The Tobacco Protest in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The View from a Provincial Town

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The Tobacco Protest in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The View from a Provincial Town

Ranin KazemiKansas State University

[email protected]

Abstract

This article adopts a microhistorical lens to study the social dynamics that accompa-nied the eruption of the 1891 protest in Qajar Iran. Utilizing spatial and temporal limits, and a historical narrative technique, it disentangles the often overlooked or confound-ing aspects of popular claim-making practices in what came to be known as the Tobacco Movement in Iranian and Middle Eastern historiography. In using a bottom-up approach, the article provides ample evidence for the historical agency of the local actors on the ground and several historiographical interventions in areas such as the key social groups that partook in the protest, the tactics and strategies used throughout the agitations, and the dynamics of the Iranian public sphere at this point in time. In show-ing how the southern city of Shiraz experienced the earliest popular unrest in the coun-try, the paper makes use of new archival evidence to contend that it also articulated the Tobacco Movement’s principal strategy (that of collective strikes and embargoes). The protest leaders in Shiraz never operated in isolation. They were in regular contact with fellow agitators in other parts of the country and in the neighboring Ottoman Empire. In explaining these national and transnational connections, the article makes the case that the Tobacco Protest marks an important phase in the development and maturation of what eventually came to be known as activist or political Islam.

Keywords

Tobacco Régie – Tobacco Protest – anti-colonial resistance – national movement – origins of political Islam – Iranian nationalism – public sphere

* Author’s note: I am grateful to the following individuals for providing comments on the ear-lier drafts of this paper: Abbas Amanat, Robert Harms, Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, Navid Fozi, Eric Brandom, David Stone, Robert Clark, and Brent Maner.

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Journal of persianate studies 7 (2014) 251-295

On 8 March 1890, the Iranian government signed an agreement with a British subject whereby the latter was given the right to institute a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of Iranian tobacco for a period of fifty years. In return, the concessionaire, a certain Major Gerald F. Talbot who was well connected in the British political circles of the time,1 agreed to pay an annual fee of £15,000 along with one-quarter of the yearly net profits minus a five per-cent dividend on the total capital of the company that would come to own this monopoly. The concession was soon registered at the British legation in Tehran and sold to a dummy syndicate that Talbot had established in order to project the appearance of an “international,” as opposed to a purely British, undertak-ing in Iran. The commercial agreement was sold once again later that year to a similar “international” group which came to be known as the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia or simply the Régie.2 The reason for these attempts to distance British interests (and the British government) from the tobacco con-cession was the anticipation of Russian opposition to the further expansion of that country’s economic and political influence inside Iran.3 Little did the British or, for that matter, the Iranian officials know that the most serious opposition to the Régie would be a local one that drew from a cross-section of Iranian society. One of the earliest revolutionary movements in the history of the modern Middle East, widespread popular resistance to the establishment of the tobacco monopoly—which only later came to be known as the Tobacco Protest—marks the beginnings of a national movement that in many ways defined Iran in the twentieth century.4 What follows is a close analysis of the

1 Besides his own political connections, Major Talbot was a distant cousin of Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, third marquess of Salisbury, who served at the time as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Britain. (Keddie, 36)

2 In the political and administrative parlance of the nineteenth century, the term “régie” referred to a government department or a private enterprise that controlled (often com-pletely) a specific industry (e.g., tobacco, salt, and other natural resources) or service (e.g., press and advertising). In the neighboring Ottoman Empire, a Tobacco Régie had been estab-lished since 1884. (Quataert, 14; Shaw, 448)

3 For British-Russian rivalry in nineteenth-century Iran see Rawlinson; Gordon; Brockway, 36-47; Thornton 1954, 554-579; idem 1955, 55-71; Kazemzadeh, 1968; Andreeva; Ewans.

4 In certain ways the Tobacco Protest is comparable to a number of other nineteenth-cen-tury social protest movements such as the 1879-82 ‘Urabi Revolt in Egypt, the 1857-58 Sepoy Mutiny in British India, and the 1899-1902 Boxer Uprising in China. All were anti-colonial, anti-state protest movements. All involved a series of policy miscalculations. All strained cordial diplomatic relations. And all were long in the making and the first manifestation of a national movement in their respective countries. There were also remarkable similarities between Iranian society and economy, and those of Egypt, India, and China. On the politi-cal and cultural impact of the Tobacco Protest on Iran’s first modern revolution see Browne, 31-58; Bayat, 18-21; Afary, 17-36; Cronin, 81-89.

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social dynamics that accompanied the eruption of protest in Shiraz, the first city that experienced popular anti-Régie agitations in the country.

Soon after the signing of the agreement with Talbot, the Russian legation’s first secretary, and later the Russian Minister at Tehran, Evengii Karlovich Biutzov, initiated a series of diplomatic protests against the tobacco conces-sion and what seemed to be the Iranian government’s recent turn to adopt pro-British policies. In doing so, the Russians made a number of thinly veiled threats which have been unnecessarily overstressed in the literature on the Tobacco Movement.5 There were also a few Iranian officials in Tehran who objected to the terms of the agreement with Talbot.6 But there is no evidence that either of these two groups in the capital city had a significant influence on the popular agitations in Shiraz, a southern provincial town that was far from both Tehran and the Russian sphere of influence.

While the grant of the tobacco concession became immediately known to many high-ranking officials and foreign diplomats, the government tried to keep the Iranian public unaware until close to a year later. As such, this news was first communicated to Iranians by the private, Istanbul-based Persian newspaper Akhtar on 11 November 1890. In an article, which was essentially a translation of a piece published two days earlier in the Ottoman newspaper Sabah—whose sources of information in turn consisted of articles published in European newspapers—Akhtar was somewhat critical of the concession. It chided the Iranian Qajar state for exchanging exceedingly valuable privi-leges and resources of the country for a paltry return. Comparing the Iranian tobacco scheme unfavorably with those of the Ottoman and French states, it contended that the concentration of the market in the hands of a single for-eign corporation would produce enormous loss for the mercantile community.

5 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Marquess of Salisbury, 14 September 1890, no. 227 in FO 60/513 in the Foreign Office papers of the National Archives (in London, United Kingdom); Salisbury to Wolff, 13 April 1890, no. 25 (42) in FO 539/48; Wolff to Salisbury, 17 September 1890, no. 234 in FO 60/553; M. R. D. de Balloy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 October 1892, no. 65, in Les Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires éstrangères (in Paris, France), Perse, 1892; same to same, 17 September 1890, no. 28, in ibid, Perse, 1890; same to same, 30 October 1890, no. 34 in ibid.; Kazemzadeh 1957, 363-373; idem 1968, 241-301; Lambton 1965a, 119-157; idem 1965b, 71-90; Keddie, 41-44; passim. This overemphasis on the Russian involvement in the Tobacco Protest has much to do with the conditioned perspective of Western scholars who wrote about these events during the Cold War.

6 These included, among others, Mirzā ‘Ali Khān Amin al-Dawla (President of the Council of Ministers), Yahyā Khān Moshir al-Dawla (Minister of Commerce), Prince Kāmrān Mirzā Nā’eb al-Saltana (son of the shāh, Minister of War, and governor of Tehran). (Keddie, 35-60)

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This truth is obvious to all that the exports of every country are reckoned to be one of the principal sources of its wealth. Consequently, the ruler of every country ought, by all possible means and in every practicable way, to facilitate and promote that country’s exports, and keep them free from all restrictions and obstacles. But this concession and monopoly which the Iranian government has granted to the English company is diametri-cally opposed to these general considerations. As such, tobacco growers are left helpless and defenseless in the hands of the company, and will be unable to sell the produce of their toil at a remunerative price or profit by trade competition. As a result, a large number of Iranians whose earnings and livelihood are exclusively derived from this source will suffer, and [more important] extraordinary damage will accrue to the mercantile interests of the country.7

Motivated at once by patriotism and mercantile concerns, the editors of Akhtar, some of whom merchants by profession, published a second article on 20 January 1891 voicing more clearly their objections against the tobacco monopoly. One of the editors of the newspaper reported on his conversa-tion with Major Talbot in Istanbul and pointed out that what he had learned through that exchange illustrated the great disadvantages the tobacco scheme would bring about for the Iranian mercantile community.

It is clear enough that the concessionaire will commence the [required] work with a small capital and will purchase tobacco from cultivators and sell it to merchants and manufacturers for higher prices. [In this way,] all the profit will remain in the purse of the English. As the Iranian mer-chants [will] have no right to export tobacco from Iran, those who were formerly engaged in this trade are now obliged to give up their businesses and find some other work for themselves.

The concessionaire does not take into consideration how many mer-chants who were formerly engaged in this business will be left without employment and will suffer loss in finding other occupations.8

7 “Enhesar-e toton dar Iran,” in Akhtar (Istanbul), 27 Rabiʿ I 1308 AH/11 November 1890, no. 13, year 17; Sabah (Istanbul), 25 Rabiʿ I 1308 AH/9 November 1890, no. 430. The tobacco sector was a major industry in nineteenth-century Iran and was solely in the hands of the Iranian mercantile community (Floor 2003, 461-477).

8 “Sokhani chand dar enhesar-e tanbaku va toton-e Iran,” in Akhtar (Istanbul), 9 Jomadi II 1308/20 January 1891, no. 23, year 17; see also Robert Kennedy to Salisbury, 15 April 1891, no. 105 in FO 60/522 where a translation of this article is provided.



These two articles did much to damage the cause of the Régie in Iran. That the earliest news about a “secret” and seemingly harmful contract between the Iranian government and a foreign entity was conveyed to the Iranian public by a critical independent newspaper went a long way to alarm various social groups inside the country.

The official proclamation announcing the establishment of the Régie came a few months after the first announcement in Akhtar. It was carried out through a statement published in the official government gazette on 28 February 1891.9 In March, the central government dispatched specific guidelines to the pro-vincial governors instructing them to recognize the Tobacco Régie and aid in enforcing the terms of the concession (Adamiyat, 17-19). Right about this time, the government issued a lengthier public notice to encourage various groups across the country to support this undertaking.10 In February, the tobacco company commenced its operation in Tehran, and within the next couple of months it dispatched to key tobacco producing provinces—e.g., Fars, Isfahan, Azerbaijan, and Khorasan—company agents responsible for establishing pro-vincial branches and enforcing the terms of the monopoly during the harvest season that year.11 The operation of the Régie was formalized particularly after the arrival, in April, of the director-general of the company in Tehran. From this point on, new employees were hired to expedite the establishment of the monopoly. To Talbot and other investors, the Régie was a major undertaking and the Iranian tobacco industry a lucrative business with great potential for enor-mous returns. The company had, therefore, anticipated to hire eventually some 18,000 individuals to run its various offices and bureaus across the country.12

There has been no serious archival-based study of the Tobacco Movement in the past several decades. The first and, arguably, the only serious attempt to understand this major episode in Iranian history was made by Nikkie Keddie in the mid-1960s (Keddie; see also Lambton 1965a; idem 1965b; Algar 1969, 205-221). Given the well-known limitations of this earlier scholarship13 and the sig-nificant new materials that have been made available since, this study, which

9 Iran (Tehran), 18 Rajab 1308 AH/27 February 1891, no. 739.10 The text of the public notice is available in Taymuri 1982, 39-40.11 The Times (London), 1 April 1891. 12 Précis of M. Ornstein’s “Memorandum for the Shah on the work of the Tobacco Régie”

included in Kennedy, 2 September 1891, no. 200 in FO 60/553. Due mostly to widespread opposition across the country, the Régie was not able to employ as many people as it had initially anticipated. By September 1891, the number of Régie employees was no more than 266.

13 See for example Cuyler Young, 115-116; Kelly, 697-698; Floor, 141-142; Davison, 555-556.

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is part of a series of articles and a larger book-length project that this author is presently working on, is an attempt at analyzing anew the course and nature of the Tobacco Movement. In the process, I hope to revive a much-needed discus-sion that deals with the place and importance of this moment in Iranian and, by implication, Middle Eastern history. Adopting a microhistorical approach to study the events associated with the Tobacco Protest, I utilize spatial and tem-poral limits to put a small community, as it were, under the microscope.14 In the process, I not only dissect and tease out the social dynamics of the Tobacco Protest at the most tangible level but put local issues and concerns in a dia-logue with relevant national and transnational events and processes. My aim here is not to produce a local history but rather to place a local community in a broader context and, as practitioners of microstoria have long shown, “to eluci-date historical causation . . . where most of life takes place” (Muir and Ruggiero, xxi). The choice of Shiraz is significant because it was the first city that experi-enced Régie-related social unrest in 1891. Shiraz as the capital of the province of Fars was, moreover, the nearest major urban center to Iran’s most crucial tobacco producing region in the south.

Trade and Politics in Shiraz

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Shiraz was a flourishing market-place with a lively consumer base and an active export trade. The relative pros-perity of the town had much to do with its location. It was on the main trade route between Bushehr, the most important port city of Qajar Iran, and key interior urban centers of Isfahan, Kashan, Qom, and Tehran. Other port cities of the Persian Gulf, such as Lenga and Bandar ‘Abbas, had also contributed to the rise of the profitable regional and national trade networks in the south that were beneficial for the prosperity of Shiraz. The economy of the city depended on a number of industries which had been developed in part to address foreign demand. These trades produced delicate items such as jewelry, seals, engraved stones, enameled bowls, decorated stems of water-pipes, repoussé silver work, as well as mosaic work in wood, brass, silver, ivory, and stained bone (known as khātam- kāri) (Curzon 1892, II, 100-101, 573). The main production of Fars, however, consisted of agrarian products such as opium, cotton, tobacco, wine, dried fruits, almonds, wheat, horses, mules, gum, carpets, and sheepskins. The province, on the other hand, imported from Bombay and other parts of the British Empire a great deal of mostly European-owned goods. These were, for

14 On microhistory see Levi; Ginzburg; Iggers, 101-117.



instance, cotton fabrics of Manchester; woolen tissues of Austria and Germany; loaf sugar from Marseilles; raw sugar of Java and Mauritius; French, German, and Austrian cutlery and crockery; copper sheets of England and Holland; can-dles from Amsterdam; and tea, spices, dyes, yarn, iron bars, lead, tin, glass, and ceramic ware from India, Java, Ceylon, and China.15

During this period, the international trade of Fars and the other southern provinces came increasingly under British influence. This was in part because of the proximity of Iran to South Asia, and the concomitant commercial and geostrategic interests of Britain in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the broader Middle East. The British domination of international trade in south-ern Iran was facilitated by the advent of regular steam navigation in the Persian Gulf in 1862, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the establishment of extensive telegraphic lines across Iran throughout the 1860s (Issawi, 152-205). By the late 1880s, it was clear to casual observers that the British had gained a de facto trading monopoly in the Persian Gulf and its surrounding environs. This is perhaps best illustrated in the writings of George Curzon who, traveling in the region in 1889-90, admitted that

[t]he proximity of Bombay, the vast merchant fleet of Great Britain, and the consistent and intelligible policy that has for long been pursued in this quarter . . . have given to this country [i.e., Britain] the trading monopoly of the Persian Gulf and the unchallenged supply from that base of the towns and villages of Southern and, in a less degree, of Central Persia.

Although statistics are often inexact for nineteenth-century trade, the de facto monopoly of British firms over the international trade may be gleaned as well from the following numbers drawn from 1889 for the three main port cities of the country located in the south: out of 118,570 tons of shipping that entered Bushehr, 111,745 belonged to British firms and subjects; in Bandar ‘Abbas the proportion was 104,496 tons out of 114,396; and in Lenga 82,780 tons out of 119,280. The value of imports to Bushehr from Britain and India, in 1889, amounted to 744,018l. out of a total from all countries of 790,822l. while the value of exports to Britain and India was 251,902l. out of 535,076l. The propor-tion with regard to Bandar ‘Abbas was for imports 338,182l. out of 353,506l. and for exports 185,258l. out of 336,129l. At Lenga, the figures were: imports, 258,156l., out of 589,939l.; exports, 379,988l. out of 586,147l (Curzon 1892, II, 571-574; see also Davies, 199-411; Sayf, 309-337).

15 Despite this seeming diversity, cotton manufactures alone amounted to near one-half of the value of all imports (Curzon 1892, II, 99-100, 571-573; Davies, 296-302).

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The British commercial presence in Fars may also be gauged by the sheer number of firms, agents, and retailers representing British interests. The principal British firms in the province were Messrs. Hotz & Son (based in Bushehr, Shiraz, and other parts of the country), the Persian Gulf Trading Company (based in Bushehr, Shiraz, and other parts of the country), Messrs. Ziegler & Co., (based in Isfahan and Yazd but also operating in Shiraz), Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. (based in Bushehr), and Messers. David Sassoon and Co. (based in Bushehr and Isfahan) (Curzon 1892, II:573; Davies, 376-77). There were, moreover, certain British subject traders such as Messrs. Malcolm, and Akbar & Qasim. These were Indian or Iranian firms whose owners had British citizenship, took advantage of being under British protection, and worked ultimately to ensure British interests in southern Iran. In addition, there were local Iranians who had been employed as agents of British firms. These included, for example, Mayill & Co. of Bushehr who represented Victor Torfs of London; a certain Mohammad ‘Ali who worked for Messrs. Shorey, Clark & Co. of London; and Herapit & Arrathoon and a certain Dehdashti merchant in Shiraz who represented Ellinger & Co. Beyond these, there were an increasing number of British retailers (close to 112 individuals) operating in various parts of the province without being subject to the taxes that their Iranian counter-parts faced.16 British retailers and larger firms engaged in many different lines of commerce and traded in commodities as diverse as piece-goods, carpets, grain, sugar, arms, livestock, animal skin, and sheep-gut. By 1883, British sub-jects had also begun experimenting with heretofore purely Iranian operations such as mining and pearl fisheries. (Davies, 376-382)

Other foreign firms and agents were too active in southern Iran and engaged in competing with local merchants. The Dutch, the Americans, the French, the Russians, and the Ottomans had all developed commercial interests in Fars and other parts of the south, and sought, as it were, a piece of the pie. (Davies, 377) Despite these attempts, the British had an unrivaled position in the region, a clear de facto monopoly over trade.

To many in southern Iran (and especially in Fars), it seemed that this monopoly had become entrenched further by a series of concessions granted by the central government in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Given to Iranian and foreign subjects, these agreements appeared ultimately to provide British firms with even more control over the southern and central Iranian market. Between 1888 and 1891, as Curzon put it, “[t]he air was full of rumours of con-cessions for exclusive introduction, or manufacture, or growth of wine, sugar,

16 Davies, 382. With regard to Qajar taxation on retail business see Floor 1998, 366-373 and other relevant sections in chapter 9.



glass, telephones, electric light, and in one instance for a monopoly of all agricultural produce.”17 The single most important of these contracts allowed the operation of a noncompetitive British-owned state bank across Iran. The creation of the British Imperial Bank of Persia proved devastating to the mer-cantile community at large because it in effect took over most of their tradi-tional sphere of activities.18 Serving as a “National Institution,” the bank had “the exclusive right of issuing” paper money which had not yet been adopted in the country. The bank was also to “facilitate the payments of the Imperial Treasury in Persia and abroad.” Article 11 of the agreement granted the bank “for the term of the present Concession [i.e., sixty years], the exclusive right of working throughout the [Persian] Empire the iron, copper, lead, mercury, coal, petroleum, manganese, borax, and asbestos mines which belong to the State, and which have not already been ceded to others.” (Jones II, 1-100) The gradual establishment of branches in important cities of the country, the bank’s abil-ity to intervene in the business of local merchants, and its pursuit of several different lines of work that could have otherwise benefited the local entrepre-neurs gradually antagonized many. That, since the appearance of the bank, a number of well-established merchants in Shiraz and elsewhere were forced into bankruptcy gave as well a sense of urgency to the threat posed by the bank and other British and European commercial excursions into Iranian economy.19

Next in importance was the opening of Iran’s only navigable river, the Kārun, in the southwest to “international”—that is, once again, mostly British—steam ships.20 The value of this river for British trade increased even further when the government almost simultaneously granted the Imperial Bank a road conces-sion in order to build a highway between Tehran and Ahvaz (situated on the

17 Curzon 1892, I, 483. Besides those discussed below, there was another concession over the roads in Tehran, and those between the capital and its most important suburb in Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azim which was given to the Russians. (Sayyah, 328) There was also another monopoly over all lotteries across Iran which was initially given to the Persian Minister in London Mirzā Malkom Khān in July 1889 but which was then sold in the London Market to a company that came to be known as the Persian Investment Corporation. This con-cession was canceled in December 1889 due to court intrigues and clerical opposition. (Taymuri 1953, 213-222)

18 For a history of the British Imperial Bank of Persia see Jones; Nateq; Walcher, 164-203.19 Wealthy merchants that experienced bankruptcy in 1890-91 in Shiraz were two brothers

Hajj Mohammad Javad and Hajji ‘Ali Akbar, along with Hajji Mohammad Hasan Bazzaz and Hajji ‘Abd al-Rasul Bazzaz. They all had extensive dealings with British firms; see numerous reports about them in FO 248/533.

20 Jamshedji Modi; Ainsworth; Lynch, 592-595; Taymuri 1953, 151-177; Shahnavaz; Walcher, 56-78.

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banks of the river).21 Making the Kārun available for extensive commercial use and development had come as a result of decades of British advocacy for a quicker and cheaper route by which to access Tehran and north-central Iran. It was believed that the river cut in half the amount of distance and time it took for goods or caravans to reach the central and northern parts of the country, thus opening those regions to British trade, influence, and possible military retaliation in the event of a Russian aggression. While steam navigation on the Kārun was quite beneficial to British interests, it deflected the commer-cial routes that passed through Bushehr, Shiraz, Yazd, and the other southern cities, and resulted, almost immediately, in the decline of transit trade in Fars and its neighboring provinces. In overshadowing the importance of Shiraz as an entrepôt, the two related Kārun agreements unleashed processes that helped raise the prices of goods in these places and made their long- established centers of trade less crucial in the commercial life of the coun-try. This development, naturally, further alienated the mercantile community in these cities. In Shiraz, for instance, merchants found themselves forced, in early 1889, to submit petitions to the shah against the opening of the Kārun River and the prospect of the destruction of transit trade in the city.22 Curzon too noted that “I found the Shirāzis very apprehensive of the opening of the new trade route by the Karun, which, without interfering with their local traffic, would, if it superseded the Tehran-Bushere line as the main commer-cial avenue into Persia from the south, destroy their transit trade altogether.” (Curzon 1892, II, 100)

The economy of southern Iran during the second half of the nineteenth century was increasingly dominated by British commercial interests. The cen-tral government, on the other hand, appeared to be helping this development by granting key concessions that the British so ardently sought but which jeopardized the position of local merchants and other groups in the southern economy. The grant of the tobacco concession thus came as the culmination of a process that worried many across Fars and the other southern provinces of the country.

21 Taymuri 1953, 223-236; Colonel Bell, 437-481; Curzon 1892, I, 488-490; idem 1890, 509-532; Issawi, 171-177.

22 “Rudkhāna-ye Kārun,” Akhtar (Istanbul), 15 Safar 1308/30 September 1890, no. 7, year 17; Mirzā Haydar ‘Ali Khān Navvāb to British Minister at Tehran, 25 Jomadi II 1306/26 February 1889 in Sa’idi Sirjani (henceforth abbreviated as VI), 329.



Early Stirrings

The earliest instances of people from Fars taking part in a protest against the tobacco concession occurred in the first months of 1891. It was in mid-February that a group of eight wealthy merchants of Jahrom, who dealt in tobacco and were based in Tehran, began to agitate against the Régie.23 They claimed that the tobacco monopoly was detrimental to their business inter-ests and was yet another indication that the government was “selling” its people to foreign, mostly British, companies and entrepreneurs. They also threatened to go on strike and take sanctuary (bast) under the Russian flag. In their opposition to the Régie, it appears that the Jahrom merchants were sup-ported by other tobacco sellers and merchants in Tehran (E‘temād al-Saltana 2006, 735-736). Upon hearing these complaints, the President of the Council of Ministers Mirzā ‘Ali Khān Amin al-Dawla summoned the merchants and reportedly advised them to keep quiet.24 In a letter written to the shah imme-diately after this meeting, Amin al-Dawla explained that most of the Jahrom merchants were his “ tenants,” and that was the reason he met with them and heard their objections in the first place. Amin al-Dawla who had himself sev-eral months earlier become a vocal critic of the tobacco scheme was accused by the Premier ‘Ali Asghar Khān Amin al-Sultān and the British diplomats in Tehran of having incited this early opposition amongst the mercantile com-munity of Fars.25 There is, however, no evidence that this was the case. On the contrary, it is more likely that the principal tobacco merchants of Jahrom, upon hearing the news of the establishment of a foreign tobacco monopoly, had growing concern about whether it would eventually harm their business.26 Be that as it may, Amin al-Dawla reportedly assured them that their fears were unwarranted and that “the merchants and the ryots of Persia had not been sold to [a] foreign company.” Still the merchants submitted a petition to Amin

23 Jahrom was a major opium and tobacco producing area in Fars. Along with Shiraz, it expe-rienced a lot of Régie-related unrest in 1891. Fasa’i II, 1277-1288, mentions at least one tobacco merchant, a certain Hajji ‘Ali Mohammad, to have been among the local notables of Jahrom.

24 For biographical information on Amin al-Dawla see Amin al-Dawla; Bamdad II, 354-366; Farmayan, 337-351.

25 Amin al-Dawla was, in turn, believed to have been encouraged by the Russians who opposed any pro-British undertaking in late nineteenth-century Iran; see Kennedy to Salisbury, 3 February 1891 in FO 60/553; Lambton 1965a, 124-125.

26 In fact, as I noted above, as early as 11 November 1890, the mercantile (and nativistic) interests of the Akhtar editors had served sufficiently to motivate them against the Régie.

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al-Dawla in order to be directed to the shah. In evaluating this early instance of protest in the capital, Amin al-Dawla explained to the shah that there was wider opposition to the Régie, and implied that the Jahrum merchants were encouraged or supported by a broader community. “Although Major Talbot’s first plan and scheme with regard to the tobacco business was not of a nature to create difficulties and discussions, yet, for some time past, various kinds of remarks are being made by the people.”27 That there was wider opposition to the Régie at this early stage may be gleaned as well from the distribution of a clandestine placard (E’lan-e shabāna) across the city during this time. Posted on the doors of foreign legations, caravansaries, mosques, and other pub-lic venues, the notice criticized the authorities for giving concessions to the Europeans:

How did you give away to foreigners these narrow streets [of the capital], to which all the Muslims [i.e., Iranians] and even [their] dogs and cattle have a right? [The time will soon come] when the carriages of [these] foreigners will trample on the children of Muslims. Even worse, tobacco belongs to Iranians; the customers and consumers [are] Iranians; for what reason have [its] sale and purchase been restricted to foreigners?28

To address the situation, the shah ordered the Minister of Commerce to speak with the complainants and inquire about their grievances. A meeting was therefore held on 22 February, where Major Talbot was himself present and evidently exchanged with the Jahrom merchants “assurances of a friendly nature.” Perhaps in response to this gesture of goodwill or, more likely, because of concern over possible government reprisals, the merchants “denied [that day] that they had any grievance and [went so far as to] repudiate their seals which had been affixed to the petition presented by the Amin-ed-Dawleh.”29 While this early instance of opposition by a handful of wealthy merchants of

27 Inclosure 1 in Amin al-Dawla to Shah, 19 February 1891, no. 12, FO 881/6359. This remark by Amin al-Dawla has previously been taken as a vague suggestion on his part that the Russians were conspiring against the Régie and encouraging their allies to protest against its operation. This is, however, no more than an over-reading of the original statement. A good instance of this over-interpretation is displayed in Lambton 1965a, 124-125.

28 Sayyah, 329. The first part of the placard referred to a road concession which was given to the Russians; see note 17. As far as anti-Régie sentiments were concerned, historical records show that as early as mid-January there were clandestine placards and leaflets posted in Tehran which were critical of the tobacco monopoly. (Keddie, 46-47)

29 Kennedy to Salisbury, 23 February 1891, no. 9, and Kennedy to Salisbury, 25 February 1891, no. 12, FO 881/6359.



Fars and their supporters was suppressed expeditiously, wider resistance to the joint foreign and government interference in the tobacco industry was already in the making.

As rumors and informal reports about the tobacco monopoly reached Fars in these early months of the year, serious opposition, composed of several key social groups, began gradually to manifest itself. The mercantile community was quite shaken by the prospect of yet another victory for the British subjects and trading firms. They became incensed, too, by the complicity of their own government in taking away from them yet another area of commerce. That tobacco was one of the most lucrative lines of business in the province, and that many local merchants engaged in its trade, was certainly a crucial factor.30 More important was the widespread fear that European, especially British, firms would continue unhindered to dominate the local economy and divest indigenous merchants of their traditional enterprises. Landowners too felt threatened by the establishment of a tobacco monopoly. Their heavy invest-ment in the mass production of cash crops such as tobacco supported their privileged socioeconomic position in the province. They detested any further regulations in addition to the substantial land taxes they had to pay every year.31 They also feared that the establishment of the Régie would be followed by further government, or foreign, interventions in other areas of local agrar-ian business. Certain government officials in Fars had interests in commercial-ized agriculture as well. Not only did these functionaries have landholdings of their own, but they were also responsible for the fiscal administration of key tobacco producing districts. They were, in other words, in charge of extract-ing revenues—and in the process a good deal of unchecked and unrecorded emoluments (madākhel)—from the most productive lands in the province. The ulema, some of whom belonged to the local landed gentry, had their own concerns. Many were related either through family ties, or professionally, to the mercantile and landed classes of the province. As such, they cared for the interests of the latter groups. In addition, they worried about the prospect of public exposure to a growing number of foreign nationals in the region. They were soon to express their anxieties over how the Europeans could influence

30 Adamiyat, 19, asserts that 50-60 prominent merchants dealt in tobacco. Keddie, 67, sug-gests that the reason why the anti-Régie unrest started in Shiraz, rather than elsewhere in the country, was because the city had “felt the effects of the concession” before anywhere else. This is evidently not the case. The protest in Shiraz began prior to the actual imple-mentation of the terms of the monopoly in the province.

31 On land taxes in this period in Qajar Iran see Issawi, 52-54, 219-231, 361-370; Floor 1998, 316-358; idem 2003, 15-133; Lambton 1991a, 151-177; idem, 1991b, 459-505.

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the cultural outlook, especially the religious beliefs, of the local population. That the generality of people were small-time producers, dealers, or else mass consumers meant that they too could have worried about being compelled to sell their tobacco-related commodities at lower prices, the possibility of losing their fledgling business, or the likelihood of being forced to purchase tobacco for their own consumption at much higher prices. That there were already other kinds of public frustrations in the province, particularly in Shiraz, over chronic food scarcity, epidemics, massive unemployment, decreasing wages, severe inflation in the prices of essential goods, the declining standards of liv-ing, as well as the absence of public security in towns and cities, and of road security in the countryside, had significantly compounded the situation. Many considered that the government had failed to address these crises and yet had persisted in increasing taxes on all subjects. Nor could the government effectively deal with widespread corruption and abuse of power among state officials. These grievances coalesced into a single, larger concern over the gov-ernment’s treatment of its people and whether the authorities had the right to lease to foreigners the tobacco industry that seemed so beneficial to various groups inside the country.32

By early March, there were reports of “much discussion among people” in Shiraz and elsewhere in Fars. People were said to worry about what they had heard and read of the Régie. They appeared much “agitated” (motezalzel) over the monopoly-related news. Tobacco merchants, more specifically, were in a state of complete “panic” (vāhema-ye ziyādi dārand). Alarmed by the prospect of loss, they frequently inquired of the British legation agency in Shiraz about the particulars of the Régie contract. Following instructions from his superiors, Mirzā Haydar ‘Ali Khān Navvāb, the astute British agent in town, tried to allay their concerns and reassure them that the tobacco scheme was beneficial to all parties involved. He stressed that the establishment of the Régie would in fact be profitable to merchants and the generality of the population.33

In early to mid-April, a series of letters addressed to prominent clerics in town arrived from Tehran. The ulema were urged to lead a popular protest

32 “Akhbār-e ghayr-e rasmi, Fārs,” in Iran (Tehran), 5 Zi al-Hajja 1308/12 July 1891, no. 750; ibid., 19 Zi al-Hajja 1308/26 July 1891, no. 751; ibid., 1 Moharram 1309/14 September 1891, no. 754; ibid., 29 Safar 1309/3 October 1891, no. 756; ibid., 4 Rabi‘ II 1309/7 November 1891, no. 758; ibid., 4 Jomadi I 1309/6 December 1891, no. 760; ibid., 29 Jomadi I 1309/31 December 1891, no. 762; ibid, 4 Shavval 1308/13 May 1891, no. 745; ibid., 19 Shavval 1308/28 May 1891, no. 746; passim.

33 Navvāb to Kennedy, 3 Sha‘ban 1308/14 March 1891 in FO 248/533; VI 374. For biographical information on Navvāb see various autobiographical references in VI.



(shuresh va balvā) against the Régie. The local government undertook an investigation of the matter and concluded that the former Persian Minister in London Mirzā Malkom Khān’s associates had been responsible for sending out these letters. However, the local authorities appeared reluctant to take mean-ingful action to stop the distribution of these letters.34 While the local oppo-sition had deep roots of its own, these messages had evident effects among certain quarters in town. For one, the clerics, merchants, and others in Shiraz realized, if they had not before, that resistance to foreign interventions and certain government policies was far wider than they had previously appraised.

Either upon the receipt of the aforementioned letters or a few days earlier, several clerics began to preach openly against the tobacco concession; they also made disparaging remarks about the central government that was party to such a commercial agreement.35 The most outspoken of these clerics was a certain Āqā Sayyed ‘Ali Akbar Fāl-Asiri who had a long history of opposing the provin-cial government. Fāl-Asiri was the main prayer-leader of the Vakil Mosque, one of the city’s two most popular places of worship, and enjoyed a considerable number of students and devotees. Moreover, he had a favorable reputation among merchants and shopkeepers. The latter thought of Fāl-Asiri as someone who could be persuaded to defend them against frequent government abuses. More important, Fāl-Asiri had connections with fellow clerics across various provinces of the country and the seat of Shi‘ite learning in Ottoman Iraq.36

34 Because of a combination of personal and political reasons, Malkom Khān had since a few months earlier become overtly critical of the Qajar state and, through a network of associates, disciples, and sympathizers, was able to engage in a campaign of public agita-tion and protest based in Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. See Algar 1973, 163-227; and Mirzā Malkom Khān’s newspaper, Qānun (London), which was published during this time and distributed clandestinely across the country. The contents of the letters distributed in Shiraz (and elsewhere) are given in Sayyah, 336-342.

35 Navvāb to Kennedy, 9 Ramazan 1308/18 April 1891 in FO 248/533; VI, 376. Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26 and Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclosure in Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26, FO 881/6359.

36 A native of the Garmsirat region in Fars, Fāl-Asiri had received his preliminary education in his native village of Asir under the guidance of Shaykh Mohammad Asiri. When still a teenager, he had moved to Shiraz and worked with Shaykh Mahdi Mojtahed Kojuri, the prayer-leader of the Āqā Bābā Khān Mosque in the Darb-e Shahzada quarter. Subsequently he had relocated to Najaf in Ottoman Iraq and studied under Shaykh Mirzā Habib Allāh Rashti. This early education notwithstanding, Fāl-Asiri did not seem to have much inter-est in pursuing legal and scholastic studies. His only known work is an unfinished treatise on inheritance law which he began while still a student under Rashti. He seems to have had interest in the more practical aspects of clerical work. Married to the daughter of Mirzā Mohammad Hasan Shirāzi, the most senior Shi‘ite cleric of the time, Fāl-Asiri had

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Other clerics who preached against the Régie had similar reputations. They included figures such as Āqā Mirzā Mohammad ‘Ali Mojtahed, the prayer-leader of the New Mosque; Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh Modarres, the prayer-leader of the Nasir al-Molk Mosque; and Shaykh Mohammad Hosayn Mahllāti, the prayer-leader of the Molā Mosque. These mosques were all popular places of worship. And these clerics each had a large following which included seminar-ians (tollāb), artisans, tradesmen (kasaba), and even vigilantes (alvāt). Equally important was the fact that they were well connected with fellow clerics in other parts of the country and in Ottoman Iraq.37 The opposition consisting of these, and other, clerics had a mercantile backing and was soon accompanied by popular excitement. Various groups in town who had their own grievances found new reasons to criticize the current state of affairs and the role of the government in generating public frustration. Merchants, in particular, began to submit “strong protests” directly to the shah and his premier.38

To address the growing excitement, a public meeting was held in town in which the provincial governor, Sultan Uvays Mirzā Mo‘tamed al-Dawla,39 instructed by the premier, explained to the merchants that the tobacco con-cession was legally “irrevocable.” They had to understand that no amount of pressure from below could force the government to reverse the signed and

acquired in Shiraz a reputation for persecuting confessional minorities and supporting people who had grievances against the local government. In 1886 he had provided support and leadership for a bread riot that shook the foundation of the provincial government. His involvement in the riot had resulted in his being subject to banishment (to Isfahan) for several months and public condemnation coming from several of his colleagues (Fasa’i II, 914, 1254; Agha Bozorg al-Tehrani 1984b, IV, 1584; idem, 1936, XXIII, 303; Rahmati). Short biographies are available in Bamdad II, 430-433; and Roknzada Adamiyat I, 307-308. For Fāl-Asiri’s connections with the local merchants see Navvāb to British Minister at Tehran, 17 Moharram 1304/17 October 1886 in VI, 273.

37 The mosques managed by these clerics were all well-attended places of worship with large congregations (Fasa’i II, 1205-1219). Son of a widely respected preacher and grandson of a popular poet, Mirzā Mohammad ‘Ali was a native of Shiraz, had acquired his education in Ottoman Iraq, and had some seminarians who studied with him (ibid., 1126). Likewise, Mahallati came from a clerical family background, received legal and religious training in Ottoman Iraq, and had a group of students working with him in the Mola Mosque (ibid., 911). Similarly, Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh came from a prominent noble (sādāt) and clerical family (the Dast-Ghayb family) background, had received training in Ottoman Iraq, and had a group of seminarians studying with him (ibid., 914).

38 Navvāb to Kennedy, 14 May 1891, FO 248/533; VI, 378; Kennedy to Salisbury, 27 April 1891, no. 17, FO 881/6359.

39 For biographical information see ‘Azod al-Dawla, 206; Mostawfi I, 437-439; E‘temad al-Saltana 1984, 270, 317, 340; Sadid al-Saltana, 43; see also many references to him in VI.



agreed-upon contract. Still he assured the merchants that they would suffer no loss. That the governor was at this stage compelled to speak directly to the concerns of the merchants, not the clerics, showed that while the respected ulema in town served as the mouthpiece of the opposition, the most influen-tial actors behind the scene were in fact from the local business sector. The government’s tepid attempt to address popular concerns notwithstanding, the opposition remained vocal in mosques and other religious sites. There was even an apparent intensification in the language of protest. Fāl-Asiri now gave incendiary sermons and publicly called for a holy war against those who supported foreign firms. For his part, Mo‘tamed al-Dawla began to send him a number of private messages in order to press upon him the gravity of the matter and that he should soften his tone or refrain from the topic altogether. But Fāl-Asiri had found in his opposition to the Régie—and by implication all foreign commercial enterprises—a unique opportunity to become the spokesperson for a large number of people in town and across the province. He preached what the popular classes, the merchants, and even the wealthy landowners wished to express but, for fear of reprisal, did not. As such, not only did the cleric not refrain from the topic, but his sermons became more inflammatory. On one occasion, he went so far as to threaten the life of the principal Régie agent, a certain Mr. Binns, who was due in Shiraz in a few days. The latter, and his attendants who were responsible for the establishment of the new tobacco enterprise in the province, having arrived in the vicinity of the city found it impossible to enter. They feared that the local government would not be able to contain popular excitement generated by growing anti-Régie activism.40 The clerics and merchants who had grown confident over this development persisted in promoting their agenda. Fāl-Asiri in particular continued to make extreme pronouncements. He now called for a mass killing of all foreigners in town.41

The persistence of the clerical opposition in exciting popular groups in town eventually convinced the authorities in Tehran to remove the most outspoken of the ulema from Shiraz.42 In deciding on this measure, the shah and the pre-mier had assumed that they could intimidate the clerical body and force the wider public to refrain from agitating against the Régie. The local government

40 Karbala’i, 71-72; Navvāb to Kennedy, 29 April 1891, FO 248/533.41 Imam Jom‘a to Mirzā Mohammad Hasasn Shirāzi, 19 Jomadi I 1309/21 December 1891 in

Kirmani I, 44-46; also quoted in Rahmati, 84.42 Navvāb to Kennedy, 14 May 1891, FO 248/533; VI, 378; Kennedy to Salisbury, 27 April 1891,

no. 17, FO 881/6359. As Navvāb states in his letter, the plan seems to have included the arrest of some key individuals who were involved in the excitement.

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was thus instructed to devise a plan to banish Fāl-Asiri. While the central gov-ernment did not elaborate on the specific manner through which Fāl-Asiri was to be forced out of the city, it had supposed that his exile would be arranged according to the common practice of the time.43 As the turn of events was to indicate, the authorities in Tehran were gravely mistaken.

On 17 May when Fāl-Asiri was taking an early morning walk, Habib Allāh Khān, the Bayglarbaygi of the city and the son of its powerful mayor,44 arrested the cleric just outside the city gate and dispatched him directly to Bushehr where he was put under the custody of the local district governor. He was sub-sequently forced to take up residence in Ottoman Iraq. The direct seizure of the cleric, and the humiliation he experienced on the way to Bushehr, seemed contrary to the long-established norms that implicitly governed the authori-ties’ treatment of recalcitrant ulema.45 They were, however, carefully planned by the mayor, and his associates and family in order to humble an archenemy and provoke popular outrage. The animus between Fāl-Asiri and Mohammad Rezā Khān Qavām al-Molk III dated back to many years earlier and was rooted in their conflicting roles and interests in Shiraz and across the province. While Fāl-Asiri was very much a figure who often showed support for grass-roots agitations and agendas of an anti-establishment nature, Qavām al-Molk was a member of the political elite of the province and saw Fāl-Asiri as little more than an upstart involved in undermining his authority. Beyond this personal vendetta, Qavām al-Molk and his clan had, for many years, devoted substan-tial investment to the production and sale of tobacco and other cash crops which were specialized in Fars. The establishment of the tobacco monop-oly in the province seemed, therefore, contrary to their material interests.

43 Fāl-Asiri had been expelled from Shiraz once before. His leading role in the anti- government bread riot in 1886 had led to his temporary removal from the city. But in contrast to his 1891 arrest and forced settlement in Ottoman Iraq, the authorities had kept up appearances in 1886 by showing him some respect. He was thus directed to take up residence for a few months in Isfahan; Navvāb to British Minister at Tehran, 10 October 1886 in FO 248/439; same to same, 17 Moharram 1304/17 October 1886 in VI, 273. See also Davies, 438-452.

44 Appointed by the governor and assisted by his own executive officers, the Bayglarbaygi was the chief of the city’s general policing and responsible for public order in the com-munity; he was also in charge of urban administrative officials.

45 As Fāl-Asiri’s earlier banishment showed (see notes 43 and 36), the Qajar authorities gen-erally maintained a good popular front by showing respect to powerful but unruly cler-ics even as they took measures to punish them and send them to exile. A similar case occurred with regard to the removal of Shaykh Mohammad Taqi Āqā Najafi from Isfahan in 1890 (Walcher, 135-137).



They feared too that the successful operation of the Régie would serve as a dangerous precedent for further interventions in the local economy by either the central government or its foreign concessionaires and contractors.46 In the following months, Qavām al-Molk; his son, the aforementioned Habib Allāh Khān; his uncle Mirzā Hasan Nasir al-Molk who served as deputy governor of Fars; and their client Fath ‘Ali Khān Lāri who functioned as district governor of Lar, an important tobacco producing region (Fasa’i II, 1501-1524), engaged in three different types of action that in effect enabled the opposition in Fars. They secretly encouraged their most trusted allies among the merchants, the shopkeepers, the clerics, and perhaps even the vigilantes to proceed with their anti-Régie agitations. Alternatively, they refrained from suppressing the oppo-sition or, in crucial moments, took calculated steps to provoke popular outrage. Numerous reports show that the manner in which these figures responded to the Régie-related protest in Shiraz and elsewhere in Fars was consciously designed to provoke or encourage the opposition, rather than contain or sup-press it.47 The actions of the governor showed similar traits. At critical junc-tures, he was either reluctant to take energetic action or gave mixed signals to the clerics and merchants in town (Kazemi, 449-477).

To be sure, the local authorities were in a difficult position, for the central government expected them to maintain a certain level of public order in the city and beyond. They had also to provide security and support to the local Régie as its agencies were gradually being established in various districts. As such, they could not openly display their own opposition to the tobacco monopoly with impunity. What they did instead was to work in various ways behind the scenes in order to undermine the establishment of the Régie. This has led previous scholarship to erroneously stress the anti-opposition nature of actions under-taken by the local authorities (Davies, 476-493; Adamiyat, 19-31). However, a more careful reading of the sources not only questions this conclusion but

46 Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26, and Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclosure in Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26, FO 881/6359.

47 Navvāb to Kennedy, 14 May 1891, FO 248/533; VI, 378. Kennedy to Salisbury, 27 April 1891, no. 17, FO 881/6359. Navvāb to Kennedy, 16 November 1891; same to same, 17 December 1891 in FO 248/534. Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891 in FO 60/553; Navvāb to Kennedy, 18 June 1891 in FO 248/532. See also Davies, 489. Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26; Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclosure in Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26, FO 881/6359. Same to same, 16 September 1891; same to same, 23 September 1891; same to same, 4 November 1891; and same to same, 11 November 1891 in FO 248/534. Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891 in FO 60/553; Navvāb to Kennedy, 29 April 1891 in FO 248/533; same to same, 15 February 1892 in FO 248/555. Same to same, 14 July 1891 in FO 248/533; same to same, with enclosure, 23 September 1891 in FO 248/534.

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makes it abundantly clear that the local elites were closely involved in promot-ing and perpetuating protest in Shiraz and elsewhere in Fars.

The news of the seizure of Fāl-Asiri spread across Shiraz with a degree of exaggeration and outrage. People were led to believe that the government had “abducted” (vaz‘-e asirāna) a well-respected dissident cleric in town (Karbala’i, 73). This, in turn, infuriated the religious groups, the cleric’s mercantile sup-porters, and a large section of the population. That very day a sizable group of people gathered at Fāl-Asiri’s residence to show their indignation at the way the authorities had treated him (sholugh-e ziyād mikonand). The crowd then proceeded to the Shah Cheraq, one of the city’s principal shrines, where they continued to condemn his seizure. Composed of three to four thousand men and women, the protesters subsequently closed all four extended sections of the Vakil Bazaar, the most important marketplace in town, and in effect staged one of the earliest popular boycotts in the country that year. Popular agita-tions continued throughout the night. In the morning, the number of people increased further.48 The occurrence of several incidents the following day, all seemingly planned and executed by Qavām al-Molk and his officers, aggra-vated the locals even more. These clashes between the local police forces and the protesters resulted in the death of two women and twelve “teenagers.”49 Some sixty individuals were also severely injured, of whom several would die in the following days. Within a day or two of banishing Fāl-Asiri, Shiraz was engulfed in a major crisis. People had broken into the customs house,50 and threatened to storm other government buildings such as the local telegraph house and, more importantly, the seat of the provincial government. The house of the local British agent had been jeopardized as well. Popular excitement (eghteshāsh) had reached such a point that the authorities were compelled to militarize the city. They put the entire police force in town on alert and dis-patched security guards to the local bazaars. Meanwhile British firms, such as Hotz & Son, and neutral or pro-government merchants shut down their busi-nesses out of fear of public retaliation.51

48 Navvāb to Kennedy, 9 Shavval 1308/18 May 1891 in FO 248/533; VI, 378; Karbala’i, 72-75.49 They were 10 to 15 years of age; Navvāb to Kennedy, 11 Ziqa‘da 1308/18 June 1891 in FO

248/533; VI, 379.50 On people’s frustrations with the customs administration see note 57.51 Navvāb to Kennedy, 9 Shavval 1308/18 May 1891; same to same, 11 Ziqa‘da 1308/18 June 1891

in FO 248/533; VI, 378-79; Kennedy to Salisbury, 17 May 1891, no. 19; same to same, 20 May 1891, no. 20, FO 881/6359; cf. Heydaji, 117, who suggests that the killings occurred before the expulsion.



In the next few days, agitation grew in intensity rather than subsiding. The protesters telegraphed “very strong appeals” directly to the shah to have him intervene in the matter and order the return of Fāl-Asiri. Engaging in the time-honored practice of expressing dissent, the clerics refused to hold any religious services, declined to enter mosques, and disallowed the performance of the daily public calls to prayer (azān). These actions were tantamount to the moral and political paralysis of the city. In the months to come, these early instances of boycott were to be repeated with more efficiency in both Shiraz and many other parts of the country. To be sure, public striking became the single most important tactic of protest employed by the agitators throughout the Tobacco Movement. For their part, the local authorities engaged in the type of response that alienated even further the rank and file of the opposition. They secured permission from Tehran to have the male members of Fāl-Asiri’s household join the cleric in Bushehr before they were all forced to make a journey to Iraq. The expulsion of Fāl-Asiri’s sons, just days after his seizure and concurrent with the impending arrival of Binns, the Régie agent, seemed to the public to be yet another act of provocation. It was as though the government had conspired with the British to humiliate the protesters, and debase the clerics and mer-chants. Enraged by the turn of events, many became exceedingly suspicious of the intentions of the government and the tobacco company. It appeared, in the new order of things, that the government placed a higher value on non-Iranian firms, and showed more deference to foreign subjects, than it did to the most respectable clerics or merchants. Nor did the arrival of Binns and his atten-dants help the crisis in any way. Steered by their supporters (moridhā), the cler-ics, in the next few weeks, proceeded to insist on the expulsion of Binns and the liquidation of the Tobacco Régie. The alternative, they threatened, would be “some awful disturbance.”52

Continuing agitations and expression of public dissent in Shiraz worried the central government, the British legation, and the managers of the tobacco com-pany in Tehran. They rightly feared that the spread of the news of anti-Régie unrest in Shiraz would be extremely damaging to the cause of the Régie and the position of the central government. They dreaded that other parts of the country would follow suit. The local authorities too could not tolerate the situ-ation indefinitely. They were after all responsible for maintaining social order in the city. As such, they joined the local British agent in attempting to persuade the clerics to return to their duties and deescalate unrest. Navvāb continued to

52 Navvāb to Kennedy, 11 Ziqa‘da 1308/18 June 1891, FO 248/533; VI, 379; Karbala’i, 75; Mirzā Mohammad Shafi‘ Tajir to Amin al-Zarb, 18 Shavval 1308/17 May 1891 quoted in Adamiyat 20.

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argue that the Régie was beneficial to all social groups already involved in the tobacco business. The local authorities, on the other hand, gave mixed signals. On one level, they seemed to agree with Navvāb that the Régie was not detri-mental to any social groups in the province. On another, they made the types of remarks that were in fact very damaging to the cause of the Régie. Navvāb, who could observe all this, noted repeatedly that the authorities seemed to be “inciting the mullas . . . and dropping hints calculated to excite them.” But the authorities also gave assurances to their most trusted allies. Qavām al-Molk, in particular, confided in a few clerics that “he will have the Régie concession canceled in the next six months.”53 In any event, through a series of extended private meetings, Navvāb and the local authorities were able to gradually con-vince the clerics to break their collective strike, return to mosques, and tone down their criticism of the government and the Tobacco Régie. By 26 May, sev-eral vocal clerics had started to refrain from explicit anti-Régie activism. The crisis had not been resolved, however. As of 29 May, “matters” were said to be “growing very serious”; there continued to be “every likelihood of masses grow-ing unmanageable again.”54 Several clerics kept refusing to go back to mosques until early June, but by then a semblance of public order had come to the city even if the apparent quiet remained delicate and fragile (Keddie, 68).

The Interlude

The next two and a half months witnessed a steady diminution of popular unrest in Shiraz. The pro-Régie bloc, consisting of Navvāb, Binns, and presum-ably a few other prominent notables, argued that it was not the intention of the tobacco company to “deprive people of their daily bread.” On the contrary, the company was interested in investing heavily in Fars, the main tobacco pro-ducing region of the country, and employing a large number of locals in its enterprise. The cultivators were said to get cash, rather than credit, for their

53 Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26; Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclosure in no. 26, FO 881/6359.

54 Navvāb to Kennedy, 11 Ziqa‘da 1308/18 June 1891, FO 248/533; VI, 379-380; Kennedy to Salisbury, 2 June 1891, no. 25; Governor-General of Fars to Amin al-Sultan, 26 May 1891, inclosure 1 in no. 25; Navvāb to Kennedy, 27 May 1891, inclosure 6 in no. 25, FO 881/6359; Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26; Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclosure in no. 26, FO 881/6359.



produce.55 The consumers were to find tobacco of a significantly better qual-ity at the same price as they had already been paying for. The retailers and merchants were to continue to function within the tobacco sector. They were to work for the Régie and receive “liberal commissions” for their transactions. In addition, “hundreds of clerks and workmen” were said to be employed from “the natives of all classes.” These measures were to boost the local economy, help develop the province, and ensure that local jobs were not threatened or destroyed but rather strengthened and expanded. To pacify the clerics, the pro-Régie faction pledged that only a handful of key positions at the manage-rial level would be occupied by foreigners. The ultimate aim of the company was, therefore, not to “flood the country with Europeans” or to “permit any [foreign] interference with the religious views of the people.”56 It is unclear whether these pronouncements had a significant impact on the opinions of the local merchants, clerics, retailers, consumers, landowners, or peasants. The opposition, though restrained for the time being, remained strong in the city. Meanwhile Binns engaged in developing the affairs of the tobacco company. He was able to hire two Swedes in order to establish a functional provincial office in Shiraz. He also employed tobacco agents, inspectors, and other lesser workers who were dispatched to various districts or kept in Shiraz in order to run the day-to-day business of the company.

Notwithstanding the company’s lukewarm efforts at public relations, there was still a considerable amount of tension in the city and a good deal of popu-lar dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. For one, the merchants remained quite critical of the Régie, other British enterprises such as the Imperial Bank, and even the newly modified government policy towards the customs administration.57 In June, they went on strike against the Imperial Bank and set up a local rival bank of their own in Shiraz. Some also continued to encourage the ulema to preach against the Régie and maintain their activism in mosques and other religious sites. Other well-connected merchants such

55 On the indebtedness of peasants, their overall condition in Qajar society, and their not always getting cash for their crops see Sayf, 65-111; Floor 2003, 71-78, 89-104, 119-123.

56 Ornstein to Binns, 29 May 1891 in FO 881/6359.57 The grievances of the merchants as regards the customs administration were several-fold.

They objected to a series of issues ranging from the levying of excess charges and the opening or detention of packages to mistreatment and abuse by the operators at the cus-toms houses; Wolff to Salisbury, 16 August 1888, FO 248/466. In 1891, the customs houses of Bushehr and Shiraz made an attempt to initiate “ground rents” inside the customs houses, but this was opposed by merchants of both Shiraz and Bushehr; Nezam al-Saltana to British Resident in Bushehr, 20 July 1891; same to same, 25 August 1891, FO 248/543; Navvāb, 14 September 1891, FO 248/534. See also, Davies, 372-375.

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as Gholām Hosayn Lāri and Asad Allāh Lāri got the Russians involved in the politics of the tobacco business in Fars. They forged alliances with the local Russian legation agent Mirzā Āqā Khān ‘Ezz al-Molk and fellow Russian Azeri colleagues resident in Shiraz, such as ‘Abbas Ordobadi. This anti-Régie bloc contended that Russian subjects, amongst whom a number of Iranians pos-sessing Russian citizenship were included, could not be compelled to respect the terms of the Régie agreement. This was because Article 1 of the 1828 Treaty of Turkomanchay between Iran and Russia had guaranteed freedom of com-merce in all parts of Iran for Russian subjects (Lambton 1965a, 122-123). As such, the establishment of a tobacco monopoly was in direct violation of this earlier treaty. It was in part because of the advocacy of this anti-Régie bloc, and its appeal to the Russian legation in Tehran, that in early July new guidelines were dispatched from Tehran to the effect that Russian merchants were no lon-ger obligated to abide by the terms of the tobacco monopoly. They could buy and sell tobacco at will as before.58

By mid-September, news of the anti-Régie protests in Tabriz, Mashhad, and Isfahan had reached Shiraz. Thanks to a network of telegraphic lines, which connected various cities in the country and had initiated processes of national integration, for the first time in history, the locals were kept abreast of con-current developments of tremendous interest in other, more distant parts of the country. There were clearly a series of informants who assisted in keeping the city connected to other provinces and thus helped, from this point on, to synchronize the anti-Régie efforts. That other regions of Iran objected to the establishment of the tobacco monopoly heartened the lingering underground opposition in Shiraz. When, on 17 September, people received the news that popular protest in Tabriz and the threat of violence against pro-Régie elements in Azerbaijan had resulted in the indefinite suspension of the Régie in that province,59 key opposition groups in Shiraz understood that they should push forward with their cause if they sought to achieve similar results in Fars. The

58 Navvāb to Kennedy, 7 Zihajja 1308/14 July 1891; same to same, 29 Zihajja 1308/5 August 1891; same to same, 12 Safar 1309/14 September 1891 in FO 248/533 and FO 248/534; VI, 381-382, 384-385; Kennedy to Salisbury, 10 June 1891, no. 26; Navvāb to Kennedy, no date, inclo-sure in no. 26, FO 881/6359. Incidentally, ‘Ezz al-Molk was also the agent of the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Shiraz. Same to same, 7 Zihajja 1308/14 July 1891 in FO 248/533; VI, 382. See also same to same, 10 October 1886 in FO 248/439; same to same, 23 September 1891 FO 248/534. Same to same, 10 Rabi’ I 1309/14 October 1891 in FO 248/534, VI, 387. Same to same, 9 Ramazan 1308/18 April 1891, 11 Ziqa‘da 1308/18 June 1891 in FO 248/533; VI, 376, 381. Cf. Adamiyat, 24; Keddie, 68.

59 Navvāb to Kennedy, 10 Rabi‘ I 1309/15 October 1891, in FO 248/534; VI, 387; Amin al-Sultan to All Governors of the Protected Domains, 17 September 1891, FO 248/534.



news of protests in other parts of the country was accompanied by a series of incidents which seemed to undercut the tobacco company’s purported benefaction in the province.60 One such event occurred on the night of 14 September when four employees of the Régie got into a fight with several local security guards and badly injured the most senior of the officers. In the follow-ing days Navvāb and Binns intervened in the matter and, by excusing and pro-tecting the offenders, alarmed various groups in the city. In shielding the Régie employees, Binns in particular may have thought that he had to display resolve in this and other possible anti-Régie incidents in the city. But the majority of people, including the local authorities, concluded that he was needlessly aggressive and confrontational.61

It was against this background that on 16 September an incendiary placard was posted on the gates of various caravansaries denouncing the Tobacco Régie and threatening anyone who cooperated with the company. The public notice read: “If anyone could kill or direct to hell [even] a single one of the greater or [lesser] dogs, that person will have incalculable heavenly recompense.”62 The placard laid bare the degree of antipathy harbored by the opposition in town. The reference to dogs, which were at the time widely despised and considered “ritually unclean,” was a common trope employed by protesters in the Tobacco Movement. It suggested that certain groups in the anti-Régie camp viewed the Europeans, along with their Iranian and foreign assistants, with a great deal of contempt; in addition, they considered them to be morally degenerate. The placard implied, furthermore, that all Régie employees and sympathizers—Iranian or European, prominent or otherwise—could be targets of violence. While anti-Régie threats such as this one were used earlier by the opposition in Shiraz—especially by Fāl-Asiri in April and May of that year—their resur-gence in September should be understood as an attempt by the locals to repli-cate the successful strategies of protest in Tabriz. Threats of violence were then accompanied by, not actual violence, but instances of harassment and public humiliation. One such occurrence took place on 21 September when a Régie

60 Navvāb to Kennedy, 16 September 1891, FO 248/534.61 Same to same, 16 September 1891, FO 248/534; same to same, 14 October 1891, FO 248/534;

Mo‘tamed al-Dawla to Navvāb, no date, FO 248/534; same to same, no date, FO 248/534; Written Evidence Prepared by Binns, no date, FO 248/534; Mo‘tamed al-Dawla to Navvāb, no date, FO 248/534; Navvāb to Kennedy, 23 September 1891, FO 248/534.

62 Placard at Shiraz, no date, FO 248/534; cf. Navvāb to British Minister at Tehran, 10 Rabi‘ I 1309/14 October 1891 in VI, 386-387. Navvāb to Kennedy, 23 September 1891 in FO 248/534. Navvāb to Mo‘tamed al-Dawla, no date, FO 248/534; Mo‘tamed al-Dawla to Navvāb, no date, FO 248/534.

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employee was rebuked while attending a religious service at the house of the activist cleric Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh Modarres. In the course of this confronta-tion, the latter and his supporters not only attacked the tobacco company but poured scorn on the unfortunate Régie staffer who was eventually forced to leave the commemoration service.63

Yet another key strategy used during this phase of the protest was the spread of anti-Régie rumors. Unsubstantiated stories and information about the com-pany or the growing nationwide opposition proliferated, and they were meant to convince local residents to partake in the agitations. One such rumor per-tained to an alleged “letter” from Mirzā Mohammad Hasan Shirāzi who was the most senior religious authority, and yet hereto one of the most apolitical figures, in the Shi‘ite world. Although he led a quiet life in the city of Samarra in Ottoman Iraq, Shirāzi, as his toponymic surname suggests, was a native of the city and, more importantly, the father-in-law of Fāl-Asiri.64 Given these con-nections, any report about his intervention in the Tobacco Protest was likely to be accepted by many in Shiraz and beyond. More crucially, it would have added further legitimacy to the cause of the opposition. It was in September that for the first time a rumor went around that a “letter” (neveshta) from Shirāzi deemed the sale, purchase, and consumption of tobacco to be against the religious law (harām). The “letter” supposedly stated as well that those who were employed by the company or helped it in any way were from this point on “ritually unclean” (najes), and thus association with them was prohibited.65 The contents of the alleged “letter,” in other words, prescribed nothing less than a complete boycott of the Régie. The willful dissemination of uncorroborated information about this “letter” should be seen as the culmination of the earlier strategy of striking which was now amplified and meant to target the finan-cial interests of the tobacco company. If Iranians were to withdraw from the tobacco sector—as producers, consumers, and dealers—then the Régie enter-prise would no doubt be in jeopardy. Rumored as written, signed, and sealed by Shirāzi’s own hand, the alleged “letter” was said to have been dispatched to Āqā Mirzā Mohammad ‘Ali Mojtahed, although the latter denied having come into possession of such a “letter” in an inquiry conducted by the local authorities. In the coming months, the opposition in Shiraz, and other parts of the country,

63 Navvāb to Kennedy, 23 September 1891 in FO 248/534; same to same, 10 Rabi‘ I 1309/14 October 1891 in VI, 387-88.

64 For biographical information on Shirāzi see Agha Bozorg al-Tehrani 1982; idem 1984a; Mir Sajjadi.

65 Navvāb to Kennedy, 23 September 1891; Navvāb to British Legation at Tehran, 4 November 1891 in FO 248/534.



would deliberately spread more rumors about this “letter.” By early December, few referred to this evidently fictive piece of writing as a “letter”; within a cou-ple of months, the nature of this “writing” had been transformed from a sup-posedly simple and friendly communication between two clerics into a “legal decree” (hokm) which was now binding on all believers. Throughout this time, the anti-Régie groups insisted that the “letter-cum-decree” was indeed authen-tic, but time and again they could not furnish any evidence to substantiate this claim. Be that as it may, by mid-November, Isfahan had begun to support a general strike on tobacco, and by early December Tehran, and other cities, had accepted the veracity of a clearly fabricated piece of writing from the most eminent religious authority of the day. (Walcher, 154; Lambton 1965a, 145; Keddie, 94-95; Adamiyat, 74-75).

Previous scholarship has maintained that the earliest reference to a piece of writing from either Shirāzi or any other cleric which interdicted tobacco was made in the period between late November and early December in places such as Isfahan and Tehran. New archival evidence suggests, however, that the first attempt to implement a general embargo on tobacco trade and consump-tion took place in Shiraz on or before 23 September—some two months before Isfahan or Tehran began to advocate and uphold a general strike (Lambton 1965a, 145; Keddie, 94-95; Adamiyat, 74-75). The significance of this evidence is twofold. On one level, it means that Shiraz was at the forefront of the embargo movement during the Tobacco Protest. Not only had Shiraz experienced the earliest popular unrest in the country, it also articulated its principal strategy. On another level, new archival evidence confirms the information provided by a few other sources that the alleged letter or legal ruling in Shirāzi’s name was indeed fabricated by protesters in Iran.66 It seems that agitators in Shiraz started an embargo movement in the name of Shirāzi, which after a time became a remarkably successful popular action across the country. It was only after this initiative had become an exemplary resistance movement, with potential to completely defeat the Régie, that Shirāzi chose to accept full responsibility for it. Indeed, for well over two months—between mid- September and late November—Shirāzi refrained from responding to constant telegraphic inqui-

66 Amin al-Dawla, 155, 173; Dawlatabadi I, 108-109. Karbala’i who was Mirzā Shirāzi’s resi-dent student in Samarra and who soon became the principal pro-ulema propagandist of the events associated with the Tobacco Protest is clearly mistaken when he suggests that it was Isfahan which started the embargo movement in mid- to late Rabi‘ II/November 1309/1891 (Karbala’i, 96-97) and that Mirzā Shirāzi issued his “legal decree” (hokm) in a “letter” (tawqi‘) written in late Rabi‘ II/November 1309/1891; he states that the letter was received for the first time in Tehran in early Jomadi I/December 1309/1891 (idem, 108-109).

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ries which asked him to make a public statement about the veracity of the rumored “letter-cum-decree” in his name. While, for personal and nativistic reasons, Shirāzi was unhappy with all forms of concessions, in September he was still in the middle of extended negotiations with the shah and his offi-cials about the nature of the government’s new policies. It is therefore under-standable that he did not abruptly choose to ban tobacco before waiting to see whether the central government would respond positively to some of his requests. But as the turn of events showed, these negotiations ended in due course without the government yielding to any of Shirāzi’s demands (Karbala’i, 88-89; see also note 87). By then, that is, in late November or early December, Shirāzi was more than willing to validate a growing embargo movement that was by and large predicated on deliberate rumors and yet had, without his ini-tiative, become the single most important weapon against the Régie.

Even as anti-Régie rumors circulated in Shiraz, Binns and his employees continued to harm and discredit the new enterprise in Fars. In October, com-pany representatives were dispatched to various districts in order to survey the tobacco crops and begin purchasing them while new employees, includ-ing several Europeans and Armenians, arrived from Tehran to administer the burgeoning company business in Shiraz.67 In his by now typically combative approach, Binns ordered his employees and representatives to obtain tobacco at significantly lower prices than were customarily expected by peasants and landowners. When tobacco owners refused to sell at such prices, the agents reportedly sneered and retorted that tobacco owners would not be able to sell their crops elsewhere in the country. They were destined to incur losses.68 The contentious actions of Binns and his employees were bound to generate fur-ther backlash. And this worried other, more sensible, Régie supporters such as Navvāb. In one of his regular dispatches to the British legation in Tehran, he wondered whether Binns had adequate training, or even guidance, from his superiors. He explained that he had to deal with the repercussions of Binns’s reckless behavior and had to address serious complaints which he received daily from people of all classes. He urged the British chargé d’affaires at Tehran to have the Régie director-general put pressure on Binns so that he would temporarily raise the tobacco prices to avoid any further adverse reactions. These appeals notwithstanding, Régie employees continued to bring the com-pany into disrepute. In one case, a senior Régie accountant—a certain Āqā Sayyed Hosayn of Tehran who was himself a cleric—managed to offend a large group of people in the city center when he destroyed an anti-Régie placard

67 Navvāb to British Legation, 10 Rabi‘ I 1309/14 October 1891 in FO 248/534; VI, 388.68 Same to same, 11 November 1891, FO 248/534.



and replaced it with his own makeshift pro-Régie notice which was extremely critical of the protesters. Provoked by this foolishly audacious act, an agitated crowd descended upon him and, after some beating, took him to the Nasir al-Molk Mosque where he was confined for a night. It was only through the inter-vention of the local authorities that Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh, the prayer-leader of that mosque, permitted the release of the unfortunate Régie employee. The senior administrators of the Régie had hoped that employees such as Āqā Sayyed Hosayn who had a religious background would help the company gain the support of the ulema in Fars, or in any case bring about a semblance of understanding between them and the company. But as was evident, their gen-erally aggressive and impetuous actions became a cause of much alarm among various groups in town.69

From June through the end of October, there was a good deal of opposition in Shiraz. But matters remained by and large manageable for the Régie and the local authorities. Beginning in early November, however, the city was once again engulfed in crisis.

The Final Push

From the beginning of November, there occurred a series of incidents that showed the resilience of the opposition, its power of persuasion, and its apti-tude to put pressure on the Régie and the authorities in Tehran. Perhaps the most significant achievement of activists and protest leaders was to finally convince a large group of people to abstain from tobacco. Given the popu-larity of tobacco in Fars, this was certainly not an easy task; in fact, it took the opposition well over a month to have a sizable crowd undertake a gen-eral strike. Prominent clerics seemed to be the most visible advocates of the embargo movement although the mercantile community was no doubt very active in promoting it as well. With this support base, by early November, many in Shiraz and across the province appeared pliable and willing to accept a popular embargo on the Régie. That the activist clerics were at the forefront of the strike movement is evident in a series of events that transpired dur-ing this time. On 5 November, for example, Āqā Mirzā Mohammad ‘Ali called on all the local artisans and tradesmen (kasaba) to close down their shops and gather at the Moshir al-Molk Mosque. The cleric announced that he had

69 Same to same, 11 November 1891, FO 248/534; VI, 393.

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allegedly received a “legal ruling” (hokm)70 from Mirzā Shirāzi and wished to inform people about it.71 Going beyond the purported contents of the “legal decree,” Mirzā Mohammad ‘Ali explained that people were to refrain from renting their properties to Europeans, entering their service, or selling them tobacco or, for that matter, any other commodities. Those who did not fol-low these injunctions were said to harm religion, and, therefore, deemed to be infidels and apostates.72 Other clerics followed suit and began once again to preach openly against the Régie and all the European enterprises in town. Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh, for instance, gathered a group of worshipers in the Nasir al-Molk Mosque, declared that the consumption of tobacco was henceforth religiously unlawful, and, in a calculated move that was little more than an exhibition of theatrics, personally took part in breaking water-pipes, the most popular instruments of tobacco consumption in the province.73 In the next couple of weeks, activist clerics missed no opportunity to spark public discon-tent and encourage their followers to undertake strikes and demonstrations. Taken aback, Mo‘tamed al-Dawla and Navvāb made serious attempts to con-tain growing unrest, even if for radically different purposes. The local govern-ment was particularly successful in suppressing any overt manifestation of discontent, but agitation continued to simmer below a superficial calm that was imposed on the city.74

That a good deal of disquiet and resentment was felt among various groups may be seen in two incidents that occurred in late November. In one instance, a British subject, a certain Mr. Fahie who served as chief of the local British telegraph house, was harassed in the streets of Shiraz by a serviceman from the Zarand Regiment. While public abuse of foreign subjects was previously not unheard of, the fact that a government soldier took part in insulting a senior British officer in the midst of continuing nationwide protest against a British enterprise was an indication of the worsening public mood and growing

70 A number of scholars (e.g., Browne, 22; Keddie, 69, 72n, 95, and 96) have considered the statement distributed in the name of Shirāzi to have been a “legal opinion” ( fatwa). Contemporary sources were, however, divided as to what the technical or legal term for this statement was; they referred to it as a “religious ruling” (hokm) or simply a “letter” (nevashta or tawqi’).

71 There were clearly different versions of this “ruling.” The text of one popular version may be found in Browne, 22n.

72 Navvāb to British Minister at Tehran, 11 November 1891, FO 248/534.73 Same to same, 11 November 1891, FO 248/534.74 Same to same, 16 November 1891, FO 248/534; see also VI, 391-392.



indignation against foreign subjects.75 Fahie, for his part, arrested the soldier and turned him in to the local authorities, demanding an appropriate penalty. Coming under pressure from Navvāb, the authorities publicly administered corporal punishment with a bastinado, thus humiliating the serviceman, his regiment, and above all the colonel in charge. The government’s response to the incident was subsequently understood to have been overtly in favor of Fahie and his government. This seemingly pro-British measure offended many including Colonel Mohammad Hasan Khān Sartip, the head of the regiment in question. Openly exhibiting his displeasure, he seems to have petitioned the central government to condemn the actions of the local authorities. More importantly, though, he showed his displeasure locally by making statements that were in support of the anti-Régie opposition. He complained that “a sol-dier of [his majesty] the shah was [needlessly] abused because of a [simple] act of throwing stones at a European dog.”76 In referring to Fahie as a “European dog,” the colonel was, as I indicated above, using a common trope employed by other protesters in the Tobacco Movement. Public indignation against the British and the Régie was, therefore, not limited to the rank and file of the pro-testers. Even some military officers appeared sympathetic to this cause. Nor was Shiraz alone in its opposition to the Régie; other provincial towns partook in the growing social unrest in Fars. In Jahrom, for instance, the Régie agent, along with his deputies and assistants, was attacked by a large crowd of people who verbally harassed them, threw stones at them, and went so far as to intimi-date them by discharging their guns. Paralyzed by such a menacing reception, the Jahrom agent reported the matter back to Shiraz. And compelled as they were to act on behalf of the Régie, the provincial authorities dispatched an official to inquire about the unrest in Jahrom.77

Continuing agitation in Shiraz finally exploded in early to mid-December when a stunning number of people stopped consuming tobacco and, in a sign of contempt for what the Régie stood for, destroyed their water-pipes in bazaars and other public venues. There were instances of company employees or indi-viduals under British protection being harassed or beaten by popular groups. The excitement had reached a new climax. The authorities seemed both unable and unwilling to suppress the continuing unrest, and a spirit of resignation

75 Fahie was once again harassed in December when his cook conspired with another of his employees to stage a burglary in the course of which some pieces of jewelry and 150 tumans worth of cash were taken from Fahie; “Akhbar-e ghayr-e rasmi, Fars,” Iran (Tehran), 29 Jomadi I 1309/31 December 1891, no. 762.

76 Navvāb to Sir Frank Lascelles, 15 Jomadi I 1309/17 December 1891 in FO 248/534; VI, 392.77 Same to same, 15 Jomadi I 1309/17 December 1891 in FO 248/534; VI, 390-391.

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overshadowed much of their response to the opposition. The increased public discontent in Shiraz was in part linked to massive protest in other parts of the country. The local population, the clerics and merchants especially, had been in regular contact with fellow protesters in Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad. Now that Tehran was in turmoil, they followed closely any news from the capital. The nationwide protest movement appeared to have reached a new phase where an overwhelming number of people came to its support in just about all parts of the country. Towns such as Qazvin, Yazd, and Kermanshah, which had not experienced agitations, were now engulfed in the anti-Régie crisis. Even the shah’s immediate relatives in the imperial harem displayed their support for the protest (Karbala’i, 106-116; Keddie, 103). Public outcry in other parts of the country seemed widespread. Neither the overpowering magnitude of the opposition, nor its expansive list of demands, had any precedent.78 The central government, on the other hand, looked paralyzed and weak. The rekindling of public outrage in Shiraz was, furthermore, connected to a sustained campaign to implicate Mirzā Shirāzi, the highest, if hereto quietist, religious author-ity of the Shi‘ite world, in the anti-establishment protest that was sweeping the country. It had been sometime since activist clerics, dissident intellectu-als, and disgruntled merchants in Shiraz and elsewhere had tried to publicize and enforce an alleged legal ruling by Shirāzi which purported that tobacco had become unlawful to believers (Karbala’i, 108-109; Amin al-Dawla, 155, 173; Dawlatabadi I:108-109). We have seen how as early as September rumors circu-lated about this supposed interdiction, and how the clerics and merchants in town were in full support of its implementation. By December, more people were convinced that the prohibition of the consumption of tobacco was legiti-mate and authentic. This was because Shirāzi had at long last wired a series of telegraphs to various parts of the country endorsing the widely rumored ban on tobacco which had already been disseminated in his name (Kirmani I, 45-46). An evidently new, and significantly modified, version of the “legal rul-ing” was now posted on the doors of public buildings across the city. The state-ment, which was somewhat different from the earlier one that had proscribed trade in tobacco, in addition to its consumption, and moreover directly stigma-tized Régie employees and supporters as “ritually unclean,” was in the form of a simple legal inquiry by believers; it contained a leading question forwarded to Shirāzi. He was asked what, given the circumstances, the religious obligations of believers were with regard to the consumption of tobacco. In response, the

78 The opposition at this point demanded nothing short of the complete abolition of all con-cessions given to European nations and the expulsion from Iran of all European subjects (Keddie, 97-107).



cleric reportedly noted that “at this time the consumption of tobacco in any form or shape is deemed to be identical to waging war against the [Shi‘ite] Twelfth Imam.”79

The overall public mood was fragile and unpredictable until, on 19 December, a telegraph arrived from Tehran announcing the abolition of the tobacco monopoly in all parts of the country. The official statement, dispatched by the Premier Amin al-Sultan, explained that the reasons for the unilateral gov-ernment cancellation of the Régie consisted of repeated popular requests for “exemption and abolition,” and a realization on the part of the authorities that the monopoly had become “somewhat arduous for all subjects” (bar ‘omum-e ‘ahali qadri shāq ast). The government’s open admission that there were pop-ular demands, and its recognition that the establishment of the Régie made business and life difficult for people seemed an unparalleled triumph for the opposition, and boosted the morale in Shiraz and elsewhere in the province. The premier’s statement was also informative to those who had not heard of, or may not have fully trusted, rumors and independent reports about the magni-tude of the ongoing upheaval across the country. The official notice announced that people were from this point on completely free to trade in tobacco and all its derivatives. Nor was there any restriction on the prices of tobacco or the manner in which its sale was to be conducted. But the authorities admonished protesters against persisting with their “foolish conduct” (harakat-e jāhelāna), and warned them not to undertake “inappropriate and illegal acts” (khalāf-e qā‘eda va khalāf-e ehterām) towards Régie employees.80 Upon the receipt of this telegram, the local authorities, who were at last witnessing the first glimmers of a much anticipated victory, communicated its contents to the local clerics, the wardens of all the quarters in the city, as well as the district governors in

79 Navvāb to Lascelles, 17 December 1891, FO 248/534; VI, 392-393. See also Keddie, 95-96. While by December the popular mood in Shiraz was in favor of upholding the alleged injunction, Navvāb and Mo‘tamed al-Dawla remained skeptical about the authenticity of the statement. When the governor approached the local clerics and asked for a copy of the original document, they denied having received any such message directly from Shirāzi. In fact, they denied having recommended believers in town to refrain from con-suming tobacco.

80 Navvāb to Lascelles, 12 Jomadi II 1309/13 January 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 394; Amin al-Sultan to All Governors of the Provinces, 18 December 1891, FO 248/534; same to same, 16 Jomadi I 1309, Sazman-e Asnad-e Melli-ye Iran (in Tehran, Iran), Document Number 296000651. The telegram may also be found in Kirmani I, 39; Karbala’i, 132; Taymuri 1982, 129. See a different version of this official notice in “E‘lan-e dawlati,” Iran (Tehran), 29 Jomadi I 1309/31 December 1891, no 762. The original telegraph arrived in Shiraz a day after it was dispatched.

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the province. The telegraph appeared, at least for a time, to work as a balm for the popular nerves. There was, however, a collective sense of urgency to commemorate and advertise what seemed to be the opposition’s extraordinary achievement against both the government and the British. People asked the local authorities for permission to decorate the city with lights and publicly celebrate the marvelous success of the protest movement. When the local gov-ernment did not consent to unrestricted public jubilation, mosques, religious buildings, and local shops were illuminated for the next few weeks. People too started using water-pipes again and seemed indifferent to the continuing religious-cum-legal ban on the consumption of tobacco which had not yet been formally lifted by Mirzā Shirāzi or any of the prominent clerics in the country. Just as it had started with grass roots efforts, the embargo movement came to an end through popular agency and without the formal support of the cleric in whose name the strike was in fact conducted. The local ulema, for their part, wired a telegraph to the shah expressing their gratitude for the lat-est measure adopted by the government.81 These developments helped defuse a considerable amount of tension in Shiraz. By early January, people had seen, as well, the gradual discharge of the Régie staff. The company had stopped purchasing tobacco and begun returning the merchandise already in its pos-session to those interested in reclaiming it.82

Still, matters were far from having been completely settled. In fact, a grim sense of foreboding soon enveloped the city which had a lot to do with the spread of rumors that anticipated the imminent expulsion of all Europeans. The removal of foreigners was said to be a necessary corollary to the liquida-tion of the tobacco company. Stories circulated that the government was will-fully misleading in its official proclamation of the abolition of the Régie. It was only the company’s monopoly over the domestic trade in tobacco that had been brought to an end; the Régie remained very much active in its monopoly over the lucrative export trade (Karbala’i, 126-133). Casting further doubts on the veracity of the earlier government communiqué, Binns had, for his part, declared that the Régie remained very much in operation. Not only was the company in full possession of its export monopoly, but it remained active in the internal trade as well. It was simply the Régie’s “monopoly over the [domes-tic] tobacco trade” that had been suppressed. The company was to remain a major competitor even within the internal tobacco market. These rumors and pronouncements were disconcerting to the local authorities who were by this time less discreet in their support for the protest movement. They told Binns

81 Navvāb to Lascelles, 12 Jomadi II 1309/13 January 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 394-95.82 Same to same, 12 Jomadi II 1309/13 January 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 395.



that if his statements were in fact true, they predicted nothing short of “a full-fledged insurrection” in the coming days. Nor could the local government con-trol what popular groups might do to the Régie and foreign subjects in town.83 The rank and file of the participants in the anti-Régie protest, on the other hand, seemed deeply unsettled; the new revelations had done much to despoil them of their earlier sense of jubilation and victory. The fragility of calm in Shiraz was threatened, moreover, by reports of an “open revolt and uprising” (balvā va shuresh-e ‘āmmi) in Tehran against the government and the Régie.84 People also learned about famine, inflation in the prices of essential goods, and above all the confrontation between the clerics and the central government in the capital. Word had it that “the people of Tehran no longer want the Premier Amin al-Sultan [to remain in power] and have dismissed him from office” (u rā ma‘zul karda-and). While such hearsay indicated that the authorities had not yet addressed the main causes of popular protest, it simultaneously laid open the seemingly limitless potential concerted public agitation had to make claims on the authorities and demand that they should modify their policies or even change key officials in power.85

These reports were accompanied by the distribution of a hereto private tele-graph from Mirzā Shirāzi to the shah which dated back to early November; the letter was extremely critical of what it called the pro-European policies of the state.86 The dissemination of this telegraph should be understood as yet another tactic on the part of the opposition who, despite repeated requests, had not been able to furnish concrete evidence that Shirāzi had composed the original “legal decree” against the consumption of tobacco. By distribut-ing a letter that was critical of the state, especially with regard to its support for the Régie and its pro-British policies, the opposition aimed to placate any attempts to discredit earlier reports that cast doubts on the veracity of the orig-inal “legal ruling.” Regardless of the hidden motives behind the release of the letter, its impact was undeniable. That the letter was written by not only the most eminent Shi‘ite cleric of the time but also a well-respected fellow Shirāzi

83 Navvāb to Lascelles, 12 Jomadi II 1309/13 January 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 394-95.84 Same to same, 12 Jomadi II 1309/13 January 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 395.85 Same to same, 16 Rajab 1309/15 February 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 397.86 Same to same, 16 Rajab 1309/15 February 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 397. Kirmani I, 35, dates

this telegraph back to 4 Rajab 1309/3 February 1892. The contents of the telegraph, how-ever, support the date given by Taymuri 1982, 97, and Rasul Ja‘fariyan in Karbala’i, 88-89, which is early Rabi‘ II 1309/November 1891, that is, well over a month after the earliest rumors in Fars about Shirāzi’s ban on tobacco and before the 18 December decree from Amin al-Sultan.

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eroded people’s confidence in the authorities even further. The letter stated that government officials did not understand the magnitude of damage caused by the implementation of the recent concessions. The inevitable “dependence of the state” (‘adam-e esteqlāl-e saltanat) on foreigners, the widespread “fear and dissension among the subjects,” and the “dissonance in the legal system of the country”—a reference to questionable procedures that dealt with legal disputes involving foreign subjects—were said to be some of the outcomes of such pro-British policies. These measures empowered foreigners to “have con-trol over the country’s economy and commerce” (vojuh-e ma‘āsh va tejārat). As a result, people had lost power over their own businesses and were overtaken in their own country by the commercial and political interests of foreigners. In addition, they were put in a position to develop relations with foreigners, often out of compulsion, in order to find jobs and enter into their service. Shirāzi complained that the monarch was not adequately informed about what was actually happening in his country and especially about “the extent to which his subjects remained in a state of anxiety and panic.” In a thinly veiled threat, the cleric concluded that the establishment of foreign enterprises such as the Régie was not feasible “even if it means people’s lives should be spared” in opposition to the authorities (har chand monjar beh etlāf-e nofus shavad).87

Despite these revelations and the continuing disquiet in Shiraz, the Tobacco Protest came to an end in mid- to late January. On the 9th day of the month, the locals learned about the complete liquidation of the Régie which had come as a consequence of the most recent unrest in Tehran. If there were any doubts about the collapse of the Régie, a telegraph from Amin al-Sultan, which announced in early February the complete termination of the tobacco monopoly over both internal and external trade, reassured the skeptics that the authorities had finally caved in to pressure. The statement reiterated that the operation of the Régie was admittedly harmful to the interests of the mer-chants and various groups inside the country. The company was said to be in the process of evaluating the extent of its loss and upon the receipt of com-pensation would completely close its offices and recall all its employees. The telegraph enjoined people to desist henceforth from disputing matters related to the tobacco monopoly. The complete liquidation of the Régie

has been hereby explained [in great detail], so that no one would have any doubts [about it]. . . .

87 Navvāb to Lascelles, 16 Rajab 1309/15 February 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 397.



People must not engage in discussions pertaining to this topic that would [somehow] generate sedition [in the country]; nor should they bring up a new issue everyday [on the pretext that it is in some way] related to this matter. The Régie has been completely brought to an end; it has been wholly abolished; it has been unconditionally annulled.88

And such was the end of a popular movement in Shiraz that had numerous national and transnational connections and ramifications. The opposition seemed to have achieved most, if not all, of its goals. It was able to reverse the tobacco concession, humiliate the British and pro-British elements inside the province, and declare undisputed victory over the government. A popular consensus had been built over what seemed to be the reckless policies of the Qajar state and the wisdom of popular intervention in the affairs of the gov-ernment. While it appeared that the expulsion of all foreigners and European businesses was unlikely to materialize, the opposition in Shiraz appeared con-tent with what had been accomplished. Although immediately clerics such as Mirzā Hedāyat Allāh began to take matters into their own hands and encour-age further popular agitation, there was no longer any public dissent over the operation of the Régie. By early February, the Tobacco Protest in other parts of the country also came to a symbolic end when the prominent ulema of Tehran and a few other cities collaborated to rescind Mirzā Shirāzi’s legal decree. On 25 March, Fāl-Asiri returned to Shiraz and received a hero’s welcome. With his arrival a new era began in the history of popular protest and violence in the city.89

Conclusion

In an impressive study of the social experience of the laboring population in a small community in rural England, Barry Reay remarks by way of conclusion that

[t]he guiding principle of microhistory is historical research on a reduced scale, under the microscope so to speak, with the conviction that detailed observation and analysis will not only uncover unknown complexities and reveal ‘new meanings’ in structures, processes, belief systems and human interaction, but sometimes even—as Italian practitioners have pointed out—render macrohistorical analyses irrelevant (Reay, 258).

88 Same to same, 16 Rajab 1309/15 February 1892 in FO 248/555; VI, 397-98.89 Same to same, 14 Sha‘ban 1309/14 March 1892; same to same, 13 Ramazan 1309/11 April 1892

in FO 248/555; VI, 398-401.

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In placing Shiraz under the microscope, my purpose was to provide ample evi-dence for several historiographical interventions. First, the 1891 agitations in Shiraz appear to be the earliest instance of popular protest against the Régie in Iran, and, more importantly, the protest did not die down, as previous scholar-ship has generally assumed, after the expulsion of Fāl-Asiri. Tabriz, Isfahan, Mashhad, Kerman, and many other cities of the country joined the movement much later and did not have as much influence, as Shiraz did, in the making of the Tobacco Protest. As I noted earlier, Tehran however did have a vocal anti-Régie opposition in the early months of the year, but this was limited to a smaller number of senior state officials, wealthy merchants, and political dis-sidents who had not yet been able to fully mobilize either the religious groups or a sizable population of that city.

The reasons for the beginning of the protest in Shiraz were several fold. That Fars was the most important tobacco producing region in the country was certainly a contributing factor. This meant that more people depended on the tobacco industry, and as such more felt threatened by the prospect of losing their livelihood. That the Régie tried to establish a provincial office in Fars before it did in many other parts of the country could also be another factor. But it is an overstatement to argue, as previous scholarship has, that Shiraz displayed the earliest popular opposition to the Régie because it was the first region to experience “the effects of the concession” (Keddie 67). As we have seen, the opposition was extremely active even prior to the arrival of Binns and the implementation of the terms of the Régie. Yet another reason for the start of popular unrest in Shiraz was the widespread awareness that the city and the province, along with the rest of southern Iran, had, more than any other parts of the country, come under British commercial and economic domination. Merchants were losing their business; some were going bankrupt. Retailers too were experiencing some foreign competition in lines of work that were heretofore exclusively in the hands of the local population. The clerics, for their part, feared that the increasing presence of foreign subjects may have undue cultural influence and thus help to turn the popular classes away from them. These groups all feared, as well, that the Tobacco Régie was simply the earliest phase of a broader policy to intervene in other areas of the local econ-omy; they felt that the production and sale of other cash crops and industries could be monopolized by the central government, the British firms, or possibly other foreign subjects.

While the popular protest in Shiraz had deep local roots and dynamics of its own, it also had national and supranational connections and ramifications. From the earliest part of the year, various opposition groups were in contact with fellow agitators in other parts of the country and those in the neighboring



Ottoman Empire and Europe. We have reasons to believe that the protest in Shiraz was informed, to some undetermined extent, by the earlier opposition of the editors of the Istanbul-based Persian newspaper Akhtar and of the clan-destine network of dissident intellectuals and agitators loosely associated with the former Persian Minister in London Mirzā Malkom Khān. I have also noted the connections of several clerics in Shiraz with Ottoman Iraq where Mirzā Mohammad Hasan Shirāzi and other widely-respected Shi‘ite clerics resided. Likewise, the agitators in the city were in contact either through telegraph or postal mail with like-minded associates and acquaintances in Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. The unmistakable parallels and similarities between the protest movement in Shiraz and those of other cities suggest that the former in fact set an example for several key cities, but more importantly, was itself influenced by events in Isfahan, Tabriz, and Tehran. To cite one crucial example, many of the strategies of protest used by the clerics, merchants, and other groups in 1891 seem to have been originally employed in Shiraz. These included the effective practice of collective strikes, public demonstrations, threats of violence, public harassment, and so on. Even with regard to the usage of religious and commer-cial buildings—that is, mosques, shrines, markets, and caravansaries—as sites of anti-Régie protest and consensus-building, we see the undeniable influence of Shiraz. These strategies of protest had deep historical roots of their own and functioned within a larger culture of dissent in the country. But their effective use that year against the Régie and the government was first manifested in Shiraz. After the expulsion of Fāl-Asiri, and once other cities had learned of the events in Shiraz, these strategies were replicated with increasing efficiency in other parts of the country. On the other hand, the unforeseen successes of the agitations in Tabriz, Isfahan, and Tehran subsequently influenced the protest-ers in Shiraz. We notice this reciprocal relationship most clearly in the case of the general interdiction on tobacco. It was initially in Shiraz that rumors suggested Mirzā Shirāzi had issued a “legal decree” against tobacco. As these reports spread to other parts of the country, a full-fledged embargo movement took off in places like Isfahan and Tehran. Inspired by the evident political impact of the alleged legal ruling in other parts of the country, the protesters in Shiraz then, in November, redoubled their efforts to stage a popular strike on tobacco.

The opposition in Shiraz consisted of several key groups among the middle and lower layers of society. The merchants and clerics remained the most vis-ible elements although it is clear that the participation of a number of other groups was equally crucial for the success of the protest. The merchants were one of the most active groups in the agitations and remained crucial for its success. They were the first social group to inquire about the details of the

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Régie contract, to petition the shah and the local British legation agency, and to induce the clerics to preach against the Régie and the other European enterprises. It is also not inconceivable that they could provide the necessary financial backing for the continuation of the protest in Shiraz. Although the merchants remained crucial throughout the year, the ulema gradually became the principal interlocutors in the ongoing negotiations with the government, the Régie, and the British legation agency. By November, and especially after the general embargo on tobacco became a reality, the clerics had acquired an unparalleled status as not only the public face of the protest movement, but as shrewd tacticians who were at last able to outmaneuver the authorities and pro-Régie elements in the community. Beyond the clerics and merchants, the opposition enjoyed the support of other groups. Government officials and mil-itary officers had anti-Régie sentiments too, and provided the necessary back-ing for the protest movement. The landed elites were also implicated in the agitations. In this regard, the role of the local notables such as Qavām al-Molk and his clan who were at once landowners and important local politicians should be stressed. Even the local governor was not uninvolved in the anti-Régie unrest. These figures remained key players, and yet also the most mis-understood and neglected participants in the Tobacco Protest. Evidence from other towns and cities suggests that local notables and politicians played a similar role in Isfahan, Tabriz, Tehran, and elsewhere.90 The generality of peo-ple, about whom we do not hear much, took part in the protest movement for several reasons. On one level, it may be argued that as small-time consumers and retailers of tobacco they had a stake in the tobacco industry and did not wish to see a foreign monopoly jeopardize their position. On another level, it is possible that the effective use of religion as the principal ideology of the pro-test brought a large section of the community together to take part in the anti-Régie agitations. But this in and of itself does not explain the massive popular participation. On yet another level, one could posit that popular groups had many grievances of their own which ranged from chronic food scarcity and severe inflation to massive unemployment and declining standards of living. Given the fact that they regarded the government as uninterested in resolving these frustrations or, for that matter, in containing recurrent instances of extor-tion perpetrated by the local authorities, these groups found, in the anti-Régie protest, a cause with which they could identify. The lower layers of society, however, did not get to articulate these grievances and frustrations throughout the Tobacco Protest in Shiraz for reasons I will explain below.

90 For Isfahan see Walcher, 141-163; for Tabriz and Tehran see my own analysis (Kazemi, 449-477).



The tactics and strategies used by protesters in Shiraz varied, but they all focused on a set of common goals. As we have already seen, they included embargoes, collective strikes, public demonstrations, threats of violence, rumors, public harassment, and public spectacles such as the communal break-ing of water-pipes in the bazaars or raids on key government buildings and European-managed sites with some sort of symbolic significance. These tactics were meant to create a general sense of crisis in the city, recruit more partici-pants to the anti-Régie struggle, silence neutral or pro-Régie elements in the community, and, above all, paralyze the government. Embedded in the social and political culture of nineteenth-century Iran, these tactics had all existed prior to the anti-Régie protest in Shiraz. But their effective use in Shiraz that year made them more appealing to protesters elsewhere in the country where they were employed again and again over the course of the Tobacco Protest.

A good deal of social networking also took place within the community about which we have very little concrete evidence but we can nonetheless infer with a degree of certainty. People discussed intensely, in private and pub-lic venues, matters relating to the Régie and what they considered to be their common good. The bourgeoisie, as represented by both the merchants and the clerics, used their politically and financially autonomous institutions—i.e., the religious and commercial sites—to recruit and persuade more people to take part in the agitations. This author does not consider the clerics to have been part of a socioeconomically antiquated class. As lawyers, jurists, teach-ers, and prayer-leaders of popular houses of worship, the clerics’ fortunes in late nineteenth-century Iran were tied to that of the merchants, and the eco-nomic and market dynamics of the localities in which they lived and flour-ished. These bourgeois groups also deployed their available resources for the cause of the protest movement, and, more importantly, managed to deter-mine the language of dissent and the types of claims that could be made on the authorities and the Régie. As the most visible and articulate groups in the protest, the merchants and clerics engaged in valorizing their own demands and de- emphasizing or excluding certain others that belonged to the lower lay-ers of society. The public sphere in Shiraz was thus never completely free and unrestricted; either the authorities, or else the dominant opposition groups, regulated what could or could not be expressed publicly. This is one reason the popular groups did not get to articulate simultaneously their own equally important concerns and grievances throughout the Tobacco Protest. And yet despite restrictions, people from the middle layers of society did manage to talk about their growing concerns and use their autonomous institutions to oppose government policies or increasing foreign domination of southern economy. Throughout the year, we see as well how in the public sphere a cause

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of common good became, certainly not for the first time in the history of Iran or the Middle East, entangled with religious concerns and how religion was used as a political ideology to mobilize various groups in Shiraz and beyond. Perhaps because this process—that is, the effective adoption of religion as a means to bring about a political end—manifested itself for the first time in an enormously popular nationwide struggle, it was bound to remain influential in future national struggles in Iran and the broader Shi‘ite world. It was also to remain a durable voice in the country’s public sphere. The Tobacco Protest did not mark the true beginnings in Iranian society of what has been described in the context of Ottoman history as the “politicization of Islam” (see Karpat and Commins), but it did mark a crucial phase in its development and maturation.

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The Tobacco Protest in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The View from a Provincial Town

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