U.S. Marines in Vietnam

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distributionis unlimited. PCN 19000306400

u.s. MARINES IN VIETNAMTHE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA

1954-1964

by

Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1977

Library of Congress Card No. 76—600051

PCN 190 003064 00

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)

Stock Number 008—055—00094—7

Foreword

This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by theMarine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corpsinvolvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relativelyobscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history—the activities of Marines in Vietnambetween 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities froma one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the endof 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an importantsecondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundationupon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and MuseumsDivision from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to major soon after hisreturn to inactive duty, he is now working for the Kentucky State Government. Anative of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Morehead State College(1965) and a Master of Arts degree in American History from the University of Ken-tucky (1972). Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platooncommander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine Division inVietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer Candidate School, Quantico.For services in the Republic of Vietnam during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Dis-tinguished Flying Cross and 26 awards of the Air Medal.

E. H. SIMMONSBrigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

Director of Marine Corps History and MuseumsReviewed and Approved:15 September 1976

111

Preface

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954—1964 is a narrative account of the initial decade ofMarine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The monograph had two immediateforerunners, both classified studies prepared in the middle 1960s by the former His-torical Branch, G—3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by MajorJames M. Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, thefirst of these was entitled United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1963." The second, entitled "United States Marine Corps Operations in the Republicof Vietnam, 1964," was authored by Major Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpub-lished, these studies served as important sources for the material contained in thistext. Otherwise, this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records, theOral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the comment files ofthe division, and appropriate historical works. Of particular value in its compilationhave been the command diaries of the various Marine organizations involved.

Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early Marine advisoryprogram or to the early operations of the Vietnamese Marine Corps still exist. There-fore, that portion of the text which deals with those areas has been reconstructedfrom interviews with various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assist-ance, however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources.Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited to submitpertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.

This monograph has not been the product of a single individual's labor. A com-ment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons, most of whom weredirectly associated with the described events. (A list of these contributors appears asAppendix F.) Their remarks have been of immense value in reconstructing withaccuracy the origin, nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manu-script was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., ChiefHistorian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and the preparationof the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the Historical Branch. Miss Kay P.Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript typist for the division, performed valuable servicesin typing and proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul A.Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and MuseumsDivision, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts. Unless otherwisecredited, photographs are from official Marine Corps files.

ROBERT H. WHITLOWCaptain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

V

Table of Contents

Page

Foreword. iiiPreface V

Table of Contents vii

PART I THE WATERSHED 1

Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance 3

The Geographic Setting 3

The People 6

Vietnam's Recent History 9

Post-Geneva South Vietnam 12

The American Response 14

Chapter 2 The Formative Years 15

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 15

Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance 16

Political Stabilization and Its Effects 18

Reorganization and Progress 20Summing Up Developments 25

Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency 26

Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency 26

Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps 31

Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands 39American Decisions at the Close of 1961 42

Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962 44The War's New Context 44Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division 46

The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962 49Some Conclusions 53

PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR 55

Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang 57

The Decision 57

Deployment to Soc Trang 59

Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations 65

Preparations and Redeployment 73

Accomplishments 74Chapter 6 SI-IUFLY Moves North 75

Arrival at Da Nang 75

I Corps Tactical Zone 76

Military Situation, September 1962 79

Initial Helicopter Operations 80

Marine People-to-People Program 85

SHUFLY Operations in I Corps 85

vii

viii CONTENTS

Page

Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962 86

Genesis of the Problem 86

The American Response 88

The Marine Corps Role 88

Marine Participation: A Summary 94

PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 97

Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort 99

The Political Climate 99The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations 100Accomplishments 110

Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations 111

Development of the Compound Continues 111

Combat Support Operations 113

The Situation in Vietnam 121

PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 125

Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge 127New American Decisions 127A. Restructured Military Assistance Command 130Changes in Marine Leadership 130Redesignation and Reorganization 131The Vietnamese Marine Brigade 132Additional Marine Activities 138

Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting 144The Monsoons 144The Weather Breaks 148Sure \Vind 202 152

Operations Elsewhere in I Corps 154Changing the Watch 156

Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations 157Dry Weather Fighting 157Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations 159Changes and Improvements 162Action as the Year Ends 164

Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation 166

NOTES 169

APPENDICES 175A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954—1964 175B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964 176C. Glossary of Acronyms 178D. Chronology 179E. List of Reviewers 182

INDEX 184

PART I

THE WATERSHED

CHAPTER 1

Background to MilitaryAssistance

The Geographic Setting—The People—Vietnam's Recent Histor.y —-Post-Geneva South Vietnam—The American Response

The Geographic Setting

Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China'ssouthern border, the Southeast Asian land massprojects itself southward to within 100 miles of theequator. Often referred to as the IndochinesePeninsula, this land mass is contained by theAndaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of Siam on thesouth, and the South China Sea and the TonkinGulf on the east. Along with the extensive In-donesian island chain which lies to the immediatesouth, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the keywater routes between the Pacific and the IndianOceans. So positioned, the Indochinese Peninsulaand the offshore islands resemble the Middle Eastin that they traditionally have been recognized as a"crossroads of commerce and history." 1 -

Seven sovereign states currently make up theIndochinese Peninsula. Burma and Thailand occupywhat is roughly the western two-thirds of the en-tire peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state ofMalaysia occupies the southern third of the rugged,southward-reaching Malaysian Peninsula. East ofThailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a rela-tively abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam,and Laos, a landlocked country. The DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), whichborders to the north on China, and the Republic ofVietnam (South Vietnam) form the eastern rim ofthe Indochinese Peninsula.

Vietnamese have often described the area cur-rently administered by the two separate Vietna-mese states as resembling ''two rice baskets at theends of their carrying poles." 2 This descriptionis derived from the position of extensive rice pro-ducing river deltas at the northern and southern

extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coast-line and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civiliza-tion originated in the northernmost of these so-called ''rice baskets," the Red River Delta, cen-turies before the birth of Christ. Pressured atvarious stages in their history by the vastly morepowerful Chinese and by increasingly crowdedconditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamesegradually pushed southward down the narrowcoastal plain in search of new rice lands. Eventuallytheir migration displaced several rival culturesand carried them into every arable corner of theMekong Delta, the more extensive river deltalocated at the southern end of the proverbial"carrying pole." Although unified since theeighteenth century under the Vietnamese, the areabetween the Chinese border and the Gulf of Siamcame to be divided into three more or less differentregions: Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta;Cochinchina, centered on the Mekong Delta; andAnnam, the intervening coastal region.

Since mid-1954 the area known collectively asVietnam has been divided into northern andsouthern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956as the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliestU.S. military activities were focused, came toinclude all of former Cochinchina and the southernhalf of Annam. The geography of this small state,described in general terms, is rugged and difficult.The lengthy country shares often ill-defined jungleboundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the westand with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam(DRV) to the north. Its land borders total almost1,000 miles—600 with Cambodia, 300 with Laos,and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approxi-

3

4 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

BACKGROUND To MILITARY ASSISTANCE 5


mately 1,500 miles of irregular coastline on theTonkin Gulf and the South China Sea completethe enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.

South Vietnam is divided into four relativelydistinct physiographic regions—the Mekong Delta,the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains, and theforested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive andfertile lowland centered on the Mekong River,covers roughly the southern quarter of the country.This region is essentially a marshy flat land wellsuited for rice growing and is recognized as one ofAsia's richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam'ssecond physiographic region, the coastal plain, issimilar to the Mekong Delta in that it is pre-dominantly flat and generaliy well suited for ricegrowing. Properly known as the coastal lowland,this region extends from the country's northernborder to the Mekong Delta. Its width is neverconstant, being defined on the west by the ruggedAnnamite Mountains—the region which dominatesthe northern two thirds of South Vietnam. Thejungle-covered mountains, whose highest eleva-tions measure over 8,000 feet, stand in sharp con-trast to the low and flat coastal plain. The easternslopes of the mountains normally rise from thelowlands at a distance of five or 10 miles from thesea. At several points along the coast, however,the emerald mountains crowd to the water's edge,dividing the coastal plain into compartments andcreating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty.At other locations the mountain chain recedesfrom the coast, allowing the lowlands to extendinland as far as 40 miles. An extensive uplandplateau sprawls over the central portion of SouthVietnam's mountain region.

This important subregion, known as the CentralHighlands, possesses relatively fertile soil and hasgreat potential for agricultural development. Thehighest elevations in the Annamite chain are re-corded south of the Central Highlands. Fromheights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, the mountains dis-solve southward into the forested plain, a hillytransition zone which forms a strip between theMekong lowlands and the southernmost mountains.

South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic ofCancer. Its climate is best described as hot andhumid. Because the country is situated withinSoutheast Asia's twin tropical monsoon belt, itexperiences two distinct rainy seasons. The south-west (or summer) monsoon settles over the Mekong

Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May and lasts until early October. In the northernreaches, the northeast (or winter) monsoon seasonbegins in November and continues through mostof March. Unlike the rainy season in the south,fog, wind, and noticeably lower temperaturescharacterize the wet season in the north. While thereversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance ofwater for rice growing throughout the MekongDelta and most of the long coastal plain, rainfallis not distributed uniformly. Parts of the centralcoast record only about 28 inches of annual pre-cipitation. In contrast, other areas along thenorthern coast receive as much as 126 inches ofrain during the course of a year. Even worse, apercentage of this rainfall can be expected to occuras a result of typhoons. The tropical stormsusually lash the Annamese coast between July andNovember. Almost always they cause extensiveflooding along normally sluggish rivers whichdissect the coastal plain.

The People

Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabitSouth Vietnam. Of these, over 13 million areethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers andfishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to com-press themselves into the country's most produc-tive agricultural areas—the Mekong Delta and thecoastal plain. Chinese, numbering around onemillion, form South Vietnam's largest ethnicminority. Concentrated for the most part in themajor cities, the Chinese traditionally have playeda leading role irs Vietnam's commerce. About700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered acrossthe upland plateau and the rugged northern moun-tains, constitute South Vietnam's second largestminority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely akin tothe dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit thelowlands along the Cambodian border. Roughly35,000 Chams, remnants of a once powerful king-dom that blocked the southern migration of theVietnamese until the late 1400s, form the country'ssmallest and least influential ethnic minority. TheChams, whose ancestors once controlled most ofthe central and southern Annamese coast, are con-fined to a few small villages on the central coastnear Phan Rang.


South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range ofreligions. Between 70 and 80 percent of the coun-try's 16 million people are classified as Buddhist.It is estimated, however, that a much smallerpercentage are actually practitioners. Roman Cath-olics comprise roughly 10 percent of the totalpopulation. Usually found in and around the coun-try's urban centers, the Catholics are products ofVietnam's contacts with Europeans. Two so-calledpolitico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and the HoaHao, have attracted large segments of the ruralpopulation, particularly in the Mekong Delta.* Forthe most part, the scattered Montagnard tribesworship animal forms and have no organizedreligion, although many have been converted toChristianity.

Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society isrural and agrarian. Over the centuries the Viet-namese have tended to cluster in tiny hamletsstrewn down the coastal plain and across the Me-kong Delta. Usually composed of a handful ofclosely knit families whose ancestors settled thesurrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet isSouth Vietnam's basic community unit. Nextlarger is the village which resembles the Americantownship in function in that it encompasses anumber of adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamesepeople have naturally developed strong emotionalties with their native villages. "To the Viet-namese," it has been said without exaggeration,

*Founded iust after World War 1, the Cao Daj claims morethan one and a half million faithful in South Vietnam. Thereligion incorporates elements of Taoism, Buddhism, Chris-tianity, Confucianism, and large doses of spiritualism. Itsclergy, headed by a "pope, 'is organized in a heirarchy modelledon that of the Roman Catholic Church. The extent of its borrow-ing is suggested by the fact that adherents count the Frenchauthor Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the CaoDai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism during the1940s, organized its own army, and fought sporadic actionsagainst the French and the subsequent French-controlled govern-ment of Emperor Bao Dai until suppressed by the Diem govern-ment in 1954.

Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. Inthe late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a"protestant" movement within the worldly, easy-going Buddhistfaith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks grew rapidly,called themselves Hoa Hao after the village where Phu So beganhis crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful and Catholics, theytended to live apart in their own villages and hamlets concen-trated in the very south and west of Vietnam, Primarily along theCambodian border. Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic,they were under constant attack from the French, Japanese, andViet Minh, and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militiawhich was subsequently disbanded. Today their o'all member-ship stands-at about one million.

''the village is his land's heart, mind, and soul."Given the rural nature of the country it is under-standable that the inhabitants of the villagesand hamlets have retained a large degree of self-government. "The laws of the emperor," states anancient Vietnamese proverb, ''are less than thecustoms of the village."

Overlaying this rural mosaic are two inter-mediate governmental echelons—the districts andthe provinces. The district, the smaller of thesepolitical and geographic subdivisions, first ap-peared in Vietnamese history following the earliestannexation of Tonkin by the Chinese in 111 B.C. Itremained in use and was extended down the Anna-mese coast and into Cochinchiria by the successiveVietnamese dynasties which came to power in theensuing centuries. Provinces, larger geographicsubdivisions, eventually were superimposed overgroups of contiguous districts, thus adding anotherechelon between the reigning central governmentand the villages. This structure remained in exist-ence under the French after they took control of allVietnam in the late 19th century. In order to maketheir administration more efficient French colonialauthorities modernized the cumbersome adminis-trative machinery and adjusted provincial bound-aries. It is essentially this French-influenced struc-ture that exists in South Vietnam today. Still,after years of use and modification, the systemseems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule of the villages tends to nullify the efforts ofprovinces and districts to govern rural areas, Oftenthe central government's influence is unable toseep lower than the district headquarters, par-ticularly in more remote areas.

While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, itdoes possess several important urban centers. Asmight be expected, these are found primarily in thedensely populated Mekong Delta and along thecoastal lowland. Saigon, the nation's capital andlargest city, presently has a population estimatedat 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the Me-kong River complex and inland from the coast, thecity dominates the country in both an economicand political sense. Saigon has excellent port facili-ties for ocean-going ships, although such trafficmust first negotiate the tangled Saigon River whichleads inland from the South China Sea. Da Nang,located on the Annamese coast 84 miles below thenorthern border, is the country's second largest


city. With a population of roughly 500,000 and aprotected harbor, Da Nang constitutes the prin-cipal economic center in northern South Vietnam.The old imperial capital of Hue (population ofroughly 200,000), situated about 50 miles north ofDa Nang, historically has exerted a strong cul-tural influence over the Annamese coast.* Scores oflarge towns, such as Quang Tn, Hoi An, QuangNgai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long, extend down thecoast and across the Mekong Delta. Often theseserve as provincial capitals. A few lesser popula-tion centers, notably Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban MeThuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.

Most of South Vietnam's major towns andcities are connected by one highway—Route 1.Constructed by the French during the early 20thcentury, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi,the principal city of Tonkin in northern Vietnam,down the coast and inland to Saigon. While Route1 and a French-built railroad which parallels ithelped unify South Vietnam's most densely popu-lated areas, the country's road network is other-wise underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads dotwist westward from Route 1 into the mountainsto reach the remote towns there. Of these the mostnoteworthy are Route 19, built to serve Pleiku inthe Central Highlands, and Route 9, which ex-tends westward into Laos from Dong Ha, SouthVietnam's northernmost town. A number of roadsradiate outward from Saigon to the populationcenters of the Mekong Delta. For the most part,however, the Vietnamese people traditionally havedepended on trail networks, inland waterways,and the sea to satisfy their transportation needs.The location of the bulk of the population in thewatery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast hasencouraged their reliance on waterbornetransportation.

Vietnam's Recent History

Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland South-east Asia now occupied by South Vietnam, NorthVietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to France.

*The population of most of South Vietnam's cities and townshas been swollen by the influx of refugees which occurred as theVietnam War intensified in the middle 1960s. In 1965, for ex-ample, rtfuget population estimates for the three major citieswere as follows: Saigon—1.5 million; Da Nang—144,000; Hue—105,000.

211—623 0 — 77 — 2

Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina over which the French had exercisedpolitical control in one form or another, with oneexception, since the last quarter of the 19th century.The only interruption occurred following thecapitulation of France in June 1940. Exploitingthe disrupted power balance in Europe, and at-tracted by the natural resources and strategicvalue of the area, Japan moved into northernFrench-Indochina less than four months afterFrance had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French govern-ment agreed to Japanese occupation of southernFrench-Indochina. Soon Japanese forces controlledevery airfield and major port in Indochina. Underthis arrangement the Japanese permitted Frenchcolonial authorities to maintain their administra-tive responsibilities. But as the tide of war beganto turn against the Japanese, the French becameincreasingly defiant. The Japanese terminated thisrelationship on 9 March 1945 when, withoutwarning, they arrested colonial officials through-out Indochina and brutally sçized control of allgovernmental functions.

Six months after the dissolution of the Frenchcolonial apparatus in Indochina, World War IIended. The grip which Japan had held on most ofSoutheast Asia for nearly half a decade was brokenon 2 September 1945 when her foreign ministersigned the instrument of unconditional surrenderon board the battleship USS Missouri. Shortly there-after, in accordance with a previously reachedAllied agreement, Chinese Nationalist forces movedinto Tonkin and northern Annam to accept thesurrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16thparallel, British units arrived from India to disarmthe defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150 menfrom a small French Expeditionary Corps arrivedby air in Saigon on the 12th to assist the British,who had included them only as a courtesy sinceFrance was not among the powers slated to receivethe surrender of theJapanese in Indochina.

But the end of World War II and the arrival ofAllied forces did not end the struggle for control ofFrench-Indochina. Instead, it signalled the be-ginning of a new conflict in which the contestantswere, in many respects, more formidable. One ofthese, the French, moved quickly to restore theirformer presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Re-inforced with additional units, they occupied mostmajor towns between the Mekong Delta and the

BACKGROIND To MILITARY ASSISTANCE 11

16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months laterFrench negotiators secured an agreement with theChinese Nationalists whereby French units wouldreplace the Chinese occupation forces north of the16th parallel.

Wartime developments in French-Indochina,however, had brought about profound politicalchanges which eventually would doom the Frencheffort to re-establish political and economic influ-ence in the region. During World War II, Ho ChiMinh, an avowed Communist, had transformed arelatively feeble political party into a sizableguerrilla organization. Known as the Viet Minh,the Communist guerrillas had been organized,trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former his-tory teacher from Annarn. During the latter stagesof the war, the United States had supplied the VietMinh with limited quantities of military supplies.In return, Ho's guerrillas had assisted downedAmerican pilots and occasionally had clashed withsmall Japanese units. But the Viet Minh hadwasted few men on costly major actions againstthe Japanese. Conserving their forces, Ho and Giaphad concentrated on organization and had man-aged to extend their strength into the denselypopulated Red River Delta and along the Anna-mese coast. in Cochinchina, where their numberswere considerably smaller, the Communists hadlimited their activities almost entirely to organiza-tion and recruitment. Thus, by the end of the warHo's organization was able to emerge as a definitemilitary-political force in northern French-Indo-china.

Following the Japanese surrender and before thearrival of the Chinese Nationalist occupation forces,the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi, the capitalof Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Re-public of Vietnam. At Ho's direction the VietMinh promptly shifted from their anti-Japaneseposture and prepared to contest the French return.

Confronted with this situation in northernIndochina, the French were forced to bargain withthe Communists. A preliminary agreement wasreached on 6 March 1946 whereby the Frenchagreed to recognize the newly founded but rela-tively weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a'free state within the French Union.'' In return,

Ho's government declared itself ' ready to welcomein friendly fashion the French Army, when inconformance with international agreement, it

would relieve the Chinese forces" which had ac-cepted the Japanese surrender in Tonkin.5 Shortlyafter the conclusion of this agreement, Frenchforces began reoccupying Tonkin and northernArinam. Within six months they controlled everymajor strategic position from the Chinese borderto the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina's southerntip.

The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946after Viet Minh and French negotiators failed toreach a final agreement on actual political controlof Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted,Ho withdrew the bulk of his military forces intomountainous sanctuaries along the Chinese border,but left small groups of guerrillas scatteredthroughout the heavily populated Red River Delta.Reinforced with contingents from Europe andAfrica, the French Expeditionary Corps initiallymanaged to hold its own and, in some cases, evenextend its control. But, drawing strength from itsnatural appeal to Vietnamese nationalism, theCommunist movement began gaining momentumin the late 1940s. Gradually the war intensifiedand spread into central Annam and Cochinchina.

In January 1950, the French moved to undercutthe Vict Minh's appeal to non-Communist na-tionalists by granting nominal independence to itsIndochina possessions. Under the terms of a formaltreaty, all of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Co-chinchina) was brought together under a Saigon-based government headed by Emperor Bao Dai.Laos and Cambodia likewise formed their owngovernments, whereupon all three countries be-came known as the Associated States of Indochina.

This new arrangement, however, had littleeffect on the ongoing war with the Viet Minh. Inaccordance with the treaties, the Associated Statesbecame members of the French Union and agreedto prosecute the war under French direction.Moreover, French political dominance in the regioncontinued, virtually undiluted by the existence ofthe Associated States.

In related developments, Mao Tse-turig's ChineseCommunist armies seized control of mainlandChina in 1949 and Communist North Koreanforces invaded the pro-Western Republic of Koreain 1950. These events added new meaning to theFrench struggle in Indochina as American policymakers came to view the war on the SoutheastAsian mainland within the context of a larger


design to bring Asia entirely under Communistdomination. Following the invasion of SouthKorea, President Truman immediately announcedhis intention to step up U.S. military aid to theFrench in Indochina. Congress responded quicklyby adding four billion dollars to existing militaryassistance funds. Of this, $303 million was ear-marked for Korea, the Philippines, and 'the gen-eral area of China." * Thus, the Truman Ad-ministration, now confronted by the possibilitythat Communism might engulf all of mainlandAsia, extended its containment policy to Indochina.

Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S.material assistance, the French proved unable towrest the initiative from Giap's growing armies.Although national armies drawn from Cambodia,Laos, and Vietnam were now fighting alongsidethe French, the Expeditionary Corps was over-extended. Moreover, the French cause was ex-tremely vulnerable to Communist propaganda. Onthe home front, public support for the so-calledsale ,guerre (dirty war) eroded steadily during theearly 1950s as the Expeditionary Corps' failures andcasualties mounted. Finally, on 7 May 1954, thebesieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien BienPhu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shatteringwhat remained of French determination to prose-cute the war in Indochina. In Geneva, where Com-munist and Free World diplomats had gathered toconsider a formal peace in Korea along with theIndochina problem, French and Viet Mirih repre-sentatives signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 Julywhich ended the eight-year conflict.

The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantiallyaltered the map of the Indochinese Peninsula.France agreed to relinquish political controlthroughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-nam all gained full independence. The most contro-versial provision of the 20 July agreement dividedVietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed ademilitarized zone over the partition line. Thisdivision, intended to facilitate the disengagementof the opposing forces, was to be temporary pend-ing a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956.In accordance with the agreement, France im-mediately turned over political control of thenorthern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of

*Thc folloving year would see a half billion U.S. dollarsallocated to support French operations in Indochina. By 1954that figure would climb to an even one billion dollars.

Annam) to the Communist Viet Minh. Hopromptly re-established the Democratic Republicof Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.

Other provisions of the Geneva Agreementcalled for the opposing armies to regroup in theirrespective zones within 300 days. Following theirregroupment, the French military forces were to becompletely withdrawn from the North within300 days and from the South by mid-1956. Civiliansliving both north and south of the partition linewere to be allowed to emigrate to the oppositezone in accordance with their political convictions.It was anticipated that thousands of Catholicsliving in Tonkin would seek refuge n the the non-Communist South. Other articles of the agreementdealt with the creation and responsibilities of anInternational Control Commission (ICC) tosupervise the cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Pol-ish delegations were to comprise this commission.

On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agree-ment, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the PeoplesRepublic of China, Cambodia, and Laos joinedFrance and the Viet Minh in endorsing a "FinalDeclaration" which sanctioned the previouslyreached cease-fire agreement. The United Statesrefused to endorse this declaration, but issued astatement to the effect that it would not use force todisturb the cease-fire.

Post-Geneva South Vietnam

The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrustthat area of Vietnam south of the partition lineinto a period of profound confusion and insta-bility. Even worse, the colonial period had donelittle to prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamesefor the tremendous problems at hand. No real ap-paratus for central government existed. Likewise,the long colonial period left the area with fewexperienced political leaders capable of establish-ing and managing the required governmentalmachinery. Political control passed nominally tothe French-sponsored emperor, Bao Dai, who wasliving in France at the time. For all practical pur-poses, leadership in the South devolved upon BaoDais recently appointed pro-Western premier,Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a prosperous andwell-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diemhad served the French briefly as a province chief

BACKGROUND TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE 13

prior to World War II. Always a strong nationalistbut staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unableto reconcile his anti-French attitudes with theViet Minh movement during the Indochina War.As a result Diem had left his homeland in theearly 1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in theUnited States. There he remained until his appoint-ment as premier in mid-June of 1954.

The months immediately following the Genevaagreement found Ngo Dinh Diem struggling tocreate the necessary governmental machinery inSaigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best,however, his hold on the feeble institutions wastenuous. A serious confrontation was developingbetween the premier and the absent Bao Dai, stillresiding in France. Further complicating thepolitical scene was the presence of Hoa Hao andCao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding thecapital, and the existence in Saigon of an under-world organization named the Binh Xuyen.* As1955 opened the leaders of these three politicallyoriented factions were pressing demands for con-cessions from the new central government. Amongthese were permission to maintain their privatearmies, and the authority to exercise politicalcontrol over large, heavily populated areas.

The outcome of the embryonic power strugglein Saigon hinged largely on control of the Viet-namese National Army (VNA). Although notconsidered an efficient military organization byeven the most liberal estimates, the 210,000-manNational Army was the principal source of or-ganized power available to the quarreling leaders ofsouthern Vietnam. Originally created by the Frenchin 1950 to supplement their Expeditionary Corps,the VNA had since suffered from structural de-ficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelonbetween the French-controlled General Staff andthe 160 separate battalions. Tied to no regimentsor divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturallywere dependent on the French Expeditionary Corpsfor operational instructions and logistical support.**

*The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps southof the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon. Controllingthe vice and crime of the tity, by 1954 they had gained controlof the police under circumstances that reeked of bribery. A yearlater the organization was brutually crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.

**Sclected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized into&rouPes mobiles (mobile groups) by the French for specific offensiveoperations. But these groups, which were roughly equivalent to aregimental combat team, were never composed entirely of VNAbattalions under a Vietnamese command group.

A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and adegree of inattention on the part of the Frenchcompounded the problems which stemmed fromthe army's structural flaw. Partially as a result ofthese shortcomings the morale of the VNA had de-teriorated sharply in the waning stages of theFrench-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high desertion rates were reportedin almost every Vietnamese battalion. Still, it wasevident that he who controlled the National Armywould most likely control the government in thearea south of the partition line.

The danger that the pro-Western zone might be-come the victim of a sudden Communist attackfrom the north, as had been the case on the KoreanPeninsula, injected another element of uncertaintyinto the overall situation in southern Vietnam,The conditions which settled over the area in theimmediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement sug-gested this possibility since they were alarminglysimilar to the conditions which had prevailed inKorea prior to the North Korean invasion of 1950.Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographi-cally and ideologically: the North clearly withinthe orbit of the Soviet Union and CommunistChina, and the South under the influence of theWestern powers. As in Korea in 1950, there alsoexisted a very real armed threat to the weaker pro-Western southern state. Immediately after theGeneva cease-fire, the Viet Mirih army regroupednorth of the 17th parallel and was redesignated thePeople's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Americanintelligence reported that the PAVN, which num-bered roughly 240,000 disciplined veterans, wasbeing reorganized and re-equipped with Soviet andChinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agree-ment. At the same time Western intelligencesources estimated that the Viet Minh had inten-tionally left between 5,000 and 10,000 men southof the partition line following their withdrawal.Also done in violation of the cease-fire agreement,this meant that Communist guerrillas could beexpected to surface throughout the South in theevent of an outright invasion.

A related condition heightened fears that a

Korea-type invasion might occur in Vietnam. InSouth Korea a military vacuum had been allowedto form in 1949 when American units withdrewfrom the area. Apparently that vacuum, coupledwith a statement by the American Secretary of


State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeterin the Pacific did not include South Korea, hadencouraged Communist aggression. Now, with thescheduled evacuation of French armies from Indo-china by mid-1956, there emerged the distinctpossibility that such a military vacuum wouldrecur, this time in southern Vietnam. "Vietnam,"warned one American scholar familiar with theregion, 'may very soon become either a damagainst aggression from the north or a bridge serv-ing the communist block to transform the coun-tries of the Indochinese peninsula into satellites ofChina."

The American Response

It was in the face of this uncertain situation onthe Southeast Asian mainland that the Eisenhoweradministration moved to discourage renewed Com-munist military activity. First, the United Statessought to create a regional international organiza-tion to promote collective military action underthe threat of aggression. This was obtained on8 September 1954 when eight nations—the UnitedStates, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Aus-tralia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand—signed the Manila Pact. The treaty area encom-passed by the pact included Southeast Asia, theSouthwest Pacific below 21°31' north latitude, andPakistan. Two weeks later the pact was trans-formed into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-tion (SEATO). In a separate protocol, the membernations agreed that Cambodia, Laos, and the

''Free Territory under the jurisdiction of the Stateof Vietnam'' all resided within their defensesphere.8

Next, after several months of hesitation, theUnited States settled on a policy of comprehensiveassistance to South Vietnam, as the area southof the 1954 partition line was already being called,As conceived, the immediate objective of the newAmerican policy was to bring political stabilityto South Vietnam. The longer range goal wasthe creation of a bulwark to discourage renewedCommunist expansion down the Indochinese Pe-ninsula. In this scheme, military assistance was toplay a key role. "One of the most efficient meansof enabling the Vietnamese Government to becomestroug," explained Eisenhower's Secretary ofState, John Foster Dulles, ''is to assist it in re-organizing the National Army and in trainingthat Army." ° In short, the State Department'sposition was that a stronger, more responsiveVietnamese National Army would help PremierDiem consolidate his political power. Later thatsame force would serve as a shield behind whichSouth Vietnam would attempt to recover from theravages of the French-Indochina War and theafter effects of the Geneva Agreement.

So by early 1955 a combination of circum-stances—South Vietnam's position adjacent to a

Communist state, the unsavory memories of theKorean invasion, and the impending withdrawalof the French Expeditionary Corps—had influencedthe United States to adopt a policy of militarysupport for Premier Diem's struggling government.

CHAPTER 2

The Formative YearsMilitary Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam—Origins of U.S. MarineAssistance—Politicl Stabilization and Its Effects—Reorganization and

Progress—Summing Up Developments

Military AssistanceAdvisory Group, Vietnam

When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect inthe late summer of 1954, the machinery for imple-menting the military phase of the American assist-ance program for South Vietnam already existed.President Truman had ordered the establishmentof a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group(IJSMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina inmid-1950 as one of several reactions to the NorthKorean invasion of the Republic of Korea. Estab-lished to provide materiel support to the FrenchExpeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted littlemore than a logistical funnel through which U.S.military aid had been poured.

Lieutenant General John M. ('Iron Mike")O'Daniel, U.S. Army, had been assigned to com-mand the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O'Daniel'sselection for the Saigon post anticipated a moreactive U.S. role in training of the VietnameseNational Army. He had been chosen for the as-signment largely on the basis of his successful rolein creating and supervising the training programswhich had transformed the South Korean Armyinto an effective fighting force during the KoreanWar. Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settle-ment, he and his 342-man group began preparingfor the immense task of rebuilding South Viet-nam's armed forces.

The entire American project to assist the SouthVietnamese in the construction of a viable statewas delayed during the fall of 1954 while the neces-sary diplomatic agreements were n,egotiated amongAmerican, French, and South Vietnamese officials.President Eisenhower dispatched General J. Law-ton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon inNovember to complete the details of the triangular

arrangements. Collins carried with him the broadpowers which would be required to expedite thenegotiations.

By mid-January 1955, the president's special en-voy had paved the way for the transfer of responsi-bility for training, equipping, and advising theVietnamese National Army from the French to theUSMAAG. He and General Paul Ely, the officerappointed by the Paris government to oversee theFrench withdrawal from Indochina, had initialeda "Minute of Understanding." In accordance withthis document, the United States agreed to providefinancial assistance to the French military in Viet-nam in exchange for two important concessions.First, the French pledged to conduct a gradualmilitary withdrawal from South Vietnam in orderto prevent the development of a military vacuumwhich might precipitate a North Vietnameseinvasion. Secondly, they accepted an Americanplan to assist in a transition stage during which theresponsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese mili-tary could be transferred to the MAAG in an or-derly fashion. General Collins, in addition to en-gineering the understanding with General Ely,had advised Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a level of 100,000,a figure which the U.S. State Department felt theUnited States could realistically support andtrain.

The American plan to begin assisting SouthVietnam encountered further delay even after theEly-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely'sgovernment, arguing that the United States hadagreed to provide only one-third of the amountFrance had requested to finance its Indochina forces,refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock wasfinally resolved on 11 February 1955 when French

15

16 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, I94—I964

officials accepted the terms of the Ely-Collins ar-rangement in a revised form.

A combined Franco-American training command,designated the Training Relations Instruction Mis-sion (TRIM), became operational in Saigon theday following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins understariding.* Headed by LieutenantGeneral O'Daniel but under the 'overall author-ity" of General Ely, TRIM was structured to pre-vent domination by either French or Americans.The training mission was composed of four divi-sions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and NationalSecurity, each of which was headed alternately byeither an American or a French officer. The chief ofeach division had as his deputy an officer of theopposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headedthe divisions considered by MAAG officials as themost important—Army and National Security.Operating through TRIM and assisted by theFrench military, the USMAAG was tasked withimplementing the U.S. Military Assistance Pro-gram in a manner that would help shape theVietnamese national forces into a cohesive defenseestablishment prior to the withdrawal of Frenchforces

Origins ofU.S. Marine Assistance

Only one U.S. Marine was serving with theUSMAAG in Saigon when TRIM became opera-tional—Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat.**Croizat's assignment to the U.S. advisory grouphad resulted when General Lemuel C. Shepherd,Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominatedhim to fill a newly created billet as liaison officerbetween the MAAG and the French High Com-mand during the latter stages of the IndochinaWar. Largely because of his French languagefluency and his former association with manyFrench officers while attending their war collegein 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.

*The combined training mission originally was designated theAllied Training Operations Mission. This designation waschanged prior to the time the mission became operational.

**Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at the time.They were those assigned to the American Embassy. One officerwas serving as Assistant Naval Attache/Assistant Naval Attachefor Air, and 12 other Marines were serving as security guards.

Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did notarrive in Vietnam until 2 August 1954. By thenthe cease-fire agreement had been signed at Genevaand the need for a liaison officer with the FrenchHigh Command no longer existed. GeneralO'Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrivedMarine officer to serve on the General Commissionfor Refugees which had been created by the SouthVietnamese Government immediately after thecease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directlyinvolved in the construction of refugee receptioncenters and the selection and development ofresettlement areas in the South. When U.S. navalforces began assisting in the evacuation of NorthVietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat was sentto Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin.There he headed the MAAG detachment and wasresponsible for coordinating U.S. operations in thearea with those of the French and Vietnamese.When the so-called "Passage to Freedom" con-cluded in May 1955, 807,000 people, 469,000 tonsof equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicleshad been evacuated from Communist NorthVietnam.* It was not until February 1955 that theMarine returned to Saigon.

During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat's absence,Premier Diem had acted on a long-standing proposalto create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps. Theissue of a separate Marine force composed ofVietnamese national troops had surfaced frequentlysince the birth of the Vietnamese Navy in theearly 1950s. Although the proposal had beenheartily endorsed by a number of senior FrenchNavy officers, the downward spiral of the Frenchwar effort had intervened to prevent the subjectfrom being advanced beyond a conceptual stage.Largely as a result of earlier discussions withCroizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on13 October when he signed a decree which includedthe following articles:

ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is createdwithin the Naval Establishment a corps of infantryspecializing in the surveillance of waterways and am-phibious operations on the coast and rivers, to be desig-nated as:

*The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of equipmentand supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S. Navy moved thebalance.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS 17

THE MARINE CORPS'

. , .ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various

type units suited to their functions and either alreadyexisting in the Army or Naval forces or to be created inaccordance with the development plan for the armedforces. 1

In accordance with this decree a miscellaneouscollection of commando-type units was trans-ferred from the Vietnamese National Army andNavy to the Marine Corps. Except for a navalcommando unit, which had conducted amphibiousraids along the coastal plains, these forces hadoperated in the Red River Delta with the Frenchand Vietnamese Navy dinassauts (river assaultdivisions). First employed in 1946, the dinassautshad evolved into relatively effective naval commands capable of landing light infantrycompanies along Indochina's tangled riverbanks.Normally the dinassaut was composed of about adozen armored and armed landing craft, patrolboats, and command vessels. An Army commandounit, consisting of approximately 100 men, wouldbe attached to such naval commands for specificoperations. Thus organized, the dinassauts couldtransport light infantry units into otherwise in-accessible areas and support landings with heavycaliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Suchoperations had been particularly successful in thesprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin wherenavigable estuaries and Viet Mirth abounded.*Later in the war, as the concept was refined, theFrench created a number of Vietnamese NationalArmy commando units for specific service with thedinassauts. Still attached to the Navy commandsthese units were sometimes responsible for securityaround the dinassaut bases when not involved inpreplanned operations. A number of these ratherelite Vietnamese units, variously designated lightsupport companies, river boat companies, and com-mandos, were now transferred to the newly decreedVietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).

By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returnedto Saigon in early 1955 these units, which totalledapproximately 2,400 officers and men, had been

*Of the dinasfatit Bernard Fall wrote: [It] may well havebeen one of the few worthwhile, contributions of the Indochinawar to military knowledge.' (Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 39)A more thorough analysis of dinassaut operations is includedin Croizat, A Translation From The French Lessons of the War, pp.348—351.

evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of thecommandos had been assembled at Nha Trang onSouth Vietnam's central coast where the Frenchstill maintained an extensive naval training fa-cility. There, under the supervision of a juniorFrench commando officer, several former com-mandos had been organized into the 1st MarineLanding Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion),The balance of the newly designated Marine units,however, were scattered in small, widely sep-arated garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta.These units included six river boat companies, fivecombat support light companies, and a small train-ing flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Viet-namese National Army officer, Major Le QuangTrong, as Senior Marine Officer. But because noformal headquarters had been created and becauseno real command structure existed, Major Trongremained relatively isolated from his far-flung Ma-rine infantry units.

Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assignedto the MAAG's Naval Section and subsequently toTRIM's Naval Division as the senior U.S. advisorto the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps.In this capacity the Marine officer quickly deter-mined that the small Vietnamese amphibious forcewas faced with several serious problems. First,and perhaps its most critical, was that despitePremier Diem's decree, the Marine Corps continuedto exist essentially on an informal basis. ''TheMarine Corps itself had no real identity," its U.S.advisor later explained. ''It was a scattering of dis-similar units extending from Hue to the MekongDelta area.' '2 The fact that its widespread unitswere still dependent on the French ExpeditionaryCorps for logistical support underscored the weak-ness inherent in the VNMC's initial status.

Other problems arose from the continuation ofFrench officers in command billets throughout theVietnamese naval forces. Under the Franco-American agreement which had created TRIM, aFrench Navy captain doubled as chief of the com-bined training missions' Naval Division and ascommanding officer of the Vietnamese navalforces. This placed the French in a position toreview any proposals advanced by the U.S. Marineadvisor. Complicating the situation even further, aFrench Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually


commanded the 1st Landing Battalion at NhaTrang.*

Demobilization presented another potential diffi-culty for the Vietnamese Marine Corps in early1955. Under the U.S-Vietnamese force levelagreements, the Vietnamese naval forces werelimited to 3,000 men. The Marine Corps, whichalone totalled a disproportionate 2,400 men, hadbeen instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137men and officers. With no effective centralizedcommand structure and so many widely separatedunits, even the relatively simple task of musteringout troops assumed the dimensions of a complexadministrative undertaking.

In short, the very existence of the VietnameseMarine Corps was threatened in a number of inter-related situations. The continuation of a separateand distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, ofcourse, on the overall reorganization of the Viet-namese armed forces and their support structure.Essentially it would be necessary to establish arequirement for such an organization within SouthVietnam's future military-naval structure. Croizatpersonally sensed that this would be the pivotalissue in determining the VNMC's future. Therewere numerous representatives of the three militaryservices from each of the three countries concernedwith the fate of the Vietnamese Army, Navy, andAir Force,'' he pointed out. ''But, there was nochampion from within the Vietnamese MarineCorps since no Corps existed except on paper.''Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, aVietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenantcolonel to keep alive the idea that South Vietnam'sdefense establishment needed a separate MarineCorps.

Political Stabilization andIts Effects

During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamesegovernment was engulfed by a crisis which threat-ened to disrupt the American plans to help builda viable anti-Communist country. The crisisoccurred not in the form of an overt North Viet-

*Delaycn, described by Croizat as 'an exceptionally qualibedFrench Commando officer, later attended the U.S. MarineCorps Amphibious \Variarc School at Quantico. (Croizat,

Notes on The Organization," p. 3.)

namese attack but rather as a result of the South'spolitical instability. In February the leaders of theHoa Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen,dissatisfied with Premier Diem's refusal to accedeto their various demands, formed the United Frontof National Forces.

By mid-March the disaffected leaders of theseorganizations felt strong enough to test the pre-mier's strength. Trouble began late that monthwhen the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type activities against Diem's National Armyunits in the sect's stronghold southwest of Saigon.On 28 March Diem ordered a company of para-troops to seize the Saigon Central Police He ad-quarters which the French had allowed the BinhXuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughoutthe capital the next day as Binh Xuyen unitsclashed with loyal government forces. A truce wasarranged finally in the city on 31 March after threedays of intermittent but fierce fighting. Thatsame day the Cao Dai broke with the UnitedFront and accepted a government offer to integratesome of its troops into the National Army.

An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnamuntil 28 April when new fighting broke out. By themiddle of May, government forces had driven theBinh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing theirorganization. Remnants of the bandit group,however, escaped into the extensive Rung Satswamps south of the capital where they continuedfighting individually and in small groups. In thecountryside south of Saigon, 30 of Diem's bat-talions, including the 1st Landing Battalion, tookthe offensive against the Hoa Hao regular andguerrilla forces.

The national crisis, for all practical purposes,ended in the last week of June when a Hoa Haoleader surrendered 8,000 regulars and ordered hisfollowers to cease all anti-government activities.Sporadic fighting continued, however, as Diem'sforces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao splinter groupsfighting in the western Mekong Delta and BinhXuyen elements still resisting in the rugged man-grove swamps south of the capital. In August theMarine Landing Battalion fought a decisive actionagainst the remaining Hoa Han in Kien GiangProvince about 120 miles southwest of Saigon,destroying the rebel headquarters. Later in theyear the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by severalriver boat companies, reduced one of the last


pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance in the Rung Sat.As a result of these and similar actions beingfought simultaneously by loyal Army units, or-ganized resistance to Premier Diem graduallycollapsed. *

The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turningpoint in Diem's political fortunes. At the heightof the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai attempted to removeDiem as premier by ordering him to France for'consultations.'' Electing to remain in Saigon anddirect his government efforts to quell the rebellion,the premier declined Bao Dais summons. TheVietnamese military forces proved loyal to thepremier, having faithfully executed Diem's com-mands throughout the emergency. Having suc-cessfully met the armed challenge of the sects andthe Binh Xuyen and having openly repudiatedBan Dai's authority, Premier Diem had imposed atleast a measure of political stability on SouthVietnam.

An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on23 October when a nationwide referendum washeld in South Vietnam to settle the issue of nationalleadership. In the balloting, since criticized as

having been rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2percent of the total vote against Bao Dai. Threedays later, on 26 October, South Vietnam's newpresident proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam(RVN).

The \/ictnamese Marine Corps benefited greatlyfrom Premier Diem's successful confrontation withhis political rivals. On 1 May, in preparation forthe 1st Landing Battalion's deployment to combat,Major Trong had established a small Marine Corpsheadquarters in Saigon. Shortly thereafter, Diemhad appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain BuiPho Clii, to replace Captain Delayen as commanderof the landing battalion. The French commandoofficer, who was a member of TRIM, remainedat Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then,on the last day of June, Diem removed the re-maining French officers from command positionsthroughout South Vietnam's naval forces. Thecombined effect of these actions was to reduceFrench influence throughout the nation's naval

*Sonse sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Han andCao Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Vict Congguerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in thelate 1950s, (Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. in.)

establishment while making the \Tietnamese MarineCorps more responsive to the central government.

The burdens of demobilization also were light-ened somewhat as a result of the sect crisis when anew force level was approved by the United Statesin mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement,dictated in part by the requirement to integrateportions of the sects' armies into the nationalforces, raised the force level to 150,000 men andplaced the personnel ceiling of the \Tietnamesenaval forces at 4,000 men. This revision enhancedthe prospects for a corresponding increase in theauthorized strength of the VNMC.

The 1st Landing Battalion's performance againstthe sect forces in the Mekong Delta and the RungSat, moreover, tempered much of the previousopposition to a separate \NMC. Heretofore, U.S.and Vietnamese Army officers had opposed theexistence of a Vietnamese amphibious force apartfrom the National Army. Until the sect uprising,Lieutenant Colonel Croizat had used the influenceafforded by his position as naval advisor to thegeneral staff to advocate the continuation of the\NMC. But during the sect battles the VietnameseMarines had firmly established their value to thenew government. By displaying loyalty, discipline,and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out intheir own behalf at a critical juncture in theircorps existence.

Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion de-ployed to fight the rebellious sect forces, two add i-tional U.S. Marine advisors—an officer and a non-commissioned officer—arrived in South Vietnamfor duty with the MAAG. Both Marines wereassigned to TRIM. Croizat d isparclied the officer,Captain James T. Breckmnridge, to Nba Trangwhere he soon replaced Captain Delayen as ad-visor to the 1st Landing Battalion. As State De-partment policy prohibited U.S. military personnelfrom participating in combat activities with indig-enous forces, Breckinridge was forced to awaitthe battalion's return from the field. During itsabsence he divided his time between Nba Trangand Saigon where he assisted Colonel Croizat withplanning and logistics matters. The noncom-missioned officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E.Tracy, initially remained in Saigon hut latermoved to Nha Trang. There, serving principallyas a small unit tactics instructor to the VietnameseMarines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a ''first-


Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Goiat, first U.S. Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates durinçdiscussions between Lieutenant General John Iron ZVJIike'' O'Daniel, USA, Chief, USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier

N&o Dinh Diem. (Photo courtesy of Colonel Victor J. roiat, USMC (Ret.)).

rate Marine NCO'—one who could carry out themost complex assignment with little or no Super-viSion."

Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointeda new officer to head the Vietnamese Marine Corps.On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed com-mand of the VN MC, and thereby became the secondSenior Marine Officer.

Reorganization and Progress

The 1st Landing Battalion remained in actionagainst the Binh Xuyen remnants until February1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel Croi-zat reviewed the entire organizational structureof the Vietnamese Marine Corps. By now the sizeof the service had been reduced to roughly 1,800officers and men although it retained its originalorganization of six river boat companies, five

light support companies, a landing battalion, atraining flotilla, and a small headquarters.

This organization, with so many dissimilar unitsexisting on one echelon, influenced Croizat tosuggest that Major Lieu restructure the service.Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, andTechnical Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staffspent several months developing and refining plansfor the comprehensive reorganization of the Ma-rine Corps. Lieu submitted this package to theVietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 De-cember 1955. The salient feature of the plan was tocreate an additional landing battalion withoutincreasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then gov-erned the size of the VNMC. Significantly, theplan contained a clause proposing that the Viet-namese Marine Corps be expanded to regimentalsize in the future.5

The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approvedthe new structure, and reorganization of the


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VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalionfinally returned to Nba Trang in February. Theold river boat and light support companies weredisbanded and three new units—a 4.2-inch mortarcompany, a headquarters and service company,and a new landing battalion—were formed. Desig-nated the 2d Landing Battalion, this new unitformed about 25 miles south of Nba Trang atCam Ranh Bay where the French had trainedamphibious forces during the latter stages of theIndochina War.

As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, thetables of organization and tables of equipment forthe Vietnamese Marine battalions were com-pletely revised. Three infantry companies, a heavyweapons company, and a headquarters and servicecompany now comprised a landing battalion.*Each infantry company was organized into threerifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn,the rifle platoons each consisted of three 10-mansquads (three 3-man fire teams and a squadleader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifle-man was armed with the 30 caliber M—1 carbine,a weapon formerly carried by many French andVietnamese commandos. It had been retained foruse within the VNMC because it was substantiallyshorter and lighter than the standard U.S. infantryweapon, the M—1 rifle, and was therefore bettersuited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. Theautomatic rifleman in each Vietnamese Marinefire team carried the Browning automatic rifle(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon.The weapons platoon of the rifle company wasbuilt around six .30 caliber light machine guns.Within the heavy weapons company of the landingbattalions was a mortar platoon, equipped withfour 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle platoon.

While this reorganization was underway, Lieu-tenant Colonel Croizat initiated a search foracceptable means of expanding the VietnameseMarine Corps to regimental size. A staff studyproduced by the Senior Marine Advisor a monthbefore the first phase of the reorganization efforthad begun included several important recom-mendations. Croizat proposed to General O'Danielthat authorization be granted to raise the ceiling

*Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated byletters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine infantry com-panies were given number designations.

on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers andmen. This, the Marine advisor pointed out, couldbe accomplished without affecting the overallceiling on all South Vietnamese military andnaval forces. By reassigning to the VietnameseMarine Corps an amphibious battalion stillorganized within the National Army, the 150,000-man force level would not be altered. This wouldtransform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into a

three battalion regiment and would unify all SouthVietnamese amphibious forces under a singlecommand. Croizat's study further recommendedthat the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designatedpart of the general reserve of the nation's armedforces and that it be controlled directly by theVietnamese Joint General Staff. Although noimmediate action was taken on these recommenda-tions, they were to serve as a blueprint for thefuture expansion of the VNMC. Equally im-portant, they bore the seed that would eventuallymake the Vietnamese Marine Corps a fully in-tegrated component of South Vietnam's defenseestablishment.

During the ensuing three years, several apparentlyunrelated occurrences impacted either directly orindirectly on the U.S. Marine advisory effort inSouth Vietnam. The French completed their mili-tary withdrawal from South Vietnam and dis-solved their High Command in April 1956, slightlyahead of schedule.* In con junction with this finalphase of the French withdrawal, the TrainingRelations Instructions Mission was abolished.Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAGprograms to be executed through the combinedtraining mission.

Shortly after the departure of the last Frenchtroops, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat ended his as-signment as Senior Marine Advisor. He was re-placed by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes,Jr., in June 1956. A veteran of the Guadalcanalcampaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from Wash-ington, D.C. where he had recently completed aFrench language course. Like his predecessor, thenew Senior Marine Advisor was scheduled to servein Vietnam for two years.

In August, less than two months after LieutenantColonel Wilkes' arrival, President Diem appointed

*A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officersremained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.


a new officer to head his Marine Corps. This timeBui Pho Chi, the captain who had commandedthe 1st Landing Battalion during the sect uprising,was selected for the assignment. Chi's appointmentwas only temporary, however, for in October Diemordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume commandof the Marine Corps. Major Hung, who became theVNMC's fourth Senior Officer, was to hold theposition for four years.

An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese MarineCorps coincided with the series of changes in itsleadership and the departure of Lieutenant ColonelCroizat. During the summer months, the Viet-namese Minister of Defense proposed that theVNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam'sArmy. Fortunately, the recent combat record ofthe 1st Landing Battalion outweighed the min-ister's influence and the effort to disestablish theVietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.

Another noteworthy incident in the record ofthe early relations between the U.S. and Viet-namese Marines occurred when the Marine non-commissioned officer billet within the MAAGwas upgraded to an officer position. This adjust-ment, which anticipated the creation of the 2dLanding Battalion, had the effect of making aU.S. Marine officer available to advise individualVNMC battalions on a permanent basis. Thusoriginated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officerwould advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion—a concept abandoned only temporarily between1959 and 1962.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as atwo-battalion regiment under the command ofMajor Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through1959. During this period Lieutenant ColonelWilkes and his successor, Lieutenant ColonelFrank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who hadserved as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt,instituted a variety of programs intended toprovide the Vietnamese Marines with a commonbase of experience and training.* Perhaps themost important of these was one implemented in1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers beganattending basic and intermediate level schoolsat Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. Other formalschools for noncommissioncd officers were es-

*See Appendix A for complete listings of VNMC Comman-dants and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC duringthe 1954—1964 period.

tablished by the Vietnamese Marine Corps inSouth Vietnam. In an effort to build espri: decorps among the lower ranking Vietnamese Marines,the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlist-ments. They also persuaded their Vietnainseecounterparts to adopt a corps-wide marksmanshiptraining program similar to the one then in useby the U.S. Marine Corps.

In conjunction with the reorganization of theVNMC and the stress being placed upon smallunit and individual training, much of the U.S.advisory effort during this period was devotedto logistics. The Marine advisors soon discoveredthat the Vietnamese officers, who had not beendirectly concerned with supply matters under theFrench, tended to ignore this important area."The real problem," explained Captain Breckin-ridge, ''was the newness of it all. The Vietnameseofficers simply possessed no base of experience ortraining in logistic matters.'' 6 This shortcomingdictated that the American advisors not onlydesign a workable logistics system but closelysupervise its operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkin-son instituted intensive schooling of supply andmaintenance personnel and emphasized the valueof command supervision to the Vietnamese leaders.The Marine advisors, for example, taught theircounterparts that equipment shortages could oftenbe prevented if command attention were given torequisitions. Still, even with constant supervisionand formal schooling, the Vietnamese MarineCorps continued to experience problems in thisarea throughout the 1950s and well into thenext decade. Breckinridge, who returned to servewith the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenantcolonel in the late 1960s, recalled shortages ofsuch vital and common items as small arms am-munition even then.

The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw theMarine advisors working to overcome a po-tentially more serious problem, one that alsodated from the French-Indochina War, From theoutset of their experience with the VietnameseMarine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived thata strong defensive orientation seemed to pervadeevery echelon of the smail service. Most Americans,including U.S. Army advisors who were encounter-ing similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army,agreed that this "defensive psychology" was aby-product of the long subordination of the


First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose withLieutenant Colonel Frank R. IVilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). /lt theextreme left is Captain Le Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To his immediateleft is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC).

Vietnamese National forces to the French HighCommand. Indeed, a criticism frequently voicedby USMAAG officials during the Indochina Warhad been that the French tended to frustrate thedevelopment of the Vietnamese military forcesby assigning them static security tasks ratherthan offensive missions. Even though the fore-runners of the Vietnamese Marine battalions hadoperated as commando units, they too had seenextensive duty protecting dinassaut bases andother French installations. Now this defensivethinking was affecting the attitude of the Viet-namese Marine toward training. Moreover, itwas threatening the American effort to transformthe service into an aggressive amphibious strikeforce.

By nature this particular problem defied quick,simple solutions. The Marine advisors, therefore,undertook to adjust the orientation of the entire

Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged periodthrough continuous emphasis on offensive training.The advisors consistently encouraged their Viet-namese counterparts to develop training scheduleswhich stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and

maneuver, and night movement. In this sameconnection the Marine advisors translated U.S.Marine small unit tactics manuals into French,whereupon the same manuals were further trans-lated by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese.This process assured that adequate training litera-ture was made available to the individual Marineand his small unit leaders. The offensively orientedtraining programs and the translation projectcomplemented one another, and combined withcontinuous supervision by the U.S. advisors andthe return of young Vietnamese officers from

Quantico, gradually helped impart a more ag-


gressive offensive Spirit to the entire MarineCorps.

Summing Up Developments

The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute per-haps the most critical and challenging span in thechronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Bornout of the :onfusion which dominated South Viet-nam in the aftermath of the Geneva Agreement,the embryonic Marine Cofps had survived againstheavy odds. Even before its scattered componentscould be drawn together under a centralized com-mand, the Corps had been hurled into combatagainst the rebellious sects. Over the course oftheir commitment the Vietnamese Marines hadstrengthened their own cause through demon-strations of their fighting capability and loyalty.In terms of the VNMC's continued existence,equally critical battles were being waged in Saigonwhere the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and theVietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain

211—623 0-77 — 3

support for the infant service. It was there, ironi-cally, that the destiny of the Vietnamese MarineCorps ultimately had been decided.

On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959was characterized by uncertainty, transition, andproblem solving. Never sure of the Marine Corps'future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and ahandful of U.S. Marine advisors had carried for-ward their efforts to transform scattered French-inspired river commando units into a coherent andresponsive American-style amphibious force. Whilethis transformation was only partially realized,definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese officershad replaced French commanders, and with Ameri-can guidance, had given their service a strong in-terim structure. Many of the more serious prob-lems which had plagued the struggling organiza-tion since its inception had been identified. WithAmerican assistance, solutions to those problemswere being developed and tested. So, despite astormy beginning and a threatened early child-hood, the Vietnamese Marine Corps lived.

CHAPTER 3

Vietnamese Marinesand the Communist Insurgency

Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency—Insurgency and the VietnameseMarine Corps—Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands—American

Decisions at the Close of 1961

Origins and Early Stages ofInsurgency

South Vietnam gave every outward indicationthat it had achieved a measure of overall stabilityin the two-year period following President Diem'selection in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diemfelt strong enough politically to announce hisgovernment's refusal to participate in the re-unification elections scheduled for midyear. Hebased this position upon the argument that freeelections were impossible in Communist NorthVietnam. The proposed July election deadlinepassed without a serious reaction by North Viet-nam. Equally encouraging was the fact that therehad been no noticeable resurgence in the armedpower of either the politico-religious sects or theBinh Xuven. At the same time the American-backed South Vietnamese economy appeared tobe gaining considerable strength.

The threat of invasion from the North had alsobeen tempered somewhat by 1958. The MAAG,now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T.Williams, U.S. Army, a commander respected asa tough disciplinarian, was beginning to reshapethe former Vietnamese national forces.* Renamedthe Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN),the army now consisted of four field divisions(8,500 men each), six light divisions (5,000 meneach), 13 territorial regiments (whose strengthvaried), and a parachute regiment. AlthoughGeneral Williams viewed this as merely an interim

*General Willianis would head the MAAG until his retirementin 1960.

26

Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Com-mander, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam.

(USA Photo SC'494954).

organization, it had provided the South Viet-namese army with a unified command structurebased on sound organizational principles. Thearrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary EquipmentRecovery Mission (TERM) in 1956, moreover,had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment toeach ARVN regiment. American officers werelikewise reorganizing and helping train the small

VIETNAMESE MA SINES AND TILE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 27

Vietnamese Navy (2,160 othcers and men) andAir Force (4,000 officers and men). The VietnameseMarine Corps continued to exist as a two-battalionamphibious force within the nation's navalestablishment. General Williams felt confidentthat by 1958 South Vietnam's regular militaryestablishment had been strengthened enough todiscourage North Vietnamese leaders from seriouslyconsidering an outright invasion.'

Backing these developing regular forces, atleast on paper, were two generally feeble para-military organizations—the Civil Guard (CG)and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). Thelarger of these, the Civil Guard, existed within theMinistry of Interior and was funded and advisedby the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its48,000 men, therefore, were not charged againstthe 150,000-man force level ceiling that regulatedthe size of Diem's regular forces. Nor were the47,000 members of the Self Defense Corps, eventhough this organization received limited amountsof U.S. military assistance funds for payroll pur-poses. In any case, serious shortcomings wereevident in both the CG and the SDC. Organizedinto provincial companies directly responsible tothe various province chiefs, the Civil Guard wasentirely separate from the ARVN chain of coin-mand. Furthermore, American civilians undergovernment contract had armed and trained theCG for police-type as opposed to military missions.The SDC, essentially a scattering of local militiaunits, was even weaker, having been organizedat the village level into sc1uads and an occasionalplatoon. Although the SDC units were subordinateto the respective village chief, the ARVN borethe responsibility for providing then with armsand training. More often than not the VietoaieseArmy units gave their obsolete weapons to theSDC and showed little genuine interest in trainingthe small units.2

Although a measure of stability was obviouslyreturning to South Vietnam by 1958, one of thecountry's more serious problems remained un-solved—the threat of subversion by CommuniitViet Minh agents who had remained south of the17th parallel following the Geneva ce1tse-fire.

Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955,Dieni turned to neutralize this potential threat.lnitia1ly his army experienced som siccess withpacification operations conducted in former .Viet

Minh strongholds. While they did help extendgovernment control into the rural areas of severalprovinces, such operations were discontinued in1956.

Another policy initiated that same year seems tohave nullified the moderate gains produced by thepacification campaigns. Acting both to eliminateViet Minh sympathizers from positions of leader-ship at the local level and to extend his own gripdownward to the rural population, Diem replacedelected village officials with appointed chiefs. Thenew policy, which threatened the traditionalautonomy of the individual Vietnamese village,was immediately unpopular.

So was another government program whichDiem implemented to undercut Communist strengththroughout the country—the Anti-CommunistDenunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 todiscredit former Viet Minh, the denunciationcampaign evolved into something of a witch hunt.By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietramese withonly minimal Communist connections were al-legedly being confined in political re-educationcamps. Like the appointment of village leaders,the denunciation campaign served to alienateVietnamese who might otherwise have supportedthe central government in its struggle for control ofthe rural regions.

Forced underground by the Anti-CommunistDenunciation Campaign, Viet Minh agents con-centrated on strengthening their political posturefor the proposed general election in the periodimmediately following the Geneva Agreement.When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passedinmid-1956, the so-called stay behinds'' beganrebuilding clandestine political cells in theirformer strongholds. Having retained their aptitudefor the adroit manipulation of local grievances, theCommunists gradually won support from ruralVietnamese who sw themselves threatened by thenew government policies. In mid-1957, the Com-munists, who were now being labelled VietCong" by the Diem government (a derogatory butaccurate term which, literally translated, meant'Vietnamese Communist'') began assassinatinggovernment officials in several of the country'srural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village chiefs,rutal police, district officials, and school teachers,the Viet Cong's assassination campaign was under-taken to erode the government's contacts with the

28 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—t964

local populace and thereby enhance their ownorganizational efforts.

Still faced with the possibility of a conventionalattack across the demilitarized zone, PresidentDiem was reluctant to commit his regular militaryunits to a problem which seemed to demand police-type operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, herelied on the Village Self Defense Corps and theCivil Guard to maintain order in the provinces.Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily inurban police methods, the paramilitary forcesproved unable to prevent the diffuse terroristattacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957and July 1958, for example, some 700 more SouthVietnamese officials reportedly died at the hands ofCommunist terrorists.3

The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaignscontinued apace throughout 1958. The occurrenceof the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon andthe initiation of an anti-American propagandacampaign near the end of that year, moreover,indicated that the Communists were broadening thescope of their activities. By this time, the internaldisturbances were beginning to assume the dimen-sions of a concerted guerrilla movement in severalof the country's more heavily populated regions,including parts of the important Mekong Delta.Near the close of 1958 President Diem finally beganordering regular military units into the provinceswith instructions to eliminate th Viet Cong andrestore government control.

The very nature of the enemy, however, tendedto render such government operations ineffective.Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their strengthfrom the clandestine political structure whichagents had established in portions of the country-side. Interwoven into the social fabric of the ham-lets and villages, this political infrastructure, as itlater came to be called, served a dual purpose. Itwas both the machinery by which the Communistsexercised control over the population and a vitalbase of support for the growing guerrilla forces,providing the Viet Cong with men, food, intelli-gence information, and refuge.

As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited fromand lived among the local populace, outsidersfound it virtually impossible to identify them.Their familiarity with the local terrain, theirmethods of operating in small groups, and massingfor attacks mostly at night made locating them

equally difficult. Even their patience seemed toenhance their ability to survive. Unwilling toengage a stronger military force and realizing thata specific government operation could not continueindefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would meltinto their environment with the arrival of regularunits. When the operation terminated and theregular government forces withdrew, the Commu-nists would re-emerge, often stronger than before.In many cases the guerrillas could give real meaningto their anti-government propaganda once the localpopulation had felt the weight of military opera-tions in their particular community. Operating inthis manner, the Viet Cong were able to husbandtheir strength while simultaneously expandingtheir influence.

There was ample indication that the Communistmovement was not wholly indigenous to SouthVietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing NorthVietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becom-ing apparent near the end of the decade. In May1959, the Central Committee of the North Viet-namese Communist Party publicly announced itsintention 'jto smash" the government of Ngo DinhDiem.4 By the summer of that year the Viet Congwere being reinforced with men and limited quan-tities of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam.Many of the Communist infiltrators, who at thisearly stage were entering Diem's country across theDMZ and by sea, were southerners who had goneNorth with the Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained inpolitical and military operations, these returneesadded substantially to the Viet Cong's disciplineand technical capabilities.*

So strengthened, the Communist guerrillasreportedly were operating in battalion strength(300- to 400-man battalions) in some areas by mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expandedtheir activities to include hit-and-run attacks onparamilitary posts, district headquarters, hospitals,schools, and agricultural stations. Like the assassi-nation campaign which was underway concurrentlyin areas still controlled by the GVN, these attacks

*A State Department publication released in 1965 placed thenumber of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators for the years1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that an additional 2,700North Vietnamese were estimated to have been infiltrated duringthis two-year period. The vast majority of these were thoughtto have been former residents of southern Vietnam. (Departmentof State, Aggression from the North, p. 33.)

VIETNAMESE MARINES AND THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 29

were conceived with political considerations inmind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly de-fended facilities, the Viet Cong was able to em-barrass the central government while demonstratingtheir own strength to the local population. Theraids, furthermore, produced weapons whichenabled the guerrillas to operate without totaldependence on the North.

By mid-1959 the security situation in the Re-public of Vietnam had deteriorated to the pointthat much of the optimism formerly voiced byAmerican and South Vietnamese officials had begunto disappear. The National Intelligence Estimatereleased in Washington during August accuratelydescribed the conditions which were settling overSouth Vietnam. This paper disclosed that thenation's economy was beginning to falter noticeablyand that President Diem's government was growingincreasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimatewarned that harassment by the Viet Cong could beexpected to intensify.5

As predicted, security conditions in SouthVietnam did grow worse in the period followingthe August intelligence estimate. In the last fourmonths of 1959 almost 200 assassinations werereported. In January 1960 another 96 civilians werekilled by the Communists and in the followingmonth the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960the Viet Cong were strong enough to begin am-bushing regular ARVN units in several provinces.Like their raids on fixed installations, their ambushtactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizingdefeats for the government. Like the raids, theywere also providing weapons and ammunition forthe growing guerrilla forces.

By 1960 the government's inability to containthe disturbing malaise was beginning to producepolitical tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a groupof 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures,including a number of former cabinet members,issued a public demand for President Diem'sresignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering thearrest of all who signed the manifesto.

A more serious effort to bring down the centralgovernment occurred in November when a group ofmilitary officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi,the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVNairborne brigade, staged an abortive coup d'etatin Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese Marines

joined Thi's rebellious paratroops.* But the powerstruggle, which began in the early morning hoursof 11 November, ended when units loyal to Presi-dent Diem converged on the capital. Realizingthat the balance had been tipped against them, thecoup leaders fled the country and the incident wasclosed. While it had failed to bring down the Diemgovernment, Thi's attempted coup had revivedthe possibility of efforts by military leaders toseize control of the government and had injecteda new element of uncertainty into South Vietnam'salready unstable internal situation.

Two other danger signals flashed across South-east Asia shortly after the abortive coup. InJanuary 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi an-nounced that the National Liberation Front (NLF)had been founded in the South on 20 December 1960with the stated purpose of closely uniting the

various classes of the South Vietnamese patrioticpopulation in the struggle against the Americansand Diem 6 In truth, the NLF emerged asa fully developed Communist political organizationimported from North Vietnam for the purpose ofcontrolling, directing, and coordinating the insur-gency south of the 17th parallel. For Americanofficials, the announced establishment of the NLFsignified that Ho Chi Minh's government had optedfor the forceful reunification of North and South.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event ledto further speculation that the war in Vietnam wasabout to enter a new phase. Backed by the NorthVietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forcesseized control of the southeastern portion of theLaotian panhandle. Thus, the North Vietnameseobtained a protected corridor along South Viet-nam's northwestern border through which men andmateriel could be infiltrated to the South.

The establishment of the NLF and the Commu-nist takeover in southern Laos coincided roughlywith approval in Washington of a comprehensiveplan designed to help President Diem restoreinternal order. Designated the Counter-InsurgencyPlan (CIP), this study had been ordered by Presi-dent Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed byLieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army,the officer who had relieved General Williams asMAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the

*Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere in thischapter.

30 THE ADyISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

White House shortly after President John F.Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961. Signifi-cantly, its arrival came at a time when the SovietPremier, Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledginghis country's support for "wars of nationalliberation.''

The plan presented for the new president's con-sideration drew clear connections between themilitary and political aspects of the war in Viet-nam. It included a conditional offer of U.S. supportfor a 20,000-man increase in the regular SouthVietnamese military forces and a 32,000-man in-crease in the size of the Civil Guard. These militaryand paramilitary increases were to be dependentupon President Diem's agreement to effect majorreforms in his military and political apparatus—measures which American officials in Saigon con-sidered necessary for the success of any counter-insurgency effort.

President Kennedy approved the main provisionsof the Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961and negotiations on the package opened with Diemtwo weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked onthe issue of political and military reforms. Mean-while, with the discussions in Saigon dragging oninconclusively, the situation in the provincescontinued to worsen. A National IntelligenceEstimate released in March estimated that VietCong military strength had reached 10,000 men.Furthermore, the number of violent incidentsreported in the country had risen to 650 per month.Even worse, it was estimated that 58 percent ofSouth Vietnam was under some degree of Com-munist control.7

Convinced that the situation was becomingcritical and fearing that it might soon becomehopeless, President Kennedy approved a new pro-gram of military assistance to the Diem governmenton 29 April. Inspired in part by Kennedy's desireto increase Diem's confidence in the new U.S.administration, the 29 April program did notrequire concrete pledges of reform from the SouthVietnamese. In its specifics, however, the newpackage was similar to the CIP. It contained pro-visions for supporting a 20,000 man increase in theRepublic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)—a move which would raise the ceiling on the SouthVietnamese regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000.Another provision approved the use of MilitaryAssistance Program appropriations for the Civil

Guard and Self, Defense Corps and expanded theMAAG's responsibility to include training andequipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan,the paramilitary forces were to be transferred fromDiem's Ministry of the Interior to his Ministry ofDefense. In order to meet its increased advisoryresponsibilities, authorization was given to increasethe size of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of785. This provision allowed the first enlargementof the group since the introduction of the Tem-porary Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.*

General McGarr's advisory group began imple-menting President Kennedy's 29 April programduring the summer of 1961. But the increases in thegovernment's regular and paramilitary establish-ments and in the size of the MAAG failed to arrestthe trend of warfare on South Vietnam's battle-fields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized byincreasingly aggressive guerrilla operations and thesteady growth of Viet Cong'military forces. InAugust, for example, the ARVN reported 41 majorarmed attacks on its units. The following monthbrought 450 Viet Cong-initiated incidents, includ-ing several involving multi-battalion forces of over1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, anestimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, thecapital of Phuoc Thuan Province, and held thetown for an entire day before escaping unmolestedinto the countryside.8

Equally alarming was the rapid rise in theViet Cong's overall strength. Increasing numbersof Communist troops were now being infiltratedover recently opened trails through Laos. Curvingsouthwestward out of the North Vietnamesepanhandle, these infiltration routes enabled the.Communists to bypass the demilitarized zonewhich separated the two Vietnamese states andcontinue their southward movement down thelength of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuarieswithin these countries the North Vietnamesecould easily infiltrate into South Vietnam by usingtrails through the rugged mountains. Relyingprimarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Viet-namese infiltrators reportedly entered South Viet-nam during 1961. Successful recruiting in theSouth served as another source of manpower for

*With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the Inter-national Control Commission had granted permission for theMAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. \Vhen the logisticspersonnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets were createdwithin the MAAGs table of organization.

VIETNAMESE MARINES AND THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY .31

the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steadycadçnce of victories greatly enhanced the VietCong's prestige and thereby made recruitment lessdifficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from theNorth and recruitment in the South had swollenthe Viet Cong regular military forces to an esti-mated 25,000 men.

insurgency andthe Vietnamese Marine Corps

At the end of 1958, when President Diem beganordering his regular military forces into actionagainst the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese MarineCorps was a two-battalion infantry force organizedwithin South Vietnam's naval establishment. The1,837-man corps was still commanded by MajorLe Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquartersat the Cuu Long Navy Yard, an installationsituated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia Dinhboundary. Although they continued to maintainbarracks at Nha trang and Cam Ranh Bay respec-tively, the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions were nowbeing rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa,a town located about 20 miles northeast of thecapital. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, who hadreplaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as SeniorMarine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of theMAAG headquarters in Saigon but maintained anoffice in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long.Wilkinson's two assistants, Captains Gary Wilderand Dale N. Davis, lived with their battalions.

Elements of Hung's Marine Corps were amongthe first regular government units committed to theeounterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing Battalionwas ordered into action by the Joint General Staffin the closing weeks of 1958. After deploying fromBien Hoa, the battalion spent nearly two monthssearching for Viet Cong is a mosquito-infestedregion of An Xuyen, South Vietnam's southern-most province. Primarily, the Vietnamese Marinesconducted company and platoon-sized patrolsthrough rugged mangrove swamps in search ofguerrillas. When the operation ended in lateJanuary 1959, thç Vietnamese commanders reportedthat their units had killcd and captured severalCommunist guerrillas and political leaders. Theirtroops had also reported finding a suspectedguerrilla training camp which contained small

Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC,Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo .4229373).

quantities of food and some weapons. The Viet-namese Marines suffered no casualties during theirdeployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAGpolicy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompanythe unit into combat. Unable to observe the opera-tion, the American advisors could not accuratelyassess the battalion's tactical proficiency.

A few months after this initial operation, bothVNMC battalions were deployed against the VietCong—the 1st again to An Xuyen Province and the2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on theseacoast. So deployed, both units came under theoperational control of the respective provincechiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought duringMay, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unitclaimed to have inflicted over 200 casualties on theViet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one company ofthe 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18

guerrillas and capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S.Marine advisors were not present and thereforecould not assess the accuracy of these reports. Inany case, these were the final combat operations forthe Vietnamese Marine Corps as a two-battalionforce.


Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities inSaigon were giving increased attention to thegrowing internal threat. Still, they had yet toinitiate any sweeping changes in the orientation ofthe RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entireARVN was in the final phase of a reorganizationprogram which would culminate by mid-year inthe formation of seven divisions of uniform size(10,500 men each), five territorial regiments, andan airborne brigade (formed from the old Armyparachute regiment). Under the new organizationthe Seven standard divisions were to be deployedin or near population centers throughout thecountry and were to be organized under two corpsheadquarters, one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, andthe other (II Corps) located at Pleiku in the CentralHighlands. A third provisional corps headquartershad also been formed in Saigon for activation in theevent of a national emergency.*

One of the MAAG's reactions to the emergingguerrilla threat was to urge that President Diemtransfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of Defense.This adjustment, General Williams pointed out,would permit the MAAG to train and equipthe CG for a mobile counterguerrilla mission.But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man forcelevel ceiling. When both the Diem government andthe U.S. Embassy objected to the proposed transfer,the MAAG turned to another alternative: thestrengthening and use of the regular units whoseassignment to counterguerrilla operations wouldnot seriously disturb the country's counterinvasionpotential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whoseinfantry battalions had already participated inseveral operations against the Viet Gong, fell intothis category of units to be bolstered for thecounterguerrilla role.

It was against this background that the VNMCwas enlarged again in mid-1959. This latest expan-sion was generally accomplished in accordancewith the staff study prepared by Lieutenant ColonelCroizat some three years earlier. On 1 June, afterboth Marine battalions had returned from theircombat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3dLanding Battalion was formed at a camp just

*By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated andgeographic boundaries of all three corps would be delineated tofacilitate the coordination of the governments military effortsagainst the Viet Cong. These military-geographic subdivisionswere termed corps tactical zones (CTZ).

outside the Cuu Long Navy Yard. This new unit,manned primarily by troops transferred fromamphibious elements then being phased out of thereorganized ARVN, was built around a smallnucleus of seasoned Marine officers and noncom-missioned officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2dBattalions, most of these Marines had seen combatagainst the Viet Minh, the sects, and the VietCong.

Another development saw a fourth rifle companyadded to each Marine infantry battalion. In turn,the old heavy weapons companies were abolished.The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles werereorganized into platoons within the battalions'headquarters and service companies. New weapons,two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man themwere added to each Marine rifle company. Theseadjustments raised the strength of the infantrybattalions to around 900 officers and men andprovided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with abasic organizational structure which its infantrybattalions would retain throughout the comingdecade.*

Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Bat-talion and the modification of the organizationaltables, the VNMC was formally designated the

Marine Corps Group." Now numbering 2,276officers and men, the Vietnamese Marines wereformed into a group headquarters, a group head-quarters and service company, a 4.2-inch mortarbattery, and the three infantry battalions.**

As important as the VNMC's expansion, reorgan-ization, and redesignation was the dramaticchange in its role within the Vietnamese armedforces. On 1 June the Joint General Staff directedthe Vietnamese Marine Corps and the newly formedARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission ofthe general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. Soassigned, the Vietnamese Marine Corps became a'force in readiness' '—a service directly responsible

to the Joint General Staff for any assigned groundwarfare mission.9

'A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification ofthe VNMCs table of equipment. The most important changesaw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their M—1 carbinesfot the heavier M—1 rifle, the weapon with which the ARVNinfantry forces were equipped.

**The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known asthe Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formalredesignation.


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The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elementsof the ARVN airborne brigade (also garrisonednear Saigon) were ordered into action against theViet Cong with increasing frequency after beingdesignated the RVNAF general reserve. Usually,the Marine battalions, like their airborne counter-parts, were assigned to operate in a particularprovince for a specified time period. In such assign-ments the battalion commander was directlyresponsible to the province chief who, in mostcases, was a military officer. The province chiefssometimes utilized the Marines in conjunction withtheir Civil Guard units. It was not uncommon forthe Vietnamese Marines to find themselves con-ducting operations in the most rugged and inac-cessible regions of the province to which they wereassigned. In such deployments the Marine bat-talions often bore the brunt of hostile action or

suffered the physical hardships associated withliving and fighting in the most adverse swampsand jungles.

In connection with their continuing campaignto transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into atruly elite fighting organization, the U.S. MarineAdvisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecksto take pride in the difficult and dangerous missionsnow being assigned. In a related effort intended togenerate espri: de corps throughout the service,Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that theMarine Corps adopt an official emblem and adistinctive uniform. These suggestions producedresults when a board of Vietnamese officers selectedan emblem design similar to that of the U.S.Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC adopted alight weight, black and green tiger stripe''camouflaged utility uniform similar to that for-

Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested swamps of the ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation.(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Golonel Michael J. Gott, USMC).

VIETNAMESE MARINES AND TI-IC COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 35

merly worn in Indochina by French commandounits. Although designed and procured primarilyfor use in steamy tropical jungles, the colorfuluniform came to be worn in garrison with a darkgreen beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem,which was worn as a patch over the left breastpocket, this uniform became the distinguishingmark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S.Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblemdid much to set the VNMC apart from the otherSouth Vietnamese armed services

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated anotherchange during this same period which did much toimprove the effectiveness of the Marine advisoryprogram. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 Americanpolicy had prohibited all U.S. military personnelfrom participating in combat with South Vietnam-ese forces. Because the prevailing restrictions pre-vented his assistants from accurately assessing thecombat capabilities of the Vietnamese Marinebattalions, Wilkinson requested that they beallowed to accompany their units into action. Aftersome study, General Williams, still the MAAGChief, approved this request with the stipulationthat the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as non-participating observers.11 This privilege was notextended to other MAAG personnel. Wilkinsonand his assistants, therefore, became the firstAmerican servicemen to witness actual combatoperations against the Viet Cong. So through aninformal and relatively unknown arrangement, ahandful of Marine advisors were able to insurethat principles being stressed in training werebeing applied in combat. Now operating alongsidethe Vietnamese Mariiies in action, the advisorswere also able to obtain a better appreciation of theterrain and enemy and a more thorough understand-ing of the frustrating problems being encounteredby the VNMC units.

The first half of 1960 brought changes in boththe leadership of the Vietnamese Marine Corps andthe U.S. Marine advisory program. In May Presi-dent Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior MarineOfficer. His replacement was Major Le NguyenKhang, an officer who spoke fluent English andwho had been the first Vietnamese Marine gradu-ated from the U.S. Marine Amphibious WarfareSchool at Quantico. A capable and inspiring officerwho had formerly commanded a landing battalionin combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to

head the VNMC for over three years. The followingmonth Lieutenant Colonel Clifford J. Robichaudrelieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as SeniorMarine Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seencombat previously. A. former master sergeant, hehad been commissioned during World \Var II andhad fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadal-canal and later in Korea. Like all U.S. Marinesassigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960,Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one yeartour in South Vietnam.

Combat assignments against the Viet Congcontinued to dominate the VNMC's activitiesduring the remainder of 1960. With Communistforces now capable of battalion-sized operations insome areas, the Joint General Staff began deploy-ing government forces to the provinces in multi-battalion strength. By late 1960 the VietnameseMarines were conducting two-battalion operationscontrolled by a task force headquarters. Khang,now a lieutenant colonel, normally commandedthese Marine task forces.

It was during one such operation, in which the1st and 2d VNMC Battalions were operatingtogether in the provinces south of Saigon, that

Vietnamese Marine corps Emblem.


Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior MarineAdvisor. (USMC Photo A25342).

elements of the 3d Battalion became involved inthe abortive coup of November 1960. The powerstruggle began in the early morning hours of the11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attendingan informal celebration of the Marine Corpsbirthday at Lieutenant Colonel Robichaud's quar-ters in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi'srebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3dVNMC battalion commander and two Marinecompanies from Cuu Long, moved into the capitalon trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Head-quarters. The remainder of the 3d battalion, led bythe battalion executive officer, who was unawareof his superior's intentions, moved to the presi-dential palace and established protection for Diem.Word of the coup, meanwhile, had reached Khangat his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Ledby the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2dBattalions returned to Saigon by truck convoy andimmediately joined the two Marine companiesalready around the palace. For several hours thepossibility existed that Khang's Marines mightclash with Thi's paratroops or even with the tworebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion.

But pro-Diem units soon began converging onSaigon in such numbers that the coup collapsed.Thi and his associates fled the country, whereuponDiem appointed new officers to command theinsubordinate units. With loyalists in chargethroughout South Vietnam's military and navalservices, the incident was closed. Both the airbornebrigade and the VNMC resumed their functionsas the RVNAF general reserve.'2

By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, nowheaded by General McGarr, was ready to imple-ment the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF asauthorized in the package approved by PresidentKennedy the previous spring. Included in this U.S.program were plans to increase the size of theVietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. Thisexpansion got underway in July when the initialsteps were taken to form a fourth infantry battalionand a 75mm pack-howitzer battery—additionswhich were to raise the authorized strength of theVNMC to 3,321 officers and men. The transfer ofARVN artillerymen provided the personnel neces-sary to man the pack-howitzer unit, which formednear Thu Due, a small town about 13 miles northof the capital. Officers and noncommissionedofficers were drawn from the three existing VNMCbattalions to form a nucleus for the new infantrybattalion while its ranks were filled gradually byrecruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized atVung Tau, a coastal resort town situated on CapeSt. Jacques about 40 miles southeast of Saigon.Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a WorldWar II veteran who replaced Robichaud as SeniorMarine Advisor in August, was on hand to assistwith this latest reorganization of the VNMC.

While the new Marine units were forming theJGS ordered the Vietnamese Navy and MarineCorps to conduct an amphibious assault against asuspected Communist stronghold near South Viet-nam's southern tip. The objective area was aportion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive inun-dated region located along the western coast ofthe Ca Mau Peninsula. Because it was inaccessibleby land, the forest had served as Communist basearea since the French Indochina War. The conceptof operation called for the Marines to land atdaybreak, move inland through the mangroveswamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elementsinto ARVN units which would have established ablocking force inland from the beach. Captains


Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnameseofficers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC).

Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S.Marine advisors, embarked on board two WorldWar II vintage Vietnamese Navy LCIs (landingcraft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3dBattalions respectively.

A series of problems arose on the morning ofthe operation to delay the landing for severalhours. When the Marines finally came ashore latein the morning they failed to locate any enemyforces. Captain Gott, who accompanied the 1stBattalion for the duration of the operations ashore,later recounted the difficulties. He noted, forinstance, that no U.S. Navy advisors were embarkedon board the Vietnamese ships. As a result, therelatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors en-countered technical difficulties with their naviga-tional aids, and the ships arrived at the objectivearea late. Inexperience on the part of the VietnameseMarines and sailors in debarkation techniquescompounded the delay. Once ashore, outdatedFrench maps and dense mangrove jungle combined

to retard the Marines' progress inland, thus allow-ing the Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gottconcluded that Some of the difficulties encounteredafter the landing phase of the operation mighthave been offset by the presence of observationaircraft. As it was, the Marines' visibility wasrestricted throughout the operation by thickmangrove vegetation. Thus a combination ofunforeseen factors had rendered this particularoperation ineffective.'3

A similar landing was repeated in the same areathe following month. Again the participatingMarine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces.Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complainedthat there were no enemy troops in the area andthat the government's intelligence was inaccurate.Whatever the reason, the results of these twounsuccessful offensives typified the problems whichplagued most South Vietnamese ground forcesthroughout the country during the 1960—1961period. The Communist guerrillas, aided by


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difficult terrain, a well-developed intelligencenetwork, and sometimes by the local population,could usually evade government units wheneverescape was desirable. Because the Marines normallyoperated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet Congpolitical apparatus was strong, their units wereparticularly frustrated. In regions such as theU Minh Forest intelligence information simplydid not flow upward from the people. Instead, insuch Communist-controlled environments, the localVietnamese served the Viet Cong, warning themof strengths, locations, and movements of Marineunits.

While combat deployments such as the Ca Maulandings highlighted the remainder of 1961, theMarine battalions nevertheless spent the majorityof their time in non-combat assignments. Duringsuch periods the battalions occupied their respectivebase camps around Saigon and Vung Tau, awaitingorders from the Joint General Staff. Even thoughheld in reserve, they frequently were called uponto provide security detachments for vital pointssuch as bridges, naval facilities, and communica-tions installations. Most U.S. Marine advisorstended to oppose such assignments, contendingthat they detracted from the overall readinessof the battalions and disrupted much neededtraining. The utilization of the \TNMC units instatic security roles also conflicted with the ad-visor's continuing efforts to convince the Vietnam-ese Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensivelyoriented strike force. Still, despite the protestationsof the American advisors, the JGS persisted indispersing VNMC detachments in and around thecapital.

Although its battalions were sometimes beingfrustrated, both in their attempts to accomplishunit training and in their attempts to fix Communisttroop formations, the VNMC's involvement in thewar effort was forcing improvement of the servicein other areas. Frequent inspections by U.S.advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placingmore emphasis on the care of individual equipmentand weapons. Replacement items were beingrequisitioned with more promptness and unit com-manders were beginning to show increasing con-cern about the slow receipt of requested supplyitems. The replacement of worn-out World War IItrucks with new vehicles removed a long-standingsource of trouble in that it greatly reduced the

time consumed in performing major mechanicalrepairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequentdeployments of the \TNMC battalions were helpingto improve the overall combat readiness of theservice by preparing a solid core of small unitleaders and troops for operations against the VietCong.

Ancillary Effects of MarinePacific Commands

At the same time the intensified conflict in SouthVietnam was forcing improvement on the VNMC,it was having a siniilar but less direct effect onU.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac),approved a plan to assign individual Marines fromhis scattered commands to temporary duty inVietnam. The purpose of this program, whichbecame known as On-The-Job Training (OJT), wasto allow Marine officers and noncommissionedofficers to obtain firsthand knowledge of the com-plex nature of the conflict being waged in SouthVietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups ofofficers and noncommissioned officers from variousFMFPac commands were sent each month toobserve the counterguerrilla techniques beingdeveloped and employed in Vietnam. Although theOJTs were normally 'in country" for only a two-week period, the program was gradually producinga pool of small unit leaders somewhat acquaintedwith the situation in the Republic of Vietnam bythe end of 1961.*

The major Marine command to feel the impactof the war in Southeast Asia during the early1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-mancombat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. Inaddition to its participation in the OJT program,the 3d Marine Division began altering its conven-tional alnphibious orientation. Major GeneralDonald M. Weller, the division commander, pro-vided the initial impetus for this shift away froma purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early1961 had commanded a task force headquartersformed in response to the deteriorating militarysituation in Laos, anticipated that his command

*The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the endof 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of 1963.


Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet cong on the CaMan Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC).


Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (Photo courtesy ofLieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC).

might be committed to combat somewhere on theSoutheast Asian mainland. He therefore instructedhis staff to begin studying possible counterinsur-gency training programs which would help "turnthe entire orientation of the division toward thetype of intervention [which] we would be facedwith in Southeast Asia.'

Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of aNavy Cross and a future Commandant of theMarine Corps, assumed command of the 3d MarineDivision in September 1961 before General Weller'sobjectives could be fully realized. The new com-manding general immediately convened a Counter-guerrilla Warfare Study Group to consider theproblem. This study group framed a set of recom-mendations for Cushman in late 1961. His approvalof their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry

21.1-623 0—77— 4

Unit Training Course and a Command and StaffTvaining Course early the next year.

Conducted in Okinawa's rugged Northern Train-ing Area, the infantry course prepared rifle com-panies from the various infantry battalions forparticipation in counterguerrilla warfare. Theinstructors, graduates of either the Jungle WarfareSchool in johore, Malaya, or the new ArmySpecial Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, NorthCarolina, placed much emphasis on the originsand nature of guerrilla movements, small unitstactics, and night operations. The training syllabusfor this course included several live firing exercisesdesigned for individual Marines and fire teams.Some of these exercises required the Marines tonegotiate "jungle lanes" equipped with pop-uptargets. The week-long infantry course culminated


with a two and one-half day field operation forthe individual infantry platoons.

The Command and Staff Training course wassomewhat less rigorous, being designed primarilyto prepare battalion staffs to support their com-panies in a counterinsurgency environment. Lessthan 10 hours in length, this course was basedprimarily on lectures and map exercises.

At General Cushman's direction, the divisionG—3 (Operations Section) began stressing thesignificance of counter-insurgency training at allechelons of the division. Unconventional warfaretraining soon became an integral part of the train-ing schedules at every echelon. Under this programthe various infantry battalions were required toconduct an extended battalion-sized counterguer-rilla operation, and to report to the G—3 on theprogress of their efforts.15

The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program andthe 3d Marine Division's new approach to trainingcomplemented each other in several ways. Whereasthe OJT program helped create an awareness ofcounterguerrill a operations among individual Ma-rine officers and noncommissioned officers, thedivision's training programs achieved the sameresults at the staff and battalion level. At pointsthe two programs overlapped to the furtherbenefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to thenature of guerrilla warfare and the problems in-volved in countering the guerrilla, the officers andnoncommissioned officers who returned from OJTassignments in Vietnam provided assistance inplanning and supervising the division's counter-insurgency training programs. Short of actualcommitment to combat in a guerrilla-type en-vironment, it is doubtful that any other combinationof training could have better prepared the 3dMarine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.

American Decisions atthe Close of 1961

The progressive erosion of the government'sstrength and the steady growth of the Viet Congduring 1961 prompted President Kennedy to dis-patch his special military advisor, General MaxwellD. Taylor, to Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor,who had retired in the late 1950s after having

served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried thefollowing instructions from the president:

I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose ofappraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly asit concerns the threat to the internal security and defenseof that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferredwith the appropriate United States and South Vietnameseauthorities, including the Commander in Chief, Pacific,I would like your views on the courses of action which ourGovernment might take at this juncture to avoid a furtherdeterioration in the situation in South Vietnam; andeventually to contain and eliminate the threat to itsindependence.10

Like other American officials who had visitedDiem's republic during the course of the year,General Taylor returned to Washington convincedthat South Vietnam was in grave danger. In areport delivered to President Kennedy in Novem-ber, the general outlined his formula for salvagingthe situation. This included the broad recommenda-tion that the United States abandon its existingpolicy of strict military advice and begin cooperat-ing with the Vietnamese in a form of ''limitedpartnership.'' The American role in such a partner-ship, Taylor explained, would be to provide"working" advisors and "working" military unitsto aid South Vietnam's military forces.

General Taylor's report offered several specificproposals for implementing such a program.Among these were recommendations that threeU.S. Army helicopter companies and approxi-mately 6,000—8,000 American ground troops bedeployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam. Thehelicopter units would support the government'sground operations but the American ground forceswere to be used only in a defensive posture. Taylorbelieved that their presence would underscore theUnited States' determination to stand by SouthVietnam. A side-effect of this display of determina-tion would be to stimulate the morale of the re-public's armed forces. He added that in order tosupport such a build-up, it would be necessary torestructure and increase the size of the USMAAG.

President Kennedy's consideration of Taylor'sproposals resulted in a compromise decision whichcleared the way for more intense American involve-ment in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem'sapproval in early December, Kennedy authorizedthe Department of Defense to expand its advisoryand assistance programs. To enhance the effective-ness of the advisory program, he removed some of

VIETNAMESE MARINES AND TUE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 43

the official restrictions under which most U.S.military advisors had operated since 1955. Oneimportant change would allow all advisors toaccompany their Vietnamese units into combat. Atthe same time President Kennedy decided againstordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone;however, he instructed the Secretary of Defense,Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such a

contingency. He also approved General Taylor'srecommendation that American helicopter unitsbe sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of thefirst of these reinforceiiients just before 1961 ended,signalled the beginning of a new and more dynamicphase of American military participation in thestruggle to preserve the independence of SouthVietnam.

CHAPTER 4

An Expanding War, 1962

The War's New Context—Creation of MACV and Marine AdvisoryDivision—The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962—-Some Conclusions

The War's New Context

More than any previous year, 1962 was to be aperiod of deepened commitment for all participantsin the continuing struggle for control of SouthVietnam. On the American side plans already setin motion by President Kennedy's recent decisionspromised to loosen the flow of dollars, equipment,advisors, and combat support personnel to SouthVietnam. Administration officials envisioned thatthis sharp influx of assistance would stimulate aredoubled war effort on the part of the Diemgovernment.

Viet Cong strength and operational capabilitieslikewise were on the upswing as 1962 opened.U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placingtotal Viet Cong military strength at roughly25,000 men. Backing these military forces was afar greater number of sympathizers. Americanagencies tended to divide the Communist militaryforces into three rough categories according tofunction and composition—main forces, local forces,and village activists. Thought to total around9,000 men at the beginning of the year, the mainforces constituted the pillar of Communist militarystrength in the South. They were organized intoapproximately 20 small (200- to 400-man) andhighly mobile battalions and a number of inde-pendent companies. Main force units as a rulewere cadred by North Vietnamese (or returneestrained in the North) and were capable of con-ducting operations on an interproviricial scale.(They often were referred to as interprovincialbattalions and companies. Later in the war Ameri-cans came to call the main forces hard core''units.) Next in terms of operational capabilitieswere the Viet Cong local forces whose aggregatestrength stood at around 8,000 part-time but well-trained soldiers. The local forces were organizedinto platoons and companies which operated

44

independently within their respective districts.Finally, there were some 8,000 village activists.Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of theterm, the activists commonly worked in thepaddies by day and engaged in military pursuits atnight. For the most part their ranks were filledwith men considered either too young or too oldfor service with organized Viet Cong militaryunits. Nevertheless, they played an importantrole in the struggle for South Vietnam's rural areasby providing various forms of support for largerViet Cong formations. Living and working withinthe rural hamlets and villages as they did, theactivists were a ready source of intelligenceinformation for the Viet Cong. Often they servedas porters and guides for main force units whichhad been assigned to operate within their locale.Otherwise, the activists were responsible for de-fending their particular villages against the govern-ment's military and police forces—a defense whichnormally took the form of harassment with minesand sniper fire.*

After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Congmilitary and paramilitary forces were carefullycoordinated with Communist political activitieson the national level by a Central Office for SouthVietnam (COSVN).** From its headquarters, be-

"The three-way division was the most commonly used methodof categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army, TheViet Gong, p. 1:52.) A USMAAG document published duringthis period, howevcr, divided the Viet Cong into two somewhatbroader categories—main forces and guerrillas. Both local forceunits and village activists were classified as guerrillas under thissystem. (USMAAG, Vietnam, Tactics and Techniques of counterinsurgent Operations, p. 11—5.) Other sources tended to make moreelaborate divisions. (See Pike, Viet Cong.)

**cosvN apparently was established in March. Prior to thisthe NLF had functioned through two separate geographic head-quarters—Interzone V, responsible for roughly the northernthree-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO Interzone,responsible for the area roughly described by the forested hillsand Mekong Delta physiographic regions.

AN EXPANDING WAR, 1962 45

lieved to have been located northeast of Saigon inBinh Duong Province, COSVN exercised directcontrol over six military regions (MRs). Desig-nated MR—S through MR—9 (arranged in a northto south pattern) with an additional Saigon-GiaDinh Special Zone, the Communist military regionsserved essentially the same purpose as the govern-ment's corps tactical zones. Within these six regionsCOSVN utilized a province and district structureonly slightly different from that of the Diemgovernment to exercise administrative and militarycontrol. At each level within this organization asmall, disciplined Communist political committeeorchestrated the activities of its subordinatemilitary units with the actions of its politicalapparatus.

To counter the strengthened NLF organizationand to satisfy American demands that he adoptsome form of national strategy, President Diemlaunched one of the most controversial large-scaleundertakings of the war—the Strategic HamletProgram. Instituted on an informal basis in theclosing stages of 1961, the program became fullyoperative in mid-1962. Although heralded as a newconcept, the campaign actually grew out of anexisting program whose broad objective had beento bring improved economic and social conditionsto South Vietnam's rural areas. Named the Agro-yule Program, this effort had been in effect sincelate 1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, thepresident's brother and principal advisor. Since itsinstitution, however, the program had achievedlittle aside from the resettlement of many ruralfamilies in to government constructed communities.Few meaningful reforms, either social or economic,had been realized. During the early 1960s, more-over, many of the Agrovilles had been victimizedby the Viet Cong, who saw the developments assymbols of the government's presence in contestedareas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the moreremote Agrovilles, authorities in several provinceshad begun fortifying the otherwise helpless popu-lation centers.

Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovillesinto fortified communities, Sir Robert G. K.Thompson, the head of a newly formed BritishAdvisory Mission in Saigon, suggested thatPresident Diem consider adopting a similar schemewith broader strategic objectives. Thompson,who had helped implement such an effort in

Malaya in the 1950s during the struggle thereagainst Communist insurgents, specifically proposedthat the South Vietnamese integrate variouseconomic and social programs into an effectivecampaign to reestablish its influence in the heavilypopulated Mekong Delta. This campaign, Thomp-son advised, 'should lead by stages to a reorganiza-tion of the government machinery for directingand coordinating all action against the communistsand the production of an overall strategic opera-tional plan for the country as a whole 1

Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to developsome sort of national strategy for countering theinsurgency, President Diem accepted the conceptof Thompson's proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diemnamed Ngo Dirih Nhu to head a campaign formallydesignated the Strategic Hamlet Program. Nhuwas instructed to plan the program and to create acombined agency that would insure its coordinationwithin the various government ministries. Theseinstructions resulted in the creation (in February)of the Interministerial Committee for StrategicHamlets. A counterpart American organization,the U.S. Interagency Committee for ProvinceRehabilitation, was formed in April to provideassistance to Nhu's agency.

With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Em-bassy, the Vietnamese formulated a program whichin theory was to evolve in several rather distinctphases. First it would be necessary to select specificgeographic areas wherein the Strategic HamletProgram would be implemented. Once specificobjective areas had been established, regular mili-tary units would initiate operations to clear thoseareas of Viet Cong formations. Following thecompletion of these operations RVNAF unitswould resettle the inhabitants of the area in forti-fied hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to bedefended by Civil Guard units while regular forcescontinued screening operations in the surroundingcountryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corpsunits would assume responsibility for local securitywhile regular units continued to screen \Tiet Congforces from the developments. During this phasedistrict civil authorities would initiate economicand social programs within the newly formedcommunities in an effort to recapture the allegianceof the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, itwas expected that the Communist political infra-structure would be broken.


Following the pacification of a few contiguoushamlets, the same process was to be repeated oyerand over, in an expanding pattern. In this mannerDiem hoped to expand the GVN's control pro-gressively outward from the initial secure hamletsover large areas of the countryside. Ultimately theGVN intended to construct nearly 11,000 such pro-tected communities in several of the country'smost critical rural areas.

A principal shortcoming of this method ofpacification was that the success of the entire pro-gram within a specific area depended on the success-ful completion of virtually every developmentalphase in every strategic hamlet. Should the Com-munist infrastructure remain intact in even onehamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapseof the entire campaign by contaminatingthe surrounding communities in a geometricprogression.

Given this critical requirement that all phases beaccomplished in a deliberate and orderly manner, itwas unfortunate that Nhu initiated the programin an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of theyear, months before the appropriate American andSouth Vietnamese agencies had been formed toguide the program, the construction of hamlets hadbegun on a scale which already suggested a nation-wide campaign. Furthermore, the governmentfailed to test the plan in a pilot project such asThompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recom-mended. Instead, it launched rather extensivecampaigns simultaneously in several traditionalCommunist strongholds during the spring of 1962.

Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Stra-tegic Hamlet Program constituted the government'sfirst real effort to implement a concerted counter-insurgency strategy on a national scale. Regardlessof its weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start,the program would serve as the context withinwhich the Diem government would wage its battlewith the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963.From this military standpoint, moreover, Diem'sadoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program markedsomewhat of a watershed in the evolution of groundstrategy in the Vietnam war. Inherent in itsselection was the decision to opt for a "clear-and-hold" as opposed to a search-and-destroy"strategy. In accordance with the dictates of thepacification campaign, RVNAF ground forces wouldfocus primarily during the next two years on

operations to clear Communist military formationsfrom the more densely populated rural areas.

The creation of MACVand Marine Advisory Division

The American military build-up called for bythe Washington decisions of December 1961 waswell underway as the new year opened. SeveralU.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961had already begun operations by January. Theseincluded two U.S. Army transport helicoptercompanies and a composite U.S. Air Force detach-ment. Designated FARM GATE and composedinitially of 151 officers and men, the Air Forcedetachment had a dual mission of training VNAFelements and conducting attack sorties in supportof President Diem's forces. The arrival of anotherU.S. Air Force unit, a C—123 transport squadron,another Army helicopter company, and an Armycommunications organization, the 3d Radio Re-search Unit, just after the first of the year raisedthe number of American military personnel servingon permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000.Assigned to the Army's radio unit, which im-mediately began operations from Pleiku in II CorpsTactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1stRadio Company, FMF. Designated Detachment A,1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S.Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.

Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving inVietnam were for combat support rather thanadvisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honoluluin mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamaraordered the ranking American military oflicialsconcerned with Vietnam to make substantialincreases in the number of advisors serving withthe Vietnamese armed forces.

Less than a month after the Honolulu conference,a new U.S. command was created in Saigon tomanage the expected influx of advisors and theintensified military assistance effort more efficiently.On 8 February, the U.S. Military Assistance Com-mand, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) supplantedthe MAAG as the senior American command inthe Republic of Vietnam. Its commander, ArmyGeneral Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV), assumeddirect responsibility for all U.S. military policy,operations, and assistance to President Diem's


government. Harkins was directly subordinate tothe Commander in Chief, P:tcific, Admiral HarryD. Felt, whose headquarters was in Hawaii.

The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV'sstaff indicated that they would play an importantrole in its operations. In all, 21 staff billets in thenew command were allocated to the Marine Corps.The most important of these was the chief of staffbillet. This assignment went to Major GeneralRichard G. Weede, a veteran who had commandedan artillery battalion during the campaigns forSaipan and Okinawa during World War II. Later,in Korea, he had distinguished himself as thecommander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived inSaigon from Hawaii where he had commanded the1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other Marinesjoined General Harkins' command as Deputy Chiefof Staff, J—2 and as branch chiefs for the J—3 throughJ—6 divisions. Two other positions assigned toMarine officers were the project officer for a JointOperations Evaluation Group and a research anddevelopment project officer for a Department ofDefense agency. Both of these were operationallycontrolled by the newly organized MilitaryAssistance Command.

Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief ofStaff, U.S. Military zLcsistance Command, Vietnam.

(USMC Photo A150562).

Under the new U.S. command arrangement, theold Military Assistance Advisory Group becamesubordinate to General Harkins' command. Headedby Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army,the MAAG was now responsible primarily for theadvisory aspect of the assistance program. Toaccommodate the impending increases in the numberof advisors, the MAAG's staff was restructured.Under its new table of organization, Marineofficers were to serve as deputy chief of staff andhead of the plans branch of theJ—3 division. Later,in 1963, the MAAG's table of distribution wouldbe modified with the effect that the chief of staffbillet would be held by a Marine colonel. The firstMarine to serve as General Timmes' chief of staffwould be Colonel Earl E. Anderson, a much-decorated aviator who eventually would becomethe Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The reorganization of the MAAG brought abouta dramatic change in the size and scope of the U.S.Marine advisory effort. The new table of organ iza-tion included a provision for an 18-man MarineAdvisory Division within the MAAG's NavalSection. The organizational charts for this divisionincluded advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel, amajor, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and fourstaff sergeants. Administrative positions were tomake up the balance of the new organization.

As had been the case previous to this expansion,the lieutenant colonel was to serve as the SeniorMarine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.The inclusion of the major's billet was expected toenhance the overall effectiveness of the advisorydivision as he was to double as Assistant SeniorAdvisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gun-nery sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisoryduties. Of the six captains, four were to be assignedas advisors to VNMC infantry battalions while thetwo others were slated to advise on engineer andsupply matters. The four logistics-trained staffsergeants were to be assigned as assistant infantrybattalion advisors and were expected to free theofficer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming supply matters.

Marines required to man this enlarged advisoryunit began arriving in Vietnam as early as Febru-ary. All of the new officer advisors were graduatesof either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools,Quantico or the U.S. Army Special WarfareSchool at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Following


their assignments, but before departing for Viet-nam, many advisors received schooling in militaryassistance operations. This normally included afive-month course of instruction in the Frenchlanguage, a requirement which more and moreMarine advisors were beginning to question as aresult of the Vietnamese desire to converse intheir own language rather than French. Uponarrival in Saigon, the Marines were given two daysof orientation briefings at MACV headquartersbefore assuming their jobs in the Marine AdvisoryDivision.

Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve asthe Senior Marine Advisor and headed the newadvisory division throughout the summer of 1962.In October he was relieved by Lieutenant ColonelClarence G. Moody, Jr., a veteran who held theNavy Cross for heroism as a company commanderduring the Korean War. Having served with theBritish Royal Marines following Korea, Moodywas somewhat familiar with the problems involvedin dealing with foreign military services.

Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S.Marine advisors participated in every combat

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC,Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A412981).

operation undertaken by the VNMC during 1962.Prior to planned operations they helped theirVietnamese counterparts coordinate the moresophisticated means of support which becameavailable as the American military build-up tookhold. During planning phases, for example, theyassisted with the development of detailed ordersand helped plan for employing artillery fire and airsupport. If the impending operation was to beamphibious in nature, the Marine officers coordi-nated with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to thesupporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insur-ing that planning for embarkation had beenaccomplished. On occasion the advisors wererequired to coordinate helicopter support for theVNMC units—a task sometimes complicated bythe Vietnamese Marines' lack of experience inheliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almostconstant combat assignments being drawn by thehandful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter units availablein Vietnam made training in such operationsimpossible.

Even more difficult were the advisor's responsi-bilities after their units deployed to combat. TheU.S. Marines were experiencing the often frus-trating task of actually searching out the elusiveViet Cong on a continuing daily basis. Addition-ally, the Americans found themselves faced withthe unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers,who, in some cases, had been fighting Communistguerrillas since the French-Indochina War. Thesecircumstances presented a unique set of challengesfor the advisors. For American officers withrelatively little actual experience in this brand ofwarfare to offer tactical advice in a form acceptableto their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a

combination of tact, patience, and subtle per-suasive powers.

The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned thatsuccess in this peculiar assignment dependedlargely on the degree of respect they commandedamong the Vietnamese Marines. To help build thisintangible yet vital foundation of mutual under-standing and confidence, the Marine advisorsstayed with their units iii combat, sharing with theVietnamese Marine the same foods, the samedangers, the same discomforts, and the sameroutines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S.bachelor quarters in Saigon when their respectivebattalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they


spent much of this time at the Marine base camps,inspecting troops and equipment and makingpreparations for the battalion's next combatassignment. Among others, Lieutenant ColonelsBrown and Moody viewed this continuous as-sociation with the Vietnamese Marines as the singlemost essential ingredient to a successful advisoryprogram.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962

For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 wascharacterized by expansion, redesignation, andcontinued combat operations against the VietCong. On 1 January the former Vietnamese MarineGroup was redesignated the Vietnamese MarineBrigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men.Under its new table of organization, the number ofinfantry battalions remained at four but two newbattalions were added. One battery of eight 105mmhowitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm packhowitzers, and a headquarters and service batterycomprised an artillery battalion which was createdto provide artillery fire support to the infantryunits. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038officers and men was also formed. This unit con-tained the personnel necessary to provide the entireMarine brigade with reconnaissance, communica-tions, motor transport, medical, engineer, andtraining support. Lieutenant Colonel Khang con-tinued in his position as Commandant of theexpanded and restructured Vietnamese MarineCorps.

The infantry battalions of the VietnameseMarine Brigade performed a variety of combatmissions ranging from security duty around keygovernment installations to helicopter landings insuspected Viet Cong redoubts during 1962. Thefour infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion becameavailable for combat assignment at midyear) par-ticipated in 23 combat operations which involved404 days in the field. These operations included12 amphibious landings and eight heliborneassaults. With the exception of two howitzerbatteries which saw some combat, the artillerybattalion devoted the year to training. Supervisedby Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant

William A. Loyko, their new Marine advisors, theVietnamese artillerymen learned their skills in anumber of field firing exercises conducted on ARVNartillery ranges.

In terms of casualties the VNMC battalionsfought no major engagements with the Com-munists during the year. A typical operation wasone conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam'ssouthernmost province, early in the year. The 2dBattalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyenprovince chief for the period between 18 Februaryand 26 April, conducted one helicopter landing,provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys,and fought several minor engagements with theViet Cong. Although the Vietnamese commanderreported 112 enemy killed and another 40 woundedduring the two-month assignment, the figurescontradicted those of Captain Evan L. Parker, theMarine advisor, which placed the Viet Congcasualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. Thisdifference, which was not uncommon, stemmedlargely from the fact that the Marine advisorslimited their reports to enemy dead and woundedactually sighted. Still, the conflicting reports some-times led to tensions between the Vietnamesecommander and the Marine advisor.

In other instances the Vietnamese Marinebattalions were ordered to serve as the reserve forcefor one of the three corps tactical zones. The 1stBattalion, for example, accompanied by CaptainBradley S. Snell, assumed the mission as II Corpsreserve on 16 May and remained in that role untilmid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in theCentral Highlands, the battalion provided securityfor government installations while remaining readyto react to enemy threats. As the corps reserve itconducted one heliborne operation and severalsearch-type missions. In one of these searches theVietnamese Marines uncovered and destroyed aViet Cong small arms factory. During its assign-ment in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted foronly four Viet Cong dead and one wounded whilesuffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These sta-tistics attested both to the grim effectiveness ofenemy sniper fire and mines and to the enemy'selusiveness.

The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised byCaptain Don R. Christensen, entered combat for thefirst time during an operation in Binh Thuan


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Vietnamese Z4ari,zes search dense jungle for Viet ('ong base areas. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,(]SMC).

Province in the first week in August. Supportedby Battery A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of theartillery battalion, it joined the 43d ARVNInfantry Regiment in an attempt to locate anddestroy Viet Cong forces operating around PhariThiet, the provincial capital, located on the coast95 miles east-of Saigon. Following the conclusionof this operation on 22 August, the Marine unitsreverted to the control of the Binh Thuan provincechief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing andresettlement operations being conducted in con-junction with the Strategic Hamlet Program.Between 4 August and 15 October, when its assign-ment in the province ended, the 4th Battalionreported 12 Viet Cong killed and seven captured.Vietnamese Marine casualties were one killed and

five wounded. During the assignment the Marinesresettled some 600 civilians in fortified harnlets.l*

In the last week of September General David M.Shoup, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps,arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of SouthVietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor forhis actions as a regimental commander on Tarawain World War II, was recognized as one of PresidentKennedy's most trusted military advisors. Actingin his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Commandant was scheduled to visit a numberof U.S. and South Vietnamese installations, includ-ing several strategic hamlets.

*Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor duringthis period, later recalled that Pro\'incc chiefs tended to misusethe Marine units by assigning them unproductive missions suchas static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft, Comments on 2d DraftMS, Whitlow, Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964,"hereafter Croft Comments.)

52 TUE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA. 1954—i964


After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAGheadquarters in Saigon, the Commandant and hisparty journeyed by automobile to the base camp ofthe 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Ducon the outskirts of the capital. There, accompaniedby Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Khang, Shoupreviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard andinspected the 3d Battalion. Impressed with theunits he had seen, General Shoup commendedPresident Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade."From my observation," he wrote from Washing-ton, "the Vietnamese Marine Corps is in an excel-lent state of readiness from the standpoint ofequipment as well as the degree of training of itsmembers." "Indeed," he added, "your Corps ofMarines seemed to be a splendid and competentfighting organization."

The Commandant was less complimentary of theStrategic Hamlet Program. After visiting severalof the developments, he concluded that the govern-ment's effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civil-ians into defended communities was counter-productive to the program's stated objective ofwinning the allegiance of the rural population. AsShoup reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon hisreturn to Washington, the forced resettlement ofthe peasants from their native hamlets and villagesinto what amounted to fortified camps seemed tobe generating antagonism rather than good will.4

At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine com-manders reported a total of 192 Viet Cong killed,77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S.Marine advisors felt that even these moderatefigures were inflated. They estimated that onlyabout 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27 wound-ed, and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong

captured as had been reported by their VietnameseMarine counterparts. The Vietnamese Marines alsohad failed to inflict any serious damage on theenemy's logistic system, capturing only 16,000rounds of small arms ammunition, 45 grenades,31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printingpress, two typewriters, several motors, and anassortment of medical supplies.5

Some Conclusions

ifl retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an im-portant watershed in the chronicle of U.S. Marineactivities in Vietnam. As the year began onlythree Marine advisors and a handful of embassyguards were serving in the Republic. The initialmonths, however, brought a dramatic expansionof that role, both in terms of numbers and respons i-bilities. By March Marines were functioning onMAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon, in U.S. Armycommunications facilities in the Central Highlands,and throughout the provinces where VietnameseMarine units operated. Their contributions to thewar effort, therefore, were broad and varied, rang-ing from high level planning to infantry advisoryduties. The Marine role had expanded in roughproportion to the broad-based expansion of theoverall U.S. military assistance projram. In thisconnection, Marine contributions tended to beconcealed within the context of the Americanassistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could besaid that the Marines in Vietnam were leavingthe impact of their service on virtually every stageof the ground war.

PART IIMARINE HELICOPTERS

GO TO WAR

CHAPTER :5

SHUFLY at Soc TrangThe Decision—Deployment to Soc Tran,g—Mekong Delta Combat Support

Operations—Preparations and Redeployment—-Accomplishments

One of the most important developments in thechronicle of U.S. Marine activities in SouthVietnam during the early 1960s occurred shortlyafter the creation of MACV. Tn mid-April 1962, aMarine medium helicopter squadron was deployedto the Mekong Delta to provide support for theGovernment of Vietnam forces in their battle withthe Communist guerrillas. The significance of thesquadron's arrival went beyond the added mobilitythat it afforded those Vietnamese units attemptingto hold the rice producing delta region. Coincidingas it did with the increases in the number of Marinesserving on the MACV staff and under the MAAG,its arrival indicated that the Marine role wouldexpand in direct proportion to the widening U.S.effort to defend the Republic of Vietnam.

The Decision

The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unitto the combat zone originated in the immediateaftermath of General Taylor's report to PresidentKennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific(CinCPac), Admiral Harry D. Felt, to prepare forincreased operations in South Vietnam. This orderimplied that the Pacific command should standready to deploy additional helicopter units toDiem's republic in the event that it became necessaryto augment the Army companies already operatingthere. (By now the number of Army helicoptercompanies in South Vietnam stood at three.)CinCPac was also instructed to explore SouthVietnam's requirements for additional helicopterunits beyond the Army companies already present.'

Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised theJoint Chiefs of Staff that a valid requirement foradditional helicopter support did exist in the

211—623 0— 77 — 5

Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. Herecommended that a fourth U.S. Army light heli-copter company be deployed to the area. Includedin the admiral's recommendation was a proposalto support the aviation unit with a compositemaintenance, avionics, and medical group.2

Admiral Felt's recommendations were approvedby the Secretary of Defense on 6 March. The JointChiefs immediately assigned the responsibility forproviding the support package and helicopter unitto the Army. In turn, Army authorities alertedthe 33d Transportation Light Helicopter Companyat Fort Ord, California for the move. Its departuredate was set for 18 April.3

Unknown to the officers and men of the alertedunit, the plans for its deployment to combatwere being reconsidered at the time the orderswere received. Two days before Admiral Felt'srecommendation reached thejoint Chiefs, a proposalto augment Army helicopter units with Marinepilots had been advanced by General Timmes, theMAAG chief. This proposal triggered a brief buteventful debate within U.S. military circles. WithGeneral Harkins' concurrence, Timmes recom-mended that nine Marine helicopter pilots beassigned to the Army aviation units in Vietnamfor periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, hepointed out, would enable the Marine pilots tobecome familiar with the nature of the combatsupport operations in South Vietnam and wouldprovide them with transitional training in theArmy's Piasecki-built tandem-rotored H—21 heli-copter (nicknamed the 'Flying Banana' ).4

Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), LieutenantGeneral Alan Shapley, for his comments on theMAAG chief's plan. Shapley in turn instructedMajor General Carson A. Roberts, the CommandingGeneral, Aircraft, FMFPac to study the proposal

57


and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts,who had been selected for promotion to lieutenantgeneral and was scheduled to relieve Shapley asCommanding General, FMFPac, found the prospectof Marine aviators participating in combat supportoperations in Vietnam appealing but felt that theproposal under review had some definite disad-vantages. He pointed out that under Timmes' planthe Marine pilots would be flying a type of heli-copter unfamiliar to them instead of the ones theywould operate if the Marine squadrons were laterdeployed to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Rob-erts warned that the piecemeal assignment of hispilots would reduce the combat readiness of theunit from which they would be drawn.5

At Roberts' suggestion, General Shapley offeredCinCPac a counterproposal which he believedwould benefit both the South Vietnamese govern-ment and the Marine Corps. He suggested that acomplete Marine medium helicopter squadron fromMarine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG—16), 1st MarineAircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elementsbe moved from Okinawa to the war zone. TheMarine squadron, operating 24 HUS—ls (a single-rotor, Sikorsky-built transport helicopter laterknown as the UH—34D) would replace the Armyhelicopter company at Da Nang in the northern-most corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unitwould then be freed for redeployment southwardinto either II or III Corps Tactical Zones.

General Shapley emphasized several advantageswhich he saw in this plan. First, it would provideadditional helicopter support for the Republic ofVietnam Armed Forces while concurrently pro-viding an entire Marine helicopter squadron withan opportunity to gain first-hand experience in acounterguerrilla environment. It would also pro-vide Marine Corps units with operational experi-ence in I Corps, the area to which they would becommitted if standing contingency plans were laterexecuted. Finally, Shapley explained that hisproposal offered an almost entirely self-sufficientaviation unit which could be supported adminis-tratively and logistically by the 1st MarineAircraft Wing. The unit would require onlyminimal support from the Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam.6

On the same day that he had heard the Marinecommander's proposal, Admiral Felt received amessage from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander

in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advisedthat Roberts' plan be implemented.7 Admiral Feltthen solicited General Harkins' opinion on thematter. He reminded the MACV commander thatthe proposed deployment would provide theMarines with operational experience in an areawhere they might some day be committed. Theadmiral further pointed out that the location of aMarine helicopter unit at Da Nang would enablethe Army aviation companies to move south intoone of the other corps tactical zones—a move thatwould facilitate the logistical support of thoseunits by shortening their supply lines.8

Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt'sviewpoint. He noted that the more powerfulMarine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could beexpected to out perform the Army's H—21 in thehigher elevations around Da Nang. He also feltthat the Marines, with their seaborne supplynetwork, were better equipped to cope with thelogistics problems in the more isolated northernreaches of South Vietnam. But he objected to thedeployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on thebasis that the relocation of the Army's 93d Heli-copter Company from I Corps in the immediatefuture would disrupt a series of operations whichwere already underway in I Corps. As an alterna-tive, General Harkins proposed that the Marinehelicopters be located initially at Soc Trang in theMekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operationsin the northern corps tactical zone permitted, itcould exchange places with the Army unit atDa Nang.°

One Army general raised a specific objection tothe proposal that the Marine squadron be deployedfrom Okinawa. General James F. Collins, theCommander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (Cm-CUSArPac) argued that the presence of the Marinehelicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet'another supply and maintenance feature into the

III Corps area.'' This argument was followed bythe recommendation that the Army's 81st LightHelicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, beordered to the Mekong Delta. The 81st, GeneralCollins contended, was already trained in trooptransportation operations in jungle terrain.

General David M. Shoup, the Marine CorpsCommandant, who approved the FMFPac plan inconcept, harbored one reservation regardingGeneral Roberts' proposals. His concern stemmed

SHUFLY AT SOC TRANG 59

from the possibility that the Marine Corps mightbe required to replace the squadron from Okinawawith another in order to maintain the level ofoperational forces available to CinCPac—an even-tuality which would upset long-range MarineCorps deployment schedules. General Shoup indi-cated that he, too, would oppose the deploymentof a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnamif this proved to be the case.'1

At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Feltjourneyed to Saigon to discuss the matter morethoroughly with General Harkins. Followingconsultations, the two commanders jointly com-municated their recommendations to the JointChiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised thatit would be more desirable to deploy one of theMarine helicopter squadrons from Okinawa thaneither the Army unit already on alert in Californiaor the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt andHarkins informed the Joint Chiefs, was influencedheavily by the readiness posture of the variousunits under consideration. A Marine squadron,they pointed out, could be on station and readyfor combat operations by 15 April—three daysbefore the company already alerted by the Armycould depart California.12

Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt withthe CinCUSARPac contention that additionalsupply problems would be created by the deploy-ment of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. ThePacific commanders advised that, in their opinion,the logistical support 'can be handled relativelyeasily by [the] Marines." ' They added that shouldrequirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise inSouth Vietnam, the Army's 81st Helicopter Com-pany would be selected for the assignment. Itwould be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Trans-portation Light Helicopter Company from FortOrd. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkinsrecommended that the Marine squadron be de-ployed initially to the Mekong Delta area of IIICorps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, whenoperational conditions in I Corps were morefavorable, the Marines could replace the Armyhelicopter unit there.

After meeting to discuss the matter, the JointChiefs of Staff approved the entire package ofrecommendations on 16 March. Admiral Feltimmediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploya Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam

and authorized direct liaison between the 1stMarine Aircraft \Ving and ComUSMACV. In turn,Admiral Sides, the Commander of the PacificFleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet,Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decisionand directed him to take appropriate action.14

Deployment to Soc Trang

The Commanding General of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, Major General John P. Condon, aMichigan native who had earned a DistinguishedFlying Cross and three Legions of Merit for serviceduring World War II and Korea, was informed ofthe impending deployment on 22 March. At thetime, Condon, his staff, and elements of his com-mand were participating in SEATO exerciseTULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of theorders proved timely for most of the affected unitswere in close proximity to the wing commander.As the Marine helicopter squadron and its support-ing elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnamjust two weeks after the SEATO exercise ended,preparations for the move were begun immediately.General Condon quickly dispatched several officersto Saigon to establish liaison with IJSMACV.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunatelypossessed a background which facilitated the rapidpreparations for the movement. Since August of theprevious year General Condon's command regularlyhad deployed a medium helicopter squadron(HMM) and its supporting elements with theSpecial Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-groundteam embarked on board the Seventh Fleet'sAmphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this navaltask force had cruised Southeast Asian waters readyto implement U.S. contingency plans. Thesedeployments had given the Marines of the wing areservoir of experience which enabled them to makemaximum use of the short period of time availablefor planning.

By 30 March, the wing's planning had pro-gressed to the stage that General Condon couldprovide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet withspecific recommendations for the entire operation.The general concept of the plan was that Task Unit79.3.5, under the command of a Marine colonel,was to be built around a Marine medium helicoptersquadron which was participating in Operation


Major General John P. Condon, USMC, commandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (USMC Photo

A420 792).

TULUNGAN. This task unit, code named SHU-FLY, was to occupy an old Japanese-built landingstrip near Soc Trang, a small town located about85 miles southwest of Saigon in Ba Xuyen Province.Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trangpossessed one of the few hard surfaced runways inthe area. Condon informed the Seventh Fleetcommander of the arrangements which his liaisonofficers had made during their trip to Saigon. AnARVN infantry battalion and two 4.2-inch mortarcompanies were to assume the defense of the airstrip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marinesbegan landing.

The Marine general then proceeded to outline thechain of command and method of support which heconsidered best for the Marine task unit. SHUFLY,he suggested, should be under the operationalcontrol of ComUSMACV but should remain underthe administrative control of the 1st Marine Air-craft Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wingcommander thought, could come through normalMarine and Navy channels with fuels, lubricantoils, rations, and ammunition, being the excep-

tions. Rations and ammunition were to be providedby MACV, while fuels would be supplied byprivate Vietnamese distributers operating undercontracts with the U.S. government.

Next, General Condon explained to AdmiralSchoech his desires for the organization of the taskunit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best iforganized into three distinct task elements. First,he proposed that a headquarters be formed underthe command of Colonel John F. Carey, a veteranMarine aviator who had been awarded the NavyCross for heroism during the battle for Midway.Carey was currently serving as Chief of Staff of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters,General Condon advised, should consist of eightofficers and six enlisted men. The second element ofthe task unit, the wing commander continued,would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362(HMM—362), reinforced, under the command ofLieutenant Colonel ArchieJ. Clapp. The squadron,whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196enlisted Marines, was to be augmented by 50additional maintenance personnel. Its equipmentwould include 24 HUS helicopters (which undernormal operating conditions could lift eight to 12combat-loaded Vietnamese troops), three Cessnasingle-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one R4Dtransport aircraft, and supplemental maintenanceequipment. Prior to its deployment, HMM—362would exchange its helicopters for recently over-hauled aircraft in order to reduce maintenanceproblems once operations in Vietnam began.SHUFLY's third element would be a sub unit ofMarine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS—16). Desig-nated Task Element 79.3.5.2, it would be com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel William W. Eld-ridge. Navy medical, dental, and chaplain per-sonnel would be included in the sub unit's 193enlisted men and 18 officers.

The wing commander intended to provide theMABS—16 sub unit with a Tactical Airfield FuelDispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine AirfieldTraffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic con-trol unit would be equipped with Tactical AirNavigation (TACAN) and Ground Control Ap-proach (GCA) systems which would enable thehelicopter squadron to conduct landings duringperiods of reduced visibility. 15

Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, wasto be assigned responsibility for liaison with


MACV and military authorities in III Corps, thetactical zone which encompassed the entire MekongDelta and the transition zone between the deltaand the highlands. All operational planning,security, external communications, and administra-tive matters also were to fall under his cognizance.This arrangement would allow Lieutenant ColonelClapp and his squadron to concentrate on dailyflight operations and aircraft maintenance. Lieu-tenant Colonel Eldridge's MABS—16 sub unit wouldbe responsible for all normal base support andairfield operations.15

General Condon's report to Admiral Schoechconcluded with a rough outline of the schedule forthe task unit's deployment. On 9 April—only eightdays after the termination of the SEATO exercisein the Philippines—Marine transport aircraft fromthe 1st MAW, augmented by three transports fromthe 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), wouldbegin airlifting the task unit headquarters and theMABS—16 detachment from Okinawa. The Marinegeneral anticipated that all "housekeeping'' facili-ties would be in position at Soc Trang within fivedays. Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's HMM—362 wouldfly into Soc Trang from the amphibious assaultship (helicopter carrier) USS Princeton (LPH—5) onthe morning of 15 April. The proposal that thehelicopters be flown ashore satisfied a Departmentof Defense requirement that conspicuous unloadingactivities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.

Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW's pro-posed plan on 3 April and ordered Task Unit 79.3.5to be transferred to General Harkins' commandon 15 April. He then instructed the Commander,Task Group 76.5 (the Amphibious Ready Group)to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply andadministrative support it might require for themovement. At the same time the fleet commanderordered appropriate subordinate commanders toprovide an escort of destroyers for the USS Princetonand an inconspicuous air cover when the LPHarrived and began unloading HMM—362. Accord-ingly, the covering aircraft were instructed not toapproach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unlessthe situation around Soc Trang endangered theMarine helicopters.'7

The day following Schoech's approval of theMarine plan, the carrier task unit was formed totransport HMM—362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLYwas activated simultaneously and given orders

which reflected General Condon's planning. ColonelCarey was instructed to establish his headquartersat the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan,in order to prepare for the deployment. The taskunit commander was advised that he would receivemore detailed instructions relative to administra-tion and logistics at a later date.

Colonel Carey's task group headquarters in Japanhad only one week in which to complete prepara-tions for the move to the Republic of Vietnam. Hisstaff's responsibility for coordinating between unitslocated at Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa,made this task even more difficult. Carey's officersworked out the details of the airlift with the staffof Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152(VMGR—152), the GV_1* unit assigned to carrythe MABS—16 sub unit and the task unit head-quarters to Soc Trang.

The airlift portion of the movement began asscheduled on 9 April with the MABS--16 detach-ment being transported from Futema directly toSoc Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of hisstaff landed at Soc Trang in a twin-engine DouglasR4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVNbattalion had already established a perimeteraround the airfield. Using the R4D's radio, thecrew provided landing instructions for the GV—lsof VMGR—152 and VMGR—352 which began land-ing and unloading their cargoes at half hourintervals. Several key American and Vietnamesemilitary officers were on hand to watch the leadelements of SHUFLY arrive. Major GeneralCondon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the firstGV—1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircrafthad been unloaded. General Harkins and BrigadierGeneral Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese com-mander of III Corps, also made appearances at theairstrip to welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge 's MABS—16 detach-ment began readying the airfield for HMM—362'sarrival shortly after the first transport aircraft hadunloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marinesraised 75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks.They set up a water purification system and begantrucking water from the town of Soc Trang, abouttwo and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000gallons of water had been purified. Other con-

*The GV—1 (later KC—130), a four-engine, turbo-proprefueler-transport built by Lockheed, ,s the Marine refuelingversion of the Air Force C—130.

62 THE ADVISORY AND COMEAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

veniences improved the camp's living conditions.A. field laundry and a mess hail were set up and by12 April, hot meals were being served to theMarines. A post office began operations and tele-phones were installed to connect living andworking areas.

By 14 April, the day before HMM—362 wasscheduled to arrive at Soc Trang, most of theairfield facilities were ready to support flightoperations. An old hangar, which had beenconstructed by the Japanese during their WorldWar II occupation of Indochina, had been repairedto house some of the squadron's aircraft and equip-ment. The MABS—16 communications section wasoperational and had established radio and teletypelinks with MACV in Saigon and MAG—16 onOkinawa. The TAFDS had been assembled andfilled with aviation fuel and MATCU—68, the airtraffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, wasprepared to control flight operations.

The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5)steamed from Okinawa on 10 April with HMM—362,its reinforcements, and HMM—261 embarked on theUSS Princeton. The task group arrived off the coastof South Vietnam in the early morning hours of 15April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel Ciapp, who hadseen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jimaand Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led thefirst flight of helicopters from the deck of thePrinceton. The operation proceeded smoothly withaircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM—362'sequipment inland to the Soc Trang airstrip. Farout at Sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet orbited, readyto provide protection to the Marine helicopters.They were not needed, however, as the Viet Congmade no effort to oppose the movement. By mid-afternoon the airlift of HMM—362's personnel andequipment to the Soc Trang airfield had beencompleted. HMM—261 returned to the Princetonwhere it continued to function as the helicopterelement of the Special Landing Force.

The day after arriving at Soc Trang, LieutenantColonel Clapp's squadron, nicknamed Archie'sAngels," was prepared to support the ARVN.Since the squadron's combat support was not re-quired immediately, the pilots and crews beganflying missions to familiarize themselves with theirnew surroundings. They learned that their opera-tions were to be conducted over the vast expanse

of South Vietnam which stretched from just northand east of Saigon to the nation's southernmost tip,the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South ChinaSea westward to the Cambodian border. Theirinitial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed apredominantly flat and monotonous landscape.Parched by the long dry season, the dusty brownrice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the verdantmangrove swamps which abounded near majorstreams and along the coast. Numerous hamlets,most enclosed by dense hedgerows and treelines,were scattered across the countryside. Thousandsof canals and trails and a few crude roads completedthe rural landscape in which the Viet Congguerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang,Can Tho (located about 80 miles southwest ofSaigon), and My Tho (located about half waybetween the capital and Can Tho) were under thecontrol of the Government of Vietnam.

While the pilots and crews of HMM—362 wereacquainting themselves with the geography of theMekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff met inSaigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from theMACV and III Corps headquarters. There, theyestablished liaison with the three ARVN divisionssubordinate to General Nhgiem's III Corps—-the21st, the 7th, and the 5th—and discussed opera-tional matters. After several conferences, the finaldetails of the command arrangements were com-pleted. It was agreed that all Marine missionswould require the approval of MACV, III Corps,and the task unit commander. This arrangementwould enable General Harkins' command to retainactual operational control of the Marine helicopterseven though they would be supporting III Corpsexclusively. Final approval of all mission requestsfor Marine support would rest with the JointOperations Center (JOC) at JGS headquarters inSaigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force,ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part ofa recently instituted Tactical Air Support System,the purpose of which was to provide positive con-trol over all military aircraft in South Vietnam.To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons,Marine liaison officers were assigned to the corpsheadquarters and to the 21st ARVN Division. Itwas anticipated that this division, headquarteredat Can Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang,would require more Marine helicopter support than

5141T10.Y AT Soc TRANG 63

Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clap p (second from left), HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John c'ondon(fourth from left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and colonel John Carey (extreme right), taskunit commander, confer briefly after arriving at Soc Trang. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kier, USA4C).

the other divisions that were operating within thecorps tactical Zone.*

While operational planning was underway, theMABS—16 Marines set about to improve the newlyoccupied compound. Two diesel-powered gener-ators were put into operation and began furnishingelectrical power for the camp. The utilities section,which maintained the generators, then began in-stalling electrical wiring throughout the com-pound. Toilet and shower facilities were con-structed to accommodate the Marines.

Measures were also taken during this interludeto strengthen the airfield's defenses. Expecting thatthe Viet Cong might attempt to infiltrate the

* and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps head-quarters for control of air assets whereas III CTZ relied directlyon the JOC. Under this arrangement, I Corps and II Corps wererequired to pass nlission requests for air support on to the JOC.

Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-mansecurity unit to protect the inner camp and flightlines. This unit, composed of men from MABS-46and HMM—362 and responsible to a permanentsergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrolsand security posts during hours of darkness. Anetwork of concertina wire, trip flares, and machinegun emplacements provided additional protectionaround the helicopters and living area. Attackalerts were conducted periodically to coordinatethe ARVN's outer defenses and the Marine guardwithin the perimeter.

Within less than two weeks after the firstMarines had arrived at Soc Trang, the camp hadbeen adequately prepared to support sustainedcombat helicopter operations. In addition, defenseshad been established and the lines of logisticalsupport from MACV had been opened. Food and

64 TNE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964


water were readily available. All necessary liaisonwith the Vietnamese units to be supported hadbeen accomplished. Pilots and crews had gained arudimentary knowledge of the area in which theywould fly and SHUFLY's entire command structurehad undergone a one week' shake down" in whichit had proven sound.

Mekong Delta CombatSupport Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's squadron began com-bat operations on Easter Sunday, 22 April, exactlyone week after arriving in the Republic of Vietnam.The unit's first combat assignment was to assistthe Army's Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Companyin an operation code named LOCKJAW. TheAmerican helicopters were to support the ARVN7th Division which was headquartered at My Tho,53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The Marine heli-copters, which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29sorties and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers withoutincident during the course of their first operation.

Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operat-ing in other parts of South Vietnam, the MarineHUS—is were not armed with machine guns duringtheir initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior totheir deployment, the Marine commanders hadreasoned that weapons mounted in the cargo hatchwould hinder loading and unloading duringcritical periods while the helicopters were inlanding zones. Additionally, armed aircraft wouldtend to present a more hostile appearance toVietnamese civilians, thereby providing the VietCong ready-made material for their anti-Americanpropaganda themes. The only weapons on board thehelicopters, therefore, were the individual sidearms and two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine gunscarried by the crew members. The automaticweapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's mento return fire at short ranges and would also en-hance their survival capabilities in the event anaircrzft was forced down in unsecure territory.*

Once HMM—362 began combat flight operationsthe tempo of activities at Soc Trang quickened.

*By the summer the new light weight AR—15, the fore-runner of the M—16, would replace the M3A1 'greaseguns."Near the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crewswere carrying M—14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantryWeapon of this period.

The same day that SHUFLY helicopters partici-pated in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, anHUS was called upon to evacuate an Americanadvisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles north of SocTrang. The following day the first combined opera-tion involving Vietnamese Marine ground forcesand U.S. Marine helicopters was conducted. Acompany of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted intoa threatened government outpost south of thetown of Ca Mau, located near the southern tip ofSouth Vietnam, to provide security while HMM—362's helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.

On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the21st ARVN Division in Operation NIGHTINGALEconducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zonesalong two canals where a large group of VietCong had been reported. Shortly after the firstwave of the assault force landed, a vicious smallarms fight erupted. HMM—362 suffered its firstcombat damage when a helicopter was forceddown after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire.An accompanying HUS quickly landed and re-trieved the crew. Four other helicopters proceededto the forward loading site, picked up a Marinerepair team and enough ARVN troops to protectthe team while it worked, and returned to thedowned aircraft. The mechanics completed theirrepairs in two hours after which the crew returnedthe helicopter to Soc Trang. The security forcewas then lifted out of the area.

Despite the damage suffered by the Marineaircraft, the Can Tho operation apparently achievedsome success. The Viet Cong reportedly suffered70 dead and lost three prisoners to the SouthVietnamese while the ARVN units lost only threekilled and six wounded. The Marines of HMM—362,moreover, had responded to a new challenge bydemonstrating that they could recover helicopterswhich had been forced to land in insecure territory.Although the principle of providing security whileaccomplishing field repairs had been employedpreviously by the Army helicopter companies, theCan Tho operation of 24 April marked the firsttime the Marines had been required to use thetechnique.

HMM—362 again joined the Army's 57th Heli-copter Company for a coordinated troop lift on25 April. This time the objective was the smalltown of Chau Doe on the Bassac River near the


Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kiter, USMC).

SHUFLY AT Soc TRANG 67

Cambodian border which had been raided andburned by a force whose identity was undetermined.Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troopsfrom the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of theincident while two other squadron aircraft liftedthe Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21stDivision Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisorin III Corps, Colonel Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S.Army, to the village. The landing was uncontestedas the marauding band had fled across the inter-national border into Cambodia.

The conditions which confronted HMM—362 inthe Mekong Delta during its first weeks of combatoperations encouraged the squadron's pilots toexperiment with new tactics. One such instanceoccurred in the first week of May in Ba XuyenProvince when the province chief requested thatthe Marine helicopters support his Civil Guardcompany in a raid on a fortified Viet Cong villageabout 12 miles southwest of Soc Trang. Because theobjective was located so near the Soc Trang air-field, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusualtechnique used for approaching the landing zone.The flight would rendezvous over Soc Trang attree-top level and proceed to the objective with theflight leader slightly to the rear and above theformation. From this vantage point the flightleader could keep the other aircraft in sight andexercise better control over each element of theflight. The success of the new procedure ledLieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that thetechnique was similar to calling the plays fromthe grandstand.'' It became another tactic avail-able for the squadron's future use.

In terms of lessons learned, HMM—362's mostsignificant operation during its initial month ofcombat support came on 9 May. Twenty-threehelicopters and two OE—1 observation aircraftlaunched from Ca Mau at 1100 for an assault onCai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21 milesto the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landingthe ARVN troops in six landing zones which hadbeen attacked only five minutes earlier by Vietnam-ese Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke outeven before the Vietnamese troops could jumpfrom the helicopters. During this clash eight ofthe Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fireand two Vietnamese troops were wounded whilestill on board. One HUS, struck in the oil returnline, was forced to land a few miles from the

objective. Troops were flown in quickly to estab-lish a perimeter around the downed aircraft whilerepairs were made. After the temporary repairshad been completed, its crew flew the helicopterto Ca Mau, where it remained until more extensivework could be accomplished. The other aircraft,including an OE—1, suffered only superficial damageand continued to support the ARVN oçieration.

From this encounter with the Viet Cong, theMarine pilots learned that air strikes conductedjust prior to a helicopter landing in the heavilypopulated delta country tended to disclose thelocation of the landing zone to the enemy. In thisinstance the Communists had been able to reach thelanding zone in the few minutes which elapsedbetween the last air strike and the arrival of theMarine helicopters. Following this experience,the Marines would no longer allow VNAF airstrikes on landing zones prior to operations in theflat delta region.*

The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soonlearned to use fixed-wing aircraft to supporthelicopter operations in another manner. By mid-June, FARM GATE T—28 Trojans (a single-enginetwo-seat trainer built by North American) modifiedto carry bombs, rockets, and machine guns wereflying escort missions for the Marine helicoptersquadron. This particular aircraft could fly slowlyenough to cruise with the HUS yet fast enough todeliver an air strike en route to the objective andthen catch up with the helicopter formation. Nor-mally an element of two T—28s accompanied thehelicopters and were used primarily to attacktargets near the landing zone after the ARVNtroops were on the ground. The placement of anAmerican pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese studentin the T—28, a requirement imposed by MACV,helped avert language problems which invariablydeveloped when coordinating ARVN ground opera-tions and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness ofthe escort tactic increased as the Marine and AirForce pilots became accustomed to planning, co-ordinating, and executing the missions.

The Marines quickly learned the value of utiliz-ing the OE—1 in conjunction with their helicopteroperations. Three single-engine, two-man aircraft,

*The development of helicopter tactics and techniques inVietnam will be coveted in detail in a separate monograph beingprepared for publication by the History and Museums Division,Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.


i,icmese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362 helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopterassault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the ZVfekong Delta. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P.

Kier, USMC).

a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron2 (VMO—2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day operations over the delta. Primarily, theywere used in daylight visual reconnaissance, usuallyto study objective areas and the approach routeswhich the helicopters would later use. Sometimestheir crews were called upon to photograph pro-posed landing zones for briefing purposes. Oftenthe aircraft's radios were used to relay messagesbetween various ARVN ground units which wereoperating beyond the range of their radios.Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM)radios for work with ground stations and oneultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicat-ing with other aircraft, the OE—1 was perfectlysuited for controlling helicopter landings. TheMarine aviators also found that, unlike theirhelicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse

suspicion in the area over which it flew. Thisadvantage was due probably to several factors.First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinelyoperated similar aircraft over the entire region;secondly, the enemy could not readily determinewhether the OE—1 was on a reconnaissance missionor merely flying from one point to another; andfinally, the small aircraft made little noise. Giventhese characteristics it was no accident that thehelicopter squadron relied on the observation air-craft more and more as the pattern of operationsunfolded.

Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, theMarines of HMM—362 began experimenting withone of the more imaginative techniques developedin the early stages of the intensified U.S.—GVNcounterinsurgency effort. Marine air crews hadnoticed that the enemy often managed to elude the


larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations areain small groups. Even the smallest breach betweenARVN units seemed to allow large numbers ofguerrillas to escape into covered or heavily popu-lated areas where they became impossible to find.Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel Clappdevised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature.Their idea was to have a flight of four Marinehelicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN soldierscircle above the contested area. This so-called• Eagle Flight" would be on the alert for anyViet Cong attempting to evade the ground forces.Once the enemy was located, often by the OE—1observation aircraft, the helicopters would landthe Vietnamese soldiers at a position where theycould block his escape. The Marine commandersfelt that the adoption of such a tactic wouldincrease the effectiveness of the ARVN's heli-copter assault operations.

After several weeks of planning by HMM—362and the affected III Corps commands, the conceptwas put into practice. The Eagle Flight was firsttested in a large operation on 18 June whenHMM—362 helilifted ARVN troops into 16 differentlanding zones. Heavy monsoon rains made theenemy particularly difficult to pin down, but theMarine pilots managed to sight 10 Viet Cong nearthe main landing zone. After landing near theenemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communistsoldiers and wounded one other. Shortly after thisincident another Eagle Flight made two eventfulcontacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopterslanded their small force and the ARVN promptlykilled four Viet Cong and captured another.Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the heli-copters, the South Vietnamese swept down upon anew prey, this time capturing four prisoners.

The novel concept was employed successfullyagain on 10 July. While HMM—362 aircraft lifted968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an EagleFlight spotted a sampan moving northward fromthe operations area. The flight leader landed thetroops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the craft.Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the EagleFlight clashed twice with an estimated platoon ofViet Cong. In the first encounter seven enemy werekilled and several weapons were captured. In thesecond skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead andlost more weapons. All four Marine helicopters,

however, were hit by small arms fire during thetwo brief fights.

By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight hadbecome a proven combat tactic. By reducing theenemy's opportunity to escape when the govern-ment forces possessed the advantage on the battle-field, it had favorably influenced the tactical situa-tion when used in the Mekong Delta. Equallyimportant, SHUFLY's commanders had demon-strated their ability to adapt their technologicalresources to the Viet Cong's methods of operations.Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under differentnames such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk,Pacifier, and Quick Reaction Force, would be usedby the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.

The Marines were quick to apply their techno-logical knowhow to other problems which wereto confront them during their early operations inthe III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was theiradaptation of the TAFDS to the problem whicharose when the helicopters where called upon tooperate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM—362 helicopters would airlift a TAFDS unit,complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder, pumps,and MABS—16 personnel, to the site where theARVN troops were to be loaded. The fuel bladderswere filled by gasoline trucks which travelled fromthe nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopterscould then use the TAFDS as a temporary base ofoperations, refueling between troop pick-ups whennecessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed theoperating radius of the helicopters to be extendedto support even the most distant South Vietnameseoperation.

While the Marines were learning to adapttheir technology to the guerrilla war environment,the enemy was applying his ingenuity in attemptsto frustrate the American and South Vietnamesehelicopter operations. The Viet Cong quicklylearned to capitalize on the presence of largecrowds of civilians who sometimes gathered nearhelicopter landing zones to watch the strangeaircraft. One such incident occurred in June whenCommunist soldiers mingled with a crowd anddelivered fire on helicopters which were liftingelements of the 21st ARVN Division. Two aircraftwere hit by enemy fire although the damage wasnot extensive enough to force them to land. TheMarines, who refused to return fire with theirindividual weapons unless the Viet Cong could be


separated from the civilian populace, found noeffective method of countering this tactic. Later inJune, the Marines of HMM—362 encounteredanother tactic when they found that hundreds ofupright bamboo stakes had been prepositioned inthe intended landing zone. The perpendicularspikes, each four or five feet high, not only pre-vented the helicopters from landing but also madeit impossible to disembark the ARVN troops whilehovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landingzones in the delta region tended to make thisparticular tactic ineffective.*

On 20 July, HMM—362 added a new dimensionto the counterguerrilla capabilities of the SouthVietnamese forces when it executed the first nighthelicopter assault of the war. The mission, whichbegan at 0415 at Soc Trang, involved lifting threewaves of ARVN troops into an objective on thePlain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of BenTre. The ARVN force intended to encircle a sus-pected Viet Cong village before dawn and thenattack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of theairlift was completed 10 minutes before daylightafter which the Army's 57th Helicopter Companyjoined the operation. Although the night trooplift was executed without incident, LieutenantColonel Clapp attributed its success at least par-tially to the near perfect conditions. The moon-light, reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies,had aided the Marine pilots in the trickyoperation. 19

Prior to SHUFLY's deployment to Soc Trang,General Roberts' staff at FMFPac had developed apolicy for the periodic rotation of the task unit'sMarines for which the Commandant's approvalhad been gained. The helicopter squadron would bereplaced by a similar unit after approximatelyfour months of operations in the combat zone.But rather than being drawn from the 1st MAWon Okinawa, the replacement squadron was to beprovided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing inCalifornia. Officers and men serving with thesupporting headquarters and MABS—16 elements,however, were to be replaced by Marines fromMAG—16 at approximately four-month intervals.So as not to disrupt the operational efficiency of

*The German army had used a similar technique (uprightpoles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops atNormandy during World War II. (Taylor, Swords and Plowshares,p. 80.)

the task unit, individual replacements would bemade in increments.

In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM—163, the HUS unit scheduled to relieve HMM—362,began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July. Commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a

veteran fighter pilot of World War II and Korea,the squadron continued to arrive during the lastweek of July. Airlifted by GV—ls from the MarineCorps Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, thenew squadron brought neither helicopters normaintenance equipment. The squadron commanderhad orders to continue operations with HMM—362'saircraft and equipment.

Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's squadron maintaineda steady operational pace even after the new unit'sappearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM—362's heli-copters participated in an operation about 30miles northeast of Soc Trang. The next day thetask unit commander committed 21 helicopters andOE—ls to a 21st ARVN Division operation nearCa Mau. The Eagle Flight was committed on fourdifferent occasions during this operation.

Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun's Ridge Runners"officially relieved 'Archie's Angels" on 1 Augustafter a week of orientation flying with HMM—362'screws. The men of the departing squadron couldreflect on their tour in South Vietnam with asense of satisfaction and accomplishment. Sincetheir arrival in mid-April, they had executed 50combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties,and had amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time,all in unarmed aircraft. During the course of thesemissions they had made approximately 130 differentlandings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeenof their 24 helicopters and two of the three OE—1aircraft had received battle damage. To the creditof the squadrons maintenance personnel and air-crews, HMM—362 had not lost a single aircraftduring its operations in the Republic of Vietnam.Miraculously the squadron had suffered no casual-ties while testing the Marine Corps' vertical en-velopment concept in the guerrilla war situation.2°

During their three and a half months at SocTrang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's men had con-tributed significantly to another facet of the wareffort—one usually considered unrelated to normalcombat operations. Sensing the unique links be-tween the political and military aspects of thestruggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had


initiated a People-to-People-Program," the ob-jective of which was to assist the Government ofVietnam in winning the allegiance of the Viet-namese people. Within a few days after occupyingthe Soc Trang airfield, Colonel Carey had orderedthe task unit's medical facilities made available toVietnamese civilians requiring emergency medicaltreatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen beganvisiting nearby villages to hold sick call'' for thelocal inhabitants. On an average visit these medicalteams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of allages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, andaspirin—cornmodities which some rural Vietnamesehad never seen. Gradually, the meaical teamsexpanded their operations until by mid-June theywere being flown by helicopter as far away asCa Mau.

HMM—362's departure from Vietnam coincidedroughly with the departure of most of the Marinetask unit's senior officers—the men who haddirected the efforts to win the other war'' for theallegiance of the Vietnamese people. On 30 July,Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another Marine aviatorwho had seen combat in two previous wars,relieved Colonel Carey as the task unit commander.The new commander was one of few Marines whohad been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 hehad landed at Da Nang (then known by its Frenchname, Tourane) as squadron commander of MarineAttack Squadron 324 (VMA—324) and delivered 25F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French whowere in desperate need of attack aircraft to supportDien Bien Phu. Five days after Ireland assumedcommand of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant ColonelRalph R. Davis replaced Lieutenant ColonelEldridge as commanding officer of the MABS—16sub unit. On 13 August another change occurredwhen the executive officer of the Marine task unit,Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Dees, was relieved byLieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Exceptthat it left few original members of the task unit,the departure of these Marines for new dutystations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United Statesdid not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thor-oughly briefed on their responsibilities, the newofficers would continue to direct Marine support ofthe Vietnamese government on both the battlefieldand the psychological front.

HMM—163 participated in its first combatmission as a squadron on 1 August when it joined

the Army's 57th Helicopter Company in a co-ordinated troop lift. Like their predecessors,

Rathbun's Ridge Runners" maintained a briskpace of operations during the weeks followingtheir initial assignment. Shortly after its first trooplift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-manSouth Vietnamese spoiling operation in An Xuyen,South Vietnam's southernmost province. Antici-pating a major Viet Cong offensive in the foursouthern provinces, III Corps authorities movedtheir headquarters to Soc Trang and established aforward command post at Ca Mau. The VietnameseAir Force then positioned a composite detachmentof four AD—6 Skyraiders (single-engine, propeller-driven attack bombers built by Douglas), twoT—28s, and a number of H—34 helicopters (the U.S.Army, Air Force, and VNAF version of the HUS)at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined bythe VNAF H—34s, the Marine squadron conductednumerous troop lifts during the week-long opera-tion. At the end of the action the ARVN reported84 \Tiet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and theconfiscation of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms,ammunition, and explosives. The first Marine heli-copter loss in Vietnam occurred during the opera-tion when a VNAF fighter careened off the runwayand damaged a parked HUS to the extent that itcould not be repaired. Marine mechanics strippedundamaged parts from the helicopter for use asreplacements. *

HMM—163 suffered its first aircraft damage as aresult of combat a few day's later on 18 August dur-ing a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun.Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pick-uppoint to rendezvous with an ARVN infantry forcebut the Marine pilots discovered that the unit hadnot appeared. One crewman then reported havingseen some ARVN troops about a half mile awayfrom the landing zone. At this juncture, a whitesmoke signal appeared at approximately the samelocation that the Marine had observed the SouthVietnamese troops. Lieutenant Colonel Rathbunand his wingmate, assuming that the smokcmarked the actual pick-up point, took off to in-vestigate the area. While making a low pass over

*Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962—1964period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa byU.S. Air Force C—124 Globemaster transports. By replacingaircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task unit was able tomaintain a level of 24 helicopters except for brief periods.


Marine officers visit Father Phuoc' s village. Left to right. Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; C'olonel Johiz F. Carey;Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius 11/. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter

Gilles H. Rocheleau; and three unidentified Marine officers. (USMC Photo 11420824).

the smoke signal, the squadron commander'shelicopter was hit several times by small arms firewhich severed the rudder control cable and punc-tured the main rotor transmission. The loss of oilrequired Rathbun to make a forced landing on anearby road. After mechanics had been flown in andrepairs had been accomplished, the helicopter wasflown to a secure area.

An investigation of thc incident later revealedthat the confusion had begun when the ARVNunit scheduled to be helilifted became involvedin a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile fromthe pick up point. A VNAF Forward Air Controller(FAC) in an observation aircraft had then markedthe Viet Cong position for an air strike with awhite smoke grenade rather than red smoke, aswas normally used. This was the smoke which

Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted toidentify when his aircraft was hit.

From this incident the pilots of HMM—163learned several valuable lessons about helicoptersupport in conjunction with ARVN groundoperations. First, helilifts of government forcesfrom the field at prearranged times requiredthorough last minute coordination. Secondly,helicopters could not be used safely on low-levelreconnaissance or identification passes. Finally,prearranged colored smoke signals were easilyconfused and when used routinely were subject toenemy attempts at deception. Such signallingmethods were most effective when used in conjunc-tion with radio communications between air andground units.

A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident

SHTJFLY AT SOC TRANG 73

took place later in the day when Rathbun learnedthat he had been selected for promotion to colonel.The timing of the notification prompted onesquadron wit to quip: 'Lost a bird, gained abird." 21

'Rathbun's Ridge Runners" continued intensivesupport operations in III Corps Tactical Zonethroughout the month of August. Their dailymissions normally included both scheduled trooplifts and unscheduled medical evacuations. Duringthe week of 19—25 August HMM—163 helicopterslogged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. Asquadron record for a single day was established on24 August when 197.6 helicopter hours were flown.Flight time for the helicopters during the entiremonth. totalled 2,543 hours—a new Marine Corpsrecord for an HUS squadron. The OE—1 aircraftadded 63 missions and 212 hours to this total.Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron'spilots ]ogged over 100 hours of combat flying timeduring August.22 This record was even moreimpressive considering that flight operations werehampered by the monsoon season which reachedits peak during August in the Mekong Delta.

In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun's menmade a significant modification to their helicopterswhen they began mounting M—60 machine gunsinside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct thehatch during loading and unloading phases, thesquadron's metalsmiths designed a flexible mountwhich allowed the crew chiefs to swing the belt-fed, 7.52mm automatic weapon back into thecabin when necessary. The addition of the machinegun enabled the crew chief to protect the otherwisedefenseless helicopter during critical landing andtake off phases. Still, the Marine gunners wererestricted in their action by MACV's ''rules ofengagement'' which at this time stipulated thatAmerican servicemen could fire only after beingfired upon and then only at clearly identifiedenemy. Intended to prevent offensive combataction by U.S. military personnel operating inVietnam, these regulations prevented Americansfrom returning fire except when the enemy wasclearly identified.* Primarily because of theserestrictions the Marines seldom employed theirM—fiOs in the heavily populated Mekong Delta.

*The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as well asaviation crews. Although they underwent several modificationsduring the course of the war, the above definition was virtuallyunaltered during the period between 1962 and 1964.

215—627 0 — 77 — 6

Preparations and Redeployment

In early September General Harkins directedthat Colonel Ireland begin planning for the rede-ployment of his helicopter task unit northward toDa Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had beenthe subject of much debate prior to SI-JUFLY'sassignment at Soc Trang, came as no surprise.Shortly after the task unit's arrival in the MekongDelta, Colonel Carey accompanied General Condonon a visit to the Army's 93d Helicopter Companyat Da Nang. There they discussed details of therelocation with Army officers. In early JulyGeneral Harkins set 1 August as the date on whichthe Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter Com-pany would switch locations. But personal appealsby General Nghiem, the III Corps commander andhis senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter, that theMarine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang causedHarkins to postpone the date for the exchangeuntil 15 September.

In that the airlift was executed in phases, theMarines' movement to Da Nang was accomplishedin much the same manner as had been the taskunit's initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 SeptemberColonel Ireland dispatched the task unit's assistantcommunications officer and an advance party toDa Nang to assess the communications require-ments there and to prepare for the arrival of theremainder of the Marines and their equipment.Four days later Marine wiremen, message centerpersonnel, and radio operators began preparing acommunications center at their new home. Thenext day the advance party established radiocontact with SHUFLY headquarters in order tohelp coordinate the move. By 9 September MABS—16 technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the DaNang airfield. This facility would enable the GV—1transports participating in the airlift to refuel forthe 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang afterunloading their cargoes at Da Nang.

While the advance party readied the facilities atDa Nang for its unit's arrival, combat supportoperations and preparations for the move north-ward confinued simultaneously at Soc Trang.During an operation on 5 September, three ofHMM—163's helicopters were hit by several roundsof enemy small arms fire. Although all three air-craft returned safely to base, the Marines sufferedtheir first casualty to Viet Cong fire when Corporal


Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightlywounded. Troop lifts from Soc Trang continueduntil 1740 on 13 September when helicopter supportoperations were ended and the final preparationsfor the move to Da Nang began.

On the evening of 14 September, the first of theMarine GV—ls slated to transport the task unitarrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn thenext morning, the refueler-transports began shut-tling Marines and their equipment to Da Nang andthe Army's 93d Helicopter Company to Soc Trang.By the end of the day much of the airlift had beencompleted. The crews and helicopters of LieutenantColonel Rathbun's squadron, however, did notbegin displacing northward until the 16th when12 HUSs made the seven-hour flight to Da Nangwith three en route refueling stops. The 12 remain-ing helicopters arrived at SHUFLY's new base ofoperations the next day. The move was completedon 20 September when the last cargo carrying GV—1landed at Da Natig.

Accomplishments

As SHUFLY's Marines began preparing for theirimpending operations in the northern provincesthey could look with pride on their accomplish-ments at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in theMekong Delta in April the Leathernecks hadclearly demonstrated their ability to conduct sus-tained and effective helicopter operations in supportof non-English-speaking ground forces. While itcould not be said that their presence had com-pletely transformed the complexion of the GVN'sstruggle to control the critical Mekong Deltaregion, the Marine helicopters had provided theARVN units operating there with a degree ofmobility they had not previously possessed. Thisnew-found mobility in turn had helped generate a

new offensive spirit within government unitsassigned to southern III Corps. in his letter toComUSMACV requesting the retention of the taskunit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter, the Senior U.S.Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: ''Nowthey [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory andfor the first time are beginning to believe there is apossibility of defeating the Viet Cong." 23

During the course of their operations throughoutSouth Vietnam's southern provinces, the SHUFLYMarines displayed an instinct for recognizingand coping with the challenges of unconventionalwarfare. Confronted by a war without frontlines in which an elusive, highly mobile enemyblended readily with the local populace, thetask unit's leaders devised new and successfulhelicopter tactics. Likewise, SHUFLY's Marineand Navy personnel moved to prevent a possibleconflict of cultures and to discredit Communistpropaganda through the initiation of the People-to-People Program. Although only an informalbeginning, this program would serve as a founda-tion upon which the U.S. Marine Corps wouldlater build a doctrine defining the relationshipbetween Marines on duty in Vietnam and theVietnamese people.

Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders,much of SHUFLY's success in III Corps wasproduced by hard work on a sustained basis. Forthis the individual Marines, particularly themaintenance crews which often worked around theclock in primitive surroundings to keep thehelicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit.Although unglamorous, their daily contributionsunderwrote the success of the combat supportoperations. So, functioning as a team, the taskunit's members blended innovation, hard work, andtechnical expertise with perseverance and courageto carve out a reputation for themselves in the far-away rice lands of the Mekong Delta.

CHAPTER 6

SHUFLY Moves NorthArrival at Da Nang—I Corps Tactical Zone—Military Situation,September 1962—Initial Helicopter Operations—vfarine People-to-People

Program—SHUFLY Operations in I Corps

Arrival at Da Nang

Da Nang retained many characteristics of an oldFrench colonial port city when the Marines arrivedthere in mid-September 1962. With its thrivingmarket place, its throngs of bicycles, and a notice-able dearth of automobile traffic, the city wascertainly more Asian than European in appearance.Still, the former French presence was evident inthe architecture of public buildings, electric andtelephone lines, paved streets, built-up waterfront,and an airfield. Although the French influenceseemed not to have disturbed the traditionalVietnamese culture, it had imparted a picturesquecharm to South Vietnam's second largest city.

Virtually surrounded by the city itself, DaNang's airfield was to serve as SHUFLY's new baseof operations. Having been rebuilt as a militarybase by the French following World War II, theDa Nang facility was relatively modern. Under-standably, it differed in many ways from the crudelittle airfield the Marines had left behind in thesteamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example,was considerably longer, having 8,000 feet of pavedsurface. The Da Nang base was also busier, havingalready been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. AirForce units. Furthermore, it served the city as acommercial airport.

Scattered around the long north-south runwaywere nunierous clusters of French-built masonrystructures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walledbuildings, located about one half mile west of therunway, had been designated as living quarters forthe newly arrived Marines. Although the actualliving spaces were somewhat crowded and in needof much repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceilingfans, and fluorescent lights (none of which func-tioned properly) were welcomed by the men who

had experienced the discomforts of life in So'Trang's 'tent city." Once the Marines had movedin, their compound would include a chapel,medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie,a barber shop, a laundry, and a mess hail.

While many of the problems encounteredinitially by the Marines at Da Nang were similarto those that had greeted their predecessors at SocTrang, there were also some new ones to beresolved. The two most imposing of these stemmedfrom the distance between the living compound andworking areas. Located along the southeast side ofthe airstrip, the flight line and hangar were nearlythree miles from the Marine quarters by road.Located still farther away, about a quarter milesouth of the hangar, were the motor pool andcommunications facility. In addition to creating anew requirement for transportation, the distancesbetween the various areas necessitated adjustmentsin the security arrangements which had been usedat Soc Trang.

Fortunately SHUFLY 's first commander, ColonelCarey, had foreseen the requirement for transporta-tion between the living area and the flight lineduring his visit to the Da Nang installation inApril. The problem was solved by the purchase ofthree used American school buses which were al-ready on hand when the Marines arrived from SocTrang. The security situation proved somewhatmore perplexing. Initally Colonel Ireland handledthe problem in much the same manner as it hadbeen at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard was detailed to supervise a security forcecomposed of men from the MABS—16 sub unit andHMM—163. Guard posts were established aroundthe helicopter flight line, the hangar, the TAFDS,the motor pool-communications area, and thebilleting compound. But this arrangement, while

75


A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (Official USMC Photo).

serving the intended purpose, was not ideal.Frequently the Marines who served on securifywatch at night were called upon to perform longhours of work the following day. This promptedColonel Ireland to request that a permanent securityforce be assigned to his command in order that theoverworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, elec-tricians, and communicators could concentrate ontheir particular sobs. The request was placed underconsideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPacauthorities but was not approved immediately. *

At Da Nang Colonel Ireland's task unit was notresponsible for every facet of airfield operations ashad been the case previously at Soc Trang. TheU.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control

*General Weede explained that, because such increases couldnot be made without the approval of the Department of Defense,such requests were forwarded first to MACV Headquarters forapproval. (Weede Interview.)

approach, tactical air naviation, and meteorologicalservices at the new installation while the Viet-namese operated the control tower. These con-veniences allowed Ireland to make a small reductionin the overall size of the Marine task unit. ThoseMABS—16 specialists who had operated thesesystems at Soc Trang were returned to their parentorganizations on Okinawa.

I Corps Tactical Zone

At the time the Marine task unit arrived in DaNang, I Corps Tactical Zone encompassed SouthVietnam's five northern provinces. Quang TnProvince, located immediately south of the demili-tarized zone (DMZ) topped this tier of politicalsubdivisions. Below Quang Tn Province layThua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin

SHUFLY MOVES NORTH 77


(recently created), and Quang Ngai Provinces. Allare coastal provinces and, with the exception ofQuang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast tothe Laotian border, a distance which varies be-tween 30 and 70 miles. Together, they occupy thecentral portion of the region formerly known asAnnam and extend 225 miles to the south of theDMZ.

The climatic pattern in the northern provincesis the exact reverse of that which affects the south-ern portion of the nation. In I Corps the dry seasonoccurs in the summer months while the monsoons,which blow from the northeast, dominate thewinter. Heavy monsoon rains accompanied by windand fog normally begin in October. After reachingtheir peak usually in November, the monsoon rainstend to diminish gradually until their disappear-ance around mid-March.

The differences between the physical structureof the northern provinces and the Mekong Deltais even more striking than their reversed climaticpatterns. White beaches stretch almost unbrokenalong the entire length of I Corps. Just inland androughly parallel to the coast south of Da Nanglies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes andgenerally unproductive soil. This strip varies inwidth from one half to two miles. In the west itdissolves into the flat, densely populated coastalplain. Any similarity between the Mekong Deltaand the northern provinces is found in this expanseof fertile rice-producing land where tiny ruralhamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosedby thick hedgerows and treelines, abound. Northof Da Nang the semi-barren coastal sands tend toextend farther inland, and thereby reduce theproductive portion of the coastal plains.

The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps,and one easily visible to the Marines at Da Nang,is the chain of towering mountains which protrudefrom the flat coastal plain several miles west ofthe city. There is a conspicuous absence of foothillsleading to the mountains which seem to surroundDa Nang on the north and west. North of the HaiVan Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which jutsinto the South China Sea about 10 miles north ofthe Marines' new home, a zone of foothills easesthe transition from the wide coastal plain to therugged jungle-covered mountains.

The coastal plains of the five northern provincesare broken by several significant streams along

which most of the region's principal populationcenters are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the1954 partition line the Cua Viet empties into thesouthern portion of the Tonkin Gulf. Both QuangTn City, the capital of Quang Tn Province, andDong Ha, South Vietnam's northernmost popula-tion center of any significance, are situated on theCua Viet and its major tributary, the Song Cam Lo.The Song Huong (often referred to as the PerfumeRiver), which flows past the old imperial capitalof Hue, enters the sea at a point approximately halfway between Da Nang and the nation's northernboundary.* At Da Nang the Song Han (also calledthe Da Nang River) flows into Da Nang Harborafter its main tributary, the Song Cau Do, curvesthrough the coastal plains immediately south andwest of the city. Eighteen miles south of theMarines' new base of operations, the Song Cau Daiempties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, thecapital of Quang Narn Province. The Song Cau Daioriginates about 18 miles inland at the confluenceof the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia whichtwist seaward from the south and west respec-tively. Together these three estuaries constitute themost important geographic feature of the sprawlingcoastal plain south of Da Nang. Another majorstream, the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastwardcourse about 32 miles south of the Song Cau Dai.Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a riverwhich dominates the wide coastal plain of QuangNgai Province in much the same fashion as doesthe Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the areasouth of Da Nang. The provincial capital, QuangNgai, once a major railroad center for SouthVietnam, is situated several miles inland on thesouth bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southern-most stream of any significance in I Corps is theSong Ve, which angles northeastward throughcentral Quang Ngai Province. While none of thesewaterways is navigable far beyond its mouth byocean-going vessels, each serves the local popu-lation as convenient local routes of communi-cation as well as vital sources of irrigation waterduring the long dry seasons.

The two and a half million people who inhabitedI Corps in 1962 had developed along social andeconomic lines dictated largely by the geographyand climate of their region. Rice growing, centered

*In the Vietnamese language the word song" means streamand normally Precedes the name of rivers.


/lerial view of Marine helicopter fti&ht line at Da Nang shortly after SHUFLY's relocation to I Corps in September1962. (Official USMC Photo).

on the coastal plains, dominated the economicactivities of the area. Combined, the provinces ofI Corps produced nearly half a million tons ofrice annually. Fishing, concentrated along thecoast and the major rivers, ranked as the secondmost important economic pursuit. Unlike most ofSouth Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potentialfor industrial development. A small but productivesurface coal mine was located about 25 milessouthwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along thewestern bank of the Song Thu Boo. Although themine was operating in 1962, it had made littlediscernable impact on the overall economic pictureof the region.

Mlilitary Situation, September 1962

From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland'stask unit was responsible for directly supporting

the forces under Major General Tran Van Don'sI Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVNDivisions, headquartered respectively at Hue andDa Nang, were the major tactical units at GeneralDon's disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25thARVN Division, headquartered at Kontum innorthwestern II Corps, joined I Corps forces foroffensive operations along the southern fringe ofQuang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Rangerbattalions served as mobile reaction forces for thecorps tactical zone.* Also scattered over the north-ern corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitaryunits of assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisonedprimarily along the heavily populated coastalplain.

*Thc ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960 fromexisting ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly mobileinfantry units and were onder the direct control of the CTZcommander.

80 TUE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

Opposing these government forces in the earlyfall of 1962 were Viet Cong forces of formidablestrength. Four interprovincial battalions (mainforce), four interprovincial companies, five pro-vincial companies, 18 district companies, and threedistrict platoons were known to be operating with-in the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these unitstotalled an estimated 4,750 men.' Added to thepresence of these known Viet Cong units was thethreat posed to I Corps by its proximity to NorthVietnam and to the so-called Ho Chi MinhTrails" located across the Laotian border. Therelative position of the northern provinces naturallyinvited Communist infiltration. In June, forexample, the 4th Viet Cong Battalion, a main forceunit, was infiltrated into Quang Nam Provincefrom sanctuaries in Laos. By September MACVintelligence estimates reported one North Viet-namese (PAVN) infantry division, two independentPAVN infantry regiments, and an artillery regimentpoised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corpsborder. "These units," the U.S. report warned,

could be committed anywhere in I Corps or[the] northern part of II Corps 20 days afterstarting movement." 2

While the government's nationwide strategyfocused on clearing and holding the populatedareas, the physiographic configuration of I Corps(as well as II Corps to the south) demanded thatoffensive operations be conducted in the mountainsadjacent to the coastal plains against Viet Congbase areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Armyhelicopter company at Da Nang early in the year,General Don had shown an increasing tendency tomount battalion and regimental heliborne assaultsdeep into the western mountains. Capitalizing onthe mobility which the American helicoptersafforded, the ARVN command had hoped todisrupt remote Communist base areas inside theinternational border. Still, heliborne offensivesinto western I Corps were often hampered by badweather, particularly during the monsoon season.

Another facet of the government effort to denythe enemy unrestricted access to the mountains wasa system characterized by a network of small,relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at theurging of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem govern-ment had launched a program whose ultimateobjective was similar to that of the StrategicHamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces

teams entered remote Montagnard villages locatedin the Annamite Chain and built small fortifiedcamps. This accomplished, the Americans initiatedpacification activities with the hope of securing theallegiance of the traditionally independent Mon-tagnard tribesmen.

By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appearedon its way to success. Already Montagnard tribes-men had been organized into a number of CivilianIrregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout themountains of I and II Corps. Advised by SpecialForces teams, the CIDG units were monitoring in-filtration routes and harassing the Communists asthey attempted to move through the mountains.By the summer of 1962 the distinctive little barbedwire enclosed camps were scattered over the lengthof western I Corps.

Although it played an important role in thegovernment's strategy for controlling the insur-gency in the northern provinces, the outpost systemhad obvious shortcomings. Roads between thedistant camps and the towns along the coastalplain were almost nonexistent. Those that didexist, such as Route 9, the road which extendedfrom Route 1 westward across Quang Tn Provinceand into Laos, were vulnerable to ambush orinterdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys,furthermore, consumed time and required protec-tion by security forces. As a result of their relativeisolation, the CIDG camps had come to dependheavily on aircraft as a means of resupply. Whilecrude runways had been constructed at many ofthe outposts, they were often better suited forhelicopter operations than for fixed-wing transportlandings. The newly arrived Marine commandersanticipated that their squadron, like the Armyhelicopter company it had replaced, would be re-quired to devote a sizable percentage of sorties toresupplying the far-flung outposts.

Initial Helicopter Operations

The system of helicopter coordination in I

Corps promised to be somewhat different fromthat which had governed Marine operations inthe Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air SupportOperations Center (ASOC) was organized withinthe corps headquarters to process all requests foraviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S.


Air Force, and U.S. Marine officers, the ASOCprocessed mission requests from the various fieldcommands, passing them on to the Joint OperationsCenter at JGS headquarters for final approval.Once approved, the ASOC assigned specific missionsto the American and Vietnamese units whichsupported I CTZ. This arrangement enabled thecorps headquarters to plan and coordinate allcombat support missions flown within the fivenorthern provinces.

The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, whohad learned to value helicopter support as a result,of the Army aviation company's eight-monthpresence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing thenewly arrived Marine squadron. HMM—163 flew itsfirst combat operation from Da Nang on 18 Sep-tember, the day after the last flight of helicoptersarrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs liftedtroops of the 2d ARVN Division into two landingzones in the rugged hills about 35 miles south ofDa Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. Thescarcity of suitable landing zones in the steep hillccuntry and the fact that the enemy could deliverfire on those that did exist from nearby high groundand the surrounding jungle prompted the Marinepilots to adjust their tactics in preparation for thismission. After VNAF fighters bombed and strafedthe objective area, the helicopters made an un-opposed landing.

The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zoneswith air strikes was continued and refined in theensuing weeks. The Marines began using artilleryfire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralizeenemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. TheOE—1 was well suited for assisting in the employ-ment of the artillery fire support. Having famili-arized themselves with the landing site during aprior reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observerof the OE—1 would arrive over the designated areaprior to the operation and adjust artillery fire untilthe helicopters appeared. During the landing thecrew of the observation aircraft often coordinatedbetween the helicopters and the escorting aircraftand were available to assist the ground units withartillery fire missions.

The task unit's staff borrowed another idea fromtheir experience in the Mekong Delta whichallowed HMM—163 to provide more efficient heli-copter support in the northern provinces. In thiscase the concept of temporarily positioning the

TAFDS to support specific operations was refinedsomewhat by placing the portable refueling bladdersat secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps.Several days after arriving in I Corps, the Marinesemplaced a 10,000-gallon section of the TAFDS atQuang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, toserve as a permanent refueling point for aircraftoperating in southern I Corps. Within the month,another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and athird was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital ofQuang Tin Province, which was situated on Route1 about half way between Da Nang and QuangNgai. These well-chosen refueling points greatlyenhanced the squadron's operational potential.Used to support daily operations, they enabled thehelicopters to operate deep into the adjacentmountain areas on resupply and medical evacuationliiissions.

On 19 September, the day after their initialcombat support assignment in I Corps, the Marinehelicopter crews were called upon to conduct anoperation which they would repeat often in thecoming months. They were ordered to evacuate athreatened government outpost from the mountains18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM—163pilots lifted an odd cargo of troops, dependents,personal belongings and an assortment of pigs,cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on thecoastal plain.

Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of en-circled or endangered South Vietnamese outpostswould become almost routine for Marine helicoptersquadrons assigned to Vietnam during the periodbetween 1962 and 1965. As the North Vietnamesestepped up their support for the Viet Cong, theisolated government outposts along the infiltrationroutes became particularly vulnerable. The in-creased number of helicopter evacuation missionsduring the next three years would be grim testi-mony of the trend of warfare which was unfoldingin the South. Reinforced with more and more NorthVietnamese and growing amounts of Communistbloc and captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Congwould press the initiative even in South Vietnam'smost isolated areas.

The Communists operating in I Corps lost littletime in challenging the newly arrived Marine unit.HMM—163 suffered its first battle damage whilelifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into alanding zone southwest of Tam Ky 0026 September.


One of 22 helicopters involved in the mission wasstruck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite theuse of preparatory air and artillery strikes on thelanding zone. The day after this iocident anotherof the squadron's helicopters was hit by enemy firewhile attempting to evacuate wounded ARVNsoldiers from the battlefield. On the 29th two moreaircraft were damaged by ground fire while par-ticipating in another troop lift. One round passedthrough the windshield and exited at the rear of thecockpit, missing the copilot's head by inches.During the first week of October another HUS wasstruck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a governmentoutpost about 15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. Inthis incident two ARVN troops were killed andthe Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I.Mansfield, was wounded before the pilot could flythe aircraft out of the danger area. In each of theinstances the helicopters were able to return to DaNang where necessary repairs were made.

The most serious incident recorded during theearly operations in I Corps ironically resulted frommechanical failure rather than Viet Cong fire. Itoccurred on 6 October when a search and rescuehelicopter crashed and burned on a hillside 15 milessoutheast of Tam Ky while covering a 20-planehelilift of 2d ARVN Division elemenrs.* Unable toland near the downed aircraft because of the thickjungle, other helicopters landed troops at the baseof the hill with instructions to proceed to the crashsite on foot. When the Vietnamese ldiers reachedthe downed aircraft after cutting their way throughdense vegetation, they found the copilot, crewchief, and five other members of the task unit dead.The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott,who was injured seriously, was hoisted throughthe trees and evacuated by an NUS which came tothe rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash wereFirst Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, SergeantRichard E. Hamilton, Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell,Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance CorporalMiguel A. Valenrin. Two Navy personnel, Lieu-tenant Gerald Griffin, a doctor, and HospitalmanG. 0. Norton were also dead. These were the firstdeaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 sincedeploying to Vietnam.

*For larger operations the task unit commander usuallydesignated one HUS as a starch and rescue aircraft. This heli-copter normally carried several mechanics and Navy medicalpersonnel and was equipped with a hoist.

An administrative measure which eventuallyresulted in the extension of the length of tours forthe Marine helicopter squadron as well as all otherpersonnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in thefirst week of October. Colonel Ireland dispatcheda recommendation to the Commanding General,1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that thetours for both the squadron and the individualMarines serving with the sub unit and the taskunit headquarters be set at six months. Pointingout that the U.S. Army helicopter company whichhad occupied Da Nang previously had operatedfrom January to September without rotatingpersonnel, the task unit commander outlined thepositive features of such an adjustment. It would,he contended, provide mbre continuity for ad-ministration and operations, thereby resulting in amore effective utilization of manpower. To under-score his argument, Ireland emphasized the numberof man hours involved in the rotation of a helicop-ter squadron. Adding his opinion that the two-month extension of all tours would not measurablyaffect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, herecommended that the next rotation of helicoptersquadrons be postponed until January. After beingforwarded to FMFPac for consideration, ColonelIreland's proposals were approved later in the falland instructions were passed to all involvedcommands to implement the new policy.4

Another adjustment—this one in the area oftactics—had been made during the task unit'sfirst two months at Da Nang. By November theEagle Flight concept had been tailored to comple-ment reaction force plans which already existedin I Corps at the time of SHUFLY's relocation.ARVN authorities in the northern corps tacticalzone had developed a system whereby their variousinfantry units were placed on alert for use asheliborne reaction forces. Designated the TigerForce, the alert unit was staged at its base, readyto react to any tactical emergency.

HMM—163 Marines executed one of their earliestTiger Flights on 7 November in response to a trainambush sprung by the Viet Cong several milesnorthwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marinehelicopters launched from Da Nang, made anairborne rendezvous with two other RUSs, andproceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick upa 52-man ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines thenhelilifted the South Vietnamese into a suitable


landing zone near the ambush site. The relativelyshort amount of time Consumed in the reaction didnot prevent the Communist attackers from vanish-ing into the surrounding jungle. Generally, how-ever, the tactic was more successful, particularlywhen the reaction force was used to reinforce athreatened static position or to establish hastyblocking positions in support of ground offensiveoperations that were already underway.

While the task unit encountered few majorproblems during the early operations from DaNang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Mostoften these developed during the execution phaseof combat support missions. One that particularlyconcerned the Marine commanders was the ten-dency of South Vietnamese units not to prepareproperly for scheduled helilifts. To the dismay ofthe Leatherneck helicopter crews, ARVN activitiesat the pickup points were usually characterized byconfusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unitscheduled to be helilifted had not been organizedinto heliteams prior to the arrival of the transportaircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operationswere still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVNsmall unit leaders (and to many U.S. advisors) atthis stage of the war, these circumstances wereperhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of priorpreparation at pickup points on the part of theground units often threatened to disrupt the timingof preplanned operations.

To help remedy this situation and to insure thattheir helicopters were not overloaded, the U.S.Marines began designating one of the squadron'snoncommissioned. officers as "loadmaster."Equipped with a radio, the loadmaster wouldarrive at the assembly area on board the first heli-copter, whereupon he would disembark and super-vise the entire loading process. This technique wasparticularly valuable during operations in whichARVN units were being helilifted from the field.In such cases the loadmaster performed the samefunction as did those who supervised the loadingprocess at secure assembly areas. This, of course,required that the Leatherneck remain in the landingzone until the last Vietnamese troops had boardedthe final helicopter. Although dangerous, thistechnique enabled the Marines to eliminate manyproblems which might otherwise have occurred.

By early November the monsoon season hadbegun to settle over the northern portions of South

Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the MekongDelta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun'screws had managed to set new helicopter flightrecords, the winter monsoons that struck thenorthern provinces seriously restricted flight opera-tions. Heavy fog and low clouds frequently madeit impossible to conduct air operations in the moun-tainous areas; therefore, the squadron was forcedto concentrate most of its operations in the coastalplains. In an effort to maintain his support at amaximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun begandispatching an OE—1 to the objective area priorto scheduled missions in order to obtain a currentreport on the local weather conditions. Despitethese efforts, the monsoon rains, which oftenmoved in quickly from the South China Sea, stilldisrupted flight operations. A typical weather-related incident occurred on 13 November when ascheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavyfog after 200 Vietnamese Special Forces troops hadloaded onto 20 Marine helicopters for an earlymorning operation.

Several unrelated changes in official designationsoccurred at approximately the same time that themonsoons began affecting operations in the north-ern provinces. In November all Marine aircraftwere redesignated in accordance with a Departmentof Defense order which standardized aircraft desig-nations throughout the U.S. armed services.Thereafter, SHUFLY's HUS helicopters would beknown as UH—34Ds, its OE—ls as 0—iBs, and itsR4D as a C—117. In another adjustment, the JointGeneral Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment ofSouth Vietnam's tactical zones. A fourth corpstactical zone (IV CTZ), which encompassed theentire Mekong Delta, and a Capital MilitaryDistrict, which included Saigon and its environs,were created. The composition of I Corps wasaffected by the adjustments as the new alignmentshifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. TheMarines, however, continued to provide helicoptersupport to the province, which was relativelyisolated from the remainder of II Corps.

More important than either the new aircraftdesignations or the realignment of the tacticalzones were several internal changes within theMarine task unit. On 6 November the task unitwas redesignated Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton W.McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel


Ireland's executive officer, assumed command ofthe task element. Ireland returned to Okinawawhere he took command of Marine AircraftGroup 16, which, under the new arrangement,became responsible for both the administrativeand logistical support of SHUFLY.

Marine People-to-People Program

The concept of the People-to-People Program,which had been initiated with a degree of successin the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang byColonel Ireland and his Marines. During the falland early winter of 1962, as weather caused flightoperations to subside, the Marines were able toincrease the tempo of the program. SI-IUFLY'smen actively supported an orphanage in Da Nangwhich was maintained by an American missionaryfamily. On Christmas day the Marines partici-pated in a 'Father-For-A-Day" program whichhad been arranged by the task element chaplain,Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Eachorphan spent the day with a Marine who hadvolunteered to serve as his father.' The Viet-namese children were treated to dinner in the messhall, presented with Christmas gifts, and thenjoined in singing carols with the Marines. At theconclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinsonprcsented the director of the orphanage with a giftin Vietnamese currency equivalent to over 800dollars—money which the men of tEe task elementhad donated.

In addition to their activities associated with theorphanage, the Marine officers taught English toa number of Vietnamese civilians. Held three

nights weekly, the classes were received enthusi-astically. Beyond the foundations of good willwhich it helped shape, the People-to-People Pro-gram enabled the Marines to acquire a betterunderstanding of the Vietnamese people, theirculture, and their problems.

SHUFLY Operations in I Corps

SHUFLY's initial helicopter support operationsin I Corps represented the beginnings of whatwould become a long association of U.S. Marineswith South Vietnam's rugged northern provinces.Essentially these early operations were charac-terized by continuity and adjustment. Since theirarrival at Da Nang in September the Marines hadextended the standard of consistent and effectivecombat support operations set earlier in the flatMekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY's command-ers had modified the previously developed tacticsand techniques to fit the mountainous terrain andthe nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. Forthe most part these adjustments had proven success-ful by allowing the Marines to continue the pace ofhelicopter support with a reduction of the risksinvolved. That SHUFLY had suffered its firstfatalities during these initial months in I Corpsdampened but did not detract from its overallachievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines hadbegun establishing a reputation in the northernprovinces as courageous, professional fightingmen and generous allies. It was this reputationupon which a generation of Marines would buildin the ensuing decade.

CHAPTER 7

The Laotian Crisis, 1962

Genesis of the Problem—The American Response—The Marine CorpsRole—Marine Participation: A Summary

Genesis of the Problem

Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY's deploy-ment to Soc Trang in April 1962, U.S. Marine com-bat forces were ordered to Thailand in response tothe growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the mostpart by peaceful hill tribes, the small, landlockedKingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely setting forany significant military confrontation. Even moreimprobable was the possibility that a seriousinternational crisis could stem from what hadbegun as a political rivalry among relativelyobscure princes.

To be certain, the context of what should havebeen a rather meaningless political feud had beenaltered substantively by North Vietnam's drive toextend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone fortheir southward thrust, the North Vietnamese,joined by the Soviet Union, had begun providingmilitary aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftistprince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. Tocounter these Communist activities, the UnitedStates had extended military assistance to the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. Inthe resultant struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma,who previously had proclaimed neutrality, sidedwith the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn andthe contenders now reinforced by powerful allies,the conflict naturally escalated. Laos, like SouthVietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.

Administered through a small USMAAG, theAmerican military assistance to Boun Oum, how-ever, did little to slow the advances of the PathetLao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces withNorth Vietnamese units to seize control of theeastern portion of the country's long, southwardextending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed

86

by North Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao hadopened an offensive on the Plain of Jars in centralLaos. Boun Oum's units, commanded by GeneralPhoumi Nosavan, proved unable to contain thispush into central Laos.

By March 1961 the situation had become criticalenough for President Kennedy to direct thatCinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible de-ployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated atask force headquarters and assigned Major Gen-eral Donald M. Weller, who was then serving asCommanding General, 3d Marine Division, as itscommander. Designated Joint Task Force 116 inaccordance with existing CinCPac contingencyplans, Weller's command was to consist predom-inantly of Marine air and ground forces with Armyand Air Force units making up the balance.Simultaneous with the activation of Weller'sheadquarters on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted thescattered forces earmarked for assignment to thejoint task force.

Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration man-aged to defuse the situation somewhat by securingSoviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in Laos.The crisis cooled further when 14 governments,including the Soviet Union, Communist China,and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene theGeneva Conference to consider neutralization of theKingdom of Laos. This conference convened on16 May 1961, and together with the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. Withinternational tensions eased, the alert of U.S.forces in the Pacific ended. Subsequently, Genera]Weller's JTF 116 headquarters was deactivated.

The negotiations in Geneva proved to be longand tedious. In Laos, frequent fighting, usually ofa localized nature, punctuated the cease-fire almostfrom the day it was effected. Finally, in the first

THE LAOTIAN CRISIS, 1962 87


weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, thistime on a general scale, and precipitated a new andmore intense crisis. For U.S. observers the situationseemed to reach its critical point in early May whenPathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnameseformations, routed a major element of Phouma'sarmy from Nam Tha, a town located east of theMekong River in extreme northwestern Laos.Following this action, Phoumi's forces retreatedsouthwestward across the Mekong into northernThailand. Now in full control of the east bank ofthe Mekong, the Communists appeared poised fora drive into Thailand, a full-fledged member ofSEATO. The collapse of Phoumi's military forces,moreover, seriously threatened the U.S. bargainingposition at the ongoing Geneva talks.

The American Response

In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff instructedCinCPac to upgrade the readiness of Joint TaskForce 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on10 May Admiral Felt directed Major General JohnCondon, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Air-craft Wing, to activate the joint task force head-quarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deploymentplans. The Amphibious Ready Group of the SeventhFleet, carrying the Special Landing Force, promptlysailed into the Gulf of Siam.

Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitmentto its defense and to discourage further Communistadvances on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, Presi-dent Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thai-land on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediatelyto execute this decision. In simultaneous actionsCinCPac designated Army Lieutenant GeneralJohn L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Com-mander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, to replaceMajor General Condon as Commander, JTF 116 andinstructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Opera-tions Plan 32—59, Phase II (Laos). Felt's instruc-tions to the new Commander, JTF 116 wereexplicit. General Richardson's command was toact in such a way that would leave no doubt as toAmerican intentions to defend Thailand. Throughthese same actions JTF 116 was to exert a pre-cautionary impact" on the situation in Laos.Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116 was di-

rected to position his forces in a manner so thatthey could respond to any armed Communist threatto Thailand.'

Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116,CinCPac instructed the Commander, U.S. MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins,to establish and assume command of a U.S. Mili-tary Assistance Command, Thailand (USMAC-Thai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMA-CV and ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible toCinCPac for all U.S. military activities and opera-tions in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Onceit became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plusthe already existing Joint U.S. Military AdvisoryAssistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were tocome under Harkins' purview. Until USMACThaiand the JTF staffs could become operational, how-ever, the various task force components were toreport to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, MajorGeneralJ. F. Conway, U.S. Army.

One element of the joint task force was alreadyin Thailand when President Kennedy issued theorder to commit U.S. forces—the Army's 1stBrigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantrybrigade was participating in a SEATO exercisenear Korat, a town located about 130 miles north-east of Bangkok in the central portion of the coun-try. In response to CinCPac orders it promptlymoved into bivouac at a position 40 miles west ofKorat.

The Marine Corps Role

Operations Plan 32—59, Phase II (Laos), calledfor a U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade composedof a regimental landing team (three reinforcedinfantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a

helicopter transport squadron, and supportingunits, to operate from Udorn, a provincial capitallocated nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok.Strategically situated only 35 miles south ofVientiane, the political capital of Laos, Udornwas the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A300-man Marine aviation support unit, MarineAir Base Squadron 16, had actually been positionedat this airstrip for over six months during 1961.While at Udorn the MABS—16 Marines had pro-vided maintenance support for helicopters whichwere assisting General Phoumi's forces in Laos. ARoyal Thai regiment had provided security for the


Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977).

base during this unit's deployment and was stillin the area in 1962 when the decision was made tocommit JTF 116 to Thailand.

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton's VMA—332, an A—4C (Skyhawk) jet attack squadron,claimed the distinction of being the first Marineunit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962Laotian crisis. The 20 single-placed Skyhawksdeparted the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in thePhilippirles on the morning of 18 May, wererefueled in flight by aircraft from VMA—211, an-other Marine A—4 squadron, and landed at Udornaround noon. The bulk of the Marine units beganarriving in Thailand the following day. At Bang-kok the Special Landing Force, composed ofLieutenar1t Colonel Harold W. Adams' 1,500-manBattalion Landing Team 3/9 and LieutenantColonel Fred A. Steele's HMM—261, an HUS—1helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships

211-623 0—77—7

of the Amphibious Ready Group.* That same dayMarine GV—1 refueler-transports began airliftingadditional aviation support detachments fromOkinawa to Udorn. These included detachmentsof Marine Air Control Squadrons 2 and 4 (MACS—2and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS—12),and a Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (Prov-MAG) headquarters. Upon landing Colonel RossS. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG,established his headquarters at the airfield andassumed operational control of all USMC aviation

*A Marine battalion landing team derives its designationfrom the infantry battalion around which it is built, in thiscase the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962, the BLT includeda howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an amphibious tractorplatoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and naval gunfire liaison teams.

Following the commitmtnt of the SLF on 19 May, anotherBLT and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted theSeventh Fleet Special Landing Force.


elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM—261'shelicopters began arriving at the now busy airfield,having flown from the Amphibious Ready Groupwith a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant ColonelSteele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.

On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpsonarrived at Udorn with the staff and communicationspersonnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade(3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan whohad been serving as Assistant Division Commander,3d Marine Division, had assembled and activatedthis headquarters on Okinawa shortly afterCinCPac's activation of JTF 116. As CommandingGeneral, 3d MEB, Simpson was to assume corn-mand of all Marine elements, air and ground,deployed to Udorn. In addition to being the CG3d MEB, General Simpson carried the designation,Naval Component Commander, a title whichgave him responsibility for all Navy as well asMarine forces operating at Udorn under JTF 116.

Concurrent with General Simpson's arrival, U.S.Air Force C—130 and C—123 transports were ferryingLieutenant Colonel Adams' Battalion LandingTeam from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placedits supplies and trucks, along with HMM—261'sheavier equipment, on rail cars for transport toUdorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small toaccommodate such massive vehicles, Adams orderedhis tank and amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS Point Defiance (LSD-31).Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and itsremaining reinforcements assembled alongside theairstrip. From there the Leathernecks were trans-ported by Thai Army trucks some eight milessouth to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astridethe main service road. Adams' battalion establisheda temporary camp on some high ground just be-yond the town. With the BLT's arrival, the initialMarine combat forces assigned to JTF 116 were inposition. The next day, 20 May, General Simpsonassumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navyunits at Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being.

Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-upwas continuing apace. A squadron of 20 U.S. AirForce F—lao Super Sabre tactical fighter bombersand a detachment of three refueler aircraft haddeployed to Takhli airfield from Clark Air ForceBase in the Philippines. Two USAF transportsquadrons had also begun operations from this

base. At Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry wasbeing reinforced with Army units from Hawaii.Another Army unit, a logistics support command,was being activated near Bangkok.

To command this growing assortment of mili-tary units, General Richardson established theJTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major GeneralDonald M. Weller, who had been serving as DeputyCommanding General, FMFPac, since leaving the3d Marine Division in 1961, joined Richardson'sheadquarters as chief of staff. General Weller'sofhces were located at Korat initially. Later herelocated at Bangkok where he headed a rearechelon responsible for coordination with theJUSMAAG, ComUSMACThai, and the Americanrepresentatives to SEATO. While in the capitalWeller was also responsible for implementing alogistic plan, the objective of which was to upgradelines of communication being used by JTF—1l6elements.

It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, whohad been the first U.S. Marine advisor to the Viet-namese Marine Corps, was serving at this time asthe senior U.S. military representative on theSEATO planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller,who had commanded JTF 116 for a period duringearly 1961, and Croizat who had served as itschief of staff during that interval, were intimatelyfamilar with the JTF's structure, capabilities, andfunctions. In fact, the operations plan being exe-cuted had been developed in large part under theirguidance.2

Another facet of this particular situation wasthat portions of Operations Plan 32—59 Phase II,(Laos) were to exert a profound influence on laterU.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam.A key provision of this particular document out-lined the command relationships which wouldgovern Marine and Air Force tactical air support inthe event JTF 116 actually became involved incombat. This provision designated the CommanderJTF 116 as the "coordinating authority" respons-ible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support.But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB,operational control of all Marine tactical aircraft,thereby insuring that the Marine air-ground teamwould not be fractured. Later, in the rnid-1960swhen American tactical jet squadrons would becalled upon to support U.S. and RVNAF groundforces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would


Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok, Thailand. (USMC Photo 11182785).


exercises, Lieutenant Colonel Adams' infantry com-panies sharpened their skills in patrolling of alltypes and made frequent use of nearby Thai Armyfiring ranges to maintain their weapons proficiency.All field training was conducted in an unpopulatedarea defined by the Thai government and everyprecaution was taken so as not to disturb the localpopulation. The Marine units utilized blank ammu-nition exclusively in training except for the closelysupervised live fire exercises.

Realizing that the ultimate success or failure ofthe American commitment in Thailand might hingeon the relationships U.S. military men establishedwith the Thai populace, General Simpson orderedhis command to initiate a civic action program.The day after his arrival at Udorn, Simpson metwith local civilian officials and established thebasis for a people-to-people program similar to theone instituted by SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang.Thereafter, the MEB's goal in this area was tofoster among the Thai a favorable impression ofthe individual Marine, his commanders, and his

Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff,Joint Task Force—fl 6. (USMC Photo A407463).

borrow heavily from this arrangement to definethe relationships of Marine and Air Force tacticalaviation assets.

Training began almost immediately after theMarine units were in position at Udorn and NongTa Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a trainingprogram designed to help fulfill three requirements:to make its presence known and thereby enhanceits credibility as a "show of force"; to acclimatizethe individual Marines to the hot, humid, tropicalclimate; and finally, to familarize the operationalelements and their commanders with the surround-ing terrain. The primary objective of this program,of course, was to prepare the brigade for combatshould that contingency arise out of the troubledsituation in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercisesconducted around Udorn enabled General Simpson'scommand to publicize its presence in the area whileconcurrently refining its heliborne and close airsupport capabilities.* In addition to air-ground Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier

*The MEB's after action report pointed out one flaw in the General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand.composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been no pro- (USMC Photo A182779).vssson made to include light obseevation aircraft in its organiza-tion. As a result, aerial reconnaissance had to be accomplished — — — — —from either A—4Cs or HUS—is, neither of which was configured sions. The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that futurefor such a mission. The A—4C, which could carry only the pilot, composite aviation packages of this nature should include aand the HUS—1 proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance mis- detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial observers.


unit. The people-to-people program which fol-lowed was, in all respects, a concerted and inte-grated effort. Officers taught conversational Englishclasses to interested civilians both at Udorn and atNong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck engineers andNavy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May)helped repair public buildings. Navy medical anddental personnel attached to Colonel Mickey'sProvMA.G and Lieutenant Colonel Adams' BLTjoined the effort by administering almost daily tothe physical ailments of the local populace andoccasionally visiting the snore remote villages byhelicopter. In an action intended to help preventfriction between Marines and Thai townspeople,General Simpson directed that MEB units disem-bark from trucks as they approached towns, marchthrough the population centers at sling arms, andre-embark aboard their trucks at the opposite endof the town. Relying on this broad array of simplebut effective programs, the 3d MEB was able toimpress upon the civilian population that its mis-sion was one of assistance and good will ratherthan occupation.

This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after theU.S. joint task force established its presence innortheastern Thailand, and Communist forceshalted their advance short of the internationalborder. With these two developments there wasno requirement for additional Marine infantrybattalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesig-nated his force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit(3d MEU), even though other reinforcementscontinued to arrive at Udorn throughout May andmost of June. Near the end of May, a 70-manSeabee detachment from Navy Mobile Construc-tion Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position.This detachment, the initial increment of a largerLogistics Support Group (LSG), moved to NongTa Kai where it helped the BLT's pioneer platooncomplete a rnore permanent camp designed towithstand the approaching monsoon season. Inmid-June, with no end to the MEU's assignmentin sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSGdeployed from Okinawa to Udorn. Commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, thisgroup included a motor transport detachment,a medical detachment, a supply unit, and anengineer detachment. * These reinforcements

*Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by LieutenantColonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.

brought the number of Marines, Seabees, and Navymedical and dental personnel under GeneralSimpson's command to its highest level—3,426officers and men. A final change in the compositionof the 3d MEU occurred in the final week ofJune when HMM—162, an HUS—1 squadron com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu,replaced HMM—261 as the helicopter element.

While General Simpson's MEU was strengthen-ing its posture in northeastern Thailand, U.S.officials were reporting definite progress in thenegotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane.Encouraged by these signs and hoping to influencethe Geneva talks even further, President Kennedyordered major elements of the U.S. combat forceswithdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just fourdays after HMM—162's arrival at Udorn. Inresponse General Richardson directed GeneralSimpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawalof the ProvMAG and one infantry company.Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA—332's Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in thePhilippines. Subsequently, HMM—162's helicoptersdeparted for Bangkok where they re-embarkedon board the USS Valley Forge. Okinawa-basedGV—ls airlifted one of BLT 3/9's companies tothe Philippines while elements of the Marine aircontrol squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkokfor embarkation on board ships of the SeventhFleet. By 6 July General Simpson's 3d MEU hadbeen reduced by just over 1,000 men.

At Geneva, the first weeks of July were markedby steady progress toward a diplomatic solutionto the long-standing Laotian problem. By the 20thit was evident that a formal agreement would soonbe forthcoming. With these encouraging develop-ments, General Richardson was directed to preparefor the withdrawal of the remainder of his forcesfrom Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling politicalfactions had already agreed to participate in acoalition government headed by Prince SouvannaPhouma which would serve as the basis for aneutral state. At Geneva on the 23d, the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, SouthVietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada,India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, theKingdom of Laos, arid Cambodia finally signed theDeclaration of Neutrality of Laos and an attachedprotocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed torecognize and respect the sovereignty, independ-


Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883).

ence, and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos.Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troopswere prohibited from entering or operating withinthe borders of Laos. Had it been adherred to, thisprovision would have denied North Vietnam theuse of the corridor down the length of easternLaos, altering the scope and nature of the conflictin the Republic of Vietnam.

Following the signing of this declaration inGeneva, CinCPac directed General Richardson toeffect the withdrawal of the remainder of hisjoint task force. General Simpson's 3d MEU beganexecuting these instructions on the 28th whenMarine GV—ls and Air Force C—130s began air-lifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams' BLT 3/9 toOkinawa. By the 31st no Marine combat unitswere left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staffdeparted the airfield a few days later, and shortlythereafter the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit wasdeactivated.

Marine Participation; A Summary

The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the endof the first deployment of a Marine air-ground com-bat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since thedecision to commit American forces to Thailandin mid-May, the Marine units assigned to GeneralSimpson had demonstrated anew the value of theirservice as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreignpolicy on short notice. Within the period of a fewdays, the various FMFPac commands had assembleda complete air-ground-support team, and, assistedby the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affectedunits to a position over 1,800 miles from the nearestmajor Marine base. Located far inland from theseacoast, a Marine unit's normal habitat, the 3dMEU had been sustained solely by air while main-taining its combat readiness in a difficult tropicalenvironment.

TI-IE LAOTIAN CRISIS, 1962 95

In so doing the Marines had shown that a sub-stantial American combat force could be broughtto bear quickly in the remote areas chosen by theCommunists as targets for their so-called "warsof national liberation.'' Furthermore, the MEUby relying on a vigorous civic action program, hadestablished that a sizable Marine command couldmaintain its combat readiness almost indefinitelywithout eroding the respect of the indigenouspopulation. Thus, General Simpson's Marines had

created a solid foundation of mutual respect andconfidence with the Thai people. This accom-plishment alone would prove valuable whenAmerican military forces would be required toreturn to northern Thailand later in the decade.Against the backdrop of these accomplishments,the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit's operations inThailand could be assessed as having extended thetradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effectiveinstrument of American diplomacy.

PART IIITHE STRUGGLE CONTINUES,

1963

CHAPTER 8

The Marine Advisory EffortThe Political Climate—The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations—

Accomplishments

The Political Climate

A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam'sinternal political situation during 1963 whichlargely determined the course of the war as wellas the nation's future. Following the sect uprisingof 1955—1956, the Diem government had experi-enced a three-year period of relative politicaltranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, politicaldissent had begun to re-emerge from several influ-ential segments of South Vietnamese society. Theresults of the August 1959 national elections, inwhich pro Diem candidates captured every seat inthe National Assembly, served to stimulate politi-cal opposition which had lain dormant for nearlyfour years. Opposition to the government mountedsteadily in the months following the electionswithin military as well as political circles as someSouth Vietnamese officers began privately express-ing disem:hantrnent with Diem's management ofthe war. Then came the abortive coup in November1960. The regime's popularity diminished in thewake of this crisis as Diem tightened his controlon the war-torn nation.

Another problem—religious unrest—which wasto play a key role in determining South Vietnam'spolitical direction as the decade unfolded, alsoemerged during this period. Buddhist leadersthroughout South Vietnam began protestingagainst various policies enacted by the Catholic-controlled government. The tensions graduallymounted, and by early 1963 the protests werehighlighted by spectacular and highly publicizedself-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, inMay, the religious problem erupted into violencewhen the Vietnamese police and military forceskilled 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppress-ing a religious demonstration at Hue. This actiontriggered a protracted crisis of public confidence

in the Diem government which deepened as thesummer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo DinhNhu, the president's closest political advisor,ordered the national police to raid key Buddhistpagodas throughout the nation. Following theraids, which uncovered some weapons, Nhuattempted to blame the attacks on several keySouth Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift theresponsibility for the police raids served only toalienate some of the nation's most powerful mili-tary leaders.

On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamesegenerals led by Major General Duong Van Minhreacted to the deepening political crisis by deposingPresident Diem and seizing control of the Govern-ment of Vietnam. Both the president and hisbrother were murdered by an ARVN officer thefollowing day. The U.S. government, which hadadvance knowledge of the coup and was in contactwith the plotting generals, publically declared itsintention to remain neutral. General Harkins or-dered USMACV to cease all activities and to with-draw its advisors from South Vietnamese unitspending the outcome of the power struggle.

The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred freshhope among many Americans and South Viet-namese that the new government could attract thesolid public support of the Vietnamese people, andthereby wage a more effective war against theCommunists. South Vietnam's new leaders imme-diately focused their attention upon healing thenation's deep political divisions and securing con-tinued U.S. assistance for the war effort. Theypledged to respect religious freedom, to return thegovernment to civilian control, and to continuethe struggle against the Viet Cong. Appreciatingthe interrelationship of these assurances, theUnited States officially recognized the new govern-

99


ment on 7 November, whereupon ComUSMACVlifted the temporary ban on military assistance.

The American hopes that the new politicalclimate in the Republic of Vietnam would stimu-late a more effective military effort, however,proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent ofthe sect uprising in 1955 spread throughout thegovernment following Diem's death. The dismissalof more than 30 high-ranking military officers foractively supporting the former president during thecoup typified the new regime's campaign to realigntop personnel in all governmental agencies. Farfrom enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamesemilitary, the power struggle and the chaos whichprevailed in its wake dragged the war effort to itsmost ineffective level since before the U.S. stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. Itwas on this unfortunate note that the year 1963ended.

The Advisory Division andVNMC Operations

At the beginning of 1963, the Marine AdvisoryDivision, still headed by Lieutenant ColonelMoody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10noncommissioned officers. In April, however, thetable of organization was adjusted slightly whenthe first sergeant and four assistant infantry advisor(noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated.Another s:mall unit training advisor was added tothe organization, changing the strength of Lieu-tenant Colonel Moody's command to eightofficers and six noncommissioned officers. Men fromthe 3d Marine Division continued to augment theadvisory effort and gain combat experience whileserving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.

Like the U.S. organization which advised andassisted it, the Vietnamese Marine Corps began thenew year at the same strength that it had achievedwhen it had been expanded to brigade size in early1962. Still commanded by Lieutenant ColonelLe Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Brigadecontinued to operate as part of the nation'sgeneral reserve under the direct control of the Viet-namese Joint General Staff.

As the :ear opened three of the four VNMC in-fantry battalions were garrisoned separately insmall, crude, self-sustaining camps around ThuDue on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th

Battalion maintained its camp at Vung Tau on thecoast. The newly formed artillery battalion, whichbecame fully operational in mid-January when Band C Batteries passed their final gunnery exami-nations, was garrisoned near Thu Duc. While theMarine units spent little time in their base camps,being deployed almost continuously in combat,the Joint General Staff normally kept one bat-talion at Thu Due to enable it to respond to anyemergency which might develop.

For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was tobe highlighted by innovations in the importantareas of training and operations. Prior to Lieu-tenant Colonel Moody's arrival in Vietnam, allVietnamese Marine recruits had received basictraining at ARVN installations, an arrangementtolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marineadvisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963,Moody was able to convince Khang that he shouldpush for the authority to establish a separateMarine training center. In late 1963 the JGSapproved this proposal, whereupon the VietnameseMarine engineers, advised by Captain Robert C.Jones, began building a small training facility atThu Due. In a related action Moody set in motionplans to have a small number of specially selectedVietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers sentto the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diegofor training as drill instructors. Although theseplans would not come to fruition during Moody'sassignment, the concept of a separate recruittraining center promised to permit the VietnameseMarine Corps to establish and maintain its ownstandards for basic training.

Another change to occur in 1963, this one inthe area of tactical operations, was the reinstitu-tion of multi-battalion combat operations underthe control of provisional Marine Brigade head-quarters.* Although the VNMC had performedsuch operations in 1960, they had been abandonedin the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sizeddeployments to the various provinces and corpstactical zones. Moody, however, prevailed uponKhang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments

*Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called eitherprovisional brigades or provisional regiments but on at least oneoccasion the organization was designated a Marine Task Force.In each case the composition was similar—two or three infantrybattalions, an artillery unit, an engineer or reconnaissancecompany, and a command element.

THE MARINR ADVISORY EFFORT 101

Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects anhonor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left, are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Com-mandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Mil1tary AssistanceCommand, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine

Corps. (Official USA Photo).

that would enable the brigade headquarters toexercise tactical control of its battalions.

The first such operation was launched in the firstweek of the new year. On 1 January a provisionalbrigade headquarters, commanded by Khang andadvised by Moody, embarked on board a Viet-namese Navy LST (landing ship, tank) at Saigonalong with the 2d VNMC battalion. The 4thVNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R.Christensen, embarked on board two VietnameseLSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time.The mission of the provisional brigade was toconduct an amphibious landing near the tip of theCa Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units froma series of villages in conjunction with the Stra-tegic Hamlet Program. Subsequent to the clearing

operations, VNMC engineers were to constructa fortified hamlet. The entire operation was toextend until mid-April.

Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclosethe location of the objective area. The smallflotilla sailed beyond sight of land and remainedafloat for two days before moving into positionoff Ca Mau. On 3 January the two LSMs proceededto the coast, moved up a river lined with thickmangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion.The 2d Battalion, accompanied by Captain RichardB. Taylor, came ashore from the LST in Dong aiboats, small styrofoam craft specifically designedfor use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigadeheadquarters remained on board the LST as the

102 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, J954—1964

U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese recruits. (USMC Photo A183561).

designated operations area did not extend farinland.

To their surprise the VNMC assault elementsfound the first objective, a large village, com-pletely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moodylater recalled, They had removed everything,even the cattle and other livestock. " At thesecond objective, a nearby village, the Marinesfound definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activitybut no enemy troops. There they captured a handfulof rifles, carbines, and light mortars along witha printed document that contained detailed ex-cerpts of the Marine operations plan. Quiteobviously the operation had been compromisedin Saigon during the planning stages. In any case,this discovery explained the evacuation of theinitial objective as well as the relative dearth ofaction during the remainder of the operation.

The provisional headquarters and the 4th Bat-

talion returned to Saigon after the initial phases ofthe operation had been executed, leaving the 2dBattalion and an engineer platoon to continuesecurity operations in the area and build the stra-tegic hamlet.* When the operation finally endedon 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost atotal of five men killed and 14 wounded. Minesand snipers had produced most of these casualties.The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killedand 14 wounded.

In the closing days of April, the JGS orderedLieutenant Colonel Khang to form two infantrybattalions and an artillery element into a provi-sional brigade for immediate assignment to IICorps. There the Vietnamese Marines were to join

*Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the VietnameseMarines seldom were involved in the actual construction ofstrategic hamlets. This task was normally left to the civilauthorities in the area who more often than not used the localpopulation as a labor force. (Moody Comments.)

THE MARINE ADVISORY EFFORT 103

elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN Divisions for amulti-regiment thrust into the rugged mountainsjust south of the I Corps-Il Corps border. Codenamed BACH PHOUNG XI, this offensive was topenetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area neverbefore entered by government forces. Centered inthat portion of the Annarnite Mountains wherethe borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Kon-turn Provinces converged, the Do Xa had beenunder Communist control since the early stages ofthe French-Indochina War. In this remote, inac-cessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedlyhad built-up extensive staging areas and trainingcamps. Prisoner interrogations obtained through-out the early 1960s revealed that many NorthVietnamese soldiers entering the South's northernprovinces had infiltrated the Do Xa before movinginto the densely populated coastal lowlands ofQuang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Addition-ally, the area was thought to contain the Com-munist military headquarters for Military Regions (MR—5).

After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a packhowitzer battery, a reconnaissance platoon, and aheadquarters element, Khang flew with LieutenantColonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferenceswith Major General Nguyen Khanh and his IICorps staff. The concept of BACH PHOUNG XI,Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marineand Army helicopters to lift ARVN infantry andartillery elements into positions which would forma loose ring around the suspected center of theDo Xa base area. The ARVN units would thenbegin contracting this ring in stages, whereuponthe provisional Marine brigade would be heliliftedinto its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search forCommunist camps. To control the entire operationGeneral Khanh would establish a corps headquar-ters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard villagelocated on the southern edge of the operationsarea, about 25 miles northeast of Kontum.

On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C—123 transportsairlifted Khang and the 2,000-man provisionalMarine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai.Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft,the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor and artilleryadvisor, accompanied the Marine force. The nextday an ARVN truck convoy transported theMarines from Quang Ngai some 40 miles north toTam Ky, the roadside town which served as the

capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion,advised by Captain Taylor, dismounted from thetrucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip while theremainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrowdirt road which curved through the foothillsand deep into the jungle-covered Annamite Chain.Meanwhile, Army H—21s from Pleiku landed atTam Ky, loaded assault elements of the 2d Bat-talion, and began helilifting them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of theprovincial capital. The convoy carrying the balanceof the Marine force continued its southwest motormarch until it reached the small ARVN-held townof Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of TamKy, Khang established his command post in aschool house adjacent to a crude little dirt air-strip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advisedby Major Croft, setup its weapons nearby while thereconnaissance platoon and elements of the 4thBattalion, advised by Captain Christensen, es-tablished security. When these units were in placeU.S. Marine IJH—34Ds from Da Nang lifted a

TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the airfield.Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed,the Army H—21s, refueling from the TAFDSbladder, began lifting the 4th Battalion into the2d Battalion's landing zone, which was locatedseveral miles south of Tra My.

With the initial movement into the operationsarea accomplished and the brigade command postfunctioning, the two infantry battalions begancombing a deep valley and the adjacent mountainsfor Communist base camps. After several daysKhang's Marines located one rather complete campbut encountered no resistance upon entering theposition. Once again the occupants, probably fore-warned by the initial movement of the ARVNunits into the area, had withdrawn ahead of theMarines. The only people found in the camp werea North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A. subse-

quent search of the bamboo huts and the under-lying tunnel complex did produce a supply cache.The Vietnamese Marines discovered several rifles,six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio,44 maps, a French artillery computing board, andscores of flashlight batteries.

ARVN and Marine operations in the area duringthe next two weeks failed to locate any large VietCong elements. For the most part the Marinesbusied themselves by destroying a few abandoned

104 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA TQ4—TQ1


camps and some cultivated crops. ARVN unitsoperating around the Marines reported scatteredaction as they engaged small groups of Viet Congattempting to escape from the center of the Do Xa.BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in mid-May whenU.S. Marine UH—34Ds lifted the VNMC battalionsback to Tra My. From there the Marines returnedby convoy to Quang Ngai where they staged forthe airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for theMarine portion of the operation revealed that onlytwo Viet Cong soldiers had been killed. Khang'sforce suffered 36 wounded, most as a result ofencounters with booby traps constructed fromsharpened bamboo spikes. ARVN forces fared onlyslightly better, having killed barely a score ofCommunists. Except for the fact that they haddemonstrated their ability to penetrate the mostdifficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two week offen-sive into the Do Xa base area had little impact onthe war effort. From the standpoint of trainingand experience, however, the operation wasbeneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and theiradvisors learned a great deal about construction oflanding zones and about directing helicopters,fields in which they had received little previoustraining. *

In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C.Noren, recently transferred from the 2d MarineDivision where he had served as Assistant G—3,arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant ColonelMoody as the Senior Marine Advisor to theVietnamese Marine Corps. Already selected forpromotion to colonel, Noren would become theseventh Senior Marine Advisor when Moodyleft Vietnam in October.

In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine com-manders formed a provisional regiment for Opera-tion Pl-II-HOA 5, which was to be conductedin III Corps Tactical Zone.** The 1st, 3d, and4th Battalions, supported by a composite artillery

*An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it stimu-lated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and the JGS.Military officials from Saigon who visited the brigade commandPo including General Weede, took back large water-smoothedrocks as souvenirs of their trip to the infamous Viet Congstronghold. Printed on the side of these ornate stones were thewords Do Xa, May 1963." (Moody Comments.)

**After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December,III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam whichencompassed the southern one third of the Central Highlandsand the area south to the boundary of the Capital MilitaryDistrict near Saigon.

2i1—623 0 — 77 — 5

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of theMarine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren,Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps,confer with Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Com-mandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC

Photo A420917).

battery and the reconnaissance company, joinedARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units ina major search and clear campaign in the northwestcorner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20 milessoutheast of Saigon. Like many other large govern-ment military operations undertaken in 1963,this one failed to uncover any major enemy forces.The Communist soldiers again managed to eludegovernment forces. An extensive tunnel and cavenetwork, which the Marines systematically de-stroyed with demolitions, was discovered underthe entire area. Still, the Marines managed tokill only six Viet Cong and capture 10. TwoVietnamese Marines were killed and 36 otherswounded before the operation terminated on 1November.

The coup d'etat which toppled President Diemfrom power began the same day that OperationPHI—HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning totheir base camps, the 1st and 4th VietnameseMarine Battalions, accompanied by the compositebattery, moved into the capital to participate inthe power struggle. These units actually launchedthe coup by seizing key installations in the heartof the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion blockedthe highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalistintervention. Sporadic fighting against troops loyalto Diem continued until the early morning of2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed


and captured the presidental palace. Four Viet-namese Marines were killed and 12 wounded duringthe battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines were in-volved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Norendirected his subordinate advisors to remain in theirquarters. When the situation stabilized, the advisorsrejoined their units and resumed their normalduties.

Combat operations against the Communist guer-rillas resumed for the Vietnamese Marine Brigadein the second week of November. Accompanied byits U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWil-liams, the 3d Battalion initiated a search and clearoperation in III Corps in conjunction with the 11thARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next daythe Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with asubstantial Viet Cong force west of My Tho andsuffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen enemybodies were found on the battlefield along withfour weapons, several grenades, and some docu-ments. McWilliams, respected by his fellow ad-visors for his candid and forthright assessments,later recalled that such encounters were the excep-tion rather than the rule. "While the VietnameseMarines were individually good fighters andshowed tenacity in most cases against forces thatwould stand and fight, this was not the nature ofthe conflict,'' he lamented. More often than not,McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobileViet Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersomegovernment units 2

On 14 November, the same day that the combinedMarine-ARVN operation in III Corps terminated,the Vietnamese Marine command formed a pro-visional regiment to control operations DAI—PHONG 28 and 29, which were to be conductedconcurrently in the same general area. Composedof the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 73mm packhowitzer platoon, the Marine force searched until21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be inBinh Duong Province but with discouraging re-sults. only one enemy was killed, two prisonerstaken, and three weapons captured at the expenseof five dead and 13 wounded Marines.

A week later the 2d Battalion, now advisedby Captain Joseph N. Smith, fought a more typicalaction while participating in Operation DAI—PHONG 30. The battalion commander, CaptainNguyen Thanh Yen, received orders for the opera-tion during the early morning hours of 25 Novem-

her. Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 VietnameseMarines boarded trucks at their camp near ThuDuc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon arrival,officers from III Corps headquarters informedCaptain Yen chat his battalion was to conduct aheliborne assault against Hoi Dong Sam, a VietCong-held village in western Hau Nghia Provincejust west of Saigon. The purpose of the operationwas to intercept a guerrilla force which had over-run the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp theprevious day and had taken several Americanprisoners. The enemy unit was believed to be usingHoi Dong Sam as a way station while attemptingto escape across the Cambodian border.3

The operation began at about 0800 when eightU.S. Army H—21 Flying Bananas" from the145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith,a Vietnamese company commander, and his90-man assault force from Bien Hoa. Eight ArmyUH—1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force 0—lBBird Dog observation aircraft escorted the trans-port helicopters on the 20-minute flight to theobjective area. The gunships were put to use almostimmediately when Communist .50 caliber machinegun fire erupted from a treeline at the eastern edgeof the village. Under the suppressive fire of theUH—lBs, the first wave of H—21s landed the assaultforce in some partially flooded rice paddies about700 meters east of the Viet Cong positions. TheMarine assault force quickly deployed into a

treeline on the western edge of the landing zone.From this position the company began returningfire with rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.The Air Force forward air controller (FAC)overhead in the 0—lB and the Army gunshipsprevented the enemy from withdrawing acrossthe open rice paddies which surrounded theobjective on the north, south, and west.

The distance between the assembly area at BienHoa and xhe landing zone combined with thescarcity of transport helicopters to slow theprogress of the helilift. The landings continued at40-minute intervals while the UH—1B gunshipsteamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault forceto suppress the enemy's fire. The last elementsof the battalion were finally landed about two hoursafter the initial assault. Largely because of theeffective suppressive fires from the air and ground,no aircraft were hit during the helilift.

B-26STRIKE

Streams

57mm Recoilless Rifle

.50 Caliber Machine Guns

60mm Mortars

SCALE IN METERS


•i _I1__—a--'u-- ---

—-— —

2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ONHOl DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963

Rice Paddies

O—


Once the entire battalion was on the ground, theassault company, augmented by a pair of 60mmmortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles, provideda base of fire to protect the movement of its sistercompanies. Captain Yen maneuvered his threeremaining rifle companies and a battalion commandgroup north to a position from which they couldlaunch an envelopment on the fortified village.Using a treeline which bordered an irrigationcanal as cover, the force hooked westward untilit was directly north of the Viet Cong position.Meanwhile, a FARM GATE twin-engine B-26relieved the UH—1B gunships on station. At thispoint in the action the Air Force FAC observed agroup of 30—40 enemy attempting to flee from thenorthwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After clearingthe target with the Marine battalion, he directedthe B--26 to attack the target with its 250-poundbombs. The aircraft made several bombing passesand dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strikeended the enveloping force began its assault againstthe northern edge of the village with two com-panies abreast and one following in reserve severalhundred meters to the rear. Once the assault forcewas in motion the base of fire displaced forward,firing as they moved, to a small canal about 120meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in thetreeline. The two assault companies, followedclosely by Yen, Smith, and the battalion commandgroup, penetrated the northern end of the villageand swept through to its southern periphery. Thecommander of the company on the east (or left)flank, deployed elements into the treeline wherethe Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active.Following a sharp but brief exchange of gunfire,the Marines cleared the position. They found eightenemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.

By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entirevillage. Captain Yen ordered his assault companiesto establish a perimeter defense and the reservecompany to begin a systematic search of the posi-tion. His Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting positions. Ina small canal just east of the village the Marinesfound the mount for another heavy caliber auto-matic weapon. They also discovered eight VietCong suspects and detained them for questioning.One rifle company moved to investigate the areawhere the B—26 had attacked the fleeing enemyearlier in the morning but found no evidence of

additional casualties. Following the capture ofHoi Dong Sam, Yen's battalion conducted patrolsfor several days in search of the Viet Cong forcethat had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forcescamp on the 25th. The enemy force, however,eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in Cambodia.The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on28 November.

In many ways the results of DAI—PHONG 30pointed up the problems which frequently frus-trated GVN military forces and their Americanadvisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objectiveand in so doing had killed a handful of Viet Congand detained a number of suspects. The Marineshad captured three heavy caliber automatic weap-ons and an assortment of small arms—all withoutsuffering a single casualty of their own. Still, itwas difficult to translate the action into victory.The Marines, along with the other governmentforces involved in the operation, had failed tointercept the Viet Cong raiding force in its flighttoward the international boundary. Moreover,most of the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had madegood their escape despite the presence of observa-tion and attack aircraft. Like many other govern-ment military operations undertaken during the1961—1964 period, DAI—PHONG 30 was successfulfrom a statistical standpoint but did little to wrestthe tactical initiative from the guerrillas.

In the first week of December, the VietnameseJoint General Staff ordered VNMC units to conductan extended search in the jungles of western TayNinh Province in III Corps. A special Marine TaskForce composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions washelilifted into the area on 3 December to beginOperation DAI—PHONG 31. This operation waspunctuated by two major engagements and fre-quent enemy harassment. In one particularly vi-cious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavycasualties while attempting to fight out of a skill-fully executed Viet Cong ambush. When the opera-tion concluded on 9 December, the VietnameseMarines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded,and 1 captured. Nine Viet Cong bodies werefound and another Conimunist soldier was cap-tured. The enemy left four individual weapons onthe battlefield.

In mid-December, South Vietnam's new leadersremoved Lieutenant Colonel Khang from his posi-tion as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine

110 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 19S4—1964

Corps. Although he had not participated in theNovember coup, Khang had been a political ap-pointee of President Diem and as such was viewedas a potential threat to the new regime. After beingpromoted to colonel, he was assigned to the Philip-pines as the Republic of Vietnam's Armed ForcesAttache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, whohad been serving as Assistant Commandant andChief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed asKhang's successor. He assumed command of theVietnamese Marine Corps on 16 December.

Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continuedoperations against the Viet Cong followingKhang's relief but fought no major engagements.Near the end of December, with the nation drift-ing into political uncertainty and its own topleadership changed, the morale of the VietnameseMarine Corps plummeted. Lieutenant ColonelNoren saw this unfortunate trend as a by-productof the general political instability which wasbeginning to grip the country rather than a reflec-tion of Lien's leadership. Indeed, Noren thoughtthe new VNMC commandant to be an extraordi-narily capable officer.4 In any case, as 1963 endedthe U.S. Marine advisors were reporting climbingdesertion rates in almost every battalion.

Accomplishments

Even though 1963 closed upon a discouragingnote, the Marine Advisory Division could report

positively on its own activities. At the urging ofthe Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese MarineCorps had reinstituted multi-battalion combatoperations. Steps had also been taken to cut theVNMC's last formal ties to the ARVN by creatinga separate Marine Corps recruit training facility.When activated this training center was expectedto provide VNMC battalions with a stream of en-listed men who would possess a background ofhigher quality basic training.

As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marineadvisors had accompanied their units in every com-bat operation during 1963 except the Novembercoup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-monthperiod and only four (two of whom were on tem-porary assignment from the 3d Marine Division)had been wounded. The first combat decorationsother than Purple Heart Medals for wounds werealso approved and awarded to the advisors duringthe year. On 13 December, Captains Don Chris-tensen and Frank Zimoizak, former advisors tothe 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, wereawarded the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat

V" for meritorious service. Captain RichardTaylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earnedthe first Silver Star Medal during the same periodfor "conspicuous gallantry" between November1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N. Smith,advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earnedthe second Silver Star for gallantry displayedbetween October 1963 and April 1964.*

*Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.

CHAPTER 9

SHUFLY Operations

Development of the Compound Continues—Combat Support Operations—TheSituation in Vietnam

SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical com-mand assigned to South Vietnam, continued itscombat support operations in the semi-isolatednorthern provinces throughout 1963. Althoughthe size of I Corps had been reduced in late 1962when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff shiftedQuang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission ofthe Marine task element remained essentiallyunchanged. As the new year opened LieutenantColonel McCully's command was still responsiblefor providing direct helicopter support to theforces of the five northern provinces. Likewise,the government's order of battle in the northernprovinces had not changed to any great degree.The 1st ARVN Division still occupied the coastalplains south of the DMZ in Quang Tn and ThuaThien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the2d ARVN Division continued to carry the mainburden of operations against the Viet Cong inQuang Narn and Quang Tin Provinces. Operatingin Quang Ngai Province to the south of the newI Corps-IT Corps border were elements of the 25thARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastallowlands among the various regular battalionsof these three divisions were small paramilitarygarrisons. In the mountains to the west, thescattered Special Forces outposts with their Mon-tagnard defenders continued their struggle forsurvival while monitoring Communist infiltration.

Development of theCompound Continues

The first month of 1963 saw three importantchanges in the composition and leadership ofMarine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January,HMM---162, a UH—34D squadron commanded byLieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, replaced Lieu-

tenant Colonel Rathbun's HMM—163 as the taskelement's helicopter unit. Five days later, on the16th, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Linnerneier,winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses duringWorld War II and Korea, relieved LieutenantColonel Davis as the MABS—16 sub unit com-mander. In the last week of January LieutenantColonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator whohad piloted scout-dive bombers during the SecondWorld War, arrived at Da Nang and assumedcommand of the task element from LieutenantColonel McCully.

During McCully's tour as the Commander,Marine Task Element 793.3.6, the Marine com-pound at Da Nang had begun to assume a qualityof permanency which had never been evident atSoc Trang. The utilities section of the MABS-16detachment was responsible for many of the morenoticeable improvements. By the first of thenew year they had constructed several shelterson the west side of the runway to cover the motortransport section's working area. They also hadreplaced the electrical system and repaired some ofthe damaged plumbing in the living areas. Thetask element's special services section had begunto provide the Da Nang Marines with entertain-ment by showing nightly movies, arrangingfishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuingathletic equipment.

The monsoon season, which was characterizedby cold rains, high winds, and deep mud, provedto be a source of much irritation to the Marinesduring the winter of 1962-1963. In addition toslowing flight operations and creating almostconstant discomfort, the weather caused someunforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavyrainfall had combined with constant vehicle usageto turn the road between the living area and the

111


flight line into a quagmire that was virtuallyimpassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, thenthe task unit commander, had responded byrequesting equipment from Okinawa to improvethe Marines' only road link with their aircraft.Wing authorities promptly complied and a roadgrader was flown in by KC—130 (the new designa-tion for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was opened and a drainageditch dug along its entire length.

This measure proved to be only temporary,however, for in January the mud again threatenedto cut the Marine vehicles off from the east sideof the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCullyobtained a bulldozer from Okinawa to make morepermanent repairs. With the help of this pieceof equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on an eight-inch rock base.These repairs proved to be satisfactory and theroad caused no further problem during the re-mainder of the monsoon season.

Improvements in the compound continued to bemade under the task element's new commander,Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action wastaken on an earlier request for the assignment of asecurity detachment to guard the Marine area. Areconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from the 3dMarine Division joined the task element, thusfreeing the men of the helicopter squadron and theMABS—16 sub unit of the important secondaryresponsibility they had held since the task unit'sdeployment to Soc Trang. The assignment of theground Marines was timely in that it correspondedwith a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guard-ing the perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. OneMarine general later observed that with the arrivalof the infantry unit, the air-ground team was inbeing in Vietnam."'

Other less obvious changes that contributed tothe overall efficiency of the Marine task elementalso occurred during the early spring. In April, thetask element commander was able to assign a betterfacility to medical and dental services. They hadbeen crowded into one of the small structures alongwith other offices since the displacement from SocTrang, but now were moved into a separate build-ing in the living compound.

Another problem that plagued the Marinesduring their entire first year at Da Nang—inade-quate water supply—was finally solved in late

1963. Originally the task, unit had depended on ashallow well from which water was pumped andpurified. The Marines nearly exhausted this sourceshortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in thedry season and their commanders were forced toimpose strict water discipline. The monsoon rainseased the water crisis but by January productionagain dropped, this time as a result of the accumu-lation of heavy silt in the pumps. A Vietnamesecontractor was engaged to clean and repair thepumping system but the problem soon recurred.In the early spring two new shallow wells weredug, one in the motor transport working area andthe other in the living compound. With the onsetof the dry season, however, the Marines againwere forced to conserve water. This time the short-age became so acute that tank trucks were requiredto haul some 16,000 gallons of water a day from anearby Air Force installation. Finally, in Novem-ber, a detachment from a Navy construction bat-talion completed a well 450 feet deep and cappedit with a high pressure pump. This proved to bethe permanent solution to the long-standing watershortage.

Over the course of the year the Marines receivedseveral new vehicles which helped relieve the bur-den on the rebuilt buses which were beginning tofalter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger, four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 "MightyMite" jeeps were flown in by KC—130s from Oki-nawa and assigned to the task element's motortransport section. By summer, two of the old buseswere replaced with tactical passenger vehicleswhich were better suited for transporting personnelbetween the barracks and work areas. The additionof the new vehicles also allowed the mess hail tobegin transporting hot noon meals to the menworking on the east side of the airstrip. A messline set up in the hangar area fed those Marineswho previously had lost time by travelling to theliving compound for noon meals.

Two changes were made in the task element'scommand structure in midyear. On 5 July Lieu-tenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran aviatorwith 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant ColonelLinnemeier as commanding officer of the MABS—16sub unit. Two weeks later, on the 18th, ColonelAndre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguishedhimself as an artillery officer during World War II

SHUFLY OPERATIONS 113

before becoming a pilot, assumed command ofMarine Task Element 79.3.3.6.

In summary, the improvements made in thetask element's compound during the course of1963 helped insure the successful support of sus-tained combat helicopter operations. Althoughovershadowed by the publicity which the actualflight; operations attracted, the continued improve-Inent of the Da Nang base was vital to the overalleffectiveness of the Marine combat support effort.

Combat Support Operations

Marine helicopter support for government forcesin I Corps encountered a brief interruption shortlyafter the new year began when HMM—163 wasreplaced by a fresh UH—34D squadron. MarineKC—130s shuttled between Okinawa and Da Nangfor several days during the second week of Januarybringing the officers and men of HMM—162 toVietnam and returning with members of HMM—163. The change-over of units was completed on11 January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbunofficially transferred his squadron's aircraft andmaintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.

In the five months and ten days since they ini-tiated operations at Soc Trang, 'Rathbun's RidgeRunners" had amassed an enviable combat record.The squadron's crews had flown a total of 10,869hours, 15,200 sorties, and had lifted over 25,216combat assault troops and 59,024 other passengers.In one month alone (August) they had establisheda Marine Corps record for medium helicoptersquadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter hours. Theserecords had not been set without risks, however.During the course of their operations in the Me-kong Delta and in I Corps, helicopters operatedby HMM—163's crews had been hit on 32 occasionsby Communist small arms fire.2 Moreover, thesquadron had become the first Marine unit to suffercombat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.

HMM—.162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Rein-hardt Leu, the veteran Marine aviator who hadcommanded the squadron during the recent deploy-ment to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, beganfull-fledged combat support operations the sameday that the last of Rathbun's squadron departedDa Nang. FJMM—162's crews, many of whom hadparticipated in similar operations around Udorn

the previous summer, limited their early flightsto routine resupply missions and a few medicalevacuations. Such missions enabled the squadron'spersonnel to become better acquainted with theterrain over which they would operate during thenext six months.

The new squadron participated in its first majorcombat troop lift on January 19, when a break inthe monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division toexecute a heliborne operation into the mountainsabout 15 miles west of Da Nang. Eighteen MarineUH—34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into threeseparate landing zones near a suspected Com-inunist base area. The squadron's pilots and crewsencountered their first Viet Cong opposition duringthis troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructedone of the landing zones while at another the enemyfired at the Marine aircraft with small arms.Although two UH—34Ds were hit, none wereshot down and the mission was completed success-fully.

A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilotsexperienced another of the hazards associated withflight operations in Vietnam while attempting toland troops from the 1st ARVN Division in aclearing about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Fivehelicopters sustained punctures iii the bottomsof their fuselages when they accidentally landed ontree stumps concealed by high grass in the landingzone. One stump caused extensive damage to anaircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel cell.The crew was forced to leave the UH—34D inthe field under ARVN protection overnight. Thenext morning Marine mechanics were flown infrom Da Nang to repair the helicopter.

Despite several troop lifts involving a dozenor more aircraft, heliborne assault missions didnot dominate HMM—162's operations during theunit's first three months in South Vietnam. Poorweather conditions over the northern provincescontinued to restrict flight operations generallyto resupply and medical evacuation missions.Statistics for the first quarter of 1963, for example,indicated that Marine helicopters conducted 6,537logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181 tactical supportsorties.

The single most significant incident duringHMM—162's initial three months in Vietnam tookplace in the second week of March when thesquadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casu-


alties. These were incurred during a salvage-rescueattempt in the mountains of northern II Corps.The incident began on 10 March as two MarineUH—34Ds attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team into the jungleabout 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. Theteam's assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV—1Mohawk (a twin-engine, turboprop, electronic re-connaiss ance aircraft manufactured by Grumman)which had crashed, and its pilot, who had para-chuted into the jungle. The exact site of theaccident had not been located but the general areawas known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain,the elevation of which approached 5,000 feet.While attempting to lower search personnel intothe jungle by means of a hoist, one of the heli-copters lost power and crashed. The ARVN rangerwho was on the hoist when the accident occurredwas killed but the helicopter's crew managed toclimb from the wreckage shortly before it eruptedin flames. The copilot, Captain David N. Webster,was severly burned in the explosion.

Other Marine UH—34Ds from Da Nang joined inthe rescue operation, refueling from the TAFDS atQuang Ngai for the flight into the mountains. Thesituation was complicated further when a secondMarine helicopter experienced a power loss andcrashed near the burned-out UH—34D hulk whileattempting to land a rescue team composed ofMABS—16 Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft didnot burn and the only injury incurred in the crashwas a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep anddensely jungled terrain kept the Marines fromreaching the site of the other downed helicopter.Bad weather and darkness prevented further effortsto extricate the various American and South Viet-namese personnel from the jungle that day. Duringthe night Captain Webster died of injuries.

The next day, the Marines stripped a UH—34D ofsome 700 pounds of equipment so as to enable it tooperate more efficiently at the extreme elevationsin the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefullymaneuvering the helicopter into a hovering posi-tion, the pilot was able to extract the survivorsand the dead copilot from the site where the firstUH—34D had crashed and burned. The survivorswere flown to Quang Ngai. There the woundedwere treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air Forcetransport to an American hospital at Nba Trang.

While these events were taking place, the Ma-rines from the second downed helicopter, guided bysearch aircraft operating over the area, located andrecovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. Thisaccomplished, the Marines hacked out a smallclearing from which they were evacuated byanother Marine helicopter.

The episode was not yet over, however, as thecrashed OV—1 and its payload of advanced elec-tronics equipment still had not been secured.Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which hadjoined the search, reached the remnants of theMohawk and established security around the sitewhile U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in toexamine the debris. The Marine UH—34D, whichhad crashed nearby without burning and wasdamaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usableparts and then destroyed.

On 13 March, with the search and rescue taskscompleted, Marine helicopters began shuttlingSouth Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc, a nearbygovernment outpost. During this phase of themission the helicopters received fire from VietCong who had moved into positions near the rang-ers' perimeter. Three UH—34Ds delivered suppres-sive fire on the enemy with their door-mountedM—60 machine guns while the remaining helicop-ters picked up the troops in the landing zone. Thiswas the first recorded instance of a Marine helicop-ter providing close air support in actual combat.

Other developments occurred in the early monthsof 1963 which either directly or indirectly affectedthe conduct of Marine helicopter operations. Onewas the improved coordination of intelligencegathering and usage among all South Vietnameseand American agencies within I Corps. This effort,which was essentially a concerted drive to stream-line the collection and flow of intelligence informa-tion, was stimulated by a series of corps-wideintelligence seminars, the first of which was heldin early February. Of special interest to the Marineaviators was the establishment of closer liaisonbetween the Marine task element, U.S. ArmySpecial Forces, and South Vietnamese units in thenorthern corps tactical zone.

Closely related to the improvement of the over-all intelligence situation was the acquisition ofsome new equipment by the SHUFLY Marines.In March the task element received two newmodel hand-held aerial cameras for use by the

SHtJFLY OPERATIONS 115

crews of the 0—lB observation aircraft. Later inthe month a photo lab was completed to facilitatethe rapid processing of the photographs. By theend of the month the Marines were also beingprovided with high altitude photographic cover-age of some objective areas taken by U.S. AirForce reconnaissance jets.

The tempo of Marine helicopter operations beganto quicken in early April with the advent of sus-tained periods of clear weather. On 13 April,HMM—162 participated in a major heliborneassault in which 435 2d ARVN Division troopswere lifted into a suspected Communist strongholdin the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30miles south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift mis-sions, the Marine O—lBs provided reconnaissanceand radio relay support. For the first time in thewar Marine transport helicopters were escortedby helicopter gunships, the UH—1B Iroquois (asingle-engine, turbine-powered utility helicopterbuilt by the Bell Helicopter Company). FiveUH--lBs from a detachment of the Army's DaNang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed withM—60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets,joined the VNAF fighter bombers to conduct pre-paratory airstrikes on the landing zones.

The initial landing met no enemy resistance butlater in the day action in the operational areaintensified. A Marine UH--34D was hit by eightrounds of enemy small arms fire while attemptingto evacuate wounded South Vietnamese soldiersand U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone nearthe point where the ARVN forces had been landedthat morning. With the co-pilot, First LieutenantJohn D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damagedaircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.

Two other Marine helicopters were dispatchedto the scene to pick up the Marine crew and com-plete the evacuation. They managed to evacuateLieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor,and one dead and four wounded ARVN soldierswithout incident. On a return trip to pick up morewounded, however, one of the two UH—34Ds suf-fered heavy damage from Viet Cong fire. In thisincident the crew chief, Corporal Charley M.Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, andback by small arms fire, and the aircraft was forcedto land near the first downed helicopter. The ac-companying UH—34D landed, picked up Campbell,and returned him to Da Nang for emergency treat-

ment. Repair teams were helilifted to the positionon the afternoon of the 13th, and began repairingboth helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nanglater that day but the other required extensiverepairs and could not be flown to safety until the15th.

While HMM—162 repair crews were workingfeverishly to extricate their aircraft from thepredicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon,another of their helicopters was shot down nearbywhile supporting the same operation. This air-craft was hit four times while approaching anARVN landing zone located in a small valley aboutthree miles south of the action in which the twohelicopters had been lost earlier. After temporaryrepairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH—34D to Da Nang where more detailed repair workwas accomplished.

The number of combat support sorties flowninto the mountains by HMM—162's crews rosesteadily as the weather improved. Near the endof April, the Marines helilifted three battalionsof the 1st ARVN Division into the mountains ofQuang Tn and Thua Thien Provinces near theLaotian border. These units were to participatein an extended multi-regiment drive against sus-pected Communist infiltration routes there. Thisoperation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu'ssquadron provided daily support after the initiallanding, taxed the durability of both the Marinecrews and their aircraft. For 90 days task elementhelicopters flew into and out of hazardous landingzones located at elevations as high as 4,500 feet.The Iflajority of these sorties were resupply andmedical evacuation missions with the occasionalexception being the heliborne displacement ofinfantry and artillery units when distance orterrain prohibited overland movement. Despite thedangers inherent in helicopter operations con-ducted over mountainous terrain, the squadronincurred no aircraft or personnel losses whilesupporting the offensive in western Quang Tn andThua Thien Provinces.

While his squadron's support of the 1st ARVNDivision's on-going drive near the Laotian bordercontinued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed21 UH—34Ds to support the offensive against theDo Xa base area along the southern edge of ICorps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the

116 THE ADVS0RY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

mountainous area roughly 22 miles southwestof Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONGXI. The squadron was less fortunate during thisoperation than it was during the lengthy QuangTn effort. One helicopter was shot down by VietCong fire which wounded the pilot, CaptainVirgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The crew and theembarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injurywhen the aircraft made a crash landing in whichit suffered extensive damage. After the crew wasrescued, a salvage team from Da Nang strippedthe helicopter of all usable parts and burned thehulk so the Viet Cong could not make use it.This was the first Marine helicopter loss definitelyattributed to direct enemy action.3

Following the initial heliborne assaults into theDo Xa area, two UH—34Ds were rotated to Tra Myfrom Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling from theTAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were usedprimarily to perform medical evacuation missionsfor VNMC and ARVN units involved in BACHPHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM—162's crews had evacuated nearly 100Marine and ARVN casualties from hazardous land-ing zones scattered along the border of I and IICorps. The task element's 0—lBs also providedaerial reconnaissance support for all phases of theoperation. On 19 May, the day before BACHPHOUNG XI terminated, 12 Marine UH—34Dslifted the two Vietnamese Marine battalions tothe provisional brigade command post at Tra My.This particular phase of the operation evoked fav-orable comment from an anonymous U.S. Marinepilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing formthat the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothlyand that the Vietnamese Marines appeared 'wellorganized in the landing zones and at Tra My."BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously thefollowing day when HMM—162 helilifted theARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.

One trend which became increasingly apparentas the spring of 1963 unfolded was the growingutilization of the Army UH—1B helicopter gunshipsas escorts to and from landing zones. The gunshipsaccompanied all Marine assault, helilifts and med-ical evacuations, and when available, also escortedresupply flights in order to provide suppressive firearound government positions while landings werein progress. Although well suited for the escortmissions, the lightly armed UH—lBs did not re-

place the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft asthe principal source of preparatory air strikesaround landing zones being used for assault heli-lifts. The Marine continued to rely on the morehcavily armed VNAF T—28s and A—lHs to conductthe so-called "prep strikes.'' *

May was the last full month of combat supportoperations for Lieutenant Colonel Leu's squadron.In the first week of June, transports from VMGR—152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marinesof a new UH—34D squadron. Since assumingresponsibility for helicopter support in I Corpsin mid-January, HMM—162 had compiled a solidcombat record. While under the squadron's opera-tions, the UH—34D helicopters had flown 17,670sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The 0—lBsadded approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000hours to these figures. In the month of May aloneHMM—162's helicopters flew over 2,000 flighthours—a number which approached the recordset by HMM—163 during the previous summer inthe Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected thegrowing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since itsdeployment to Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Leu'sunit had lost three helicopters—two as a result ofoperations at extreme elevations and one to enemyfire. One member of the unit had been killed andthree others wounded since the squadron enteredthe combat zone.5

After a brief change-over period, the outgoingsquadron commander officially turned over hisunit's aircraft and maintenance equipment on 8June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, thecommanding officer of HMM—261. Shook, who hadflown Marine helicopters in combat during theKorean War, committed his crews to their firstactual combat missions that same day.

A significant change took place in the coordi-nating arrangements that governed U.S. helicopterunits supporting I Corps at approximately the sametime that HMM-261 initiated combat supportoperations. Since its relocation at Da Nang, theMarine task element, along with all other aviationunits in I CTZ, had received its missions from the

As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I Corps, avigorous debate developed within the Marine Corps concerningthe value of armed helicopters. This debate and the subsequentdevelopment, procurement, and operations of Marine helicoptergunships will be covered in a separate historical monographbeing prepared by the History and Museums Division, Head-quarters, U.S. Marine Corps.


kir Support Operations Center located within thecorps headquarters. As the number of US. andVNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corpsgrew and the total number of missions multi-plied, it became necessary to modify the systemof coordination and control. In accordance with aComIJSMACV directive, I Corps headquarterscreated an Aviation Headquarters OperationsCenter (AHOC) to oversee the employment ofMarine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC,which was composed of a senior Army representa-tive, a senior Marine representative, and anoperations section, was to be directed by theCommander, Task Element 79.3.3.6. Formallystated, its primary mission was to 'plan, direct,and control the employment of all Army andMarine Corps Aviation Units and aircraft opera-tions in direct support of I Corps." The newlyorganized AHOC was also ordered to ''participatein, and provide assistance to operational planningand the coordination of employment of USA/USMCAviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air." 6 TheAl-bC, therefore, was formed to supplement ratherthan replace the older Air Support OperationsCenter, which continued to direct and controlall U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over thenorthern provinces. It was under this arrangementthat U.S. Marine and Army aviation units operatedafter mid-1963.

HM.M-261's Marines began encountering sys-tematic Viet Cong resistance to their operationsshortly after their first combat missions in earlyJune. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the moun-tains west of Da Nang was aborted on 6 Julywhen the Marine pilots discovered that the VietCong had obstructed the two available landingzones with upright stakes. While inspecting one ofthe landing zones on a low, pass, a helicopter washit in the forward fuel cell by Communist smallarms fire. The damage to the aircraft was notserious enough to force a landing, but the pilotof an escorting U.S. Army UH-JB was mortallywounded while attempting to suppress the groundfire.

Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellationof the assault mission west of Da Nang, HMM- 261suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam. The crash,which was later attributed to mechanical failure,occurred about 37 miles southwest of Da Nangwhile one of the squadron's helicopters was on a

routine logistics mission. Six passengers, twoAmerican advisors and four ARVN soldiers, wereinjured in the accident. The squadron commanderdispatched two other Ul-I--34Ds to the scene of thecrash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvageteam. The badly damaged aircraft was assessedas beyond repair and was destroyed.

In the second week of August, officers fromHMM-261 and the task element's staff (under thecommand of Colonel Gomez) met with Americanand Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters toplan a large-scale heliborne retrograde movement.The planned helilift was to mark the culminationof Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week longoffensive by several battalions of the 2d ARVNDivision against Communist infiltration routes inQuang Nam Province along the Laotian border.Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions hadencountered increasing Viet Cong pressure sinceearly AugLst. I Corps authorities feared that unlesstheir units were withdrawn promptly they mightbe cut off from the few landing zones that existedin the rugged operations area.

As planned, the retrograde operation involvedhelilifting some 1,300 troops with their artilleryand equipment to Thuong Duc, a government-heldtown situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang alongthe Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called forthe commitment of 20 Marine helicopters, 18 ofwhich would participate in the actual troop lifts.The two extra UI-I-34Ds would be used in the eventit became necessary either to replace helicoptersassigned to the troop lift or to conduct search andrescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAFUH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-lBswere designated by the I Corps headquarters toassist HMM—261 with the helilift.

The Da Nang Air Support Operations Centerassigned a variety of other aircraft to support theoperation. These included two VNAF T—28s,one FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. ArmyUH-1B gunships. These aircraft would share thetask of providing close air support for the trooplift. A Marine 0-lB was scheduled to performweather reconnaissance missions.

The entire air operation was to be coordinatedfrom two aircraft. An American forward air con-troller in a VNAF observation plane was to directall air strikes while overall control for the multi-service, bilingual effort was to come from a U.S.

118 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—J964

Air Force U—b Super Courier. This six-man, singleengine aircraft, which possessed an eight hourfuel capacity and carried three radios, would serveas an airborne air support operations center (Air-borne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air Forcepilot and would carry a Marine officer from thetask element along with U.S. and Vietnameserepresentatives from the Da Nang ASOC. Theseofficers would be in continuous radio contact withall aircraft in the operations area, and also withthe U.S. Air Force liaison officer to I Corps whowould be positioned with the ground troops.

The concept of the operation called for theARVN units to be lifted from two hazardous land-ing zones over a three-day period. According to theplan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed fromLanding Zone HOTEL on Thursday, 15 August.Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing whichcould accommodate only three UH—34Ds, wassituated along a river and was crowded betweentwo 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five milesfrom the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-coveredridges generally paralleled each other less than 400meters apart on either side of the landing zone.Slightly west of the small clearing the ridgesjoined to form a box canyon. The physical struc-ture of the location dictated that the transporthelicopters use the same approach and retirementroutes.

Due largely to the proximity of the high terrainwhich surrounded Landing Zone HOTEL, the&RVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a 125-man security force on the two ridges. This forcewould provide cover for the helicopters conductingthe final troop lift during this first phase of theretrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamesesoldiers would move cross-country to anotherlanding zone to be picked up by helicopters fol-lowing the completion of the helilift from LandingZone HOTEL.

The second landing zone, codename ZULU, wasnearly as treacherous as the first. ZULU was com-pletely encircled by a rim of hills some 500 feethigher than the floor of the landing site. In addi-tion to the 125-man security force from HOTEL,the Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters werescheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mmhowitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 Au-gust (the second and third days of the operation).

An unexpected complication developed the

morning the operation began when the Air Forcegrounded its B—26s after one of the attack bomberscrashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Viet-nam as a result of undetermined causes. Shortlyafter this crash, HMM—261 was called upon todivert a flight of helicopters to assist in searchand rescue operations for the downed B—26, thusreducing even further the assets available to supportthe heliborne retrograde.

Despite the loss of some of the air power assignedto the operation, I Corps authorities elected toproceed with the helilift from Landing ZoneHOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine0—lB confirmed that good weather prevailed overthe operations area, the first helicopters departedDa Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour aftertake off the Marine and Vietnamese pilots beganmaneuvering their aircraft between the two ridgeswhich dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twiceduring the pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drewfire from the thick jungle on one side of the ap-proach lanes being used by the transports. Bothtimes they returned fire in the direction of theunseen enemy and forced him to silence his wea-pons. The first phase of the operation was coin-pleted without serious incident four hours after ithad begun.

The second phase of the helilift began the nextmorning with the two unarmed U.S. Army UH—lBsmaking several trips to Landing Zone ZULU tolift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers.The Marine and VNAF transport helicopters fol-lowed and continued to shuttle troops out of thelanding zone for three hours without encounteringenemy opposition. Then a departing flight ofUH—34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline. Oneof the escorting UH—lBs immediately marked thesuspected target for the VNAF T—28s and theattack aircraft bombed and strafed the position.The Communist activity ceased.

After an overnight march, the covering forcefrom Landing Zone HOTEL arrived at LandingZone ZULU. Although they were not scheduledto be removed from the field until the next day,the schedule was adjusted and the 125 wearyARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assemblyarea on the afternoon of their arrival. This modifica-tion reduced the amount of work which wouldbe required of the helicopters on the final day ofthe operation.


The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on17 August was characterized by increasing concernfor security around the landing site. The generalscheme for protecting the helicopters during thiscritical stage of the exercise was to establish twoperimeters, one around the rim of high groundwhich surrounded the zone and another aroundthe immediate landing site. The outer perimeterwould be withdrawn first, leaving the inside ringof troops to deny the enemy direct access to thelanding zone while the force from the outer perim-eter boarded the helicopters. Once the Vietnamesesoldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills,the area within 300 meters of the close-in defenseswould be automatically cleared for air strikes.Even with these precautions the helicopterswould be extremely vulnerable to any enemyforce that might rapidly occupy the high groundabove Landing Zone ZULU following the with-drawal of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, oncethe troops from the outer defenses were staged forthe helilift, the transport helicopters would bedirected by the airborne ASOC to tighten the land-ing interval between aircraft from the usual fiveminutes to as short a time span as possible. Bylanding in such rapid succession, the dangerousfinal stage of the operation could be accomplishedmore quickly.

Two hours after the helilift began on Saturdaymorning, the air liaison officer at ZULU reportedthat the outer perimeter had been withdrawn andthat all remaining Vietnamese troops were inpositions around the landing zone. At this pointthe operation, now in its most critical phase,began to experience agonizing delays. First, a

loaded helicopter arrived at the assembly areawith a rough running engine. Fearing that thefuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contam-inated, Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed allHMM—261 pilots to check their aircraft's fuelstrainers while their passengers disembarked atthe assembly point. No evidence was found toindicate that the fuel contained contaminants, butthe operation was slowed at the exact point wherethe intensified helilift was to have begun. Anotherminor delay occurred after a helicopter flying nearthe landing zone reported having drawn enemyground fire. The approach and departure routeswere adjusted slightly so that the transport heli-copters would not fly over the area and VNAF

T—28s were directed to attack the suspected enemyposition. Shortly after the air strike ended the airliaison officer at the landing zone reported moreenemy activity only 500 meters from his position.This momentary crisis was resolved when theAmerican air liaison officer personally directedarmed UH—lBs to neutralize the target area.

Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructionsto proceed with the operation, whereupon HMM—2611 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling downinto the landing zone. The escorting UH—1Bgunshtps provided continuous protection for thetransport helicopters by flying concentric butopposite patterns around them. One after anotherthe transports landed, took on troops, climbedout of the landing zone, and turned toward ThuongDue. Less than five minutes after the stepped-uphelilift began, the last troops were airborne. Thecrew chief of the helicopter which embarked thefinal ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smokegrenade into the empty landing zone to signalall other aircraft that the lift was complete.

The three-day heliborne retrograde from theLaotian border proved to be one of the mostefficient helicopter operations conducted by theMarines in the Republic of Vietnam during theearly 1960s. Its success was due largely'to detailedplanning, particularly the South Vietnamese plansfor the ground defense of both landing zones. Theseplans and their subsequent execution led a gratefulColonel Gomez, the task element commander, todeclare: 'This was the first time in our experiencethat a helicopter-borne withdrawal had beentreated as a retrograde operation rather than anadministrative lift. Without a sound retrogradeplan the operation might well have failed.''

Although this observation was correct, it shouldbe added that the close coordination between theairborne ASOC, the operational aircraft, and theair liaison officer on the ground had contributed tothe successful execution of the plans. These agencieswere instrumental in coordinating the bilingual,multiservice effort, particularly when it was besetwith difficulties in its critical final stage.

HMM—261's combat support missions continuedat a normal rate following the completion of themid-August retrograde helilift. A month later, on16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook's squadronlost its second UH—34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which had


developed mechanical problems while carryingtroops of a South Vietnamese assault force, wasdamaged beyond repair. Its crew members and pas-sengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraftwas stripped of usable parts by a salvage team fromDa Nang and burned.

Shortly after this incident, the first elements of anew squadron began arriving at Da Nang andHMM—261 turned to preparations for its departure.Since early June, when it had become the fourthMarine helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY,Lieutenant Colonel Shook's unit had accumulated5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties inthe UH—34Ds alone. The squadron's crews hadhelilifted over 6,000 troops, nearly 1,900,000pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600medical evacuation missions.8

The new squadron, HMM—361, assumed respon-sibility for helicopter support in I Corps on 2 Octo-ber after a short period of orientation flying withthe crews of the departing unit. HMM—361's com-manding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J.Ross, was well qualified to direct a tactical avia-tion unit in a combat situation. Decorated withfive Distinguished Flying Crosses during WorldWar II and Korea, he was a recent graduate of theAir Force Command and Staff College.

Barely a week after Ross' squadron initiatedcombat support operations at Da Nang, it sufferedits first aircraft and personnel losses. The incidentoccurred on 8 October when two UH—34Ds crashedalmost simultaneously while on a search and rescuemission 38 miles southwest of Da Nang. Both heli-copters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots, copilots,the squadron's flight surgeon, and five crewmen. Asearch of the area was initiated immediately forthe downed aircraft, but darkness prevented theirdiscovery until the next morning. By then the VietCong had surrounded both crash sites and werewaiting to ambush the search and rescue heli-copters which they knew would arrive. When therescue aircraft attempted to land, they met deter-mined enemy opposition. Colonel Gomez requestedARVN assistance and 254 South Vietnamese troopswere lifted into nearby clearings with instructionsto dislodge the enemy force from the area aroundthe downed aircraft. While executing the landing,HMM—361 helicopters were hit nine times by smallarms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. OneARVN soldier was killed.

The following day, as the South Vietnameseforces moved toward the downed UH-34Ds, threeMarine helicopters escorted by three armed UH—lBs and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspectionteam into the crash site to recover the bodies andinvestigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic weap-ons fire broke out while the UH—34Ds waited inthe landing zone and forced the pilots to take offwhile the inspection team found cover on theground. After the Communist fire had been sup-pressed, the helicopters returned for the strandedMarines. Their investigation of the aircraft hulkshad been fruitful: the evidence of enemy smallarms fire in the wreckage and the relative positionsof the two helicopters led Lieutenant ColonelRoss to conclude that the aircraft had been shotdown by the Viet Cong.9 But this was not a con-clusive finding. There was room for speculationthat the two helicopters had actually collided inmidair while attempting to evade ground fire.

Ground action th the hills around the crashsites continued. On 11 October, another Marinehelicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while resupply-ing ARVN units in the area. In this incident theUH- 34D was struck twice in the engine and oncein the wheel strut while in a landing zone abouttwo miles from the point where the crashes hadoccurred. After assessing the damage, a main-tenance team from Da Nang determined that thei9elicOpter would require a new engine. Marinesfrom the security platoon were utilized to providesecurity until 13 October when an additional120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the areaand established a perimeter around the aircraft.Other helicopters then delivered the new engineand a maintenance crew to the landing zone. Afterthe engines were exchanged, a crew returned theUH-34D to Da Nang.

By the time HMM- 361 had removed the lastARVN troops from the hills around the scçneof the tragic accidents, monsoon weather hadbegun to restrict flight operations. The remainingtwo weeks of October were characterized by areduced number of missions, most of which wereeither resupply or medical evacuations. By theend of October, despite numerous flight cancella-tions, Lieutenant Colonel Ross' crews had gainedthe unenviable distinction of having attractedmore enemy fire during a one month period thanany previous squadron to serve with SHUFLY.


Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 differentoccasions and had been hit 18 times.1°

SHUFLY's combat support operations came to ahalt in the first days of November as the rever-berations from Diem's overthrow spread to SouthVietnam's northern provinces. American officialsin Washington and Saigon, aware of the pitfallsthat might accompany open support of either sidein the power struggle, ordered all U.S. militaryforces to cease advisory and combat support activi-ties. As a result of the sensitive political situation,no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2 November.Two days after the new regime seized power inSaigon, the U.S. Marine helicopters were permittedto perform emergency medical evacuation andemergency resupply missions. Even these flightswere to be approved beforehand by ARVN mili-tary officers in Saigon. Four days after Diem'soverthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased thepolitical restrictions and SHUFLY's operationsreturned to near normal. One remaining limitationstipulated that U.S. helicopters could not transportARVN units into population centers even thoughtroops could be helilifted from the cities into ruralareas.

Due to torrential monsoon rains which beganstriking the Da Nang area in mid-November,HMM-361's combat support operations continuedat a relatively low level throughout the remainderof the year. This trend was confirmed by the flighttotals compiled for the final two months of 1963.In November, the squadron's UH- 34Ds flew only145 sorties for 233 flight hours. December's statis-tics, 230 helicopter sorties for 338 flight hours,indicated a slight upswing but fell far short of themonthly figures achieved earlier in the year. Withrain and fog frequently rendering the mountainsinaccessible by air, the preponderance of the squad-ron's missions were conducted along the coastalplains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY's combat supportoperations were continuing at a greatly reducedrate.

The Sitnation in Vietnam

Although not yet desperate,the overall situationin South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was far fromfavorable. Mismanaged and poorly coordinatedfrom the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program hadfailed to fulfill even the most moderate of American

211—623 0— 77 — 9

and South Vietnamese expectations. Little dis-cernable headway had been made toward restoringany large segment of the populated rural areas togovernment control. Meanwhile, the North Viet-namese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement of1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops andmaterial down the Laotian corridor into the South.Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 confirmed in-filtrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than thefigure for the previous year, it was substantialenough to force the government to deviate more andmore from its avowed strategy of clearing VietCong formations from the vital populated areas.To help meet this continuing influx of Communistregulars, the government had committed its groundforce to operations against base areas located in theremote hinterlands with increasing frequency.More often than not these multi-battalion offen-sives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the DoXa base area in May, proved futile, usually result-ing in scattered and inconsequential clashes withsmall groups of Viet Cong. The continuation ofsuch actions, of course, worked to the advantageof the Communists as the government forces ex-pended time, energy, and lives without exactinga commensurate price from the enemy.

Other disturbing trends had emerged on theSouth's battlefields during the course of the year.Following an action fought in the Mekong Deltaduring early January in which the Viet Congsoundly defeated a multi-battalion ARVN heli-borne force, enemy main force units continued tomaintain their integrity and fought back whenconfronted with helicopter assaults. This trendwas evident even in the northern provinces whereeach successive assault by Marine helicopters ap-peared to meet more determined resistance. Asidefrom the Viet Cong's new-found confidence incountering heliborne offensives, another source ofconcern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was theappearance in the South of several Viet Cong regi-mental headquarters during the year. The activa-tion of these headquarters, which assumed controlof already operational main force battalions,seemed to presage another phase of Communistmilitary escalation.

The situation throughout South Vietnam wors-ened in the aftermath of the Diem coup. Subsequentto the widespread command changes ordered bythe new government, the morale, and in turn the


ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC PhotoA420866).

effectiveness, of the Vietnamese armed forces de-clined sharply. The Viet Cong moved quickly toexploit the prevailing state of confusion by staginga rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem's over-throw—attacks which worked a profound influenceon the already faltering Strategic Hamlet Program.'The fall of the Ngo regime,' wrote one American

scholar, "was accompanied by the complete col-lapse of the pacification efforts in many areas, andvast regions that had been under government con-trol quickly came under the influence of the VietCong." The nation's new leaders therefore for-mally terminated the badly damaged StrategicHamlet Program. Although it was soon to bereplaced with similar pacification campaigns, mostVietnamese and American officials conceded thatmuch time and energy would be required to restoremomentum to the government's efforts at securing

the allegiance of the rural population. So, by theend of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness ofSouth Vietnam's overall war effort was at its lowestebb since the intensification of the U.S. militaryassistance program in early 1962.

This threatening situation was hardly consistentwith American military plans which were beingimplemented at year's end. Drawn up at Secretaryof Defense McNamara's direction and approvedby him in the late summer of 1963, these planscalled for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.s.servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. Thephased withdrawal plan, whose ultimate objectivewas to end direct American participation in thewar, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S.involvement while simultaneously turning overmore military responsibility to the South Viet-namese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction


was the 47-man security platoon which had guarded note. While the Viet Cong threat appeared on thethe U.S. Marine task element's compound at Da rise, their own defenses were being reduced.Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-task element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous range plans already in motion.

PART IV

AN EXPANDING GROUNDWAR, 1964

CHAPTER 10

Marines Meet the ChallengeNew American Decisions—A Restructured Military Assistance Command—Changes in Marine Leadership—Redesignation and Reorganization—The

Vietnamese Marine Brigade—Additional Marine Activities

New American Decisions

Less than three weeks after the overthrow ofNgo Dinh Diem, the U.S. Presidency changed hands.On 22 November President Kennedy was assassi-nated in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B.Johnson took the reigns of the American govern-ment. By late November, when the new presidentassumed office, the process of political and militarydisintegration which had begun in South Vietnamfollowing the Diem coup was already well under-way. This process continued into the early weeksof 1964 when, in late January, General NguyenKhanh, the newly appointed commander of I

Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup. Thissecond turnover in the government of South Viet-nam in less than three months had its most seriousimpact on the nation's armed forces. A new seriesof command changes ensued and again the govern-ment's operations against the Communists suffered.As had been the case in the closing months of 1963,the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the gov-ernment's disarray by expanding its control intopreviously secure areas.

By March the rapidly declining effectiveness ofthe South Vietnamese military forces led theJohnson Administration to review the earlierdecisions to withdraw American servicemen andto cut back the military assistance program. In a16 March memorandum to President Johnson,Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that ''the[military] situation had unquestionably beengrowing worse" in South Vietnam.1 To counter-act this threatening trend, McNamara offered abroad set of recommendations which included aproposal to support a 50,000-man increase in thesize of the Vietnamese military and paramilitaryforces. The memorandum did not address the ques-

tion of additional American advisors who mightbe needed to supervise the proposed expansion.In any case, President Johnson approved McNa-mara's plan the following day, thus setting thestage for increases in U.S. military assistance toSouth Vietnam.2

Shortly after his most recent decision on Viet-nam, President Johnson ordered changes in histop civilian and military representatives in Saigon.On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland,U.S. Army, who had been serving since Januaryas Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeededGeneral Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later,on the 23d, President Johnson announced thatGeneral Maxwell D. Taylor would replace HenryCabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republicof Vietnam. Taylor, who had been serving since1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,had been closely associated with the Vietnamproblem since his 1961 fact-finding mission. Bothhe and Westmoreland were thoroughly familiarwith U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.

Soon after assuming his new responsibilities,General Westmoreland requested that the JointChiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100additional military personnel. In his opinion,these men were needed to support and supervisethe expansion of the Vietnamese military andparamilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met withthe Joint Chiefs on 20 July to discuss this requestfor 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional supportpersonnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situa-tion in Vietnam demanded the measure and rec-ommended its approval. The proposal was for-warded to President Johnson who approved it inearly August. Emphasizing the urgency of themilitary situation, McNamara then ordered theJoint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up

127

before 30 September. At this juncture, however,General Westmoreland pointed out that such arapid influx of personnel would 'overload existingfacilities [in South Vietnam]" and stated hisdesire to see the build-up accomplished in a moreorderly progression over a period of several months.After considering the general's latest request,the Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlierdemand for an accelerated deployment.3

While the details of the expanded U S. advisoryprogram were being hammered out in Washington,the focus of the administration's concern swungabruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam tothe Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam.In two separate incidents during the first week ofAugust, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked


The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA. Major General Richard G.Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to General Westmoreland's immediate left, and Brigadier General CarlA. Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J—2, is seated two positionc to General J'Veede's left. (Photo courtesy

of Major General Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)).

U.S. Navy ships operating in international waters.*An international crisis ensued when the UnitedStates retaliated with limited air strikes againstNorth Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August,the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint reso-lution authorizing the President "to use all meas-ures, including the commitment of armed forces toassist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its inde-pendence and territorial integrity Presi-dent ,Johnson signed the so-called Tonkin GulfResolution five days after it was passed, and in so

*A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the actualorigins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been claimed thatthe Americans precipitated the attacks by supporting aggressiveSouth Vietnamese naval patrols off the North Vietnamese coast.

MARINES MEET THE CHALLENGE 129

doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for theGovernment of Vietnam.*

While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulfincidents never really subsided, the immediatecrisis soon passed. Thereafter the American atten-tions focused once again on South Vietnam wherethe political and military situation began to deteri-orate at an unprecedented rate after midyear. Ironi-cally, this process of accelerated decay coincidedwith the initiation of a new South Vietnamesepacification strategy designed to prevent just suchan occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was theChien Tang ("Struggle for Victory") Plan. An-nounced by General Khanh shortly after his rise topower, this campaign was similar in method andobjective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program.Like the earlier program, the Chien Tang Planenvisioned the restoration of government influencein selected rural areas through the coordination ofmilitary and paramilitary operations with socialand economic development programs.** While theChien Tang campaign was better planned and farless ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program,there were definite similarities between the two.The instrument for the social, economic, and polit-ical developmental phase of the new effort, forexample, was the New Life Hamlet—a variation ofthe planned government community. Begun in someareas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets wereto become the symbol of the new pacification effortin much the same manner that the fortified hamlets

*lJ.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which fol-lowed the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine expeditionarybrigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from elements of the 3dMarine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed onboard amphibious shipping to a position off Da Nang where itwas available to support U.S. contingency Plans. Its commander,Brigaditr General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attendedplanning conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possiblelanding sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed.Instead, the organization remained in existence throughout theremainder of 1964 and into early 1965 when, in March, two ofits battalions were landed at Da Nang. The formation andsubsequent commitment of the 9th MEB in the Republic ofVietnam are covered in detail in the 1965 history of U.S. Marineoperations in the Republic of Vietnam.

**Motivated at least partially by the requirement to providebetter support for the pacification strategy, the Vietnamesegovernment restructured its paramilitary forces in the springof 1964. The old Self Defense Corps was expanded dramaticallyand renamed the Popular Force (PF). The Civil Guard wasreorganized and designated the Regional Force (RF). Moreimportantly, the RVNAF extended its control over both para-military organizations for the first time since their creation.

had symbolized the earlier Strategic HamletProgram.

Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, asimilar but locally concentrated pacification effortwas instituted in the rural areas around Saigon.Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaignwas conceived in order to link the seven provincesaround the capital into a zone of intensive pacifica-tion in which closely coordinated military, para-military, police, and civil activities would syste-matically reduce Viet Cong strength. Because oftheir proximity to the area and their availability,the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVNAirborne Brigade were assigned primary responsi-bility for military operations in support of theHop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tangand Hop Tac plans emerged as the backbone ofGeneral Khanh's strategy to stave off furtherCommunist advances in critical areas of thecountry.

The development of the government's newestpacification strategy, however, was based on theassumption that the Viet Cong would pursue acampaign to strengthen their control in South Viet-nam's populated rural areas. Such was not the case.Instead, at midyear the Communists began waginga brand of warfare characterized by large-scalemobile operations against government militaryforces. Obviously the enemy had shifted to the"general counter-offensive' '—that phase of guer-rilla warfare designed to bring on the completepolitical and military collapse of the opposition.

The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself intwo general geographic areas during the fallmonths. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast ofnorthern II Corps, two Viet Cong main forceregiments staged a series of particularly swift andsuccessful attacks which virtually eliminated thegovernment's presence except in the provincecapital, Qui Nhon, and a few district towns. Ina coordinated offensive the Communists increasedpressure throughout that portion of the CentralHighlands west of Binh Dinh Province, therebythreatening to sever South Vietnam along anaxis that extended roughly between Qui Nhonon the coast and Pleiku in the highlands. Mean-while, another phase of the new initiative un-folded in III Corps where the government's HopTac campaign was just getting underway. Therethe Communist offensive threatened to neutralize


the government's concentrated pacificationcampaign.

Eroded by the political side-effects of the battle-field developments, South Vietnam's fragile powerStructure became increasingly unstable. The lastfive months of 1964 brought frequent changesin the Saigon government although GeneralKhanh was able to maintain a semblance of con-trol until December. The turmoil then climaxedwhen Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, thecommander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineereda bloodless coup that forced Khanh from theSaigon political scene.

The frequent changes of government coupledwith the stepped-up Viet Cong military pressurethroughout Vietnam produced a downward spiralin the effectiveness of the republic's armed forces.By the end of the year it was becoming increasinglydoubtful that the government could stave offtotal collapse even with the increased volume ofmilitary assistance it was already teceiving fromthe United States. Against this backdrop ofCommunist military activities, unprecedented polit-ical instability on the part of the South Viet-namese, and mounting combat losses, Americanmilitary involvement in Vietnam deepened.

A Restructured MilitaryAssistance Command

In many respects 1964 was a year of transition forthe U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.Not only did the command experience a change inleadership when General Westmoreland replacedGeneral Harkins as ComUSMACV, but it wasthoroughly reorganized in preparation for themore vigorous U.S. advisory program which wasexpected to begin about midyear.

The major organizational change within MACVtook place on 15 May when the MAAG wasabolished and its staff integrated into that of thesenior command. In June MACV itself was re-structured under a new table of distribution. Thesechanges reflected the anticipated influx of advisorsand support personnel, and therefore concernedthe Army more than the other U.S. armed services.

Initially, the number of Marine billets on therestructured Military Assistance Command staffdid not change substantially. Twenty-four Marines

(15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in thenew table of distribution. This represented a netincrease of only one over the number previouslyassigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By theend of September, however, Marines temporarilyassigned to the MACV staff from FMFPac com-mands brought the on-board strength to 37.Another increase occurred in the early fall wheneight more permanent Marine billets (three of-ficers and five enlisted) were approved.

Changes in Marine Leadership

Two key links in the Marine command chainthat joined government policy decisions in Wash-ington to Marine Corps operations in Vietnamchanged hands during the first 60 days of 1964.On 1 January, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.,replaced General Shoup as Commandant of theMarine Corps. Greene, known in American mili-tary circles as a brilliant staff officer, had beenserving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the MarineCorps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken sup-porter of South Vietnam's struggle for independ-ence. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andas a Chief of Service, his presence in administra-tion policies wbuld be felt until his tour as com-mandant ended on 31 January 1967.

An equally important change occurred in earlyMarch when General Greene named LieutenantGeneral Victor H. Krulak to replace GeneralRoberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Krulak hadwon the Navy Cross during ground action in WorldWar II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washingtonwhere he had served both Presidents Kennedy andJohnson as special assistant for counterinsurgencymatters. Having made numerous fact-finding tripsto Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimatelyfamiliar with the unique political-military strugglebeing waged there. He also had a reputation ofbeing one of Washington's most vocal advocatesof resisting Communist aggression in SoutheastAsia. A dynamic leader and a man of strong con-victions, Krulak was to exert a pervasive influenceover all Marine operations in the Pacific for nearlyhalf a decade.

Less obvious but of immense importance to boththe Marine Corps and to the future of U.S. military


operations in Vietnam was a change institutedwithin MACV by General Westrnoreland duringthe early part of the year. The command's modifiedtable of organization called for the establishmentof a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by anArmy general officer. The joint table of distributionfor the reorganized command specified that anArmy general would also fill the chief of staffbillet-—a position which had been held by Gen-eral Weede since MACV's creation in early 1962.Thus, when Weede's assignment ended in May,Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army,became Westmoreland's chief of staff while Lieu-tenant General John L. Throckmorton, U.S. Army,became Deputy ComUSMACV.* The Marine Corps,however, did not lose its entire senior presenceon the MACV staff. Brigadier General Carl A.Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year career in-cluded distinguished combat tours in both WorldWar II and Korea, arrived 15 January for assign-ment as Assistant Chief of Staff, J—2 (Intelligence).His presence on the MACV staff would insure aMarine voice in U.S. military planning at theSaigon level. Still, many Marines saw their relativestrength on Westrnoreland's staff seriously re-

duced—-a change which seemed to mark somewhatof a turning point in the overall management ofthe military assistance effort.

Redesignation and Reorganization

The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assist-ance Command, Vietnam, had little initial effecton the Marine advilory program. With the disso-lution of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, underwhich the Marine advisors had operated since 1955,was redesignated the Naval Advisory Group,MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren's Marine Ad-visory Division, whose authorized strength re-mained at 11 officers and nine enlisted men throughthe first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May. Known thereafter as the Marine AdvisoryUnit, Vietnam, the organization continued tofunction in much the same manner as it had underthe previous arrangements.

For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede wasawarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

The last five months of the year, however, sawsome substantial changes in the composition of theMarine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-uprecently approved by the Secretary of Defensebegan. Colonel William P. Nesbit, a recent graduateof the Naval War College irs Newport, RhodeIsland, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted fromlieutenant colonel on 1 July) as the Senior MarineAdvisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit arrived intime to supervise the implementation of a newtable of organization which added eight first lieu-tenants and a captain to the advisory unit inNovember.* The captain and one of the lieutenantswere assigned as advisor and assistant advisorrespectively to a new Vietnamese Marine infantrybattalion which was in the process of being formed.Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit'scommand as assistant advisors to existing infantrybattalions and one became the assistant artilleryadvisor. The two remaining lieutenants were as-signed as advisors to the brigade's motor transportand communications companies, replacing non-commissioned advisors. Two billets were down-graded in rank: the engineer advisor from captainto first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor frommajor to captain.

In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisorbillets, these changes relieved the AssistantSenior Marine Advisor of his artillery responsi-bilities. Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had beenserving since mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief ofStaff, was instrumental in bringing about thisparticular modification. Under the old arrange-ment, the Senior Marine Advisor's presence fre-quently had been required at the MAAG head-quarters in Saigon while the Vietnamese MarineBrigade headquarters was deployed to combat.As the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor waslikewise torn between two jobs, Anderson haddirected that he be relieved of artillery advisoryduties. Thus, Major Raymond C. Damm, anofficer who had served as Assistant Naval Attachein Saigon between 1959 and 1961, became thefirst full-time Assistant Senior Marine Advisorafter he joined Colonel Nesbit's command in May.When the changes were finally completed, therestructured and redesignated Marine Advisory

*A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly createdbillets did not arrive until early 1965.


Unit included permanent billets for 24 officersand men (18 officers and six enlisted men).

Another important aspect of he overall Marineadvisory program was altered in the closingmonths of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel Croizat'stour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immedi-ate post-Geneva period, most Marine advisorshad attended French language courses prior todeparting for service in Vietnam. As Frenchinfluence in Vietnam faded during the late 1950s,however, the requirement for the language hadgradually diminished, particularly as French mapswere replaced by American ones. By the early1960s this situation had prompted several Marineadvisors to recommend that instruction in Frenchbe replaced by Vietnamese language training.Primarily through the persistence of ColonelsMoody and Noren, the policy was revised in1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fallmarked the first time that Marine officers hadreceived formal Vietnamese language trainingbefore beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, whohad the advantage of commanding advisorstrained in both languages, saw the change as"a marked step forward," in improving theadvisory effort.5

The Vietnamese Marine Brigade

At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Viet-namese Marine Brigade, commanded by Lieuten-ant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisisof morale. The recent command changes that hadoccurred at almost every echelon and a soaringdesertion rate combined to undermine the brigade'scombat readiness. In February the Khanh govern-ment recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from thePhilippines, promoted him to brigadier general,and reinstated him as commandant in an attemptto restore the unit's spirit. A veteran Marine whohad been instrumental in the development of theVNMC since its inception, Khang commandedconfidence throughout the corps. Following hisreturn, increased attention was given to the welfareof the individual Marine and his dependents inorder to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Underthe close supervision of the senior Vietnameseofficers and their American advisors, the moraleproblem was gradually overcome.

Throughout the year the Vietnamese MarineBrigade continued to share the role of SouthVietnam's general reserve force with an ARVNairborne brigade. Normally at least one Marinebattalion was held in the vicinity of Saigon, readyto respond to tactical emergencies while othersoperated nearby in support of the Hop Tac cam-paign. Still, the brigade's infantry battalionsmanaged to see action in every corps tactical zoneexcept I Corps, which was the farthest removedfrom the capital.* Although sometimes combinedinto regimental-sized task forces for specific opera-tions, the individual Marine battalions normallywere attached to either a corps, a province, or anARVN division for combat operations. When soattached, the Vietnamese Marines often wereassigned to clear particularly hazardous or difficultterrain. At times they served as a reserve force,responding to crucial situations to either recoupor exploit actions initiated by other governmentunits.

in early January, the Vietnamese Joint GeneralStaff assigned a Marine task force to a pacificationmission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces, locatedjust southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions,controlled by a task force headquarters, moved intothe operations area later in the month and remaineduntil mid-September when the operation was ter-minated. The object of the Marine unit's presencewas to reestablish government control over theregion through systematic small unit operationsdesigned to deny the enemy his usual freedom ofmovement.

Despite the length of this particular deployment,the Vietnamese Marines fought no major engage-ments. Furthermore, they had not translated theirimproved morale into an effective pacification oper-ation. While desertions and unauthorized absencesremained low considering the duration of thisparticular assignment, Colonel Noren later recalledseveral flaws in the campaign. These operations, he

*South Vietnam's corps boundaries were adjusted again inlate 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved southto include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border of IICorps was also moved southward to include esght provincesformerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the new arrangement,III CTZ formed a narrow strip across the nation which centeredroughly on Saigon. The Capital Military District, the bound-aries of which coincided with those of Gia Dinh Province,formed an enclave within III Corps. The southermost tacticalzone, IV Corps, encompassed the entire Mekong Delta,


General J'J/allace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines.With him are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and Major General

Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Official USMC Photo).

remarked were characterized by inadequate coor-dination of military operations and intelligencereporting . . . too little operational activityand a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectivesof pacification." Colonel Nesbit, who became theSenior Marine Advisor as the operation entered itsfinal stages, tended to confirm this assessment.

The capacity of the task force headquarters instaff functioning," he reported, 'was marginal.''

While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long Anareas was in progress, other Vietnamese Marinetask forces were organized to undertake differentcombat assignments elsewhere in the southern por-tion of Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions,an artillery detachment, and a headquarters ele-ment, launched a brief clearing operation northwestof Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Provincein January. A similar operation involving another

task force was conducted the next month in thedifficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Provinceat the southern tip of the nation. In both cases thegovernment offensives enjoyed local success, butfailed to reduce significantly the enemy's capabil-ities and influence in the area.

Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marinecommanders and their American advisors engagedin renewed efforts to restructure and expand theVietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for themost part in July, the salient feature of this latestreorganization was the creation of a new infantrybattalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a smallbase about 12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newlyorganized 5th Battalion devoted the remainder ofthe year and the first six months of 1965 to formingand training its companies. It finally became com-bat ready in June 1965.


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Aside from the addition of the new infantrybattalion, the mid-1964 reorganization producedother noteworthy changes in the structure of theVietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery bat-talion, the two 75mm pack howitzer batterieswere combined into one battery of eight weapons,while the one 105mm howitzer battery was di-vided to form two new batteries of six howitzerseach. The tables of equipment were revised toreflect these adjustments. Another significantchange occurred in the area of training.. TheTraining Company was deleted from the Amphibi-ous Support Battalion and a separate recruittraining center was created at Thu Duc nearSaigon. Tactical planning and control was alsoimproved when the Brigade Headquarters wasreduced in size and two smaller Task Force Head-quarters (Task Force A and Task Force B) wereformed.

Following the mid-1964 reorganization, theVietnamese Marines performed combat missionsnot unlike those they had been assigned priorto July. One exception was that the brigade nolonger found itself tasked with actual pacificationphases of operations. Instead, the Marine bat-talions concentrated on clearing operations aroundSaigon in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign.Additionally, the various battalions were calledupon occasionally during this period to providesecurity for key government installations locatedin Saigon and Vung Tau—assignments whichgave the infantry units much needed respitesfrom field duty.

By the end of the year the Vietnamese MarineCorps had been improved in several areas. In themotor transport field two new pieces of equipmentwere put into full-time operation—a high pressuresteam cleaner and an M—108 wrecker. Progressalso was made in upgrading the entire communica-tions capability of the brigade when the tableof equipment was revised in accordance with themodified table of organization. The new tablesprovided for modern test and repair equipmentand eliminated obsolete and impractical items.Other unrealized improvements were still in theirformative stages as the year closed. In the fieldof supply, for example, the brigade supply officer,with assistance from his American advisor, wasdrawing up plans which would give the Vietnamese

Marines a more responsive and more manageablesystem.

While the technically oriented programs werebeing developed and implemented, intensifiedtraining programs were preparing more and bettertrained Vietnamese Marines for their responsi-bilities. Established in July, the Marine TrainingCenter at Thu Duc had graduated 1,464 recruitsbefore the end of the year. These recruits, more-over, were trained by Vietnamese noncommissionedofficers who had recently completed the drillinstructor course at Marine Corps Recruit Depot,San Diego. For the first time since its inception,the VNMC was benefiting from a flow of recruitstrained by Vietnamese Marines at a separateMarine training facility.

Other programs likewise were helping prepareVietnamese officers and noncommissioned officersto command and manage their growing service.A total of 718 officers and noncommissionedofficers attended various training courses in SouthVietnam during the year while 42 more officersattended formal schools in the United States duringthe same period. Another 52 small unit leadersparticipated in on-the-job training programs withU.S. Marine units on Okinawa between Januaryand December.8

Unfortunately, these developments were over-shadowed by a military disaster which befell the4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the year.The Marine unit had been serving since earlyDecember as the reserve force for III Corps TacticalZone. On the 27th an estimated Viet Cong battalionoverran the small pro-government town of BinhGia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35miles east of Saigon. III Corps officials reactedby dispatching the 4th Battalion and an ARVNRanger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion,accompanied by two U.S. Marine advisors andthree OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division,was ordered to recapture the town. It proceededto do so on the 30th, encountering no enemyopposition. Later in the day, while the Marineswere developing defensive positions around thetown, a spotter aircraft sighted a large Viet Congforce approximately two miles to the west andcalled for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicoptergunship was shot down and its crew killed whileattacking the target.


Against the advice of his senior U.S. MarineAdvisor, Captain Franklin P. Eller, the 4th Bat-talion commander ordered one of his companies tosecure the crash site and recover the bodies of thedead crewmen. Accompanied by Eller, First Lieu-tenant James P. Kelliher, and Staff Sergeant Clif-ford J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, thecompany moved west from Binh Gia on themorning of the 31st to carry out the mission. Afterreaching the crash site, the Marine unit was am-bushed by a large Viet Cong force using 82mmmortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, and .50 calibermachine guns. Unable to maneuver because of theintense fire, the company radioed for assistance andbegan withdrawing from the ambush site in smallgroups.

The battalion commander, accompanied by theassistant Marine advisor, First Lieutenant Philip0. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to thecall for assistance by leading the remaining threecompanies from their positions at Binh Gia. Just

outside the town they met Captain Eller, who hadbeen wounded in the face, along with LieutenantKelliher and the remnants of the hard-hit company.Eller and the survivors of the morning ambushreturned to Binh Gia while the remainder of thebattalion pushed westward in an attempt to locatethe enemy force. Later in the morning, the Marinecolumn was surprised while moving through anabandoned rubber plantation by a Communistforce of between 1,200 and 1,800 men.

No artillery was available to support the be-leaguered battalion. Vietnamese Air Force A—iSkyraiders, however, were able to deliver closeair strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army heli-copter gunships replaced the Skyraiders on station,but their rocket and machine gun fire proved toolight to dislodge the enemy from his positionsunder the dense vegetation. By late afternoon,29 of the 4th Battalion's 35 officers, including thebattalion commander, were dead. In desperation,the Americans organized the surviving Viet-

Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised 1nits operating nearby. (USMC Photo /1183570).

211—623 0—77 — 30

138 TIE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

namese Marines into small groups some of whichmanaged to slip past the Viet Cong and find theirway back to Binh Gia.

The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their mostdecisive defeat of the war. Their losses were ex-tremely high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and 13missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipmentlosses included 142 weapons and over a dozenradios. Additionally, all four of the U.S. Marineswho had participated in the disastrous action hadbeen wounded. Both Captain Eller and LieutenantBrady were later awarded the Silver Star Medalfor their roles in the battle.* Captain Donald G.Cook, one of the OJT observers from the 3d MarineDivision, was missing in action at the close ofthe battle.**

• The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered asimilar fate, incurring nearly 400 casualties in an-other violent ambush. Thus, within a 24-hourperiod two elite government battalions had beenshattered. Only later was it learned that the Marinesand rangers had clashed with two -main force regi-ments of the 9th Viet Cong Division—the firstCommunist division to become operational inSouth Vietnam.

As a result of the disastrous engagement atBinh Gia, the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalionwas rendered ineffective as a fighting force for aperiod of three months. I'his loss created twoimmediate problems for General Khang and hisAmerican advisors. It reduced the brigade's avail-able infantry strength by approximately 25 percentand placed an added burden on the recruit trainingcenter which was already laboring to provideenough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. Forthe Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on adiscouraging note.

Additional Marine Activities

U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam Warduring 1964 was not limited to the activities ofthe advisory division and the helicopter taskelement. Various other Marine units and detach-ments made significant, although less publicized,contributions to the war effort throughout theyear. One of these was the Marine security detach-ment which continued to protect the U.S. Embassyin Saigon. Twice during the year the growingpolitical unrest and the increasing threat ofCommunist terrorist attacks prompted the expan-sion of the security detachment, first in April andagain in October. By the end of the year thedetachment's strength stood at 30 Marines—afigure which made it the second largest such unitin the world. Only the Marine detachment inParis, with 37 officers and men, was larger. Andnowhere was an embassy guard assignment moredangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist attackswere apt to occur at anytime.

Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4thVietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumouslyawarded the first Navy cross for action in Vietnam.

(USMC Photo A411741).

*Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more fre-quently to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier in the year(16 February), a Marine captain, Donald E. Koelper, an advisorto the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion earned a Navy Cross,the nation's second highest award for heroism. Koelper wasdecorated for warning the occupants of a crowded Americantheater in Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of aViet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a VietCong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number ofcasualties to three killed and 51 wounded.

**Jt was later learned that Captain Cook had been woundedand captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in captivityin 1967.


Other groups of Marines performed an assort-ment of missions in support of the Governmentof Vietnam during the course of the year. TheDetachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, forexample, continued its duties at the U.S. ArmyCommunications installation in Pleiku. A handfulof these Marines also served at a newly openedU.S. Army communications station at Phu Baisome eight miles southeast of Hue. The strengthof the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company,however, was reduced from 42 officers and men toonly 16 by the end of December.

The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantiallylarger Marine communications detachment in-troduced into the northern provinces of SouthVietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku andPhu Bai, this unit was composed exclusively ofMarines and included an infantry element forsecurity purposes. Designated the Signal Engineer-ing Survey Unit, the radio detachment consistedof three officers and 27 enlisted men drawn fromthe 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and fromHeadquarters Marine Corps. This element, com-manded by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived atDa Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantrydetachment from Company G, 2d Battalion, 3dMarines. The infantry element, reinforced with an81mm mortar section (two mortars), was coin-manded by First Lieutenant RaymondJ. Otlowski.Major Gray assumed overall command of thecomposite force which was designated MarineDetachment, Advisory Team One. Advisory TeamOne became the first actual Marine ground unitto conduct independent operations in the Republicof Vietnam.

U.S. Air Force C—123 transports airlifted thebulk of the newly formed unit to the CivilianIrregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at KheSanh in northwestern Quang Tn Province in theclosing days of May. Two officers and five enlistedcommunicators remained behind at Da Nang anda four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Armycompound at Phu Bai to provide radio support forthe main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory Team Oneinitially concentrated on building a solid supplybase prior to undertaking actual communicationsoperations. ARVN truck convoys brought thepreponderance of its supplies from Quang Tn overRoute 9, the old colonial road that snaked throughthe Annamite Mountains into Laos. While Major

Gray and his men proceeded with this task,Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted anAR\TN infantry company onto Tiger ToothMountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-coveredmountain located eight miles north of the CIDGCamp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger ToothMountain is the highest terrain feature in northernI Corps. On 13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopterslifted Major Gray, nine enlisted men, and severalthousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landingzone which the South Vietnamese troops hadhacked out near the top of the rugged mountain.The ARVN soldiers, who had established a roughperimeter around a peak slightly below the moun-rain's highest point, were on hand to greet thesmall group of Americans. After the initial helilift,however, bad weather in the form of dense cloudsintervened to delay the remainder of the movementfor an entire week. SI-LUFLY helicopters finallycompleted the mission on 21 June. When thehelilift concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100Vietnamese troops were strung around and acrossa 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth'shighest elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks re-mained at Khe Sanh to provide a pooi from whichfresh security forces and radiomen could be drawnwhen needed.

MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marineson Tiger Tooth Mountain from patrolling orengaging in any other activity which could havebeen construed as offensive in nature. As a resultof this restriction, Major Gray's men were con-fined to defensive positions around the crude littlelanding zone and the tents which housed theradio equipment. Even so, life on the mountainwas extremely rigorous. The clouds which fre-quently enshrouded the mountain top left theMarines, their clothing, weapons, and equip-ment constantly damp. High winds heightenedtheir discomfort. The local weather conditionsalso made food and water deliveries to the positionhazardous and irregular. Marine IJH—34Ds pre-positioned at Khe Sanh brought C rations andwater cans whenever the clouds revealed TigerTooth's higher elevations. Often, however, theweather did not break for days. Normally themen were limited to two canteens of water daily—arestriction which made bathing and shaving im-possible. Because of the harsh living conditionson the mountain, fresh security forces and radio


men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two week in-tervals, weather permitting.

Advisory Team One operated in the extremenorthwestern corner of the republic withoutincident until the second week of July. Thena severe storm struck its mountaintop base,blowing away tents and antennae, collapsingfighting positions, and generally disrupting opera-tions. Several nights later, on the 17th, a VietCong force of undetermined size probed the Marinesector of the perimeter. An intense exchange ofsmall arms and automatic weapons fire ensued fornearly two hours. Although the Marines sufferedno casualties and could find no dead or woundedViet Cong the next day, it was apparent that theirlocation had been compromised.

Amid reports of increasing Communist activitythroughout the area, MACV authorities in Saigonpromptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw hisforce from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunatelygood weather permitted Marine helicopters fromDa Nang to helilift the men and their equipmentfrom the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after thefirefight. On the 22d, Air Force C—123 transportsairlifted the entire Marine detachment to DaNang. There Gray and his Marines crowded intothe old French compound occupied by the heli-copter task element. Although cramped, theSHUFLY facilities provided welcome relief forthe men who had endured the rigors of TigerTooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly twomonths.

While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a smallgroup of radiomen to Monkey Mountain, a rocky,jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into theSouth China Sea just northeast of the city. Therein relative comfort and safety, the techniciansconducted equipment tests for two weeks. Severalchanges in the leadership and composition of theadvisory team took place during this interval.Captain Raymond A. Becker, a communicationsofficer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac,relieved Major Gray as the commander of the uniton 13 August. Soon thereafter a reinforced infantrycompany, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replacedLieutenant Otlowski and the Company G Marinesas the advisory team's security element.

Under Captain Becker's command, AdvisoryTeam One redeployed, this time to Dong Bach Ma,a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 mileswest-northwest of Da Nang. An abandonedFrench resort, still untouched by the war, sprawledacross the higher elevations of Bach Ma and ahard surface road curved up its steep northern facefrom Route 1. Using this road ARVN trucksmoved Captain Irwin and the infantry element tothe newly selected site in advance of the radiopersonnel. Once atop the mountain, Irwin had hismen establish a perimeter around an abandonedmonastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared asmall helicopter landing zone near the old but well-preserved religious building which was to serveas their base of operations. On 19 August Marinehelicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communi-cators, and some 4,000 pounds of equipment tothe site from Da Nang.

Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marinehelicopters for logistical support, operated withoutincident from the quaint old monastery until thesecond week of September. The composite unitcompleted its operations at Bach Ma on the 10thwhereupon it returned to Da Nang. Within daysthe detachment was disbanded without fanfare.The radio experts returned to their parent com-mands in Hawaii and Washington while CompanyK was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The quite dissolutionof the Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One,ended the first brief and little publicized chapterof Marine ground unit operations n the Republicof Vietnam.

In October an element of the 3d ReconnaissanceBattalion, 3d Marine Division, operating fromships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an extensivesurvey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps.The purpose of its survey was to determine thefeasibility of establishing a naval facility. Marinecounterintelligence teams from FMFPac also weretemporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periodsthroughout the year. These officers and noncom-missioned officers normally augmented the U.S.Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during theirstay in Vietnam. Another group of Marines toemploy their skills in the counterinsurgencyenvironment was a small Special Operations Groupof six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marinesconducted operations under the auspices of MACV.


A more permanent influx of Marines into thewar-torn republic occurred in the last quarterof the year. In response to the intensified advisoryeffort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July,General Greene, the new Marine Commandant,assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffthat the Marines could be expected to carry theirshare of the increased burden. Shortly thereafter,the Marine Corps was directed to. provide 60officers and noncommissioned officers to serve asadvisors with ARVN units in I Corps TacticalZone. These orders, later described by MajorDamm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor tothe VNMC as 'very short fused ones," wereexecuted without delay.9 The 3d Marine Divisionwas given short notice to select suitable personneland to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV.In response to these instructions, the Okinawa-based command quickly formed four advisoryteams, each composed of four men—a captain,a first lieutenant, a gunnery sergeant, and a corporal(who was to serve as the team's radio operator).Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, thefirst increment of Marine advisors was airlifted toDa Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.

Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S.Advisor, Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, U.S.Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marinesbeing assigned individually to battalions of the1st and 2d ARVN Divisions. Major Walkerjoined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang asassistant operations officer. The balance of the 60new Marine advisors were formed into teams onOkinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuingweeks. By December the advisors, who hadinitially been drawn from the 3d Marine Division,were being replaced gradually by officers andnoncommissioned officers just beginning theirnormal 12-month overseas tours.

Two additional permanent Marine advisorbillets were also approved in the closing weeks of1964. These were created within the Naval Ad-visory Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy incontrolling one of South Vietnam's mtst trouble-some areas—the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ).Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of theLong Tao River, the main ship channel to thecapital, the Rung Sat was a vast, difficult-to-

penetrate, mangrove swamp. Due largely to itsrelative inaccessibility, the area had been de-veloped by the Viet Cong into a key base forsupporting their operations in the surroundingprovinces. More significantly, by early 1964 theCommunist-held Rung Sat posed a serious threatto commercial ships bound for Saigon. For thisreason the responsibility for pacifying the area wasturned over to the Vietnamese Navy in April.

Initially one Marinç major, Edward J. Bronars,was assigned to assist and advise the VietnameseNavy in its attempts to secure the Rung Sat. InNovember, however, the RSSZ advisory staff wasreorganized to include one Marine captain and onesergeant. Although they did not arrive for dutyuntil early the following year, the newly ap-proved billets created the third distinct group ofMarine ground advisors assigned to the Republicof Vietnam.1°

The OJT program continued in effect for juniorMarine officers and staff noncommissioned officersthroughout 1964. Near the end of the year theprogram was broadened somewhat to includemembers of Hawaii-based Marine commands. Eachmonth 10 Leathernecks arrived at Da Nang tobegin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY head-quarters the visitors were briefed as a group beforebeing attached individually to specific South Viet-namese units for the duration of their stay inVietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncom-missioned officers joined a unit already being ad-vised by a U.S. Marine. When possible, the OJTwas assigned to a unit which could benefit fromhis particular military and technical skills. Still,the on-the-job-trainee was not always consideredan asset. 'In honesty," one permanent advisor tothe Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, 'OJTswere a mixed blessing—they provided some helpbut they also were an added responsibility for theVNMC commander who was charged with theirsafety." "Some OJTs," he added, "received mis-perceptions of the capability of the Viet Congsince their knowledge/experience was limited tothe events occuring during their brief 30-daytour.'' Nevertheless, a significant number ofMarine small unit leaders were able to gain somedegree of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla


warfare under the provisions on the OJTprogram.*

A similar but shorter term program for fieldgrade officers and colonels, the Job Related Orienta-tion (JRO) Program, also took hold during theearly months of 1964. Instituted in the last halfof the previous year, the JRO program provided fora small number of staff officers from the variousFMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquartersin Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period.Small groups of these officers arrived at Da Nangfrom Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were briefed bythe helicopter task element commander and hisstaff. Later they were afforded an orientation flightover the northern provinces. Next, the visitingofficers were flown to Saigon where they receivedmore briefings at MACV headquarters. In thecapita], where they were hosted by the SeniorMarine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marineunits and discussed tactics and problem areas withthe advisors. After four days in the Republic ofVietnam the Marines travelled on to Bangkokwhere they spent the balance of their visit. Upon

*The 3d Marine Divisions OJT program did not end untilafter elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March 1965.The Marine Advisory Unit exptrimented successfully withanother form of augmentation in the first days of 1965. Whenthe Victnarnesc Marines deployed to the Binh Gia area with apro' isional brigade in early January, Colonel Nesbit, who wasstill serving as Senior Marine Advisor, requested additionalpersonnel to assist and advise at the staff level. FMFPac respondedby temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men tothe advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine officersand seven additional enlisted men, all of whom remained attachedto the Marine Advisory Unit for the duration of the operation.The temporarily assigned Marines returned to their parentorganizations svhen the operation terminated. This is coveredin more detail in the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities inVietnam.

the conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer wasrequired to submit a detailed written report to theCommanding General, FMFPac. In turn, extractsof these reports were forwarded to the Commandantof the Marine Corps in Washington.

Generally these reports addressed tactical, op-erational, logistics, and intelligence matters. But anumber of the Marine officers used the reportingsystem to articulate their opinions relative to theoverall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P.Baker, a member of the 3d Marine Division staffwho visited \Tietnam in March, pointed out thatfield advisors and MACV staff members differedsharply in their personal assessments of progressbeing made. The field advisors, Baker observed,demonstrated far less optimism than did the staffmembers. Furthermore, he reported that unless thepeople of South Vietnam could be won over to thegovernment, the Viet Cong's success could beexpected to continue.12 Another officer, LieutenantColonel Harry E. Dickinson, summarized hisconclusions with an even more emphatic warning:

The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units shouldnot be effected except to Protect the seat of government.\Vhile local success might be achieved in certain areas, itis extremely doubtful svhether any lasting degree of successwould entail in the northern and svestern sections. As combatunits were increased, the forces of Vietnam would do lessand less svith the inevitable conflict of os'erall command. Theend result svould be the ringing of the country with combatunits but no solution for the internal conflict. I stronglydisagree that any tsvo or three divisions could achieve realvictory as has been stated in the press.iS

Through candid reporting of this nature, Marinecommanders from Okinawa to Washington werekept abreast of the complex and difficult problemsbeing generated by the war in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER 11

Spring and Summer FightingThe Monsoons—The Weather Breaks—Sure Wind 202—Operations

Elsewhere in I Corps—Changing the Watch

Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, thestrength of the Marine task element at Da Nangstood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened.Lieutenant Colonel Ross' HMM-361 continuedits assignment as the task element's helicoptersquadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy's204-man MABS- 16 sub unit retained responsibilityfor maintaining and operating the support facilities.

Shortly after New Year's Day, ComUSMACVadvised Colonel Gomea that the entire Marinetask element would be withdrawn from theRepublic of Vietnam during the first half of 1964.This decision was one of CinCPac's continuingresponses to the Defense Department plans forreducing the level of direct American militaryinvolvement in Vietnam. Additionally, Gomeawas informed that the task element would becalled upon to initiate a training program designedto prepare Vietnamese Air Force pilots and me-chanics to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds.This program was scheduled to culminate with thetakeover of the 24 Marine helicopters by a newVNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequentdeparture of the entire task element for Okinawawhere it would rejoin MAG—16, its parentorganization .

The Monsoons

The new year broke with Marine flight opera-tions at Da Nang still proceeding at a reducedrate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As hadbeen the case at the close of 1963, medical evacua-tion and resupply missions continued to constitutethe major source of work for HMM—361's crews.The first Marine helicopter ioss during 1964 oc-curred during one such mission on 3 January whenan aircraft was shot down while attempting to

144

perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles duewest of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on itsdescent toward the landing zone, the UH—34Dcrashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculouslyescaped injury and was rescued by another Marinehelicopter. The aircraft, damaged beyond repair,was intentionally destroyed by U.S. SpecialForces personnel. This was only the second Marinehelicopter loss definitely attributed to Com-munist fire since SHUFLY's arrival at Soc Trangnearly two years earlier.

In the second week of January the weather overthe mountains west to Da Nang broke long enoughfor Lieutenant Colonel Ross' squadron to accom-plish a critical trooplift. On short notice theMarines were ordered to remove a 200-man CIDGforce from the hills about 30 miles west-southwestof Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor,the South Vietnamese unit had been conductinga reconnaissance in force about eight miles westof its camp at An Diem.* Under cover of themonsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. orVNAF air support, Viet Cong elements of undeter-mined strength had closed in on the governmentforce, threatening to isolate and destroy it beforethe weather lifted.

The immediate nature of this particular missionleft little time for detailed planning and briefing.I Corps headquarters could oniy advise the Marinesof such vital information as the unit's radio callsign, radio frequency, size, and location. Tofamiliarize himself with the terrain in the vicinityof the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel Ross firstmade a reconnaissance flight to the area in an0—lB. His reconnaissance revealed the landingzone to be 'a precarious hill top knob exposed toa 360° field of fire," Ross later recalled.2

*See map of outposts in I CTZ, page 81.

SPRING AND SUMMER FIGHTING 145

The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadroncommander returned to Da Nang, exchanged the0—lB for a UH- 34D, and led a flight of 14 helicop-ters to the pickup point. In accordance with thesquadron's standing operating procedure, Ross,the flight leader, was to land first, drop off a load-master, and lift out the first Vietnamese heliteam.Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the leadhelicopter was forced away by heavy small armsfire which punctured the aft section of the air-craft's fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.

The second aircraft, following at close interval,was also hit. Lieutenant Colonel Ross then orderedthe entire formation into a holding pattern out ofsmall arms range while he attempted to persuadethe American advisor to move the Vietnameseunit overland a short distance to a less exposedlanding zone beside a stream. This the U.S. ad-visor was reluctant to do. "I was convinced,"

Ross concluded, "that his real concern was theshattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubtsabout being able to get them moving to the alter-nate site."3 After some delay the Vietnamese unitfinally moved to the new landing zone, whereuponthe Marines completed the troop lift. Still, thehelicopters were exposed to unnecessary risks.

Understandably concerned with problems ofthis nature which tended to plague all but thelarger preplanned operations, Lieutenant ColonelRoss questioned the "ability of the advisors tomake operational decisions based upon considera-tions beyond their own tactical problems."4In this particular case the selection of the exposedhilltop landing zone tended to substantiate theMarine commander's complaints.

During the second week of January, GeneralGreene, the newly appointed Commandant of theMarine Corps, visited the Marine installation at,

Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared landing zone. (USMC Photo /1329576).


Da Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspec-tion of the compound and was briefed on operationsby Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presentingcombat decorations to several members of the taskelement, Greene departed for Hawaii where he wasto visit the FMFPac headquarters.

The Commandant summed up his impressions ofthe Marine helicopter task element in testimonybefore the House Committee on Armed Servicesseveral weeks after his return to Washington. "Iwas assured by General Harkins and his officers—and by the officers of the supported Vietnameseunits—that this squadron has performed its sup-porting mission in an outstanding manner," relatedGreene. 'Everything that I observed," he added,''certainly attested to the high morale and effective-ness of this unit." *

Late January and early February saw the normalrotation of several of the task element's keypersonnel as well as its helicopter squadron. On 14January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officerwith a diverse military background, assumedcommand of SHUFLY. Merchant had commandedan artillery battalion on Okinawa in World WarII, a Marine attack squadron in Korea, and hadserved on the joint staff of the Specified Commanderfor the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958Lebanon Operation. More recently he had gradu-ated from the Industrial College of the ArmedForces. Having flown with the task element'ssquadron while on temporary duty in Vietnam theprevious October and since his arrival in earlyJanuary, Merchant was thoroughly familiar withSHUFLY's operations.

Command of the MABS—16 sub unit changedhands two weeks later when Lieutenant ColonelSamuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant ColonelCassidy. Beal, also a veteran of World War II andKorea, came from the 4th Marines in Hawaii wherehe had served as that unit's air liaison officer.

Lieutenant Colonel Ross' HMM—361 ended itstour at Da Nang on 1 February. The squadron'sarrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided withthe arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit's

more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter taskelementwas Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff. An experiencedaviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a Marine bombersquadron (VMB—443) in the latter stages of World War II. Whileserving as the MAAG Chief of Staff during 1963 and 1964,Anderson participated in a number of combat missions as a pilotwith the various squadrons assigned to SHUFLY.

flight statistics had suffered also from the interrup-tion caused by the political infighting which haddeposed President Diem. As a result, its operationsnever reached the sustained tempo which hadcharacterized the records of the Marine helicoptersquadrons previously assigned to SHUFLY. Lieu-tenant Colonel Ross' UH—34Ds totalled 4,236combat flight hours and just under 7,000 combatsorties—figures which, considering the conditionssurrounding their accumulation, compared favor-ably with the number of combat flight hours(7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged by the fourprevious UH—34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.6

HMM—364, commanded by Lieutenant ColonelJohn H. La Voy, a pilot who had flown his firstcombat helicopter missions during the KoreanWar, initiated support operations from Da Nangon 1 February. Under the existing plans to de-activate the Marine task element, La Voy'ssquadron was scheduled to be the last Marinehelicopter unit to operate in South Vietnam.As such, HMM—364's pilots and maintenancecrews were to launch the training program thatwould prepare the Vietnamese Air Force personnelto take over the Marine helicopters upon the taskelement's departure from Da Nang.

On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamesepilots began a 50-hour package of flight instructionunder the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel LaVoy's pilots. Included in the course of instructionwere operational missions, night and instrumentflying, formation work, and landing practice. Eachstudent was already a qualified copilot with atleast 25 flight hours in VNAF UH—34s—a factorwhich allowed the training to be conducted con-currently with normal operations. This was ac-complished by having the Vietnamese traineesfly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operationalflights. In addition to being an effective trainingmethod this system had two other advantages.First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquirea first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tacticsmost commonly used in the northern provinces.Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel La Voy'ssquadron to concentrate on its primary mission ofproviding combat support for the ground forcesin I Corps.

Another vital aspect of the training programinvolved preparing Vietnamese ground personnelto keep the squadron operational. This demanded


ex'tensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs,engineering, supply, operations, and ordnanceperscmnel. "This additional duty,' LieutenantColonel La Voy explained, 'was a tremendousburden on all departments of my squadron, whoseprimary job was to keep aircraft in commissionand to conduct combat operations." The languagebarrier understandably threatened the success ofthe overall training effort. In La Voy's opinion,however, ''the eagerness of the students to learnand the wealth of practical experience and varieddemonstrations" combined to help reduce prob-lems imposed by the language difference.7

The progress of the program proved the conceptssound. The first small group of student pilots wasgraduated on 9 March despite numerous flightcancellations due to bad weather during thetraining period. Subsequent classes of VNAFpilots continued to train with the Marine helicoptertask element throughout 1964. Eventually, a moreadvanced training program would have theVietnamese pilots flying sections of two and fourhelicopters as integral elements of larger Marinehelicopter operations.

Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered overI Corps throughout most of the month of March,brief periods of good weather sometimes allowedheliborne incursions into the mountainous areas.One such period began on the 5th and lasted longenough for Marine, Army, and VNAF helicoptersto lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to alanding zone near the Laotian border. During theoperation one escorting U.S. Army UH—1B gunshipaccidentally struck a tree and was forced to landin a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicoptersquickly rescued the crew and weapons of thedowned UH—1B, but drew automatic weapons firein the process. That afternoon 15 Marine heli-copters and two armed UH—lBs returned to thecrash site with 64 ARVN troops who establisheda perimeter around the damaged helicopter afterbeing landed. A maintenance team then landed andrepaired the aircraft which subsequently was flownback to Da N ang.

LieutenantColonel La Voy's crews undertookto correct several problems which they identifiedduring these initial combat operations. One wasthe need for machine gun fire to protect the port(left) side of the transport helicopters as theyapproached contested landing zones. To fill this

requirement the squadron's rnetalsmiths designedand fabricated a flexible mount for an additionalM—60 machine gun. This new mount was designedto allow the machine gun to be swung out a port-side window from the cabin. Placed on each ofHMM--364's 24 helicopters, this modificationultimately added a gunner to each crew and en-abled the Marines to deliver fire to either or bothsides of the aircraft during the critical landingphase of helilifts.8

La Voy personally instituted another changewhich made the coordination of trooplifts moreeffective. Prior to F-IMM—364's arrival in Vietnam,different Marines had served as loadmasters foreach heliborne operation. While this system ofrotating the loadmaster assignment had stood thetest of numerous operations since its inception inlate 1962, La Voy believed that it could be im-proved. Accordingly, he assigned one pilot andtwo crew chiefs permanent additional responsi-bilities as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-manteam was responsible for coordinating loading andunloading activities at pickup points and landingzones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relativelyminor adjustment, the Marines helped insure thecloser coordination of thcir helicopter operationswith ARVN ground forces.9

In early March hostile incidents around the DaNang air base increased dramatically. The incidentsusually took the form of sniper fire from the villagesituated just across the perimeter fence from theliving compound. The primary target of the enemysnipers seemed to be the task element's electricalgenerators whose high noise level preventedsentries from determining the firing position.Tensions heightened on the night of the 15th whena terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle into thedoorway of the staff noncommissioned officersquarters. The crude bomb fortunately failed toignite. Several days later, however, a Marine inthe compound was wounded by sniper fire frombeyond the perimeter wire.

These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant torequest that the security platoon from the 3dMarine Division be redeployed to help protect thebase camp and flight line. This request was ap-proved by ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac withoutdelay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from the1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on aMarine KC-130 and assumed responsibility for


South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel andwheel strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (USMC Photo A329570).

security around the Marine Compound and flightline. Attached to the MABS—16 sub unit, theinfantry platoon freed Colonel Merchant's aviationpersonnel to devote full time to their primarymission—providing helicopter support to I Corps.Like its predecessor which had been withdrawnonly three months earlier, the new infantry unitwould assist with rescue operations in insecureareas and on occasion would be called upon toprovide security around TAFDS bladders duringhelicopter operations in more remote areas.

The same day that the platoon from the 3dMarine Division arrived at Da Nang, a task elementMarine was involved in an act of heroism whichlater earned him the Bronze Star Medal. Whileescorting Marine helicopters on a resupply missionabout five miles west-northwest of Tam Ky, aU.S. Army UH—1B gunship from Da Nang washit by Viet Cong fire and crashed in flames. Marine

Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a volunteermachine gunner on board the Army gunship,acted rapidly to help secure the area despitehaving suffered injuries in the crash. Manningan M—6O machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on theapproaching enemy while the pilot, copilot, andthree other passengers were pulled fro at thewreckage. All six American personnel, includingthe injured Marine, were evacuated safely to DaNang, and then flown to the U.S. Army FieldHospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medicalattention.

The Weather Breaks

Much of I Corps began experiencing improvedweather conditions during the first days of April.Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN resumedits offensives into the rugged mountainous regions.


On the 6th a combined Allied helicopter flightlifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky to a landingzone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai.An Army UH—1B was shot down by Communistfire during the operation. Shortly after the crash,one of HMM—364's helicopters landed to rescuethe crew and strip the weapons from the downedaircraft. Marine mechanics then helped Armyaviation technicians disassemble the UH—1B where-upon it was suspended beneath an Army UH—37(a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy helicoptermanufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designedsling and helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.

Lieutenant Colonel La Voy's squadron sufferedits first combat aircraft loss on 14 April. Theincident occurred after one of HMM—364's heli-copters was hit in the engine by Viet Cong firewhile attempting to evacuate wounded Viet-namese infantrymen from a hillside landing zoneabout 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotianborder. Struck while taking off, the UH—34Dplunged 150 feet down the steep hillside andcrashed through the jungle into a stream bed.One Marine manning an M—60 machine gun sufferedat broken leg in the crash. The other crew membersand passengers, however, were able to carry himup the hill to the ARVN landing zone. Heavythunder showers prevented rescue for two hours,but the weather finally broke and the men werehelilifted to Da Nang. The aircraft was destroyedthe next day.

Four days after this incident, HMM—364 com-mitted all available aircraft to a battalion-sizeheliborne assault into rugged northwestern ThuaThien Province. The ARVN's objective was amountainous area on the northern rim of theA Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-widetrough whose location adjacent to the Laotianborder invited Communist infiltration. Althoughenemy activity would eventually force the govern-rqent to abandon its string of outposts in the valley,the issue of control of the area was still unresolvedin early 1964.

Colonel Merchant, as commander of the AviationHeadquarters Operations Center for I Corps,assigned 20 Marine UH—34Ds, four VNAF UH—34s,five U.S. Army UH—1B gunships, and three Marine0—lBs to the operation which the ARVN codenamed LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAFT—28s, four A—1H Skyraiders, and two observation

aircraft were assigned by the Joint General Staff toprovide support for the helicopter assault. Theoperation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchantas the Tactical Air Commander Airborne (TACA)from a U.S. Air Force U—b, whose radios wouldpermit the commander and his staff to communicatewith every aircraft participating in the effort. (TheMarine helicopters had UHF and VHF communica-tions, while the Marine observation aircraft usedUHF and FM. The Army UH—lBs had UHF; theVNAF transport helicopters also relied upon UHFradios.)

In addition to Merchant, the airborne controlstaff from the ASOC included Lieutenant ColonelWilliam Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnameseofficer. The Vietnamese representative was toassist in clearing close air strikes with ARVNground forces and also was to help resolve anylanguage problems which developed.

The one-day operation began early on 18 Aprilwith Marine and VNAF transport helicopterslifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from anoutpost in the northwestern portion of the A ShauValley into a rugged landing zone approximatelysix miles further north. Later the same morning300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from agovernment outpost in the central portion of thevalley to a second landing zone situated six milesnorth of the 200-man unit which had been flownin earlier. HMM—364's helicopters averaged almost8 hours per aircraft while flying 160 total hoursin support of LAM SON 115. Only one MarineUH—34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit byenemy fire during the execution of the well-plannedand efficiently coordinated operation. No aircraftwere lost.

Often the daily support flights proved morehazardous then the large assault operations whosedetails were planned in advance. An incidentthat occurred on 21 April while a UH—34D wasevacuating a wounded South Vietnamese soldierfrom the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Kyconfirmed the dangers inherent in such dailyoperations. In an effort to lure the evacuationhelicopter within range of their weapons, theCommunists ignited a yellow smoke grenade ina clearing close by the actual landing zone. Thepilot alertly identified the correct landing zone,thereby foiling the enemy ruse.


HMiVI—364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop landing zone during operations in I Corps. (USMC PhotoA329571).

Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy'sMarines encountered an equally clever Viet Congtactic while performing another evacuation mis-sion, this time in support of a U.S. Special Forcespatrol 20 miles west of Thuong Due. Army UH—1Bgunships made several low-level reconnaissancepasses over the pickup site while the UH—34Dpilot prepared to hoist the casualties through thedense jungle. When the gunship crews reportedno enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuveredhis aircraft into a hovering position above theinvisible patrol. At this juncture, well-concealedViet Cong began firing automatic weapons at thehovering helicopter and forced it to seek safetyaway from the pickup area. The es,corting gunshipsthen wheeled in from above, returning the VietCong's fire with rockets and machine guns. Theenemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon theMarine helicopter again maneuvered into position

above the patrol. Again the enemy challengedthe aircraft with fire, this time striking it in therear portion of the fuselage. Although no seriousdamage was done, the evacuation helicopter wasagain forced away from the patrol's position.

The UH—lBs once more placed suppressive fireon the enemy position, finally allowing a secondMarine helicopter to hoist the wounded manthrough the trees. A new burst of enemy fire,however, interrupted a subsequent effort to re-trieve the body of a dead patrol member. AnHMM—364 helicopter returned to the area thefollowing day and completed the evacuation.

Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAFaircraft losses, the incidents of 21 and 24 Aprilconfirmed that the Viet Cong was devising newmethods with which to counter the Allies' heli-copters. His use of false smoke signals and hispersistent refusal to compromise his position by

152 THE ADVISOEY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S.gunships represented crude but effective additionsto his expanding repertoire of counter-helicoptertactics. Although unappreciated by the Leather-neck crews, the enemys' most recent flurry ofactions had no lasting effect on the overall patternof helicopter operations.

Sure Wind 202

In late April Colonel Merchant's Marines joinedwith VNA.F and U.S. Army elements to launchwhat would be the costliest and most viciouslyopposed heliborne assault attempted in SouthVietnam during the 1962—1965 period. On the 26th,Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, andLieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the taskelement operations officer, flew to Quang Ngai andPleiku to participate in the final stages of planningfor a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into theDo Xa area, the mountainous Viet Cong strong-hold locai:ed along the northern border of IICorps. At Quang Ngai officials from the IICorps headquarters had already completed thegeneral plans for Operation SURE WIND 202(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202),the size of which demanded the use of all transporthelicopters available in both I and II Corps. TheMarine representatives learned that HMM—364'srole in the upcoming operation would be to helilifta 420-man South Vietnamese battalion from theQuang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO,an objective located about 30 miles due west of thepickup point. Simultaneous with this assault, aU.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleikuwas scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions(960 troops) from Gi Lang, an outpost located 24miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a secondlanding zone about eight miles west-southwestof Landing Zone BRAVO. The operation was tobegin on the morning of 27 April, with the firstassault waves scheduled to land at 0930.

Due to the distance between the mountainouslanding zones and because two different helicopterunits would be conducting the respective troop-lifts, the operation plan treated the two assaultsas separate operations. A U.S. Air Force U—lU air-craft had been assigned to carry Colonel Merchant,the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who

would coordinate the helilift into Landing ZoneBRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A—IIH Skyraidershad been assigned to provide tactical air supportfor the Marine portion of the operation. Twelveof these attack aircraft were scheduled to conductpreparatory strikes on and around the landingzones, four were to orbit above the area after thehelicopter landing began, and the remaining fourwere to be positioned on airstrip alert at Da Nang.Five Army UH—1B gunships were assigned toescort the Marine UH—34Ds to and from the landingzone.

The preparatory air strikes around Landing ZoneBRAVO began as the first ARVN heliteams boardedthe 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters atQuang Ngai. Following the VNAF's air strikes,the escorting Army gunships swept in for a pre-landing reconnaissance of the zone. They weremet by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 calibermachine guns. The gunships countered with re-peated rocket and machine gun attacks on thoseenemy positions that could be located but wereunable to silence the Communist weapons. Mean-while, the loaded Marine and VNAF helicopterscleared Quang Ngai nd were closing on theobjective. After the UH—lBs expended theirentire ordnance load and most of their fuel inattempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchantordered all helicopters, transports and gunshipsalike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm and refuel.

With the transports and gunships enroute toQuang Ngai, the ASOC summoned the on-callVNAF A-lHs to attack the Viet Cong positions.During ensuing strikes one Skyraider wasdamaged severely by .50 caliber machine gun fire.The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking aircrafteastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it tothe Quang Ngai airstrip. The attack bombercrashed less than one mile from the west end ofthe small airstrip.

The A-1H air strikes on and around LandingZone BRAVO continued until 1225. Shortly afterthe strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered thefirst wave of transport helicopters to land theARVN assault force. Escorting UH- lBs were stilldrawing fire as the first flight of three UH—34Dsapproached the contested landing zone. This time,however, the Marine and VNAF pilots were notdeterred. The first UH—34Ds touched down at 1230with their machine gunners pouring streams of


A formation of Marine UH—34Ds lift South Vietnamese troops i/ito mountains southwest of Da Nang. (USM C PhotoA329574).

orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despitethe high volume of suppressive fire, several heli-copters in the first wave sustained hits from VietCong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically,crashed in the landing zone. Its crew members, allof whom escaped injury, were picked up by anotherMarine helicopter, piloted by Major John R.Braddon, which had been designated as the searchand rescue aircraft for the operation. AnotherUH—34D with battle damage proceeded to theoutpost from which the Army helicopter missionswere originating and made an emergency landing.

The second assault wave was delayed whileVNAF Skyraiders renewed their efforts to dislodgethe enemy from his positions around the embattledlanding zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in theface of reduced but stubborn Communist resistance.During this phase of the troop lift, one VNAF and

211.623 0 — 77 — 11

several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50caliber fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lostits tail rotor controls, spun sharply while tryingto take off and crashed near the center of the zone.Its crew members escaped injury and were pickedup by Major Braddon's rescue helicopter.*

After this incident, as the South Vietnamesesoldiers began fanning out from the landing zoneand forcing the Communist gunners to withdrawdeeper into the jungle, the landing proceededsomewhat faster. The fourth and final assault liftof the day was executed at 1730, after which 357of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported intoLanding Zone BRAVO. During the first day of theoperation, 15 of the 19 participating MarineUH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF

*For his role in the two successful rescue attempts, Braddonwas awarded the Silver Star Medal.


At the loadmaster's direction, a Marine UH-34D waitsin a crude Iandzng tone as an unidentified U. S. advisorand two Vietnamese soldiers unload supplies. Other/IRVN troops provide security. (USMC Photo A329572).

helicopters originally assigned to support theoperation remained airworthy.

The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND202 was completed the next morning. FourteenUH- 34Ds from HMM- 364, several of which hadbeen repaired during the night, and four ArmyUH—lBs lifted the remainder of the South Viet-namese battalion into the landing zone. By thenthe intensity of the enemy action in the surround-ing hills had diminished greatly. Only one Marinehelicopter was hit and it suffered only minordamage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM—364'saircraft proceeded to Gi Lang, the outpost fromwhich the Army helicopter company was operat-ing, to help it complete its portion of the assaultlift.

Aircaft losses for the operation continued toaccumulate on the second day when a Marine

UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other

landing helicopters and crashed while approachingthe runway at Quang Ngai. The aircraft plumetted

into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip,rolled over onto its side, and completely sub-merged. The crewmen managed to climb to safetybut the helicopter was a total loss.

On 29 April, three UI-i- 34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection team and a Marine security squadfrom Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO toassess the damage suffered by the two helicopterswhich had been shot down on the first day of SUREWIND 202. The inspection team found that fourbullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAFaircraft, on the other hand, was riddled by nearly30 bullets, including a .50 caliber round that hadsevered the tail rotor control cable. The inspectionteam concluded that both helicopters were damagedbeyond repair and proceeded to destroy themwhere they had fallen.

Originally, MACV and II Corps planners hadanticipated that the Marine helicopters wouldnot be required to support SURE WIND 202beyond the initial assault. It soon became ap-parent, however, that the daily helicopter re-quirements for the operation would exceed theaviation assets available in II Corps. The Americancommand in Saigon, therefore, directed ColonelMerchants task element to continue providingsupport for the duration of the offensive. Accord-ingly, the task element commander assigned aliaison officer to the 2d ARVN Division head-quarters. This officer was tasked with coordinat-ing daily aircraft requirements. When SUREWIND 202 finally ended on 25 May, HMM—364'screws had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flighthours to the South Vietnamese effort in north-western II Corps.'°

Operations Elsewhere in I Corps

While some of HMM-364's crews continuedflying support missions from Quang Ngai, othersconducted a critical operation in western I Corps.The mission, which already had been delayed fivedays because of the Marines' extensive commitmentduring the early stages of SURE WIND 202, wasexecuted on 30 April. It involved 17 MarineUH-34Ds, four Army UH-lBs (two transportsand two gunships), two Marine O-lBs, two VNAFSkyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observationaircraft. Their assignment was to evacuate a


78-man ARVN patrol which had been underfrequent enemy fire for six days in the ruggedjungle about 42 miles west of Da Nang. Thetransport helicopters encountered almost con-tinuous small arms fire during the landing andsubsequent evacuation. One Marine helicoptercarrying a crew of four Marines and five ARVNpassengers was shot down while climbing awayfrom the contested landing zone. The pilot madea forced landing in a nearby clearing and the ninemen were evacuated under fire by other UH—34Ds.Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, theentire South Vietnamese patrol was removed tothe safety of Nam Dong, a well-defended SpecialForces camp located in a valley 34 miles west ofDa Nang.

Acts of heroism were commonplace during the30 April evacuation. One Marine copilot assumedcontrol of his severely damaged helicopter andflew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chiefhad been wounded. Staff Sergeant John C. Thomp-son, who served as one of the loadmasters for theoperation, was later awarded the Navy Cross forhis role in the action. Having arrived in the landingzone aboard the first transport helicopter, theMarine noncommissioned officer exposed himselfto Viet Cong fire almost continuously whilesupervising the loading of each aircraft. After thelast five South Vietnamese troops had boarded thefinal helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilotthat he would remain on the ground to providecovering fire while the aircraft took off. But thepilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board andthen succeeded in maneuvering the heavily loadedUH-34D out of the empty landing zone.

By late May it had become apparent to U.S.military authorities in South Vietnam that thedemand for American transport helicopters in ICorps would continue beyond the 30 June datewhich had been set earlier for SHUFLY's departure.General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to theCommander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unitbe retained at Da Nang indefinitely. He furtherrecommended that HMM—364 turn over its heli-copters and maintenance equipment to the Viet-namese Air Force on 30 June as scheduled, andthat the unit be replaced by another MarineUH—34D squadron. These recommendations wereforwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who ap-proved them on 10 June. In response, the Marine

Corps began immediate preparations to deploy anew, fully equipped, medium helicopter squadronto Da Nang.

HMM—364 began its final month in Vietnam bysupporting another heliborne assault into II Corps.This time the Marines teamed with the U.S.Army's 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVNbattalion from Dak To, a town situated in westernKontum Province, to an objective in the Do Xa basearea. To support the operation, which was codenamed SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel LaVoy's crews positioned a TAFDS fuel bladder at theDak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15 MarineUH—34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assaultphase of the new government operation. No battledamage was recorded by Marine aircraft duringthis latest incursion into northern II Corps.

The Marine task element's responsibilities wereexpanded slightly in the first week of June whenMACV directed Colonel Merchant to providesearch and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerialreconnaissance operations which had begun overLaos and North Vietnam. After 7 June at least twoUH- 34Ds (one section) were positioned togethereither at Quang Tn or at Khe Sanh, ready toconduct SAR missions for downed American andVNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the heli-copters were also used to support Advisory TeamOne on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At Quang Tn theSAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacentto a local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilotswho had stood the SAR duty there would recallthe incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boysplayfully pursuing their soccer games alongsideparked combat aircraft and a TAFDS bladder.

In addition to normal support operations,HMM—364's pilots devoted much of the secondweek of June to a search for Privates First ClassFred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, twoMABS—16 Marines who had disappeared from theDa Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reportsindicated that both men had been captured byCommunist guerrillas about five miles south of theairfield while sight-seeing on rented motor bikes.The aerial search produced no signs of the missingenlisted men but reliable Vietnamese sourcesreported that the Vict Cong had displayed themin several villages. The task element commanderfinally called off the fruitless search on 15 June, afull week after it had begun. Ground efforts by the


South Vietnamese to locate the men continued butwere also futile. The two Marines were neverfound.*

While the aerial search south of Da Nang wasin its final stages, HMM—364 suffered its lastaircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter crashedwhile carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to MajorGray's Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Moun-tain. The accident occurred on 13 June when aUH—34D was caught in severe down drafts whileattempting to land in the small landing zone nearthe top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak. Thecrew and passengers luckily escaped injury andwere rescued but the aircraft was damaged tooextensively to be repaired. Marines stripped theUH—34D of radios and machine guns and thenburned the hulk.

Changing the Watch

On 16 June, three days after the crash on TigerTooth Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy'sunit ceased its operations and began preparationsfor turning over its helicopters and equipment tothe Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spentthree days removing the automatic stabilizationequipment (the helicopter's equivalent of anautomatic pilot) and the USMC identificationfrom the 24 UH-34Ds. While HMM—364's menaccomplished the necessary last-minute prepara-tions, pilots from a new Marine medium heli-copter squadron, HMM-162, began flying theirUH—34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS ValleyForge. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel OliverW. Curtis, an Oklahoman who held four Dis-

*The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed frommissing in action to killed in action, body not recovered, on23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L. Greet was likewisechanged on 14 November 1975.

tinguished Flying Crosses for air actions foughtduring World War II and Korea, HMM-162 wasthe first Marine squadron since Lieutenant ColonelClapp's to deploy to Vietnam with its complementof aircraft and maintenance equipment. WithHMM- 162's arrival, elements of LieutenantColonel La Voy's unit began departing for Okinawaon board refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR—152. Also on board one of the IKC-130s bound forOkinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, whorelinquished command of the MABS- 16 sub unit toMajor Marion R. Green on the last day ofJune.

The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadroninformally accepted the aircraft from HMM-364on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 dayslater with Major General Paul J. Fontana, thecommanding general of the 1st Marine AircraftWing, attending a ceremony presided over by theI Corps commanding general. Following theexchange of equipment, the Vietnamese officialspresented various orders of the Cross of Valor,their nation's second highest decoration, to Marinepilots who had distinguished themselves duringOperation SURE WIND 202. Vice Air MarshalNguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Viet-namese Air Force, then presented Vietnamesepilot wings to Colonel Merchant, LieutenantColonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot who had participated in the helicopter pilottraining program. HMM-364's tour in SouthVietnam ended officially on 30 June when the lastof its members boarded KC—130's bound forOkinawa. Since initiating combat flight operationsin February, the squadron's helicopters had logged2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours.Another statistic underscored the intensity of theactions in which the unit had participated. Wellover half of the squadron's 24 helicopters had beendamaged by enemy fire during its five-monthdeployment in Vietnam,11

CHAPTER 12

Fall and Winter Operations

Dry Weather Fighting—Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations—Changesand Improvements—Action as the Year Ends

Dry Weather Fighting

The military situation in I Corps remainedessentially unchanged as HMM—162 began itsassignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather,with its promise of near perfect flying conditionsand spirited fighting, continued over the moun-tainous northern provinces.

After a series of orientation briefings and famil-iarization flights, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis' squad-ron initiated support operations in the closingdays of June. HMM—162's first real taste of actioncame on the last day of the month when six UH—34Ds, escorted by two armed U.S. Army UH—lBs,attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating inthe hills nine miles west of Tam Ky. While tryingto locate a Communist position which was firingon the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships washit and crashed in flames. Two transport heli-copters landed immediately to rescue the crew.The Marines pulled three of the four injured menfrom the wreckage before being driven away fromthe scene by approaching guerrillas. During takeoff,one UH—34D was struck by ground fire but wasable to continue its flight to Da Nang. The woundedcopilot of the downed Army aircraft died while en-route to the dispensary, but the injured pilotsurvived and later was evacuated to the NhaTrang Field Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering aircraft hulk prevented a second at-tempt to extricate the body of the fourth soldierlater in the day. It was finally recovered on 1 July.

The squadron's first critical troop lift camewithin days of its initial action when the taskelement was called upon to helilift urgently neededreinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG campwhich had come under heavy Communist attack.Situated in south central Thua Thien Province

at a point where two prominent mountain valleysconverge, Nam Dong held special strategic appealto both sides engaged in the struggle for SouthVietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration routesfrom Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang andPhu Bai and also protected some 5,000 Montagnardtribesmen who occupied a string of villages alongthe valley floor. The camp and the villages weredefended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forcespersonnel and three CIDG companies, none ofwhich could muster more than 90 men. Its statusas a thorn in the enemy's side, its relative isolation,and its proximity to Communist base areas alongthe Laotian border, combined to make the outposta particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong.

Nam Dong's hour of crisis came shortly aftermidnight on 7 July when the Communists launcheda large-scale ground assault against the barbedwire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, withhis position holding out against heavy mortar andmachine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon, theSpecial Forces officer in charge, radioed for assist-ance. Two hours later, six Marine helicopters,loaded with U.S. Special Forces and South Vietna-mese personnel, launched from Da Nang for thebeleaguered little fortress. Colonel Merchant, fly-ing an 01—B, led the transport helicopters to theobjective area while two U.S. Army UI-I—lB gun-ships provided escort. Meanwhile, two otherHMM—162 helicopters launched for An Diem carry-ing U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions toassemble a company-sized reaction force for com-mitment to Nam Doug.

Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at NamDong initially prevented the six HU—34Ds fromlanding the reinforcements, whereupon ColonelMerchant and the flight returned to Da Nangfor fuel. At the airfield the task element corn-

157


mander briefed VNAF A—1H Skyraider pilots andthe crew of a Marine 0—lB on the battlefieldsituation. He took off again at 0910, this time toact as TACA in an Air Force U—b. Meanwhile, aU.S. Army CV—2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing light transport) had managed to airdropsmall arms ammunition to Donlon and the em-battled defenders. Following this emergency re-supply, air strikes were conducted on the hills tothe south and west of the outpost, causing enemyground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, aflight of 18 Marine helicopters, led by LieutenantColonel Curtis and escorted by four UH—1B gun-ships and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landinga 93-man relief force which had been collectedearlier from Da Nang and An Diem. Evacuationof the dead and wounded began immediately.At 1545, a flight of 10 UH—34Ds lifted 9,500pounds of ammunition, medical supplies, radios,and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Sixpassengers, five wounded Vietnamese, and eightmore bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on thereturn trip. By then, the battle was finished. TwoAmericans, one Australian advisor, and 55 SouthVietnamese had been killed. Captain Donlon, whoearned the first Medal of Honor awarded for actionin Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had beenwounded. The Viet Cong, who had failed toeliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies onthe battlefield.*

Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, ColonelMerchant's tour in Vietnam ended. He returned toOkinawa to assume command of Marine AircraftGroup 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy ("Tex") Hay,a 1940 graduate of Texas A&M, assumed commandof Task Element 79.3,3.6.**

Normal flight operations continued during theremainder of July with no major heliborne assaultsconducted and no Marine aircraft lost. Theseoperations, however, did not lack excitement.Supporting the Marine and ARVN forces on TigerTooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous asthe HMM—162 crews soon came to realize. On

*FOr a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong,see Donlon, Outpost of Freedom.

**FOr his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I CorpsAviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S. AviationAdvisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later awarded theLegion of Merit with Combat •\T' He was also decorated withtwo Vietnamese Crosses of Valor—one for SURE WIND 202and the other for the relief of Nam Dong.

11 July, for example, the mountain nearly claimedone of their helicopters when a UH—34D lostpower as a result of the extreme altitude whiledelivering supplies to Advisory Team One. As theaircraft plummeted into the hillside landing zone,its tail pylon struck the vegetation around theedge of the tiny clearing causing some structuraldamage. Fortunately, the damage was such that thecrewmen were able to make emergency repairswhile Major Gray's men provided security aroundthe aircraft. This accomplished, the crew returnedtheir damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh withoutfurther incident.

Daily operations continued to produce actionfor the newly arrived squadron as July wore on.On the 15th a UH—34D was hit by Viet Cong firewhile performing a routine resupply mission southof Da Nang. Again, damage was only minor and theaircraft continued its mission. Support for TigerTooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY's operationson the 18th after MACV officials ordered MajorGray's Advisory Team One withdrawn to safety.Colonel Hay directed HMM—162 to commit allavailable aircraft in order to complete the with-drawal as rapidly as possible. Good weather andflying expertise helped the helicopter crews trans-port the entire Marine force (92 men) and over21,000 pounds of equipment to Khe Sanh beforenightfall on the 19th.

In a simultaneous but unrelated development,HMM—162 was called upon to detach four heli-copters to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty.These aircraft and crews were assigned to assistwith search and rescue operations in support ofongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in thatarea.

In early August, the heightened internationaltensions which accompanied the Gulf of Tonkincrisis prompted General Westmoreland to order allAmerican military installations throughout SouthVietnam to brace for possible enemy attacks.Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV's in-structions by placing his Marines on high alertstatus for several weeks. The precautions wererelaxed gradually as the crisis eased and thelikelihood of a sudden Communist attackdiminished.

The pattern of helicopter operations in thenorthern provinces throughout the remainder ofthe summer differed little from that which had

IALL AND WINTER OPERATIONS 159

emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacua-tion and resupply sorties continued to constitutethe majority of the task element's support missions.Generally, medical evacuation missions, many ofwhich were executed while Viet Cong and SouthVietnamese forces were engaged in combat, pro-vided the major source of action for LieutenantColonel Curtis' squadron during this period. On6 August, for example, a UH- 34D was hit by enemyfire while its crew was evacuating ARVN casual-ties from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon.Two days later, a second Marine helicopter was hitduring an attempt to evacuate dead and woundedfrom the mountains about eight miles west ofTam Ky. The following day, on 9 August, anotherHMM- 162 UH—34D drew fire while evacuating awounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastalplain 12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all threeincidents the aircraft received only minor damageand were able to return safely to Da Nang.

Although the medical evacuation missionsgenerally attracted more Viet Cong attention,many resupply flights also proved hazardous.Small landing zones, high elevations, and badweather often made even the most routine missionsdifficult. HMM—162 lost a helicopter as a resultof a combination of two of these adverse condi-tions—extreme elevation and a small landing zone—on 30 August. While resupplying a mountain-topoutpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, theUH—34D struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearingand crashed. The crew members were uninjured,but the extent of the aircraft's damage was toogreat to permit repair. It was stripped of radios,machine guns, machine gun mounts, and otherusable parts before being destroyed.

In mid-August the Marines also lost their firstobservation aircraft since deploying to Vietnamin 1962 when an 0-lB crashed after experiencingmechanical failure. The incident occurred on the15th while the pilot and observer were conductinga reconnaissance of the northwestern corner ofQuang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed rescueattempts for over an hour, but the two injuredcrewmen were finally recovered by helicopter andflown to the Da Nang dispensary for treatment.The pilot's injuries were severe enough that hewas evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at NhaTrang.

The last major heliborne assault conducted inextreme western I Corps during 1964 was initiatedin the first week of September. Eighteen MarineUH-34Ds, four Army Ul-i--lBs, six VNAF Sky-raiders, two Marine 0—iBs, and two U.S. Air Forceliaison aircraft were assigned to support a 2dARVN Division heliborne offensive against Com-munist infiltration routes in remote southwesternQuang Nam Province. The operation, code namedCHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 Sep-tember when 15 HMM—162 helicopters (the otherthree UH—34Ds participating in the operation wereserving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted thefirst wave of South Vietnamese soldiers from KhamDuc, a government-controlled town located 12miles from the Laotian border in northwesternQuang Tin Province. Their objective was a landingzone situated 24 miles northwest of the assemblyarea in Quang Nam Province and only three milesfrom the Laotian border. No enemy resistance wasencountered and the initial assault helilifts werecompleted shortly after noon. Support for CI-IINHBIEN continued the next morning. When thehelilifts were finally completed shortly before1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown 265 sorties for180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVNground forces in remote areas of I Corps.

Monsoon and FloodRelief Operations

Adverse weather began influencing SH[JFLY'soperations a few days after CHINH BIEN ended.On 14 September all flights were cancelled by rainand high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severetropical storm. All aircraft remained groundeduntil late afternoon of the next day when HMM-162 helicopters conducted an emergency evacua-tion of storm victims from Tam Ky which had beenhard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused someminor damage to SI-IUFLY's facilities whenelectrical power was lost for a few hours. By themorning of the 16th, power was restored and allMarine operations returned to normal.

Within a week, however, a more severe weatherdisturbance—Typhoon Tilda—struck the coastnear Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September, inthe face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hayordered Lieutenant Colonel Curtis to displace his


Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the coastal plain south of Da Nan,g. (Official USZVIC Photo).

squadron to Nha Trang in central II Corps.Later in the day, the unit's entire complement ofaircraft departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flightto safety. The task element's C- 117D found refugeat Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Tranguntil the 23d when it returned to I Corps.

Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damageto the Marine base of operations than had herimmediate forerunner. Most of the permanentstructures in the compound showed signs of waterdamage arid the electrical power was lost for anentire week, except at the waterpoint and the messhail where a concerted repair effort restored powerpromptly. Teletype communications circuits wereclosed for a full week as a result of damage, and theradio link with the 1st MAW was broken fornearly two hours.

While the Marines of the MABS—16 sub unitconcerned themselves with cleaning up the debris

and repairing their damaged facilities, HMM—162's crews resumed combat support operations.On the afternoon of their return from Nha Trang,a flight of UH—34Ds delivered 19 passengers and4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a government-controlled town located seven miles west of TamKy. The next day Major General Paul J. Fontana,who as commanding general of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing was responsible for the administra-tive and logistical support of the task element,arrived at Da Nang for a one day visit to assessthe damage and to confer with Colonel Hay.Flood relief missions and clean up activitiescombined with normal flight operations to consumethe remainder of September.

Two changes were made in the composition ofthe Marine task element in late September andearly October. On 29 September, the security forcefrom the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back

FALL AND WINTER OPERATIONS 161

to its parent unit on Okinawa. It was replaced bya 78-man element from Company E, 2d Battalion,9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieuten-ant Anthony A. Monroe, the newly arrivedMarines would provide protection for the aviationunit until late November.

The second alteration occurred about a weeklater when HMM—162 was relieved on-station bythe officers and men of a fresh squadron. Therotation of helicopter units was completed on8 October when Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officiallysigned over the aircraft and maintenance equipmentto the new squadron's commanding officer. In athree month deployment to the war zone HMM—162's helicopters had conducted approximately6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over 4,400flight hours. Many of these sorties had beenmissions of mercy flown in the wake of the ty-phoons which had ravaged Vietnam's northernprovinces. During three months of sustainedcombat support activities, the squadron had losttwo UH--34Ds and one 0—lB in operationalaccidents I

The newly arrived squadron, HMM—365, wascommanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler,Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had begunhis career shortly after World War II as an infantryplatoon leader with the 1st Marine Division inChina. Under his leadership the squadron beganperforming resupply missions the same day thatthe last of HMM—162's personnel departed DaNang. On their first day of operations, Koler'screws airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo tovarious outposts around Da Nang. The followingday a flight of 12 HMM—365 helicopters providedtransportation for ARVN troops who were beingrotated between Kham Due and A Roe, an isolatedoutpost in southwestern Quang Nam Provinceless than seven miles from the Laotian border.On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilotsand crews tasted their first actual combat wheneight UH--34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while landinga 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 mileswest-southwest of Tam Ky.

The day after its crews had witnessed theirfirst ground fire, Koler's squadron lost its firstaircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred inwestern Quang Nam Province while a UH—34Dwas attempting to take off from a South Viet-namese landing zone located high in the mountains.

211—623 C' — 77 — 12

The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured,resulted from a loss of power due to the highaltitude. After the crew was evacuated, a mainte-nance team salvaged the usable parts and destroyedthe aircraft.

In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized thesituation in I Corps for his superiors at the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. The task element com-mander was particularly concerned about a newphase of Viet Cong activity which he saw de-veloping in the coastal lowlands of the northernprovinces. Although there were few visible signsof either combat or enemy movement to confirmthe trend, intelligence sources indicated that VietCong main force battalions in I Corps had increasedin number from nine to 11 in the past severalmonths. During this same period, the number oflocal force Viet Cong companies in the area hadjumped by 50 percent to a total of 17. These growthpatterns, Colonel Hay noted, enabled the Com-munists to tighten their grip on the civilian pop-ulace. Likewise, they were responsible for increasedenemy harassment of lines of communications inI Corps and posed a particular threat to Da Nang. 2

Colonel Hay's tour as task element commanderended on 17 October. After a brief change ofcommand ceremony during which he expressedhis appreciation to his subordinates for theirassistance, Hay departed for Okinawa to assumecommand of MAG—16. His replacement at DaNang, Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer whohad seen his first action as a fighter pilot duringWorld War II, was well prepared to direct the taskelement's operations. A recent graduate of theNational War College, King had commanded thefirst operational Marine transport helicopter unit,Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during theKorean War.

HMM—365 's operations continued throughoutthe remainder of October with only a few signifi-cant actions reported. One of these was an abortivemedical ev.acuation mission attempted on 26October during which the squadron suffered itsfirst combat casualties. The incident, in whichboth the copilot and crew chief were wounded byViet Cong small arms fire, occurred while thehelicopter was approaching a poorly protectedlanding zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. Thepilot managed to return the damaged helicopterto Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon the seri-

162 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSJ ..NCE ERA, 1954—1964

ously wounded copilot was evacuated to NhaTrang and the crew chief was administered firstaid.

In early November, at the height of the monsoonseason, Typhoon Iris struck the Annamese coast.The tropical storm, whose full force was felt on4 November, was followed by nearly a week ofcontinuous rain, wind, and fog. The conditionscaused flight operations to be suspended exceptfor emergency medical evacuations. When theoperations resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corpsbirthday., the Leatherneck crews concentratedon rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the innun-dated coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 ontheir first day of the flood relief operation, Lieu-tenant Colonel Koler's Marines rescued 144 floodvictims. These rescues, many of which wereaccomplished by hoisting the Vietnamese fromprecarious positions in trees or on roof tops werecomplicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassingfire. Many of the stranded civilians were evacuatedto the Da Nang airfield. Following emergencymedical treatment administered by Navy doctorsand hospitalmen, the civilians were given shelterin the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert P.Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLYat the time, later praised the Marines who sharedtheir birthday cake with the homeless Vietnamesethat night.3 The next day, although poor visibilitycontinued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted1,136 more flood victims to safety. Again theguerrillas harassed the rescue attempts with smallarms fire, this time hitting three of the participatingaircraft.

The humanitarian operation continued until16 November, when another typhoon—Kate-—threatened to make matters even worse. Theweather on the storm's periphery forced the can-cellation of many Marine flights but the center ofthe disturbance passed about 200 miles south ofDa Nang. The flooding which resulted from thetwo back-to-back storms, however, demanded arescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marineand VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps.Accordingly, the Special Landing Force (SLF) ofthe U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on 17November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis' HMM- 162,the helicopter element of the SLF, returned to itsformer operations area and spent six days rescuingflood victims. The Marines evacuated the most

seriously injured to the USS Princeton where theyreceived emergency treatment before being returnedto civilian hospitals. When the SLF departedVietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM—162'shelicopters had flown over 600 hours and com-pleted 1,020 sorties in support of the disasterrelief operations. Unfortunately, one UH—34Dwas lost at sea in an operational accident on 21November while participating in these operations.Two crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr.and Lance Corporal David Nipper, died in thecrash.4

With the SLF's departure, the Marine task ele-ment and the VNAF 217th Squadron reassumedthe full burden of rescue operation. ntil theywere finally terminated on 10 December. Duringthis period HMM—365 was forced to divide itsflights judiciously between combat support andmissions of mercy.*

Changes and Improvemeni.i

While some of Lieutenant Colonel Foler's menwere employed in evacuating the fl.,od-strickenVietnamese, others were modifying three of thesquadron's helicopters to carry a new weaponssystem which had been developed specifically foruse on the UH-34D. The TK—1, an externallymounted combination of M—60 machine guns and2.75-inch rocket launchers, was first used on 19November in support of a Tiger Flight missionconducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about17 miles from Da Nang. Two armed UH—34Dsexpended 90 rockets and 500 rounds of 7.62mmammunition on enemy positions during prelandingstrikes. The effectiveness of the new system couldnot be determined after this particular strike, butan estimated 10—15 Viet Cong were killed in asimilar action by the armed UH—34Ds the nextday. The transport aircraft armed with the TK- 1would continue to escort troop carrying heli-copters regularly throughout the remainder of the

*The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the inhabitantsof Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin Provinces by theNovember storms is borne out by the following Statistics. Inthese three provinces over 50,600 houses were destroyed while4,870 civilians were reported 1either dead or missing. Another12,240 Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at governmentcenters in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64—14Jan65.)


year. At best, however, the TK-1 was of onlymarginal value. The inherent limitations of theUH- 34D, which possessed neither the maneuvera-bility nor the speed to conduct truly effectiveattacks, reduced the overall value of the system.Because of these limitations the Marines seldomrelied solely on the UH—34D for fire suppressionduring assault missions. The system would eventu-ally be phased out in 1965 with the arrival ofMarine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam.

Two improvements, one in the physical facilitiesavailable to the task element and the other in thesize and composition of its security detachment,were made shortly after the Marines began usingthe UH- 34Ds in the gun ship i-ole. On 25 November,HMM—365 moved its aircraft and maintenanceequipment across the airfield into a newly con-structed hangar just west of the strip. The secondchange took place the next day when the securityforce from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines wasreplaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,reinforced with engineers, 81mm mortar teams,and counter-mortar radar personnel. This adjust-ment came in response to the reports of the growingViet Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated theSecurity Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, the255-man organization was under the command ofMajor William F. Alsop, the battalion's executiveofficer. Captain John Sheridan, the companycommander, retained tactical control of theinfantry unit.

Although responsibility for the overall defenseof the Da Nang airstrip still resided with theARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatlystrengthened the Marine defenses within theinstallation. Major Alsop divided his reinforcedrifle company into two groups—one to protectthe living compound and the other to defend theflight line and the new hangar. Around the livingcompound the engineers constructed a complex ofmachine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammuni-tion bunkers. A barricade was also erected at agate near the Marine compound which previouslyhad been open and manned only by Vietnamesesentries. Strong defensive positions were also con-structed around the task element's new hangarand flight line. This network included fox holes,barbed wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an addedprecaution, Company L maintained a reaction forceat the living compound. This force was prepared

to board trucks and rush to reinforce the criticaldefenses around the aircraft and maintenancefacilities in the event of an enemy ground attack.5

Despite the stronger defenses and the presenceof the larger Marine infantry force, several security-related problems were still unsolved. One whichremained outside of Colonel King's influence wasthe laxity of the ARVN sentries around the outerperimeter who sometimes allowed Vietnamesecivilians to wander into the installation. Anotherwas that a small village close to the Marinecompound, but outside the perimeter fence, stillharbored an occasional sniper. The task elementcommander had lodged repeated complaints aboutboth situations with the appropriate SouthVietnamese authorities but no action had beentaken to eliminate them. In spite of these minorsources of irritation, the recent changes in itsdefenses greatly enhanced the task element'sability to protect itself against Communist groundattacks.

Action as the Year Ends

While Company L was developing defensivepositions at the airbase, HMM—365's crews con-tinued to provide support for both flood reliefand military operations throughout I Corps. On7 December, 17 Marine helicopters and eightArmy UH—1B transports were called upon to helptrap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in avillage less than five miles west of Da Nang. Codenamed DA NANG SIX, the operation began atdaybreak when the American helicopters lifted240 men of the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion intothe objective area. Two UH—1B gunships teamedwith two armed UH—34Ds to suppress ground firethat erupted as the first wave of transport aircraftbegan their approach to the landing zone. OneArmy gunship sustained minor damage when hitthree times during the exchange of fire. After theenemy had been silenced, the landing proceededwithout incident and the Vietnamese rangersquickly secured their objective. In the process,nine Viet Cong were killed and four others cap-tured along with nine rifles and one automaticweapon. Successful though it was, the action onthe outskirts of Da Nang confirmed previous re-ports that the Communists were tightening theirgrip on Quang Nam Province.6


Another indication of the enemy's growingstrength in I Corps came only two days later whena large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpostfour and a half miles southwest of Tarn Ky. I

Corps Headquarters quickly drew up plans for amulti-company search of the area even though theCommunists had withdrawn from the badlydamaged government position shortly after theirfinal assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH—34Ds (threearmed) and four Army IJH—lBs (two armed)helilifted a 208-man Tiger Force from Da Nang toTam Ky where it had orders to stage with otherunits for the operation. While the U.S. helicopterswere in the process of transporting the Vietnamesetroops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer sighted alarge formation of Viet Cong moving southwestfrom the scene of the previous night's battle. Theobserver immediately brought air strikes and artil-lery fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape.

Firepower contained the enemy throughout themorning while the infantry units at Tam Kyprepared to exploit the situation with a heliborneassault. The helilift was launched at 1345. En-route to a landing zone, located six miles southwestof Tam Ky, the helicopter formation passed over thesmoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost whereammunition stockpiles were still exploding. Onceat the objective, the armed helicopters began de-livering suppressive fire into the surrounding hedgerows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraftapproached the landing zone. Still, after nearlysix hours of air and artillery strikes, the Com-munist force was able to oppose the landing withintense small arms fire. No helicopters were hitduring the landing, however, and the assault forcemanaged to secure the landing zone. This ac-complished, two companies from the 11th ARVNRanger Battalion were helilifted into the positionwithout incident. After the final troop lifts, theMarine transport helicopters began evacuatingcasualties from the outpost where eight Viet-namese soldiers and one American advisor haddied and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor hadbeen wounded. The government's response to theenemy-initiated action, including air and artillery

strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong killed and 39weapons captured. While reflecting a moderatesuccess, these statistics were little compensationfor the knowledge that the Communists coulddestroy a well-fortified position within five milesof a provincial capital.7

Weather caused many Marine flights to bedelayed and some to be cancelled during the closingmonth of 1964. But the interruptions were notfrequent enough to prevent the task elementfrom fulfilling its support commitments. Theonly type of support operation actually curtaileddue to the monsoons was the pre-planned heliborneassault into the mountains. Brief periods of favor-able weather usually enabled the Marine crews toaccomplish resupply and medical evacuation mis-sions even into the most remote areas of I Corps, al-though delays of such flights were not uncommon.

Lieutenant Colonel Koler's HMM—365 was pastthe midpoint of its assignment in Vietnam as 1964drew to a close. Through 31 December the unit'shelicopters had already flown over 6,700 sortiesfor a total of nearly 4,700 hours of flight time.Since its arrival in early October, Koler's squadronhad distinguished itself not only by providingsupport to military units throughout I Corps butby its extensive participation in the flood reliefoperations of November and December. Duringthe 30-day period after 10 November, HMM—365had contributed a substantial percentage of itsflights to the prolonged effort to rescue and evac-uate Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.8

FMFPac changed the designation of the taskelement on the final day of 1964. From that dateuntil mid-March of the following year the Marinehelicopter squadron and its supporting elementsin Vietnam would be known officially as TaskUnit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change,however, did not alter the existing command re-lationships. ComUSMACV continued to exerciseoperational control over the Marine task unitwhile the Commanding General, 1st Marine Air-craft Wing retained responsibility for its adminis-trative and logistic support.

CHAPTER 13

Prelude to Escalation

The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decadeof American political, economic, and militaryadvice and assistance to South Vietnam. That10-year period saw a fragile state born and beginits struggle for survival only to have its existencethreatened by a new brand of Communist ag-gression—the 'war of national liberation." Italso saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam'sdefense deepen in almost direct proportion to theincreasing threat. Despite growing amounts ofAmerican aid and advice, there was little doubtthat South Vietnam stood near the brink of de-struction at the hands of the Viet Cong and theirNorth Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended.

In many respects, the disaster which befell theVietnamese Marines and ARVN Rangers at BinhGia on the final day of 1964 marked a criticalturning point in the war being waged in SouthVietnam. General Westmoreland feared that thebattle heralded "the beginning of the classic andfinal 'mobile' phase of the war." "To the SouthVietnamese government," he reported, "it meantthe beginning of an intensive military challengewhich the Vietnamese government could notmeet within its own resources." 1 BrigadierGeneral Carl Youngdale, Westmoreland's assistantchief of staff for intelligence and the rankingMarine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaningof the battle in equally distressing terms. ''BinhGia," he explained, "was just part of the wholething. All the reserve—the strategic reserve--was fixed: the airborne and the four Marine battal-ions had all been committed. There was absolutelyno strategic reserve left." 2 So, as 1964 ended, hopewas fading rapidly among American militaryofficials in Saigon that the ground war for SouthVietnam could continue for long without morevigorous participation of the United States.

Pressures other than those produced by militaryevents in the South were also working to move theUnited States toward direct military interventionagainst the Communists in Indochina. Although

166

sustained open warfare had not occurred as aresult of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of early August,tensions continued to mount between NorthVietnam and the United States throughout theautumn. On 1 November, just after the cessationof the U.S. air strikes which followed the TonkinGulf incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attackedAmerican facilities at the Bien Hoa airbase nearSaigon. Four American servicemen were killed,five B—57 medium bombers destroyed, and eightothers heavily damaged in the raid.

President Johnson's reaction to the Bien Hoaattack was to initiate a month-long review ofU.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In earlyDecember that review culminated in the adoptionof a two-phased plan to discourage further NorthVietnamese support of the Viet Cong by expandingthe air war. Phase I, approved for implementationin December, called for stepped-up air operationsagainst the vital Communist infiltration routes inLaos, and for the intensification of covert opera-tions against North Vietnam. Approved "irs prin-ciple," Phase II involved "a continuous programof progressively more serious air strikes" againstNorth Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II,it was agreed, would depend on future enemyactions.3 As if to indicate that Communist policymakers had settled on a parallel course of escala-tion, Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers'quarters in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing twoAmericans and wounding over 50 others.*

The new year, 1965, would open against thisportentous combination of intensified U.S. airactivites over Laos, a worsening military situationon South Vietnam's battlefields, and the existenceof the Phase II contingency plans. It was thissituation which would spawn a new series ofevents as the first months of 1965 unfolded—eventswhich would determine the direction of American

Among the wounded was Major Darnm, the AssistantSenior Marine Advisor.

PRELUDE TO ESCALATION 167

and North Vietnamese military involvement inthe war for South Vietnam. In January, MACVintelligence would learn that two new NorthVietnamese Army regiments, the 32d and the 101st,had infiltrated the South and had initiated combatoperations. Intelligence sources would also reportthe existence of another NVA regiment in thefirst stages of formation in Quang Tn Province.When added to a unit of similar size which hadappeared in Kontum Province (II Corps TacticalZone) in the final weeks of 1964, the new arrivalswould raise to four the number of North Viet-namese regiments known to be operating onSouth Vietnamese soil.4

The pace of escalation would quicken in earlyFebruary. The Viet Cong would attack a U.S.installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands onthe 7th. Eight Americans would die in this inci-dent, over 100 would be wounded, and a score ofaircraft would be either destroyed or damaged.President Johnson would react quickly to thePleiku attack by ordering a series of reprisal airstrikes under the code name FLAMING DART.Recognizing the possibility of surprise NorthVietnamese air strikes against U.S. installationsin Vietnam, Johnson would also order a Marinelight antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion toDa Nang, the American base located closest toCommunist airfields. Armed with Hawk missiles,the Marines would protect the growing Da Nangairbase from which many of the FLAMINGDART raids were to originate.

American reaction to the Communists' escalationwould not be limited to the bombing of NorthVietnam. Washingtoti also would authorize theuse of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets inthe south. On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B—57swould conduct the first jet strikes flown by Amer-

jeans in support of Government of Vietnam groundunits. Less than one week later, on the 24th, AirForce jets would strike again, this time to breakup a Communist ambush in the Central Highlandswith a massive series of tactical air sorties.5

While the events of February would serve tofocus world opinion more sharply on the inten-sifying conflict already raging over SoutheastAsia, March would prove the decisive month interms of the commitment of American combatpower to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, thePresident would order the FLAMING DARTraids replaced by Operation ROLLING THUN-DER—a sustained air campaign against theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam designed toescalate gradually in response to continued Com-munist military activities in South Vietnam.ROLLING THUNDER would constitute a transi-tion from the earlier reprisal type raids to a con-tinuing air campaign based upon strategicconsiderations.

Within a week after the first ROLLING THUN-DER strikes over the North, the ground war inSouth Vietnam would also shift toward deeperand more active American involvement. On 7March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade—the force which had been poised in the SouthChina Sea since the Tonkin Gulf crisis of theprevious August—would finally land at Da Nangto provide protection for the air base. Althoughthe Pentagon would announce their mission aspurely defensive, the Marines would become thefirst actual American ground combat battalionson hand for use in Vietnam. With that commit-ment, the stage would be set for a new and moredramatic phase of what was already becomingknown as the "Second Indochina War."

Notes

PART ITHE WATERSHED

Chapter 1Background to Military Assistance

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations,1945—1947, 12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter PentagonPapers; The Senator Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers. The DefenseDepartment History of Decision Making On Vietnam, 4 vols. (Boston:Beacon press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers;Foreign Area Studies Division, American University, Area Hand-book for South Vietnam (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafterAmerican University, Area Handbook; Chester L. Cooper, et al.,The American Experience With Pacification in Vietnam, 3 vols.(Washington, D.C.: Institute For Defense Analysis, 1972),hereafter Cooper, et al., The American Experience With Pacification;Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Viet-nam (New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter Buttinger, The SmallerDragon; Bernard Fall, Two Viet-Nams.' A Political and MilitaryAnalysis (New York: Pratger, 1967, 2d rev. ed), hereafter Fall,Two Viet-Nams; D. G. E. Hall, A Histoiy of South-East Asia (NewYork:St. Martins Press, 1966), hereafter Half, A History of South-East Asia; Frances FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese andthe Americans In Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1972), hereafter FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake; Ellen J. Hammer,The Struggli for Indochina (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UniversityPress, 1954), hereafter Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina; DouglasPike, Vict Cong: The Organisateon and 'Techniqucs of The NationalLiberation Front (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1966), hereafterPike, Viet Cong.

Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York:Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261.

Fall, Two Viet-.Nams, p. 3.

Pike, Viet Cong, p. 81.FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake, p. 42.Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), A Translation From

The French Lessons of The War In Indochina, v. II (Santa Monica,Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter Croizat, ATranslation From the French Lessons.

Dean A:heson, Present At The Creation: My Years in The StateDepartment (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969),p. 673.

Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon, p. 46.° B. S. N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York, 1954), p. 49.o Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in 'U.S.

Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954—1959," PentagonPapers, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3.

Chapter 2The Formative Years

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), In the Midstof Wars: An American's Mission To Southeast Asia (New York:Harper & Row, 1972), hereafter Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars;George MtTurnam Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United Statesin Vietnam (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), here-after Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. In Vietnam; Joseph Buttinger,Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 2 vols (New York: Praeger, 1967),Vol. 11, Vietnam at War, hereafter Buttinger, Vietnam: A DragonEmbattled, v. II; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation UnderStress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), hereafter Scigliano,South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress; Fall, Two Viet-Nams; Pike,Viet Cong; Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, vs. I & II; VietnamHistories Comment File, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter Viet-nam Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954—1964Project Interview Folder Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter1954—1964 Prolece Interview Folder.

Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: Indochina At War,1946-1954, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961),hereafter Fall, Street Without Joy; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC(Ret.), ''Vietnamese Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,''USNI Proceedings, v. 99, no. 2 (Feb73), pp. 48—58, hereafterCroizat, ''Vietnamese Naval Forces''; Col Victor J. Croizat,USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 10—11Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter CroizystInterview; Col VittorJ. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and sup-porting materials on Draft MS Jack Shulimson, "U.S. Marines inVietnam," pt 1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter CroiatComments and Supporting Materials; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC(Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S.Marine Attivities in Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam CommentFile), hereafter Croiiat Comments On Whitlow MS; Col James T.Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt RobertWhitlow, ''U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964''(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Breckinridge Comments;MajGen William F. Bulton, USA (Ret.), Riverine Operationsi.Washington, D.C.: Department of The Arnsy, 1973), hereafterFuf ton, Riverine Operations; Croizat, A Translation From TheFinch Lessons.

i Col VictorJ. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), "Notes on The Organi-zation of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,'' p. 3 (Croiat Commentsand Materials), hereafter Croizat, "Notes on The Organization."

2 Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 6.

169

170 THE ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, X94—I964

Political Stabilization and its EffectsUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, v. II; GravelEdition, Pentagon Papers, v. I; Fall, Two Vietnams; Robert Shaplen,The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis,The U.S. In Vietnam; Lansdale, In The Midst of Wars.

Col John T. Breckinridgc, telephone conversation withCapt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early Experienceswith the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to Breckinridge Comments,Vietnam Comments File), hereafter Breckinridge Conversation.

Croizat, 'Notes on The Organization," p. 5.6 Breckinridge Conversation.

Chapter 3Vietnamese Marines and the Communist

Insurgency

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: Department of State, Aggression From The North.' TheRecord of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam(Washington: GPO, 1965), hereafter Department of State,Aggression From The North; Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Em-battled, v. II; Fall, Two Viet-Nams; FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake;Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. In Vietnam; Pike, Vies' Cong.

U.S. News QY' WorldReport, 9Nov64, p.63.2 Scigliano, South Vietnam.' Nation Under Stress, p. 164.

Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 360.Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. II, p. 35.

5 "Evolution of The War," Pentagon Papers, bk. 2, sec. IV.B.1,p. 1.

6 Pike, Vies' Cong, p. 81.Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. II, p. 36.

8 HistBr, G—3, HQMC, "General Chronology of Events inVietnam,1945—1964,"p. 41.

Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine CorpsUnless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived

from: SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: VietnameseMarine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary,1954—1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU HistSum, 22Mar73; MajJames Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M.Frank, "United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam1954—1963," MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling,et al., "USMC Activities 1954—1963"; Col Frank R. Wilkinson,USMC (Ret.), irltvw by Hise&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74(Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter WilkinsonInterview; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, CaptRobert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, R. E. Brown Com-ments; Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, CaptRobert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File) hereafter Damm Comments; LtColMichael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,"U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Com-ment File) hereafter Gott Comments; Col Gary L. Wilder, Com-ments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "Marine Activities inVietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterWilder Comments.

VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73.10 Wilkinson Interview.Ii Ibid.12 Damm Comments.3 Gotr Comments.

Ancillary Effects on Marine Pact/ic CommandsUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: Maj T. C. Edwards, "3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Train-

iog: A Readiness Report," Marine Corps Gagette, v. 47, no. 5(May 1963), pp. 45—48, hereafter Edwards, "CounterguerrillaTraining"; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), Commentson Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine Activitiesin Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterWeller Comments; MajGcn Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Weller Interview; MajGcn Donald M.Weller, USMC (Ret.), Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv Training Program (1954—1964 ProjectInterview Folder), hereafter Weller Interview on Training Programs.

14 Weller Interview on Training Programs.13 Edwards, "Counterguerrilla Training," p. 46.

American Decisions at the Close of 1961

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom : Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. II; "The Fall Deci-sions,' Pentagon Papers, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; ArthurM. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: HoughtonMuffin Company, 1965), hereafter Schlesinger, A ThousandDays; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York:W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), hereafter Taylor, Swordsand Plowshares; Chester L. Cooper, The Last Crusade: America InVietnam (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970), hereafterCooper, The Last Crusade; Geo. William C. Westinoreland andAdns U. S. G. Sharp, Report On The War In Vietnam (WashingtonGPO 1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, Report On TheWar.

16 Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 225.

Chapter 4An Expanding War, 1962

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam1962—1965 (Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency,1966), hereafter Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, 1962—65;

USMAAG, Vietnam, "Tactics and Techniques of Counter-insurgent Operations" (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG, 1961), here-after, USMAAG Vietnam, "Tactics and Techniques of Counter-insurgent Opns"; Hdqts, U.S. Army, The Vies' Cong (Ft. Bragg,N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, Viet Cong; Cooper, Ct al., TheAmerican Experience With Pacification; Gravel Edition, PentagonPapers, v. II; "The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961—63," PentagonPapers, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, Two Viet-Nams.

As quoted in the Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. II,p. 140.

Jreation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, here-after SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64; CinCPac Command History,1962; MACV Command History, 1962; Marine Corps CommandCenter, Items of Significant Interest, Jan—Fcb62, hereafter MCCItems; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMCdtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafterWeede Interview.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64; Capt Don R. Christensen, "ASpecial Gazette Report: Dateline . , , Vietnam," Marine CorpsGazette, v. 47, no. 9 (Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, "Date-

NOTBS 171

line"; Gen David M. Shoup, SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, here-after Shoup SEA Trip Folder; LtCol Harold F. Brown, Commentson Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, 'U.S. Marine Activities inVietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterH. F. Brown Comments.

2 SMA itt to CMC, 24Jan64.Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd

Oct62 (Shoup SEA Trip Folder).Gen Da.'sd M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H.

Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954—64 Project Interview Folder).SMA itt to CMC, 24Jan64.

PART IIMARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR

Chapter 5SHUFLY at Soc Trang

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapc;r is derivedfrom: HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File MCC Items;CinCPac Command History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. MeCutcheon,"Marine Aviation In Vietnam, 1962—1970," Nava, Review, v. 10(1971), hereafter MeCuecheon, "Marine Aviation."

I JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File),2 CinCPac to ,JCS 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File),

JCS to CinCPae, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA toCinCPae and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File).

ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC MsgFile).

° CGFMPac to CinCPac 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File).Ibid.CinCPacFlt to CinCPae, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg

File).8 CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z

(HQMC Msg File).ComUSMACV to CinCPae, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg

File).° CioCUSARPac to CinCPae, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg

File).ii Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC

Weekly Corif., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter Squadronto ChMAAG, Vietnam,

iS CinCPac to JCS, 24Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File).i3 Ibid.14 CinCPiic to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62,,

0412Z (HQMC Msg File); CinCPac FIt to ComSevcnthFlt,21Mar62, 2048Z (HQMC Msg File).

Deployment to Soc TrangUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Ju1—5Nov62,hereafter CTU 79.3,5 CmdD, 31 Jul—5Nov62; CG 1st MAW,SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr—Sep62; CG, 1st MAW, Ltr of instruc-tion, SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter CG, 1st MAW LOl;LtCol ArehieJ. Clapp, "SHU—FLY Diary," USNI Proceedings, v.89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, "SHU—FLY Diary", CdrWithers M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, Navy Chaplains inVietnam, 1954—1964 (Washington: Department of Navy, 1968),hereafter Moore, Navy Chaplains; Capt Robert B. Asprey, "SagaAt Soc Trang: Marines In Viet-Nam," Marine Corps Gaette, v.46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2—3, hereafter Asprey, "Saga At SocTrang"; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), Intvw by CaptRobert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954—64 Project InterviewFolder), hereafter Hooper Interview.

5 CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (QMHCMsg File).

.iO Ibid.i7 ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC

Msg File).

Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1,ded 12Mar63, "Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Opera-tions in the Mekong Delta," hereafter MCOAG Study No. 1;LtCol Robert L. Rathbun, Comments on Tingling, et al,, "USMCActivities 1954—1963,'' (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterRathbun Comments on Tingling MS; Richard Tregaskis, VietnamDiary (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter Tregaskis,Vietnam Diary; Clapp, "SHU-FLY Diary"; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,3lJul—5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr—Sep62.

is Clapp, "SHU-FLY Diary," p. 46.i° Ibid., p.51.23 CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Ju1—5Nov62.

0 Yingling, etal., "USMC Activities 1954—1963," P 118.22 CTU79.3.5 ComdD, 31Ju1—5Nov62.

23 C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Tingling, et al,,USMC Activities, 1954—1963," P. 153.

Chapter 6SHUFLY Moves North

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, CaptRobert Whitlow, ''U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964'' (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ireland Comments;McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation"; Weede Interview; RathbunComments on Y:nglon,g MS.

I Corps Tactical Zone

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: BGen Edwin H. Sinimons, "Marine Corps Operations inVietnam, 1965—1966," Naval Review, 1968, hereafter Simmons,"Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 65—66"; McCurcheon,"Marine Aviation"; Fall, Street Without Joy; Nighswonger,Rural Pacification, 1962—65.

Military Situation, September 1962

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961—1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), here-after Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces; MACV J—2 ltr to CTU79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62, Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62—Feb63 (End D—17 to CTU 79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter MACVIntell Est, 11Oct62.

i MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62.2 Ibid.

Initial Helicopter Operations

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: CTU 79.3 .5 ComdD, 3lJul-5Nov62; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY,OpSums, Sep—Dec62; MeCutcheon, ''Marine Aviation''; IrelandComments; Rathbun Comments on Yengiong MS.

MCC Items, 7Oct62.CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation

of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (end. 111—15, CTU79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr-5 Nov62).


Chapter 7The Laotian Crisis, 1962

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, l6May—7Aug 1962, hereafter 3d MEU Special Report; CinCPac OperationsPlan 32—59 Phase II (Laos), hereafter OpPlan 32—59; WellerInterview; Croiat Intirview; MCC Items, May, Jun, Jul62;Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; Cooper, The Lost Crusade; paul F.Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao:Partners in The Struggle For Laos (Cambridge, Mass'.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff, NorthVietnam and The Pathet Lao; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, U.S. MarineActivities In Vietnam, 2954—1963,' (Vietnam Comment File),hereafter Simpson Comments; Foster Rhea Dulles, American PolicyToward Communist China: The Historical Record (New York:Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), hereafter Dulles, AmericanPolicy Toward Communist China; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares.

I MCC Items.' 16 May 62.2 Croirat Interview; J'Veller Interview.

PART IIITHE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963

Chapter 8The Marine Advisory Effort

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake; The Overthrow of NgoDinh Diem, May—November, 1963," Pentagon Papers, bk. 3,sec. IV.B.5; Gravel Edition Pentagon Papers, v. III; Shaplen,The Lost Revolution; Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. In Vietnam.

The Advisory Division and VNMC OperationsUnless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived

from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly HistoricalSummaries, 1963—1965, hereafter SMA, MACV HistSums; ColWesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Maj HarveyBradshaw, 'U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964"(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Noren Comments on BradshawMS; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt RobertWhitlow, 'U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954—1964'.(Vietnam Comment File), heriafter Noren Comments On WhitlowMS; Col Clarence G. Moody, Comments on Draft MS, CaptRobert Whitlow, ' US. Marine Activities Irs Vietnaip, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereaftr Moody Comments;LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, CaptRobert Whitlow, 'U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McWilliams Comments;LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on Draft MS, Capt RobertWhitelow, "U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964'(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Smith Comments; LtColJoseph N. Sn6ith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954—1964Project Interview Folder), hereafter Smith Interview; Col EdwinF. Black, USA, and Lt R. P. W. Murphy, USNR, 'The SouthVietnamese Navy," USNI Proceedings, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64)pp. 52—62, hereafter, Black and Murphy, "The South Viet-namese Navy"; Maj Alfred J. Croft, "A Special Gazette Report:Dateline, Vietnam,' Marine Corps Gazette v. 47, n. 10 (Oct63),p. 18, hereafter Croft, "Dateline, Vietnam''; Christenson,'Dateline"; Capt. James P. McWilliams, ' Pacify and Hold,"

Marine Corps Gar,ette, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafterMcWilliams, Pacify and Hold.

I Moody Comments; I'Veede Interview.McWilliams Comments.Smith Interview.

Noren Commenr. on Whitlow MS.

Chapter 9SHUFLY Operations

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62—310ct63; CTE 79.3.3.6ComdD, 310ct63—14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments onDraft MS, Bradshaw, "U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN,1964," (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ross Comments on

Bradshaw MS.I McCutcheon, Marine Aviation.''

Combat Support OperationsUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62—310ct63; CTE 79.3.3.6ComdD, 310ct63—14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports,26Apr—20May63, hereafter CTE 79.3.6 AAR; McCutcheon,'Marine Aviation"; MajGen Paul J. Fontana, Comments on

Drafe MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine Activities InVietnam, 1954—1964," (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterFontana Comments; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS,Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ross CommentsOn Whitlow MS; Ross Comments On Bradshaw MS; H. F. BrownComments,

2 CTE 79.3,3.6 ComdD, 6Nov—310ct63.Ibid.CTE 79.3 .3 .6 AAR, 19May63.

CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov—310ct63.o Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (end

5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Ju1—310ct63).Col A. D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing

Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (end 1, CTE 79.3.3.6ComdD, 18Ju1—310ct63).

o 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun—200ct63.Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS.

10 CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63—14Jan64.

The Situation in VietnamUnless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. II; Nighswonger,Rural Pacification, 1962—65; Fall, Two Viet-Nams; Cooper, TheLost Crusade; Department of State, Aggression from the North.

ii Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, 1962—65.

PART IVAN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964

Chapter 10Marines Meet the Challenge

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv,HQMC), hereafter Youngdale Interview; MajGen Carl A. Young-dale, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whit-low "U.S. Marine.Activities in Vietnam, 1954—64" (VietnamComment File), hereafter, Youngdale Comments; Westmoreland andSharp, Report On The War; Cooper, et al., The American ExperienceWith Pacification, 1962—65; ''Military Pressures Against NorthVietnam, July—Oct 1964,' Pentagon Papers, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2;Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. III; CinCPac CommandHistory, 1964, hereafter CinCPac ComdHist, 64; U.S. MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, here-after MACV ComdHist, 64; Nighswonger, Rural Pacification,

1962—65.Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, v. III, p. 501.

2 Ibid.Ibid., v. II, p. 471."Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul—Oct 1964,"

Pentagon Papers, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p.42.

NOTES

Redesignation and ReorganizationUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports,1964—65, hereafter SMA, MACV, AARs 64—65; Col William P.Nesbjt, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt RobertWhitlow, ''U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964''(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Nesbit comments On Whit/owMS; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on DraftMS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, 'U.S. Marine Corps Operations InRVN, 1964'' (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Nesbit Com-ments on Bradshaw MS; Noren Comments on Whit/ow MS; NormComments on Bradshaw MS; James C. Pickerel!, "Marine Advisor:Vietnam," Marine Corps Gasettc, v. 48, n. 4 (Apr64), hereafterPickerail, "Marine Advisor"; Damm Comments,

N:sbit Comments on Bradshaw MS.

The Vietnamese Marine BrigadeUnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived

from: SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training, RVN, Monthly Reports, Jan—Dee, 1964, hereafterOJT Monthly Repts, 64; Capt Philip 0. Brady, intvw by HistBr,G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv,HQMC), hereafter Brady Interview; Westmoreland and Sharp,Report On The War; Pickerel!, "Marine Advisor"; Naval AdvisoryGroup, MA.CV, Historical Review, 1964—65, hereafter NAVGP,MACV, HistRevw, 64-65.

Noren Comments on Whit/ow MS.Nesbit Comments on Whit/ow MS.

8NAVG] MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21.

Additional Marine Activities

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derivedfrom: LtCoL Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow,dtd 25Jan74 (1954—64 Project Interview Folder), hereafterBecker Interview; Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with CaptRobert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74 (1954—64 Project InterviewFolder), hereafter Ga//ma Interview; Director of Intelligence,HQMC, to Director, History and Museums Division, dtd31Jan74, Sub1: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations atTiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter"Summary of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain"; ColRaymond C. Damm intvw with Captain Robert H. \Vhitlow,dtd 19Jul73 (1954-64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter DammInterview; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64—65; CTE 79.3.3.6ComdD, lNov63—160ct64.

Damm Interview.NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, P 14.Smith Comments,

07 Col Warren P. Baker, itt to CG, 3dMarDiv, drd 3Apr64,Subj: Job Related Orientation Report.

13 CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations,

Chapter 11Spring a'nd Summer Fighting

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—160ct64; Col AndreGomez, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S.

173

Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954—64" (Vietnam CommentFile), hereafter Gome Comments; Col Robert A. Merchant,Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S. MarineActivities In Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File),hereafter Merchant Comments; Col John H. La Voy, Commentson Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S. Marine ActivitiesIn Vietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafterLa Voy Comments; Ross Comments on Whit/ow MS; LtGen HermanNickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt RobertWhitlow, ''U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964"(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Nicktrson Comments.

CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—160ct64.2 Ross Comments on Whit/ow MS.

Ibid.Ibid.

Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, beforethe House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964(Greene Papers Collection).

6 CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, lNov63—160ct64.La Voy Comments,

8 Ibid.Ibid.

'° CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—160ct64; Merchant Comments;La Voy Comments.

° CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—160ct64.

Chapter 12Fall and Winter Operations

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derivedfrom: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—160ct64; CTU 79.3.5ComdD, 170ct64—14Jan65; 1st MAW OpSurns, 9Ju164—70ct64;CinCPac CmdHist 64; Fontana Comments; BGen Joseph Koler,USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, "U.S.Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954—1964'' (Vietnam CommentFile), hereafter Koler Comments; Col Hardy Hay, Comments onDraft MS Capt Robert Whitlow, ''U.S. Marine Activities InVietnam, 1954—1964" (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter HayComments; Becker Comments; Merchant Comments; Nickerson Com-ments; Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, Outpost of Freedom (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, Outpost of Free-dom; Moore, Navy Chaplains.

CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—l60ct64; CG 1st MAWOpSums, 9Jul—70ct64.

2 CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, lNov63—l60ct64,Moore, Navy Chaplains, p. 92.MCC Items, 23Nov64.

CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 170ct64—14Jan65.6 Ibid.Ibid.

8 Ibid.

Chapter 13Prelude to Escalation

Westmoreland and Sharp, Report On The War, p. 95.2 Youngdale Interview.Gravel Edition, Penta&on Papers, v. III, p. 289.Westmoreland and Sharp, Report On The War, pp. 95, 97.Ibid., p. 98.

Appendix AUSMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954-1964

USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS

LtCol Victor J. Croizat Aug 1954—Jun 1956LtCol Willim N. Wilkes, Jr Jun 1956—Jun 1958LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr Jun 1958—Jun 1960LtCol CliffordJ. Robichaud,Jr Jun 1960—Aug 1961LrCol Robert E. Brown Aug 1961—Oct 1962LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr Oct 1962—Oct 1963LtCol Wesley C. Noren Ocr 1963—Sep 1964Col William P. Nesbit Sep 1964—

VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS

Ma Le Quang Trong 1 Oct 1954—17 Jun 1956Maj Phan Van Lieu 18 Jan 1956—22 Aug 1956Capt Bui Pho Chi 23 Aug 1956— 1 Oct 1956Maj Le Nhu Hung 2 Ocr 1956—23 May 1960LtCol Le Nguyen Khang 24May1960—15 Dcc 1963LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien 16 Dcc 1963— Feb 1964BGen Le Nguyen Khang Feb 1964—

SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS*

SHUFLY Commanders DatesCol John F. Carey 15 Apr 1962—31 Jul 1962Col Julius W. Ireland 1 Aug 1962— 5 Nov 1962LtCol Alton W. McCully 6 Nov 1962—28 Jan 1963LtCol Harold F. Brown 29 Jan 1963—17 Jul 1963Col Andre 1). Gomez l8Jul 1963—14 Jan 1964Col Robert A. Merchant l6Jan 1964— 9Jul 1964Col Hardy Hay lOjul 1964—16 Oct 1964Col John HI. King, Jr 17 Oct 1964—

Squadron Commanders Squadron DatesLrCol ArchieJ. Clapp HMM—362 15 Apr 1962—31 Jul 1962LtCol Robert L. Rathbun HMM—163 1 Aug 1962—11 jan 1963LtCol Reinhardt Leu HMM—162 12 Jan 1963— 7 Jun 1963LtCol Frank A. Shook HMM—261 8Jun 1963— 1 Oct 1963LtCol Thomas J. Ross HMM—361 2 Oct 1963—31 Jan 1964LtCol John H. LaVoy HMM—364 1 Feb 1964—21 Jun 1964LtCol Oliver W. Curtis HMM—162 17 Jun 1964— 7 Oct 1964LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr HMM—365 8 Oct 1964—

Sub Unit Commanders DatesLtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr 15 Apr 1962— 3 Aug 1962LtCol Ralph R. Davis 4 Aug 1962—15 Jan 1963LrCol George H. Linncrneier l6Jan 1963— 4Jul 1963LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 5 Jul 1963— 6 Feb 1964LtCol Samuel G. Beal 7 Feb 1964—26 Jun 1964Maj Marion R. Green 27 Jun 1964—14 Dec 1964LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 15 Dec 1964—

*SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April 1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6 November1962 through 31 December 1964.

175

Appendix BAwards and Decorations, Vietnam,

through 1964*

Navy CrossMaj Donald E. Koelper ' 16 Feb 1964SSgt John C. Thompson 30 Apr 1964

Navy Distinguished Service MedalMajGen Richard G. Weede 2 Feb 1962—May 1964MajGen Carl A. Youngdale 25 Jan 1964—20 Jul 1965

Silver Star MedalMa; John R. Braddon 27 Apr 1964lstLt Phillip 0. Brady 31 Dcc 1964Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr 31 Dec 1964Capt Joseph N. Smith 27 Oct 1963—25 Apr 1964

Capt Richard B. Taylor 25 Nov 1962—31 Oct 1963

Legion of MeritCol Earl E. Anderson 8 Jul 1963—15 May 1964

LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 2Ju1 1963—l4Jan 1964Cal John F. Carey 4 9 Apr 1962—31 Jul 1962

LtCol Archiej. Clapp 5 15 Apr 1962—31 Jul 1962

Col Andre D. Gomcz 19 Jul 1963—14 Jan 1964

Cal John H. King, Jr 16 Oct 1964—15 May 1965LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr 7 Oct 1964—18 Feb 1965LtCol John H. La Voy 1 Feb 1964—22Jun 1964Cot Robtrt A. Merchant 2 Jan 1964—10 Jul 1964

LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr 18 Jan 1962—24 Oct 1963Col Wesley C. Noren 13 Oct 1963—13 Sep 1964LtCol Thomas J. Ross 1 Oct 1963—3 1 Jan 1964Col Roy H. Thompson 27 Feb 1962—16 Jun 1964Cot Charles E. Warren 8 Feb 1962— 9 Jul 1964

Col Edwin 13. Wheeler 1 Aug 1964—23 Aug 1965

Distinguished Flying CrossMaj Albert N. Allen 27 Apr 1964Capt William J. Burrows 27 Apr 1964Capt Charles E. Cannon 27 Apr 1964Capt William Cunningham 27 Apr 1964lstLt Ronald V. Debrincat 27 Açr 1964Capt George H. Dunn II 27 Apr 1964Capt George H. Dunn II 30 Apr 1964Capt Robert K. Ervi 31 Dec 1963lstLt Melvin T. Graves 27 Apr 1964Capt Theodore A. Heister 1 Aug 1963

*Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list.First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam.

2 First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for Vietnam.First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam.

First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for Vietnam.

176

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS, VIETNAM THROUGH 1964 177

Distinguished Flying Cross—ContinuedlstLt Donald A. Hodgen 10 Mar 1963—11 Mar 1963LtCol John H. La Voy 27 Apr 1964Capt Peter A. Love 27 Apr 1964WO Dennis T. McKee 27 Apr 1964lstLt Edward P. Moore 27 Apr 1964CWO Robert F. Patton 5 Jun 1964lstLt Thonias H. Peters 9 Mar 1963—10 Mar 1963Capt Eugene W. Rawlins 27 Apr 1964Capt Howard G. Taylor 27 Apr 1964lstLt Charles R. Upshaw 27 Apr 1964Capt William W. IVamel, Jr 27 Apr 1964Capt Willizm IV. Wamel, Jr 30 Apr 1964Maj Goodell P. Warren 27 Apr 1964lstLt Charles C. Wood, Jr 27 Apr 1964Capt GrantT. Yule 27 Apr 1964

Bronze Star MedalSSgt John Baran 12 Dec 1964LtCol Samuel G. Beal 3 Feb 1964— 1 Jul 1964SSgt Clifford J. Beaver 30 Dec 1964—31 Dec 1964LtCol George A. Brigham 3 Apr 1964— 3Ju1 1964SSgt Marvin I. Bryant 12 Oct 1964— 8 Mar 1965Cpl Clarence L. Chester 30 Jun 1964Capt Don IL. Christensen 8 28 Sep 1962—31 Jul 19632dLt Francis R. Ciceone 16 Oct 1964SSgt James A. Coryer 30 Jun 1964Maj AlfredJ. Croft 1 Feb 1962— 7 Feb 1964LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 17 Jun 1964—23 Nov 1964LtCol Raymond C. Damm lOMay 1964— 1 Dec 1964Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr 11 Apr 1964—15 Aug 1964Capt James J. Harp 10 Mar 1963—11 Mar 1963Cpl Cary F. janulewicz 9 Dec 1964lstLt Weston L. Johnson 10 Nov 19642dLt James P. Kelliher 31 Dec 1964lstLt Donald H. Larson 4 Apr 1964— 1 Feb 1965GySgt Richard L. Latimer 9 Dec 1964Capt John P. Monahan 21 Mar 1964—28 Feb 1965Capt James P. McWilliams 2 May 1963 9 Jun 1964GySgt Charles D. Peck 14 Apr 1963—22 Apr 1964LCpl James N. Phinney 10 Apr 1964LCpI Waltcr L. Rupp 24 Mar 1964GySgt Edmund R. Sewell 20 Sep 1964SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens Dcc 1962— Dec 1964Capt Edward H. Walsh 28 Sep 1964— 1 May 1964Maj Charles K. Whitfield 31 Jan 1964—20 Jan 1965Capt Frank Zimolzak 27 Apr 1962—25 May 1963

67 First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC pcrsonnel in Vietnam.One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.

211—623 0 — 77 — 13

Appendix CGlossary of Acronyms

AHOC Aviatios Headquarters Operations MAW Marine Aircraft WingCenter MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam MEU Marine Expeditionary UnitASOC Air Support Operations Center MR Military RegionBLT Battalion Landing Team NLF National Liberation FrontCG Civil Guard OJT On-The-Job Training (Program)ChMAAG Chief, Military Assistance Advisory PAVN Peoples Army of Vietnam

Group PF Popular ForcesCIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group RF Regional ForcesCinCPac Commander in Chief, Pacific RLT Regimental Landing TeamCIP Counter Insurgency Plan RSSZ Rung Sat Special ZoneComUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance RVN Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

Command, Vietnam RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed ForcesCOSVN Central Office for South Vietnam SAR Search and RescueCTZ Corps Tactical Zone SDC Self Defense CorpsDMZ Demilitarized Zone SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty OrganizationDRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam SLF Special Landing Force

(North Vietnam) TACAN Tactical Air Navigation (system)FAC Forward Air Controller TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel DispensingFEC French Expeditionary Corps System

FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific TERM Temporary Equipment RecoveryGCA Ground Controlled Approach (system) MissionGVN Government of Vietnam (South TRIM Training Relations Instruction Mission

Vietnam) USMAAG (MAAG) U.S. Military As'sistance AdvisoryHMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron GroupICC International Control Commission USMACThai U.S. Military Assistance Command,JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff ThailandJGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) USOM U.S. Operations MissionJRO Job Related Orientation (Program) VC Viet CongJTF Joint Task Force VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler TransportLSG Logistics Support Group SquadronMABS Marine Air Base Squadron VNA Vietnamese National ArmyMAG Marine Aircraft Group VNAF Vietnamese Air ForceMATCU Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps

178

Appendix DChronology

1954

7 May—French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to VietMinh.

16 Jun—Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored emperor, Bao Dai.

20 Jul—French and Viet Minh representatives sign Genevacease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southernzones pending reunification elections to be held in 1956.

2 Aug—LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vice-nam for duty with USMAAG.

8 Sep—Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations.Within weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformedinto the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

13 Oct—Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-manMarine Corps (VNMC).

1955

Feb—LtCol Croizae becomes first advisor to VNMC.Apr—Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government.

Marine Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta.31 May—Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine

Officer of VNMC.Sep—Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant,

are assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with theVNMC.

23 Oct—Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamesevote during a national referendum in which he was opposedby Bao Dai.

26 Oct—Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnamand becomes the republic's first president.

1956

18 Jan—Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer ofVNMC.

Feb—Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at NhaTrang. VNMC reorganized into two landing battalions, is

4.2-inch mortar company, and a small headquarters.Jun—LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as

Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.Jul—Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern

zones passes without serious incident.Aug—Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of

VNMC.Oct—Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of

VNMC.Nov—LtGcn Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John

ODaniel as Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.

1958

Jun—LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes asSenior Marine Advisor to VNMC.

1959

May—ist VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations againstViet Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Bat-talion conducts similar operation against Communist guer-rillas in Vinh Bjnh Province.

1 Jun—The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of2,276 officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formedand the battalions are reorganized into four infantry com-panies.

1960

Jun—LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinsonas Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.

Sep—LtGcn Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williamsas Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.

11 Nov—An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and twoMarine companies to overthrow the Diem Government.

20 Dec—The Communist "National Front for Liberation ofSouth Vietnam" was formed.

1961

May—On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC juniorofficers and staff noncommissioned officers is initiated.Thereafter, 20 Marines per month enter Vietnam to observeoperations.

16 May—A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotiansituation convenes at Geneva.

Jul—VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of afourth infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer batteryraises the strength of the VNMC to 3,321.

Aug—LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud asSenior Marine Advisor to VNMC.

Aug—VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundatedU Mirth Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula.

Nov—General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), PresidentKennedy's special military advisor, visits South Vietnam onfact-finding mission.

11 Dec—The first direct support contingent of U.S. militaryforces arrives in Vieenam—400 Army Troops and twohelicopter companies.

Dec—USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine AdvisoryDivision.

1962

1 Jan—VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesig-nated the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibioussupport battalion is formed.

3 Jan—First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in SouthVietnam to support government forces.

Jan—Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives inVietnam for duty with Army communications unit.

20 Jan—CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompanytheir Vietnamese units into combat.

179


3 Feb—President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation ofthe Strategic Hamlet Program.

8 Feb—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV)activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as com-mander. MajGen Richard G. Wecde, USMC, becomesMACV's first chief of staff.

7 Feb—Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe thePresidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure PressdentDiem.

9 Apr—The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5(SHUFLY), commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive atSoc Trang, Republic of Vietnam.

15 Apr—HMM—362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transporthelicopter squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin opera-tions in support of government forces.

22 Apr—HMM—362 helicopters fly their first combat supportmissions in Vietnam.

9 May—Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arsfss fire duringlanding on Ca Man Peninsula.

18 May—The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) beganmoving into positioo at Udoro, Thailand, in response tothe deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was partof Joiot Task Force 116, organized for use in the mountingcrisis.

20 May—BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3dMEU.

18 Jun—Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marinehelicopters operating from Soc Trang.

25 Jun—HMM—162 replaces HMM—261 at Udorn as 3d MEW(MEB) helicopter element.

1 Jul—First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udnrn,Thailand, as a display of good faith.

23 Jul—An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos issigned by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China,North Vietnam, and 10 other nations at Geneva.

30 Jul—Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLYcommander.

31 Jul—Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udnrn,Thailand.

1 Aug—HMM--163 replaces HMM—362 as operational squadronassigned to SHUFLY.

Aug—First machine guns mounted on Marine helicoptersoperating in Vietnam.

4 Sep—Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nangin I Corps l'aetseal Zone.

18 Sep—HMM—163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps.20 Sep—All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang.Oct—LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCnl Brown as Senior

Marine Advisor to VNMC.6 Oct—Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in

HUS crash near Tam Ky.7 Nnv—HMM—163 executes first tiger flight reaction force

mission in I Corps.Nov—All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated.6 Nov—Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Ele-

ment 79.3.3.6.6 Nov—LrCnl Alrnn W. MeCully assumes command of SHUFLY.Dee—Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnams

Corps Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a CapitalNlilitary District.

1963

11 Jan—HMM—162 replaces HMM—163 as SHUFLY's opera-tional squadron.

19 Jan—HMM—162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Viet-nam.

10—13 Mar—HMM—162 helicopters participate in search andrescue attempts for U.S. Army OV—1 Mohawk and crew.Two Marine helicopters crash in high mountains nf nnrthernII Cnrps.

13 Apr—Marine transport helicopters conduct first operationwith U.S. Army UH—1B armed helicopters.

Apr—Organizatinn of Marine Advisory Division modifiedslightly.

1 May—Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces foroperation in Do Xa base area.

8 Jun—HMM—261 replaces HMM—162 as SHUFLY's operationalsquadrnn.

15—16 Aug—HMM—261 helilifts 2d ARVN Divisinn units fromfield to culminate operation LAM SON XII.

21 Aug—Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodasthroughout South Vietnam.

Sep—LtCnl Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Mondy as SeniorMarine Advisor to VNMC.

2 Oet—HMM—361 replaces HMM—261 as SHUFLY's operationalsquadron.

Oet—Prnvisional Marine Regiment ennduees operation PHI—HOA 5 in Gia Dinh Province.

1 Nov—Diem government overthrown by enup of militaryleaders. Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated.

14 Nov—Provisional Marine Regiment launches OperationDAI—PHONG 28 and 29 in 111 Corps Tactical Zone.

25 Nnv—2d VNMC Battalinn participates in Operation DAI—PHONG 30.

16 Dee—LtCnl Khang relieved as Commandant nf VietnameseMarine Corps. Replaced by LtCnl Nguyen Ba Len.

1964

1 Jan—General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General DavidShoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.

Jan—General Greene visits Vietnam.15 Jan—BGen Carl A. Ynungdale, USMC, becomes MACV

Assistant Chief nf Staff for Intelligence (J—2).1 Feb—HMM—364 replaets HMM—361 as SHUFLY's operational

squadron.Feb—Cnl Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol

Lien as Commandant of VNMC.Mar—LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts

as Commanding General, FMFPae.27 Apr—HMM—364 participates in Optration SURE WIND 202

in northern II Corps.May—MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief nf Staff.15 May—USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division re-

named Marine Advisory Unit and placed under NavalAdvisory Group, MACV.

20 May—Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang.7 Jun—Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing

south of Da Nang.13 Jun—Advisnry Team One mnvts to Tiger Tnnth Mountain

in northwestern I Corps.19 Jun—HMM—364 turn over helienpters and maintenance

equipment to VNAF 217th Squadron.21 Jun—HMM—162 replaces HMM—364 as SHUFLY's operational

squadron.Jul—Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu

Due. VNMC expanded with the ertatinn of a fifth infantrybattalion.

7 Jul—HMM—162 participates in relief of Nam Dong SpecialForces Camp.

CHRONOLOGY 181

1964—Continued 14 Sep •-SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe2—5 Aug—North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash tropical storm.

in Tonkin Gulf. Sep -Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded.6 Aug— -U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution, -S Oct HMM—365 replaces HMM 364 as SHUFLY's operational11 Aug—President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf squadron.

Resolution. Oct Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam19 Aug- Advisory Team One nsoves to Bach Ma and continues Ranh Bay in southern II Corps.

operations. 31 Dec--Vice Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon.4 Sep-—-Col \Villiam P. Nesbit replaces Col Norcn as SeniorMarine Advisor to VNMC. 31 Dcc 4th \TNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps.

13 Sep—Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam.

Appendix EList of Reviewers

General Officers

Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMCGen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.)LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)LrGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.)LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.)LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, (Ret.)MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.)MajGen CharlesJ. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.)MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC, (Ret.)MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC

Colonels

Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.)Col John T. Breckinridgc, USMCCol Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.)Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.)Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.)Col Alfred J. Croft, USMCCol VictorJ. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)Col Oliver W. Curtis. USMC (Ret.)Col Raymond C. Damm, USMCCol Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.)Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.)Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.)Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.)Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.)Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.)

Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.)Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMCCol \Villiam P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.)Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.)Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Rct.)Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.)Col CliffordJ. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.)Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant Colonels

LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.)LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.)LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMCLtCol George H. Linnemeicr, USMC (Ret.)LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMCLtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC

CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps HistoryCol Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.) *Ma;Gcn Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.) *Dr. Gordon A. CraigDr. Philip K. LundebergMr. Robert L. SherrodMajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.) *

Others

Center of Military History, Department of the ArmyDr. Philip A. CrowlCapt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Rtt.)Naval Historical Division, Department of the NavyOffice of Air Force History, Department of the Air Forte

*Cited previously.

183

Index

Adams, LtCol Harold W., 89—90, 92—94Africa, 11Agroville Program, 45Aircraft

TypesAD-6. See Al-HAl—H (Skyraider), 71, 116, 137, 149, 152—154, 158—159A—4C, (Skyhawk), 89, 92B—26, 109, 117—118B—57, 166—167

F4U (Corsair), 71F—lOU (Super Sabre), 90C—117 (Skytrain), 60—61, 84, 160C—124 (Globemaster), 71C—l23 (Provider), 46, 90, 103, 139, 141CH—21 (Shawnee), 58, 103, 107CV—2 (Caribou), 158GV-1. See KC-130H—21. See CH—21

HUS-:l. See UH—34D

KC—130 (Hercules), 61, 70, 73, 89-90, 93—94, 112—111, 142,147, 156

0—lB (Bird Dog), 60, 67—69, 73, 82, 84, 92, 107, 115—118,144—145, 149, 154, 157—159, 161

OE-1. See 0-lBOV—1 (Mohawk), 114R4D. See C—117

T—28 (Trojans), 46, 67, 71, 116—118, 120, 149U—lU (Super Courier), 118, 149, 152, 158UH—1B (Iroquois), 107, 109, 115—120, 139, 147—149, 151—1 52,

154, 157—159, 164—165

UH—34D, 57—58, 65, 71, 84, 89, 92—93, 103, 105, 111, 113—121,139, 144—146, 149, 151—161, 164—165

UH—37 (Mojave), 149Air Force, 46, 62, 71, 76, 82, 112, 114—115, 117, 149, 152, 158—

159, 167Air Force Command and Staff College, 120Air Support Operations Center, 80, 82, 117—119, 149, 152Allied Training Operations Mission, 16Alsop, Maj William F., 164Amphibious Ready Group 59, 88—90Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), 61—62Andansan Sea, 3Anderson, Col Earl E., 47, 131, 146Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., 83An Diem, 144, 147, 158Annarn, 3, 9, 11—12, 78Annamesc Coast, 8, 162Annaniitc Mountains, 6, 80, 103, 139Anti-Conimunist Denunciation Campaign, 27An Xuyen Province, 31, 49, 71, 133Armed Services Committee, 146

Army, 23, 26, 42, 46, 62, 80, 83, 117, 136, 152, 154, 157—158Units

27th Infantry Brigade, 88, 9052d Aviation Battalion, 155145th A'iation Battalion, 10733d Helicopter Company, 57, 5957th Helicopter Company, 65, 70—7168th Aviation Company, 11581st Helicopter Company, 58—5993d Helicopter Company, 58, 73—74704th Counterintelligence Unit, 1413d Radio Research Unit, 46Paratroopers, 70Special Forces, 80, 111, 114, 151, 155, 157

Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, 139Army Communications Station, Pleiku, 139Army Field Hospital, Nba Trang, 148, 157, 159Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, 41, 47A Shau Valley, 149Asia, 12Associated States of Indochina, 11Atsugi, Japan, 61Australia, 14, 165Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, 117

Bach Phoung Xl, 103, 105, 116Baker, Col \Varrcn P., 143Bangkok, Thailand, 88—89, 93, 143Ban Me Thout, 9, 49Bassac River, 65Ba Xuyen Province, 61, 67Beal, LtCol Samuel G., 146, 156Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., 137Becker, Raymond A., 141Beirut, Lebanon, 146Bell Helicopter Company, 115Ben Hai River, 12Ben Tre, 70Bien Hoa, 105, 107, 166Binh Dinh Province, 129Binh Duong Province, 45, 107Binh Gia, 136—138, 143, 166Binh Thuan Province, 49, 51Binh Xuyen, 13, 18—20, 26Braddon, Maj John R., 153Brady, Lt Philip 0., 137—138Breckinridge, Capt James T., 19—20, 23Brigham, LtCol George, 152British Advisory Mission, 45Bronars, Maj Edward J., 142Bronze Star, 110, 148Brown, LtCol Harold F., 111—112Brown, LtCol Robert E., 36, 48—49, 53Buddhist, 8, 99Burma, 3, 93

185


Cai Ngai, 67California, 59, 70Ca Man, 40, 65, 67, 69—71Ca Mau Peninsula, 11, 36, 62, 101Cambodia, 3, 8—9, 11—12, 14, 30, 67, 93, 109Cambodian Border, 107Campbell, Cpl Charity M., 115Cam Ranh Bay, 22, 31, 141Canada, 12, 93Can Tho, 9, 62, 65Cao Dai, 8, 13, 18—19Cape St. Jacques, 36Capital Military District, 84, 105, 132Carey, Col John F., 60—61, 63,69—71,73Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., 112, 144, 146Catholicism, 8, 12—13, 99Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party,

28Central Highlands, 6, 9, 32, 49, 53, 105, 129, 167Central Office for South Vietnam, 44—45Chai Doc, 65Chams, 6Chien Tang ("Struggle for Victory") Plan, 129Chi, Capt Bui Pho, 19, 23China, 3, 11—13, 96, 93, 161Chinese, 6, 8Chinese Nationalist Forces, 9, 11CHINH BIEN, 159Cholon District, 13Christanity, 3, 8Christensen, Capt Don R., 49, 101, 103, 110Civil Guard, 27—28, 30—32, 34, 45, 67, 129Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 80, 139, 144, 157Clapp, LrCoi ArchieJ., 60-62, 65, 67, 69—70, 156Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, 90Cochinchina, 3, 8, 11Cold War, 86Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, 58Collins, GenJ. Lawton, 15Command and Staff Training Course, 41—42Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 94, 144, 155Condon, MajGen John P., 59—61, 73, 88Confucianism, 8Conway, MajGenJ. F., 88Cook, Capt Donald G., 138Corps Tactical Zones

I Corps, 46, 58, 63, 73, 76, 78—80, 82—85, 103, 111, 113—114,116—118, 120, 127, 132, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148—149, 152, 154—162, 164—165

II Corps, 46, 49, 58, 63, 79—80, 84, 102—103, 111, 114, 129, 132,141, 152, 154—155, 160, 167

III Corps, 58—59, 61—63, 67, 69, 71, 73—74, 107, 109, 129, 132,136

IV Corps, 84, 132Counter-Insurgency Plan, 29-30Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, 41Croft, Maj Alfred J., 49, 51, 103Croizat, LtCoi VictorJ., 16, 18—20, 22—23, 32, 90, 132Cronin, LtCol AngusJ., 93Cross of Valor, 156Cua Viet, 78Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, 89Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., 156—159, 161—162Cushman, MajGen Robert E., 41—42Cuu Long, 36Cuu Long Navy Yard, 31—32

Dai, Emperor Bao, 8, 11—13, 19DAI-PHONG 28, 107DAI—PHONG 29, 107DAI-PHONG 30, 107, 109DAI-PHONG 31, 109Dak To, 155Damm, Maj Raymond C., 131, 142, 166Da Nang, 9, 32, 58, 71, 73—76, 78—80, 83—85, 103, 111—118,

120—121, 123, 129, 139, 141—149, 154—162, 164—165, 167Da Nang Harbor, 78, 111Da Nang River, 78DA NANG SIX, 164Davis, Capt Dale N., 31Davis, LtCol Ralph R., 71, 111Davis, BGen Raymond G., 129Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, 93Dees, LtCol Harry C., 71Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, 17, 19Demilitarized Zone, 13, 27—29, 76, 78, 111Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Sec North VietnamDepartment of Defense, 42, 47, 61, 76, 84, 144Department of State, 15, 19, 28Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., 143Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 8, 12—16, 18—20, 22—23, 26—32, 35—36

42, 45, 53, 80, 99—100, 105, 121—122, 127, 146Dien Bien Phu, 12, 71Distinguished Flying Cross, 59, 111, 120, 156Distinguished Service Medal, 131Don, MajGen Tran Van, 79—80Dong Bach Ma, 141Dong Ha, 9, 78Dong Nai boats, 101Donlon, Capt Roger H. C., 157—158Do Xa Base Area, 103, 105, 115—116, 121, 152, 155Dulies, Secretary of State John Foster, 14

Eagle Flight, 69—70, 83Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 14—15, 29Eldridge, LtCol William W., 60—61, 71Eller, Capt Franklin P:, 137—138Ely, Gen Paul, 15—16Europe, 11

Father-For-A-Day Program, 85Felt, Adm Harry D., 47, 57-58, 86, 88, 90FLAMING DART, 167Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 40, 42, 58, 70, 76, 83, 90, 94, 141,

143, 147, 165. Sec Also Marine Corps, FMF UnitsFontana, MajGcn Paul J., 156, 160Fort Ord, California, 57, 59Foward Air Controller, 72, 107, 109France, 8, 9, 11—14, 19, 22, 93French Expeditionary Corps, 9, 11—16French High Command, 16, 22, 24French-Indochina, 9, 11, 15French-Indochina War, 13—14, 16, 22—24, 36, 48, 103French Navy, 16French Union, 11Futema, Okinawa, 61

General Commission for Refugees, 16Geneva Conference, 12—16, 25, 27, 86, 88, 93—94, 121, 132German Army, 70Gia Dinh Province, 105, 132Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, 11—12Gi Lang, 152, 154Go Cong, 132—133

INDEX 187

88, 111—114, 144, 146,

Gomez, Col Andre D., 112, 117, 119—120, 144, 146Gott, Capt Michael J., 37Gray, Maj Alfred M., 139, 141, 156, 158Great Britain, 9, 12, 14, 93Green, Maj Marion R., 156Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., 142, 145—146Greer, PFC Robert L., 155—156Griffin, Lt Gerald, 83Ground Control Approach, 60Guadalcanal, 22, 35Gulf of Siam, 3, 88Gulf of Torikin, 6, 78, 128—129, 158, 166—167

Haiphong, 16Hai Van Peninsula, 78, 83Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., 83Hanoi, 11—12, 291-larkins, Gm Paul D., 46—47, 57—59, 61—62, 73, 88, 99, 127, 146Hau Nghia Province, 107Hawaii, 47, 59, 90, 141—142, 146Hay, Col Hardy, 158, 160—161Heim, Lt Robert P., 162Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, 107, 109Hoa Hao, 8, 13, 18—19Hoa My, 83Ho Chi Minh. Sec Minh, Ho ChiHo Chi Minh Trail, 80Hoi An, 9, 78Hoi Dung Sam, 107, 109Honolulu Conference, 46Hop Tac Program, 129, 132, 136Hudson, LeCol Robert S., 93Hue, 9, 12, 16, 78—79, 82, 99, 113, 119Hughes, Capt Virgil R., 116Hugo, Victor, 8Hung, Ma Le Nhu, 23, 31, 35

India, 93Indian Ocean, 3, 12Indochina, 3, 11—12, 16, 35, 62, 166Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 146Infantry Unit Training Course, 41interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, 45. See Also

Strategic Hamlet ProgramInternational Control Commission, 12, 30. See Also Canada, India,

and PolandInterzone 'V, 44Ireland, Col Julius W., 71, 73, 75—76, 79, 83, 85, 112Irwin, Capt William R., 141Iwo Jima, 62

Japan, 8—9, 11, 62, 71Jeep, M—442 "Mighty Mite," 112Job Related Orientation Program, 143Johnson, President Lyndon B., 127, 166—167Johore, Malaya, 41Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51, 53, 57, 59, 88, 127, 142, 155Joint General Staff, 20, 22, 31—32, 35—36, 40, 82, 84, 100, 102,

109, 111, 132, 149Joint Operations Center, 62—63, 82Joint Operations Evaluation Group, 47Joint Task Force 116, 86, 88—90. See Also Marine Corps, FMF UnitsJoint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, 88, 90Jones, Capt Robert C., 100Jungle Warfare School, 41

Kelliher, Lt James p., 137Kennedy, President John F., 30, 36, 42—44, 57, 86, 88, 93, 127Kham Due, 159, 161Khang, BGtn Le Nguyen, 35—36, 49, 53, 100—103, 105, 109—110,

132, 138Khanh, MaGen Nguyen, 103, 127, 129, 132Ke Sanh, 139, 141, 155—156, 158Khmers, 6Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, 30Kien Giang Province, 18King, Col John H., Jr., 161—164Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., 161—162, 165Kontum, 9, 79, 103Kontum Provinee, 103, 155, 167Korat, Thailand, 88, 90Korean War, 15, 35, 47—48, 59, 70, 111, 116, 120, 131, 146, 156, 161Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Gao, 156

LAM SON XII, 117LAM SON 115, 149Laos, 3, 9, 11—12, 14, 29—30, 80, 86, 88, 92—94, 139, 155, 166Laotian Border, 78, 80, 117—119, 121, 147, 149, 157, 159La Voy, LtCol John H., 146—147, 149, 151—152, 155—156Legion of Merit, 59, 158Leo, LtCol Reinhardr, 93, 111, 113, 115—116Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, 110, 132Lieu, Maj Pham Van, 20Linnemeier, LtCol George H., 111—112LOCKJAW, 65Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 127Logistics Support Group, Thailand, 93Long An, 133Long An Province, 132Long Tao River, 142Loyko, GSgt William A., 49

Malaya, See MalaysiaMalaysia, 3, 45Mang Buc, 114Manila Pact, 14Mansfield, LCp1 James 1., 83Mao Tse-tung, 11Marine Corps, 22—25, 34—35, 40—41, 46—48, 53, 57—58, 65, 73—74,

82, 85, 90, 95, 100, 103, 107, 110—111, 116—117, 121, 123,136—139, 142, 156

FMF Air Units:1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 59—61, 70, 83, 88, 129, 156, 160—

161, 1653d Marine Aircraft Wing, 71, 70Task Unit 79.3.5. See SHUFLYTask Element 79.3.3.6. See SHUFLYMAG—16, 58, 62, 70, 85, 158, 161ProvMAG, 89—90, 92MACS-2, 89MABS—12, 89MABS—16, 60—63, 69—71, 73, 75—76,

148, 155—156, 160VMA—211, 89VMA—324, 71VMA—332, 89, 93VMB—443, 146nVMGR—152, 61, 116, 156VMGR-352, 61VMO—2, 68HMM—161, 161HMM—162, 93, 111, 113, 115—116, 156—162HMM—163, 70—73, 75, 80, 83, 111, 113, 116

188 TI4E ADVISORY AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA, 1954—1964

Marine Corps—ContinuedFMF Air Units—Continued

HMM—161, 61, 89—90, 93, 117—120HMM—361, 120—121, 144, 146HMM—362, 60—63, 65, 67—71HMM—364, 146—147, 149, 151—142, 155—156HMM—365, 161—162, 164—165MATCU—68, 60, 62Task Element 79.3.5.2, 60 See also MABS—16

FMF Ground Units1st Marine Division, 1613d Marine Division, 40—41, 86, 90, 100, 110, 112, 129, 136—

138, 142, 147—1584th Marine Division, 1463d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 88, 90, 92—939th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 129, 1675th Marines, 473d Marine Expeditionary Unit, 93—95, 113Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, 131, 143

Infantry Battalions1/9, 147, 1602/9, 1643/9, 89, 93—94

Infantry CompaniesG/2/3, 139, 141K/3/3, 141E/2/9, 161L/3/9, 164Advisory Team One, 139, 141, 155—156, 1581st Radio Company, 46, 139, 141Signal Engineering Survey Unit, 139. See Also 1st Radio

CompanySecurity Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, 164

Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, 70Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, 61Marine Corps Amphibious Warfate School, Quantico, 16, 18,

23, 24, 35Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, 47Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, 100, 136McCully, LtCol Alton W., 71, 84, 111—112McGarr, LtGen Lionel C., 29, 36McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 43, 46, 122, 127, 142McWilliams, Capt James P., 107Medal of Honor, 51, 158Mekong Delta, 3, 6, 8—9, 16, 18—19, 28, 32, 36, 44—45, 57—59,

61—62, 67, 69, 73—75, 78, 80, 82, 84—85, 113, 116, 121, 132Mekong River, 6, 8, 88Merchant, Col Robert A., 146—149, 152, 154—158Mickey, Col Ross S., 89, 93Middle East, 3, 146Midway, 60Military Assistance Program, 30Military Region 5, 45, 103Military Region 9, 45Minh, MajGcn Duong Van, 99Minh, Ho Chi, 11, 29"Minute of Understanding,' 15Missouri (BB—63), 9M—108 Wrecker, 136

Monkey Mountain, 141Monroe, Lt Anthony A., 161Montagnards, 6, 103, 111, 157Montgomery, LtCol William, 149Moody, LtCoi Clarence G., 48—49, 100—103, 105, 132My Tho, 62, 65, 107

NAMBO Interzone, 44Nam Dong, 155, 157—159Nam Tha, 88National Intelligence Estimate, 29National Liberation Front, 29, 44, 45National War College, 161Navy, 37, 48, 71, 90, 128Navy Cross, 60, 48, 155Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, 93, 112New Life Hamlets. See Hop Tac ProgramNewport, Rhode Island, 131New Zealand, 14Nesbit, Col William P., 131—133, 143Nghiem, BGen LeVan, 61—62, 73Nha Trang, 16, 18—19, 22, 31, 114, 157, 160, 162Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 45—46, 99NIGHTINGALE, 65Nipper, LCpI David, 162Nong Son, 79Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, 90, 92—93Noren, LtCol Wesley C., 105, 107, 110, 131, 132Normandy, France, 70Northern Training Area, Okinawa, 41North Korea, 11, 13, 15North Vietnam, 3, 9, 11—12, 16, 26, 28—29, 44, 80, 86, 93—94, 128,

155, 166—167North Vietnamese, 27, 29, 30, 88, 103, 121, 129North Vietnamese Army

Units32d Regiment, 167101st Regiment, 167

Norton, H. G. 0., 83Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, 86

O'Daniel, LtGen John M., 15—16, 22Olmen, LtJohn D., 115Okinawa, 41, 47, 58, 61—62, 70—71, 74, 76, 85—86, 89—90, 93,

112—113, 136, 141—144, 146, 156, 161On-The-Job Training Program, 40, 42, 136—137, 142—143Otlowski, Lt.Raymond J., 139, 141Oum, Prince Boun, 86

Pacific Ocean, 3Pacifier, See Eagle FlightPakistan, 14Paris, France, 138Parker, Capt Evan L., 49

Passage to Freedom," 16Pathet Lao, 29, 86, 88Patton, LtCol Harvey M., 89Pendell, Sgtjerald W., 83People-to-People Program, 71, 74, 85, 92—93People's Army of Vietnam, 13, 80Peoples Republic of China. See ChinaPerfume River, 78Phan Rang, 6Phan Thiet, 51PHI-HOA 5, 105Philippines, 12, 14, 59, 61, 89—90, 93, 110, 132Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 36, 88, 93Phu Bai, 139Phouc Thuan Province, 30Phouc Thy Province, 136Phouc Vin, 30Plain of Jars, 86Plain of Reeds, 70Plateau Gi, 103Pleiku, 9, 32, 46, 103, 129, 139, 152, 167

INDEX 189

Point Defiance (LSD—31), 90Poland, 12, 93Popular Forces, 129Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., 67, 73—74Princeton (CV—37) (LPH—5), 61—62, 162Purple Heart Medal, 110

Radar, counter-mortar, 164Radios, 61, 68, 149Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., 70—74, 84, 111, 113Red River Delta, 3, 11, 16Regional Forces, 129Republic of Korea. See South KoreaRepublic of Vietnam. See South VictoamRichardson, LtGen John L., 88, 90, 93—94Roberts, MajGen Carson A., 57—58, 70Robichaud, LtCol CliffordJ., 35—36Roe, 161ROLLING THUNDER, 167Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 23Ross, LtCol Thomas J., 120, 144—146Route 1, 9, 80, 141Route 9, 9, 80, 139Route 19, 9Royal Marsnes, 48Royal Thai Regiment, 88Rung Sat, 18—19Rung Sat Special Zone, 142Rupp, LCpl Walter L., 148

Saigon, 8—9, 15—16, 18—19, 28, 30—32, 34—36, 40, 45—48, 51, 53,58, 60, 62, 65, 80, 100—102, 105, 107, 121, 129, 131—133, 136,138, 141—153, 160, 166

Saigon Central Police Headquaiters, 18Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, 45Saigon River, 8St. Clair, Col Howard B., 142Saipan, 47Secretary of Defense, 57, 128, 131Self Defense Corps, 30, 45, 129Seventh Fleet, 59—60, 88, 93—94, 141, 162Sehoech, VAdm William A., 59—61Sehrenkengosr, PFC Fred T., 155—156Shapley, LtGen Alan, 40, 57—58Sheperd, Cen Lemuel C., 16Sheridan, Capt John, 164Shook, LtCol Frank A., 116, 119—120Shoup, Gen David M., 51, 53, 58SHUFLY, 59—62, 65, 69—71, 73—75, 83—86, 92, 111, 113—114,

117, 120, 121, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 157—159, 165Sides, Adm John H., 58—59Silver Star Medal, 110, 138Simpson, BGen Ormand B., 90, 92—95Sinnott, Lt William T., 83Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., 162Smith, Capt Joseph N., 107, 109—110Snell, Capt Bradley 5., 49Soc Trang, 58,60—63,65,67,70—71,73—76,82, 86, 92, 111—113, 144So Huynh Pho, 8Son, MajGen Tran Van, 79Song Cam Lo, 78Song Cau Dai, 78Song Can Do, 78Song Han, 78Song Huong, 78Song Thu Boom 78—79, 115, 162Song Tra Boo, 159

Song Tra Bong, 78Song Tra Khuc, 78Song Ve, 78Song Vu Gia, 78, 117Souphanauvong, Prince, 86South China Sea, 3, 6, 8, 78, 84, 141, 167South Korea, 11—13, 15South Vietnam, 3, 6, 8—9, 12, 14—16, 18—19, 22—23, 25, 27—30, 35,

40, 42—45, 48, 51, 53, 57—58, 61, 65, 68, 70—71, 74, 78—79, 84,86, 88, 90, 93—94, 100, 109, 110—Ill, 119, 121—123, 127—129, 138—139, 141—144, 152, 155—158, 166—167

South Vietnamese Armed Forces, 30, 32, 34, 36, 43, 45—46, 58, 129Units

Vietnamese Air Force, 27, 46, 48, 62, 67—69, 72, 80, 82, 105,115—120, 137, 144, 146—147, 149, 151—152, 154—156, 158, 162

Vietnamese Army, 13—16, 18, 22-23,26—27, 32, 49, 60—61,63, 65, 67, 72, 74, 80, 83—84, 103, 105, 110, 112, 116—121,129, 139, 141—142, 145, 147—149, 152—153, 155, 157—159,161, 164—165

1st ARVN Division, 79, 111, 113, 115, 1422d ARVN Division, 79, 82—83, 103, 105, 111, 113, 115,117,

142, 154, 1595th ARVN Division, 627th ARVN Division, 62, 6521st ARVN Division, 62, 65, 67, 79—6025th ARVN Division, 79, 103, 111Airborne Brigade, 34, 129, 13211th ARVN Regiment, 10743d ARVN Regiment, 51Ranger Battalions, 79, 114, 136, 164—166Special Forces, 84Vietnamese Marine Corps, 16, 18—20, 22—24, 29—30, 32, 34—

37, 40, 47—49, 53, 58, 65, 84, 90, 100, 102—103, 105, 107,109—110, 116, 121, 129, 131—133, 136, 138, 142—143, 166

Amphibious Support Battalion, 1361st Battalion, 16, 18—20, 22—23, 31, 37, 49, 105, 107, 1092d Battalion, 22—23, 31, 35, 49, 101—103, 107, 109—1103d Baeealion, 32, 36—37, 53, 105, 107, 109—1104th Battalion, 36, 49, 51, 100—103, 105, 110, 136—1385th Battalion, 133, 138Reconnaissance Company, 105Training Company, 136Artillery Batteries, 51, 100, 105Vietnamese Navy, 16, 36—37, 48, 101, 105, 142

South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, 32South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, 27, 30Southeast Asia, 3, 9, 11, 14, 29, 40—41, 94, 167Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 14, 59, 61, 88, 90Soviet Union, 12—13, 86, 93Sparrow Hawk, See Eagle FlightSpecial Landing Force, 59, 62, 88—89, 162Special Operations Group, 141.Steele, Col Fred A., 89—90Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., 131Strategic Hamlet Program, 45—46, 51, 53, 80, 101, 121—122, 129SURE WIND 202, 152, 154—156, 158

Tactical Air Commander Airborne, 149Tactical Air Navigation, 60Tactical Air Support System, 62Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, 60, 62, 69, 73, 75, 82,

103, 114, 119, 148, 155Takjli, 90Tam Ky, 82—83, 103, 116, 149, 157, 159—161, 165Taoism, 8Tarawa, 51Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 42—43, 57, 127


Taylor, Capt Richard B., 101, 103, 110Tay Ninh Province, 109, 133Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 26, 30Texas A&M, 158Thailand, 3, 14, 86, 88—90, 92—94, 113, 143Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, 29, 36Thompson, SSgt John C., 155Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., 45—46Thoung Duc, 117, 119, 151Throckmorton, LtGen John L., 131Thua Thien Province, 76, 111, 115, 149, 157Thu Duc, 36, 53, 100, 107, 136Tien Phouc, 83, 160Tiger Flight. See Eagle FlightTiger Force, 83, 162, 165Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), 139, 141, 155—156, 158Timmes, MajGen CharlesJ., 47, 57Tonkin, 3, 8—9, 11—12, 16Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 128Tourane, 71. See Also Da NangTracy, TSgt Jackson, E., 19—20Training Relations Instruction Mission, 16, 19, 22Tra My, 103, 105, 116Trong, Maj Le Quang, 16, 19Tropic of Cancer, 6Truman, President Harry S., 12, 15TULUNGAN, 59-60Tunny, Lt Michael J., 83Turner, Capt James S. G., 37Typhoon Kate, 162Typhoon Tilda, 159—160Typhoon Violet, 159

Udorn, Thailand, 88—90, 92—93, 113, 158U Minh Forest, 36, 40United Front of National Forces, 18United States, 13, 15, 19, 42, 71, 93, 99, 136, 166U.S. Air Force. See Air ForceU.S. Army. See ArmyU.S. Congress, 12U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 32, 45, 138U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, 45U.S. Marine Corps. See Marine CorpsU.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, 15—16, 19, 22—24, 26,

29, 31—32, 35—36, 42, 44, 46—48, 53, 57, 86, 131, 146U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, 88, 90U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 46—48, 53, 57—63,

67, 73, 76, 80, 88, 99—100, 117, 127, 131, 139, 141—144, 147,154—155, 158, 165, 167

U.S. Military Assistance Program, 16U.S. Navy. See NavyU.S. Operations Mission, 27

Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., 83Valley Forge (LPH—8), 93, 156Vichy Government, 9Vientiane, Laos, 88, 93

Viet Cong, 19, 27—32, 34—37, 40, 43, 45—46, 49, 51, 53, 62—63, 6567, 69—74, 80, 82—83, 99, 101—103, 105, 107, 109—111,113—116. 120—123, 127, 129, 136, 138, 141—154, 148—149,151—153, 155, 157—159, 161—162, 164—167

Units9th Viet Cong Division, 1384th Viet Cong Battalion, 80

Vjet Minh, 8, 11—13, 16, 27, 32. See Also Viet CongVillage Self Defense Corps, 27—28Vinh Binh Province, 31Vinh Long, 9, 65Vinson, Lt Richard P., 85Vung Tau, 36, 40, 100, 136

Walker, Maj John W., 142Washington, D.C., 22, 29—30, 42, 46, 121, 128, 141, 143, 167Watson, Cpl Billy S., 74Weapons

TypesAR—15 automatic rifles, 65Browning automatic rifles, 2281mm mortars, 32, 16482mm mortars, 13757mm recoilless rifles, 32, 109, 137.50 caliber machine guns, 107, 109, 137, 152—1544.2.-inch mortars, 22, 32, 60Hawk missiles, 167Light antiaircraft missiles, 167M—14 rifles, 65M—1 carbines, 22, 32M—1 rifles, 32M—16 rifles, 65M—60 machine guns, 73, 114—115, 147—149, 162M3A1 submachine guns, 65105mm howitzers, 49, 118, 13675mm pack howitzers, 36, 49, 13660mm mortars, 32, 109.30 caliber machine guns, 107, 152TK—1, 162, 1642.75-inch rockets, 115, 162

Webster, Capt David N., 114Weede, MajGcn Richard G., 47, 76, 131Weller, MajGen Donald M., 40—41, 86, 90Westmoreland, Gen William C., 127—128, 131, 155, 158, 166Wilder, Capt Gary, 31Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., 22—23, 31Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 23, 31, 34—35Williams, LtGen Samuel T., 26—27, 29, 32, 35World War 11,9, 11, 13, 35—37, 40, 47, 51, 59, 62, 70, 75, 111—112,

120, 131, 146, 156, 161

Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, 107, 109Youngdale, BGen Carl A., 131, 166

Zimolzak, Capt Frank, 110

13.5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977 0—211-623

U.S. Marines in Vietnam

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