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INTEGRITY* EFFICIENCY* ACCOUNTABILITY* EXCELLENCE

Mission

Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight

of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes

accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of

Defense and Congress; and informs the public.

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Our vision is to be a model oversight organization In the Federal

Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting

excellence-a diverse organization, working together as one

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August 5, 2015

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to assess processesused for reporting DoD Nuclear WarheadUnsatisfactory Reports (UR).

(U) What We Found

(U) Insufficient oversight and control of theUnsatisfactory Report Integrated ProcessTeam (UR-IPT) prevented routine andcontinued assessment of the UR process.

(U) Disparate policies and processes haveled to inefficiencies, including lack ofstandardization and feedback from fieldunits.

(U) Differences in Restricted Dataclassification policies and proceduresbetween DOE and DoD and subsequent useof muJtiple information systems haveresulted in communication challenges.

(U) Recommendations

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition, Technology and Logistics,-asthe Nuclear Weapons Council Chair:

• (U) work with DOE and DoD ChiefInformation Officers to develop across-department infonnationtechnology solution and policy foruse by all stakeholders in the URprocess.

Visit us at www.dodlg.mil

Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate, Defense ThreatReduction Agency, oversee UR·IPT actions to:

• (U) change Technical Publication 5-1 to define roles,responsibilities, and a clearly defined reporting strucn1re

• (U) standardize maintenance operations criteria,

• (U) standardize existing UR trend metrics, and

• (U) review UR categories to determine if an additional category is· needed.

(U) Director, Strategic Systems Programs:

• (U) evaluate the efficiency versus the cost effectiveness of SpecialWeapons Operating Procedures instead of the Joint NuclearWeapons Publication System, and

•

(U) The Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center:

• (U) direct a security classification review of the Air Force NuclearMunitions Command and Control SharePoiut site.

Management Comments and Our

Response

(U) The Under Sec1·etary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology andLogistics, non-concurred with Recommendation A and did not providecomments on Recommendation C. The Director, Strategic SystemsPrograms non-concurred with Recommendation B.2, and concurred withRecommendation 0.1. The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, StrategicDeterrence and Nuclear Integration, responding for the Commander, AirForce Nuclear Weapon Center, concu1Ted with Recommendation 0.2. The Director, Nuclear Ente11>rise Support Directorate, Defense ThreatReduction Agency, was pa1tially responsive to Recommendation B.l. Werequest additional comments on this report. Please see therecommendations table on the back of this page.

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(U} Recommendations Table

IRecommendations

Requiring Comment INo Additional Comments

Required Management

Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics

C

Director. Nuclear Enterprise

Support Directorate, Defense

Threat Reduction Agency

A. 8.1

Director, Strategic Systems

Programs

8.2, D.1

Commander, Air Force Nuclear

Weapons Center

0.2

Please provide Management Comments by September 4. 2015.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350·1500

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Assessment of the Nuclear Warhead Unsatisfactory Report Process (Report No. DODJG-2015-1571)

AUG -5 2015

(U) We are providing this report for review and comment We conducted this assessment Inaccordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standardsfor Inspection and Evaluation. We considered management comments on a draft of this reportwhen preparing the final report. Insufficient oversight and controls, and disparate policies andprocesses have caused a lack of standardization and inefficiencies within the Unsatisfacto ReportUR rocess. Additionall ,

Meetings with the National Nuclear Security Administration and Sandia National Laboratory were conducted in coordination with Department of Energy Inspector General and National Nuclear Security Administration Audit

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. As a result ofthe Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics non-concurrence withRecommendation A, we redirected the recommendation to the Director, Nuclear EnterpriseSupport Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The Under Secretary's comments did notaddress Recommendation C and we request the Secretary provide comments to RecommendationC. The Director, Strategic Systems Programs non-concurred with Recommendation 8.2 butaccepted the schedule and cost impact of additional procedures. The Director, Nuclear EnterpriseSupport Directorate was partially responsive to Recommendation 8.1 and we request additionalcomments to Recommendation A and B.1. We request that all additional comments be provided bySeptember 4, 2015.

(U) Please provide comments that conform t ction 7650.03. Pleasesend a PDF file containing your comments to Copies of yourcomments must have the actual signature oft e aut orizing o cia or your organization. Wecannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classifiedcomments electronically, send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).We a reciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at

Classified by: l>o()OI(, 1h)(hl

t Derived from: p Dcdassify on: 20340713

r

s

1)11 I) ( ) ( ( I • ( I l II fl)

omas ---"41..�lw',.,l�l-'-="'vr General for

Intelligence and Special Program Assessments

(This memorandum Unclasslfled when separated from report)

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DISTRIBUTION:

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTER

DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, DEFENSE THREAT

REDUCTION AGENCY

CC:

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DEPUTY ASSJSTANT CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION

DIRECTOR, AUDIT COORDINATION AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

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(U) Contents

(U) Introduction 1 .....................................................................

(U) Objectlve 1 ...............................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Background 1 .........................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Finding A. Oversight and Controls of the Unsatisfactory

Report Integrated Process Team are lnsufficient 4 .......................

(U) Conclusion 6 ...........................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Recommendation 6 ..............................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Finding B. Disparate Policies and Processes Have Led to

Inefficiencies 9 ..........................................................................(U) Conclusion 12 .........................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Recommendations. 12 ........................................................................................................................................................... : .............

(U) Finding C. Using Multiple Information Systems for the UR

Process is Inefficient 15 ............................................................

(U) Conclusion 16 .........................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Recommendatlon 17 ............................................................................................................................................................................

.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1.11

(U) Conclusion 20 .........................................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Recommendattons 20 ..........................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Appendixes(U) Appendix A. Scope and Methodology . 22 ....................................................................................................................................

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data . 22 ..................................................................................................................................

(U) Use of Technical Assistance . 22 .............................................................................................................................................

(U) Prior Coverage . 22 .......................................................................................................................................................................

(U) Appendix B. Technical Procedure 5-1 Excerpt, Unsatisfactory Reporting-Integrated Process Team . 23 ......

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations 25 ..........................................

(U) Management Comments 27 ....................................................

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I 11Lroducl io11

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this project was to assess processes used for reporting DoD Nuclear

Warhead Unsatisfactory Reports (UR). Specifically, we assessed the UR notification and

transmission procedures, the efficiency of DoD's interface with Sandia National

Laboratory, and the extent that training and technical order changes could decrease UR

throughput.

(U) Background

(U) The UR is used to process questionable conditions pertaining to Department of

Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)-designed nuclear

weapons, nuclear weapons related support equipment, related software, and the Joint

Nuclear Weapons Publication System (JNWPS). The UR identifies discrepancies,

requests clarification, or requests resolution of other issues. Since URs request

clarification of approved technical procedures, maintenance action cannot proceed

normally until UR resolution is complete. Operations involving the questionable

conditions are often required to stop until scientists or engineers analyze the

discrepancy submission and provide resolution through the UR process allowing

operations to continue. The resolution of questfonable conditions helps ensure the

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.

(U) Units generating URs must determine the appropriate category when submitting

URs for system defects or unsatisfactory conditions. Users can generate two UR

categories, priority and routine. A priority UR pertains to safety or security conditions,

work stoppage, or environmental hazards. A routine UR, as defined by Technical

Publication (TP) 5-1, is for conditions that do not meet the criteria for a priority UR. As

URs are coordinated through the services, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),

and DOE, it is possible for any of these organizations to upgrade or downgrade the URs.

(U) Assets awaiting a UR response can often be returned to storage in a safe

configuration until the guidance or disposition is received from the appropriate experts.

However, in some cases, the scheduling, access, transportation, and maintenance or

"rework," is substantial. The resources expended to expedite a UR at the engineering

level can also be substantial, creating a natural conflict between the operational and

engineering stakeholders in the UR process.

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l11iroduclio11

(U) While the UR process is specific to DOE/NNSA-designed nuclear weapons andrelated items, there are concurrent processes that look at similar defects or issues

involving the portions of nuclear weapon systems designed a!1d owned by the Services.These concurrent reporting processes are different from the UR process in each Service

and can use different terminology and information systems when reporting on thequestionable service-designed/owned assets. These processes are similar to the

UR process in that they seek to obtain discrepancy resolution from engineers for issuesthat are not available in technical publications or procedures. Additionally, the Services

generate Information URs for DOE situational awareness when the questionable

condition of the service-designed/owned items could have an impact on theDOE/NNSA-designed nuclear weapons or related items.

(U) The only UR-related information system that is present at DOE, DTRA andthe Services is the Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data

Services (DIAMONDS) system. DIAMONDS is a DTRA-owned classified system used

jointly by DoD and DOE to report and track nuclear maintenance and accountability.By entering information into the DIAMONDS database, users can update and produce

the required reports and transactions. DiAMONDS is a classifi�d web-basedinformation technology system residing on personal computer clients and servers (site,central and maintenance laptops). DIAMONDS consists of a web-based application,

database, client browser, and related software utilities, all of which reside on a

maintenanc� laptop. DIAMONDS provides a common online portal to required

information within a classified network. Connections between locations are establishedby commercial lines. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is then created to isolateDIAMONDS system traffic. Data is exchanged by a National Security Agency approved

cryptographic device, Tactical Local Area Network Encryption (TACLANE) that is KG-175.

(U) The UR module is one of many functions within DIAMONDS. When DIAMONDS was

fielded to all nuclear custodial units, DTRA received requests to incorporate thepaper-based UR process intq an electronic format. Business Process Reengineering

meetings were held with the user community to gather requirements. Joint ApplicationDesign meetings followed, before the UR module was developed and fielded.

DIAMONDS provides units with a single web-based system for all nuclear reporting

requirements. This is seen as a benefit to the majority of the nuclear enterprise. Thebandwidth of Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) is not robust enoughto handle most UR attachments.

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l11Lroducliot1

(U) The DIAMONDS system and DIAMONDS Program Office is funded and managed by

DTRA as the Executive Agent. The DIAMONDS Program Office is responsible for

management of the DIAMONDS system including funding, design and development of

software and hardware, schedule, change configuration control board, and other system

administration functions. This office has a 24/7 help desk. Anyone can call to submit or

attain statµs on problems and enhancements. The DIAMONDS Program accreditation is

based on information technology, software design, and software acquisition/execution.

United States Cyber Command is active in ensuring the office meets hardware and

software classification requirements.

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(U) Finding A

(U) Oversight and Controls of the Unsatisfactory Report

Integrated Process Team are Insufficient

(U) Existing formalized Unsatisfactory Report lnte�ated Process Team (UR­

IPT) oversight and controls are insufficient to ensure routine, continued

assessment of the UR process. Insufficient codification causes a lack of

accountability, limited participation, and inadequate representation of field­

level considerations. As a result. the team is not as efficient or effective as it

could be.

(U) The JNWPS TP 5-1 established the UR-IPT, which is the body responsible for policy,

oversight, coordination, support, and resolution of all aspects of UR management and

operations. Additionally. this committee has the obligation for implementing solutions

after member agreement. For this reason, the effectiveness of this organization is vital

to the overall UR process. The established UR-IPT is not formally chartered. The roles

and responsibilities of process stakeholders, outlined in TP 5-1, are incomplete and

sometimes ineffective when carrying out the UR process.

(U) The UR-IPT meeting is the forum by which members identify and discuss issues and

possible solutions pertaining to the UR system. The UR-IPT is co-chaired by Sandia

National Laboratory and DTRA. They meet annually, or inore often, as deemed

necessary by the UR-IPT co-chairs. to review all issues affecting the UR system.

(U) The members of the UR-IPT are DTRA, DOE/NNSA, Sandia National Laboratory,

SPF20 UR (representing the Navy). Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center (representing the

Air Force), and the United States Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical

Detachment (representing the Army). The term "service center" associated with the UR

process refers to either SPF20 UR, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, or the United

States Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technic.il Detachment who support their

respective operational units. The UR-IPT d,oes not report to a higher level.

(U) A review of the team's meeting minutes from 2011 through 2014 show the

representatives in these meetings are only from Albuquerque, New Mexico. Only once

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ri11ding A

(U) have individuals assigned outside the local area been present for a meeting. That

meeting produced numerous action items relevant to the Navy Service Center.

Representatives from operational units are not required to be in attendance at UR-IPT

meetings and they have not been present according to the reviewed meeting minutes.

The lack of attendance by representatives from operational units limits direct

operational feedback to the UR-IPT.

(U) The usefulness of field-level involvement is similar to other procedures or reviews

within the nuclear enterprise, such as technical order validations. It is useful to have

insight from recent experience at operational units to highlight problems, frustrations,

or good ideas. DTRA's DIAMONDS Program Office representatives have not been

present at UR-IPT meetings when many of the issues discussed are technical in nature

involving DIAMONDS functions for the UR process. First-hand feedback and discussrons

with stakeholders, operational representatives, and system administrators could

facilitate actionable items to benefit the community and customers. The resources

spent for attendance or video-teleconferencing would be minor for the return on

investment to this critical process.

(U) The UR-IPT requirements are self-governed and documented inconspicuously in pages

2-11 and 2-12, paragraph 2·8 of TP 5-1 (see Appendix B). However, oversight of the UR·

!PT, and the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of all stakeholders with duties in

the UR-IPT are insufficient. Similarly, this was noted by the UR-!PT, with the statement

"TP 5-1 does not provide clear guidance on how the UR-IPT functions." When

interviewed, DTRA staff said there is no oversight or self-assessment for the process

except by partners in the UR-IPT. Additionally, the UR-I PT relationships and

requirements that cross DOE and DoD are buried in TP 5-1, rather than in a separate

formal coordinated document.

(U) DTRA's role in the UR process is prominent as a co-chair of the UR-IPT, owner of the

DIAMONDS Program Office, and DoD lead. DTRA's participation in the UR process is

required, but they could divest some functions when reviewing URs. Numerous

stakeholders noted "DTRA would add value if it played a liaison role rather than take on

the role of technical expert." It is understood that certain URs are required and

appropriate for DTRA's review and comments, but with proper guidance to service

centers, other URs could be directly forwarded without in-depth review and comments.

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Finding A

(U) Technicians at operational units, experts at service centers, and engineers at the

national laboratories are technically proficient and competent when working UR

discrepancies. Additionally, the time saved by DTRA divesting some UR reviews could

be used to better manage other issues in the UR process.

(U) A joint DOE/DoD UR process improvement event and internal UR-IPT discussions

both identified the need for an information technology solution that cuts across DOE

and DoD. It was the primary factor identified for improvement during the June 2013 UR

process improvement event. There are a number of ways this could be accomplished, to

include a new end-to-end system outside of DIAMONDS, or a cross-domain solution

using existing systems of infrastructures. As of the date of this report, little action has

been taken. Funding is needed for DTRA to do a trade study. DTRA estimates it could

take 8-10 months once funded.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Formal UR-JPT oversight, and better defined roles and responsibilities will help

ensure routine continued assessment of the UR process. Additionally, effective

management will foster solutions to the challenges, inefficiencies, and communication

issues throughout the UR process. Stakeholders and field-level units can benefit from

the improvements generated by the UR-IPT.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and

Our Response

(U) Revised and Redirected Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments and additional research, we revised draft

Recommendation A to expand wording in TP 5-1 rather than create a new charter. We

redirected the Recommendation from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics to Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate, Defense

Threat Reduction Agency.

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Fi11ding A.

{U) Recommendation A

(U) We recommend that the Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate,

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, representing DoD's role in the Unsatisfactory

Report Integrated Process Team, oversee changes to Technical Publication 5-1

addressing a long-term process control solution for the Unsatisfactory Report

Integrated Process Team to ensure:

a) Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined across DOE and DoD.

b) A mechanism for feedback from operational units and information system

administrators to the Unsatisfactory Report Integrated Process Team.

c) A reporting structure to provide the Nuclear Weapons Council with visibility

into Unsatisfactory Report Integrated Process Team issues.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics non­

concurred. He stated that Technical Publication 5-1 Unsatisfactory Reports includes the

roles, responsibilities, and oversight mechanisms for the Unsatisfactory Report

Integrated Process Team.

(U) Our Response

(U) Our fieldwork and the responses received from the Air Force and Defense Threat

Reduction Agency provided evidence that the roles and responsibilities of members of

the Unsatisfactory Report Integrated Process Team as written in Section 2-8 of

Technical Publication 5-1 are incomplete and sometimes ineffective. Additionally, we

found no formal oversight mechanism exists for the Unsatisfactory Report Integrated

Process Team.

(U) Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate

(U) Although not required to comment, the Director did not agree that a charter was

the best soluti.on to codify binding actions and proposed the recommendation be

incorporated in Technical Publication 5-1 Unsatisfactory Reports.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate offered an alternative

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Findmg A

(U) that would address our concern with oversight. We believe adding more fidelity to

the verbiage in TP 5-1 would improve the definition of roles, responsibility, and

oversight. We request the Director provide a response to the final report specifying

when this action will be taken.

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(U) Finding B

(U) Disparate Policies and Processes Have Led to

Inefficiencies

(U) Multiple procedures for similar nuclear weapons maintenance operations

contained in Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System (JNWPS) guidance have

caused inefficiencies. A lack of standardization, inadequate feedback from field

units and the reluctance to compel the services to a single process has left

nuclear weapons technicians with uncertainties about the UR process. This has

(U) The governing document for the UR process is the JNWPS. TP 5-1. It is the single

agreed upon, coordinated publication through all the pe1tinent parties that outlines

DOE and DoD reporting requirements for the UR process. TP 5�1 identifies the

responsibilities of each organization, including the UR-IPT. service centers and

individual units. It explains the UR management process, UR content and formatting,

pertinent definitions and UR process flow. Other items covered include guidance for

classification and software-based applications, including the DIAMONDS application.

Each applicable service also has an addendum outlining its unique differences for the

UR process.

(U) The UR process currently ensures high nuclear standards are met when

maintaining the technical aspects of critical weapons, equipment, software and

publications. Over the past five years, improvements have been made (to JNWPS in

particular) ensuring clarification witJ1 less chance of misinterpretation of the guidance.

Additionally. UR-IPT co-chairs held a process improvement event facilitated by an

industry process expert. The goal was to streamline and enhance the UR process.

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rinding B

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Finding LI

(U) Another field-level concern is that operational or readiness factors are not

considered sufficiently when determining the category of UR. On occasion, operational

units can be burdened while waiting on UR responses that have an effect on the

operational mission at their specific location. Host-nation security support, Combatant

Command readiness requirements, and rework that requires additional handling and

exposure of nuclear assets effect the operational mission. Many of these scenarios

require time-sensitive responses and can be in higher threat environments which create

a challenge when accomplishing a sensitive mission. Currently, commanders in the

operational chain of command have little influence in affecting URs because current

policies rely on Service representatives at the service center to be their advocates.

Often the field units disagree with the eventual outcome. A unit said that "all of the

unit's 15 priority URs since May 2012 have been downgraded.'' The 2014 UR-IPT

meeting minutes indicate discussions on the related topic of further defining priority

URs or what constitutes "work stoppage." No action was taken because the UR-I PT

decided further defining "work stoppage" would restrict the use of priority URs.

However, keeping the policy subjective suggests the status quo will remain in place.

lJSAF--(b)(J), IOlJSC* 128

(U) One inefficiency in the Navy involves Special Weapons Operating Procedures

(SWOPs). The Navy takes vetted and signed JNWPS procedures, which they have

previously coordinated on and have agreed to follow, and produce Navy SWOPs. The

SWOPs include the Navy's preferences for language, and include Navy-specific parts,

equipment, and processes. The SWOPs also provide a single procedure to follow,

instead of using multiple documents during an operation. However, the SWOPs burden

DTRA and DOE staff with reviewing and certifying additional, duplicative procedures.

Also, there is a cost to the Navy for the contract that generates SWOPs and the Navy

engineers who provide extensive reviews before sending them to DTRA and DOE for

certification. Additionally, the updates to the SW OPS routinely take 6 to 18 months and

funding is sometimes an issue. ·-oTRA stated concerns about the SWOPs being several

revisions behind the technical data provided by the Jabs. However, DTRA does not

believe they have the authority to make the Services change to one standardized

process.

(U) Another inefficiency is the Air Force decision to generate and maintain guidance and

procedures for a system they do not own or maintain. The Air Force developed

additional UR guidance that is not provided by TP 5-1 or DIAMONDS User Guides. It

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Finding B

(U) also puts the Air Force at a disadvantage when trying to incorporate pertinent

system changes into their Service specific guidance in a timely manner. Furthermore,

the Air Force has somewhat redundant duties, including a DIAMONDS Help Desk and a

DIAMONDS Program Manager. DTRA already has these positions or functions, but they .

contend that those functions do not meet the particular needs of the Air Force.

Operational units are required to create, coordinate and submit URs for technical issues

with the DIAMONDS application instead of contacting the DIAMONDS Help Desk and

using their resources. One unit stated "URs are to be used for DOE items, and

DIAMONDS is not a DOE item." It is understood that Services want to maintain some

level of control and visibility with issues, but adjusting policies and being demanding

customers is preferable to creating redundant offices, positions, and procedures for

work already being accomplished within DoD. Many of these policies are in affect for all

DIAMONDS issues and not just the UR module.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Standardized JNWPS general weapons maintenance procedures that are similar' in

application would increase field-level efficiencies in nuclear weapons maintenance.

Incorporating a robust feedback mechanisms from the field for UR processes would

enhance maintenance operations, reduce security risks and improve mission response

times.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and

Our Response

{U) Revised Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments and additional research, we revised draft

Recommendation B.1 for clarity. Specifically, "when beneficial" was added to B.l.a, and

"standardize existing" replaced "develop a common set" in B.1.b to more accurately

capture our intent.

{U) Recommendation 8.1

(U) We recommend that the Director, Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate,

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, representing DoD's role in the Unsatisfactory

Report Integrated Process Team, oversee Unsatisfactory Report Integrated

Process Team actions to work with weapon system program officer groups to:

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Finding tl

a) Standardize the criteria, when beneficial, across the weapon types withinthe same service for use by nuclear weapon technicians.

b) Standardize existing Unsatisfactory Report trend metrics and makeavailable to all stakeholders to include end users.

c) Review Unsatisfactory Report categories and determine if an additionalcategory is needed capturing operational concerns that require expedited URresponse.

{U) Director of the Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate Comments

(U) The Director of the Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate concurred with our

recommendations. However, the Director commented that the Director, Nuclear

Enterprise Support Directorate, DTRA position has normally been a USAF Brigadier

General working out of the Defense Threat Reduction Center. He stated that the

recommendation would increase the current Integrated Process Team leadership by

two levels beyond what is currently in place and proposed changing the Integrated

Process Team to a Colonel level.

(U) The Director, responding to Recommendation 8.1.a, stated no entity within DTRA

owns the process to standardize criteria across weapon types. Further, the Director

stated that Engineering Authorities at the respective National Laboratories control the

outcome of the criteria.

(U) The Director, responding to Recommendation B.1.b asked that DoD IG provide more

detail about the target for trend metrics because what sometimes appears to be a

simple resolution can often require in-depth analysis by the National Labs.

(U) The Director, responding to Recommendation 8.1.c, stated an expedited urgency

category already exists within Technical Publication 5-1.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Director's comments were partially responsive to Recommendation B.1. The

intention regarding the level of the recommendation was not to increase the level of the

Unsatisfactory Report Integrated Process Team co-chair leadership, but to ensure the

co-chair's chain of command was involved in correcting the issues given the agencies

involved, complexity of the subjects, and lack of Unsatisfactory Report Integrated

Process Team oversight.

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Finding ll

(U) Technical Publication 5-1 states DTRA is the single point of contact between DoD

activities and the DOE/NNSA for the Joint Nuclear Weapon Publication System and

resolving issues concerning unsatisfactory conditions. The Unsatisfactory Report

Integrated Process Team co-chair for DoD1 a DTRA representative, should continue to

work across departments or raise concerns to the Nuclear Weapons Council on behalf of

DoD if efforts for reasonable standardization fail. The recommendation was revised to

clarify that the existing UR metrics should be standardized. Technical Publication 5-1

identifies two categories of Unsatisfactory Reports, neither of which captures

operational concerns requiring expedited response. Additionally, no mechanism is. in

place to prevent higher headquarters from downgrading an Unsatisfactory Report

without conferring with the reporting unit. Therefore, we ask the Director to provide

additional comments on Recommendation B.1 to include specifying what actions will be

taken to determine whether an additional Unsatisfactory Report category is needed.

(U) Recommendation 8.2

(U) We recommend the Director, Strategic Systems Programs, evaluate the

efficiency versus the cost effectiveness of using Special Weapons Operating

Procedures instead of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System procedures

already approved by the Navy.

(U) Director, Strategic System Programs

(U) The Director, Strategic Systems Programs, did not concur with Recommendation

B.2. However, the Director acknowledged that there is a schedule and cost impact by

supplementing information through the Special Weapons Operating Procedures. The

Director also stated that the Navy's approach to nuclear weapons technical publications

has been the subject of internal and external reviews, and continuous improvement and

periodic process reviews ensure costs are minimized.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Director has acknowledged and accepted the schedule and cost impact to

provide an additional layer of clarification through the Special Weapons Operating

Procedures. The Director, Strategic Systems Programs is at the appropriate level to

accept this risk. This risk management decision should be revisited in the future to

ensure there is still value in the tradeoff. Future reviews should also include the costs

levied onto the Department of Energy and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for

their labor resources obligated to develop the additional Navy products. No further

comments are required.

SECRE:l' llOl>ll,-20lS-l57 J M

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(U) Finding C

(U) Using Multiple Information Systems for the UR

Process is Inefficient

(U) DOE, DoD, and the Services use different information systems when

performing UR process functions. Differences in DOE and DoD policies

regarding Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data are a barrier to a single,

standardized information system. Additionally, the Services' use of concurrent

processes for easier access to information and better trackii1g mechanisms

contributed to the development and use of different systems. These redundant

infonnation systems have resulted in inefficiencies and communication

challenges throughout the UR process.

{U) Department Policy Barriers

(U) Currently, DOE uses the Secure Workflow Enabled Unsatisfactory Report System

and DoD uses DIAMONDS when processing URs within their respective departments.

By having two separate systems, the process routinely requires individuals to physically

h·ansfer the data back and forth between the systems using a removable hard drive.

This is refer1·ed to· as the "air gap." Although normally much quicker, it can take as long

as 10 hours of work because of software inconsistencies, corruption of files, and editing

for a single UR. Additionally, there is the possibility for mistakes when re-entering data

with key strokes, which is sometimes necessary during this transaction. The process of ·

using removable media is allowed only because a waive1· was attained for this unique

cross-department procedure. Besides being inefficient, the air gap is a major cause of

the lack of visibility in the UR process mentioned in the 2013 Defense Science Board's

Follow-On Review of the Air For�e Nuclear Enterprise.

(U) Both DOE and DoD cite an information technology policy disparity between the

departments as a major obstacle in rectifying the air gap issue. DoD authorizes and

routinely uses the SIPRNet to transmit and receive both Restricted Data and Fonnerly

Resh·icted Data. The DoD process is governed through personnel verifications,

need-to·know, and access lists. DOE does not consider SIPRNet to be a Restricted

Data system; therefol'e, Restdcted Data is not transmitted by email on SIPRNet.

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1:inding C

(U) However, Restricted Data is supported on DIAMONDS and can be transmitted from

DOE to DoD using email on DIAMONDS. DOE considers weapons data to be important

enough to be transmitted only within the DOE classified network. Due to this disparity

in policy, the only weapons data interface between the two departments is manually

accomplished with removable media described above.

Concurrent Service Proce,sses

(U) There is a concurrent process in the Air Force for Service-designed weapon system

components. Deficiency Reports or Engineering Technical Assistance Requests are

produced in addition to a UR in DIAMONDS for these components. In these cases the UR

stays open until the deficiency report is closed. The Air Force gave examples of URs

being opened for extended periods of time waiting on engineering disposition within

the Air Force, including one that was opened for 1,100 days. Some of the examples in

the 2013 Defense Science Board Follow-On Review are tied to this delay within the Air

Force, not a delay with disposition from DOE.

(U) The Navy's method for concurrent reporting is to complete all discrepancy reports

that are related to nuclear weapon systems through the Navy's unclassified

Electronic Unsatisfactory Report System (EURS). Once these reports are received

by the Navy Service Center, the discrepancies that are related to DOE/NNSA-designed

items are then generated into URs within the classified DIAMONDS system. The

remaining issues related to Service-designed items remain in EURS to be worked within

the Navy. Unlike the Air Force practice, the Navy created an additional UR in

DIAMONDS each time they observed the same issue. This was counter-productive

because the correspondence and discussions normally captured on the issue cannot be

built upon and easily accessed in the body of the DIAMONDS report. This can cause

additional research and work for other stakeholders when ensuring the data is correct.

However, this practice allows the Navy to close URs quickly because the same UR is not

kept open when dealing with a lingering issue.

(U) Conclusion

(U) A single, standardized information system between DOE and Do 0, to include the

Services, would provide more efficient processing of data with better visibility

throughout the UR process. Overcoming cross-departmental rule sets will permit the

needed information system's development and allow for more standardized policy and

processes.

_

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1:i11ding C

(U) Recommendation, Management Comments and

Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation C to

include "work with the DOE and DoD Chief Information Officers." This change

acknowledges the cooperation that will be required across departments.

(U) Recommendation C

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics, as the Nuclear Weapons Council Chair, work with the

DOE and DoD Chief Information Officers to develop a cross-department

information technology solution and policy which maintains robust integrity, yet

allows end-to-end transparency to all stakeholders in the Unsatisfactory Report

process.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provided

comments to this report but did not address Recommendation C.

(U) Our Response

(U) We request the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics provide comments to the final report that address Recommendation C.

(U) Director of the Nuclear Enterprise Support Directorate

(U) Although not required to comment, the Director of the Nuclear Enterprise Support

Directorate stated that without a mandate/directive for use of a cross-department

information technology solution for all organizations involved, the system will not

achieve desired outcomes. He stated experience with DIAMONDS has demonstrated

that organizations use the portions of the information technology system that meet

their needs and ignore other portions. This creates a lack of standardization, which is

what the recommendation is attempting to address.

SECRE'F ))()1)1(; 2ll l'.,-157 I t7

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l·111di11g I>

(U) Finding D

• ClSll.111d'\.\\ .. i -11>1111 I 11.11

(U) DoD Manual 5200.01-Vl, "DoD Information Security Program: Overview,

Classification, and Declassification," February 24, 2012, states that compilations of

information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled

information reveals an additional association or relationship that qualifies for

classification and is not otherwise revealed by the individual elements of information.

The DoD Manual specifically warns that data in electronic formats subject to user

queries (for example, databases, spreadsheets) lead to new aggregations. Posting this

information on the internet makes the use of data mining tools and other data

correlation tools easy and widespread.

(U) Similarly, CG-W-5. the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide,

cautions to be aware of unclassified information that can become classified through

association with other key bits of information. CG-W-5 only addresses classification by

association or compilation sparingly. There is no single guide to assist users in

correctly classifying URs.

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(U) l JSAF - (b)(3), lO lJSC * l28

llSAI· and Nt\ VY - (h)(,), 10 lJSC * 128

(U) The Navy's Electronic Unsatisfactory Report System (EURS) is an unclassified web­

based application which is used to create, submit, and archive URs and responses to the

Service Center before the information is transferred into DIAMONDS. The system is

also used for Service-designed reports which are submitted to the service center. When

necessary. either DIAMONDS or SIPRNet is used for transmitting classified information

or any large files, such as photographs and guidance. Some of the comments about

EURS were:

• (U) "We can't get to the detail that we may eventually need, we do have

to work around some information."

• (U) "I would prefer a classified system that was reliable and works well

for transmitting. We have had issues with classification where some

don't consider it classified and others do."

• (U) "The process is inhibited because of the need to work around

classification issues."

(U) The Air Force created the unclassified Air Force Nuclear Munitions Command and

Control (NMCZ) Share Point site to help track URs and provide more visibility across

organizations. It is used as a "snapshot" tool to track progress from creation to

disposition. However, this is double documentation and increases the unit's workload.

Additionally, the amount of information entered for each UR is inconsistent, but some of

the data viewed by the project team showed very specific information related to the UR.

Citing concerns about information on the NMC2 SharePoint site, a unit stated, "Creating

a SIPRNet based Share Point site would eliminate talking around classified items."

Another unit asserted "NMC2 SharePoint does nothing for the unit that can't be done in

DIAMONDS. It's only for folks that don't have access to DIAMONDS or want easier

access to the information."

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Finding D

OSI> and NA VY • (b)( I), I .4(a)

(U) Resource constraints, such as number of SIPRNet terminals or ease of access to

information, resulted in Services using unclassified systems as a workaround instead of

using DIAMONDS for monitoring UR status. However, the capability exists for UR status

and other minor management functions to be accessed and performed through

SIPRNet-based access to the DIAMONDS network. This method of using DIAMONDS

does not require dedicated hardware. Licenses are purchased through the DIAMONDS

program office to leverage this capability at a much lower cost.

(U) DoDM 5200.01-Vl states the program manager or other official responsible for the

database, application, or program that creates or generates the compilation is

responsible for facilitating, as necessary, a security classification review with the

appropriate Original Classification Authorities for the constituent items of information.

We did not find any evidence a security classification review has ever been completed.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and

Our Response

(U) Recommendation D.1

(U) We recommend that the Director, Strategic Systems Programs, directs a

security classification review of the Navy's Electronic Unsatisfactory Report

System.

SECRET IH)l>II, /lll'i l'il I iW

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(U) Director, Strategic Systems Programs

(U) The Director, Strategic Systems Programs, concurred with the recommendation and

stated that currently several unclassified information technology tools specific to

reentry systems operations are being evaluated.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Director was responsive to Recommendation D.1 and no further comments are

required.

(U) Recommendation D.2

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center,

directs a security classification review of the Air Force Nuclear Munitions

Command and Control SharePoint site.

(U} Commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center Comments

(U) The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Integration,

responding for the Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center, concurred with the

recommendation and will conduct a security classification review.

(U} Our Response

(U) The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Integration,

responding for the Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center, was responsive to

Recommendation 0.2 and no further comments are required.

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Appendixes

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from August 2014 through July 2015 in accordance

with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards

for Inspection and Evaluation. These standards require that we plan and perform the

evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for

our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) In coordination with DOE Inspector General and National Nuclear Security

Administration Audit, we conducted interviews with representatives from the National

Nuclear Security Administration and Sandia National Laboratory. We also conducted

interviews with Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters,

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Navy Strategic Systems Programs, Air Force A/4, Air

Force A/10, the UR service centers for both the Air Force anct Navy. Additionally, we

visited and conducted interviews with three Service Major Commands, and five

operational units wher� we saw applicable information systems, applications,

processes, and products related to the nuclear warhead UR process.

(U) We reviewed DoD and DOE policy, Service guidance to identify requirements and

guidance for the Unsatisfactory Report process.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this review.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not use technical assistance in performing this review.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior audits or evaluations have been conducted in the last 5 years on the

Unsatisfactory Report process.

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(U) Appendix B

(U} Technical Publication 5 .. 1 Excerpt, Unsatisfactory

Reporting-Integrated Process Team

5-1

,. Tln,ure propm clB.s1ifiCAllon offtll URS and exhlb\18 lhat al'O printed f'tom DIAMONDS regardless of ClfiCnt 11111kinp,

t. Acknowledges all lnfurmallu111d tm..

a. �oviow ,II rOutlno llRll !or 4 l't(J\�fd fGSJll)nM 11Atn In tho n:ClOromcnd�llnn black. An lllll\Vm" or 4 auuu, of th& UR ts required by Ille fPDCiflod due II) l)'l'KA. I

2-7:;. !'or JJO.l!/f'WSA URI (Jl,evme URs), SNL wUl:

a. Notify and ,oorolnRt1l1'1J Priority IJR na1ion1 with th&MlttAge111>)' ill Ille pruc...sl.ug �ba.ui vla tlllephouo and/or CH11.1U.

b. Collect Ind""""'" report, fron1 DOE!�SA lllclllda1 concemln& dl.,UCl)11.itconc1Jtlo� onm1tmol n:twncd by DoD lo DOB/NNSA, Thos� n:p0,c. lochld� co,ullliona dial po1enti<,.1Jy affac;t nfcty mid n,limblli1y. A[)Jl. will be fmpued md sent to DTRA on those deemed lj)proprlate.

o. Complete epplfcciblo portlonll oflha UR<llli. on V.ll.$ forwardod totrmA.

2-4 UNSA1181'ACfflRV REPORT1NG0INTEOR.A1t!D PROCE!8B TEAM (UR-IPT).

2"8.1 The Uk·IPT Li! .. ,uuHlir,g u'.Hh11linee 1cspoJ1Slblc for Iic l pol!,y, ovonright, comdlnAtlon. :ruppo:t Nld l'C$0:\luon of all a.ipects otUR nianagcmait 1.11d operations. The UR·IPT meeUng i& the forum by wbloll mombenl identify a'ld dlacun Issue! penalnln& to die UR ayatcm, aud di'°use pcmlble 1ohnlOM. The UR-IPTwlll implement 1olutlons only "1le, member �cnL liooh 11£eo<lY, Servloe. tnd o,e,rni,atinn with a J'Ci"'C-•llnb.live 0A t.hl> 1JR.IPT ls l'f8l)01111iblo for u,igoillij t ,��oessor, in v,Tit\ns to Ol'RA, o) tranrl'cr °' n,lld'uf01ij liUJ.ug u1oml>;r.

Z-8..2 'lb U.K·ll'T r.1emben roproacnt thdr 11P01110r·a lnt�eit In lhe ��fllnA wl molutlon ofnll IMi� affecting UR manaiionumt Md opm\ioo�.

27 F1bnJ1r1 2DD9

SECRET 1io111t,.;w 1 1

, 1 i,, In

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Appendixes

(U} Technical Publication 5-1 Excerpt, Unsatisfactory

Reporting-Integrated Process Team (cont'd)

S. -.

l)TRA/mJI.M nrprctontias DoD DOJ:I.IINSA ropmentill,eDOE SN'l.n.,!I, ..,,,e-tlog �lllonsl L!lbonnQrle« SPF20 UR ttf)meatfng: the D.;pmmem oflhe Navy AFNWCINCLL ,q,rc1C01inJ1bt D11portmen1 oftJi& Air Fo«,,; USAB0rtrt1r.HnRT rtpmenl!OJ! tho OopWlnl .. tt nrth, All!IY

b. D1RA/NSPO wUI ;>rovlde lnformntinn !"'rtinentto implementing 1oftwm, chlll18e, �sired by !he lJR,.IPT.

2.fl,3 The UR,!I'T h oo,ehai"'� by SNL and D'!RA a.nd m.,.,t, twnl*lly, or moM often II.! dOCJUCd ,,..x.111111 by Ille, UR·IPT ca-tb.e.ln, to review all lssuc., al'!"ec1tng Iha U1{ sy1f.tnl. UR·IPT rnect\ni rnlnu.tl!a, hle1Udl11S •II sign!fioMt ngcnd!, aetion items and aunchmeni., atuillbo pfCl).1ffd by OTRA and iocludcd In a fcrmcl repo:t lo !ill oon1mltteo mombcrJ. Dluenilna f)C)sitlon, will bonotGc ir. tto meetinrt mlnn11:.1. Commln� �=dnnce m.,y ba exp�. u 1pproprl1w, to.it,0lu<la ouch adclltlon.,l ropre,smtlltl� 11 011:«islll')' for tho oflbctivo cond�t oflho ptOC<e<:ing, Tho �ltlfng boa.I'd J11ay �vlgn addil.iollll.l 1"0mb«11,

I 2-1:2 77Fobluery2ooa

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All'o11yllls and /\hhrcviations

·(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CG-W-5 Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide

DIAMONDS Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data Services

DOE Department of Energy

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EURS Electronic Unsatisfactory Report System

IPT Integrated Process Team )

JNWPS Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System

NMC2 Nuclear Munitions Command and Control

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SPF20 UR UR Office of Record, Program Management Office Strategic Systems

SWOP Special Weapons Operating Procedure

TP Technical Publication

UR Unsatisfactory Report

DOTllG·2111� 1:.7 I 2:.

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§ECRET

M.111.1g<'llH'1ll Lo1111111·111�

(U) Management.Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics Commen�s

/\5Sl!:>TANT SECRL r/\RY or OLrLNS( 10'i0 Or Pl NGI= PrN"r AC:01,l

WI\Sf!IN lUN DC .tO 101 .10�0

' ' r 4,� Hi WI •t A'1

I I)(. 41 Q(' I ,, � f •AL• JU/I 2 J iUIS

MEMORANOIJM FOR OEPl'TY ASSISl/\NT INSPECTOR GENERAi. FOR INl 1:1.1.IGl:f\C'I! AND Sf'l!('fAf. PROGRAM ASScSSMGNTS AUl>ITS. OHl('E or 'I lie INSPE<.TOR Gl·.N · L

· 1 •Tl IROlJ(if I: OIR"CTOR, ACQlJISITION RESOI IRC'CS /\NI> /\)';Af.YSI!, \ \ '•

Sl IBJH'T: Rc5poi.ic to DoO IG OrnO Report un /\ 'l.'cssmcnt llf Nuclcnr W11Thc.id Un_\llfi>fnctory R.:ron Pr�cs., (1'1t1jttt Nn. D2014-l>IN1'02-0l 911.t)O())

A• r�<111,•<1C(I, I n11111tt1,i.linu n rcsJll>n«' '" 1h,• 11cncml con1cnt nn,l ,...cnm111tn,t111inn• wnlaineJ in Stibjc;:t rqon,

1lccom1ptnd111illn ,\: 1 he f)ol) ICi rcn1mm�•111h 1lmt the llndct SCCfi:lnl)' vf l'>cfemc fut Ac<1ui1ition. 1 cchnolo1:1y nnd l.ogi,1ic,. Ill< the "uch::.r Wc3fl(lflll t'tlun.:il Chmir, dc,-cltlp 11 clmnl'I or 1cnnsof rcforcnco for the Unsatisfnctol')' Report (Uk)-ln1clJ!tllti:d 1•,oc.:ss Tcam (11'1) to cnsurt

a) rolC'll 1U1d NJpon,ibili1l� Cll'il clcnrly defined om,as 001.i Md Uol>, h) a 111c:ch3niKm tor tccJhnck from tlllCrtttion�l units and ioformaiion sy�tem oJmini�lf11HtN

10 the UR·ll'T. anJ c) o rcponiog �•n•cturc 10 proviJc 1hc Nuckw Wcopons Council (NW<') \llslbilhy into UR­

ll'T issues.

Rnp111ur: NON-COJ'l:C\JR

Teclu1i.:1I Mwiual (1 I'S• I, Fcbrullf}' 200<)) U11,u1/(u,·111ry1 R11p,m.,, Jdlncs tltc roles 1111J responsibilitic< for lhc opcemtional unit. in,·,..hi!d S,m ice. l lR-IPT nnJ No1iunul Nuclear S,-curi1y AJ.m111iS1r11hon INNSA) • Slllldio National Lub<itOIOI")' (SNI.). 11'5-1 also idcntincs the ovcrsi(!ht pruviJetl by the UR·IPT. ·n1c UR-IP1 is the upprnpriah: l!ovcmancc structurt' for S(lf· a�scf.Smmrs nnd 1he creation of m:lion plnns 10 nddrcss lnefficitnclcs 11nd issues Identified l111hc l>llD l\.i Dnill Rcpc,rt. The ll'T un be CllpMdcd lo include wlditional po.nic� 11.S neCCM41")' 10 conJuc1 prll\'cctlin11s wid LL\Silln new rnembc:t:,. Tile NWC's >UborJinulc 11ruups we bricf�,J if 1hcr,· ,� llll lsi.uc 1ha1 ln,olvc� :>.1fc1y or s�'(llrily ur Is bcyMd 1hc rapability of 1hc Services or NNSl\-!iNl.101cs11l\'c, lfthc i<�Ut con n(ll � rcsolwll UI Ill( h)\\Cr IC\'CIS tltcn Ille NWC C.lll b;; bri1:fcd for 1:1uld11J1cc.

�·Lv�� Ar1hur T, I l<>p�i11s l'rincip:11 l)cput)' l't-rfom1in� ihe Duties l,fthe ASD(Nfll)

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�l 111,l•'PIJtfllll Cn111111P11's

(U) Director of the Nuclear Enterprise Support

Directorate Comments

e0EFliNH THRlli.AT Re:DUCTION AOD,ICV

ANO UNIUD STA TU ST1'4ATEGIC COMMAND

Cl!:NTl:R FOR COMISA'l'ING W£Al"DN• OP' MA .. DBT1'4UCTION 8725 JOHN J. l<INGMAN AOAI), S'To .. sao,

Fo,n BILVOtll. VA UOl5�2.01

JIM ·r O llllS

l'rom: l>im:tor, Nuclear Enterprise Support l>ircctoratc, Defense Thn:11 Reduction Aacncy

To: f>oputy AJ�illlllll lnsJWCtor Ovaerul Co: lruollia•nco a.nd SJ"K'iol l'msnm A£1111mtni. Audits. Otlicv of the Inspector <imc�I

Subj: l>'l'RA JI O lnpuu on ln,pector General Rep011 on /\sxs.smcnt ofNuclc.ir Warhead llnsatisfoctory R�pon Procc,1$ Jotc:d Moy 12 20 I�

I. A, requested, we IITC providing a response to the 9cncml content 1111d recommendations conlllinC'd in tlic 12 May 2015. Doi> Office nf 1hc ln�pcctor (Jcncrol Rc(>Ort on A$SC1smcn1 ofNucl�t.r \Varhud Un.,.,l,litctoryRcp<>n Pl'OC\rn. I hr Nuclear en1crprise Suppo11 Direoctoratc,JIO. DTRA concurs with the 12 M�y 201S. I.he rcf,:ri:nccd report. We providt the following commt.'llts for your ,-onsklennlon.

a. I\ �ubstanth·c cc,mmcnt on "k,-,.ul" in Hricr· page. first column, 1hird pania,nph tht nQClntoln1. "(U) DlfroNncc, In UR clcwlfico,iion policlc11111d pn:codurcs bc1wcon DOI; 1111d DoD and Cheu� of multipk fofom1u1ion ')'$h,m• hu� 11:�ultcd in communicatioo chnllcngcs. .. lne ke)' to lht� isrue i1 lhe dill'ercnce bel\\a:n DOI; lll'ld DoD t.&lldlinll,'elecLtonic 11orage ttquircmcnts for Rn '71d not tl1c clusific111io11 of URs. Recommend cluif)ln11 lhls parlQJ'llph with the following wordina: "(IJ) PiffCN11ecs in RI) ch1Mlfico1 on pollcica tnd procedwcs WL�;..�u DOC w.,ll DuD w.i\l :.u�U\:I.U \Ale urwuhlt,11" lu.llnu, .. ,duu b.) uca1L> •� .. �•uhal Lu communica1ion challcnaes."

h I\ substomivo er•ll' mC11t on fl"&" Im, l"'"'IV"Ph two 1h01 contain,, "(11) Stondordb.l!d JNWPS general wcop;,ns mointcnancc procedure� 1hot ore simil:i, in J()f)lietllon would lncre:ise neld·level cOlclcncles In nucleor weapum mulmenwia:. lncorporrulon or rubtat feedback mechanisms from !he fidd 10 work ton $lnJ11c s� of accepted practice 10 enhance maintenance operations, redU<t: security riw and impru,·r: mi»sion rcspcnuc limes." We Q81'C<1 thQI stancwdi1,11:lo11 ""'1 und m1al be "<>rim! on indMdu41 �-•· I luwuv�r. since the c:nglncaing 1Wthorl1y rc.�ls with dlITmnt Nllliolllll l..ib1 (\\1lh historic and practical dilfm:nccs In addition lo lhc dill'l'l'Coccs in design rcq11Jrcmcn1s ofwrapons) standudiralion acrou llll wcapnns will not he P.'>�siblc.

"(U) DTRA 's role in 1hc UR proecss is prominent I.!! a c"' chair nf 1�c lJR-1 l'T. O\\'ner nf the DIAMONDS p,,,ararn Office, WlU D.>D lead. Thtlr )Wlidpotion in lhe UR proc��s Is n:qulrod, bu11hcy could dlwsi !Omc nm.ilons \\hen rcvicwinw U Rs. l\unmous b'Ulkcholdcrs nOlo:d "I l I RA

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I 1111111, •111 1 1, 1 I '7

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,,,,utd add \'aluc if it 11loyc:d a tillison role rather thm take oo the NI< nftcchnleol c��rt." ll is UJ1dcr11ond th�t ccnain Ulu are r�ulN'd and lppropri1te for OTRA 'i n,vi"'" and coml!l('nU. but wilh proper ;uidancc to service ccn•.crs, olhcr Ulo c<1uld be dir«:lly forwunlcd wtlho111 ln-dtprn review and cnmmmu."

('un-on1ly Tl' S-1 P""'lo'"'P"l·::?,I IMU PmA i, llw '""Bl• poinl ,,roonlllU\ botw0""1 0oo ... J DOE ond p�h 2•6.b. n:qu.im DTRA to evwWlle each UR fo: cln..;:y, technical content, Md adhm:ncc to policy. Ol"'lA pm,idcuhc l)(ll)-lc1·cl "l<'Chnical cx;x.'T1· tor cnsurln1111JI ncilhcr the Service oor the Nulinnnl l.ahnrntnrir� ,•lolntc D!ln p<1lie)'. OTR/\ icrvi!J Bl the DoD,level coordinator for URs lhnt l'e(juirt multlpl� path processing. Monr times DTRA SMEs idtnlify errors In =omrncnuctl 8ulutlnn� that must he udjustl!d prior to submission Lil die noxt levcl reviewer. In allilition. IJTR.A pnwi1ks the only cansolidatcJ (i.c .. 11tross Service, 11\d Nutional Labs) pmp«:tlv� on ll1e �pplicubilil)' of' UR r.:sulutlo�s nnd hnw MY UR ansv.er will aO\:ct the nuolco.r rntcrprlso.

d. SubsW1ti1c comment on R.commendauon A li,nod �low:

{VJ Rtt:on1n1tnd11tlon A (U) \Ve CC(,',)OU1lCIUd th.al the Un.Jc, Scactwy or UcrclU(, for Acquisition. Technology nnd I .ogi:11iC-1, as the 1-'uclcnr Weapons C'ouncil Chair. de1dop a clulncr or tcm1� uf rcfcrcncc rnr the UR-ti>'I' lO CMUl'C a) roles tu:d re:cp<111-1lblllti� m ck�rl)• dcllncd o.c:ron DOC: and DoD, b) u mcchtnism for ktdhack from opcrationo.l wilb wid infonnuli(ln �)st�m ud:ninislJ'lllors tu t�.e t;R-ll'T. ind cl Q reporting nruciutt to pro,,dc the NuclcAr We3;,oru Council 11ith visibilit)' into UR-11'1' ii<.'lllCS

While the Nuclear WearoM Council inl'oh·es 1)0�. and in tum NNSA, we do nnt btlic1•e thi� Is the riaht pl&co 10 ncquin- fonnol agrccmmt on II long•lenn pracess cootrol ora11nl1..11inn. ·n,i., L\ u\Jl Q lC!ll�hU/ )hYAtluu &OJ. 4 \.hOtl�I (u, QU JrT l:ao i.uoyy,ua,,, il.ll!i:, t\JI) IPT IMlJ

ussociatcd chine, imply 111empumy com.'l:ti11n'condi1ion. We n:commcnd a change to 'J l' S-1 that addresses I loog-tmn solullon. This will use th-, oisting Joint Nuclear WupoGS Publication Syftcm I JNWPS) �r<K'I!,, tn e,wbli,h ralicy on J t;R proee1, control organi1ation. lltc JNWPS proccs1 uln:uuy invohc:s thc M>SA. Noti�nal uib�. 111d Services and Is hind Ina acro�1 iscnclc�. Tbcrcfo�. 11\c rcqwrcmcnu In a chll\cr illo11ld be provided In TP 5-1 i . .: .. define n,lu uni rc:,pansibili1ic:.i: huld the chan11Cs a:counwblc 10 NWC: cxl)llldcd participation: etc. Thi1 provides B long,tcrm document that by dcllnitlc>n v.iU be cootd1nlled throuaJ, all ,takchold= 1111d be readily 1muloblc for lhc �ommunlty vs. , clw!ct th11 is l!And· alone document.

�- SubJi.nti,c c1imm;nt M R.ccommMd!ltion B. I listed hclow:

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(lf) Rua1t1m,n,lnrfn11 B. I (U) We �ommcnd thnt lhc D�tor. Operntlon.s and Nuclcai �uPJlOn. l>TRi\. representing Duo· 1 role .n 1bc UR-!PT leod Ull-lPT uclion� m work \\ith weapon sys1cm prognm omccr groups 10 D) s1anJGtdlu ih.: crhtrin A.Cross tb.: ,,•to.P<Jn l)pcs wlthlc lhe same iervicc ror use by nuclear wcopon 1cchnlclons bl del'elop I common set of IJR ll'Cod metrics 10 be ustd by all sre.kd,�ldc� a11d c) relliew tJR categories and dctcm1lnc if 1111 uddltfonal l:Al¢S<11;1 is ncc:d..J cap1urin11 upc:r&lioml conc<m� th.it require Cllpcditcd UR re$poru.c.

·nut Dirootnr, 0p0fll1fona and �uoloarS.uppon. OTR.A, ;& now :ho Diroctor, NuolMI' llntcTprise Suppon Olrcctoretc. l)TRA. lllis posilicm h(IS normally b«ri a USAF Briyadicr Ocncnl working out or l>J"RC.', This n:,omnimd3llon l11c11:= the current IPT IC8dersnip by two lovcls beyond whll ls tllll'Cnll)• in place. Rcccnun.:nd chaauine 1l!c IPT to I Colonel level DI lhe Director. Nuclc-.u I .ogislic� Operotion5 l�romncnl. For item e.). no entity within ll'l'RA, mYTll! thi• prn<c.,.s r.11,;inc�ri"G auihorilio "ill cunlr\,f thi, outi:omc. JI O NI, already doc., lhh when punible 1111d "ill conlinuo lu do ro. but without Enginc�ring Authority (spccilic �alimw Lats) hu>'·fo, linlc rrowcP will he pos.slblc. Wr ha,c bad SUL.CU '>'ilh USN �cm�loxclusivcl)· under l.o, Alnmos Nolio,ml Lnh) ,1nndardi1.in11 tcrminnlo11Y and hlive 111 on11oin11 pmjccl \\ilh W87 und W78 lcchn:cul pubs Fnr item b). provide mol't' dcllil llbou1 the tar�t fur 11cml 111eulcs. Wh:.n can ap�ar 111 be u Nlmplc l\.'OOlu1lon 1h.11 ls rcptatln& to ,he units often requires a mnl't' in-depth c119lnccnns annl),is by tht appropriate: Notional I.ab. ror item c), an exJ!Ctllttd urtency cmcgnt)' nlrendy exists within TP 5-1.

f. Sub11ant.ivo comrr.cnlon Rccnmmcndltion C: li,tcd bclo\\;

(/J) Rttommtndatlqtt <.: (lJ) w� rtcommend thet the tinder Se<rcUW)' or r>.:li:nac for Acquisition, Technullll!)' md Loiri.itlcs, u the �uclcllt Weapon., Council Chair. �cvclop I cr01<.•·dc(lllrt1nc1t inforrnn1ion tcclmoloay solulion "hkh maintoln� n1bus1 intCjlril)', yet allows cnd•to·rnd 1ron�parcncy 10 all stuluihuldirs In II� UR pr111:1:i,s.

Without I m1111dalCldircctiw for use of cr�s-<k'J'3r1mcnL infom1nlion technololl)' solution from qnd-10-ond to tho So"·ioo1 and o.ll 11s•noiu in,"Oh.·.J th, �,tom will no1 caehi•v• d•rir.d wwomc!. O�r cApcricn�c wi1h l)IAMONl>S ll:11 ckorly di:n11)1mrt11� Servke,/Aacnclu \\<11111.W only Ille portions of IT solutloos lhlo1 mc�1 Ulcfr �Jl«lfl: rcqulrtmcn1s 81\d lanorc other portions oflhe rr 1y11cm. nu, crtotcs an unmndardi1.cd M1lu11on sc: ocro$:1 Ill• informallon spcx:uum. which Is CX>l(tly \\'Mt this r«ommcodPtion i., ,ucm�ting 111 uddros.

J 1111>/l, 111 'i Jt;J j "I

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t',l 111.tgt·lllt 111 ( tlllllllf'lll'i

GRE���V��.USA> Director. Nuclcaf Enterprise Support Dil'\.-ctoralc: (JI 0)

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( 1(11 >IC, '() I 1 •, 1 i H•

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f\l.111.1g1•11w11t ( ,11111111•11!-.

(U) Director of Strategic Systems Programs

Comments

0 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ffl'(l(;l<JR IIIMlt.Utii.;.IT»lLilllf.'f400HAMt

1160 II'" IIREltT IE, IUIR :M0t

� WA&tlHQTOH HAVT ?AHO 1X:, 1Q;)1' ... IIU '4•:u'i,.TtUMTQ

June 10, 201 S

MRMORANOIJM i:"OR D'l1PUTY ASSlSTANTINSPHCTOR 011NllR.AL

SUBJECT: Rupoll$0 to Dtpanmen1 ofDcfcnsoJn,pcctor Ocncru Draft Repon on Assessment of Nuclear WDJhcad U�a1bfac1ory Rcpon Process (Project No. D20t4-DINT02· 0199.000)

AJ requested, I am providing commmts lo )'OW' dmft report regarding lhe two l'O(lQmnien�Clon, dir0<:ted 10 Stnlcalc Sy,tem l'rolJ'lllU (SSP). The Dq>&r1mcnt ofDcfcaso (DoD) Inspector Oeneral (10) recommcods that the Oirec-\Or of SSP pcrfolTII the followina attiOM;

• £v4luat• the tlftoienoy von,u tho rolll •fl'ocd"•n•n ofSWOP1 iruit"d of tho Joint N11Clear Weapons Publication System; and

• Initiate a security cluslnc11lon rovlew ortha Navy's Blectronlc Un.uUsfictOI}' Report System

In tho cue of the ftnl rccommendalion, I do not e<1ncur. For some tecbnlcal operations, the Navy doc.; dlre<!tl)' Use Jolm Nuctcw Wcapollll Publlcatloo Sy,1cm (JNWPS) documents. For other opaalions, Navy SJW,:111 Weapons Openuina ProccduttS (SWOP•) build on the 1011.u data provided viaJNWPS. SWOPs provide amplification. ch11iflcatlon, and allow the Inclusion of parallel ope111ions specific 10 Navy laclll�s aad hudWGre. Th; Navy's •ppro.ch 10 nudur weapons technical publications u rimc•tCllcd and has been aubJcct to nwntroLU lntemal and external reviews. While there is• schedule Md cost lmJ)IICt 10 the 11dditlonal l1yer or

doewnontotion related 10 SWOPs, SSP's commltmen1 to continuous improvement and periodic process revieM en.sure that cost lmp1cts arc minimized, and tbBI quality and efficiency remain high.

In the ca,e of the second recommendtllon, I concur. Secwlty is a priority for SSP and 1 conUnulng challenge u we pursue lllcrcticd elC(;lrOnlc connectlv11y and llifeiltlon of datab-,, Cumntly, sc,veral unolu,ifiod lnfonmlion Technology (1T) tool• ,pecific to r'Ctnll')' sy5tems operations are being evaluated under the joint DoD/ Dcpartmtnt of Encrl)' (DOE) Weap00 Project Oflicen Group. The likely outcome ls the consolidation of several unclassified tools under a tll.$$lfled Stockpile managemen1 syn em. Tl\ls \\111 provide ad<1J11ona1 prorecuon.s for data thar i, part of the Navy', lllN>tronlc Un11tiJftc1ory Rtpon Sy11em. Addltionally, clwifieallon manaaement ttainina reinforces the �uiremcnt to avoid the enw of clwificd infonn1tlon 1111d consider the effect of compilation on unclusified data.

!(you have an estions, please contact

1118\WN!P [ qu

��e Benedict . Admiral, U.S. · Navy

111 ll llt, 'ti I', I', 1 I II

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l\l.111 1• 1 1•1111•111 ( 111111111·11h

(U) Commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapon

Center Comments

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HIAD0UAA1IAI UMITIO ITATII AJA ,011c11

WAS .. NOTON 0C

JUtl 1 1 2015

MEMOR/\Nl)IJM FOR DEPIJH' /\SSIST1\NT INSPECTOR GENER,\L FOR INTF.l.l.lGENCE /\ND SPEClAl. l'IWClRAM ASSl'SSMl'N1S AUDIT

mo:vi, II<.) lJS/\1'/A 10

1488 1\ir Force l'cnrn1ton WiL�hln1iton, I)(' 20JJO- l ol88

SI JnJE(T: 11 l) Air Forcr Rr�pon<c 10 1\sscssmc111 oflh� Nuclr�r \\'nrhertd llnsn1isf"nr1ory Rcporl l'm1:css (l'mjccl No. 1>201,1-l>INT02-0ICJ9.000) (IJ)

(lJ) Thunk you for 1hc oppon1111i1y 10 rc\'icw 1hi� r�pon. Comment� 10th: rcpon·� iinJinb(� And rc�llmmcmhtions ore puwiJed on paycs l\,,l a.Kl three ol'tlii� 111011111. Addi1in1111lly. wilh rcllnrd io 1hc rcporl's mcmll dos�ilic11tin11, our review hns dc1crmincd the n:port 10 be llnd�ssllicd.

(ll) C'11n1nc1 my POC' ... f you have uni·

0

4ucs1io

���J}�/ ()cpnly AC'S. S1rn1 Dclcrrcncc & N11c ln1ccrn1io11

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11 111J1, 11 I 1, I',/ J.i

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(U) Air force rcspo1l�cs tu: Uulllti Report. Assessment ol'thc Nuckur Wumca<l llnsutlslacmry Jkpon l'roccs,. Moy 12, :?OIS.

(lJ) �. f>.ltSC 4: O\'c1,i11h1 o,w.l ('on11 .. 1, .,f 1hc l 111..,ti,i'.i,h,i) ll.:pm I ln1c15, .. 1cJ l'1u,c» Team nrc lnsuflicicnt. Rc,l)tmsc: The l.1R nroccss is uovci;ncd h)' Joint Nuclear W1:11fl(1ns l'ublicntions System (JN\Vl'S) Ttchnical l'ublication (Tl') 5, I with the lntcw-j11!\J l'roccs.< 'l'eam co-chuiml by Siu1din Nutional l.abonuory nnd DrRA. AF p.:rsonncl und or31u1i,.u1ions �urronin11 the I Jlt proce,� "ill continue 10 c,1mrl>· with c;anbllshcd rcqulrcmem;i 11nd support prO)lrlllll linprol'CUICnlS.

( IJ) Hucon1n1tnJution A. p:11,10 6: Non,concur. 'l'uskin11 lhe llndtr St<1reml')' of lloicnnu for Acquisition, l'cchnol,1�y lllld Lo�istks. ns the NLoelcar Weapons Cowie ii Chair (NWC), hl t.'cvdnp a chnrtcr or tcm1., of reference for the UR-IPT is ou�idc t he N\\'C"s SC<lpc of n:spunslblllilcs as currcmly pnll'lc.lcu In l'uhllc J..iw 1'1llc JO. :'icctlnn I 79. /\cJcJlllnn�I uuldancc to sircny1hcn 1hc wl,� 111lll rt'ilpon,ihilitie11. frc<.lruck mct·h•nimu. 111-.J r<j1<1Ming •tructuru rrtJuircd 10 properly implcmem th,• L'R pcocess could bt' nddcd 10 TP 5-1:. 11hich is publi�h,'il umkr thc u111hnrily nf1he Sccrcturicrnfthc AMII)', Nul'y, :m<l Air Force: the l>lrcctor, l)clcmc ·n,rcdl Rcductlou AIJcncy; 011J 1h1: l:>s:pullmcm of !!11<:rlJ).

(U) l:iru!.in\:...f. p��c 7: Disparotc l'ulicks and Processes lh1,·c Led to lncfficic11cics. lkiponsc: 'I he tm pm,1::.0 i, governed hy JNWl'S l'I' 5-1. Whcrc appmprinlc ,1un1l11rJiYi11ion shnuld I><: cnc<lum�oed. ho11cvc1: diflcrcncci between the scrl'il.'Cs. weapon�. and wcopon 1ksi11n uucncic� will allow for only so much sumdnrdm1tinn. This foci is rcco11ni1.cd hy the incl11:1ion or scpnratc i\<ldcndums 111 11' 5-1 !or Scrl'kc wtl4ue rcspo1ulbilitics w1<l action�. Sw11dJrdi1..ition. in and of i1�clf. should bo pur�ucd cnutiou,I)• nnd 1101 at tho dc1rimcnt of more importrull co11,idcro1iott-1.

(l!) ltccomrncml.itlon II. I. Jl,lljc W: /\F will �11ppor1 il'thc 1>1r1:c1or. Orx,'fnlions and Nuclcnr Support, DTRA hnptcmrnl! the rccu111111c11diuion.

tll) ltccrnnmcmlution ll.2, 110111: 11: No i\F L-quily.

(U) Rccon1mcmlotion 13.3, png..: 11: Non,concur with rccommcndution lor the l'o111111u1lllcr. Air l'urw Nuclear Wc11pon Center (/\1':..WC.:). 10 rcvi�c proccc.lurcs lll rcmuvc As a result of �JunJ1111t l>IAMONl)S "'Pf'OM limctiun,, unJ oll,,w th� 1\ir r-um, unil$ l<I work ,lir('cll)' with tho manasement comments DTlli\ fund,'() DIAMONL>S support s,•r1icc,. AFNWL' pru1•idc• cs,cniiul nmn:11.1cmc111 and additional research, Ol'crsighl on<l n sin11lc f)(lint of contn(t/consolid�llon within rhc J\I' to suppo1t M' lkld units nnd dra� Recommendation l>TllA. Kcmnvln111\l'N\V(' from their "HTent mlc would ncgatl\'cly lmpac1 the Al'"s :ihlll1y tO 6.3 was deleted. rep,111 nnd 111n11ngc w:npon di8crcpancics, 11,1J to •111>poM ch:ml!c• h; 1hc UR proc"C�S.

(ll) tlrulitu:..i;. r,agc 12: llslnl! 1\lultlplc lnlhnnuilnn System� 1hr the lJR l'roccs.< I� lnenlclem. ll�.:p.">nlic: ).inking infom,ution ncl\\orL:i. uncl:i.�ifitd or clW11illcd. between dim�rcnl 11ovcmmcn1 dcpur1mcnts nnJ 011cncks ha� h<:cn cl111llc1111in11 since 1hcir inccp1ion. \\'hen: apr,ro11ri�tc. 1hc AF sur,1>or1� effort.< 111 �tr¢�1llline c1•111111unic�tic,o r>O:l\\1>1k�.

(lJ) ltccommcndntion {', pasc 14: Non-Concur. Recommending thm USl>(A'l'&l.), as the NW(' Chnir. develop n cmss-dcpJr1rncnl information technology solution which muintoins tubu,1 i111cyrtl)', )'cl UIIU\\o .:1,J-lu•Clld llull>l)Ut\.'IIC)' (() ull olll.�l.'hulJcl'l! iu lhc UR Jlr<X:CS) Upfr<:UN tn he n11uirlc 1hc NWC''s scope nf rc<pon,ihili1ic, n• current I)' pmvidcd in Puhlir Low Tille 10, Section 1711. l)ol) CIO 111oy be o more upprupriutc ullicc to 3ddrcss impmv�d �ccurc

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

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Q.ASSIFJCATION: UNCLASSIFlEO

communicutlnns within l>ol> and/or le> cn1cr ln10 di.scwsions for common infom1a1inn 1,-:hnolosr solu1im• with UR >1nkcholdcr,. If rcqocSl<d, 1\F \\ould support cffor\j 10 stt<:runli,1c con11nunicol ions bo:1wccn 1hc two dcpiV1ments.

( Ill Rccommcmlalion I>. I. p;1�'C 17: No AF ctiully.

(U) Rc,;ommcndntion D.2. pace 18· Concur. 1\F \\ill conduc1 n securil)' clM,ificn1io11 review 01'1hc Air !'ore.: NudcJr Munili,msl'on1111:md :,nd ('ontml (NMC2J Shard'ni111 site.

ClASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

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I l( 11>11, 'Ill'• I 'i JI 34

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Management Comments

(U) This Page Intentionally Blank

l)Olllfi-701f>-l:.7 I 'l�

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Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires

the Inspector General to desi9nate a Whistleblower Protection

Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions

on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for

protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline

Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against

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