 97, 105, 117, 126,

129, 132functions, 1, 5, 8, 11, 66, 75, 79–80,

83–4, 132, 139, 141, 147

GIRoA. See Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GoI. See Government of Iraqgoods, 81, 91–2, 101, 103government

contracts, 91, 100, 134control, 46, 60, 63, 69

Government of Iraq (GoI), 45, 139, 157Government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan (GIRoA), 23, 101, 123, 131, 139

governmental functions, 75, 140–1, 171

guards, 22, 37–9, 42, 60, 63, 65, 102guidance, 36, 65, 74, 76, 111, 144,

147, 149, 161

Herat province, 38, 59–61HN. See host nationhost nation (HN), 47, 66, 142, 163

IEDs. See improvised explosive devicesIG. See inherently governmentalIGC. See Iraqi Governing Council

224 Index

ignoring Iraqi law, 32, 57IIS. See Iraqi Intelligence Serviceimprovised explosive devices

(IEDs), 95, 153incidents, 28, 31, 35, 49, 52–3, 62, 66,

70, 103, 112, 127, 139, 145, 161inherently governmental (IG), 66, 75,

113, 132, 138–41, 148, 161insurgents, 18, 25, 28, 30, 45, 53, 55,

60, 95, 114–15, 129intelligence

functions, 114, 132operations, 133

interrogation activities, 88, 107, 116–17interrogations, 83, 86–7, 89–90, 105,

109, 115, 127, 129, 138interrogators, 1, 81, 83, 86, 88, 109, 115invasion of Iraq, 91Iraq

campaign, 90Contractors, 194government signing, 57, 59military campaign, 96

Iraq war, 27Iraqi

citizens, 31–3, 56–7civilians, 31, 33–4, 44, 56, 74detainees, 83, 127, 129government, 31–4, 54–5, 57–8,

68, 72, 74, 87government’s failure, 68laws, 32, 47military, 24mission, 18populations, 68, 74prisoners, 83, 87, 113, 116–17,

129–30regime, 156security, 45sovereignty, 18, 33, 57, 68, 74, 156

Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), 29Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), 182Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 8, 18, 22,

28, 156–7Iraq’s fledgling government, 29, 113

Iraq’s security forces, 30, 54, 159ISF. See Iraqi Security Forces

jurisdictioncivil and criminal, 57, 68, 74

KBR. See Kellogg, Brown and RootKBR’s failures, 119–20, 129Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR),

1–2, 10, 15, 82, 89–97, 99, 102, 105, 109, 112, 117–20, 123, 126, 128–9, 132–3

Law and Military Operations, 25–6, 28, 30, 67, 71, 115

Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 115, 145

LBGI. See Louis Berger Group Inc.legal status, 66, 128, 145LOAC. See Laws of Armed Conflictlocal nationals, 37, 79local warlords, 38, 40, 43, 46, 60, 62,

65, 69, 72LOGCAP. See Logistics Civil

Augmentation Programlogistical

services, 104–5, 120, 128–9, 132, 139

supplies, 96–7, 120, 129, 137support, 7, 9, 15, 19, 25–6, 93, 99,

102, 105, 109, 120, 132, 148, 179Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

(LOGCAP), 90, 102, 109contract, 91–2, 99, 102, 117, 119, 123IV contract, 98–9, 101–3, 122

Louis Berger Group Inc. (LBGI), 39

management, ineffective, 93–4, 105, 118

management structure, effective contract, 116, 118, 147

mercenaries, 13, 33, 67military

capabilities, 10–11, 14, 132, 142, 147, 152, 158

Index 225

commanders, 8, 22, 25, 42, 46, 49, 75, 82, 137–8, 144, 148

forces, 25, 75, 98, 128, 133, 179leaders, 10, 31, 81–2, 144, 146

mentoring Iraqi, 156leadership, lax, 116–17objectives, 6, 29, 52–3, 71, 73, 113,

120, 129–30, 152, 157operations, 2, 5–6, 17, 25–6, 28–30,

52, 54, 66–7, 71, 78, 119–21, 129–30, 146–8

personnel, 2, 8, 22, 44, 80, 83, 96, 127, 141–3

stability operations, 30, 33, 38, 42, 57–8, 61–2, 64

supplies, 93–4, 119, 138military leadership, lax, 116–17militia commanders, 43, 45, 63–4, 72militias, 39, 41–3, 62–4, 68, 72, 136mismanagement, 44, 94, 109, 121, 123multiplier, 3, 9, 14, 55–6, 70, 79, 82,

125, 138

National Defense Strategy (NDS), 5–6National Military Strategy (NMS), 5–6National Security Strategy of the United

States of America (NSS), 5–6National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 155NDS. See National Defense Strategynegative impact, 27, 57, 61, 72–4, 102,

129–31Nisoor Square, 30–5, 48, 52, 56–8,

66–8, 74NMS. See National Military StrategyNSS. See National Security Strategy of

the United States of America

Obama Administration, 151, 153–4, 156, 158

Odierno, 158–9OEF. See Operation Enduring FreedomOIF. See Operation Iraqi FreedomOMB. See Office of Management and

BudgetOND. See Operation New Dawn

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 1, 5–6, 18, 135, 151

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 1, 5–6, 90, 135, 155–8

Operation New Dawn (OND), 155, 158–9

perception, 11, 15–16, 25, 32, 47, 57, 77–8, 81, 97, 113–14, 136–8, 141

personnelsupport US military intelligence, 83

PMCs. See Private Military CompaniesPMSCs. See Private Military and

Security CompaniesPolicy/capacity-building objectives,

71–4, 130–1political

efforts, 27, 33–4, 38, 42, 45, 59, 61–4, 87

leaders, 19, 45, 52–3, 55–6, 67, 71, 148

population security, 154, 157powerbrokers, 39, 59–60, 62–3Premier Technology Group (PTG),

85, 88Private Military and Security

Companies (PMSCs), 1–7, 9, 11–14, 16–17, 23, 26, 46–7, 51, 70, 75–6, 98, 111, 135–6, 140–50

commitment of, 4, 14effectiveness of, 142, 147employees of, 47, 59, 135, 141,

143–5employment of, 4–5, 12questionable activities of, 13, 16services of, 7, 13, 148

Private Military Companies (PMCs), 1–2, 9–12, 14–16, 18–19, 24–6, 77–84, 86–8, 96–8, 102–7, 109–21, 123–9, 131–4, 137–9

employees of, 10, 78, 82, 97, 106, 109–10, 112–13, 115, 138

private sector, 3–4, 81, 88, 113, 115, 137–8, 141, 143, 147

226 Index

Private Security Companies (PSCs ), 2, 8–9, 14–15, 18–19, 21–7, 30–41, 43–9, 51–2, 55–9, 61–2, 64–72, 74–7, 136–7, 179–81

employees of, 19, 23, 25, 32, 49, 52, 57, 74

services of, 8–9, 59, 102Private Security Contractors, 48, 76,

161–2privatization, 11, 14Provincial Reconstruction Team

(PRTs), 159PRTs. See Provincial Reconstruction

TeamPSCs. See Private Security CompaniesPSCs

in Iraq and Afghanistan, 9, 23–4, 44, 52, 66

operating in Afghanistan, 34, 39, 68operating in Iraq, 30, 33, 35,

57–8, 62on US Military Goals and Policy

Objectives, 67PTG. See Premier Technology Group

QDR. See Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 81Questionable Activities/Actions of

Private Military Companies, 82, 96

Questionable Activities/Actions of Private Security Companies, 25, 34

Reconstruction Security Support Services (RSSS), 8–9

region, 44, 87, 89, 114, 116, 126, 156relationship, 3–4, 13, 29, 33, 36, 40,

42, 59–60, 104, 128, 132–3, 138, 140, 143, 146

reputation, 32, 40–1, 57, 89–90, 99, 101, 106, 118

responsibilities, 18, 48–9, 91, 104, 108, 116, 133, 141, 149, 156

contracted, 96–7

risk, 15, 19, 29, 62–3, 72, 74, 99, 110, 120, 122, 126, 132–3, 140, 143–4, 147

potential security, 45RSSS, 8–9. See also Reconstruction

Security Support Services

Sabre International Security, 8, 22salaries, 41, 63Second Battle of Fallujah, 54–5security

companies, 2, 9, 16, 23, 135contracts, 8, 22, 37, 41–2, 98convoy, 1, 8, 22, 25, 75environment, 17–18, 32, 34, 44,

67–9, 71–2, 110, 136functions, performing private, 161, 173security forces

acquired, 40, 62–3growing Iraqi, 157

services, 7, 21, 26, 38–40, 60, 62, 75, 141

support, 20–1senior military commanders in Iraq, 28senior military leaders, 47, 49, 88–9service contracts, 98–9, 146, 173services, 7–8, 10, 18–19, 27–8, 38,

78–9, 81, 91, 100–1, 103–5, 118, 123–4, 142

SOFA, 39. See also Status of Forces Agreement

SOW, 87. See also Statement of WorkSpecial Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction, 99, 102–4, 123, 125, 127, 130, 154

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), 8, 19–22, 32–3, 35, 119, 128, 158

Statement of Work (SOW), 87Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 39strategy, 3, 6, 12, 17, 22, 37, 80, 151,

154–5, 157–8subcontractors, 36, 40, 93, 101–2, 163support apparatus, internal US

military, 80

Index 227

Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 78, 80TCNs, 8, 20, 22, 37, 47, 92. See also

Third Country Nationalsterrorists, 17, 78, 87, 115Theater Transportation Mission

(TTM), 89, 91, 117, 129Theater Wide Internal Security

Services (TWISS), 8–9Third Country National, 20, 175.

See also TCNstorture, 113–14, 138Triple Canopy, 8–9, 22–3troops, 5–6, 8, 17, 23, 25, 34, 42,

67, 71, 75, 78, 93–4, 105, 118, 141–2

trucks, 26, 93, 95TTM, 89, 91, 117, 129. See also Theater

Transportation MissionTTM contract, 93–5, 117–19, 126TWISS, 8–9. See also Theater Wide

Internal Security ServicesTWISS security contracts in Iraq, 8

UCMJ, 48, 162. See also Uniform Code of Military Justice

UNAMA, 21. See also United Nations Assistance Mission of Afghanistan

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 48, 162

United Nations Assistance Mission of Afghanistan (UNAMA), 21

United States Protection and Investigations (USPI), 2, 8, 22, 35, 39–43, 45–6, 51, 59, 62, 64–5, 68–70, 72, 136, 141

US Afghanistan policy, 153–4US Army contracts, 88US Army interrogation services

in Iraq, 85US capacity-building efforts, 45–6, 55,

61, 64, 70, 110, 121–2, 136US counterinsurgency operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan, 81US counterterrorism, 98–9

US government’sefforts, 59, 63, 145–6task to DynCorp, 98

US militaryability, 82, 116, 138activities, 38, 42, 61, 64, 103, 106,

114, 124, 146bases, 38capabilities, 4, 12–15, 24–5, 36, 82,

98, 111, 135commanders, 12, 25, 53community-building

activities, 129contract, 92doctrine, 116effort in Iraq, 24, 82, 89efforts, 57, 77, 83, 105, 141, 153footprint, 142, 158forces, 7, 25, 80, 112, 159

US military intelligenceactivities, 113gathering operations in Iraq,

87, 117operations, 138services, 85

US military linguist services, 88US military mission, 24, 49,

128, 136in Afghanistan, 97

US Military Objectives, 152in Afghanistan, 64in Iraq, 89, 155in OIF, 156for OND, 158

US military operations, 2, 11–15, 22, 26–7, 29, 43–4, 51, 54–5, 67, 72, 80, 82, 90, 95–6, 135–9

in Afghanistan, 136in Fallujah, 29, 54, 71in Iraq, 27, 31, 94, 118, 120,

130, 155in Iraq and Afghanistan, 1,

11, 15, 51, 80, 112, 142US military planners, 10US military planning, 148

228 Index

US military policies, 111US military privatization

efforts, 14US military reactions, 117

to ArmorGroup’s activities, 63to DynCorp’s logistics

operations, 125to KBR’s logistics operations,

120US mission in Iraq, 31, 89–90, 113,

133, 158US mission/policy in Iraq and

Afghanistan, 15US policy

efforts in Afghanistan, 5, 14in Iraq and Afghanistan, 80objectives in Iraq, 87, 116

US–Iraq Security Agreement, 158US–Iraq SOFA, 47

USPI, 2, 8, 22, 35, 39–43, 45–6, 51, 59, 62, 64–5, 68–70, 72, 136, 141. See also United States Protection and Investigations

vehicles, armored, 26–7vetting, 63–5, 69, 73Vietnam War, 3–4vulnerabilities, 70, 140, 147

warlords, 36–7, 41–2, 45–6, 59–65, 68–9, 72–4, 154

weapons, 25, 41workforce, 11, 41, 60, 115, 127, 131, 142Worldwide Personal Protective Services

(WPPS), 9, 98WPPS, 9, 98. See also Worldwide

Personal Protective ServicesWPPS contracts, 9