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EMOTIONS OF PROTEST

Dunya van Troost Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

Bert Klandermans

Dept. of Sociology VU University Amsterdam

Politics—and especially politics of protest—are full of emotions. People are angry about

austerity measures, thrilled or fearful about the Arab Spring and indignant because they want

real democracy now!1 Clearly, there is an emotional side to how people react to their social and

political environment (e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1986; Lyman, 2004; Marcus, 2003; Marcus,

Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Way & Masters, 1996). Politics of protest are imbued with

emotions. In fact, protest is inconceivable without emotions (Jasper, 1997). It are emotions

which “give ideas, ideologies, identities and even interests their power to motivate” (Jasper,

1997, p 127).

Emotions have become a popular research area in the study of contentious politics. Such

was not always the case. Classic breakdown theories on collective action used emotion terms as

explanatory variables but equated emotion with irrationality. As rational approaches like

resource mobilization theory (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1976) or political process theory (e.g.

McAdam, 1982) became the state of the art, protesters were seen as ‘rationally’ motivated actors,

and emotional aspects were left out the explanatory models (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999).

Nevertheless, around the beginning of the 21st century, the previously held implicit assumption

that emotion and rationality contrast each other has been refuted (Aminzade & McAdam, 2002;

Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Gould, 2009).

Organizers of protest do not feel constrained by whatever paradigmatic shift. ‘Emotion

work’ has always been key to the organization of protest. Take the following quote from

Malcolm X: “Usually when people are sad, they don't do anything. They just cry over their

condition. But when they get angry, they bring about social change.” Malcolm X points to an

important characteristic of emotions; that is, that emotions propel behavior, but perhaps even

more important, different emotions propel different behavior. This is the basic tenet of appraisal

theory of emotions. A second central tenet of appraisal theory is that people can evaluate―or

appraise―the same event differently and consequently have different emotional responses. This

chapter will lay out a theoretical framework that links individuals’ appraisals of the socio-

political context to emotions of protest. Appraisals―particularly group-based appraisals―play a

crucial role in that respect. As people categorize themselves as group members, individual

emotions turn into group-based emotions; “I feel for us”. Group-based appraisals shape group-

based emotions, and consequently collective behavior. Our theoretical model― as depicted in

1 Cf. The Spanish Indignados who claim Democracia real ya!

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Figure 1―holds protest emotions dependent on the socio-political context in which a contested

issue emerges. This relationship between context and emotion is mediated by

appraisals―evaluations―of the social and political context. The resulting emotions interact with

the motivation to participate in protest or to abstain from it.

Figure 1: Model of the socio-political context, emotions and protest behavior

Emotions are socially constructed. In other words, the experience of emotions is influenced by

norms, values and culture. Goodwin et al. (2001) argue that “some emotions are more socially

constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes” (p. 13). In their view, emotions that

are politically relevant are―more than other emotions―at the social construction end of the

scale. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the

interpretation of the state of affairs by which they are generated. People might be puzzled by

some aspects of reality and try to understand what is going on. They may look for others with

similar experiences and a social movement may provide an environment to exchange

experiences, to tell their stories and to express their feelings. Social movements are carriers of

meaning and organizers do their utmost to create moral outrage and to provide a target against

which this can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package

of attitudes. Organizers appeal to ‘attack emotions’ such as anger to create “fire in the belly and

iron in the soul” (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). However, ‘just’ being angry is not enough, as Martin

Luther King aptly stated: “It is not enough for people to be angry - the supreme task is to

organize and unite people so that their anger becomes a transforming force.” Social movements

use their power, resources and creativity to turn individual grievances and emotions into

collective claims and to stage opportunities to act upon these claims. In the pages to come we

will first define emotions and then theorize about appraisal theory of emotions. In that context

we will outline appraisals deemed to be important in the context of protest and the related

emotions. Next, we discuss emotions and the related behavioral intentions before, during and

after protest. The chapter closes with a section in which we assess where we stand and propose

directions to proceed.

Socio-political

context

Protest behaviour

Emotion Group based

appraisal Action tendency

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Defining emotions of protest

Emotions can be distinguished from mere feelings or moods by their relation to a specific

object or idea. Our description on emotions of protest distinguishes between three objects of

emotion: the opponent, the in-group, and contentious issues (Jasper, 1998). Protesters are likely

to experience negative emotions towards their opponent and the contentious issue, while they

most likely feel positive emotions towards the group they identify with (Goodwin & Jasper,

2006). Yang (2000) for instance found negative emotions, anger, outrage, shame and fear elicited

by interactions with opponents (in this case Chinese authorities), while positive emotions as joy,

compassion and pride were elicited in the interaction with other activists inside the movement

(1989 Chinese student movement). The fact that moods and feelings are not related to a specific

object or idea does not imply that they have no impact on protest behavior. Contrary to that,

public mood―mood resulting from group membership (Rahn, 2004)― provides feedback to

people about how the group (i.e., the political community) is faring. Research has demonstrated

that people in a positive mood display more self-efficacy, are more optimistic, and show more

associative cognitive processes, while a negative mood, on the other hand, is related to higher

risk perception, pessimism, and more rule-based cognitive processes (Forgas, 2001). In other

words, the ‘emotional barometer’ in a country might trigger different (risk) perceptions,

cognitive styles and emotions. This suggests that public mood might influence the claims social

movement organizations make, the way problems are framed, the emotions that are experienced

and the motivations to participate in protest.

Multiple protest emotions. People evaluate similar events differently and consequently

have different emotional responses. Protesters in the same event can thus experience different

emotions. To illustrate the variety of motives for participation in an event and the multiple

emotions triggered by grievances we draw on the Belgian Dutroux case. This case revolved

around Marc Dutroux, who was arrested in August 1996, and later convicted for the kidnapping,

hostage taking, rape and murder of several young girls, acts which on their own violate many

social norms. However, it became a politically contested issue because the Belgian

authorities―police and judicial courts―made gross mistakes while investigating this case.

These mistakes undermined citizens’ trust in legislative enforcement (Fijnout, 1999), and

triggered a protest of 300.000 citizens (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005; Walgrave & Rihoux,

1998). The motives for people to participate in this so-called ‘White March’ were very diverse,

varying from the expression of solidarity with the parents of the victims, disapproval of

pedophilia, or a plea to reform the Belgian justice and/or political system (Walgrave & Rihoux,

1998). The example of the White March illustrates how in real life settings people experience

multiple emotions. Dutroux is met with outrage, the justice system is resented and the parents of

the victims receive solidarity and empathy (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2006).

People can experience multiple emotions at the same time or in very close “temporal

proximity” (Barbalet, 2002; Benski, 2011; Flam, 2005). In fact, people hardly ever experience a

single emotion, instead they display a mixture of emotions. Benski (2011) suggests using the

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concept of emotional constellation to explore these mixtures of emotions. She presents an

overview of emotions as they are experienced by female peace activists in Israel. Her findings

indicate that protesters are likely to display combinations of emotions in response to multifaceted

social and political situations. Emotional constellations may induce congruent or incongruent

action tendencies. In case of congruent action tendencies, the behavioral intentions are expected

to be strengthened. Anger and frustration, for example, both motivate aggressive behavior; the

White March protesters may have been outraged, wishing to retaliate Dutroux , and frustrated

with the inability of the authorities to properly fulfill their tasks. Both emotions and action

tendencies reinforce each other and enhance an individual’s motivation to take onto the streets.

However, in case of incongruent emotions action tendencies conflict (Benski, 2011). Incongruent

emotions―like fear which activates escape and flight behavior and anger which activates attack

behavior―may induce a tendency to flight and fight at the same time. This incongruence―or

cross pressure―can neutralize the inclination to flight and may lead to protest participation

(Benski, 2011, p. 29).

Appraisal theory of emotion

People are continuously evaluating or appraising the relevance of their environment for

their well being and these appraisals help account for different emotions (Arnold, 1960). Lazarus

proposed the distinction between primary appraisal, that is the assessment of an event’s

implications for one’s well-being and secondary appraisal, the assessment of one’s ability to

cope with the situation (Lazarus, 1966). After a fast and automatic evaluation of these first

appraisal dimensions, other dimensions are evaluated: How does the event influence my goals?

Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and power over the consequences of the event?

Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal values and (societal) norms? It

is thus the personal meaning we give to ambiguous stimuli through appraisals that determines

emotions we feel. Hence, emotional experiences are a function of characteristics of the situation

and the person (Kuppens & Tong, 2010). This implies that it is a person’s perspective at the

situation, not the situation per se, which results in an emotional response. This emotional

response is a combination of physical arousal, associated feelings and thoughts (Scherer, 2000;

Scherer & Peper, 2001) leading to emotion expression and an action tendency (Clore & Ortony,

2000; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

A major claim made by appraisal theorists is that objectively similar situations or events

can elicit, in different individuals, highly dissimilar emotional reactions depending on

idiosyncratic subjective appraisals. A number of empirical studies has confirmed this and has

shown that a limited number of appraisal dimensions is sufficient to explain emotional

differentiation. Scherer and Ceschi (1997), for example, tested cognitive appraisal theory in a

field study. In a major international airport, passengers reporting their luggage lost to the

baggage retrieval service were interviewed after their interaction with an airline agent. They

were asked to rate their emotional state before and after the interaction with the agent and to

provide information on how they had appraised the situation. The results show that the goal

conduciveness check is by far the most important predictor: perceived high obstructiveness of

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the loss was leading to anger and worry while low obstructiveness led to indifference and good

humor. After goal conduciveness coping potential was the most important predictor. Travelers

who thought that they had sufficient coping potential to deal with the lost luggage event were

angry whereas travelers with low coping potential experienced sadness. Two persons can thus

appraise the same event―the experience of lost luggage―differently and have different

emotional responses resulting in different action tendencies.

Action tendencies are the inclination to respond to a situation with particular behavior

(Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). These authors suggest that behavior is organized in two

systems. To take advantage of a beneficial situation appetitive behavior, such as care giving, is

activated. In threatening situations the defensive system is activated, stimulating behavior such

as escape, attack and withdrawal (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Frijda, 2007).

When feeling afraid people experience the urge to run away while sadness induces inactivity

(Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Anger, on the other hand induces aggressive behavior like

the urge of wanting to hurt someone. This aggressive aspect provides a reason why particularly

anger appears to be able to mobilize aggrieved individuals to fight for what they believe is right.

Nerb and Spada (2001) conducted three experimental studies to investigate the relation

between the cognitive appraisal of environmental problems, the development of distinct

emotions (anger and sadness), and the resulting action tendencies. The participants in their

studies read a fictitious but realistic newspaper report about an environmental problem (a tanker

running aground in a severe storm and spilling oil into the North Sea). Different experimental

conditions were realized: (a) the tanker did not fulfill the safety guidelines; the damage could

have been avoided (high controllability); (b) the tanker did fulfill the safety guidelines; the

damage could not have been avoided (low controllability). It turned out that the more

controllable the event the more angry people were and, important for our discussion, the more

willing to participate in a boycott (Nerb & Spada, 2001). However, if the participants were to

believe that the damage could not have been avoided, they were sad, which did not translate into

action preparedness.

Group-based appraisal theories of emotions. Appraisal theory was developed to explain

personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, “the self” implicated in emotion-relevant

appraisals is clearly not only a personal or individual self. If group membership becomes part of

the self, events that harm or favor an in-group by definition harm or favor the self, and the self

might thus experience affect and emotions on behalf of the in-group. With such considerations in

mind Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was predicated on social

identification with the group. Since collective action is by definition a group phenomenon and

group identification an important factor in determining collective action we will elaborate on the

possible implications of group-based emotions on protest behavior.

The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory (as spelled out by Smith in 1993) is that

when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their consequences for that

in-group, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioral intentions. In three studies

Mackie, Devos and Smith (2000) tested this idea. Participants’ group memberships were made

salient and the collective support enjoyed by the ingroup was measured or manipulated. The

authors then measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as

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well as the desire to move against or away from the out-group. Participants who perceived the in-

group as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the outgroup and to desire to take

action against it. Participants who perceived the ingroup as weak on the other hand, were more

likely to experience fear and to move away from the outgroup. The effects of perceived ingroup

strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger. Results of these three studies

confirm that when a collective identity is salient, appraisals of events in terms of consequences

for the salient ingroup lead to specific emotional responses and action tendencies towards the

outgroup.

Smith and colleagues investigated how identity predicted social emotions. Recent studies

address the role of social identification in a more explicit way (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, &

Gordijn, 2003; Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus,

2002; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). These scholars argue that “people can,

under certain conditions, be connected to others in such a way that they are likely to experience

emotions even though they themselves are not directly confronted with the triggering situation”

(p. 535), in their words: “I feel for us” (p. 533).

These studies suggest that the same emotion processes (i.e. appraisals, emotions and

action tendencies) operating at the individual level and in interpersonal situations operate in

intergroup situations. Moreover, people do experience emotions on behalf of their group

membership. Since intergroup emotion theory is based on the presumption that the group is

incorporated in the self (“the group is in me”, thus “I feel for us”) one would assume that the

more the group is in me (i.e. the higher the group identification) the more people experience

group-based emotions. Yzerbyt et al. (2003) showed that indeed emotional reactions fully

mediated the impact of categorization context and identification on action tendencies. In other

words, the salience of similarity was found to generate angry feelings among participants only to

the extent that they strongly identified with the relevant category. Thus people will experience

group-based emotions when the social category is salient and they identify with the group at

stake.

Appraisals, emotions, protest

A growing body of appraisal theories of emotions has emerged, each specifying a set of appraisal

dimensions in an attempt to better predict the elicitation and differentiation of emotions see (see

Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996 for a theoretical overview and integration). Given the high

degree of convergence between different appraisal theories we will depart from the improved

appraisal theory of Roseman and colleagues (1996), since this theory is an evaluation, revision

and integration of the till then proposed appraisal theories of emotions. Roseman et al. (1996)

intended to provide a systematic account of appraisal-emotion relationships. It is systematic in

that: (a) it specifies how a small number of appraisal dimensions combine to elicit a large

numbers of emotions; (b) it identifies the particular emotions that result from all possible

combinations of these appraisals; and (c) it shows how these emotions are related to each other

within an emotion system. The theory specifies which emotions are closely related (e.g. guilt and

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shame) and which are more distantly related (e.g. hope and pride); identifies families of related

emotions whose eliciting conditions differ in a single appraisal dimension; and predicts which

changes in appraisal are necessary to transform one felt emotion into any other.

Inspired by appraisal theory of emotion, we develop a framework which delineates how

(group-based) appraisals of aspects in the socio-political environment result in emotions of

protests. Appraisals deemed important in the context of protest are: goal facilitation /obstruction,

control and responsibility. Appraisals of goal facilitation elicit positive emotions while

appraisals of goal obstruction elicit negative emotions. Emotions motivating protest behavior are

in all likelihood caused by events or situations perceived as goal obstruction. Emotions

experienced during protest activity, on the other hand may be goal facilitative because

participating in protest can be seen as a way “of saying something about oneself and one’s

morals, and of finding joy and pride in them” (Jasper, 1998, p. 415). However, pessimistic

protesters who are afraid that the protest activity won’t make any difference may experience goal

obstruction, and consequently feel frustrated rather than proud. The appraisal of control refers to

the comparison of one’s own power or control to the potency or controllability of the stimulus. It

refers to whether one could “do something about an event” (Roseman et al. p. 262). Roseman et

al. show that “it is not the ability to cope with an event, but rather the perceived ability to control

or do something about its goal incongruent aspects that elicit an emotion which will contend with

a situation (such as frustration or anger) rather than an emotion which will accommodate to it

(such as sadness)” (p. 262). An additional appraisal important in the context of protest is

responsibility. A situation can be caused intentionally or unintentionally by the individual self,

others or circumstances beyond human control (Moors, 2010). The dimension of responsibility

provides direction to what circumstances or which actors are accountable for the harm or benefit

that the situation poses.

We draw on concepts used within the social movement literature to translate these

appraisals into a framework predicting emotions in the context of protest. We argue that issues or

events may be appraised in terms of being facilitative or obstructive for collective goals. An

event or socio-political situation may facilitate citizens to pursue their interests and principles.

Events may also threaten citizens’ interests and principles and accordingly elicit appraisals of

goal obstruction. These appraisals of goal facilitation and obstruction are visualized in the two

middle panels of Table 1. The right hand panel of Table 1 differentiates between appraisals of

control based on collective efficacy and political trust. The reasoning is as follows, in the context

of politics the more people have the idea that they can do something about an event, the more

efficacious they are. Additionally, the more trustworthy they regard their political authorities, the

more control they perceive to have through their political representatives. The left hand panel,

finally, differentiates between the attribution of responsibility for the issue at stake. Threats to

interests and principles, can be caused by circumstances—take for instance a natural disaster—

additionally the out-group can be hold accountable or in case of self blame the in-group is held

responsible. Table 1 identifies the particular emotions that result from all possible combinations

of these appraisals. Table 1 reads as follows: austerity measures, for instance, obstructs the goal

the movement strives for (middle right panel), in case people attribute this goal obstruction to be

caused by circumstances―the global economic crises―and have the idea that they cannot do

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anything about it, they will be fearful. However, if their coping potential is high―strong

efficaciousness and trust in politics―the situation is likely to elicit a sense of frustration. In case

austerity measures obstruct people’s collective goals―collective salary raise―but they hold an

out-group―e.g. government―accountable and have high coping potential―efficaciousness and

trust in politics―they will be angry.

Responsibility Collective Goal

Facilitative Obstructive Coping potential

Caused by

circumstances Hope, Joy, Relief

Fear, Sadness Low

Frustration High

Out-group responsible Solidarity Anger, Contempt High

In-group responsible Pride Regret Low

Guilt, Shame High

Table 1: Protest emotions and their appraisals

Protest emotions and their action tendencies

In this section we indentify the behavioral consequences of the emotions mentioned in Table 1.

Following Jasper (1997, p 127) we assume that emotions “give ideas, ideologies, identities and

even interests their power to motivate” and as such play a key role in the whole campaign.

Protest emotions thus function as accelerators or amplifiers. Accelerators make something move

faster, and amplifiers make something sound louder. In the world of protest ‘accelerating’ means

that due to emotions motives to enter, stay or leave a social movement translate into action faster,

while ‘amplifying’ means that these motives are stronger. We discuss emotions of protest along a

chronological time line, that is, before, during and after protest events. The implications of

emotions and their action tendencies―to either impair of fuel protest behavior―will be an

important aspect of our discussion.

Prior to protest

Emotions prior to protest are mostly caused by goal obstruction, emotional responses and

the related action tendencies are further differentiated by appraisals of responsibility, that is do

people believe that the events is caused by circumstances, the out-group or the ingroup. If goal

obstruction is attributed to circumstances, fear sadness and frustration are the most likely

emotions, however, when goal obstruction is attributed to the out-group, anger or contempt will

prevail, while in case the ingroup is blamed, emotions as regret, guilt and shame are expected.

Anger is deemed to be a pivotal emotion in the emotional constellation of protest participants

(Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; Van Stekelenburg &

Klandermans, 2010; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Leach &

Spears, 2012). Anger is associated with the action tendency to attack, it moves people to adopt a

more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame and

despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al., 2008). Anger motivates people to seek justice

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and retribution and act against the actor held responsible for their grievances (Smith & Lazarus,

1990). Precisely these action tendencies are important qualifiers in the context of protest, it will

therefore not come as a surprise that organizers do their utmost to evoke feelings of anger in their

constituency. Empirical evidence confirms this relationship. In Dutch street demonstrations, for

instance, anger amplified and accelerated motives to participate (Van Stekelenburg,

Klandermans, & Van Dijk, 2011). In Spain, subjects were asked whether they supported or

rejected the negotiations of their government with terrorist organisation ETA and how they felt

about this. Angry participants were motivated to participate in protest against this decision while

those who were worried chose to not participate (Sabucedo, Duran, Alzate, & Rodriguez, 2011).

Anger is mainly observed in the context of actions that conform to the norms of the existing

social system (such as taking part in lawful demonstration). In actions that violate existing social

rules (such as illegal protests and violent actions) contempt appears to be the more relevant

emotion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch, Becker, Spears, & Christ, 2008). Emotions such as

anger and contempt are likely to be nurtured by social movement organizations for their

oppositional action tendencies. These action tendencies are useful to counteract the inward and

safety seeking tendencies of emotions such as fear and anxiety or replace vulnerability, guilt or

shame (Flam, 2005, p. 26).

Appraisals of control also shape emotions prior to protest: people who perceive the

ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who

perceive the ingroup as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup

(Devos, Silver, & Mackie, 2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Fear

is thought to be an emotion that protesters need to overcome before they can participate in

collective action (Flam, 2005). Although this does not immediately prompt protest behaviour,

fear can―under the right conditions― persuade individuals to change their behaviour (Turner

2007; Witte and Allen 2000; Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2006). One such condition is that

organizers of protest successfully attribute responsibility to the out-group rather than to

circumstances. Hence, a natural disaster such as the tsunami in Fukushima may evoke fear,

however, as authorities are blamed for neglected maintenance to the reactor, fear converts into

anger. Another condition is when fear is accompanied by high coping potentials. Aminzade and

McAdam refer to such a condition. They argue that even intense fear, in the face of extreme risks

and seemingly no hope for payoff, can motivate action (2001; p17). What is needed for this to

occur is that fear is accompanied by other emotions that have a high coping potential such as

anger which will lead motives to participate to prevail over motives to withdraw.

Guilt, shame and regret are social emotions, intertwined with our attachment to other in-

group members. The action tendency of emotions like guilt and regret is to approach in an effort

to make amends. The action tendency associated with shame is to distance faults made by an

individual or his group in the past from the individual or his group at present (Fischer, 2010).

These emotions are not likely to lead to protest, but are more likely to caution an individual to

not transgress social norms and values. People become motivated to correct their own behaviour

which indirectly yields them to prevent future transgression and thus change the social situation.

An example of the role these emotions play has been provided by Leach and colleagues.

Although individuals who were part of the dominant society in Australia expressed guilt and

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shame in reaction to the suppression of aboriginals, it did not instigate a strong willingness to

engage into action on behalf of the aboriginals. Guilt and shame are therefore considered as

relatively weak predictors of willingness to act (Leach et al., 2006). Perhaps because there are

more suitable ways to show remorse over past events than expressing this in a protest

demonstration.

During protest.

So far, we have discussed emotions resulting from goal obstruction, related to the contentious

issue and/or the out-group. When it concerns actual participating in protest “the focus of

attention becomes a mutual focus of attention” (Collins, 2001, p. 28). By the physical co-

presence of other participants, protesters realise that they are part of greater whole. “This is a

crucial process, the shared sense of a group as focusing together, that creates what Durkheim

called “conscience collective”, fusing cognitive, [emotional] and moral unity (Collins, 2001, p.

28). According to Collins there are two kinds of emotional transformations in collective

gatherings. One involves the amplification of the initiating emotion. The second kind involves

“the transmutation of the initiating emotion into something else: the emotion which arises out of

being entrained within a collective focus of attention (p. 29)”. A successful collective gathering

of a social movement is a process of transforming emotions as anger into others as hope,

enthusiasm and solidarity.

Most people do not protest every day, on the other hand, protest activity can be quite a

powerful sometimes even transgressive experience (Corrigall-Brown, 2012; McAdam, 1988).

Protest events offer a possibility for social movements to create or strengthen emotional bonds

between their adherents and to establish or strengthen a collective identity (Eyerman, 2005).

Collective identities are forged by solidarity. Solidarity forges bonds and a feeling of

togetherness; together we are stronger than the sum of our parts. Protesters who identify with

others involved, share the feeling of ‘we–ness’, ‘your problem, is my problem, is our problem’,

thus evoking solidarity. Bonds between movement members are likely to be strengthened by the

shared experiences leading to greater commitment to and solidarity within the group. In terms of

action tendencies, solidarity instigates a need to come together and stay close to each other.

Social movements aimed at affirmative action, foster feelings of solidarity amongst group

members

The type of goal protesters strive for, influences how they feel about the event itself. If

the main motivation is identity based, protesters can be proud of ‘their’ in-group. Salvadorian

protesters were found to be proud of their in-group by asserting a ‘claim to dignity’ (Wood,

2001, p. 268). Ideologically motivated protesters may feel proud of themselves, as they stand up

for what they believe in. It could be a moment, so to speak, you tell your grandchildren you were

there. Instrumentally motivated protesters get exited if they see that the demonstration attracts a

large turnout which will help to pressure politicians and may bring the movement closer to the

realization of its goal. A protest event that unfolds as planned provides a sense of

accomplishment and instills pride or relief among group members (Benski,2010). Successful

events, however, do not self-evidently equate to goal attainment. Activist meetings are therefore

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also organized as a strategy to cope with frustrations regarding unrealized movement goals

(Benski,2010).

Expressing one’s emotion in public space is a way to visualise the size of the public

dismay to a wider audience (Eyerman, 2005, p. 48) perhaps in the hope of arousing sympathy

and respect from bystanders (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006, p. 623). The White March we referred

to earlier in this chapter had for many participants this purpose (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2004).

Expressing emotions may work as an individual catharsis. Raising one’s voice can be seen as

emotional coping in that it offers people the opportunity to regulate the emotions tied to the

social or political event (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Interestingly, this individual emotional

catharsis releases an energizing force if and only if one participates and therefore makes free-

riding less likely. Hence, one might take a free-ride on the production of a collective good, but

one cannot take a free-ride on one’s own emotions (more on selective incentives Van

Stekelenburg, 2012).

After protest

Literature addressing emotions of protest mainly focuses on the role of emotions in processes of

mobilization and participation―in other words, emotions as antecedent or byproducts of protest.

Emotions as consequences of protest, however, are an untouched area in the literature. Yet,

precisely in this aftermath of participation we may be able to find the answers to one of the most

intriguing questions in protest participation: that is the paradox of persistent participation (Louis,

2009). Follow-up studies of New Left activists of the 1960s show important biographical and

personal consequences of social movement engagement on the later lives of activists (e.g.

McAdam 1988; Corrigall-Brown, 2012). Activists tend to continue to espouse leftist attitudes,

continue to define themselves as liberal or radical in orientation, and remain active in

contemporary movements and other forms of political activity. Indeed, activism frequently

persists despite pessimism and frustration regarding the action’s ostensible goals (Louis, 2009).

Why do people continue participating in protest even if it does not effectuate their demands?

And what role do emotions play in that context?

When the excitement has settled down protesters will have some time to reflect on their

collective efforts to bring about change. Disappointment and frustration about not achieving

collective goals, or from having unrealistic goals are debited as causes of activist burn-out’s

(Goodwin & Jasper 2006). Despair about AIDS activism under depressive circumstances was

reported by Gould (2009) to result in conscious decisions to leave the movement. Or

alternatively, people switched to other causes within the larger movement that seemed more

attainable at the time. This emotion strategy avoided desperation about the movement’s failure to

reach its goals and by switching to other causes activists did not have to face the guilt of giving

up. Faced with disappointing results and without the energy to continue some activists even

reported bitter feelings. Gould notes that once despair and bitterness got hold among a number of

members it spread through the organisation and depleted its member and their energies (Gould

2009). These emotions provided information about how protesters felt about themselves and

their protest activities; their objections and anger were to no avail and they blamed themselves

rather than an out-group for their failure of not being taken seriously (Campbell, 1994, 55).

12

Failure of movement organisations to reach a collective goal however does not mean that

the movement will always wither away. When individuals are angry about their failure, this can

still promote willingness to engage in future collective action (Becker et al. 2012). Experimental

results have strengthened the notion that progress instills pride among movement members and

pride therefore indirectly affects willingness to continue and stay engaged (Becker et al. 2012).

This relationship was found to be mediated by the perceived efficacy of the social movement.

Gould also strongly emphasizes the importance of feeling proud for a movement to be able to

move forward (2009). One of many examples that she gives in her book on Act Up, the social

movement organization fighting against AIDS, for instance refers to a movement communiqué

which states “We as an entire community can be proud… of the cooperation within all segments

of the gay and lesbian community” (Gould, 2009, p.69). In fact, organizers of protest will always

attempt to claim a success, after all, to provide their activists with a strong and positive group

identification. Success breeds success, for social movements alike.

Discussion

We provided a framework of appraisals of protest emotions and elaborated this framework on

emotions before, during and after protest. In what follows we will discuss where we think the

lacunas are. We will mention a few and there might be more. Probably, the most important

challenge is to integrate emotions in contemporary theoretical paradigms of protest. Neglect of

emotions impairs our understanding of the dynamics of protest, which, first of all, leads to

scientific misinterpretation. Indeed, emotions might be more important than cost/benefit

calculations or identification with the group at stake. In that regard, moving from static to more

dynamic explanations of emotions in the context of protest participation is important. A more

dynamic integrated approach would provide the opportunity to study emotions in relation to

concepts like identification, participation motives, efficacy, and feelings of injustice as

antecedent, by-products and consequence of protest.

Secondly, the relation between individual and collective emotion processes are begging

for exploration. Take for instance, socially shared cognitions, group-based emotions, contagion,

or emotional resonance. The idea that emotional reactions are strongly affected by social factors,

and that emotions can be examined at the group level in addition to the individual level has

gained wide acceptance in the last decade. For example, various studies have shown that

individuals make group-based appraisals resulting in group-based emotions. Additionally,

previous research has shown that emotional contagion more readily occurs between individuals

with strong and intimate bonds. Emotional contagion may therefore explain the increase of

emotions within a group. But what about emotional contagion in intergroup conflicts? Are both

in- and out-group related emotions dispersed via emotional contagion? Or just in-group related

emotions? How individual and collective emotion processes relate to each other and influence

protest behaviour is far from clear.

Social movement organizations work hard to design collective action frames that touch

upon already existing concerns among potential participants, thereby strengthening their

concerns and instigating action tendencies. This process is referred to as frame alignment (Snow,

Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Whether frame alignment is done successfully can be

13

concluded from the degree in which a frame actually resonates with pre-existing belief systems

and symbolism and evokes shared emotions thereby gaining significance among the audience

(Cadena-Roa, 2002; Snow & Benford, 1988). Snow and Benford speak of frame resonance when

there is cognitive alignment between a movement’s ideology and the beliefs of an adherent

(Snow & Benford, 1988). But there is more to frame alignment, frames are “value-loaded”, and

supposedly evoke emotions (Gamson, 1992) as frames generally work only when they have an

emotional impact on people (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2000). Research of the emotional

appeals made by SMOs is scarce. Scholars who have examined this aspect of framing introduced

the term emotional resonance to refer to the emotional alignment between a movements ideology

and the emotional lives of a potential recruit (Robnett, 2004; Schrock, 2004).

Emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation and dropping

out (Jasper, 1998). However, the literature focuses mainly on the motivating power of emotions

to enter the movement or to participate in protest. We suggest to investigate the motivational

power of emotions at different moments during an activist career (i.e. a life course perspective).

People move, for instance, from indifferent to sympathizer, from sympathizer to member, from

passive to active member, or from member to non-member. It is expected that different (group-

based) emotions spur the motivation to move from one stage to another. Moral indignation, for

instance, spurs entering a social movement, whereas solidarity or hope might be the emotional

glue to stay in a movement, and, feelings of disappointment or regret might make people decide

to quit. In taking a chronological approach the influence of emotions on motivation to move from

one state to another is investigated in a more systematic way.

In sum, we see a future for a systematic dynamic approach to emotions of protest

exploring both individual as well as collective processes in how emotions affect social

movement participation that goes beyond a static individual level of analysis. Such knowledge

about the influence of emotions on political behavior will provide a more complete, and

accordingly, more accurate picture of the reality of political protest.

14

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