THIS MOMENT OF JUNE Philosophical Elucidations in the Application of Eudaimonia

Hannah Erickson Early Modern Philosophy 7th of December, 201

Happiness: a moment in which the evident purposiveness of being stretches out before our eyes, waxing a little with the hope for a long duration, waning a little in its clarity of sensation around the periphery. It will pass through, leaving us with a rather unremarkable feeling of having been touched by something larger than ourselves that perhaps we will be able to find again; perhaps

someday, differently.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

It has often been said that, “life gets in the way of living”. In moments of choosing a path

that aims towards happiness, many of us are rendered astutely aware of the dissonance between

what the world needs from us, and what we need from ourselves. There are types of happiness

we should want. There are types of happiness we do want. These are not always compatible.

There are questions we must ask ourselves in order to bridge the distance, such as Who am I?

What makes me happy? How am I to live? Am I responsible for changing the world, or being

happy? Can I do both? In an effort to provide an answer both to myself and on principle of

application, it is my intention to uncover a guide to action that, when followed, produces an

evolutionary happiness that is grounded in an intrinsic drive not only to survive, but to survive

better. Through the works of Mill, Spinoza, and Russell, I will seek to demonstrate that

happiness is the purposive application of Eudaimonia in striving for conatus and higher

pleasures, of which intrinsically valuable activities happiness is a sustainable byproduct.

ETYMOLOGICALLY SPEAKING

Linguistic diffusion has rendered the term Eudaimonia analogous to Happiness.

Translated directly from Greek, Eudaimonia means the having of a good (eu) spirit (daimon). A

Daimon was a minor Greek deity thought to bestow upon men fortune, or justice. Aristotelian 1

conceptions of the Eudaimon, or one who lives with(in) Eudaimonia, appear to be

fundamentally contradictory to this interpretation of “spirit”, where the Eudaimon is someone

who, as Richard Kraut points out, “has fully developed and regularly exercises the various

virtues of the soul, both intellectual and moral”. The apparent dissonance between the two 2

1 Bruce Murphy, ed., Benét's Reader's Encyclopedia , 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, ©1996), 246. 2 Richard Kraut, “Two Conceptions of Happiness,” in Social and Personal Ethics,

conceptions of spirit lies in the distinction between the passive receptivity of fate, through a spirit

external to man, and the active development or exercise of virtues of the spirit, by man, himself.

On the first account, “spirit” seems to designate something strictly external. On the second,

“spirit” appears analogous to something like, “character” or “magnanimity”. For Aristotle, the

Eudaimon is one who is in possession of Eudaimonia, which turns out to be an activity,

“theoria”, of philosophical contemplation. Accordingly, he says that,

Such a person engages in philosophical activity (since this is the full flowering of his capacity to reason

theoretically) and also in moral activities, which display his justice, generosity, temperance, etc. 3

If this distinction is accurate, the adjective eu designates good fortune at the hand of a good spirit

in the first account, and goodness, or virtuousness, of man’s character in the second.

This distinction highlights one of the most important queries regarding of the nature of

human happiness: Is happiness something that happens to us, or do we create it? On the second

interpretation of Eudaimonia, the Eudaimon creates his happiness in his philosophical

contemplation of his life and pursuits. This theory, however, is an insufficient explanation as to

how Eudaimonia could be considered analogous to general happiness, whose definition is devoid

of the requirement for philosophical contemplation.

CONTEMPLATION INSUFFICIENT

How happy is a life spent in contemplation? One could contend, ‘very happy, isolated as

I am from the madness and folly of the world’. How fruitful in experience is a life spent in

contemplation? One could contend, ‘very happy, impervious as my reason is to the whims of

what my body experiences’. How bountiful is a life whose most immense joy is derived from

3rd ed., ed. William H. Shaw (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., ©1999), 226. 3 Ibid.

contemplation, alone? One could contend, ‘very happy, contingent upon myself and nothing else

as my joy is’. Of the most reticulate examples of this active contemplation and nothing else,

Immanuel Kant is one. Kant rarely strayed from his hometown in his early years, and whence he

returned to it in his early twenties, he remained there for the duration of his life. It was said that

he did not deviate from his routine even a minute, for he believed that routine was what allowed

him to maintain such a high order of intellectual engagement. Heinrich Heine noted that,

(not even the) the great clock of the cathedral...performed more dispassionately and methodically in its outward routine...than did Immanuel Kant...everything had its appointed time, and the neighbors knew for certain it was half­past three when Immanuel Kant….stepped out of his house, and strolled to the little linden avenue…(where) eight times he walked up and down it every season of the year... 4

Can it be said that Immanuel Kant, living, as it were, a life of strict contemplation, was

happy? While it is certain that the work that he produced was exemplary, the life required of

such production does not seem to align with a more intuitive sense of happiness. It is of no

wonderment that such severe introspection, day­in and day­out, of the inter­workings of his own

brain produced works complex enough to induce a catatonic stupor in attempting to unravel

them. Perhaps, then, this type of incessant contemplation is not what Eudaimonia calls for.

Eudaimonia calls for contemplation, and contemplation requires content, as our thoughts

are always about something. When the content of contemplation is grounded in things external to

oneself, moments of rare introspection become informed by the existence and vivacity of those

externalities. In being reflected upon, these externalities become named experience, due to the

fact that, as Bertrand Russell has said, “(physical) events only become experience through the

interest we take in them”. When experience, itself, is reflected upon, it bears the mark of 5

4 Heinrich Heine, "Heine on Immanuel Kant." January 1, 1973. Accessed December 8, 2014. 5 Ibid.

individuation, for it is an act of acknowledging one’s self in the dint of the experience. A

continual investigation of the individuated experience allows one to evaluate the size and shape

of the affected self he sees within himself, aptly named his character.

Where experience is capable of showing to man his character, it is reasonable to assert

that man might be inclined to shape his character to his liking, if in turning inwards to face

himself he finds something of which he is not particularly fond. Should he find reason to believe

that there is a causal relationship between experience and the shaping of his character, he might

intentionally seek out those particular experiences which are capable of shaping his character to

his liking. The objects which man contemplates, of which his character comes to be a reflection,

become vital in the shaping of character. In this way, what the Eudaimon applies his

philosophical contemplation to can shape the nature of his character, or spirit, an application

purposive in nature on the second interpretation of Eudaimonia.

SELF­REALIZATION

To what objects should the Eudaimon purposively turn his contemplation in order to

shape his character to his liking? Whatever the objects he contemplates should produce a tight

cycle of experience, reflection, and application, so he can readily measure the growth of his

character in the dint of the experiences in which he purposively participates. The cycle of

experience, reflection, and application of contemplative thought (theoria) can most accurately be

summarized by the term self­realization, which Jon Elster suggests is “the full and free

actualization and externalization of the powers and abilities of the individual”. In his article 6

regarding the merits of activities whose focus is self­realization, Jon Elster claims that, “the

6 Elstere Jon, “Self­Realization,” in Social and Personal Ethics, 3rd ed., ed. William H. Shaw (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., ©1999), 213.

central features that turn an activity into a potential vehicle for self­realization are that it has an

external goal that can be performed more or less well”. The purposive aim to acquire the skill 7

possesses a value that is two­fold for the Eudaimon. On the first merit, the skill is inherently

valuable in its direct aim (and/or achievement) of a goal that can be realized to a higher or lesser

degree. On the second merit, the self­realization comes as result of the purposive experience,

reflection, and application of the higher faculties in the aim (or acquisition) of the new skill. An

activity such is this is capable of fostering happiness as a byproduct, while giving intrinsic value

to the degrees to which the activity can be realized

To employ a concrete example, let us imagine a situation in which one teaches oneself to

play an instrument towards which one has always had a heartfelt affinity, such as the piano. The

skill required to play the piano well inheres a technical hierarchy of skill, which will accomplish

the realization of that wellness to a higher or lesser degree. The Eudaimon in question would take

it upon his or her self to deliberately engage in the task of acquiring technical understanding of

the format of musical compositions, as well as an understanding of the manner in which those

technicalities are applied to the instrument to produce a certain sound, or system of sounds.

Within the learning process, the Eudaimon experiences technical understanding, reflects upon

what deficits exist, and returns to the piano with a purposive mind to apply what he or she knows

and fix any technical insufficiencies present, a cycle which could go on infinitely. Thus, the

activity which is capable of fostering self­realization is productive of happiness, and also gives

intrinsic value to the degrees to which the activity can be realized.

OF HIGHER PLEASURES

7 Elstere Jon, “Self­Realization,” in Social and Personal Ethics, 3rd ed., ed. William H. Shaw (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., ©1999), 212.

Two primary types of objects appear to be the most fruitful to the cycle of

self­realization: objects of higher pleasure, and objects of virtue. These activities are capable of

fostering the type of by­productive happiness Mill referred to in his Crisis in My Mental History

when he said that, “on some art of pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal

end...aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way”. Such activities, Mill said 8

famously, would preclude things like “pushpin”, and value instead things like poetry. Higher

pleasures, in of themselves valuable and capable of producing a sustainable, evolutionary

byproduct of happiness in their aim (and potential achievement) of being realized to a higher or

lesser degree, are those same pleasures which both request and require the application of

Eudaimonia. Higher pleasures, engaging the intellectual, reflective, or moral sentiments, can be

said to extend to any act which in of itself and the degrees to which it can be realized, chiefly

extends to activities of craftsmanship, art, education, morality, and aestheticism. 9

In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill rendered himself a staunch advocate for the

importance of seeking what he calls higher pleasures. Higher pleasures, he said, or those

pleasures which are, “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral

8 Ibid, 210. 9 There has been ample criticism to Mill’s claim regarding the superiority of higher pleasures to lower ones, the duration of this article being insufficient to adequately address them. The point of acknowledging the happiness that may come as a byproduct of the activities which align with the features of self­realization is captured by Bertrand Russell’s sentiment regarding different pleasures:

Pleasures exactly similar to those of my gardener so far as their emotional content is concerned are open to the most highly educated people. The difference made by education is only in regard to the activities by which these pleasures are to be obtained. (Conquest of Happiness, P. 133)

The point, rather, of cultivating a list of sorts of activities which might be more inclined to foster self­realization is that the nature of their complexity and interrelationship of parts is one which, in being acknowledged in its total scope, requires a more stringent, purposive contemplation.

sentiments”. Where the pleasures of sensation come into contact or conflict with those higher 10

pleasures and one is made to choose between them, those who are acquainted with both will,

“give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher

faculties”. On this reading, Mill appears to be in support of the experience, reflection, and 11

contemplation of the outward content which demands the use of higher faculties, namely those of

intellect, imagination, and moral sentiments, for he says the “cultivated mind...finds sources of

inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it” , whose “test of quality...must be added to the 12

habits of self­consciousness and self­observation”. We turn, now, to the second category of 13

contemplated objects capable of producing happiness as a byproduct: objects of virtue.

CONATUS

In his Ethics, Baruch Spinoza distinguishes between inadequate and adequate ideas, the

former being passive, or receptive, such as ideas of passion, and the latter being active; ideas that

result in action. The understanding, he says, is an active idea which “transforms the passions

(passive ideas) into active, rational emotions­the source of freedom and virtue”, a vital process 14

whose force of determination allows for the implementation of that power in its effect on other

things, “...for such a thing to ‘persist in being’ is precisely for it to have effects on other things”.

This determination, called conatus, is had by all finite things, as they, “not only strive to

maintain their present existence...but strive for joy, that is, for increase in the power of acting”.

10 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 2nd ed., ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2001), 8. 11 Ibid, 9. 12 Ibid, 10. 13 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 2nd ed., ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2001), 1. 14 Genevieve Lloyd, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza and the Ethics, Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks (London: Routledge, 1996), 72.

Through the body, the mind exercises its conatus in the transformation of passions into actions,

aimed ultimately at self­preservation and the attainment of joy.

With a nature of evolution in mind, Spinoza’s views on the necessary exertion of a force

which ensures not only the persistence, but the joy of being appear to be succinctly aligned with

Mill’s account of why one chooses higher pleasures. Desire, the emotion whose driving force is

conatus, is fueled towards a vision of self­directed evolution through an exposure to experiences

which require an active determination in order to ensure self­preservation. This intentional

exposure to experience that is productive of joy draws on a fundamental determination to not

only survive, but to survive better. Spinoza’s account of conatus calls on a compelling argument

for the need to expose oneself to activities which are purposive in of themselves with the aim of

performing them ‘more or less well’, or activities which enable the tight circuit of

self­realization, particularly where he says that

First, if something increases the body’s power of acting, the corresponding idea (under parallelism) of that something increases the mind’s power of acting. Second, things have a tendency to hang on to—it belongs to their conatus to conserve—those effects that increase their power of acting. 15

In his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza gives further testimony to the

detriment of pursuing what Mill would call “lower pleasures”, namely those of bodily pleasure,

or pleasures whose aims are in of themselves designed only with material acquisition in mind,

such as those powers of fame and riches with which the, “mind is so absorbed that it has little

power to reflect on any different good”. The passionate vicissitudes inextricably linked to the 16

acquisition of such simple (and often fleeting) ends reverts the mind back to a state of

15 John Carriero, “Conatus and Perfection in Spinoza1,” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 35, no. 1 (December 2011): p. 79. 16 Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics; Treatise On the Emendation of the Intellect; Selected Letters, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1992), Section 3.

receptivity, wherein the forces of determinism must actively counteract the external forces at

work which hold an aim to destroy, as opposed to foster or better, the body through which the

mind exercises its conatus.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Is happiness something that happens to us, or do we create it? On the second

interpretation of Eudaimonia, the Eudaimon creates his happiness in his philosophical

contemplation of his life and pursuits. This theory, however, is an insufficient explanation as to

how Eudaimonia could be considered analogous to general happiness, whose definition is devoid

of the requirement for philosophical contemplation. The objects which man contemplates and the

activities in which man intentionally participates with a view to better himself both request and

require the application of Eudaimonia, which produces a tight cycle of experience, reflection,

and application, so he can continually measure the growth of his character in the dint of the

experiences in which he purposively participates. This cycle, called Self­Realization, whether

done with an aim to survive or survive better, allows that happiness is the purposive application

of Eudaimonia in the region of activities that are, in possessing the possibility of being realized

to a higher or lesser degree, intrinsically valuable. These are the activities in which happiness

becomes a sustainable, evolutionary byproduct, for happiness is not, as Aristotle has said, a

target at which we, like archers, must directly aim.

Works Cited

Carriero, John. “Conatus and Perfection in Spinoza1.” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 35, no. 1 (December 2011): 69­92. Accessed December 11, 2014.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misp.2011.35.issue­1.

Elster, Jon. “Self­Realization.” In Social and Personal Ethics. 3rd ed, edited by William H.

Shaw, 211­18. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., ©1999. Heine, Heinrich. "Heine on Immanuel Kant." January 1, 1973. Accessed December 8, 2014. Koistinen, Olli, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge Companions to

Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Kraut, Richard. "Two Conceptions of Happiness." In Social and Personal Ethics, 226. 3rd ed.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 94002. Lloyd, Genevieve Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza and the Ethics. Routledge

Philosophy Guidebooks. London: Routledge, 1996. Mill, J.S. “A Crisis in My Mental History.” In Social and Personal Ethics. 3rd ed, edited by

William H. Shaw, 206­10. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., ©1999. Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. 2nd ed. Edited by George Sher. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.,

2001. Murphy, Bruce, ed. Benét's Reader's Encyclopedia . 4th ed. New York: HarperCollinsPublishers,

©1996. Russell, Bertrand. The Conquest of Happiness. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation,

2013. Spinoza, Baruch. The Ethics; Treatise On the Emendation of the Intellect; Selected Letters. 2nd

ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1992.