Galliano, Dean N. 1

The Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Military Defection for the Occurrence of Revolution, as Evident in the Arab Spring

Uprisings

Galliano, Dean

Humboldt State University

April 20th, 2012

Galliano, Dean N. 2

Galliano, Dean N. 3

On December 17th, 2010, a 26 year old Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set

himself on fire in response to harassment and mutilation by government officials. This self­immolation

served as a catalyst for the Tunisian Revolution, inciting nationwide protests of social and political issues

(Worth 2011). His death further enraged the protests to a level of civil resistance which resulted in

President Ben Ali fleeing to Saudi Arabia and effectively ending his 23 years of authority (Thorne 2011).

The success of civil resistance in Tunisia quickly promoted protests and eventually civil uprisings

throughout the Middle East, in a revolutionary movement known as “Arab Spring”. Imitation

self­immolations were committed in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, increasing the extremity of

anti­regime protests. It is understood that martyrdom as well as strategic nonviolence in the form of civil

resistance were integral in the “new Middle Eastern Revolution” (Worth 2011).

The “power of the people” heightened as TIME Magazine bestowed “Person of the Year

2011” award to “The Protestor”, in regard to Arab Spring, as well as the world­wide Occupy

movement and protests in Russia (TIME 2012). The importance of the protester conveys the power of

nonviolent, or civil resistance, in social movements. An adequate amount of attention has been given to

the power of social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, in facilitating the light speed

delivery of information

news updates . The ability of people to frequently post information to the internet, especially

videos of human rights abuse, allowed for empathy with the uprisings. While it is reasonable to agree

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that nonviolent resistance is essential as a necessary catalyst for igniting revolutionary movements, it is a

not a sufficient condition for revolutions to occur.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss and prove the importance of military defection during

times of mutiny, and how substantial military defection from the existing regime is a necessary and

sufficient condition for a revolution to occur. In essence, the most important factor in measuring the

legitimacy of a government is the loyalty of the military (Nepstad 2011).

While civil resistance and uprising serve as catalysts for radical institutional change, the

legitimacy and longevity of the current authority rests solely on the ability to effectively utilize its armed

forces and domestic security. Once a government no longer has authority over its military, it loses its

ability to physically enforce its agenda, and effectively loses its legitimacy. Nonviolent revolutionary

movements are 46 times more likely to be successful when military defections occur (Chenoweth 2008).

The course of action that a revolution undertakes relies on the intentions of the military. Understanding

the dynamics of revolution is important, so that this theory may be applied to the specific cases of the

Arab Spring.

A revolution is defined as “a radical and pervasive change in society and the social

structure, especially one made suddenly and often violent” (RandomHouse Dictionary). A

revolution is not, however, necessarily violent. Value­oriented social movements, through civil

disobedience, eventually lead to revolutionary desires. Revolutionary goals do not develop until civil

resistance becomes civil uprising. For a revolution to occur must have taken effect. This is not to say

that the revolution was successful, for that would depend on whether or not the revolutionary goals of

the participants were satisfied by the outcome. The process of revolution is not the same as the success

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of a revolution.

. It would be impossible for a revolution to occur if there exists no public display of dissent and

resistance. Such is the reason why authoritarian regimes often suppress communication and the dissent

becomes political refugees or prisoners. When a multitude of nonviolent strategies are utilized so as to

deprive the government of powers , the anti­regime fervor ignites into revolutionary desires. Because

groups of citizens execute public protests, they display their preferences about the current regime.

During times of less fervent opposition, the anti­regime preference is less apparent, often due to

suppression (McLauchlin 2007). When protests increase in intensity, a cascading effect takes place in

which more individuals support the opposition because others are publicly embracing the anti­regime

preference. There may have always been a substantial amount of anti­regime preferring citizens, but

there did not previously exist the catalyst of public protest to incite a revolutionary movement. This

individual incentive for private citizens to participate in large groups of civil resistance leads to a civil

uprising (Goldstone 2001).

Civil resistance serves as the catalyst to spark a movement for institutional change, and therefore

as the foundation for a revolution. However, a war is not over until one of the participant forces has

surrendered, for an armed conflict continues as long they remain attacking each other. In other words,

the victor does not decide when the war is over, the loser does. The same applies to a revolution. The

established government decides when their legitimacy has been diminished and they believe that they

have little to no more effectiveness of enforcement. As long as the institution remains to attempt to

enforce its authority, a revolution has yet to occur. The occurrence of a revolution therefore depends on

the “surrender” of the government. The “surrender” of the government is in turn dependent on the

legitimacy of its authority. The legitimacy of authority, ultimately, rests in the loyalty of the military. While

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the success of civil uprising relies on military defection, this does not mean that it always becomes a

violent revolution, or that the military necessarily becomes physically involved.

According to Sharp, whose theory is based on the ideas of Thoreau and Gandhi, “even ruthless

dictators can be overthrown nonviolently if an oppressed population withholds cooperation, making it

impossible for a regime to function" (Sharp). He argues that civil resisters wield the power to deprive an

authority of its legitimacy through using a multitude of nonviolent strategies, such as mass

demonstrations, labor strikes, and widespread ideological dissent. In contrast, Arab Spring exemplifies

that these techniques alone do not bring about a regime change, or revolution. Apparently, the most

crucial condition for a revolution to occur is the withholding of cooperation not from civil resisters, but

from military institutions. This ultimately determines the military as the key factor in the outcome of an

uprising.

The first three uprisings to be discussed are the ones that successfully achieved revolutions.

Arab Spring continues, but to this date four governments have been successfully overthrown,

constituting the “ radical and pervasive change in society and the social structure”. The cases of the

Tunisian, Egyptian, and Yemeni Revolutions were at an intensity of civil uprising and not civil war, but

their occurrences still depended upon whether or not the government’s sanctioning power was

weakened through military defections. The Libyan uprising escalated into a civil war as opposition

forces took up arms against Gadhafi. The Libyan Civil War, while reliant on military defection , was also

aided by foreign intervention and therefore is a more complex case. The revolutions that did not require

foreign intervention will be the focus.

As aforementioned, the protests in Tunisia were triggered by the self­immolation of the street

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vendor Mohamed Bouazizi. Protests ensued throughout various cities during the remainder of December

2010 and into January 2011, incited by the issues of high unemployment, lowering living conditions,

political corruption, and intense political oppression (Alexander 2011). The civil resisters of Tunisia

employed several nonviolent strategies such as violating curfew, forming labor strikes with up to 95% of

the nation’s lawyers, and continuous protest demanding the deposition of President Zine El Abidine Ben

Ali, thereby refusing to grant legitimacy to their leader (Aljazeera 2011).

The rise in anti­regime preference contested the ideologies of obedience to the authority.

Despite the widespread civil resistance, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali did not resign, for he felt that

the legitimacy of his authority was not seriously challenged. The true challenge to Ali’s authority came in

the form of Army Chief Rachid Ammar refusing orders to shoot citizens (Kirkpatrick 2011). Protesters

remained nonviolent in their anti­regime movement . When protesters remain nonviolent, they make

repression difficult to justify, and military and security forces become less willing to commit orders of

inflicting harm upon civilians. Defections are more likely to occur if there is a lack of an “individual

incentive” to remain loyal to the government. The refusal by Army Chief Ammar to enforce President

Ali’s orders was a pivotal point during the uprising. This “nonviolent defection” weakened the legitimacy

of President Ali’s authority, a reality he was quick to understand. President Zine El Abidine Ali fled

Tunisia on January 14th, 2011 and effectively dissolved his government (BBC 2011). Following his

departure the nation entered a period of disillusionment and was engulfed in widespread chaos. There

lacked a specific entity of governance. General Rachid Ammar declared that the “army will protect the

revolution”, so as to assure the support of the revolution by the military (Kirkpatrick 2011).

The role of the military was therefore crucial directly prior to and following the departure of

President Ali. Military defection apparently didn’t require that the defectors physically conflict with the

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regime or attempt to seize power. Rather, a substantial proportion of the military merely declared their

intention to not suppress the uprising. The defectors’ role following the departure of Ali was just as

important. General Ammar stated that the military would assure the goals of the “youthful revolution”

were met, in response to fears that there still remained numerous officials from President Ali’s

administration. The military therefore became involved in planning for institutional and electoral reform.

The Tunisian Revolution, defined by the deposition of President Ali, was dependent on military,

albeit nonviolent, defection. In an individualized incentive system like that of Tunisia’s military, troops

will support the regime as long as they believe that it will survive . A multitude of strategies of nonviolent

resistance were employed by the civil resisters, and served as the necessary conditions for a possible

revolution to occur. The most profound effect of civil resistance in Tunisia was therefore the strategy to

subvert the loyalty of President Ali’s military and security forces. The ability to persuade military

defection, and ultimately the defectors themselves, were the sufficient conditions for a revolution to

occur. The belief that the regime has a lack of legitimacy in its orders to shoot civilians provoked the

cascade of defection, which led to the deposition of President Ali.

In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak eventually succumbed to the same illegitimating forces that

ousted President Ali in Tunisia, but at a significantly quicker rate. The collective attitude for

value­oriented change swept across North Africa from Tunisia to Egypt, as protests began on January

25th of 2011 . President Mubarak’s regime responded by shutting down the internet and mobile

services in an attempt to cripple the civil resistors tool of communication (Cowie 2011). A curfew was

instituted and military forces were deployed to the demonstrations, but by January 29th there were

incidents of troops refusing to fire live ammunition at protesters. The military declared its intention to

protect the “legitimate demands of honorable citizens”, thereby ensuring support of the uprising (Black,

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Shenker, and McGreal 2011). Shortly after the neglect of orders by military officials began to occur,

President Mubarak proposed concessions, including promising not to run for re­election or to appoint

his son Gamal Mubarak as his successor, but civil uprising ensued . He re­shuffled his cabinet as well,

but all attempts to silence the opposition, which now enjoyed support of the military, failed.

By February 10th, President Mubarak was openly speculating a military coup. This fear of

military takeover displays that the loyalty of the military was among Mubarak’s highest concerns.

Orders to fire live ammunition upon protestors were being ignored. The relatively high prestige and

influence of the Egyptian military served as a severe balance to the authority of President Mubarak. The

nonviolent defection, or refusal to enforce orders, by the military therefore imbalanced the power

dynamics between leader and armed forces.. The Egyptian military is presumably strong and wealthy. It

is highly active in the private sector, involved in businesses such as road and housing construction and

consumer goods (Cambanis 2010). Approximately 40% of the nation’ s economy is commanded by the

military (Amina and Hammer 2011). Revolution, defined by the deposition of President Mubarak,

occurred after only the allegiance of Egypt’s military was shifted from the regime to the opposition,

especially due to its immense political power.

President Mubarak resigned on February 11th of 2011 and transferred his authority to the

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Aljazeera 2011) . He realized that in his situation, his powers as

President were diminished in comparison to the powers of the military. This is not to suggest that military

mutiny was the only significant factor in the uprising. Civil resistance served as the catalyst to for an

uprising, but it was military defection that ultimately delegitimized President Mubarak’s authority. The

Egyptian Revolution suffices the theory that the likelihood of a revolution is dependent on the loyalty of

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the military as an institution.

The protests in Yemen began during late January of 2011. President Saleh’s first responses to

quiet the opposition hint that he understood the necessity of military loyalty; for he declared to raise

military salaries (Bakri 2011). Protests in Yemen involved mass demonstrations, general strikes, and

widespread non­cooperation, or civil disobedience.

During February, opposition to Saleh intensified, as a group of Yemeni clerics promoted the

formation of a national unity government that would represent the opposition (Aljazeera 2011). Amid

continuous protests for nearly two months, President Saleh remained defiant to the protests. The

intensity of protests increased in March, due to the incident of 52 protesters killed on “Bloody Friday”.

This catastrophic event served as a catalyst for solidarity with the opposition to occur. The sight of

nonviolent resisters being massacred by security forces alienated further support of the regime.

Numerous tribal leaders, party rulers, and ministers resigned due to the use of violence against civil

resisters. The most crucial defections, however, would occur through the military.

In March, General Ali Moshen al­Ahmar resigned, as well as several other commanding

officers ( BBC 2011). It was reported that 2,400 soldiers declared their solidarity with the protesters

demanding the overthrow of President Saleh. General Moshen’s defection proved to be a pivotal

turning point. Prior to his decision only 200 soldiers had displayed sympathy with the opposition.

Political scientist Abdullah al­Faqeeh argues that “Moshen’s defection ensures Saleh no longer

has the capacity to pursue robust military action…Moshen’s solidarity ended the battle for the

president” ( Harazi 2011). The essence of the importance of military defection in the Yemeni Revolution

is dictated in a statement by opposition coalition spokesman Mohamed Saleh. He stated that “ the

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president lost his legitimacy on Friday”, in reference to the atrocity of killing protestors (Harazi 2011).

The massacre itself is not what depleted the legitimacy, but rather the result of the killings, which was a

catalyst for military defection.

The deposition of President Saleh would not officially happen until February 27th, 2012. Yet

the military defections of prominent commanders proved to serve as an essential increase in the

momentum of the revolutionary movement. President Saleh continuously warned of an eminent “civil

war” and the consequential chaos from national issues including secession movements, tribal conflict,

and Al­Qaeda. Deterring terrorism and the infiltration of Al­Qaeda became his standard rhetoric in his

early defiance to relinquishing power, until the cascade of military defection took effect. It appeared that

his warning of a civil war was a bluff, because with the defection of General Moshen, President Saleh no

longer had the power to wage a civil war. “It is officially over, now that 60 percent of the army is allied

with the protesters,” claimed Yemeni journalist Hakim Al­Masmari ( Al­Jazeera 2011).

President Saleh had stuck to his promise to remain in power, but following the influx of

defection, he was proposing plans of power relinquishment by April in the form of a Gulf Cooperation

Council (BBC 2011). “Moshen is a big support to the revolution. Now we feel safer to join the protest

in the sense that Saleh will be busy fighting Moshen and won’t pay attention to us” (Harazi 2011). The

increase in military defection incited further citizen protest, for now the anti­regime preference was

publicly supported by the same forces that would be expected to uphold the regime. With the physical

arm of Saleh’s authority stripped from him, he realized his 23 years of rule would eventually dissolve.

Though each with different military­political dynamics, the three nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and

Yemen experienced revolutions which depended on their military institutions.The uprising in Syria is

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evidence that significantly furthers the theory that military defection is a sufficient and necessary condition

for a revolution to occur. Civil resistance in Syria began during January of 2011, around the same time

the uprisings in Egypt had begun. The ruling Baath Party, under the leadership of President Assad, had

quieted dissent adequately for decades. An imitation self­immolation, however, ignited the same effects

that were felt in Tunisia and Egypt. Protesters demanded the release of political prisoners, an end to

political corruption and oppression, and the abolition of the nation’s 48 year old state of emergency law.

By May of 2011, President Assad was responding with besieging several cities. Tanks and rooftop

snipers were reportedly killing more and more civil resisters as time strewn on.

Notable military defections have been occurring since the summer of 2011. The Free Syrian

Army was declared to be the leading opposition to Assad’s rule. Despite ongoing defections, there

lacks to be an overwhelming shift of allegiance from regime to opposition. The explanation to why the

uprising in Syria has thus far failed to achieve a revolution through deposing Assad rests in the Sectarian

demographics of the nation. The military institution of Assad’s regime is characterized by ethnic

preferences, due to imbalanced proportions of demographics in positions of power. Alawite Muslims,

who include President Assad and his family, account for approximately 12% of the population while

Sunni Muslims are the majority at around 73% of the population (Bhalla 2011). Though the minority

sect, Alawites contribute to 70% of career soldiers in the Syrian Armed Forces, and 80% of the officers

corps. Meanwhile, a majority of the conscript soldiers are Sunni Muslim (Reuters 2011).

In the Syrian military, there is an in­group and out­group composition. The in­group soldiers, or

the elite Alawite, are likely to remain loyal while the out­group, or Sunni, are likely to defect. The elite

Alawite of Syria’s military are unlikely to oppose Assad because they too would lose dominance (Van

Dam 2011). This in­group loyalty serves as a protection against possible mutiny. With a cohesive

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in­group and an out­group vulnerable to defection, the security of the government’s authority rests in a

balance between the two powers. The out­group Sunni Muslims are more likely to associate with the

Sunni civil resisters, but unlikely to influence the in­group to defect. The barrier of different religious

sects and ethnicities prevents a cascade of individual defection that was seen in the Tunisian, Egyptian,

and Yemeni Revolutions (Nepstad 2011). The majority of troops have remained loyal and continue to

diligently execute orders to suppress resistance and uphold their privilege.

The disillusioned Syrian “Civil War” is evidence that uprising movements that do not win the

allegiance of the government’s military institution are less likely to achieve revolution. It also shows that if

military personnel are comprised of different ethnic or religious groups, and there are unequal power

relations within the military institution, the likelihood that substantial military defection will occur is less

likely. The difference between “individual incentives” and “ethnic preference” in a military institution

determines the likelihood of military defection, and ultimately, the likelihood of revolution.

Through an analysis of the Arab Spring uprisings, I conclude that strategic nonviolence is not

enough to achieve revolution. In Tunisia and Egypt, leaders of several decades were deposed shortly

after their military institutions declared their solidarity with the protesters. Both were sudden, for the

defections happened mostly in groups. Both militaries saw the lack of benefit with supporting the

regime’s authority, and it was this cascading defection that would be the final blow to such authority. In

Libya, civil uprising escalated to civil war as opposition forces executed an armed struggle against

Assad’s regime. Eventually foreign intervention would aid in the deposition and death of Gadhafi, but

such support for the opposition was due to the fact that the conflict was a full­scale civil war. The push

for civil war was in due to the National Liberation Army, whose ranks included brigades of defectors. In

Yemen, the leader was deposed over a year after protests began. Yet his actual effectiveness as a ruler

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was gradually being depleted and was minimal before he actually departed office.

In the end, revolution occurred from uprisings that were able to cause substantial military

defection. The military institutions of Tunisia and Egypt quickly declared their intent to support the

opposition, while in Yemen defection was at a more gradual rate, leading to the dissolving od Saleh’s

power. Syria is the perfect example that a lack of substantial military defection lowers the possibility of a

revolution. The case study of Arab Spring revolutions and uprisings concludes that military loyalty is the

most significant factor in facilitating a revolution. Despite the 21st century advancements in social media

and communication, the military remains the most important factor in revolutions. Civil resistance or

disobedience merely ignites the revolutionary fervor, but what actually results in a revolution is the loss

of the government’s authority over its military forces. It would be keen for nonviolent revolutionary

forces to employ strategies that subvert the loyalty of the military institution, thus leading to the

illegitimacy of the government.

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