The Vdticdn dnd the Wdr in the F m Emt, 1941-1943

BY DAVID J . ALVAREP

ITH the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Holy See assumed an important role in international diplomacy. From the first days of fighting, Pope Pius XI1 worked to secure a peaceful settlement of the conflict, while papal

diplomats assisted the victims of war and defended Church interests against encroachments by the Allied and Axis powers. At thevatican, representatives of the belligerents competed for the favor of the Pope and pursued the latest intelligence in reports that Howed into the Vatican from around the world. With global interest5 and a global organization, the Holy See was especially sensitive to the military and political currents 01 a world war. Historians of the Second World War, however, have focused upon the Vatican’s role in Europe while ignoring its activity in other theaters of war. An analysis 01 the Vatican’s role in the Far East during the critical period 1941-43 may enhance our understanding of papal wartime diploma( y and illuminate a little-known aspect of the war in the Pacific.

LJntil 1941, the Holy See limited its presence in the Far East to missionary and educational work. Traditionally, it depended upon Portugal, Spain, and France to assert and protect Church interests in the region in return for the prestige and inHuence accruing to the role of “Guardian of the Faith.” Attempts by the Vatican to secure an independent diplomatic status invariably collapsed before the opposition of the imperial powers or the anti-Catholic sentiment of the indigenous regimes. When Pope Leo XI11 sought to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1886, France, which claimed a protertorate over Catholics in China, threatened to break its own relations with the Vatican and terminate subsidies to the French Catholic Church. France, this time in cooperation with the LJnited States, intervened again in 1918 to block relations between the Holy See and China. In Japan, where the status of the Church varied historically from outright persecution to uneasy tolerance, an attempt by the Japanese government in 1922 to improve relations with the

* T h e author is Assistant Professor of Government a[ Saint Maiy’s College of California.

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Vatican through an exchange of envoys failed because of Buddhist oppos tion.’

The issue of papal diplomatic representation in the Far East remained dormant until 1939 when rumors of Japan’s renewed interest in relations with the Holy See circulated in Rome and ‘Tokyo. In the summer of 1940, an unofficial agent, Shinjiro Yokibe, a Catholic professor from Kobe, appeared at the Vatican to investigate prospects for diplomaticrelations.2 TheYokibemissionproduced no results but Tokyo maintained its interest. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was especially committed to cultivating close contacts with the Holy See. In January 1941, Matsuoka expressed to Monsignor Paul Marella, the Apostolic Delegate to Japan, his interest in diplomatic relations between Japan and the Holy See. In subsequent meetings, he missed no opportunity to assure Monsignor Marella of his admiration for the Pope. The Japanese press echoed the Foreign Minister in articles praising Catholicism and calling for formal relations with the Vatican, while a patriotic society circulated a petition expressing similar sentiments.3

Admiration for the papacy was not the motive behind Japan’s interest. Since 1931, Tokyo had been engaged in military operations to secure control over Manchuria and other strategic territories in China. By 1941, the imperial vision of Japanese policy makers had broadened to include Indo-China and the Southwestern Pacific. The United States, however, opposed Japanese hegemony in the Far East and organized a diplomatic campaign to frustrate Tokyo’s ambitions. Matsuoka hoped to use the Vatican to enhance Japan’s expansionist policies. An exchange of diplomats with the Holy See would lend a certain respectability to Japan at a time when world opinion increasingly suspected it of militarism and aggression. More importantly, friendly relations with the Vatican could provide Japan an opportunity to influence public opinion in countries like the United States that had significant Catholic populations.

Louis Wei Tsing-sing, Le Saint Si?ge, la France et la Chine sous le Pontificat de Leon X I l I (Schoneck-Beckenried, 1966), passim; H. M. Cole, “Origins of the French Protectorate over Catholic Missions in China,” American Journal of International Law 34 (July 1940): 478-82; David J. Alvarez, “The Department 01 Stateand the Abortive Papal Mission to China, August 1918,” Catholic Historical Review 62 (July 1976): 455-63; Anthony Rhodes, The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators, 1922-1945 (New York, 1973). 307.

Notes of Hurley, 7/4/40, Actes et Documents du Saint Si?ge Relatif a la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Vatican City, 1967 -), 495 (hereafter cited as Actes et Documents).

Marella to Maglione, 1/20/41, Actes et Documents, 4358; Marella to Maglione, 6/20/41, ibid., 564; Marella to Maglione, 7/5/41, ibid., 5:74. An ApostolicDelegate hasno diplomatic status, and, theoretically, he limits his responsibility toecclesiastical affairs in the country to which he is delegate. In practice, however, a delegate mainrainsinformal contacts with the host government.

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Matsuoka pursued his objective throughout the early months of 1941. In Tokyo, the Foreign Minister suggested toMonsignor Marella that, in order to reverse the deterioration in American-Japanese relations, the Pope should use his influence with American Catholics to restrain the anti-Japanese policies of the United States governmcnt.4 During a visit to Europe in the spring, Matsuoka called upon Pope Pius XI1 and dicussed the Far Eastern situation with Luigi Car-dinal Maglione, the papal Secretary of State. After remarking that the world crisis merely reflected a deeper spiritual malaise which only the efforts of spiritual leaders could remedy, the Foreign Ministct turned to the specifics of Japanese policy. He warned the Cardinal Secretary of State that an extension of the European conflict to other regions would threaten civilization. To avert such a disaster, the 1Jnited States must remain out of the European war and refrain from provoking Japan into a new war in the Pacific, which Tokyo wishrd to avoid. Toward this end, Matsuoka suggest.ed that the Vatican should persuade President Frankl in D. Koosevelt to intervcnc with Generalissimo Chiang h i - shek to end the Sino-Japanese conflict. He argued that Japan was not China’s enemy but fought only to prevent the expansion of bolshevism into Asia. President Koosevelt should trust Japan’s intentions and make a conciliatory gesture that would reestablish peace in the Far East. The alternative was a further deterioration of relations that would lrad to war.5

Maglione applauded Matsuoka’s desire for peace but doubted that the Vatican could intervene. He reminded the Japanese envoy that the United States was firm in its commitment toaidBritain against theAxis and, in a veiled reference to Japan’s adherence to the Axis in the Tripartite Pact of 1940, suggested that i t was difficult to separate events in Europe from events in the Far East. T h e Japanese Foreign Minister replied that peace in the Orient was the first step toward a general peace, and he insisted that President Roosevelt should takc the initiative. Maglione remained skeptical about the Vatican’s ability to influence the United States but he assured Matsuoka that the Holy See would take every opportunity to promote peace.6

Matsuoka’s resignation from the Japanese cabinet in July 1941 did not dampen Tokyo’s interest. Since war with the United States seemed inevitable, friendly relations with the Holy See became even more important. Once embarked upon war, Japan would need a way to end the fighting on favorable terms before the 1Jnited States could bring its economic and industrial superiority to bear. The prospect of a

Marrlla 10 Maglione, 1/20/41, Acks et DocurnentJ, 4: 358. Notes of the Secretariat of State, 4/2/41, Actes et Documents, 4: 432-37. Ibid.

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prolonged war in which Japan would eventually succumb before the greater resources of America worried the more moderate officials in the Japanese government. Speaking for the militants, the Minister of Defense, General Hideki Tojo, assuaged this concern by maintaining that Japan, after securing its objectives in the first months of war, would use the Vatican to mediate an end to the fighting. Similar optimism pervaded the highest circles of Japanese government. In mid-October 1941, Emperor Hirohito warned his Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Koichi Kido, that it was essential to prepare measures for ending the imminent war and advised closer contacts with the Vatican for this purpose.’

The Holy See discretely encouraged this interest in the expectation that closer relations would enhance the Vatican’s ability to protect Church interests in Japan. By 1941 there were approximately twenty- five hundred priests and religious serving one hundred and twenty thousand Catholics in Japan. Since 1934, the Japanese government, reflecting nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments, had sought to supervise Christian religious and educational activity and to remove Western influence from Christian organizations. In April 1940, the Japanese Diet promulgated the Religious Organizations Bill which brought all religions under closer governmental control. Shortly afterward, the Vatican replaced all foreign bishops in Japan with native priests and diocesan administrators. With relations between Church and State increasingly uncertain, i t was vital for the Holy See to improve its access to the Japanese government.*

As early as the fall of 1939, the Holy See had informed Japan that the Pope would consider a proposal to establish relations, Both parties, however, remained cautious. The Japanese government did not immediately move beyond expressions of interest to make a formal proposal. The Foreign Ministry along with certain officials in the cabinet and court supported recognition of the Holy See, but vocal elements in the army, the bureaucracy, and the intellectual community feared that such action would increase the influence of the Church and encourage among Japanese Catholics a conflict between religious and political loyalties.9 Monsignor Marella was also a restraining influence. The Apostolic Delegate in Tokyo warned the Vatican that diplomatic relations would not necessarily improye the position of the Church in Japan since Japan’s interest in relations reflected purely

John Toland, The Rzsing Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York, 1970), 179; Robert Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford, 196l), 277.

* Jean Monsterleet, Bilan et Prospective du Catholicisme au Japon (Paris, 1967), 134-36; Johannes Laures, The Catholic Church in Japan (Rutland, Vt., 1954), 244.

Marella to Maglione. 1/20/41, Actes et Documents, 4: 359; Marella to Maglione, 7/5/41, ibid., 5: 74-76; Secretariat of State to the Special Delegation of Japan, 10/3/42, ibid., 763, n. 2.

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selfish concrrns. Marella reported that the Foreign Ministry had no interest in the ecclesiastical problems of the Church and wished only to enhance Japan’s foreign policy. Also, the Japanese army and police, despite official assurances of goodwill, continued to harass Catholics and impede the work of the Church.lo

The outbreak of war in the Pacific on December 7 , 1941, was the catalyst that forced the two parties together. The Holy See could not remain aloof from events in the Far East. Within weeks the conquest of Hong Kong, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines brought eighteen million Catholics under Japanese control.” More than ever it was important for thevatican to formalize relations with Japan in defense of Church interests in the expanding Japanese empire. Moreover, if the Church was to perform its traditional humanitarian work of war rclief, it would have to deal wirh Japanese occupation authorities who were ignorant of the Church and its mission. Formal contacts with Tokyo would facilitate such dealings. For its part, Tokyo recognized the utility of closer relations with the Holy See in consolidating its control over conquered terri- tories such as the Phillipines that had large Catholic populations. Relations with the Vatican would also enhance the international status of Japan and, possibly, influence public opinion in Latin America and such neutral countries as Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.

On January 21, 1942, Francesco Babuscio Rizzo, counselor of the Italian embassy at the Vatican, informed Cardinal Maglione that Japan wished to send an envoy to the Holy See. The Cardinal Secretary of State assured the Italian diplomat that the Holy Father would respond favorably. On January 30, thc Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, handed Monsignor Marella a formal request by Japan to accredit an “Extraordinary Representative” to the Vatican. Rather than a pcrmanent embassy or legation, the Japanese planned to dispatch a special mission similar to that of Myron Taylor from the United States.“ Although the papal Secretariat of State preferred to receive a full embassy, it did not make this preference a precondition. Pope Pius approved the Japanese proposal, and on January 31, Maglionc notified Marella that the Vatican would receive a diplomatic mission

Japan seized the initiative, using Italy as an intermediary.

10 Marella to Maglione, 1/20/41, Actrs rt Documents, 4: 359. ‘ I Rhodes, The Vatican in the Age of the IXctators. 307. I2 Notes of Tardini, 1/21/42, Actes et Documents, 5: 384-85; Marella LO Maglione,

1/30/42, ibid., 398-99. For domestic political reasons, President Franklin D. Roosevelt could nor establish formal relations with the Vatican by nominating an ambassador or minister. To circumvent this problcm, the President appointed Myron C. Taylor as his “personal rqmwntalivr” 10 Pow Pius XII. See, John S. Conway, “Myron C:. Taylor’s Mission t o the Vatican. 1940-1950,’’ Church Ifistory 44 (Marrh 1975): 85-99.

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from Japan. l 3

As a gesture of courtesy to the Allies, Cardinal Maglione confidentially informed the British Minister to the Holy See, Sir Francis d’Arcy Osborne, and the American charge‘ d’affaires, Harold Tittman, that the Vatican intended to receive a Japanese mission. The information surprised the Allied representatives. When Harold Tittman suggested that the United States would not welcome such news, the Cardinal replied that he could understand America’s disappointment but the Holy See had important ecclesiastical interests in the Far East and i t could not ignore the opportunity to normalize relations with Japan.14

As Tittman predicted, word of the Vatican- Japanese agreement stirred apprehension in London and Washington. At the Department of State, American officials were already concerned that recent Axis victories would convince the Vatican that the Allied cause was hopeless and encourage the Pope to make an untimely plea for a negotiated settlement. A Japanese mission would amplify the Axis voice at the Vatican during a n especially critical period for Allied diplomacy.15 American and British diplomats also feared that, by establishing relations with Tokyo, the Holy See would appear to recognize Japanese conquests in the Far East. This would influence Catholic sentiment in China, the Philippines, and Latin America, and further undermine the precarious strategic position of the Allies. On February 23, Sir Francis Osborne presented Pope Pius a memorandum detailing his government’s opposition to the agreement with Japan. Britain argued that the Vatican’s action would be misinterpreted as condonation of Japanese aggression and atrocities in the Far East. Discounting the importance of Church interests in the region, His Majesty’s Government charged that the Pope had unnecessarily deferred to Axis pressure. Harold Tittman also expressed to the Secretariat of State his government’s concern that Tokyo was attempting to manipulate world opinion.I6

I s Notes of Tardini, 1/21/42, Actes et Documents, 5: 385; Maglione to Marella, 1/31/42, ibid., 399-400. The Vatican decided not to appoint a nuncio to Japan but to allow Monsignor Marella to continue to represent thevatican without formal diplomatic rank.

Huddle to the Secretary of State, 2/9/42, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, vol. 3 , Europe (Washington, 1961), 778 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations). Harold Tittrnan, as assistant to Myron Taylor, represented American interests at the Vatican during Taylor’s absence in Washington.

I 5 David J. Alvarez, “The United States, the Vatican, and World War 11,” Research Studies 40 (December 1972): 242-43.

l 6 Secretary of State to Huddle, 2/17/42, Foreign Relations, 779; Osborne to Pius XII, 2/23/42, Actes et Documents, 5 : 447-48; Osborne to Maglione, 2/26/42, ibid., 451. Despite British suspicions, Japan did not consult with its Axis allies before approaching the Vatican. See, Notes of Tardini, 3/8/42, ibid., 469.

Germany was as surprised by the action as the Allies.

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In the face of such protests, the Secretariat of State sought to downplay the significance of the agreement. It noted that the Vatican and Toyko had agreed to establish relations as early as 1922 but that Japanese domestic politics had delayed implementation of the plan. The present agreement, thus, was not a sudden decision but merely the culmination of previous negotiations. The Vatican also refused to judge Japan’s motives. It argued that, in establishing relations with other governments, all states consider their own interests, and relations with the Holy See were no exception. No one should be surprised that Japan, just like Britain and the United States, desired to protect its interests through contacts with the Holy See. Indeed, the Vatican itself expected to use relations with Japan to enhance its ability to protect Catholics in conquered territories.17

When Monsignor Egidio Vagnozzi, auditor of the Apostolic Delegation in Washington, called at the State Department on March 3 to explain the background of the Vatican’s decision, he found a n unsympathetic audience. Undersecretary of S Late Sumner Welles told Monsignor Vagnozzi that he found it “incredible” that the Holy See would receive a Japanese delegation when Japan was committing atrocities against civilians and religious establishments in the Philippines and announcing its intention to rid Asia of all European influence including Christianity. The Undersecretary warned that the Vatican’s action would stimulate an unfavorable reaction among Americans. Welles reiterated this concern to Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, the Apostolic Delegate, when the prelate called at the State Department on March 6 . Having just discussed the matter with President Roosevelt, Welles informed Cico,gnani that the President could not believe that the Pope would consent to receive a delegation from Japan at this time.’*

Better than their superiors in Romp, Church officials in Washington perceived the depth of American animosity toward Japan after Pearl H a r b o r a n d feared expos ing the Holy See to tha t animosity. Monsignor Vagnozzi admitted to Sumner Welles that the Vatican’s decision would have a disastrous effect on American public opinion, while Monsignor Michael Ready, Secretary General of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and an important link between the American hierarchy and the government, was “profoundly outraged” by the decision.19 Archbishop Cicognani believed that the

These arguments did not console the Allies.

I7 Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State, 3/3/42. Foreign Relations. 780- 81; Notes of Tardini, 3/2/42, Arks el Documents, 5: 455-57.

Memoranda by Wrlles, 3/’3/42, 3/6,’42, Foreign Relations. 779-82. l 9 Mrniorandum by Wrllts, .W3/42, Forrzgn Krh!zons , 780; Wrlles rn K o o ~ v c l i ,

3/14/12, Plesident’s Secretary’s File, Spellman, Box 185, Franklin D. Koosrvrlt Papers,

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action would fuel the propaganda of anti-Catholic elements in the United States. The Archbishop reported to the Vatican that the Apostolic Delegation was receiving letters attacking the Pope and that American newspapers were questioning the neutrality of the Holy See. He noted that even Catholics were disturbed and were requesting an explanation of the Vatican’s action.*O

The heated reaction in London and Washington surprised the Holy See. Papal diplomats suddenly faced a serious dilemma. The Japanese mission threatened to disrupt the Vatican’s relations with Britain and the United States, but the Holy See could not reverse its decision without appearing submissive to the Allies. The Secretariat of State, moreover, remained convinced that relations with Japan were necessary to protect Church interests in the Far East. Noting that reports from Washington were “very serious” and that the Holy See must prepare for “unpleasant repercussions,” Monsignor Domenico Tardini, papal Undersecretary of State, outlined a course of action. The Vatican would affirm its decision to recognize Japan. The Secretariat of State would, in the meantime, provide the Apostolic Delegates in London and Washington with complete information concerning the background of Vatican- Japanese negotiations and the motives behind the Holy See’s decision. The papal nuncios in belligerent and neutral capitals, especially in Latin America, would be instructed to explain thevatican’s position to their host governments in order to counter attempts by either the Allies or the Axis to exaggerate the affair. In order to disarm unfavorable propaganda, Tardini recommended using the Vatican radio and the newspaper L’Osseruatore Romano and placing news releases in the neutral press.21

After intensive deliberations, Pope Pius and Cardinal Maglione adopted Tardini’s program. The United States received special attention. On March 12, Maglione informed Cicognani that the Holy See would not reverse its decision. He noted that the reception of a Japanese mission did not diminish the Vatican’s neutrality since, by accepting delegations from all the belligerents, the Vatican

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter referred to as Roosevelt Papers).

In their concern over papal policy, Church officials often worked at cross-purposes with the Vatican. Monsignor Ready urged Sumner Welles to have President Roosevelt complain to Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York while Archbishop C i c o p n i advised the State Department to make forceful representations to Cardinal Maglione and Monsignor Domenico T d i n i , the influential papal undersrcretary of stare. Cicognani admitted to Weilrs that he could see no justifiable reason for thc Vatican’s decision. See, Welles to Koowvclt. 3/14;12, PSY, Slxllman, Hox 1x5, Kooscvcl~ Papers. Mrmorandurrl I,y C\’rllea, 3/6,’42, Forczgn Krlnlzons, 782.

20 Cicognani to Maglione, 3/5/42, Actes et Documents, 5: 462-63.

21 Notes of Tardini, 3/8/12, Actcs el Zhrunwnts, 5 : 472-73.

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demonstrated its impartiality and enhanced its ability to pursue charitable works in all nations. Maglione emphasized that the reception of a diplomatic mission did not imply approval of any state’s actions or sympathy toward any particular block of states. ‘The Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Apostolic Delegate to explain these principles to American officials while mobilizing the American hierarchy to disseminate the Vatican’s arguments among the population.22

When informed by Archbishop Cicognani of the Vatican’s position, officials in the State Department realized that the United States could do little to weaken the resolution of the Holy See. In response they adjusted the focus of American policy. The LJnited States would continue to seek a reversal of the Vatican’s decision. Toward this end, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote, on March 14, to his friend Archbishop Francis Sprllmari of New York concerning “a mattcr- which has disturbed me very much.” Roosevelt maintained that the Holy See had committed a serious error in not deferring Japan’s request to some future time. While indicating that he would say nothingofficially, the President informed Archbishop Spellman that the affair would create an unfortunate reaction against the Holy Sce.23 At the same time, however, that Roosevelt reiterated America’s displeasurc with the Japanese mission, the State Department worked to turn the incident to the advantage of the Allies.

When Cardinal Maglione first informed Sir Francis Osborne and IIarold Tittman of the agreement to accept a Japanese delegation, the American charge d’affaires had inquired if the Holy See would receive representatives from other belligerents such as the Soviet LJnion. Maglione had laughed and rejoined, “At any rate those gentlemen have not asked so far.” Despite the Cardinal’s flippancy, Harold Tittman, in subsequent conversations with Maglione and his assistant, Monsignor Giovanni Montini, gained the impression that a Soviet mission to the Vatican would be an acceptable counterbalance to thc Japancsc. Sir Francis Osborne suggested that a delegation from China would be a more appropriatr rrsixmse to the Japanese d e m a r ~ h e . 2 ~ Events in W a s h i n g t o n coniplemented these developments at the Vatican. On March 16, Archbishop Cicognani convened a secret meeting of American archbishops to discuss papal policy in the Far East. The prelates told the Apostolic Delegate that the recognition of Japan would create animosity toward the Holy See. The archbishops suggested that the Vatican could mitigate this

22 Maglionc to Cirognani. 3/12/42, Actes rt I>ocunzents, 5: 479-81. ?’ K C M W V ~ I ~ 10 Spcllman, 3: 14/42, PSE‘, Spellman, Box 185, Rooscvc.11 Papcrs. 24 Hirddlr to the Scrrrtary of State, 2;9,/42. F o r c + p Relations, 778; Tirtman t o the

Secrc.tiiry of State, 3/ti/42, ihid., 783.

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reaction by also establishing relations with China. Cicognani forwarded this recommendation to the Vatican while Archbishop Spellman, during a private visit to the White House on March 17, mentioned the idea to President Roosevelt.25

The prospect of a Chinese mission at the Vatican attracted American policy makers. President Roosevelt was especially enthusiastic. He hoped to induce not only China but also Australia and the Netherlands to establish relations with the Vatican in the expectation that Japan would, in disgust, abandon its own project. At worst, increased Allied representation would counter any Japanese propaganda advantage and, perhaps, increase Allied influence at the Holy See.26 Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles discussed the matter with the Minister of the Netherlands, Alexander Loudon, on March 19. The Dutch diplomat endorsed the idea and recommended it to his government, then in exile in London. Shortly thereafter, Archbishop Cicognani received a visit from ‘I.V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, then visiting the [Jnited States, who announced his government’s desire to establish relations with the Holy See.27

The possibility of additional diplomatic missions at theVatican also pleased papal officials. New missions would increase the international status of the Holy See and enhance its ability to protect Church interests. Although the Secretariat of State squelched rumors of a possible Russian embassy by insisting on preliminary evidence of religious toleration in the Soviet Union, it had no reservations about missions from other Allied states. On March 28, Cardinal Maglione notified Archbishop Cicognani that the Pope would receive a delegation from China and, subsequently, the Holy See agreed to establish relations with the Netherlands28

I t was Japan’s turn to protest. The news of the Vatican’s intention to recognize China arrived in Tokyo shortly after the Foreign Ministry announced that Ken Harada, formerly of the Japanese legation in Switzerland, would proceed to the Vatican as Special Delegate with the rank of ambassador.*g The news spreadrapidly, arousing the ire of officials and ordinary citizens. The Archbishop of Tokyo, Peter

25 Cicognani to Maglione, 3/18/42, Actes et Documents, 5: 491-93. e6 Memorandum by Welles, 3/19/42, Foreign Relations, 787-88. 27 Ibid.; Cicognani to Maglione, 3/22/42, Actes et Ilocuments, 5: 494. ** Harrison to the Secretary of State, 3/19/42, Foreign Relations, 787; Maglione to

Cicognani. 3/28/42, Artes rt Ihcuments, 5:507. On June 24, 1942. the Chinese govc’mmc*nl announced the appointment o f Chou Kang Sit. as ministrr tr) tht. Holy Sec. Arrdngemrnrb tor diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Netherlands were completed in August 1943, but the German occupation of Rome delayed the arrival of a Dutch mission until June 1944.

The Vatican did not appoint a nuncio to China until 1946.

29 Tojo to Maglione, 3/26/42, Actrs et Documents, 5: 502.

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Tatsuo Doi, at first refused to believe the reports, assuming, given Japanese animosity toward China, that the consequences of such an action for the Church i n Japan would obviously br serious. A[ the. time thew wrrr already signs of incrwsing hosiility ioward ihr Church with magazine and newspaper articles calling for the destruction of Catholicism as a corrupt occidental influence. The Archbishop warned the Apostolic Delegate in Tokyo that the recognition of China would alienate the influential military establishment and further undermine relations between the Church and the government. As if to reinforce the prelate's warning, the Japanese Foreign Ministry did not even await the arrival at the Vatican of its special delegate before informing the Holy See, through the Italian Government, of its opposition to the recognition of C:hina."o

The € 1 0 1 ~ See was unmovcd by thrst. protests. Marshaling argurnrnts already familiar to the Allies, the Secretariat o f Staic explained that the interests of the Church, in particular the extensive missionary activity in China, and the responsibility to promote charitable work among the victims of war, required the Vatican to improve relations with China.sl Tokyo tried to steal a trick from the Allies by suggesting that the Pope also receive a delegation from Manchukuo, a rump state which Japan had organized in 1932 from territory conquered from China. Japan noted that fifteen states recognized this regime which controlled a large part of northern China including many missionary districts. Papal impartiality, however, did not extend to the recognition of puppet governments. Realizing that the handful of states which recognized Manchukuo were largely associates of Japan and the Axis, and that the government of Chiang Kai-shek still controlled extensive territory and a large population, the Secretariat of State concluded that the Nationalist regime remained the legitimate government of China. Moreover, the Holy See traditionally declined to recognize any state which arose from a war until the final peace settlement legitimized its status. When the newly arrived Japanese envoy, Ken Harada, argued that Manchukuo had been established before a formal declaration of war between China and Japan, Cardinal Maglione reminded him that a de facto state of war had existed at the time of the appearance of Manchukuo. Ambassador Harada eventually admitted that, although insulting to Japan, the Vatican's position was juridically correct.32

30 Marella t o Maglione, 4/5/42, Acfes el Documents, 5: 513; Notes of the Secretariat of

3 1 Maglione to Marella, 4/11/42, Actes et Documents, 5 : 526. 32 Notes of Maglione,4/20/42,5/12/42,and.5/16/12,Artrsrt~orum~nts,5: 546.565-

66. 570-71. In 1943 the Vatican invoked its nonrecognition policy whcn ,Japant-sc clirnr regimes in Burma and the Phillipinrs sought to c~stahlish relations with thc Holy See. See, Maglione to Marella, 8/26/43, zhid., 7: 587; Notesof Maglione, 10/22/43, zbzd., 679.

State, 4/8/12, ihzd., 51.5-16.

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Developments in the Far East soon confirmed for papal diplomats the importance of an affirmative policy in that region. Since Japan’s conquest of the western Pacific in the early months of 1942, the Holy See had assumed an important responsibility for war relief, especially among the civilian and military personnel of Allied countries interned or captured by the Japanese. Aside from its humanitarian aspects, papal intervention on behalf of Allied captives had an important political dimension. By 1942, Britain suspected the Holy See of placating the Axis in Europe and the Far East and, as a result, London decided to make the status of Allied captives in the Pacific a test of the Vatican’s goodwill and im~artiality.3~ Throughout the spring, the Foreign Office pressed the Holy See for information concerning the c oridition of the prisoners and internees. In early May, the Secretariat of Statr, relying on preliminary reports from Hong Kong and Japan, reported that the condition of the captives was satisfactory. On May 21, Cardinal Maglione asked Ambassador Harada to intercede with his government to cooperate in securing information about prisoners and internees. The Cardinal Secretary of State also instructed Monsignor Marella to press the Japanese Foreign Ministry to establish a central clearing house for such information. As a result of Vatican intervention, Japan agreed, in August 1942, to reply to all requests, transmitted through the Apostolic Delegation, for information concerning Allied citizens in occupied territories. In return, Japan cxpec ted the Holy See to secure news of Japanese nationals in Allied hands. Japanese authorities, however, constantly delayed implementation ot the agreement and, as late as December 1942, Monsignor Marella complained of Japan’s reluctance to provide the stipulated information.34

In addition to gathering news, the Secretariat of State tried to improve the condition of Allied captives. The Vatican dispatched funds to Japan, the Philippines, Malaya, and Hong Kong for use by papal representatives in charitable work among prisoners. These expenditures, while relatively small, were a further drain on papal resources already strained by the demands and disruptions of a global war. Cardinal Maglione instructed bishops in the region to use available funds, not for the maintenance of missions but for therelief of war vi~tims.~5 The Holy See’s experience in war-torn Europe, where

33 Tittman to Welles, 6/12/42, President’s Secretary’s File, Welles, Box96, Roosevelt

34 Maglione to Marella, 7/19/42, Actes et Documents, 8: 603; Harada to Maglione,

35 Maglione to Marella, 5/11/42, Actes el Documents, 8: 533; Maglione to I t is impossible to determine from the available

Monsignor Marella receivedat least

Papers.

8/8/42, ibid., 616-17; Marella to Maglione, 12/10/42, ibid., 74344.

Constantini. 10/6/42, ibid., 67.5-74. documents the exact amounts sent to the Far East. $100,000 for use in Japan alone. See, Cicognani to Maglione, 12/2/42, ibid., 335.

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t h c ( ;r. rni ;i n a 11 t t i c x i 1 ics prohibit cri re1 i (4 w() rk m i o 1 ig t tit' C :a t t i c )I i c s ( ) f oc.c,ul)ird Poland and dcnicd p i p i t reI)r~~st"it;itiC't's ;i(ress to 1)i.isoiici -01 -

war ramps, alerted the Secretariat of State to thc difficulties o f war relief. Ilnfortunately, political and economic conditions also limitcd the Vatican's charitable activity in occupied territories in thc Far East. Japantw authorities often reslric.tc*tl iic(ws t o r)risonc.r-ol-H.ai- (-anips o r - requii-ed payxal rq~r twnta t iws to tlcposi I rdief funds with camp administrators. Rationing made purchases of clothing, food, and medicine difficult. Despite these problems, the Vatican's humanitarian efforts did respond to an important need. Even the suspicious Foreign Office recognized the significance of the work and formally expressed Britain's appreciation to the Holy See.36

While aiding the victims o f war, papal diplomats also had to protect Church interests in the Far East, in particular the independence and integrity of the Catholic Churc~h in China and the Philippines. The situation in the Philippines was especially uncertain. Early reports from the islands wrre optimistic. The Apostolic Delegate in Manila, Monsignor Guglielmo Piani, reported that, faced with a largely Chtholir population, the Japanese occupation officials were disposed to respect the position of the Church and approach religious affairs in a conciliatory mannet-. Piani thought the time opportune for negotiations bctwccn thc Holy Scc and Japan concerning the Church's rights in such arcas as ecclesiastical property, religious instruction, and marriage laws.:i7 From 'I'okyo, however, Monsignor Marella offered a more pessimistic appraisal of Japan's intentions. He reported that Japanese authorities, as part of a campaign to rid the Philippincs of Western influence, were preparing tough laws to govern all religious activity in the islands. The PhiIippine Church was espcrially vulnctablc to this anticlc.rical program t>ec.arise o f its ricpemlciit 011

Ioreign bishops and missionaries. Marvlla warnctl the Vatican t o move cauliously, and he urged his colleague in Manila, Monsignor Piani, to organize the clergy in order to deal effectively with the au thor-i ties.38

Throughout the siinirner and fall ofl942, Tokyo sought to consolidate its authority in the Philippines by undermining the independence of the Philippine Church and subjecting the local hierarchy to closer supervision by Japanese authori t ies . Dur ing th r summer , Japan prohibited direct communisation between the Holy See and the Apostolic Delegate in

Marella's analysis was accurate.

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Manila. When the Vatican asserted its traditional right LO

communicate directly, even in wartime, with its diplomatic and ecclesiastical representatives, the Japanese Foreign Ministry replied that “peculiar conditions” in the Philippines made such contacts impossible. In the future, the Vatican would have to communicate with the Philippines through the Apostolic Delegation in Toky0.~9

The Holy See also learned, in the fall of 1942, that the Japanesearmy had drafted Monsignor Paul Yoshiguro Taguchi, the bishop of Osaka, and, without theconsent of thevatican, hadsent him withseventy other Japanese priests to the Philippines. American intelligence reported that Tokyo intended to replace the anti-Japanese bishop of Manila, Monsignor Michael O’Doherty, with Taguchi. Fearing further consolidation of Japanese control over the islands, the State Department asked the Vatican to intervene.40 Although the Holy See believed that Japan intended merely to use Bishop Taguchi and the Japanese priests to improve relations between the occupation authorities and Philippine Catholics, it could not ignore a challenge to its authority over clerics especially when such a challenge aroused the concern of other powers. On October 27, the Secretariat of State instructed Monsignor Marella to secure Taguchi’s return to Osaka. Marella’s efforts, however, were unavailing. He reported that even if the Japanese army allowed the bishop to return, it would merely draft another prelate to replace him. This news, combined with reports from Monsignor Piani that the Japanese prelate had ingratiated himself through his sincerity and diligence with the Philippine hierarchy and faithful, encouraged the Vatican not to pursue the matter.41

Fearful of arousing the Catholic population, occupation officials avoided open persecution of the Philippine Church. In other areas, however, the Church faced intimidation and violence such as thedeath, in March 1942, of Monsignor Pierre Tch’eng while imprisoned in occupied China by the Japanese secret police, or the execution, in the following October, of four priests by Japanese soldiers in the Solomon Islands.42 By early 1943, the situation in China was increasingly serious, with both sides imprisoning missionaries and disrupting Church activity. In the province of Shantung alone, Japan had

3 Y Secretarial of State t o the Special Delegation of Japan, 10/3/42, Actes et Z)ocurrrrnt.\, 5: 735-36: Special Iklrgation of Japan to the Secrrtariat of State, 1 1 ~ 4 !42, ibid. , 7: 74-75.

4” Notes of Maglione, 10/27/42, Artes et Documents, 5: 750-51. 4 1 Zbid; Maglione toCicognani, 10/8/42, ibid. , 8: 695; Marella toMaglione, 10/29/42,

42 Louis Wei Tsing-sing, Le Saint Sic& et La Chine (Sotterville-Les-Rouen, 1971). ibid., 701.

143; Marella 10 Maglione, 12/10/42, Actes el Documents, 8: 743.

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incarcerated ten bishops along with numerous priests. ‘I’he prclatcs werc American, Belgian, and Dutch nationals and their imprisonment demonstrated Japan’s determination to control “subversives” in occ:upied China. For its part, China held one bishop and several priests in Honan province and harassed missionaries in othw arcas. L,ikc their Japancsc counterparts, Chincsc officials suspected cnemy nationals and, thus, dealt harshly with German and Italian missionaries as well as missionaries of other nationalities, such as Belgians, whom the authorities often mistook €or Germans.’s

O n April 4 , 1943, the Secretariat of State, maintaining that the missionaries pursued solely religious concerns and that their internment weakened the Church’s ecclesiastical and humanitarian work, formally asked the envoys of China and Japan to intercede with thcir gowrnments t o secure the release of the ~aptives.4~ The appeal was futile. T h e Japanese government categorically refused to release the missionaries under its control. The Chinese response was slightly more accommodating. The Chinese legation reported that its government allowed missionaries, including enemy nationals, full freedom to conduct their activities subject only to certain wartime restrictions. Chungking would not allow missionaries from enemy countries to work in war zones. Any missionary suspected o f subversive activity would be interned like an ordinary rnemy national. Finally, any property ticlonging to an mcniy subjcct, inc luding property used by missionaries, was subjcct to confiscation. ‘I’he Chinese legation reminded the Secretariat of State that the reported incarcerations were in the war zone and implied that the interned missionarirs rniist be suspected subversives. I n reply to the Vatican’s appeal, the legation promised only to investigate any complaints of unjustified internment.’5

T h e replies were disappointing, not merely because of their implications for captive missionaries but also because of the light they shcd upon the nature o f papal diplomacy in the Far East. With the outhrrak o f war in the Pacific and the Japancsc dEmarche of January 1912, papal diplomats saw a n opportunity to increase the international

Secretariat o f Stare to the Sperial Delrcat ion o f Japan, 4,,‘4/43. Actrsrt Docunipnts, 7: 289-90; Secretariat of State to the ChinrseI.c.gatiori,4/li.l.~, ibid. ,2YO-YI; Nicuwenfiuys tr) Maglione, 4/9/45, ibid., 299-300. I t is important to n o t r thr parallclz brtweeri thr Vatican’s difficultic~s in the Far East and those in occupied E u r o j x whrr t the C;c.rman authorities, despite the intercession of the Holy See, restricted the activity ol papal representatives, incarcerated and executed priests, religious, and faithful C;atholits. arid c-onfiscatrd Church property. See, John S. Conway, The Nazi Prrsrcutiorr of /.he Chzirchrs, 1933-45 (New York, 1968). chapters 9-1 1 .

44 Secretariat of State to thc Sperial Delegation o f Japan, 4 / 1 / 1 3 , Art?.( rl I>oc zlmrnt.~, 7: 289-90; Strretariat of Statr to the Chinese Legation, 4/4/43, ibid. , 290-91.

45 Special Iklegation o f .Jaj>an to the Secretariat of Slate, 4il4.!43, Artrs r t Documents, 7: 302; Chinese 1.egation to the Secretariat 01 State, 5/7/43. ibid., 313-15.

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status and influence of the Holy See, enhance its humanitarian mission to the victims of war, and protect Church interests. They achieved the first goal. By establishing relations with China and Japan, Cardinal Maglione secured for the Vatican an independent diplomatic role in the Orient: an objective of papal diplomacy since the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Cardinal Secretary of State could take satisfaction from the expansion of the Vatican diplomatic community to include missions from China, Japan, and the Netherlands.

International status, however, was only useful as an instrument with which to secure more substantial goals such as the maintenance of charitable works and the protection of ecclesiastical interests. In these areas, the record of papal diplomacy was uneven. The Vatican’s recognition policy did open official channels of communication with Chungking and Tokyo which the Holy See used to protect the interests of Allied prisoners, Catholic missions, and other victims of the war. Throughout the period 1941-43, the Vatican valiantly defended these interests despite obstruction from Chinese and Japanese authorities. However, since the Holy See could not overcome this obstruction, its policy in the Far East was, in the end, disappointing.

Historically, the Holy See focused its diplomatic interest on Europe where a large Catholic population, a network of economic, political, and religious contacts, and tradition combined to enhance the influence of the Vatican. Even in Europe, however, the Holy See found it difficult to pursue its mission in the midst of a total war which made the traditional humanitarian and mediatory role of the Vatican irrelevant. The frustrating experience of papal diplomacy in the Far East paralleled the experience in Europe where the forces of imperialism and racialism were equally immune to the moderating influence of the Vatican. In the Far East, moreover, the Holy See lacked its usual resources. The Catholic population, while numerically large, remained a minority in every region except the Philippines. Asian nationalists and chauvinists, especially in Japan, attacked the Catholic Church as a representative of western influence and a tool of foreign powers. Since there was only a weak tradition of papal diplomacy in the Far East, Chinese and Japanese officials often misunderstood or suspected Vatican intentions. Such disadvantages would have inhibited Vatican diplomacy toward China and Japan in peacetime. In the midst of a war which the participants considered a battle for national survival, the obstacles confronting papal diplomats were insurmountable. Even an active foreign policy could not compensate for the fact that, in the Far East as in Europe, the Vatican’s interests outdistanced its influence.

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