Political Participation: Deprivation and Protest Satish K Arora

There is increasing evidence to indicate that protest and dissent are not the activity only of the irra­tional and opportunistic sectors of society. They represent a particular mode of political participation chosen by those of the citizenry who, stilt retaining notions of personal effectiveness, feel that the system can and must be hurried, or pushed, into action.

Whatever understanding ongoing socio-political research furnishes seems to point away from conceiv­ing protest and dissent as political pathology, as irrational political behaviour; instead, it seems to be increasingly apparent that the conscience of protesters often represents a repository of articulated and accepted—but in practice denied—community values. Participants in protests—as more than one profile seems to indicate—are likely to be among those who, otherwise personally effective, are moved by fates other than their own in particularly crucial areas of their lives.

In this article, we are concerned with this segment of the citizenry—those who have participated in or sympathise with mass political protests. In particular, we shall explore those economic, social and a t t i tudinal characteristics which tend to be associated with them, in order that we may better under­stand what motivates them. This in turn may then lend greater insight into the nature of these protests, Many of the sources we draw upon have been derived from studies outside our country. The inferences we draw from these cross-cultural studies, therefore, must be regarded more as suggestive than conclu­sive when we evoke our own conditions.

E L E C T I O N - T I M E is a t ime for a re­definition of to self and society: it Is an exercise in the mobilisation of senti­ment. Inadvertently perhaps — but Invariably — it provides a setting for the surfacing of collective anxieties. Several of the issues that w i l l manifest themselves during the campaign period w i l l of course be familiar from past elections; but, this may be our first election hi which problems of internal law and order, of permissible quantities and qualitative modes of dissent are likely to emerge as major issues. The latent insecurity, especially of the nov­um riches, is more Chan likely to be translated into political and electo­ral terras. Demands, rather than de­bate, may be the emergent political style. It should not be surprising if we encounter in the coming months a harsh, even repressive, tenor injected into the usual combativeness of electo­ral political discourse.

As the volume of political communi­cation between candidates and prospec­tive supporters Swells, and larger num­bers of the citizenry are inducted into participating in the electoral process, an increase in the types of available participatory modes is also manifesting itself. Political participation, generally considered to be symbolic of the ex-tensiveness to which democratic ideals are applied, also includes a dimension which, in fact, lies outside the scope of constitutional activity. In this respect mass protests have become a conven­tional — if not legal — form of par­ticipation, and, needless to say, have engendered mixed reactions from spe­cialists in public affairs, the administra­tion, and the public at large.

It is Protests and agita-

tions are becoming increasingly pol i t i ­cal; that they are becoming Increasingly "programmed", standardised in terms of techniques; and that they are closely linked wi th the organisational capaci­ties of the political groups which sponsor them. Moreover even as one can say that the total magnitude of agi­tations and protests have increas­ed in both rural and urban areas, it is clear that the urban is usually better organised, more pervasive and has more staying power. Above all, given the type of communication net­works which we have, these urban pro­tests are also the more visible, and thus may evoke the most reaction — both from the public at large, and the government in power.

The increasing tendency of political parties toward fragmentation wi th its concomitant multiplication of political messages, means that the same people — that is, the general electorate — are increasingly subjected to a wider choice in the form of multiple electoral ap­peals. Political expression and issues thus appear to be coming closer to the felt anxieties of the people; and in a sense, hitherto unpolitical dimensions of life have gained political salience. In this process, ideology, at least for the short run, has a tendency to be­come devalued. Instead of political parties garnering beliefs and values politics becomes more action-oriented. Resentments are nurtured and cul t i ­vated; and much of the nurturance takes place, not on an artificial basis, but because the grievances cultivated exist in fact. Fragmentation of pol i t i ­cal parties facilitates their listening in where no one was listening before, In other words, instead of politics remain­

ing a remote activity, it becomes im­mediate and actable.

FROM PROTEST TO TERROR

These fragmented political groups, however, are also usually ruled at the top by political dadas. In general, the opportunism which tends to accompany this type of elite structure eventually corrupts and corrodes, and thereby threatens the loss of the popular base which it had cultivated. Thus in a sense, the protests which political groups cater to and lead may be very real in themselves; but the fact that such groups rarely can sustain their popular support may have to do wi th their leadership and organisational structure.

It is clear, however, that although protests may be of short-run duration and effect, the number of incidents has been growing, and they show no signs of abatement; rather judging from the rate of increase, we may expect to see a greater proliferation in the coming years.

As political protests proliferate, a section of the protesters, out of despe­ration and exhaustion, may be moved to utilise political terror. We are at this point today. But in such a milieu demands for counter-terror increase, and almost any protest may be con­ceived of as a threat. There is thus the danger of a loss of discrimination between what is actually the violent terrorism of small cadres of individuals committed to this mode, and those protests whose participants are general­ly intent on more or less peacefully pressing their demands in what, to them, appears to be the most effective mode available.

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Inasmuch as evert the most peaceful of demonstrations can unintentionally turn violent, it is easy to understand how, under conditions of psychic and physical insecurity, people may consi­der hitherto tolerated dissenters as potential threats. There are, moreover, in the wings, those who make political capital out of stimulating and shaping latent anxieties. And in a milieu where a segment of organised political protest turns terroristic, it may call forth the unleashing of violence by the state: imperceptibly, then, legitimate dissent and disaffection become suspect

NOT THE ACTIVITY OF THE IRRATIONAL

The plugging of discontent, the at­tempts at containing disaffection by displays of overwhelming coercive power are surely tempting; but also likely to prove corrosive of remaining social solidarities. Under such circum­stances — and we may be slowly drifting towards them — it is a poig­nant necessity to uphold liberties, not only because of ideological commit­ment but also because there is increas­ing evidence to indicate that protest and dissent are not the activity of merely the irrational and opportunistic sectors of society. Instead, they repre­sent a particular mode of political par­ticipation chosen by those of the ci t i ­zenry who, still retaining notions of personal effectiveness, feel that the system can and must be hurled, or pushed, into action. For possibly the first time in contemporary history a wide-ranging and concerted attempt is being made to systematically record the collective cries of anguish and to understand those who have taken upon themselves — often against overwhelm­ing odds and the possibility of immense injury to themselves — the public arti­culation of deeply felt resentments against organised power. Whatever understanding ongoing socio-political research furnishes seems to point away from conceiving protest and dissent as political pathology, as irrational pol i t i ­cal behaviour; instead, it seems to be increasingly apparent that the con­science of protesters often represents a repository of articulated and accepted — but denied in practice — commu­nity values. Participants m protests — as more than one profile seems to indi­cate — are likely to be among those who, otherwise personally effective, are moved by fates other than their own in particularly crucial areas of their lives.

In this article, we are concerned with this segment of the citizenry —

those who have participated in or sympathise w i th mass political pro­tests In particular, we shall explore those economic, social and attitudinal characteristics which tend to be asso­ciated wi th them, in order that we may better understand what motivates them. This in turn may then lend greater in sight into the nature of the phenome­non of these protests. Many of the sources we draw upon have been de­rived from studies outside our country The inferences we may draw from these cross-cultural studies therefore must obviously be regarded more as sugges­tive than conclusive when we evoke our own conditions,

I

The Economic M i l i e u

It has sometimes been held that flue tuations in the national economy may directly affect the proneness of indivi­duals to participate in protests. The difficulty is that there is l i t t le agree­ment on just what in the national eco­nomy is most conducive to such poli­tical behaviour. On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that a short-term decline in the national economy is correlated wi th the degree of vio-lence that the nation tends to experi­ence. Several empirical analyses of differing populations at different times in history converge on the point that wheat or bread prices are correlated with the number or severity of overt mass protests.1 We also have the modern-day example of a food riot ex-emplified by the protests which erupt ed in Poland, both in 1956 and as re­cently as December 1970. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that just the opposite relationship may hold; namely, that agitations tend to swell during periods when economic conditions are improving. A major analytical work on violence in 114 nations upheld the relationship between economic decline and degree of vio­lence, but the relationship did not hold at all for a smaller sample of 21 West­ern nations included in the same study.8 Moreover, it has been re­peatedly suggested that the French American and Russian revolutions have all erupted wi thin the context of eco­nomies on the upswing.3

Thus it may be said that there is no conclusive evidence that the state of the national economy — whether on the upswing or downswing (one as­sumes it is rarely static) — has, in i t ­self, any direct bearing upon eruption of protest and political violence In fact, there is no reason why we should

assume that either condition, by itself is conducive to mass violence. At most we are permitted to conclude that fluctuations in the economy w i l l tend to have differential qualitative effects upon various subgroups wi th in society. These effects can only be considered once we have looked more closely at factors which can more easily be meas­ured in terms of their direct effect upon individual as well as collective beha­viour.

For this reason we turn to the effects which the immediate economic environ­ment may have upon protesters and would-be participants; and then we shall attempt to locate these individuals within their environment. In this re­gard two particular dimensions should be mentioned; the absolute level of wealth which such individuals possess and which tends to characterise their immediate environment; and the indivi­dual's economic position relative to those whom he considers the "mean­ingful others".

NOT IN THE POOREST AREAS

In the first place, whereas the affect of the national economy on the erup­tion of protests may be difficult to as­certain, the effect of conditions prevail­ing in the areas in which the protests take place may be more obviously in­fluential. Whereas the recent Polish riots did take place when the national economy was suffering a decline, the particular towns where the violence erupted were relatively better off4

With respect to rural unrest, in parti­cular, protests do not tend to breed in areas characterised by the greatest poverty or downward sloping economic conditions. This can be illustrated by what are becoming legion — historical examples drawn from information on European peasant rebellions. A par­ticularly poignant illustration of this proposition is the Santhal Rebellion in nineteenth century Bengal, which oc­curred at the height of economic op­portunity and prosperity for the tribes men. And Tocqueville found the greatest propensity for revolution in just those areas of France where eco­nomic conditions were comparatively good.7

In addition to the affect of economic fluctuations and levels of prosperity, the pattern of the distribution of wealth also may be of importance with respect to the propensity of individuals to par­ticipate in protests. Especially in rural areas, overt political protests do not tend to erupt in those areas exemplified by greatest inequality with, respect to

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the distribution of land. In an exten-l ive statistical analyst of modem na-tions, Bruce Russett found that there was no strong relationship between the degree of inequality w i t h respect to land distribution, and political l i ab i l i ty as measured by violent deaths per mil l ion. An empirical study of South Vietnam reveals that those areas characterised by greatest inequality tended to be most peaceful and sup­portive of the Americans and the South Vietnam government An environ­ment of severe economic deprivation can have discouraging effects upon those who might appear to the socially distant observer as having the most to revolt against. To rebel requires some degree of hope of success, and extreme inequality of land distribution in itself would not appear to promote such hopefulness. It also often tends to evoke the greatest fear and dependency in relationships prevailing between the have-nots and the haves.10

OR AMONG THE POOREST PEOPLE

On an individual level there seems to be a great deal of agreement among a wide variety of sources that partici­pants and sympathisers wi th mass pro­tests arc rarely from among the poorest in society. There seems to be a reluc­tance to even consider this proposition by political elites entrusted w i th main­taining political order. Rather, there is a tendency to view protests as out­bursts of "riffraff" and the unemployed and unemployable; to associate lack of material resources wi th a propensity toward violence; and to proceed to view mass protests as essentially pro­blems of "control", or at most as a call for token inputs or doles to "cool" the restless at the bottom of the eco­nomic scale. In general, however, the poorest in society usually can do little more than ensure that they keep above the starvation level: all their energies — both physical as well as emotional — tend to be directed toward this e n d , "

Those who have some material re­sources to spare are more likely to be able to afford risking participation in an openly defiant manner, or articulating dissatisfaction or hostility which might lead to such participation. This ap­pears to have been as applicable to Europe historically as it is there and elsewhere today." A recent study of a slum area of a large industrial city in England reveals that "aggressive dis­satisfaction w i th the level of earnings and a keen sense of being paid less than one is worth are more commonly

encountered among the relatively higher paid workers . . ." Data from America shows that the unem­ployed are not disproportionately re­presented among participants in speci­fically Negro agitations Statistical data from Mexico, the United States and England indicate that those higher in the economic hierarchy — the skilled more than the unskilled — demonstrate greater job dissatisfaction as wel l as more agreement w i th militant rhetoric14

Presented in Table 1 are data from the arrest records of two demonstrations held in 1968, one in England, directed against Vietnam policies; the other in Chicago, during the Democratic National Convention. Where information is pro­vided, we find that the non-manual and skilled outnumber the unskilled. It may also be noted that in both cases the unemployed represent a fifth to a fourth of those arrested. It is impor­tant however, to recognise that a re­liance upon statistics drawn from among arrested individuals may be grossly misleading: at least in the case of the English demonstration we know that non-students of all categories — employed and unemployed — repre­sented only a fourth of all those who participated in the demonstration.

I I

The Social Mi l i eu Unti l very recently the concept of

anornie was considered a key to an understanding of instability! especially in urban areas. The logic — based largely upon Durkheim's original for­mulations — ran that those who can find no place in the social order are obviously ripe for recruitment to groups which tend to disrupt that order. In particular, it has been argued that ur­banisation — the movement of large numbers of presumably comfortably ensconced villagers to a city which lacks not only the warmth of rural re­lationships but the certainty of tradi­tional values — tends to produce this type of restless, potentially mobilisable individual.

There is l i t t le doubt that protesters are more likely to be among urban than rural populations. One survey in India points out clearly that compared to vi l ­lagers, urban-dwellers are much more likely to express dissatisfaction wi th and distrust of public officials,1 In another survey 2,400 Indians were asked, "Do you think that public demonstrations are or are not a useful way of getting the authorities to do the right things or cor­rect some wrongs?" Approximately half

T A B L E 1 ; OCCUPATION OF

DEMONSTRATORS15

(Per Cent)

London Chicago

Unemployed 24 19.9 Employed 56 43

Unskilled/semi-skilled manual 12

Skilled manual 8 Non-manual 36

Student 20 32.0 Not reported . 4-5_

100.0 100.0 N = 25 N = 668

of the urban-dwellers sampled agreed they were useful, while only six per cent of the rural sample felt this way. Moreover whereas less than one per cent of the rural sample admitted that they had participated in a demonstra­tion, almost 17 per cent of the urban sample did.17

LONG-TIME RESIDENT, NOT NEWCOMER

We do not seem justified, however, in blaming the process of urbanisation, ipso facto, for this phenomenon. The urban environment merely by the fact that it envelops large numbers of peo­ple together in close quarters does thereby facilitate their political mobili­sation. But, in the course of recent, wide-ranging empirical investigations, it has been discovered that in almost every ease, it is not the newcomer to the city who is most likely to join demonstra­tions, Rather, it tends to be the local, socially integrated urban resident who is represented among the militant, much out of proportion to his numbers vis-a-cis migrants; that, compared to the mi­grant it is the urban-born who tends to possess higher status aspirations and is less satisfied wi th his job, the inference being that he is then more likely to be frustrated and therefore more prone to join protests and demonstrations.1 In India it has been found that urban m i ­grants were not as favourably disposed to the use of demonstrations as were long-time resident of the c i t y . " And , going back into history, a recent study of urban turbulence in nineteenth cen­tury France reveals that there is no consistent relationship between frequen­cy of violent conflicts in departments and rates of increase of urban popula­tion in the cities dominating those departments.26

The explanatory power of the anomie concept seems most threatened by a finding of a study of Negroes in two American cities which had experienced severe agitations: compared to the non-militants, the militant Negroes

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tended to socialise more, fel t a stronger sense of identity w i t h a particular group, and were members of move or-ganisations Obviously participation for such persons can hardly represent the urge to fulf i l a deeply felt need for lost warmth and solidarity. Findings such as these stand in stark contrast not only to the explanatory powers attri­buted to the concept of anomie; bu t also to the conventional liberal image of the ideal democratic citizen whose support for the system is considered dependable largely because the polit ical is bu t one l imited facet in a r ich assodational l i fe .

MAINLY MIDDLE CLASS

As to the particular social stratum w i t h which militants tend to identify, there is data to suggest that aside from instances of protests specifically direct ed towards bettering working conditions for the working class, participants of most urban mass protests are middle class, either by self-identification, or as reflective of their orientation and the va­lues they espouse. One study of Ame­rican Negroes revealed that those es­pousing mili tant ideas also tended to reflect more middle class attitudes to­ward money, work and the like than d i d non-militants, who tended to en­dorse more values associated w i t h the lower classes.23 Regarding India, Bay-ley suggests — without going into de­tai l — that there is "considerable evi­dence that the worse violence [ in India] in the last twenty years has erupted from middle-class grievances,'''23

There is also some data to suggest that the educated are more prone to approve of or participate in protests than the uneducated. Negro rioters interview­ed in America tended to have more education than others in their neigh­bourhood.24 It is probably of l i t t le sur­prise that almost 60 per cent of Indian university students tend to approve of public demonstrations,25 And , in a study of students in Cologne, Germany, political disenchantment — a predispo­sition which possibly could lead to po­lit ical protest action — tended to be stronger among what might be consi­dered the more middle-class university students, than among those undergoing vocational training.26

I l l Rank Disequi l ibr ium

Thus far we have attempted to iso­late the social and economic factors which tend to characterise those who are either prone to participate in mass protest behaviour, or have already part i

cipated in i t Although the empirical data on the subject continues to grow, we still are able to consider as reason­able generalities only a few, primarily negative propositions w i t h respect to such participants. Thus, as we have pointed out, protests tend to take place not among the very poorest; not in the poorest rural areas; not among those lowest in the status hierarchy; not among the newest urban residents, de-mographically; not among the unedu­cated. These findings lend a direction to our thinking. But we are st i l l left wondering how much wealth, how de­veloped an area, how high a status, how much education, how long a resi­dency is necessary before one can gene­ralise about — and even more impor­tant be in a position to predict — the "who" of participation In fact, answers to such questions probably cannot be provided in quite the manner in which these questions have been posed. They depend on a variety of contextual con­ditions, each of which may exercise its power — both by itself and in combina­tion — to determine the nature of the participants.

What is, however, perhaps of even greater relevance than the delimitation of the social, economic and demographic, boundaries of potentially violent protes­ters, is the affect of their relative posi­tion vis-a-vis those whom they consider significant others. The area included within such an inquiry is a broad one for it requires probing which borders on, and indeed ought to include the realm of the psychological. It contains w i th ­in its scope a wide range of areas w i th ­in which an individual might feel rela­tively deprived: e g , economic values, social status, education and power. Ob­viously we can only indicate here some of the more relevant areas for attention.

HIERARCHICAL DISCREPANCIES

One approach to the analysis of this problem is to recognise, as did Aristotle in his "Politics", that men become dis­satisfied and rebellious when there is some discrepancy in the hierarchical positions which they occupy in the va­rious dimensions of their l ife. Perhaps one of the most common discrepancies which, throughout history, has led to disruption of the public order is the possession of wealth without concomi­tant access to power. The entire history of constitutionalism in England would seem to bear out this pattern: as each group in the social hierarchy gained status in the economic realm, it felt forced to press its demands for recog­nition in the political realm as w e l l

Only slowly, in fact; and only in res­ponse to what could be deemed at the time a-constitutional protestations on the part of these strata, was the vote and power extended down the hierarchy, beginning wi th the Magna Carta to the various reform bills extending suffrage to commercial, industrial and finally la­bouring men. This was also the bads of the American Revolution — essentially a middle class revolt against economic taxation without political representation. And, needless to add, this characteris­ed the early stages of the Indian inde­pendence struggle as well. In this con­nection one would do well to examine various agitations for regional autono­m y : for, probing beyond the surface rhetoric, one may wel l find that these demands reflect, on the part of those who have already gained economic power, "discontent over lack of partici­patory values".27 As Crane Brinton has suggested w i t h respect to the most ex­treme form of civil disorder — revo­lution :

"Long before Marx, long before Harrington's "Oceana", practical men knew that political power and social distinction are the handmaids of eco­nomic power. Where wealth, certain­ly the second or th i rd generation of wealth, cannot buy everything — everything of this world, at any rate — you have a fairly reliable prel imi­nary sign of revolution,'''

Political protests need not be, and in fact probably rarely are, for political values alone. There may be, for i n ­stance, rank disequilibrium wi th respect to economic and educational values. On the macro level, in a study of 84 na­tions, investigators found that a rapid increase in proportion of population re­ceiving education combined w i t h a slow rate of percentage change in per capita gross domestic product is most condu­cive to political unrest. One need only look also at the agitational sole of the educated youth in such States as Kerala and West Bengal and the erra­t i c , eruptions of student violence throughout the Indian university system for examples of this type of disequili­brium. For, if one is wi l l ing to peer beyond the manifest causes of such par­ticipation, one may indeed find that there is a wide discrepancy between the expectations wi th which students (and perhaps even more so their parents) have of what education should bring in terms of rewards, and the actual op­portunities which they soon realise the economic system can provide. Earlier we noted that the factor of unemploy­ment seemed overestimated in tradi­tional discussions about protesters;

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that by itself unemployment was not a particularly relevant characteristic of the typical protester. But it is impor­tant to note that unemployment, con­sidered together with educational level may prove to significantly affect predis­positions toward participation in pro­tests.

EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL STATUS The disequilibrium which can result

from a discrepancy between one's edu­cational and social status may also pro­vide grounds for discontent and poten­tial revolt. This may operate in the more obvious manner: that is, in the case of those who may have high edu­cational status but are sti l l considered social pariahs. Un t i l very recently, and unt i l , in fact they protested against i t , this was the case of many American Negroes, The proposition, however, is also reversible: Indian illiterates of high caste, for instance, would appear to feel much greater political inefficacy, and express much less confidence in the administration (both attitudes conducive to potential participation in protests), than low caste persons of similar edu­cational status.30 Obviously the latter experience far less discrepancy between their social and educational status than do those of high caste. Moreover the discrepancy theory continues to hold, at least w i th respect to attitudes toward the administration, if one considers those who have some education: there the low caste educated sample is con­siderably more critical than the high caste educated respondents.

Status discrepancies affect the pro­pensity of individuals to join in pol i t i ­cal protests for several reasons. On the psychological level, it is doubtless dis­turbing to an individual if he has gained respect, not to speak of intrinsically be­

neficial goods from one dimension of his life, but finds he is unable to achieve similar recognition and benefit in another. Moreover persons in possession of one set of values or resources are often in a position thereby to use these resources to gain others. When they cannot do so, they may feel especially deprived, a condition which may lead them to place blame on some part of "the system". This type of predisposi­tion is often a prelude to participation in some mass demonstration against that system.

In highly structured societies we often find a pattern of cumulative dis­tribution of resources: at the top a small group ranks high on the posses­sion of resources in several areas: eco­nomic, social, political; at the bottom there are large numbers who, one might say can be characterised by cumulative deprivation: they possess neither wealth nor the goods that money can buy; they exercise no power: they have l i t ­tle or no education. We have already indicated that those persons at "the bottom" are the ones least likely to be drawn into protest movements. On the other hand, it may happen that an indi­vidual from this category may gain ac­cess to one type of resource — eg some surplus wealth or education. Through it he may then gain other resources and in the course of this de­velopment both his aspirations as well as his self-confidence may rise. If , on the other hand, the process once having begun becomes stymied, the loss of in­accessible gains may be felt all the more; and individuals so afflicted may consider all available means — consti­tutional and otherwise — to protest and right the situation. Looked at from a wider level, then, we might hypothe­sise that as the pattern of cumulative

distribution of resources begins to break down, and the middle classes begin to grow, unless sufficient channels are available for the ensuing upward mobi­l i ty on a number of variables for large numbers of people, instability and dis­order w i l l tend to increase. Obviously this condition tends to characterise the developing societies. It is one reason why we need not be surprised that pro­test and violence is definitely on the increase in this country.

I V

Personal and Political Efficacy Some who suffer the status disequili­

brium we have been describing, finding that their success in some areas is not matched by equal success in other areas, actually become withdrawn, alie­nated from the system they may silent­ly blame, doubtful of their own perso­nal abilities, beset by feelings of hope­lessness regarding theirs and the sys­tem's future. These are not, however, the persons who tend to join protests. What little empirical data we have seems to point to the fact that persons who do join such protests have quite high hopes for the future; that com­pared to those of similar status who do not participate, those who do partici­pate have a higher regard for their own personal capabilities and personal effi­cacy. Independent studies conducted in three riot-affected cities of the United States reveal consistently that those per­sons who tended to score highest on feelings of militancy were also those who felt they could and should shape their own destinies.

Perhaps the most interesting illustra­tion of this point emerges from a study in Detroit, Michigan, where investiga­tors had the rare opportunity of ques­tioning Negroes a year before riots erupted regarding their personal feel­ings of efficacy; they then interview­ed them regarding their views of the riots while the latter were in progress. (Thus there was hardly any chance of contamination of dependent by indepen­dent variables.) All of those who were ranked high on personal efficacy, i e, those who felt that they could to a large extent shape their own personal destiny approved of the riots.

This type of finding obviously re­quires extensive corroboration from other cultural settings before we can accept its relevance. If it does hold cross-nationally, it provides us w i t h a stimulating hypothesis which unmasks the commonly held myth that those who support violence or participate in it are for the most part psychological cripples.

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Here we receive a picture of partici­pants being those who, having assessed their own capabilities in general, and then assessed a given situation in which they feel these capabilities are thwart ed, tend then — often realistically — to isolate the systemic or institutional factor responsible and proceed to do something about i t .

LITTLE TRUST IN OFFICIALS It is also possible to suggest that

those who tend to support or partici­pate in protest activity also tend to have less trust in officials, and less con­fidence in their own abili ty to work through them to achieve political ends; this, i t may be added, w i l l hold des­pite the fact that these same individuals may otherwise have a high degree of confidence in and evaluation of them­selves.39 By analytically distinguishing between, on the one hand, feelings of powerlessness and inefficacy as a per­sonality variable, and on the other hand, political powerlessness and ineffi­cacy, we are perhaps able to enhance, our understanding of the motivations of those who are prone to demonstrate against the government The propensity to distrust public officials, and to feel powerless w i t h respect to influencing public affairs may, in fact, reflect an intelligent realistic assessment of the political situation. Supportive data for this lies not only in the fact that m i l i ­tants may score both high on personal efficacy and low on trust in officials. A rural survey in India reveals that there is no relationship between feelings of political efficacy, and such personality variables as ranking on the trust-in-people and authoritarian scales. This study simultaneously revealed a clear relationship between political inefficacy and structural variables such as the res­pondent's social, economic and educa­tional standing.

Unt i l recently, as we have already i n ­dicated, it was generally assumed that those who tended to use violence or became recruits for mass movements and demonstrations were suffering from anomie, alienation, hopelessness; that indeed, there was a pathological de­ment attached to this type of behaviour. Echoing the sentiments of LeBon, who was one of the first to analyse mass be­haviour, social scientists and policy makers alike seemed to reflect some­times fear, sometimes even contempt for the participants. Oriented toward drawing mass polit ical behaviour as i r ­rational outbursts of rage by persons i n ­capable of other types of behaviour, a government had l i t t le choice but to con­

centrate almost exclusively on bow best to control protests once they broke out : eg , on such problems as when should troops be called in ; when should firing be condoned; how should the mass me­dia be restrained.

Unfortunately, this attitude has not completely disappeared. But a new ori­entation to the problem of violence is slowly developing, which is bui l t on a different, and, we might add, a more empirically validated assessment of the individuals who participate. It rests on the premise that individuals tend to participate not because they are, both subjectively and objectively, incapable of other modes of behaviour, but be­cause they consciously and hopefully believe that their behaviour is the most rational manner of achieving particu­lar strongly felt needs. From this view­point, such individuals are seen as more than part of the "herd" or "crowd". U n ­doubtedly they are emotionally aroused over some issue or problem: but this emotionalism need not be considered in­consistent w i th their capacity to ration­ally determine their actions, or purpo-sively select appropriate modes for achieving their desired ends. As Han­nah Arendt has written wi th respect to violence:

"Only where there is reason to sus­pect that conditions could be chang­ed and are not does rage arise. . . under certain circumstances violence . . . is the only way to set the scales of justice right again . . . In this sense rage and the violence that sometimes . . . goes with it belong among the 'natural' human emotions . . . In order to respond reasonably one must first of all be 'moved', and the opposite of emotional is not 'rational', whatever that may mean, but either the inability to be moved, usually a pathological phenomenon, or senti­mentality, which is a perversion of feeling,'' 35

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Such an outlook implies that given unjust conditions, those who are arous­ed to a sense of rage and action are worthy of respect Policy implications of such a premise are clear: the pro­blem of unrest and protests must be viewed more from the standpoint of prevention than control; that the diffi­culties experienced by those aroused to participate in public action require far more serious attention and correction than hitherto may have seemed warrant­ed. It is now increasingly apparent that once having "put down" public protests, governments tend to grant many of the demands which had given impetus to them; it would appear that a careful monitoring of the needs of

various sectors of our people, before these reach the eruption point, may help to prevent the disruption of the public order. In other words demands must be anticipated; and, in the inte­rest of a continual reappraisal of the bases for legitimacy of the public order, they must be sensitively received and acted upon. There are times when the interests of society would require that the legitimacy of the polity be accord­ed precedence over legality.

We cannot stress strongly enough, moreover, that while the poorest in so-ciety appear to be the last to be re­cruited to protest movements, they re­present too great a proportion of our total population to be ignored for too long. Unless significant strides are made to assess and aid in the fulfilment of their often unarticulated needs, it can be safely predicted that these poor wi l l also, albeit at a slower pace, break out of the numbness of collective bewilder­ment.

It is important to bear in mind that historically there has always been an intimate connection between the forms and content of social inquiry, and the societal pressures which have given im­petus to them. Unt i l 1848, for exam­ple, many governments in Europe con­ducted, as befitted the seriousness of purpose of bureaucrats, investigations into only selected industries. The first social surveys into the life and condi­tions of the masses were conducted largely by concerned citizens such as physicians and newspapermen in France, In Germany, in fact, those academics whose conscience and con­cern led them to study the l iving con­ditions of the working class were de­rided as "socialists of the chair". It was mainly the revolutionary conditions of 1848 in Paris and elsewhere which helped to legitimise the social survey, for from that time onwards it rapidly became an integral part of official in ­quiries, and to "l isten' to the masses became acceptable.

Data and analysis of protesters' de­mands are largely wanting in our country. The neglect of this dimen­sion of socio-political reality speaks by itself for the role and priorities of our social sciences. What is necessary be­yond quantitative profiles, moreover, is a deliberate and humane effort at understanding the interior life and the daily routines of our people. This be-comes all the more important in a country such as ours where the socia­lisation patterns and the life experi­ences of social scientists, not to speak of political and administrative elites,

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have usually been far removed from those of the more typical citizen. This type of inquiry would facilitate the ac­quisition of relevance to social inquiry.

Finally it should be noted that in the process of inquiring into the phenome­non of mass protest, it is often neces­sary, as it has been in this article, to rely heavily upon data which is both spatially and chronologically distant from our own country and point in time. There is (as we have noted) a need for caution in applying the find­ings of such wide-ranging materials to Indian conditions. Information must be acquired in much greater volume and sensitivity from among our own people in order to more accurately as­sess the extent to which such findings from other mileux can be of use. We can ignore, only at our own risk, the types of questions which these findings raise about those who have chosen a mode of political communication called protest.

N o t e s 1 T R Gurr, "Why Men Rebel"

(Princeton, 1970), pp 62-63. See also Mark A May, "A Social Psy­chology, of War and Peace" (New Haven, 1943), p 162. May pro­vides substantial evidence that the number of lynchings in the South of the United States tended to vary with the rise and fall of eco­nomic indices.

2 T R Gurr, "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quan­titative Evidence", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, V 391, Sept­ember 1970, p 133.

3 A de Tocqueville, "The Old Re ; gime and the French Revolution" (NY, 1955), p 174. See also C Brinton, "The Anatomy of Revolu­t i o n ' (NY, 1957), p 33.

4 Times of India, January 4. 1971. 5 For a discussion of these see S K

Arora, "Politicisation in Peasant Society", Behavioural Sciences and Community Development, V I (March 1967), 28-46.

6 Ibid, pp 32-33. 7 Tocqueville op cit. 8 B M Russett, "Inequality and I n ­

stability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics", World Politics, y 16 (April 1964), 442-54.

9 E J Mitchell , "Inequality and I n ­surgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam", World Politics, V 20 (Apri l 1968), 421-38.

10 On agrarian tensions in rural areas, see P C Joshi "Rural Base and Power", Seminar, January 1971, pp 38-41.

11 As the wel l known study of Ger­man workers in Marienthal in the 1930s demonstrated, prolonged frustration and unemployment tends to lead to apathy rather than m i l i ­

tancy. See the study by M Lazars-feld and H Zeisal cited in Gurr, "Why Men Rebel", p 34.

12 See G Ti l ly , "Collective Violence in European Perspective", in H D Graham and T R Gurr, "Violence in America: Historical and Com­parative Perspectives" (A Report submitted to the National Commis­sion on the Causes and Prevention of Violence), NY, 1969 4-44; also G T Marx, "Issueless Riots", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, V 391 (September 1970), 21-33.

13 K Coates and R Silburn, "Poverty: The Forgotten Englishmen", (Pen­guin, 1970), p 153.

14 For American data, see N Caplan, "A Review of Recent Empirical Studies", Journal of Social Issues, V 26 (Winter 1970), 59-74; for Mexican data, see J Nelson, "The Urban Poor; Disruption or Politi­cal Integration in Thi rd Wor ld Cities?" World Politics, V 22 (April 1970), 393-414, for English data, see J D Halloran, et al, "Demons­trations and Communications: A Case Study", (Penguin, 1970).

15 Data in this Table are adapted from Halloran, op cit, p 48; and from "Rights in Conflict" (A Report sub­mitted by Daniel Walker to the Na­tional Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence), NY, 1968, p 321.

16 S J Eldersveld, et al, "The Citizen and the Administrator in a Deve­loping Democracy", New Delhi, 1968.

17 D H Baylev, "The Police and Po­litical Development in India", (Prin­ceton, 1969), pp 275, 331, 459.

18 See Caplan, op cit; Nelson, op cit; and D O Sears and J B McCona-hay, "Racial Socialisation, Compa­rison Levels and the Watts Riot", Journals of Social Justice, V 26 (Winter 1970), pp 121-40.

19 Bayley, op cit 20 Ti l ly , cited in Nelson, op cit. 21 Caplan, op cit. 22 J P Forward, J R Williams, "Inter­

nal-External Control and Black Militancy", Journal of Social Issues, V 26 (1970), pp 86-87.

23 Bayley, op cit, p 261. 24 Forward and Williams, op cH and

Caplan, op cit. 25 Bayley, p 332. Education also

seems to be positively, linearly re­lated to expressions and fears for and about the nation: Indian I n ­stitute of Public Opinion, Monthly Public Opinion Survey, Apr i l 1968, p 29.

26 K L Baker, "Political Alienation and the German Youth", Comparative Political Studies, V 3 (Apr i l 1970), p 127.

27 Gurr, "Why Men Rebel", p 90. See also the argument of R Kothari, "Direct Act ion : A Pattern of Politi­cal Behaviour", In A S Ayyub and A Datta, "Ten Years of Quest"

(Bombay 1966), pp 54-83. 28 Brinton, op cit, p 67. 29 I K Feierabend, et al, "Social

Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns", in Graham and Gurr, op cit, p 651.

30 Eldersveld, op cit. 31 Adapted from Ibid, p 46. 32 From Forward and Williams, op cit,

p 84. See also studies in Caplan, op cit.

33 T M Tomlinson, "Ideological Foun­dations for Negro Act ion: A Com­parative Analysis of Mil i tant and Non-Militant Views of the Los Angeles Riot ' , Journal of Social Issues, V 28 (Winter 1970), 93-120

34 See S K Arora, "Exploring Political Predisposition: Efficacy and Cy­nicism in Rural Andnra Pradesh", Behavioural Sciences and Commu­nity Development, V 3 (September 1969), pp 126-38.

35 H Arendt, "On Violence' (London, 1970), pp 63-64.

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