An Exploration of the Emotive Roots of Terrorism.

ABSTRACT-

The question of why individuals join terrorist organisations poses a puzzle for those

foreign policy decision makers who must deal with the results of terrorist activity. Over time,

various disciplines- economics, sociology, psychology, and political science- have developed

different theories to explain why individuals participate in such, focussing on areas of study most

emphasized by the discipline while not confronting questions of interest to other scholars. To

that end I examine relative deprivation, rational choice theory, game theory, and an assortment of

criminal psychology theories against that of cognition and emotion/affect. Each theory is found

to deal well with a discrete set of considerations but fails to justify basic assumptions. Based on

the review of these areas, a synthetic model of terrorist formation is constructed, tracing the

individual from a supposed genesis of dis-satisfaction sentiments to commitment to a group. This

work is primarily designed, but it is hoped that others will continue along this path. I utilise

cross-coded data to analyse testable hypotheses, and find that the results from the analyses are

confirmatory.

INTRODUCTION-

While the consequences of terrorist activity are visible daily, the roots and underlying

causes of the primary motivators for engaging in such activities are relatively un-explored from

an emotive-factor approach. Many schools of thought come down on the side of treating

terrorism as a criminal activity (Drake 1998, Frey and Morris 1991, Wilson and Herrnstein 1985,

Kupperman and Trent 1979, Methvin 1971), or a “gang” activity (Yount 1998, Mallow 1997,

Netanyahu 1995, Mallin 1971). Others examine terrorism from a criminal-psychology (‘pathy’)

viewpoint (U.S. State Department 1996, Hindman 1994, Brown and Merrill 1993, Toch 1986).

Still others exposit terror as purely economic (Henderson 2001, Stern 1999, Moore 1997,

Mullins 1997), or anti-regime only (Kozlow 1997, CSIS 1995, Clutterbuck 1994, Fengya 1991,

Hanle 1989) with ‘hate’ being an unexplained- yet attributed- causal determinant. I seek in this

work to discover what- if any- underlying emotional roots lie at the heart of the cognition

required to engage in these tasks.

However, before one can adequately explore the topic, one must define and delineate

what it is that is being explored. That is to say, What is terrorism? Who are terrorists? To define,

one must exclude- out of the necessity for clarity and parsimony –those definitions that skew and

bias the researcher. One must remain as objective and detached in this as (it is to be hoped)

political scientists are in all empirical pursuits. In this work I produce a close definition that is

applicable, workable, and free from said biases.

Lloyd Garrison in Global Terrorism defines terrorism in a holistic sense; as “…the use of

violence, discriminate or indiscriminate, to fulfill needs or perceived needs, whether the

community views the fulfillment of these needs as legitimate or not and as rational or

irrational…”(1986). Those who study terrorism conclude three broad categories: rational,

psychological, and cultural; as the roots of terror, or any combination of these. The United States

Department of Defense states that

“… Psychological motivation for terrorism derives from the terrorist's personal dissatisfaction with his life

and accomplishments… …no clear psychopathy is found among terrorists… terrorists do not even consider that they

may be wrong and that others' views may have some merit… …tend to project their own antisocial motivations onto

others… …attribute only evil motives to anyone outside… …(thus they) dehumanize their victims and removes any

sense of ambiguity from their minds.”

(U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, "Chapter 8: Combating Terrorism.")

The chapter goes on to discuss the importance of the group in terrorism, of cogency and

concentration of action, of psycho-ideological unanimity. This is not dis-similar to Abraham

Maslow's model of psycho-sociopolitical needs fulfillment. He writes, "the chief principle of

organization in human motivational life is the arrangement of needs in a hierarchy of less or

greater priority or potency" (Maslow 1954). Other terrorism theorists critique the "mental

disorder perspective" of terrorist motivations, arguing that we must view terrorist inclinations

more as "misplaced idealism" than as mental illness. Raymond Corrado explains some mental

health problems commonly attributed to terrorists: antisocial personality disorder, narcissism,

death wish, and organic and physiological disorders (1981).

To that end, I adopt and adapt the definition in use by the United States Department of

Defense: the deliberative and calculated use of violence- or the threat of potential violence- to

inculcate fear, to disrupt daily activities, to foster mistrust, based in an ideological, religious, or

political mindset; for the purpose of obtaining a predetermined yet malleable goal-set (from

DOD Joint Pub 3-07.2; 17 March 1998). This is a flexible definition by design, one that allows

for the exclusion of groups that are purely criminal (i.e., the Somali warlords), or that are using

terrorism only as a means to a political end such as separatists or unificationists (i.e., the Sendero

Luminoso on the one hand, or the Provisional IRA on the other). This paring is necessary, simply

labelling every group with anti-regime notions as “terrorist” is tantamount to fascism (for more

on this important distinction, see Proceedings Report: Challenges for Western Security and

Defence in the 21st Century, 1999 (PIPS 99-2)).

This definition works well with the variegated approaches to the study of this subject. It

allows the various approaches- criminal, political, psycho-social, and so forth, to be synthesised

into an integrated approach to this. An integrated approach is desirable, in the main due to the

almost ‘factionalised’ religiosity some in each discipline attach to their work (in particular see

Methvin 1971). A synthetic approach also allows for more data and more methods to be

included, this assists the social scientist in providing greater validity for findings.

The difficult puzzle to fix are the Why’s? of terror- Why perform? Why join? Terrorism is

a risky business, involving quite often violence, and the cost in blood and toil of being the

‘winner’ in the terror game is often only exceeded by that incurred by the regime- the losing side.

Why, then, would any ‘sane’ individual join a terrorist group?

The theories of terror mentioned previous concern about both the individual participant

and the terrorist organ in some significant ways. This is because terror is often a group activity,

or the activities of individuals within their mandate as group members. Thus, the theories

encountered herein will focus on the area in which the distinction between individual and group

is defined, as well as the motivations from an emotive perspective.

These theories derive primarily from studies of social movements in general. Terrorism is

simply a very specific subset of social movements, and thus what has been learned about other

social movements can be invaluable in analyzing and describing terror (Rosie 1987). However,

terror is a very drastic response to problems more than it is simply protest; not merely sometimes

violent, indeed, terror must needs utilise violence in order to be. The risks associated with

belonging to a terrorist cell are higher than joining a social-protest group, or writing your

legislature, or grousing over the regime in a local public-house. Nonetheless, terrorism is not an

uncommon occurrence- far more so than its cousins revolution and civil war, and not as common

as its other cousin, crime (Sakhel 2001). Thusly, theories of terror describe a much more

unlikely, difficult, and specific activity than do social movement theories in general (Anderson

and Sloan 1995).

However, many theories of terror are somehow limited, they are not very successful at

answering the questions asked by other fields which study this (Sandler, 2009). In many cases,

this is not a worry for those who would apply any specific theory, for each does succeed

admirably in answering the questions that the discipline of its architect asks (White 1998). This

aggravates the problem for researchers from different fields who wish to discuss terror together.

It makes it difficult for a researcher who wants to use research from another; it means that

discoveries made in one field must be duplicated by those who work in another discipline, rather

than scholars simply communicating their findings in mutually comprehensible wise. An

integrated approach is thus desired. An examination of the questions each theory answers- and

those it does not- may lead to a greater understanding of how and why an individual becomes a

terrorist.

Several different approaches are examined. Relative Deprivation, made famous by the

father of revolution and political violence literature Ted Gurr, is one (1968, 1974, et al.1989,

1990). Rational Choice, and its child Game Theory is another. Resource Mobilization theory is

yet another, as first noted by Anthony Downs in 1957. I tie these together with affect-emotion

approaches to this question, noting their foci, their assumptions, and measured emotion

responses.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Early psycho-theoretical approaches over terror either fell into the “terror as crime”

approach (Methvin 1971, Mallin 1971), or as a spin-off of revolution studies derived out of

frustration-aggression theory (Salert, 1976). As put forth by Freud and the Yale group, this

theory stated that all aggression derives from frustration (Sabini, 1992). There are at least two

major problems with this theory as it applied to terror: it predicted that all frustration would lead

to aggression; and it failed to account for the direction in which that aggression would be

directed.

The first failure of frustration-aggression was the most historically obvious one, as the

account of our past is filled with ‘not all frustration leads to aggression’, much less terror.

However, the second failure was more catastrophic to the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Frustration-aggression predicted that aggression would be blind, directed towards the closest

available target rather than something which would alleviate the frustration (Sabini, 1992). Yet

terror is a very specific enterprise, with targets carefully selected (CSIS 1995). Frustration-

aggression theory does not account for this.

However, it still seems intuitively clear that frustration of needs would play a role in

terror formation. Relative deprivation takes into account not just what needs were being

frustrated, but how the level of fulfillment and frustration of one individual related to the that of

a group to which they compared themselves. Relative deprivation was defined as the emotion a

person feels when they perceive themselves to be unjustly less well-off or well-provided for than

some salient other; under some conditions, it was hypothesized, relative deprivation would lead

to terrorist activity. For the purposes herein, relative deprivation may account for the

emotive/affect factors in self-image formation for the potential terrorist (Gehm and Scherer

1988) Relative deprivation theory assumes that what is being experienced is fraternal relative

deprivation (the experience that a group is oppressed) not egoistical relative deprivation -- the

experience that an individual is being oppressed. This, however, must be adapted to understand

the motives of the individual. As well, relative deprivation theory does not state at what specific

point the experience of relative deprivation becomes sufficient to force a response. Rational

Choice and Game Theory confront this question.

Frustration is expressed when one is dis-satisfied, or lacks a sense of control. Brams

(1996) asserts that this feeling is dependent upon the actions of others. When the frustration is at

a certain threshold, anger may be the response. He avers that game theory accounts for this in

parte as a powerful tool for identifying those situations wherein a person experiences these

frustrations. He examines specifically the “Theory of Moves”, in which players in the game-

terrorists and regime actors, in our case- are not limited by predetermined strategies. This is

important in understanding terrorist actor and action, for to many the action seems sporadic and

random. This essay of Brams makes the action, at least, seem more comprehensible: even when

the players choose strategies that seem to be self-defeating, they are pursuing all courses

rationally to maximise goal-acquisition potential. As well developed as this work is, his

explanation of motive from emotion, however, is incomplete; especially in light of later work (cf.

Sandler 1992, 1995, 2003; Small et al. 2006). Other psychological theories of emotion and terror

are also as underdeveloped. (see Hermalin and Isen 2000, for a better example, also Ginges and

Atran 2008).

Nonetheless, individuals do those things society defines as terror. Terror is a high-risk

activity. Isen and Geva (1987) assert that affect/emotion play a decisive role in risk-taking

activity. They note that those persons in a positive state are more likely to engage in moderate to

high-risk activity than those in a negative state. Terrorism can certainly be seen as a high-risk

activity. To engage in terrorist activity therefore requires a fairly high degree of mental stability,

cohesion, and cognitive ability1. Drake (1998), Dalacoura (2006) and Atran (2006) note that

ideology and religion help to enhance positive mood in group formations. Dacey (1998) notes

that regime policies can aggravate subversive tendencies which can accelerate risk-taking

propensities (Sjoberg, 2007). I propose from all of these that more than one factor is at work to

explicate terrorist group formation and recruitment.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES-

I theorise that terrorist recruitment appeal, that is, mobilisation, is predicated upon two

broad factor categories. Firstly, there must be an environment receptive to this type of political

activity (Loza 2007, Franks 2009). Secondarily, there must exist within the immediate cultural

arena the twin emotional factors of relative deprivation (to borrow from Gurr, among others),

and frustration with the (eventual) target regime.

For environmental factors, I specify the following must be present:

1) a target regime of a type antithetical to the political actors; terrorists do not operate in a

vacuum,

2) the target regime must have identifiable actors,

3) the target regime is engaging in activities un-appealing to the actors,

4) the actors have a measurable socio-economic status; and,

5) there exists relative deprivation on three possible levels- a) economic,

b)political, and

c) emotional.

When the target regime’s actors (RA) engage in activity that makes the anti-regime actors (AR)

unhappy, that unhappiness (in-appeal, dis-pleasure, et cetera), the anti-regime actors are

experiencing a negative emotional state. This state taps into a latent frustration-aggression dyad

1 Thus, those who assert a crime = f (abnormal psychology~depression causality) seemingly are refuted, as the

general model for such suggests mental instability and lack of coherency.

that existed as a co-partner with the aforementioned relative deprivations. An intervener,

political awareness, encourages the AR to engage in political activity of either conventional or

unconventional types. Conventional political activity (CPA) is that which occurs inside the legal

framework of the target regime: voting, petition, et cetera. Unconventional political activity

(UPA) is that which is either outside the accepted societal norms of the target regime, or illegal

in the target regime. It is in this last area one would find terrorists and terrorist activity (hereafter

UPA(T)).

To represent this in a path model:

Political

Awareness

Environmental Emotions Positive CPA

Factors at time t decision to commit to political activity

Negative UPA

with CPA and UPA affecting the environment at time t+i. However, I am only interested in the

UPA resulting in terrorist activity, so the partial path model is thereby

Political

Awareness

Environmental Emotions Positive

Factors at time t decision to commit to political activity UPA (terrorism)

Negative

However, terrorism is a high-risk venture. Those who engage in such do so with the

knowledge that their actions may be mis-understood by those whom they hope to sway to their

cause. They do so with the knowledge that should they be discovered in their actions, they face

the possibility of incarceration, torture, maiming, execution, and so on. I thereby maintain that

those who are mobilised or elect to become associates do so with these caveats well in mind.

This is not to say terrorists do not forcibly induct, the evidence is that quite some few have and

do (see Mallow 1997, Rosie 1987, and Turco 1987). Nonetheless, even those persons are aware

of what can and/or will happen. All this said, terrorist group mobilisation becomes dependent

upon an appealing message. If one examines this issue as a political one, this is in effect a

campaign promise; and such have a very high emotional context (Geva et al. 2004). Thusly,

emotions play a three-fold role in this: in the environmental emotional relative deprivation, in the

negative emotion produced in reaction to the regime, and in the mobilisation effort.

I thusly hyposthesise that

H1: UPA(T) t = EV t + RD t + ε t

H2: UPA(T )t = EV t + EM t + ε t

H3: UPA(T) t = RD t + EM t + ε t

H4: UPA(T) t = EV t + RD t + EM t + ε t

H5: UPA(T) t = (EV t*RD t )+ (EM t*RD t)+ ε t

(Where EV is the total set of environmental factors, RD is the total set of relative deprivations, and EM is the set of

emotional messages used in mobilisation. UPA(T) is measured by dividing the number of terrorist activities in ones

own nation (summed over the past forty years) by the mean population of that same period.)

The above are set as they are so as to test the path model in parte, with the fourth being a

summed path model represented as a simple linear regression model, and the fifth being an actual

path model. This, however, is only one part of the total model, and is designed to measure intent

to commit to terrorism. The second part, using the same theoretical assumptions, measures actual

terrorists against the first model of intent. For that, UPA(T) in the first is compared to a model of

AT (Actual Terrorists, scored 2 if a terrorist, 1 if an ally, and 0 if no ties) in the second, thusly :

H6: AT t = EV t + RD t + ε t

H7: ATt=EV t + EM t + ε t

H8: AT t =RD t + EM t + ε t

H9: AT t =EV t + RD t + EM t + ε t

H10: AT t =(EV t*RD t )+ (EM t*RD t)+ ε t

Only H10 is an actual path model. As well, three sub-hypotheses indicative of the path-analytic

model are posited for EV, EM, and RD. They are as follows:

HS1: EV= Sinc + Sedl + Srel + Spinv + Supaa + Sreg + Secon + Srta + κε

(Where Sinc is the socio-economic measure of income, Sedl is the educational level , Srel is level of religious

intensity or religiousity, Spinv is level of political involvement, and Supaa is acceptability of unconventional

political action (All of these are coded low/medium/high= 1/2/3). Sreg is regime type, coded authoritarian (1),

liberal (3), or totalitarian (2). Secon is type of economy, whether capitalist (3), social-welfare (2), or controlled (1).

Srta is whether the country of origin has experienced any terrorism in the time period six-months prior to data

collection from the individual, coded 0=no, 1=yes.)

and,

HS2: EM=Eeco +Epol + Eorel +Eocul +Eonat + Eorac + Edifpol +Eter +Ereg + ώε

(Where Eeco is individual emotions regarding the economy in general, Epol is emotions regarding politics

generally, Eorel is emotions regarding other religions, Eocul is emotions about other cultures, Eonat is emotions

regarding other nations, Eorac is emotions concerning other racial groups, Edifpol is emotions about those whose

political views differ from ones own, Eter is emotions regarding the use of terror, and Ereg is emotions over ones

own regime. All are scored from –3 (very good) to +3 (very angry).)

and lastly,

HS3: RD = Deco + Drac + Drel + Ded + Dpr + Dcr + νε

(Where Deco is delphic measures of relative deprivation over economic factors, Drac over racial issues, Drel about

religious groups, Ded regarding educational opportunities, Dpr is on political rights, and Dcr is concerning civil

liberties. All are scored from 0 (none) to +3 (extreme).)

As can be seen, RD factors are similar to those of EM. The difference, as mentioned

earlier, lies in the individual versus group. This is why Rd is crossed in two path models as such.

As noted earlier, the literature suggests (Brinton, Davies, Gurr, Booth, et alii) that UPA

of many types can lead to the escalation of regime activity intensity that acts to post tempo create

a febrile arena for more intense UPA, becoming cyclical. I examine only a ‘snapshot’ of this at

time t. It may be noted that there are other cognitive factors available for study. In this puzzle, I

choose only to explore that of emotion. Others are excluded for the sake of brevity and pith.

DATA-

There is a veritable cornucopia of data covering the subjects of emotion, terror,

orginisation, mass psychology, crime, political violence, et cetera ad nauseum. The desirability

of sample-population data in studies of emotion and affect is well established (Scherer 1992,

Wallbott and Scherer 1989, Watson and Greer, 1983, among others). Cross-compilation of data

from several of these to create a single data-set is essential for reliability and validity in solving

this particular dillemma. I suggest the utilisation of Polity III and Polity IV data, Ecole

Superieure de Commerce de Paris/University of Birmingham (ESPC/ACT) data, the six-country

INTERACT data, and the as-yet incomplete Tel Aviv University interview data. I suggest

extracting from all of these applicable and reliable socio-economic (SES) materiel and re-coding

them compatibly, and drawing from each particular data-set that wnich is useful for this work.

From the ESPC/ACT, I make use of the political knowledge and awareness scores, and

their Group Formation and Mobilisation aggregated scores, logged and recoded continuously for

consistency. These data were gathered by the Surete Francais and British MI 5 during the years

1949 through 1962. The data was released in part in 1990 and the ESPC/ACT project was

stewarded from the University of Birmingham until 1999, when the Ecole Superieure took over

maintainence responsibilities. Dr. Aaron Sloman and a team of graduate assistants back-

compiled data for the years 1962-1989, and surveyed for new data from 1990 through 2001. The

data is in binary (Assembler II) form via FTP files, and contains much missing data, poor

coding, and other errors. It is, however, one of the largest sets of its kind in the psychological

study of group formations.

From Ted Gurrs’ Polity projects, I draw upon numbers III and IV that data peculiar to

SES and political violence. Some recoding is necessary for the sake of consistency. Polity and

the use of GENI coefficients is used for many different social-science studies, and is readily

available in a multitude of forms. These will also provide the bases for the dependent variable in

the first model.

INTERACT is a project on Identities, Emotions, Behaviours, Attitudes, Affect, and

Modifiers. It is (like ESPC/ACT) a continuing project. The data come from the United States,

Canada, Japan, China, Germany, and Northern Ireland. It consists of surveys of University

students and high-school students totalling 4,772 surveys. The data is in roughly three parts, one

of which is in the main binomial, and the others which are scalar (1-7) and (0-10). Missing

values are assigned different values in all six countries. Because of these problems, large-scale

recoding is necessary.

The Tel Aviv University data is a work in progress, but consists in part of interview data

with terrorists and terrorist-allies. It is primarily contextual in it’s analysis, but ordinal or

continuous scale recoding is possible. To date, I have not been able to examine more than a

portion of this data. I expect that receipt of the largest part of this will contribute to furtherance

of the model.

I have constructed twenty-three independent variables to be used in this analysis, to be

aggregated into three macro-variables. They are mentioned individually and severally on

preceeding pages. Completion of cross-coding will necessitate collapsing several other variables

into the categories I have created. Also, I will deliberately exclude those variables that are

regional or national-singular, the purpose of this model is to provide a more general, rather than

specific, approach to the puzzle posited.

METHODS-

For analysis, I test the suggested path-model and examine it in a series of OLS regression

equations. I perform the regressions using the LIMDEP 7.0 statistical package, and verify the

results as valid through use of the STATA statistical package.

RESULTS-

Problems with accessing data notwithstanding, partial analysis of the data is possible. I

used 3,200 observations for the analysis; so size of the data is clearly not a problem. The results

give an R2 of .85 for the first hypothesis, of .84 for the second, of .79 for the third, and of .90 for

the summed regression model. This seems at first highly spurious for the size of the data. I

therefore regressed a model using un-collapsed (the original) variables. The initial R2

for that

model was .874. This suggests a high degree of auto-correlation in the model that has yet to be

controlled for. Theory instructs us that perhaps indirect factors are at work, or environmental

factors of an interaction affect- or worse for disciples of scientific theory with an eye to

replication and generalisation- that there are specific, atomistic factors peculiar to each terror

event. Nonetheless, the results from all regressions are similar, the following table showing the

summed model is offered as an example.

Dependent Variable – UPAT (Unconventional Political Activity as Terrorism)

Number of Observations – 3,129 R2 – .900

RSS – .337 Standard Deviation – .079 Adjusted R2 – .890

F – 6.94 Log-L = 88.639

Restricted Log-L – 86.401

AIC – 2.157 Durbin-Watson Statistic – 1.986

ρ – .007

________________________________________________________________________________________

Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[|T|>t] Mean of X

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------

EV .408 E-01 .100 1.406 .086 .123

RD .278 .097 2.845 .006 .559

EM .167 E-02 .005 1.323 .048 .746

(Table- OLS for summed model)

The numbers do seem at first blush to be too good to be true- emotions drive terrorism. Roughly

speaking, accounting for statistical factors, emotions are more than four times more likely to be

the driving force in commitment to terrorism as a political activity (see figure, below). The

Durbin-Watson statistic suggests no auto-correlation, and as well, Wald tests performed on each

hypothesised model were not negative. That mach is positive, but as well this means that until

more data is collected, analysed, coded, and tested, the results must remain merely suggestive.

What is encouraging are the t-ratios for each variable. The results suggest that all three

aggregated variables are significant. For many, the surprise will be in variable EM (emotional

factors), which is fairly high and significant. To that end, this model is successful in testing the

theoretical assumptions. I remain convinced, nevertheless, that more exhaustive analysis is

necessary. Until the data are complete, the social scientist is only teased by this.

(Figure – Predicting causes of terrorism)

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS-

The implications of this model are only partially clear. Until the data are more complete,

different disciplines must use the methods and data at hand. Upon receipt of all data, and upon

completion of re-coding, I will be able to randomly select 1,000 cases for study from the first

three sets of data, and compare the results to such obtained from the Tel Aviv data. I find the

initial results encouraging, and expect to finesse the methodologies to better suit the puzzle

posed, perhaps through factor analysis. As well, it is hoped that a time-series analysis could be

performed upon the complete data at some point.

If eventually all analyses are valid and accurate, then all of the factors and their causes will

be better understood. From that, it may be possible to plot the current state of an individual on a

terrorist “map” and perhaps predict whether or not the individual will become anti-regime and

violent. The first priority of future research in this arena must needs be to examine the behavior

of those who have joined terrorist organs and determine if they fit one of these models. The

structures of terrorist movements, the incentives (and disincentives) utilised, and the manner in

which people determine the costs and benefits to themselves of situations will be key to

comprehension of this (Wallbott and Scherer 1989). This will require itself further studies in

group dynamics; the formulation of propaganda and persuasion; and the formation of identities

outside of the developmental stages with which identity development is most closely linked, not

to mention greater depth of investigation into cognition-affect-emotion (Kent 1978, Post 1990).

In reality, however, this is only a first step. If this model is inaccurate, then the foreign

policy maker is left with an empty bag. Not understanding terrorism and its underlying motives

is tantamount to the battlefield operator engaging an enemy when deaf, dumb, and blind. For

regimes that face terror regularly, such ignorance can indeed be fatal (Wievieroka 1993).

Comprehension is only the first step, reaction is the second (Turco 1987). Unfortunately, reaction

has been for most countries the only step, and the cyclical nature of terrorism becomes self-

evident (Lesser 1999). This model describes only a small part of terrorist formation. Perhaps as

important as any of the research mentioned above is future theoretical work in the area of terror.

Those who find objections to the definition and delineations herein can still adapt the methods to

their own data if they possess it. From that, a comprehensive theory of terrorism may be

developed, if not to predict terrorist acts and terrorist mobilisation than to at least to allow

practitioners of all disciplines to talk about terrorism in an agreeable context understood by all.

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APPENDIX: Full Version of Table One +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none |

| Dep. var. = UPAT Mean= .1778813559 , S.D.= .938 E-01 |

| Model size: Observations = 3,129, Parameters = 5, Deg.Fr.= inf|

| Residuals: Sum of squares= .3372033350 , Std.Dev.= .07902 |

| Fit: R-squared= .90013, Adjusted R-squared = .890124 |

| Model test: F[ 5, 3,122] = 6.94, Prob value = .00014 |

| Diagnostic: Log-L = 88.639 , Restricted(b=0) Log-L = 86.401 |

| LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= -4.995, Akaike Info. Crt.= -2.157 |

| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.98628, Rho = .00686 |

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|

+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+

EV .408 E-01 .100 1.406 .0861 .123

RD .278 .978 E-01 2.845 .0063 .559

EM .167 E-02 .518 E-02 1.323 .0480 .746