Is Attention Both Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness?

IsAttentionBothNecessaryandSufficientforConsciousness?

AntoniosKaldasMB.,BS.(Syd),GradDipPhil(MQ),MRes(MQ).

Athesissubmittedinfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegree

ofDoctorofPhilosophy

DepartmentofPhilosophyMacquarieUniversity

1stMarch2019

PrincipalSupervisors:DrColinKlein(2016-2017)

ProfRichardMenary(2018-2019)

AdjunctSupervisor:A/ProfAlexHolcombe(UniversityofSydney)

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TableofContentsLISTOFTABLES.............................................................................................................................................................................5LISTOFFIGURES............................................................................................................................................................................7

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................................9ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.........................................................................................................................................121 Q:ISATTENTIONBOTHNECESSARYANDSUFFICIENTFORCONSCIOUSNESS?....................151.1 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................................151.2 WHYDOESQMATTER?..........................................................................................................................................181.3 ARGUMENTS—TWOPAPERS..................................................................................................................................201.4 ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................................................................231.5 OUTLINEOFTHESIS.................................................................................................................................................38

PARTI.(RE-)LAYINGTHEFOUNDATIONS2 PHENOMENALCONSCIOUSNESS............................................................................................................452.1 PHENOMENALCONSCIOUSNESSANDQ.................................................................................................................452.2 ABRIEFHISTORYOF“CONSCIOUSNESS”..............................................................................................................462.3 THEONTOLOGYOFCONSCIOUSNESS.....................................................................................................................482.4 DEFININGPHENOMENALCONSCIOUSNESS...........................................................................................................502.5 THECONTENT-PHENOMENALITYDISTINCTION...................................................................................................572.6 CHAPTERSUMMARY.................................................................................................................................................59

3 THEMANYFACESOFATTENTION........................................................................................................613.1 ABRIEFHISTORYOFATTENTION..........................................................................................................................613.2 PRELIMINARIESTODEFININGATTENTION..........................................................................................................633.3 ATAXONOMYOFATTENTION.................................................................................................................................753.4 MYAPPROACHTODEFININGATTENTION.........................................................................................................1033.5 CHAPTERSUMMARY..............................................................................................................................................108

4 RELATIONSHIPS.......................................................................................................................................1094.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................................1094.2 THESETTHEORETICALFRAMEWORK(STF)...................................................................................................1134.3 WHATOTHERSHAVESAID..................................................................................................................................1344.4 KINDSOFRELATIONSHIP......................................................................................................................................1504.5 CHAPTERSUMMARY..............................................................................................................................................155

5 WORKINGMEMORY................................................................................................................................1575.1 INTRODUCINGWORKINGMEMORY(WM).......................................................................................................1575.2 HISTORY..................................................................................................................................................................1585.3 WHATISWORKINGMEMORY?...........................................................................................................................1615.4 THEDUAL-ASPECTNATUREOFWORKINGMEMORY.....................................................................................1765.5 BOUNDARIESOFWORKINGMEMORY?..............................................................................................................1805.6 CHAPTERSUMMARY..............................................................................................................................................181

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PARTII.ADDRESSINGQ6 PULLINGATTENTIONANDCONSCIOUSNESSAPART...................................................................1856.1 RECAPANDOUTLINES...........................................................................................................................................1856.2 ATTENTIONWITHOUTCONSCIOUSNESS.............................................................................................................1886.3 CONSCIOUSNESSWITHOUTATTENTION.............................................................................................................1956.4 CHAPTERSUMMARY...............................................................................................................................................225

7 PHENOMENALOVERFLOW...................................................................................................................2277.1 THEENIGMAOFPHENOMENALOVERFLOW......................................................................................................2277.2 SOMEMOREFOUNDATIONS.................................................................................................................................2297.3 FLORENCEANDBEN...............................................................................................................................................2417.4 EPISTEMICWOES...................................................................................................................................................2457.5 CHAPTERSUMMARY...............................................................................................................................................266

8 TRIANGULATINGCAPACITYLIMITATIONS.....................................................................................2698.1 COMPARINGCAPACITIES.......................................................................................................................................2698.2 THECAPACITYOFWORKINGMEMORY..............................................................................................................2708.3 THECAPACITYOFATTENTION.............................................................................................................................2798.4 THECAPACITYOFCONSCIOUSNESS.....................................................................................................................2858.5 THEWITCHES’HATMODEL.................................................................................................................................2938.6 ALTERNATIVEINTERPRETATIONS.......................................................................................................................2998.7 CHAPTERSUMMARY...............................................................................................................................................312

9 ANSWER(S)TOQ.....................................................................................................................................3139.1 CONCLUSIONS,IMPLICATIONS,APPLICATIONS..................................................................................................3139.2 SEEKINGANSWERS................................................................................................................................................3149.3 WORKINGMEMORY...............................................................................................................................................3259.4 IMPLICATIONSFORTHECURRENTDISCOURSEONATTENTIONANDCONSCIOUSNESS...............................3279.5 BROADERIMPLICATIONSANDAPPLICATIONS...................................................................................................3329.6 FINALREFLECTIONS..............................................................................................................................................353

APPENDICES........................................................................................................................................................355APPENDIX1.DISTINCTIONSBETWEENDIFFERENTKINDSOFATTENTION.....................................................................355APPENDIX2.FOURUNLIKELYSCENARIOS..........................................................................................................................360APPENDIX3.TABULATEDCOMPARISONSOFSTFWITHOTHERFRAMEWORKS..........................................................364APPENDIX4.CLASSIFICATIONOFAUTHORSBYSTFSCENARIO......................................................................................372APPENDIX5.MODELSOFWM:ASELECTION....................................................................................................................385APPENDIX6.METAPHORSOFWM:ASELECTION.............................................................................................................391APPENDIX7.ANATOMYANDPHYSIOLOGYOFFOVEALVISION........................................................................................394

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................................................399

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ListofTables

Table1.Asummaryofsomeimportantdistinctionsamongkindsofattention.(3.2.3)

Table2.Adefinitionaltaxonomyofattention.(3.3.1)

Table3.TheMatrixofallpossibleSTFScenarios.(4.2.3.1)

Table4.Fourkindsofrelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.(4.4.1)

Table5.FourunlikelySTFScenarios.(Appendix2)

Table6.ComparisonofSTFwiththedescriptionsofIwasaki(1993,p.212).

(Appendix3)

Table7.ComparisonofSTFwiththemodelsofLamme.(Appendix3)

Table8.ComparisonofSTFwiththecategoriesofSchwitzgebel(2007).(Appendix

3)

Table9.ComparisonofSTFwiththeframeworkofKochandTsuchiya(2007).

(Appendix3)

Table10.ComparisonofSTFwiththepropositionsofDeBrigard(2010,pp.189–

190).(Appendix3)

Table11.ComparisonofSTFwiththeCADframeworkofMontemayor&Haladjian

(2015,pp.5–6).(Appendix3)

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Table12.ComparisonofSTFwiththedescriptionsofPittsetal.,(2018,p.2).

(Appendix3)

Table13.ClassificationofAuthorsbyScenario.(Appendix4)

Table14.AlphabeticallistofScenariosbyauthor.(Appendix4)

Table15.ModelsofWorkingMemory.(Appendix5)

Table16.MetaphorsofWorkingMemory.(Appendix6)

Table17.Calculationsoffovealandfoveolarvisualfields.(Appendix7)

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ListofFigures

Figure1.ThefourpossibleCombinationsofattentionandconsciousness.(4.2.2)

Figure2Agraphicalrepresentationofonewaythatgradationsintheoverlap

betweenattentionandconsciousnessmightberepresented.(4.2.4.2)

Figure3Thepreponderanceofphilosophersvsnon-philosophersamongthe

ScenariosofSTF.(4.3.6)

Figure4.Twomodelsofworkingmemory.(5.3.1)

Figure5Witches’HatModelofconsciouscontent.(8.5)

Figure6Fourmodelsofvisualawarenessanditsrelationtoattention,modified

fromLamme(2003)p.13.(Appendix3)

Figure7ConsciousnessvsAttention,modifiedfromVanBoxteletal.,(2010,p.6,

Figure2a).(Appendix3)

Figure8Visualfieldangleanddiameter.(Appendix7)

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Abstract

Isattentionbothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness?Callthiscentral

questionofthistreatise,“Q.”Wecommonlyhavetheexperienceofconsciously

payingattentiontosomething,butisitpossibletobeconsciousofsomethingyou

arenotattendingto,ortoattendtosomethingofwhichyouarenotconscious?

Wheremightwefindexamplesofthese?

ThistreatiseisaquesttofindananswertoQintwoparts.PartIreviewsthe

foundationsuponwhichthediscourseonQisbuilt.DifferentinputstoQproduce

differentanswers.Afterconsiderationofthemanyways“attention”and

“consciousness”havebeendefined,Isettleuponphenomenalconsciousnessand

ExecutiveAttention(definedasasuiteofstrategiesforstructuringcognitionfor

furtherprocessingimplementedbytheexecutiveofworkingmemory)asthemost

interestinginputstoQ,andtheonesonwhichPartIIfocuses.

Attentionwithoutconsciousnessseemsrelativelyeasytoestablishempirically,but

consciousnesswithoutattentionismuchharder.Theputativecandidatesallseemto

havemajorproblems,butIbuildastrongabductivecaseforthehithertoignored

caseoffovealphenomenaloverflow.Weconsciouslyseefarmoredetailinourfoveal

fieldsthanwecanExecutivelyAttend,althoughthereisaseriousobstacletoour

everconfirmingthatempirically—identifyingconsciouscontentreliesonExecutive

Attentionalreport.Triangulatingthecapacitylimitationsofattention,

consciousness,andworkingmemorystrengthensthiscaseforconsciousness

withoutattention,andsuggeststhatcognitionmustworksomethinglikemy

“Witches’HatModel,”onwhichcontentcanbecomeconsciousoutsideofExecutive

Attentionorworkingmemory.Iconcludewithsomereflectionsontheimplications

ofmyargumentsforthediscourseonQ,andforotherdiscoursessuchasthe

ontologiesofattentionandconsciousness,theoriesofconsciousness,someother

cognitiveconcepts,andethicalconsiderationsinhumans,animals,andmachines.

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AconclusiveanswertoQcontinuestoeludeus.Itmayperhapsbeanultimately

insolubleconundrum.Butitistheveryessenceofhumanitytoseekananswer,and

insodoing,toimproveourunderstandingofourownnature:

“Theproperstudyofmankindisman.”1

1AlexanderPope,AnEssayonMan,2.1.

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StatementofOriginality

Thisworkhasnotpreviouslybeensubmittedforadegreeordiplomainanyuniversity.

Tothebestofmyknowledgeandbelief,thethesiscontainsnomaterialpreviously

publishedorwrittenbyanotherpersonexceptwhereduereferenceismadeinthe

thesisitself.

AntoniosKaldas

1stMarch2019

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Acknowledgments

Conductingthiskindofprolongedandconcentratedphilosophicalresearchis

privilege,andthesupportofothersindispensabletoenjoyingthatprivilege.My

beautifulwifeDaliaandwonderfulchildrenSamuelandBethanynotonlygranted

methetimetoworkonit,butunfailinglyencouragedmeandbelievedthatIcould

completeit.Theyprovidedanhonestandcreativesoundingboardwhentherewas

nooneelsetotalkto.Fortheirunconditionallove,Ishallalwaysbegrateful.

Myjourneyinacademicphilosophywouldhavemetwithaprematureendifnotfor

thekindencouragementandcommon-senseofthelatePeterMenzies,thevery

presentJeanetteKennett,andmyMasterssupervisor,RachaelBrown,fromwhomI

learntsomuch.

Atthecentreofaprojectlikethis,ofcourse,thePrincipalSupervisorcarriesmostof

theload.IfeelbothhonouredandblessedtohavestartedthisPhDjourneywith

ColinKlein(nowatANU)andcompleteditwithRichardMenary.Theyhaveboth

beenincrediblyeasytoworkwith,patient,understanding,wise,andafountainof

knowledge,aswellasbeingjollydecenthumanbeings.Icanneversaythankyou

enoughforthemanyhoursyouinvestedinmywork,andthesensitivewayyou

guidedmeoutofmysilliernotionsandtowardstrueunderstanding.Youhave

taughtmetheartofphilosophybybeingmodelsofitsnoblestembodiment.My

AdjunctSupervisorfromtheworldofempiricalpsychology,AlexHolcombe,has

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beenmorethangenerouswithhistimeandwisdom,andaninvaluableassetinwhat

were,forme,unknownlands.Forallthatmysupervisorsgaveme,Ishallalwaysbe

grateful.

Theideasinthisthesisbenefittedfromanumberofdiscussionswithothers,

includingaMacquarieUniversityHigherDegreeResearchMasterclasswithLogi

Gunnarson(March2017),apresentationattheIACAPAnnualConference(Warsaw,

June2018),andaposterattheASSC22ndAnnualConference(Krakow,June2018).

ThelattertwowerefundedbyaPGRFgrant.Myoverallresearchprojectwas

supportedwithanRTFscholarship.

Ialsohadthepleasureandprivilegeofrefiningvariousaspectsofmythesisthrough

feedbackanddiscussions,brieferorlonger,electronicallyorinperson,froma

numberofpeopleincluding(inalphabeticalorder)PeterAdamson,MichaelArcher,

DavidChalmers,MartinEimer,RanHassin,PatriciaHutchings,GreameJackson,

DimitriKokkinos,ChrisLetheby,JohnMitry,LisaMiracchi,DinyarMistry,Anina

Rich,WendyRogers,JenniferWindt,andNaoTsuchiya.Ofspecialhelpwerethe

regularmeetingsthatcametobecalled“Colin’sCrowd,”inwhichpostgraduate

studentsunderthesupervisionofColinKleintookturnstopresenttheirwork-in-

progressandreceivefeedbackfromtheothers,underColin’sgentledirection.Thank

youto(inalphabeticalorder)PeterClutton,StephenGadsby,MegIvory,Anneli

Janssen,DorianMinors,TrishaNowland,andMatthewTuxfordforallIlearnedfrom

yourcreativeideasand,especially,theissuesonwhichwedisagreed.

AspecialthankstoourdogsRuby,thelateMerlin,andtherecentArthur,andcat

Bendyfortheirdailycompanyatmyfeet,inmylap,andornamentingthewindow

sill,keepingaveryclosephilosophicaleye(sometimestwo)onmywork.

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1 Q:IsAttentionBothNecessaryand

SufficientforConsciousness?

1.1 Introduction

“Therelationshipbetweenattentionandawarenessisoneofthe

mosthotlydebatedissuesinneuroscienceandpsychology”

(Cohen,Alvarez,&Nakayama,2011,p.1170).

Youarewalkingalonganisolateddirttrackinthelushsemi-tropicalrainforestofan

AustralianNationalPark.Yoursensesarebombardedbyagloriousriotof

perceptions—thepiercingblue-greenofmyriadsofgumleavesstrewnacrossa

brilliantbrightbluesky,punctuatedbysmoothgreybranches.Brightgreenandred

kingparrotsflitby,whilethecacophonouscriesofcorellasareoccasionally

punctuatedwiththepuresinglenotesofbellbirds.Thedampredsoilsmellsoflife,

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lifegentlybubblingandboundingandburgeoning,asthegentlewarmbreezeof

springcaressesyourcheeksandwelcomesyouintonature’swarmembrace.

Memoriesofchildhoodpicnicswellupinyourheart,mixedwithemotionstoofastto

savour—thesenseoffreedom,theprofoundprivilegeofbeingonewithnature,the

joyofbeingalive.

Allthistakesalongtimetodescribebutistheexperienceofasinglemoment.It

seemssosimpleandsonatural,butitisthephilosopher’stasktopullitapartin

ordertobetterunderstandit.Gandalfwouldbedisappointed,2butweshalladopta

moreoptimisticattitudeandhopethatdissectingexperiencessuchastheone

describedwillonlyservetodeepenthemwithadditionalwonderandjoyatthe

marvelthatishumancognition.

Asyouwalkthroughtheforest,youseemtoconsciouslyexperiencesomanythingsat

once.Yetyoucannotattendtothemallatonce.Attendtothecryofabird,andyou

ceaseattendingtothebrightnessofthesky.Attendtothebrightnessofthesky,and

youceasetoattendtothesoftnessofthebreeze.Evenif,byaheroiceffortofwill,

youmanagetoattendtotwoofthesethingsatonce,youwilllikelyfinditalmost

impossibletoattendtothree.Toattendtothesamehighdegreetoeverythingyour

sensesandinnerlifepresentatonceisquitecertainlyimpossible.Yetitseems

somehowwrongtosaythatbyceasingtoattendtoathing,youtherebyceaseto

consciouslyexperienceit.Mostpeople,Ithink,wouldrathersaysomethinglikethis:

“Iamlessaware3ofsomethings,andmoreawareofothers.Imaynotbeableto

counttheleavesonabranchifIamcurrentlyattendingtothecryofthecorellas,but

Iamcertainlyawarethatthereareleavesjustthere,andthattheyareleavesrather

thaniceblocks.”Andyet,areyoureallyawareofthoseleaves?Withoutpayingat

leastsomeattentiontothem,howmuchcanyoureallytellmeaboutthemapart

fromthefactoftheirexistence?Isitpossibletobeawareofathingwithoutbeing

2“Hethatbreaksathingtofindoutwhatitishasleftthepathofwisdom”,JRRTolkien,Lordofthe

Rings,FellowshipoftheRing.3“Awareness”and“consciousness”canmeandifferentthings,butIuse“aware”inthissectionina

lessprecisefolkpsychologicalsense.Idefine“consciousness”muchmorerigorouslyinChapter2.

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abletotellanythingaboutit?Orisitthecasethatunlessyouattendtoathing,you

arenotinanymeaningfulsensetrulyconsciouslyawareofthatthing?

1.1.1 TheQuestion,Q

Thistreatiseisaquesttoansweronequestion:

Q:Isattentionbothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness?

Thisisnotasimplequestion.Therelationshipbetweenattentionandconscious

experience(consciousnessforshort)liesattheheartofavigorouscontemporary

debateinthephilosophicalandcognitivescientificliterature.Thenumberand

varietyofviewsonofferreflectsthecomplexityofQ.Whatdo“attention”and

“consciousness”mean?Whatconstitutesevidencefornecessityorsufficiency?How

istheempiricalevidencebestinterpreted?Whatunderliestherelationshipbetween

attentionandconsciousness?Andwhatdoesallthismeanforourunderstandingof

themindmoregenerally?ThesearethekindsofquestionsIaddressinthepagesto

come.

Atitssimplest,Qisaquestionaboutapatternofoccurrence.Ifattentionisnecessary

forconsciousness,thentherecanbenoinstanceofconsciousnessthatisnot

accompaniedbyattention.Wheneveryouhaveconsciousness,necessarily,youalso

haveattention.Ifattentionissufficientforconsciousness,thentherecanbeno

instanceofattentionwithoutconsciousness.Wheneveryouhaveattention,

necessarily,youalsohaveconsciousness.Inotherwords,Qaskswhetherattention

andconsciousnesscan“comeapart,”orwhethertheymustalwayscometogether.

ThescopeofQmaybegeneralorspecific.Wemayaskthequestiongenerallyofall

cognition,whetherhuman,animal,alien,computer,oranyotherkindofcognition.

Exploringthisgeneralquestionempiricallyis,ofcourse,farmoredifficultthan

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exploringthespecificquestionasitappliestohumancognition.Itis,therefore,the

morespecificquestionwithwhichIheremostlyconcernmyself.Humancognition

heresignifiesbothnormalhumancognition(ifthereissuchathing)andabnormal

humancognition—caseswherecognitionfunctionsin“pathological”ways.4

1.1.2 OutlineofThisChapter

ThechiefpurposeofthistreatiseistomakesomeprogresstowardsananswertoQ

bybuildingontheexistingliteratureinnewandhopefullyinterestingandfruitful

ways.Tothatend,thisfirstchapterbeginswithconsiderationofwhyQmatters—

whatisatstake.IarguethatQoffersavaluablewindownotonlyintothenatureof

bothattentionandconsciousnessthemselves,buttherebyintohumancognition

generally.Ithenbrieflycritiquetwointerestingpapersthattakeopposingviewson

theanswertoQtolayoutsomeprinciplesthatwillguidemyquest.Iconcludethis

openingchapterwithanoutlineoftheremainderofthethesis.

1.2 WhyDoesQMatter?

WhyshouldwepursueananswertoQ?Ishouldconfessfromtheoutsetthatmy

chiefmotivationinthisinvestigationissheerunbridledandunapologeticcuriosity.

Humanbeingsarefascinatinginmanyways,butnonesobeguilingastheirabilityto

dothingslikeattendtostuffandhaveconsciousexperiences.InthissectionIraise

4See4.2.3.2formoredetail.

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someverypracticalapplicationstowhichmyresearchmightbeofuse,butIam

ultimatelyinterestedinunderstanding.

Understandingconsciousnesshasbeencalled“TheMostInterestingProbleminthe

Universe”(Turausky,2014).Thebewilderingvarietyoflargelymutually

inconsistenttheoriesofconsciousnessstillbeingdiscussedperhapsindicateshow

farwearefromasolution.Andyet,consciousnessiswhatmakesuswhoweare.We

defineourselfhoodlargelyasourstreamofconsciousexperience,asdemonstrated

byParfit’s(1971)famousthoughtexperiments.Andyet,ascloseasourstreamof

consciousexperienceis,sofarisitinscrutabletous.Wecansayfarmore—andwith

fargreaterconfidence—aboutthingsgoingonoutsideourselvesthanwecanabout

ourselves,inthemselves.

Thisinscrutabilityhasinspireddiverseapproachesthatattempttopiercethroughit.

Fromtheverysimple,suchastheassiduousintrospectionsofDescartes,tothevery

complex,employingbrainscanners,tohybridexperimentalparadigmsthat

manipulateaspectsofconsciousexperience,dancingonthegentlylappingshore

betweentheconsciousandtheunconscious.Consciousnessisintimatelyinterwoven

withothercognitiveconcepts,soaneminentlyamenableapproachistoprobe

consciousnessthroughitsconnections.Manysuchconnectionshavebeenand

continuetobeemployed—connectionswithmemory,imagination,perception,and

action,tonameafew.Buttheconnectionofconsciousnesstoattentionseemstobe

particularlypromising.Itissoclosethatithasledmanytovirtuallyidentify

consciouswithattention(3.3.3,4.3),inawaythathasrarelyoccurredforanyother

cognitiveconcept.

Theconnectionofconsciousnesstoattentionalsoopensupaworldofempirical

researchthatcanbeusedtoprobethenatureofconsciousness.Scientists(read

psychologists,neuroscientists,etc.,asopposedtophilosophers)largelyignored

consciousnessformostofthetwentiethcentury,buttheystudiedattention

assiduously.Bridgingthephilosophicalworldofconsciousnessstudiesandthe

scientificworldofattentionstudieshasbeentheinterdisciplinaryprincipleofrecent

decades,andpromisestodeliverthebestofbothworlds.Butwemustalsobewary.

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Wecannot,forexample,simplyassumethatconsciousnessandattentionalwaysgo

togetherassomehave,andtherebymakeattentionaproxyforconsciousnessin

research.Inthistreatise,Iprovidesomecompellingreasons(summarisedin9.5.2.3)

toavoidthistrap.

Attentionandconsciousnessdonotexistinavacuum,butarepartoflarger

cognitiveeconomy—thesumofallcognitiveprocessesoccurringinanindividual

subject,whethersynchronicallyordiachronically.ExploringQleadstoallsortsof

interestinginsightsintothethingsgoingonaroundattentionandconsciousness,so

tospeak,someofwhichIexplorebrieflyinthelastchapter,whereIalsohighlight

someotherpracticalimplicationsthatarisefromconsiderationofQ.

1.3 Arguments—TwoPapers

IbeginthisquesttoexploreQbyanalysingtworecentpapersonthetopic.Idonot

claimtheyarefoundationalorcentraltextsonthetopic—onlythattheyserve

beautifullytointroduceandillustratemanyofthechiefissuesthatmyapproachtoQ

willaddressinthistreatise.Ipursueamuchfullerliteraturereviewencompassinga

broadarrayofauthorsandpositionsinChapters3and4.Thetwopapersinthis

sectionareKochandTsuchiya(2007)andDeBrigardandPrinz(2010).

1.3.1 KochandTsuchiya(KT)

Representinga“no”answertoQ—arguingthatattentionandconsciousnesscanand

doindeedcomeapart,isKochandTsuchiya(2007)(henceforthreferredtoasKT).It

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isanempiricallyrichpaper,withsomecareful,althoughnotalwaysconclusive

arguments.IbreakdowntheoverallargumentofKTinfourpropositions,inthe

orderinwhichKTthemselvespresentthem:

KT1.Attentionandconsciousnesshave“substantiallydifferentfunctions.”

KT2.Thereareempiricalinstanceswhereasubjectcanbevoluntarily

turningherattentiontoanobject5withoutsimultaneouslybeing

consciouslyawareofthatobject.

KT3.Thereareempiricalinstanceswhereasubjectcanbeconsciously

awareofanobjectwithoutsimultaneouslyvoluntarilyturningher

attentiontothatobject(oratleast,hardlyturningatall—the

“near-absenceofattention”).

KT4.Attentionandconsciousnesscansometimeshaveopposingeffects.

Thesefourpropositionstogetherconstitute,KTsuggest,apowerfulargumentthat

attentionisneithernecessarynorsufficientforconsciousness.Itisworthasking

whatroleeachofthesepropositionsisplaying.Oncarefulconsideration,KT1and

KT4donotunequivocallynegateQ,butprovideevidencethatismoredifficult—but

notimpossible—toreconcilewithapositiveanswer.OnKT1,asingleprocessmay

subservedifferentfunctions,andthesefunctionsmayevenhaveopposingeffects

(KT4),giventherightcircumstances.Ontheotherhand,KT2andKT3,ifconfirmed,

wouldseemtoprovideanunequivocalanswerofnotoQ(althoughthequalification

attheendofKT3castssomedoubtonitswarrantforanunequivocal“no”toQ,on

which,see1.4.4).Tosummarise,then,KTseemtobemountinganargumentin

5Iamusingtheterm‘object’herenotinthesenseofaphysicalobjectnecessarily,butinthemore

generalsenseofthetargetorcontentofthoughtorperception.Thatis,astraditionallyusedinthe

dyadof‘subject-object’.

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which,ifKT2isconfirmed,thentheanswertoQisconfidentlyno;ifKT3is

confirmed,theansweris“nearly”no,andifKT1andKT4aretrue,wehaveafortiori

evidencetoanswerQwithano.

1.3.2 DeBrigardandPrinz(DP)

DeBrigardandPrinz(2010)(henceforthreferredtoasDP)havearguedforthe

“yes”answer—thatattentionisbothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness—so

thatattentionandconsciousnessnevercomeapart.Isummarisetheirargumentin

thefollowingfourpropositions.Thefirsttwopropositionscanbeseenasthe

positiveprongsoftheirargument,whilethelasttwoaredefencesagainstthe

empiricalchallengesraisedagainsttheirview.6

DP1.Attentionandconsciousnesssharestrikingfunctionalsimilarities.

DP2.Thereispowerfulbehaviouralevidencethat“consciousnesscomes

andgoeswithattention”(p.53).

DP3.Theevidencethatattentionisnotsufficientforconsciousnessfails

toestablishthatconclusion.

DP4.Theevidencethatattentionisnotnecessaryforconsciousnessfails

toestablishthatconclusion.

6Infact,DP1andDP2canbetakenasresponsesagainstKT1andKT4,whileDP3refutesKT2and

DP4refutesKT3.

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UnlikeKTabove,thelogicalconclusionthattheirviewisrightcannotbedrawnfrom

thetruthofanyoneofthesepropositionsalone(1.4.1).Thebesttheycanhopeforis

thattakentogether,thetruthofall(ormany)ofthesepropositionsmakestheir

positionmorelikely.Evenifallfourpropositionsareshowntobetrue,neitherthe

factthatsofar,wehaveonlyobservedattentionandconsciousnessoccurring

together,and/orthefactthattheevidencesofaradvancedagainsttheirconcurrence

failedtoholdupcanestablishthetruthoftheirposition,sinceitwillalwaysbethe

casethatjustonepieceofnewevidence,justoneincontrovertiblenewinstanceofa

dissociationbetweenattentionandconsciousness,willbeenoughforananswerof

notoQ.

1.4 Analysis

AcompleteandexhaustiveanalysisofKTandDPwouldrequireathesisalltoitself,

buthereIaminterestedonlyinusingthemtointroduceandillustratecertainissues

thatarehighlyrelevanttomyapproachtoQinthistreatise.IconsiderwhetherQis

ananalyticalorempiricalquestion(orboth);highlightthedefinitionalambiguity

thatcharacterisesdiscourseonQ;raisethequestionofthefunctionsofattention

andconsciousness;emphasisethelackofacomprehensiveconceptualframework

againstwhichdifferentapproachescanbecompared;pointouttheimportanceof

workingmemory;suggestfourquestionsthatcanimprovetheinterpretationof

empiricalevidence;andprovideanexampleofhoweasyitistogetsuch

interpretationswrong.

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1.4.1 AnalyticalandEmpiricalQuestions

TherearetwoimportantwaysofframingandapproachingQthatneedtobe

considered.Thefirstistheanalyticalapproach:

QA:Isattentionanalyticallybothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness?

QArequiresanunderstandingofwhatkindsofthingsattentionandconsciousness

are,whatfunctionstheyperform,andfromthere,workingoutwhethertheveryidea

ofattentionisbothnecessaryandsufficientfortheveryideaofconsciousness.Our

answerstoQAdependheavilyonthedefinitionsofattentionandconsciousnesswe

startwith.KTdefineattentionasvolitionaltop-downattention,andareambiguous

astotheirdefinitionofconsciousness.DPdefineattentionasthegatewayto

workingmemory,andtherebytoconsciousness.InChapters2and3,Idevelopwhat

Iarguearemoreusefuldescriptions,withphenomenalconsciousnessasunified,

temporal,situatedfirst-personwhat-it-is-likeness,andattentionasasuiteof

strategiesforstructuringcognitionforfurtherprocessing.

TheotherapproachtoQisempirical:

QE:Isattentionempiricallybothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness?

QEmayonlybeaddressedoncewehaveatleastsomeofthegroundworknecessary

forananswertoQA.First,wecannotprofitablyanalyseempiricaldatawithout

havingaclearideaabouttheconceptsofattentionandconsciousness.This

definitionalambiguityrisksconfusionsIdescribeshortly(1.4.2).Certainanswersto

QAcanmakeQEmoot.Withtherightdefinitionsofattentionandconsciousness—

e.g.,attentionjustisaccessconsciousness,(9.2.2.3)—theanswertoQistriviallyyes,

sinceconsciousnessisdefinedintermsofattention,renderingthetwoinseparable.

Iftheconceptof“bachelor”isdefinedintermsofone’smaritalstatus,thenbeinga

bacheloristriviallynecessaryandsufficientforbeingamalewhonevermarried.In

definingattentionasthegatewaytoworkingmemory,andholdingthatallandonly

25

contentinworkingmemorycanbecomeconscious,DPbegthequestionofQE(and

Q)bytheiranswertoQA.

Whilebothpapersmakeassumptionsabouttheanalyticalnatureofattentionand

consciousnessandtheirrelationship,theeightpropositionsIlistedabove(KT1-4,

DP1-4)areallempiricalpropositions.Theyhighlightanasymmetryinanswering

QE—wecanonlybeconfidentofanoanswer,neverofayesanswer.KT2andaKT3

withoutthe“near-absence”qualificationaretheonlypropositionsinbothpapers

capableofdeliveringanunequivocalanswertoQE(andtherefore,toQ)—therest

couldatbestbesuggestive,neverconclusive.KT1,KT4,andDP1cannotbetakenas

addressingQA,sincetheyaremattersofempiricalinvestigation,atleastasKTand

DPtreatthem.Similaritiesanddifferencesinfunctionoreffectsdonotequatetothe

necessityorsufficiencyofoneprocessforanother(1.4.3below).Showingapattern

ofapparentlyconsistentempirical(QE)correlation(DP2)isnoguaranteethatsuch

correlationholdsuniversallyorisanalytical.Underminingconclusionsfromthe

empiricalevidencecurrentlyavailable(DP3,DP4)leavesopenthepossibilityofnew

evidence,orevenotherarguments,thatmaystillconfirmthoseconclusions.Only

KT2andanunqualifiedversionofKT3—thepropositionsthatattentionoccurs

empiricallywithoutconsciousnessandviceversa—ifborneout,provideadefinitive

answertoQE.Insummary,noamountofempiricalevidencecansupplyacertainyes

answertoQE(andtherefore,toQ),whileonlyonecaseofanempiricaldissociation

betweenattentionandconsciousnesscansupplyacertainnoanswer.Iarguein

Chapters7and8thatfovealphenomenaloverflowissuchacase.

Ontheotherhand,QAdoesnotexhibitthiskindofasymmetry.Sincetheanswerto

QAdependsonlyontheconceptualcharactersofattentionandconsciousness,itis

equallypossibletoarrivewithlogicalcertaintyateitherayesornoanswertoQA.

WhilePartIofthistreatiseattemptstoclarifyissuestodowiththeconceptsof

attentionandconsciousnessandtherelationshipsbetweenthem(QA),muchofPart

IIofthistreatiseisdevotedtoconsiderationofsuchcandidatesforempirical

dissociations(QE),althoughinevitably,thetwoquestionsoverlap.

26

1.4.2 DefinitionalAmbiguity

QAevokestheimportanceofbeingclearonwhatwemeanbyattentionand

consciousness.BothKTandDPsufferfromproblemsonbothdefinitions.ForKT,

attentionisdefinedastheprocessofselectinginput

“definedbyacircumscribedregioninspace(focalattention),bya

particularfeature(feature-basedattention),orbyanobject

(object-basedattention)…volitionallycontrolledformsof

selective,endogenousattention”(p.16).

Attentionhasbeentakentomeanbothvolitionalandnon-volitional,endogenous

andexogenous(top-downandbottom-up)typesofselection(3.2.3),andhaseven

beentakentoapplytothingsotherthanselectionassuch,suchasaccessand

detection(3.3.4.2).KT’sdefinitionofattentionthen,candeliverananswertoQonly

foraverynarrowdefinitionofattention.Thatisinitselfavaluableexercise,butone

liabletoaveryvalidchallengethat,forexample,consciousnessintheabsenceof

top-downattentionmaystillbeconsciousnessinthepresenceofbottom-up

attention.

Movingtoconsciousness,KTdefineitbyitsfunctions,whichinclude:

“summarizingallinformationthatpertainstothecurrentstateof

theorganismanditsenvironmentandensuringthiscompact

summaryisaccessibletotheplanningareasofthebrain,andalso

detectinganomaliesanderrors,decisionmaking,language,

inferringtheinternalstateofotheranimals,settinglong-term

goals,makingrecursivemodelsandrationalthought”(p.17).

27

Inotherwords,consciousnessplaysnoroleinselection—eventop-down

selection—butinsteadfunctionsastheexecutiveofthebrain,coordinatingits

varioussubfunctions.Theyseem,therefore,tobeidentifyingconsciousnessroughly

withtheexecutivefunctionofthemind.Animportantpointtonotehereisthat

whileKTacknowledgethecomplexitiesinvolvedindefiningconsciousness,and

distinctionssuchasthatbetweenaccessandphenomenalconsciousness(p.16,see

Block,1995),theirstatementofthefunctionsofconsciousnessquotedabove

describesjustaccessconsciousness,notphenomenalconsciousness.Allofthe

functionstheydescribeinthequoteabovecanbealsoperformedimplicitly,or

subconsciously—withoutphenomenalconsciousness(Hassin,2013;Lamme,2010,

p.210;Velmans,2014).Infact,onecouldarguethatwhattheyhavegivenismore

appropriatelyconsideredadefinitionofsomethinglikeaglobalworkspaceor

workingmemory,ratherthanphenomenalconsciousnessassuch.Thereis

doubtlessacloserelationshipbetweenphenomenalityandthecognitiveexecutive,

butitcertainlycannotbesimplyassumedthattheyareidentical.InPartIIIconsider

thepossibilityheldbyleadingtheoristsofworkingmemorythatallandonlythe

contentofthecognitiveexecutiveisphenomenallyconscious,butIwillinfactargue

thatthereisgoodreasontothinkthispossibilityiswrong.

InlaterworkKTdomoredirectlyshowtheirinterestinphenomenalconsciousness

asitrelatestoattention.IntheirresponsetoMoletheyspeakabout“consciously

experiencing”objectsorpropertiesofobjects,andcomparethisto“non-conscious

priming”(Koch&Tsuchiya,2008).Primingwouldnormallybetakentobeacaseof

accessconsciousnesswithoutphenomenalconsciousness:

“Theinformation-processingfunctionofphenomenal

consciousnessinSchacter'smodelisthegroundoftheconceptof

consciousnessthatIwillmainlybecontrastingwithphenomenal

consciousness,whatIcall‘access-consciousness.’Aperceptual

stateisaccess-conscious,roughlyspeaking,ifitscontent—whatis

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representedbytheperceptualstate—isprocessedviathat

information-processingfunction,thatis,ifitscontentgetstothe

ExecutiveSystem,wherebyitcanbeusedtocontrolreasoningand

behavior”(Block,1995,p.229).

Elsewhere,theydefinewhattheymeanbyconsciousnessinthecontextofQby

equatingconsciousnesswith“thecontentsofconsciousexperience”(Koch&

Tsuchiya,2012).Thisstronglysuggestsphenomenalratherthanaccess

consciousness.So,whiletheyhavenotmadeitclearinthe2007paperthattheyare

addressingphenomenalconsciousnessratherthanaccessconsciousness,itisclear

fromotherpapersthattheyareindeedinterestedintherelationshipbetween

attentionandphenomenalconsciousness.Perhapstheirearlierworksimply

assumedthatwhereaccessconsciousnessis,therealsowillphenomenal

consciousnessbe?ButthisexamplefromKTillustratesthefactthatattentionand

consciousnesscometogethersocommonlyastotemptsometosimplyequatethem

toeachother(QE),andthatconceptually,attentionandconsciousnessareeasily

construedasperfectlyoverlapping(QA).Iarguelaterthatthereareverygood

reasonsforrejectingbothoftheseideas.

DPfarelittlebetter,definitionally.Theirdefinitionofattentionasthegatewayto

workingmemory,andtherebytoconsciousnessrunstheseriousriskofbeggingthe

questionofQ.Onthismodel,contentcanneverreachconsciousnesswithoutpassing

throughthesieveofattentionfirst,soattentionhasbeendefinedbythemodelas

beingnecessaryforconsciousness.Ifallthecontentofworkingmemoryisconscious

(thisisanambiguouspointinDP),andifattentionisthegatewayonlytoworking

memoryandnowhereelse,thenattentionhasbeendefinedbythemodelas

sufficientforconsciousness.DParequiteawareofthedangerofmerelydefiningan

answertoQbuthavebeentakenbyothersnottohaveavoidedthedangeraswellas

theymighthave(3.2.4.2).

ContributingtothepotentialconfusionisthefactthatthelargeliteratureonQ,both

philosophicalandempirical,isbynomeansdefinitionallyconsistent.So,anypaper

29

thatattemptstosynthesiseananswertoQfromanarrayofotherpapers(asdoKT,

DP,andthistreatise)mustbeconstantlyvigilantastowhichdefinitionsofattention

andconsciousnessareinplay,andaskwhetherornottheevidenceadducedreally

justifiestheconclusionreachedwithoutequivocation.OurchallengeinPartIis

goingtobetocomeupwithworkingdefinitionsofattentionandconsciousnessthat

respecttheintimateconceptualandempiricalconnectionsbetweenthemwhile

nonethelessprovidingprincipledgroundsforaddressingQasanopenempirical

question,whileconsultingadefinitionallyunrulyliterature.

Ultimately,forthepurposesofQ,onemaydefineattentionandconsciousnessin

differentways,butonemustbecognisantofthefactthatdifferentdefinitionswill

leadtodifferentanswerstoQ(9.2.2).Forexample,differentanswersmayeventuate

foraccessconsciousnessversusphenomenalconsciousness.Andcomparingeither

kindofconsciousnessagainsttop-downattentionmayresultinadifferentanswerto

thatagainstbottom-upattention.

1.4.3 TheFunctionQuestion

QAisinpartaquestionnotonlyabouthowwedefineattentionandconsciousness,

butalsoaboutfunctionalroles.ThepointofKT1isthatifattentionfulfilsadifferent

functionalroletothatofconsciousness(whichDP1denies),thisissuggestive

(thoughnotconclusive)evidenceoftheirdissociationandtherefore,ofthenegation

ofQ.ThepointofKT4isthatifattentionproducesopposingeffectstoconsciousness,

thatleadstothesameconclusion.

“Totheextentthatoneacceptsthatattentionandconsciousness

havedifferentfunctions,onemustalsoacceptthattheycannotbe

thesameprocess”(p.17).

30

Buttheassumptionthatasingleprocess(orotherkindofentity)cannot

simultaneouslyplaydifferentfunctionalrolesorhaveopposingeffectsisbyno

meansobvious.Mostofusarewellacquaintedwiththeagonyofadividedmind

whenfacedwithamoraldilemma.Inchemistryandphysiologygenerally,thereare

innumerablecasesofcomplexsystemspullinginopposingdirections

simultaneously,thusattaininganequilibriumofopposingeffects,functions,or

forces.Forexample,enzymesarebiologicalcatalysts,moleculesinorganicsystems

thatenhanceorimpedechemicalreactions.AnenzymelikeP450isacomplex

proteinthatperformsthesameprocess—transferringahydrogenatomfroma

substratetoanoxygenmolecule—inavastarrayoforganicchemicalreactions.The

sameprocessthusresultsinawidevarietyoffunctionsandeffects,someofwhich,

presumably,mayeventuallyopposeeachother.

Incognitionitself,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatthesamecognitiveprocessmay

performdifferentfunctionsindifferentcircumstances,orgivendifferentinputs.The

brainappearstoberepletewiththephenomenonofneuralreuse(M.L.Anderson,

2010).Thereseemstobegoodevidencethatitoftenhappensthatoverevolutionary

timescales,thesamehardwareandsoftwareoperatinginmuchthesameway—the

sameprocesses—cometobeusedfornovelfunctions,whileeitherretainingor

losingtheiroriginalfunctions.SoevenifKT1isestablished,itisnotenoughto

answerQ,sinceattentionandconsciousnessmightsimplybeoneandthesame

cognitiveprocessthatplaysdifferentfunctionalrolesandproducesopposingeffects

indifferentcircumstance(i.e.,Q=yes),ortheymaybecompletelydissociableand

independentprocessesthatplaydifferentfunctionalrolesandproduceopposing

effects(Q=no).Moreinformationisneeded,beyondKT1orKT4.

Whatismissingistodeterminethenatureoftherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousness.In4.4,IconsiderwhatIbelievetobetheexhaustivelistofpossible

kindsofrelationship.Briefly,ifattentionandconsciousnessarenumerically

identical,thentheanswertoQiscertainlyayes,althougheventhatwouldnot

necessarilybeincompatiblewiththetruthofKT1orKT4,forthereasonsdescribed

above.ButthisisnotwhatKTarearguing,asIreadthem.Iftheirrelationshipisone

31

ofcausation,e.g.,attentioncausesconsciousness,7thenattentionwillbenecessary

forconsciousnessbutnotsufficient.Furtherinformationaboutthecircumstancesof

thecausalrelationshipwillbeneededtoelucidatewhetherattentionissufficientfor

consciousness.Andifattentionandconsciousnessaremerelycorrelatedwithout

identityorcausation,thenofcoursetheanswertoQisno,barringsomeweird

coincidencethatseesthemalwaysco-occurringwithoutfailbypurechance.

Thefunctionalrolesofattentionandconsciousness(andworkingmemory)are

quitepertinenttotheargumentsIofferinPartII,buttheywillplaydifferentrolesto

thosetheyplayforKT.BasedonthedefinitionsofattentionandconsciousnessI

developinChapters2and3,Iwillarguethatcognitivecontentcanbephenomenal

withoutbeingattendedbythecognitiveexecutive,andthatthisconclusionraises

interestingquestionsaboutthepurposeorfunctionalroleofphenomenal

consciousnessthatarenoteasytoanswer(9.5.2.2).

1.4.4 ComprehensiveFramework

ThediscussioninKTisframedaroundfourpossibledescriptionsofacognitive

process:attendedandconscious;attendedbutnotconscious(KT2);consciousbut

notattended(KT3);andneitherattendednorconscious.Thismatrixismuchmore

comprehensivethantheframeworksinmanyotherdiscussionsofQ,asIpointoutin

4.2.4.YetKT’sframework(andallotherframeworksIhavesofardiscovered)is

logicallyincompleteandsuboptimalforaddressingQ.QisframedbyKT,DP,and

othersinthelanguageofconditionallogic—necessityandsufficiency.Thisis

adequatetomanydiscussions,butitdoesnotcapturethefullgamutofpossible

relationshipsbetweentwoconceptssuchasattentionandconsciousness.Neither

doesitprovidethekindofoverallviewthatisrequiredtoanswerQforawhole

7Thereareotherpossiblerelationsofcausation(4.4.1).

32

cognitiveeconomy,ratherthanforaparticularcognitivephenomenonsuchasgist

perception.InChapter4,Idevelopacomplete,precise,andoptimalframeworkthat

doescaptureeverypossiblescenariolinkingattentionandconsciousnessina

cognitiveeconomy.

KThasbeencriticisedforarguingfor“consciousnessinthenear-absenceof

attention”ratherthan“consciousnesswithoutattention.”Iconsiderthiskindof

answertoQtobemuchlessinteresting.ProbingQpromisestoshedlightonthe

verynatureofattentionandconsciousnessthroughthewaysinwhichtheyrelate.

Toestablishthatconsciousnesscanoccurinthetotalabsenceofattentioncarriesfar

weightierconsequencesthanconsciousnessinthenear-absenceofattention.To

merelyassertthattheycanoccurtogetherindifferingproportionsisnotnearlyso

significantastoassertthattheycancomeapartcompletelyfromeachother.The

frameworkIdevelopinChapter4subsumesgraduatedapproachessuchasthatof

KT,andmorestarkly,ofMontemayorandHaladjian(2015),andallowssuch

approachestobecomparedwithothersthatdonotsharethistrait.

1.4.5 WorkingMemory

Wesawabovethatatleastinthis2007paper,KT’sdefinitionofconsciousnessis

verymuchlikeBlock’saccessconsciousness,Baars’globalworkspace,orthecentral

executiveofworkingmemorymodels.Weshallseelaterthatmanyauthorssimply

takethiscognitiveexecutivetobesynonymouswitheitherattention,or

consciousness,orinsomecases,both.Inthistreatise,Iargueagainstthis

assumption.KTandDPagreeinascribingdifferentrolesforattentionand

consciousness,eveniftheyarriveatopposinganswerstoQ.ForKT,thedifferent

rolessuggestthatattentionandconsciousnesscandissociate(Q=no).ForDP,

attentionisthegatewaytoworkingmemory,andconsciousnessarisesonlyfromthe

workingsofworkingmemory,sotherecanbenoconsciousnesswithoutattention,

andattentionwillalwaysproduceconsciousness(Q=yes).Thesediscussionsimply

33

thattheconceptofworkingmemory(whateverthatmaybe)islikelytobemost

helpfulinelucidatingthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousness,andtherebyansweringQ.Tothatend,Isurveytheprincipalworking

memoryliteratureinChapter5anduseitinPartIItodevelopmyarguments.

Oneofthewaysworkingmemorywillproveusefulisinthedefinitionofaparticular

kindofattention,ExecutiveAttention,thatwillplayanimportantroleinmy

arguments.In3.4.4,Iarguethatattentionasacognitivestrategyisvirtually

ubiquitous,whichthereforemakesQtrivial.Notonlyareallconsciouscontents

attendedinthisbroadersenseofattention,virtuallyallcognitivecontents—even

unconsciouscontents—areattended.Butattentionimplementedbyacognitive

executiveisfarmorecircumscribed.Howcansuchattentionbedelineatedina

principledmanner?Modelsofworkingmemoryprovideexactlywhatisneeded.

1.4.6 FourQuestions

BothKTandDP(andmostotherauthors)invokenumerousempiricalstudiesto

supporttheirarguments.Butmuchoftheworkthusinvokedwasnotspecifically

designedtodirectlyaddressQ.Evenworkthatissodesignedcansufferfroma

degreeofinterpretiveconfusionthatcloudsitsapplicationtoQ.Toavoidthiskindof

confusion,andtomoreclearlydeterminejustwhatcanvalidlybedrawnfromany

givenexperimentwithrespecttoQ,Iproposefoursalientquestionsthatcanbe

askedaboutanyexperimentalparadigm,whichIthenemploywherehelpful

throughoutthistreatise,andcapitalisetoindicatethatIamreferringtothese

specificquestions.

A. TargetWhatisthecontentofconsciousnessandwhatisbeingattended?

Doattentionandconsciousnesshavethesametarget?

34

B. TimingWhendoestheattentionoccur(ornot),and

Whendoestheconsciousnessoccur(ornot)?

C. VarietyWhattypeorvarietyofattentionisoccurring?

Whattypeorvarietyofconsciousnessisoccurring?

D. ConsequencesWhatexactlychangesduetotheexperimentalmanipulation?

TargetQuestion

TheTargetquestionaskswhethertheattentionandtheconsciousnesspertainto

exactlythesameTarget,andpreventserroneousconclusionsaboutthecorrelation

betweenattentionandconsciousness.AveryuninterestingversionofQwouldbe

whetheritispossibletoattendtoXwhilebeingunconsciousofY,e.g.,canIattendto

aBeethovensymphonywhilebeingunconsciousofthetasteofajuicygrapeinmy

mouth?Clearly,whatwereallywanttoknowiswhetherIcanattendtothemusic

withoutbeingconsciousofthatsamemusic,orviceversa.

TimingQuestion

TheTimingquestionensuresthattheparticularinstancesofattentionand

consciousnessinquestionaresimultaneous.IfattentionbeginsatTandceasesat

T+1,andthen,consciousness—evenofthesameTarget—beginsatT+2,thenthere

isanimportantsenseinwhichattentionandconsciousnessdidnotco-occur—the

temporalsense—whichishighlyrelevanttoQ.

35

VarietyQuestion

InChapters2and3Idescribesomeofthedistinctionspeoplehavemadebetween

differenttypesorvarietiesofconsciousnessandattentionrespectively.Keeping

trackofwhichvarietyofeachanauthoristalkingaboutcanplayanimportantrole

inpreventingakindofequivocationthatcanconfusematters.Thisistheessenceof

theVarietyquestion:whichspecifickindsofattentionandconsciousnessarewe

talkingabout,anddowejumpillegitimatelyfromonekindtoanotherwithinthe

sameexperimentand/orargument?Forexample,itisunhelpfulinrelationtoQto

determinethatIamspatiallyattendingtothelocusofaspeckledhen,but

unconsciousofsomeofthespotsonthathen(whichwouldcorrespondtofeature

attention,notspatial).

ConsequencesQuestion

TherelevanceofsomeofexperimentstoQdependsoncertainputative

consequencesofmanipulatingattentionorconsciousness.Thus,itwillbeimportant

toconsiderwhatexactlytheseconsequencesare,andwhetherornottheyestablish

thethingsthatauthorsneedfromthemfortheirarguments.

1.4.7 PitfallsofEmpiricalInterpretation

Justlikeproseorpoetry,empiricaldatanecessarilyrequireinterpretation.Thisisa

subtleartwithmanypitfallsthatcantrapeventhemostexperiencedandcapable

practitioner.InaddressingQ,wewillneedtobeasvigilantandself-criticalas

possible.AnexamplefromKTillustratesthisdanger,andtheusefulnessofthefour

questionsabove,buttherearemanyexamplesinDPandmanyotherpapers.

InsupportofKT4—attentionandconsciousnesssometimeshaveopposingeffects—

KTciteOlivers&Nieuwenhuis(2005)whofoundthatdistractingasubjectseems

counterintuitivelytoimprovetheirattentionbyreducingtheattentionalblink

36

effect.8Subjectswereaskedtoidentifytwonumericaldigits(denotedT1&T2)

insertedintoarapidlypresentedvisualseriesofletters.Attentionalblinkmeans

thatwithintherightrangeofdurationforthegapbetweenthetwodigits,

performanceonidentifyingT2shouldbepoor,andthatisexactlywhathappened

withthesubjectswhoperformedtheexperimentinthestandardway.However,two

othergroupsofsubjectsperformedthesametaskwhileconcurrentlydistracted

witheitherafreeassociationtask(thinkingaboutaholidayorashoppinglist)or

withlisteningtorhythmicmusic.Oddlyenough,thedistractedgroupswerebetterat

identifyingT2withintheattentionalblinktimespanthanthestandardgroup.KT

takethistobeacasewheredecreasingattentionthroughthedistraction,actually

increasesconsciousawareness,asreflectedintheimprovedaccuracyof

identificationofT2.

ThisprovidesanopportunitytoillustratethebenefitsofmyFourQuestions.The

Targetsofinterestaretheseriesofpresentedlettersandnumbers,andmore

specifically,T1andT2,whiletheVarietyofattentionistop-downselectiveattention

inthestandardcase,butbottom-upattentioninthedistractorcases.Inallcases,

spatialattentionisfocusedonthelocationofthepresentedlettersandnumbers.Itis

continuouslysofocusedinthestandardcase,butcontinuouslydistractedinthe

distractorcases(Timing)—notspatially,butthroughtherecruitmentofcognitive

resourcestolargelynon-visualtasks.TheConsequenceofthedistractionofattention

isthatrecognitionofT2withintheusualattentionalblinkwindowimproves.

ThecaseKTcanmake,then,isthatduringthatattentionalblinkwindow,cognitive

resourcesaredirectedawayfromthetaskofprocessingandrecognisingthe

presentedlettersandnumbersgenerally,andfromidentifyingT1andT2

specifically.ThisdropinattentionparadoxicallyresultsinbetterrecognitionofT2

(T1recognitionisnotsignificantlyaffected)—consciousawarenessofboth,but

8Attentionalblink(Raymond,Shapiro,&Arnell,1992)isthephenomenonwhereasecondstimulus

thatcloselyfollowsonafirststimulus(within500msec)isnotconsciouslyperceived,mostlikely

becausethelimitedattentionalresourcesarestilloccupiedwiththefirsttargetstimulus,and

thereforehaveinsufficientresourcesleftovertorecognisethesecondstimulus.

37

especiallyT2intheattentionalblinkwindow,isincreased.Fromthistheyconclude

thatattentionandconsciousnesshaveopposingeffects.

TheargumentKTwishtomakeisnotonethatcanbemadefromthisexperiment.

KTphraseitthus:“reducingattentioncanenhanceawareness”(Box2,p.20).Butan

argumentoftheform:“reducingXincreasesY”isnotanargumentforattentionand

consciousnesshavingopposingeffects,butforattentionandconsciousnessvarying

ininverseproportiontooneanother.WhatKTneedtoarguetoestablishopposing

effectsissomethinglikethis:“reducingXincreasesZ,butreducingYdecreasesZ.”In

otherwords,reducingattentionincreasestheoccurrenceofaConsequencefora

particularTarget,whilereducingconsciousnessdecreasesthesameConsequence

forthesameTarget.ThatisnotthestructureofOliversandNieuwenhuis’

experiment.

PerhapswhatKTwanttosayisthattakingT2astheTargetofbothattentionand

consciousness,intheOliversandNieuwenhuisexperiment,theConsequenceofthe

manipulationwasthatconsciousnesswentupwhenattentionwentdown.Butthisis

stillnotKT4,sincethiswayofphrasingwhathappenedholdsthemodulationsin

bothattentionandconsciousnessasConsequences,notcauses,andKT4requires

bothattentionandconsciousnesstobecauseswithdifferingeffects.Thisisapoor

wayofinterpretingtheexperimentandIdoubtverymuchthatthisiswhatKTare

doing.Infact,anyinterpretationthatholdsconsciousnessasaConsequencerather

thanacausecannotsupportKT4.

AnotherproblemisthatOliversandNieuwenhuisthemselvesofferthreepossible

interpretationsofthereasonsforthiseffect(p.268),noneofwhicharefriendlyto

KT4.First,theywonderwhetherincreasedarousalmayhaveresultedinmore

attentionalresourcescomingonlinegenerally,thusincreasingtheattentional

resourcesproportionallyforthatpartofattentiondevotedtoidentifyingT2.

However,intheirrewardgroup,whensubjectshadgoodfinancialmotivationfor

beingaroused,therewasnoimprovementinT2identification.Ifthisinterpretation

iscorrect,thentheexperimentbecomesacaseofincreasedattentionandincreased

consciousness,whicharenotoppositeeffects.Second,musicorthinkingof

38

pleasurablethingsmayproduceapositiveaffectivestate,whichhasbeenshownto

improvemanycognitivefunctions.Totestthishypothesis,onewouldneeda

distractionthatwasaffectivelyneutral.Onceagain,thiswouldmeanincreased

attentionalresourcesforT2,andtheexperimentbecomesacaseofincreased

attentionandincreasedconsciousness,whicharenotoppositeeffects.Andthird,the

distractortaskmayhaveactuallyhadtheeffectofwideningthedurationofthe

spotlightofattention,thusencompassingbothT1&T2intheonespotlight.This

explanationalsocountsagainstKT4,sinceitimpliesthattheimproved

consciousnessofT2isconsequenttogreaterattentionbeingpaidtoT2.

Thisisoneofthepitfallsinherentinutilisingempiricalstudiestoansweraquestion

likeQthatwerenotspecificallydesignedforthattask.OliversandNieuwenhuis

themselvesdrawnoconclusionsintheirpaperabouttherelationshipbetween

attentionandconsciousness.Thewords“conscious”and“aware”9donotfigure

significantlyatall,anywhereintheirpaper.Theirconclusions,instead,focuson

highlightingthecomplexstructureofattentionitself—withdrawingattentioninone

wayseemstoimproveattentioninanotherway.InmyargumentsinPartII,Istrive

toavoidthesekindsofpitfalls.

1.5 OutlineofThesis

Ithasbeensaidthatthedefinitionofinsanityistokeepdoingthesamethingover

andoverandexpectadifferentresult.10TheworkonQisabodythatislarge,

impressive,andcreative.Outofrespectforitsquality,Ihavetriedinthistreatisenot

9Theword“aware”doesappearonce,butonlyinamethodologicalsense:“Noneoftheparticipants

wereawareofconditionsotherthantheonetheywereplacedin”(267).10AttributedtoAlbertEinstein.

39

todothesamethingoverandoverthathasbeendonebyothersfarbetterthanI

evercould.Instead,IhavefocusedinPartIonacarefulreassessmentofthevery

foundationsofthediscourse.ItturnsouttherearemanydifferentwaysQcanbe

posed,andtheliteratureisnotalwaysasclearasitmightbeonwhichparticular

versionofQisbeingaddressed.InPartII,IchooseaparticularversionofQand

probeitmethodically,inlightofthefoundationslaidinPartI,graduallynarrowing

downtheinvestigation,untilIconstructanabductivecasefora“no”answertoa

specificframingofQ.Thelastchapterincludesnotonlytheresultsofthis

investigation,butsomelamentablybriefindicationsofpossiblyfruitfuldirections

forfutureinvestigation.BelowIoutlinethestructureofthistreatisechapterby

chapter,highlightingwherepossible,whatisuniquetomyapproach.11

1.5.1 PartI

Chapter2addressesthedefinitionofphenomenalconsciousnessasIuseitinPartII.

Idefinephenomenalconsciousnessbyidentifyingfourcorecharacteristics:whatit

islike-ness;asituatedfirst-personperspective;phenomenalunity;andtemporality,all

fourofwhicharenecessarytogethertoidentifyaninstanceofphenomenal

consciousness.Ifurtherdrawthedistinctionbetweenthecontentofphenomenal

experienceandphenomenalityassuch.

11Afewmonthsbeforethesubmissiondateforthisthesis,thePhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyal

SocietyB:BiologicalSciencespublishedaThemeIssue(2018,volume373,issue1755)on“Perceptual

consciousnessandcognitiveaccess,”compiledandeditedbyPeterFazekasandMortenStorm

Overgaard.Theseventeencross-disciplinaryarticlescovermuchofthesamegroundasthistreatise.

Myworkwaslargelycompletedpriortoitspublication,andsomeofmymostimportantarguments

werepresentedattheIACAP(21-23June)andASSC22(26-30June)conferencesinPoland.

Nonetheless,Ihaveendeavouredtoengagewithasmuchofthatissueasisrelevant,andasspaceand

timeallowed.Forexample,thechallengesraisedbyGross(2018)againstargumentsforphenomenal

overflowfromcapacitylimitationsofworkingmemoryaredirectlyrelevanttomyargumentsin

Chapter8,butwouldrequireawholethesistothemselvestodothemjustice.

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Chapter3turnstothedefinitionofattention,anareawheresignificantlylesswork

hasbeendone,comparedtothatonconsciousness.Aftersurveyingandanalysing

otherapproachesandsomecommondistinctionsamongtypesofattention,Itakea

descriptiveapproach,surveyingtheliteratureandcollatingandtaxonomizingthe

variouswaysattentionhasbeendefined.Iconcludethechapterbydistillinga

definitionofattentionthatliesattheheartoftheOperationsdefinitionsinthe

taxonomy:attentionisasuiteofstrategiesforstructuringcognitionforfurther

processing.Iconcludebydrawinganimportantdistinctionbetweentheubiquitous

LiberalAttentionandthemuchmorecircumscribedExecutiveAttention,thelatter

beingthedefinitionIemployinPartII.

InChapter4Iturntothenatureoftherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousness.Startingfromscratch,IbuildauniquelycomprehensiveSetTheoretic

Frameworkthatcapturesallthepossiblelogicalrelationshipsbetweentwoentities

withinacognitiveeconomyandcompareittoexistingframeworksintheliterature.

AnanswertoQmayobtainoverdifferentdomains,whichIoutlineintermsof

weakerandstrongerreadings.Ithensituatenearlyfiftyauthorsagainstthis

frameworkanddrawsomegeneralreflectionsfromthisreviewoftheliterature.I

concludethechapterbydescribingfourpossiblekindsofrelationshipthatmight

underliethepatternofoccurrencedescribedbytheSetTheoreticFramework.My

answerstoQinChapter9willbeframedintermsoftheseconstructs.

InChapter5Idescribetheleadingmodelsandmetaphorsofworkingmemory,a

conceptthatfrequentlyappearsinthediscourseonQ.Iusethesemodelstoposea

numberofpertinentQuestionsthatillustratehowhugeQis.WhileItouchupon

themallatsomestage,Iwillhavethespacetoaddressonlyone—theCapacity

QuestioninChapter8—inanysubstantialdetail.Theyarecertainlynotoriginal

questions,oruniquetoQ,buttheyhelpguideinvestigationofQ.Workingmemory

servesmanypurposesinthistreatise,amongthem,providingaprincipledwayto

delineatetheboundariesofExecutiveAttentionfromLiberalAttentionandprobing

thecapacitylimitationsofattentionandconsciousness.Iconcludewithsome

observationsaboutthedual-natureofworkingmemory:storageandmanipulation.

41

1.5.2 PartII

InChapter6Ibeginbroadlybysearchingforevidenceforthetwokindsof

cognitionsthatwillsettleQ:attentionwithoutconsciousness,andconsciousness

withoutattention.Thefirstprovesrelativelyeasytoestablish,butthesecondis

muchharder.Tofacilitatethesearch,Iinvokemydefinitionsofattentionand

consciousnessfromPartItoderivefiveclassesofwaysthattheremightbe

consciousnesswithoutattentionincognition,whetherinspecificcognitions

(“local”),orinacognitiveeconomyasawhole(“global”).Noneoftheseturnsoutto

carryconclusiveevidenceofconsciousnesswithoutattention.

ThesearchnarrowsinChapter7asIturntoaparticularformoflocalconsciousness

withoutattention:phenomenaloverflow.ButIbypasstheusualobjectionsto

overflow,whichallrelatetoperipheralvision,andfocusonphenomenaloverflowin

fovealvision.Here,Iargue,thereisgoodreasontoholdasveridicalasubject’s

confidencethatheconsciouslyseeseveryspeckleonaspeckledhenclearlyand

distinctly,eventhoughthatsubjectcannotfurtherprocess(ExecutivelyAttend)

everyspeckle.Ipresentargumentsfromthetemporalnatureofconscious

experienceandtheimmediacyofexperience,inthesensethatone’sexperienceof

perceptualcontentitself(nottheobjectoutthereintheworld)canbeunmediated

byattention.Iconcludethechapterbyconsideringwhetherno-reportparadigms

mightofferawayofbypassingtheepistemicobstacleofrelyingonreportbythe

subject(whichrequiresExecutiveAttention)toidentifyconsciouscontent.

Unfortunately,notonlydoextantno-reportparadigmsfailtoidentifyconsciousness

withoutattention—thereisgoodreasontothinktheycanneversucceed.

InChapter8Ibuildanotherabductiveargumentforfovealphenomenaloverflow,

thistimebyinvokingtheCapacityQuestionfromChapter5andapplyingitto

attention,consciousness,andworkingmemory.Triangulatingthesethreecapacities

strengthensthecasebyshowingthatthereisnoreasonwhythethreecapacities—

orevenconsciousnessandanyoneoftheothertwo—shouldbeidentical.Infact,

givenhowdifferentlytheybehave,itwouldbeanincrediblecoincidenceiftheir

42

limitationswereidentical.IexpressthisinaWitches’HatModelofcognitivecontent

andprocessing,onwhichphenomenaloverflowisalmostinevitable,andthen

comparethismodeltothreeprominentalternativeaccounts:theillusionofrichness;

expandedattention;andinchoateness.IconcludethattheWitches’HatModelwith

phenomenaloverflowistheaccountthatbestexplainsallthedata.

Finally,inChapter9,Ibringalltheseargumentstogethertosummarisemyanswer

toQintermsofthefoundationalconceptsbuiltupinPartI:theSetTheoretic

Framework;thekindsofrelationshipthatmightunderliethesepatternsof

occurrence;andthereadingsofthedomainsoverwhichtheymightobtain.Iprovide

answerstofourversionsofQ,focusingmostlyonthatconcerningExecutive

Attentionandphenomenalconsciousness,thechieffocusofPartII.Iconcludethe

treatisewithsomereflectionsontheimplicationsandconsequencesofmy

argumentsforthediscourseonQ,andonotherquestions:thenatureofattention

andconsciousness;theoriesofconsciousness;othercognitiveconcepts(intelligence

andsymboliccognition);andsomepracticalethicalissuesinvolvingartificial

intelligence,animals,infants,andtheascriptionofmoralvalueandmoral

responsibility.

43

PARTI

(Re-)Layingthe

Foundations.

45

2 PhenomenalConsciousness

2.1 PhenomenalConsciousnessandQ

“Consciousnessisawordwornsmoothbyamilliontongues”

(Miller,1962,p.25).

TherearemanyvarietiesofQthatcouldbeposed—oflesserorgreaterinterestand

utility—dependingonwhatonemeans,exactly,bybothattentionand

consciousness.Inthistreatise,IaminterestedinaparticularvariationonQ,onein

which“consciousness”signifiesphenomenalconsciousness.Inthischapter,Idevelop

aparticularconceptofphenomenalconsciousness,notbecauseIthinkittheonly

“right”concept,butbecauseIthinkitthemostinterestingandusefulconceptof

consciousnessthatcanbeaddressedinQ.Idevelopaparticularconceptofattention

inChapter3,althoughitwillrequiresignificantlymoreeffort,sinceattentionhas

beensignificantlylessstudiedthanconsciousness,philosophicallyatleast.

46

Ibeginmyanalysisofphenomenalconsciousnessbybrieflysurveyingtherelevant

historyoftheconceptandtheterm“consciousness”beforeoutlininginsomedetail

theparticularconceptofphenomenalconsciousnessIintendtouse,definedbyits

intrinsicfeatures.Iconcludewithadiscussionofaverypertinentdistinction

betweenthecontentofphenomenalexperienceandphenomenalityassuch,initself.

2.2 ABriefHistoryof“Consciousness”

Whilethephilosophicaltermconsciousnessaswedefineittodaywasintroduced

onlyaslateastheeighteenthcentury,12theconceptofbeingconsciouslikely

predatesrecordedhistory,beingasitis,thecentraldefiningfeatureofhuman

experience,13andwasnotlimitedtohumanbeings—“spirits”wereascribedto

animalsandplantsandevennaturalfeaturessuchasriversandstars.14Terms

roughlyequivalenttotheEnglish“soul,”“spirit,”“mind,”“intellect,”andsoon

aboundintheancientlanguagesoftheearliestcivilisationssuchasMesopotamia,

Egypt,andGreece.Seager(2007,pp.12–13)positsthattheearliestcivilisations

adoptedoneoftwocontrastingapproachestounderstandingmindor

consciousness:emergence,bywhichconsciousnessisconstructedoutofnon-

consciouscomponents;andpanpsychism,bywhichconsciousnessisanelementalor

suigenerispropertyofreality.ItiswiththePresocratics(and,atroughlythesame

time,inIndianphilosophy(Dreyfus&Thompson,2007))thatweseethefirst

12Cudworth(1678),seealsoLähteenmäki(2010).13Controversialideassuchasthebicameralmindnotwithstanding(Jaynes,1976).14Forexample,ithasbeensuggestedthatsomepaleolithichomininssawelephants“asa‘sister-

species’,resemblinghumansinphysical,social,behavioralandperceptionalaspects”(Lev&Barkai,

2016,p.240).

47

recordedattemptstorationallyandsystematicallyevaluatethesebroadapproaches

andelaborateanexplanationofmind.Thecurrentdebateoverattentionand

consciousnessisthedirectdescendent,insomewaysperhapsthecontinuation,of

theseattempts.Ofcourse,thediscoursehasprogressedgreatly,ashasthecontextin

whichthediscourseisconducted—ouroverallunderstandingoftheworldinwhich

welive.Empedoclesgrappledwithhowmindemergesfromthefourelements,

Democritusfoundhimselfunabletoexplainhowexperienceemergesfromatoms,

andEpicuruslatergroundedourvolitionintheswerveoftheseatoms.Whilewe

nowknowsomuchmoreaboutatoms,andaboutthemanylayersorlevelsof

organisationatomscanform,allthewayuptofunctioningbiologicalorganisms,

somemayarguethatwearestillapproximatelyasfarfromexplaining

consciousnessastheywere.

Thedifficultiesinherentingrapplingwithsomysteriousaconceptasphenomenal

consciousnesshaskeptmanybrilliantmodernmindsawayfromtheissue,

particularlyscientists.15

“Consciousnessusedtobeacontroversialtopicofstudy.Notonly

duringtheheydayofbehaviorism,butalsoduringtheriseof

cognitivescienceinthe1970sand1980s,onlyafewsenior

scientists(suchasGeraldEdelmanandFrancisCrick),whohad

firstachievedsuccessandjobsecurityincompletelyunrelated

fields,feltfreetoattackthisfinal,bigquestion.Buthowthings

havechangedinthepast20years!”(Blocketal.,2014).

AccordingtoBaars(1988,p.34),thereturntorespectabilityofthescientificstudy

ofconsciousnessbeganwiththeworkofDonaldE.Broadbentinthe1950’s.The

workofBroadbentandotherson“rapidshadowing”—listeningtoastreamof

15Scientists,perhaps,butnotpsychoanalysts,artistsandnovelists,asWertheim(2016)pointsout.

48

speechandimmediatelyrepeatingwhatyouhear—notonlyprovidedan

experimentalparadigmforprobingthestructureandlimitationsofconsciousness,

butalsoillustratesthecloserelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.The

subjectvoluntarilylearnstoselectivelyattendtothestreamofspeechtothe

exclusionofallothersensoryinput,andis(apparently)consciousofonlythat

stream.Interestingly,Moray(1959)foundthatsensoryinputintheotherear—for

example,thesubject’sname—couldbeprocessedunconsciouslyand“breakinto”

thesubject’sownstreamofspeech.Inspiteofthiscloseconnectionbetween

attentionandconsciousnessattheverybeginningsofthemodernrevivalofinterest

inconsciousness,theexplicitrelationshipbetweenthetwofeaturedlittlein

scholarlydiscourseuntilthelate1980s(4.1.1).

2.3 TheOntologyofConsciousness

Withsuchalonghistoryanduniversalaccesstoit,thetermconsciousnesshascome

tomeandifferentthingstodifferentpeopleindifferentcontexts,soaclarificationof

thekindofconsciousnessIaminterestedininthisthesisisinorder.Iaminterested

inphenomenalconsciousness,inthesenseofBlock’s(1995)phenomenal

consciousness,orinthesensemadefamousbyThomasNagel’s(1974)paperWhat

IsItLikeToBeABat?Thereis“somethingitislike”tobeyou,rightnow,readingthis

treatise.Itisverylikelythatthereisnothingitisliketobethecodexorthe

computeruponwhichyouarereadingthistreatise(althoughfarmoreofthecontent

ofthetreatiseresidesinboththaninyourbrain).

Iamnotinterestedhereinphysiologicalorclinicalconsciousness,suchasthat

measuredbytheGlasgowComaScaleinhospitalemergencydepartments,norin

consciousnessasBlock’s(1995)accessconsciousness,whichistheavailabilityof

49

informationforfurtherprocessing,16norinknowledgeorinsight,inthesensethat

Buddhistsspeakoftheconsciousnessofenlightenment.Further,Iamnothere

interestedintheuniversal(metaphysicalcategory)“consciousness,”butinactual

instantiationsofconsciousness—particularconsciousexperienceslikeyoursand

mine.

Agreatdealoftheinterestinunderstandingconsciousnesshastakentheformof

searchingforatheoryofconsciousness(9.5.2),andthevastandvariedarrayofviable

contendersistestimonytoourbefuddlement.Surprisingly,though,therehasbeen

relativelylittlesaidaboutthequestionofwhatontologicalcategoryphenomenal

consciousnessmightbelongto.Ifweemployastraightforwardontological

taxonomy(Lowe,2002,p.16),17theconceptof“consciousness”iseasytoclassify—it

belongstothemetaphysicalcategoryofuniversals.Butwhereastheparticularsof

otheruniversalsarealsoeasytoclassify,theparticularoftheuniversal

“consciousness”—particularconsciousexperiences—isnotsoeasy.Anindividual

dogisaparticularconcretesubstance.TheGrandFinalofasportscompetitionisa

particularconcreteevent.Therednessofthisappleisapropertythatinstantiatesthe

universalpropertyofredness,anditsconnectiontothisappleisarelation.Butto

whichcategorydoesyourcurrentconsciousexperiencebelong?Objects?Events?

Properties?Relations?Orsomethingelse?ThisfascinatingquestionisoneIaddress

elsewhere,whereIexplorethepossibilitythattheuniquenessofphenomenal

consciousmaywarrantitshavingitsownontologicalcategory.18

OneapproachtoQwouldbetoascertaintheontologicalcategoriesofbothattention

andconsciousness,andtherebyascertainthekindsofrelationshiptheymightbe

capableofhaving.Forexample,ifattentionisaneventandconsciousnessisa

property,thenQcouldbeposedasaquestionaboutwhetherconsciousnessisa

16AlthoughwewilllaterseethatBlock’saccessconsciousnessbearsaverycloseaffinitytowhatI

shalldefineasExecutiveAttention(7.2.2).17Thereare,ofcourse,manyotherontologicalschemes,someofwhichmaybebettersuitedto

categorisingconsciousness.However,IuseLowe’sschemeherepurelyforillustrativepurposes.18Papercurrentlyunderpreparation.

50

propertyalwaysandonlyofattentionalevents.However,theontological

categorisationofconsciousnessisaverydifficultendeavourindeed—muchharder

thanattention—andonewhichIwillthereforeeschewinthistreatiseinfavourof

justbeingcontenttoidentifyitsdefiningfeaturessothatwehaveaprincipledway

ofascertainingwhetherornotitispresentincognitionsofinterest.

2.4 DefiningPhenomenalConsciousnessAlargepartofansweringQisgoingtoinvolveidentifyingthepresenceorabsenceof

phenomenalconsciousnessandattention.ThisishowtheframeworkIdevelopin

Chapter4works.ForthepurposesofQ,weneednotworryaboutallocating

consciousnesstoanontologicalcategory,wedonotneedanall-explainingtheoryof

consciousness,normustweenterintothefinerpointsofdefiningit.Wejustneeda

setofsignaturefeaturesthatallowustoascertainwhetherornotconsciousnessis

presentorabsentinanygivencircumstance—anaturalkindapproach(Shea&

Bayne,2010).

Whatmakesphenomenalconsciousnesswhatitis?Whatareitsdistinguishing

features?OneapproachmightbetoconsiderChalmers’famous(andcontroversial)

philosophicalzombiethoughtexperiment(Chalmers,1996).Wecansiftoutthe

featuresthatdefinephenomenalconsciousnessquaphenomenalconsciousnessby

subtractingeverythingthatthephilosophicalzombiecandofromeverythingthata

consciouspersoncando.Whateverisleftover—thatisphenomenal

consciousness.19Thus,forexample,memoryisnotconsciousness(evenifthereare

19Anotherwaytoarriveatthecorefeaturesofphenomenalitymightbetoeliminateconscious

contentonebyonetillnothingisleft.Iexploresomethingverymuchlikethatin6.3.3,butwemust

bewareofbeggingthequestionofwhetheritispossibletophenomenallyconsciouswithoutbeing

phenomenallyconscious-ofanythingatall.

51

consciousmemories)sincethezombieiscapableofmemory.Whetherviathisroute

orotherroutes,Iproposefourtentativefeatures20thattogethermightforma

nomologicalcluster—asetofevidentialpropertiesthatoccurtogetherinnature

(Shea&Bayne,2010,p.471)—thatidentifyconsciousness:“whatitislike-ness;”the

situatedfirst-personperspective;unity;andtemporality.

2.4.1 WhatItIsLike-ness

Thefirstandmostobviousdifferencebetweenaphilosophicalzombieanda

consciouspersonisthatelusiveideaofphenomenality—qualia21—“whatitislike”

tobeyou.Mostauthorssurrendertothisideaanddonoteventrytodefineit

further.22Itisusuallydefinedbyappealtoyourownconsciousexperience—ifyou

arereadingthis,thenyouwilljustknowwhatitisliketobeyou,readingthis.Noone

elsecanknowthat.Infact,theProblemofOtherMinds(Hyslop,2018)suggeststhat

noonecanknowwithcertaintythatanyotherpersonisnotaphilosophicalzombie.

ButasDescartes(1637)famouslyargued,theonethingIcanbecertainofisthatI

amathinking(read,“conscious”)thing,elsehowcouldIbeawarethatIamasking

thequestionofwhatexists?

IfurtherassumeanancientIndianphilosophicalideafoundinDignāgaandothers:

whatitislike-nesscanbepurelyreflexive—itisinherentinmyexperiencethatitisI

20Block(1993,pp.313–317)listseightfeaturesandvanGulick(2017,sec.4)listsseven.21Forasuccinctreviewoftheterms“whatitislike,”“experience,”and“qualia,”seeBayneand

Montague(2011,pp.8–11).“Qualia”tendstorefertoperceptualphenomenalexperience,butof

course,someholdthattherearenon-perceptualphenomenalexperiences,suchasthinkingofan

abstractconceptlikethenumber937.Thiscontroversy,sometimescalledthecontroversyover

cognitivephenomenology,isnotacontroversyIcanaddresshere.Formypurposes,Iamjustthinking

aboutanyphenomenallyconsciousexperiencewhatsoever.22Anexcellentanalysisoftheconcept,though,isStoljar(2016).

52

havingtheexperience—withoutbeingreflective—withoutmyknowingorbeing

awareinasecond-orderwaythatitisIhavingtheexperience(Ram-Prasad,2007,p.

67).

2.4.2 SituatedFirst-PersonPerspective

Thesecondfeatureiscloselyrelatedtothefirst,butworthemphasisinginitsown

right.Thisissubjectivity,thefirst-personperspective.Consciousnessnecessarily

requiresasubjectaswellasanobject.Fortheretobeanexperience,theremustbe

anexperiencerofsomekind.23Andtheexperienceisexperiencedfromtheunique

perspective(spatialorotherwise)ofthatexperiencer,andnoother.Evenin

situationswhereweempatheticallyexperiencethingsfromthepointofviewof

anothersubject,suchaswhenyouwinceatanother’spain,youarenottruly

experiencingthatsameinstantiationofpainthattheothersubjectisexperiencing,

youaremerelysimulatingtheother’sexperiencewithinyourownexperienceand

fromyourownperspective,withvaryingdegreesofaccuracy.Thisistrueonany

theoryofempathyonemightprefer(Zahavi,2008),andtheconsequencesof

empathymayoftenworkagainstthepersonforwhomyouhaveempathy(Bloom,

2017),emphasisingthatthisisstillyouruniqueperspective,andnottrulyanother’s.

Thezombie,ontheotherhand,hasnosuchexperiencertooccupythisfirst-person

perspective.

23GalenStrawson(2017),whoarguesforavarietyofphysicalistmonism,stillconcedesthat

“Certainlyallexperiencerequiresasubjectofexperience,asubjectthatlastsatleastaslongasthe

experiencelasts”(p.375).SeealsoStrawson(1994,pp.129–134),whereheexploresindetailwhat

thenecessityforanexperiencermightmean,and(2016,pp.92–93),whereheexplicitlyarguesforan

experiencer,althoughnotonethatisontologicallyoverandabovetheexperience.SeealsoDuncan

(2017)foradefenseoftheintegralnecessityofaselfinphenomenalexperience.

53

Whatismore,thisuniquefirst-personperspectiveisuniquelysituated.Thiscan

meandifferentthings:asubject’spointofviewcanbebodily,rational,

phenomenological,oraco-incidenceofanyorallofthem(Rovane,2012,p.21).In

spatialterms,whatitisliketobemeisnotexperiencedfromthevantagepointof

thewholeuniverse,norfromaPariscafé(sadly),norfromwhereyouhappentobe

locatedinspace,butfromwhereIhappentobelocatedinspaceatthismomentin

time(Merker,2007,pp.72–73).Autobiographicalmemoriesretainthis

situationality,evenwhentheyarerememberedfromathirdpersonperspective

(McCarroll,2018).Evenoutofbodyexperiences(Agrillo,2011;Blackmore,1991)—

thesenseoffloatingaboveone’sownunconsciousbody—andegodissolution

(Letheby&Gerrans,2017)—theblurringoftheboundarybetweentheselfandthe

universe—retainthissituationality.Thelocusmaychange,oritmayenlarge,but

thereremainsalocus.Butsituationalityinvolvesmorethanjustspatiallocation.Itis

embodied,embedded,enactive,andextended(Menary,2010)—itsnatureentwines

inextricablywiththatofitsenvironment.Consciousexperienceisalsosituatedin

time(2.4.4)andsituatedwithinabroaderandcomplexcontextofnon-spatial

factorssuchasmemories,emotions,goals,affordances,etc.

Arelatedquestionishowweindividuateconsciousentities.Forexample,onan

ancientNeoplatonicview,oronsomeversionsofamodernpanpsychistview,your

personalexperienceofconsciousnessisnotjusttheinstantiationof“consciousness”

(asamemberofthemetaphysicalcategoryofuniversals),butanoutcropofa

greater“worldconsciousness.”Whatmakesyourconsciousnessdistinctfromother

consciousnesses?Istherereallyjustonebigconsciousness,ormany?Thesituated

first-personperspectiveinherentinourconsciousexperienceprovidesaclearway

todelineatemyconsciousnessfromyours,orfromaworldconsciousness.Italso

providesaremarkablyresilientwaytodelineatemyconsciousexperienceinthe

faceofextendedviewsofcognitionwhichseethecognitiveeconomyasextending

beyondtheintegumentofthehumanbody(9.5.3.2).Whateveritmightbethatis

carryingouttheprocessesunderlyingmycognitions,Icontinuetophenomenally

experiencethemfrommyown,singlesituatedfirst-personperspective.

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2.4.3 PhenomenalUnity

Thethirdfeatureofconsciousness,onerelatedtothetwoabove,isitsremarkable

unity(Bayne,2010;Bayne&Chalmers,2003;Brook&Raymont,2014).Phenomenal

unityseemstobeintimatelytiedtowhatitislike-nessandthesituatedfirst-person

perspective.Itseemsoddtothinkthatatanymomentintime,therecouldbemore

thanonethingthatitisliketobeyou.Ifthereweretwodistinctthingsitisliketobe

you,thentherewouldbetwoofyou,notone.24Itwouldalsobeoddtoconceiveof

twoperspectivessomehowbeingasingleperspective.Spatially,wethinkofa

perspectiveastheoutlookfromadimensionlesspointinspace,onethatisutterly

distinctfromtheperspectivesfromotherpoints.Tomoveperspectivetoadifferent

pointissimplytotaketheperspectiveoftheothersinglepoint.Andeventhe

binocularperspectiveweexperienceinnormalvisionisexperiencedasessentiallya

richer,congruent,singleperspective—aperspectivefromasinglepointinspace

somewherebetweenthetwoeyes—ratherthantwodiscreteperspectivesfromthe

twoindependentlocioftwoeyes.

Phenomenalunityinnowaylimitstherichnessofphenomenalexperience.The

distinctionbetweenthecontentofconsciousnessandthephenomenalityassuch

(2.5)ishelpfulhere.Althoughthecontentofoursynchronicexperienceisusually

multipleandvaried—withinsensorymodalities,acrossthem,andbeyond—

phenomenalityassuchdisplaysaremarkablyresilientsingularityofnature.Ifavour

anoexperientialpartsviewofconsciousnessunity(Brook&Raymont,2014;Lee,

2014;Raymont&Brook,2009)onwhichthepluralcontentsofasynchronic

phenomenalexperiencepopulateasolitaryunifiedphenomenalexperience(Tye,

24Thispointdoesnotrequirecommitmenttorealismabouttheself—onlytoan“experiencer”of

somekind—seefootnote23above.Nordoesthisimplyyouceasetobeyouwhenyouareina

dreamlesssleep.Ionlywishtomakethepointthatsofaraswecantell,phenomenalexperiencein

humanscannotbedividedinthewaythat,say,informationinacomputercan,orattentionina

humancan(onwhich,see8.3.2).

55

2003).Thisisincontrasttoanexperientialpartsviewwheremanydiscrete

synchronicexperiences(hearingBeethoven,tastingagrape)aresomehowglued

togetherintoasinglecompositeexperience.Bayne(2010)presentsasubtleand

fascinatingaccountthatcombinesholismandmereology.25Allofthedifferent

contentsofexperienceareunifiedandphenomenallyinterdependent26(Dainton,

2000,p.191)—thedifferentcontentsofasynchronicexperienceinfluenceeach

other’sphenomenalcharacter,asishighlightedinsomekindsofvisualillusion(B.L.

Anderson&Winawer,2005),butishappeningallthetimeinnormalcognition.This

phenomenalinterdependenceemphasisestheunityandindivisibilityofsynchronic

phenomenalexperience—thereisalwaysonlyeveronethingitisliketobeyouat

anymomentintime,albeitwithmultiplecontents.Bycontrast,thereisnosuch

simpleunitytobefoundinthephilosophicalzombie,inwhomthereisonly

multiplicityofinteractingyetdiscretecontent.

2.4.4 Temporality

Thelastfeatureisnotonethatarisesoutofthedifferencebetweentheconscious

personandthezombie,butoutofthethreefeaturesabove.Thekindofunified,

situatedfirst-personal,whatitislike-nessweexperience,asfaraswecantell,is

necessarilytemporal.Thereisasituatedperspectiveintimeaswellasinspace.

Experienceisexperiencethroughtime.Thereisnothingitisliketobeyouatjusta

dimensionlesspointintime.Norcanwecanimaginesuchconsciousnessinthe

absenceoftime.Theremaybesomeotherformofconsciousnessthatdoesnotneed

time,buttheconsciousnessweexperienceandknowseemstodependontime

passing.Ourcommonexperienceisnotconsciousnessofasingledimensionless

pointintime,butofaspeciouspresent(James,1890,p.609),aspanofafew

25IexplorehisaccountinmyMastersthesis(Kaldas,2015).26Comparetheideaofintegrativebinding(deVignemont,2014,p.130)

56

secondsaroundthatpointintime,27andtherearemanytemporalidiosyncrasiesto

ourongoingphenomenalexperience(Herzog,Kammer,&Scharnowski,2016).This

isnodoubtbecauseofthewaythatourbrainsmodelrealityforustoexperience,but

itremainstruethatwecannotimagineexperiencingrealityinanyotherway.

Indeed,timepopsupinallsortsofwaysinourexplorationofconsciousness.

Cognitiveprocesseshappenovertime,andthereareinterestingquestionstoask

abouthowphenomenalexperiencerelatestotheprocessesthatproduceitandits

contents.Whetherornotspecificcontentisbothattendedandconsciousrequiresus

toclarifywhetherthatcontentwasbothattendedandconsciousatthesametime,or

whetheritwas,say,firstattendedbutunconscious,andthenbecameconsciousbut

nolongerattended(theTimingQuestion,1.4.6).And,whenweidentified

consciousnessasbeingunitary,wehadtospeakaboutconsciousnessatamomentin

time.Whetherconsciousnessisunitaryovertimeisanotherquestionentirely.Ifitis,

thenitseemsplausiblethatitisunifiedinadifferentwaytosynchronic

consciousness.Myexperiencerightnowandmyexperiencetomorrowatmiddaydo

notseemconnectedinthesamewaythatmyexperienceofthetasteofagrapeand

thesoundofaBeethovensonataatthesamemomentintimeareconnected.Butthis

tooisanissuetooinvolvedtodoanyjusticetoithere.Formypresentpurposes,itis

synchronicphenomenalunitythatisthefeatureofinterestinidentifying

consciousness.

2.4.5 UsingtheFeaturesofConsciousness

Allfourofthesefeaturesmustbepresenttoconfirmthepresenceofconsciousness.

Theabsenceofevenoneofthefourisenoughtodiscountthepresenceof

consciousness.Temporality,ofcourse,isafeatureofallphysicalreality,andcan

27SeeAppendix1,SynchronicvDiachronicformoreonthedurationofthespeciouspresent.

57

thereforeoccurwithouttheotherthree.Butitseemsunlikelythatanyofthefirst

threecanoccurinisolationfromtheothers.

Whatitislike-nessis,Ibelieve,uniquetoconsciousnessandnecessaryfor

consciousness.Itisthesinequanonfeature,anaprioridefiningfeature,muchas

beingunmarriedisadefiningfeatureofbachelorhood.28Therestarenotapriori

features,butaposteriorifeatures.Perhapstheworldmighthavebeensuchthatthey

werenotdefiningfeaturesofconsciousness,butinourreality,theyseemalwaysto

characteriseconsciousness,anditisverydifficultindeedtoconceiveofconscious

experiencewithoutthem.Allthesefeatureshavebeenchallenged.Theleast

controversialisthefirstone,whatitislike-ness,whichhasbeenthecommonest

wayofdescribingconsciousnessinrecentdecades.Iwillnotenterintothe

controversiessurroundingthesefeatureshere,butIaskthereadertograntthat

theseareplausible,perhapsevensomewhatlikelyfeaturesofconsciousnessforthe

sakeofbeingabletoidentifythepresenceorabsenceofconsciousnessaswepursue

ourquesttoanswerQ.

2.5 TheContent-PhenomenalityDistinction

Thereisonemoredistinctiontobedrawnthatisimmenselyrelevanttomy

arguments:thatbetweenthecontentofconsciousexperience,andthe

phenomenalityassuchofconsciousexperience.29Contentiscomprisedofthe

objects—inthewidestsense—ofphenomenalexperience.Perceptionsofthesmell,

shape,andfeelofanappleareallconsciouscontent,asareimaginedwhiteunicorns,

arithmeticalsums,ideasforanovel,andfeelingsofsadness.Contentcanofcourse

28BachelorsofArtsnotwithstanding,ofcourse.29Thisdistinctionisfoundforexample,Tye(2003)andBayne(2005,2010).

58

beeitherphenomenalornot,butwhereitisphenomenal,Igenerallyusetheterm,

“phenomenalcontent.”Iusetheterm“content”toavoidgettingintodebatesover

thenatureoftheinformationincognition.Myargumenthereisneutralwithregard

towhetherconsciouscontentisrepresentationalornot,perceptualornot,etc.

Ontheotherhand,phenomenalityassuch(hereafter,just“phenomenality”)—the

phenomenalnatureofexperienceinitself—isconceptuallydistinctfromtheobjects

orcontentofthatexperience.Phenomenalityischieflycapturedbytheideasofwhat

itislike-nessandasituatedfirst-personperspective,andismuchharderto

characterisethancontent.Itisnotitselfcontent—notitselfanobjectof

experience—butexperienceitself,subjectivityitself.

“theonenecessaryconstituentofconsciousnessthatcanneverbe

anobjectofconsciousnessisthatveryvantagepointitself,namely,

theoriginofthecoordinatesystemofthesimulationspace.It

cannotbeanobjectofconsciousnessanymorethananeyecansee

itself”(Merker,2007,p.72).

Contentandphenomenalityhavedifferentattributes.Forexample,Bayneetal.,

(2016)pointoutthat“tobeconsciousofmoreisnottobemoreconscious”(p.407).

Anindividualsubjectmaybeconsciousofmoreorlesscontent,andasubjectmaybe

moreorlessphysiologicallyconscious,butitdoesnotseemthatagivenadultsubject

canbemoreorlessphenomenallyconsciousfromtimetotime(paceLycan(1996)

andDennett(1995),althoughIreturntothistopicin8.6.3).

Ileaveopenthepossibilitythatacrossspeciesorevenacrossindividualsofthesame

species,phenomenalitymayadmitofdegrees,orbecontinuousratherthan

discontinuous,touseVelmans’(2012)term.Organismsotherthanhuman—say

dogsorearlyhominids—maypossiblybelessphenomenallyconscious(Bering&

Bjorklund,2007;Corballis,2007;Polger,2017).Advancedaliensorpost-human

speciesmaybemorephenomenallyconscious.Itmayevenbethatindividual

59

humansarecomparativelymoreorlessphenomenallyconsciouscomparedtoeach

other,butthisseemssomethingwecanneverreallyknow—itisavariationonthe

ProblemofOtherMinds.Aninfantmaybelessphenomenallyconsciousthanan

adult(Trevarthen&Reddy,2017;Zelazo,Gao,&Todd,2007),butitseems

impossibleinourcurrentstateofknowledgetodeterminethiswithanycertainty.

Anotherinterestingcaseisthepossibilityof“hyperconsciousness”duetodrug

effectsormeditation,sometimesdescribedintermsthatmightsuggestincreased

phenomenalitycomparedtothesubject’sexperiencebeforeandafterthespecial

state.Butthereissomereasontothinkthisisanincreaseintheclarityorvividness

oftheexperience,whichisstrictlyadifferenceinthecharacterofthecontentrather

thanthephenomenalityassuch(Droege,2009,p.83fn.18).Later,Iconsidercertain

aspectsofclarityandvividness(3.3.3.3),meditative(6.3.3.5)anddrug-induced

states(6.3.6.1),andthepossibilityofaphenomenalstatewithoutanycontent

whatsoever(6.3.3).

2.6 ChapterSummary

Whiletheconceptofconsciousnesshasalongandpromiscuoushistory,Iamhere

mostinterestedinphenomenalconsciousness,characterisedandidentifiedbyfour

inherentfeatures:whatitislike-ness;asituatedfirst-personperspective;

phenomenalunity;andtemporality.Afurtherdistinctionbetweenthecontentof

consciousnessandphenomenalityassuchwillproveimportanttothearguments

thatfollow.HavingestablishedwhatImeanby“consciousness”inthistreatise,I

turnnowto“attention.”

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3 TheManyFacesofAttention

3.1 ABriefHistoryofAttention

Theconceptofattentionhasjustaslongahistoryasthatofconsciousness.Itis

recognisableintheancientStoicconceptofπροσοχή(prosochē)—thecontinuous

stateofbeingattentivetoone’spresentself,tothesensations,thoughts,andactions

thatmouldandshapeone’smoralcharacter,andisessentialtomakingprogresson

thepathtoeudaimonia(thegoodlife),andultimately,tobecomingaStoicsage

(Fisher,n.d.).IntheEast,wefindthattheancientBuddhistconceptof“manasikāra

liesattheoriginofallexperiencedphenomena;sincephenomenaarisewiththe

risingofattention”(Analayo,2012,p.196),highlightingtheintimateconnection

betweenattentionandconsciousnessthatpersuadedmanythinkersthroughhistory

tillthepresenttoholdthetwoinseparable.Buddhistconceptsofattentionmayhave

beenthefirstrecordedinstanceoftheconceptbeingcharacterisedusingtheideaof

bottleneckincognition(Adamson&Ganeri,2017),acharacterisationthatplayeda

centralroleinthetwentiethcentury.Theconceptsofmindfulness,thefocusingof

one’sattentionupontheexperienceofthepresentmoment,andnepsis(νῆψις),

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whichconnotesbothakindofvigilanceoverone’ssenses,thoughts,andactionsare

alsofoundinancientChristianmysticaltraditions(Morelli,n.d.).Interestinthe

conceptcontinuedthroughmedievalandEarlyModernperiodstothepresent.30

Iftheconceptofconsciousnesshasbeendifficulttodefine,sohasthatofattention,

albeitfordifferentreasons.Whereasconsciousnessisontologicallyineffable(orat

least,elusive),attentionisdefinitionallypromiscuous—thetermhasbeenusedin

vastvarietyofways,asweshallshortlysee.Thispromiscuitythreatensanyattempt

toanswerQ,sinceanyanswerwilldependonidentifyingthepresenceorabsenceof

attention.Howcanwedothisifwedon’tknowwhatcharacterisesattention?Inthis

section,Ihopetobringsufficientordertothechaostomakeitpossibletoidentify

attentionininterestingandusefulways,thusallowingforausefuldiscussionofQin

PartII.WhileImostlyfocusonvisualattention,muchofwhatissaidcan,Ithink,

safelybegeneralisedtoothermodalitiesandcognitivefunctions.

3.1.1 ChapterOutline

Inthischapter,Iaddresssomeimportantpreliminaryissues,brieflysurveyingsome

ofthedefinitionalapproachesothershavetaken,describingsomeusefuldistinctions

betweenkindsofattention,andhighlightingsomeofthedifficultiesonefacesin

findingadefinitionofattention.Ithenuseexamplesfromtheliteratureonattention

todevelopmyowndescriptivetaxonomyofdefinitionsofattention,categoriesof

whichcutacrossthedistinctionsearlierdescribed.Finally,Idescribeaparticular

approachtodefiningattention,uponwhichtheargumentsinPartIIarebased.

30Forthehistoryofattention,seeStyles(1997,Chapter2)andMole(2013).

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3.2 PreliminariestoDefiningAttention

“No-oneknowswhatattentionis.”

~whatWilliamJamesshouldhavewritten.31

Itakeitasobviousthatifthetermsandconceptsunderinvestigationinanyfieldof

researcharenotcommontoallresearchers,itwillbeveryeasyforthemtobeat

cross-purposesinwaysthathindertheprogressofthatproject.Thisisparticularly

evidentinthestudyoftherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness,andis

aconcernexpressedbymanyofitsleadingexponents.Hereareafewrecent

examples:

“itisnecessaryheretodefinethetwokeyconcepts(attentionand

consciousness),asthesetermshavebeenusedinsomanydifferent

waysintheliterature”(Iwasaki,1993,p.213).

“Althoughoftenusedineverydayspeechandinthescholarly

literature,‘selectiveattention’and‘consciousness’lackclear

definitions.Partlybecauseofthisdeficitthereexistsalivelydebate

ontherelationshipbetweenthetwo”(vanBoxtel,Tsuchiya,&

Koch,2010,p.1).

31Whatheactuallywrote,andwhatmostauthorsquote,is“Everyoneknowswhatattentionis”

(James,1890),reflectingMunsell’s(1873,p.11)lesspithybutearlierstatement:“Onattentionitself,

itisneedlesstodiscourseatlength;itsnatureandconditionsarefamiliartoeverythoughtful

student.”

64

“preciseoperationaldefinitionsarelikelytobenecessaryinorder

tounderstandtherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousness”(DeBrigard,2010,p.200).

“Onethingthatisclearisthatprogressinthisdebateseems

unlikelyifwedonotpaymoreattentiontothedefinitionsofkey

termsinvolved”(J.H.Taylor,2013a,p.192).

WilliamJames’confidencethatweallknowwhatattentioniswouldseemmisplaced,

atleastforcognitivescientistsandphilosophers.“Althoughweallknowwhatitfeels

liketopayattention,theconceptisnotoriouslydifficulttodefine”(Rosenberg,Finn,

Scheinost,Constable,&Chun,2017,p.290).Folkpsychologicalintuitionsmaybeall

verywellingeneraldiscourse,butwhenwecometoaddressaquestionlikeQ,it

quicklybecomesevidentthatweneedwelldelineated,workabledefinitionsofthe

conceptsunderinvestigation.

3.2.1 OtherDefinitionalApproaches

Attemptstosolvethisdefinitionalproblemhavetakenvariouspaths.Fewtoday

thinkofattentionasadiscretesystemwithdiscreteneuralrealisers,asis,say,the

visualsystem.Anysatisfyingdefinitionofattentionwillhavetoencompassits

pervasivenessacrossallmodalitiesofperception,thought,andaction.32

AdverbialapproachescanbetracedbackatleastasfarasLocke(Mole,2013,sec.

1.3),whocountedattentionamongother“modesofthinking”,suchasreverie,

32Watzl(2011b)discussesanumberofreductiveandanti-reductiveapproachestocapturingthe

natureofattention.

65

intention,andstudy.Indeed,manyapproachestoattentionseeitasmetacognitive

(Baars,1988,pp.302–303)—awayofthinking,ratherthanthinkingitself.Mole’s

CognitiveUnisonmodelofattentionisexplicitlyadverbial:“Whatisessentialtoan

adverbialphenomenonisnotwhathappenstowhatbuthowthethingsthathappen

happen”(Mole,2011b,p.70).

Definingattentionasanadverbatbesttellsusonlythebroadontologicalcategoryto

whichitbelongs,butitdoesnotyettellushowtoidentifyattentioninthefield.That

willrequirealotmorework.Twobroadapproachescommendthemselves.De

Brigard&Prinz(2010)contrastthecommonsenseapproachtothestipulative

approach.

Thecommonsenseapproachisbasedontheideathatwejustknowattentionwhen

weseeit.WilliamJamesfamouslywrote,“Everyoneknowswhatattentionis”back

inthenineteenthcentury,althoughithasbeensuggestedwithgoodreasonthathe

mighthavehadhistongueinhischeekwhenhewroteit(Hardcastle,1997;Mole,

2011b,p.60).Inthetwenty-firstcentury,“Theconcept[ofattention]isstill

introducedatpresent-dayconferenceswithintrospectiveexamplesfromeveryday

lifethatshowattentionatworkwhenlookingforafriend’sfaceinacrowd,orwhen

searchingforaparticularpenonacluttereddesk”(Ruff,2011,p.1).ForPrinz

(2011,p.183),attentionisa“naturalkindterm…notsomethingthathasanessence

thatcanbediscoveredbyconceptualanalysis”.Hedefinesattentionbyexamplesof

whenittakesplace:searchandpop-out;monitoring;tracking,vigilance;selection;

andsurvey.Hegoesontosay,“Idon’tthinkanyofthesephenomenaconstitutea

definitionofattention.Rathertheyareallcasesinwhichwesaythatattentionis

takingplace.”Thus,wesomehowjust“know”attentionwhenweseeit,andsimilarly

knowhowtorecogniseitsabsence.

ButasDeBrigardandPrinz(2010,p.51)rightlypointout,oneoftheproblemswith

acommonsenseapproachisthatitisveryhardtopindown.Folkpsychologyis

fraughtwithdiversityandimprecision.Arecentdebateconcernssleepingmothers

whowakeupwhentheyheartheirbabiescry.Doesthisconstituteattentionleading

toconsciousness,orconsciousnessleadingtoattention?Thisisanotherexampleof

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howtwoperfectlyreasonableyetcontradictorycommonsenseanswerscanbe

supported(DeBrigard,2010;DeBrigard&Prinz,2010;Mole,2008a).Whatismore,

DeBrigard’s(2010,pp.195–199)analysisofhowonemightjudgeaparticular

cognitiveprocessasbeingattentionornothighlightstheinfluenceothersituational

factorscanhaveonone’sconclusions,muchasourjudgementsofwhetherornotthe

colourofadressisbluedependsheavilyonhowitcontrastswithothernearby

colourstowhichwemightcompareit.

Ontheotherhand,astipulativeapproachisonewherewemerelycreateartificial

bordersthatconstrainwhichcognitiveprocessesshallbestipulatedtobedenoted

bytheterm,“attention.”Butthisapproachtoohasitsproblems.Noteveryoneagrees

wherethejointslie.Creatingartificialbordersrunstheriskofbeggingthequestion

oftherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness:ifonebeginsbystipulating

thatattentionisdirectedallandonlytothatofwhichasubjectisconscious,thenitis

unsurprising(anduninteresting)thatonecanthenconcludethatattentionisboth

necessaryandsufficientforconsciousness.AsDeBrigardandPrinzpointout,one

oughttobewareof“idiosyncraticdefinitionsthatsettlecrucialquestionsbyfiat

ratherthanfacilitatingtheprocessofscientificinvestigationanddiscovery”(p.

52).33

Anotherapproachistoembracethediversityofwaysthetermattentionhasbeen

usedandacceptthat“Thevastliteratureonattentionmakesitclearthatitisnota

unitaryprocess”(Mack&Rock,1998,p.25).34Attentioncanbetakentobean

umbrellaterm:anoverarchingconceptthatencompassesabroadvarietyofother

concepts.Thisisanideathathasbeenaroundforsometime:

33Barrett(2014)andTaylor(2013a)arguethatDeBrigardandPrinzthemselvesultimatelyfallinto

thistrap,despiteexpressinganawarenessofthedanger.34SeealsoAllport:“Evenabriefsurveyoftheheterogeneityandfunctionalseparabilityofdifferent

componentsofspatialandnonspatialattentionalcontrolpromptstheconclusionthat,quacausal

mechanism,therecanbenosuchthingasattention.Thereisnooneuniformcomputationalfunction,

ormentaloperation(ingeneralnoonecausalmechanism)towhichallso-calledattentional

phenomenacanbeattributed”(Allport,1993,p.203,italicsintheoriginal).

67

“Noragain,Ishouldadd,isthereanyonespecialactivityatall,but

variousactivities,iftheyleadtooneresult,arecalledattending”

(Bradley,1886,p.305).

Butthenatureofthisumbrellaisnotsoclear.Howarethedifferentusesoftheterm

attentionrelatedtooneanother?Aretheysomethingliketheelephantoffable?

“thefieldandliteraturelackacommonlanguagetocommunicate

andconnecttheirworkwitheachother.Drawinganalogywith

anotherfolkstory,toabandonthetermattentionwouldcauseall

blindmenorwomentofeeldifferentpartsoftheelephant,not

realizingthattheyaretouchingthesameanimal”(Chun,Golomb,&

Turk-Browne,2011,p.91).

Itwouldthereforebehelpfultohaveaprincipledwaytoclassifyallthedifferent

itemsundertheumbrellaand—moreappositelytoQ—todistinguishbetween

attentionandtheabsenceofattention.

3.2.2 MyApproach

Whileadefinitionoughtideallytocapturetheessenceofthethingitdefines,

ultimately,itisatoolintendedforacertainpurpose.Differentapproachesto

definingaconceptmaybettersuitdifferentpurposes.Purposeisnotthesolearbiter

ofthevalidityofadefinition,ofcourse.Stipulationcanbetakentoofar.Butnature

rarelyimposesextremelynarrowrestrictionsonhowitallowsitselftobecarvedup.

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“Scientifictermsarenotgiveninnature.Theyareworkedout,oftenover

generationsofdatacollectionanddebate”(Baars,1997b,p.363).InthissectionI

takeneitheracommonsensenorastipulativeapproach,butadescriptiveapproach,

identifyingandcategorisingsomeofthemostinterestingandcommonphenomena

thathavebeenallocatedundertheumbrellaof“attention”intheliterature.35From

this,Iextractwhatitistheyhaveincommontodevelopanapproachtotheconcept

ofattentionthatIhopewillbeusefulnotonlyinthistreatise,butperhapsforother

researchersaswell.

Thisdescriptiveapproachdoesnotrequiremetoendorseanyofthedefinitionsas

definitive.Itiscloselyrelatedtotheapproachbiologiststaketogroupingand

taxonomizinglivingcreatures.Likebiologicaltaxonomies,myattentionaltaxonomy

isnotsetinstone,butliabletoimprovement;anditisnottheonlywaytocarveup

attention,althoughIbelieveitisthemosthelpfulwayforaddressingquestionslike

Q.Butfirst,someimportantdistinctionsanddifficulties.

3.2.3 SomeDistinctions

Anumberofdistinctionshavebeendrawnamongdifferenttypesorvarietiesof

attention.ThesedistinctionscutacrossthecategoriesIdevelopbelowinmy

taxonomyofattention(3.3),butitwillbeusefultodescribethembrieflyherefirst

(Table1).AmoredetailedaccountofthesedistinctionsmaybefoundinAppendix1,

35ItakemyinspirationfromSamuelJohnson(1709-1784),whosepioneeringworkcapturedthe

contemporaneoususeoflanguageineighteenthcenturyEnglandintheremarkablyinfluentialA

DictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage(1755).Hismethodconsistedchieflyofgatheringexamplesofthe

manydifferentusagesofawordfromexistingliteratureonslipsofpaperandcollatingthem.Icannot

claimtomatcheitherhispatienceorthebreadthofhisreading(andcertainlynothiswit),butthen

again,mysubject—attention—isjustoneentryinadictionary.

69

includingsomediscussionofsomeofthemorecontroversialaspectsofthese

distinctions.36

ThesedistinctionsariseregularlyintheliteratureonattentionandQ,andaclear

ideaofthemwillprovehelpfulinnavigatingtheargumentsinPartII.Butthe

distinctionsdonotconstituteadefinitionoraprincipledwayofidentifyingthe

presenceorabsenceofattention.BeforeIattempttoprovidejustthat,Ibriefly

considersomeofthedifficultiesthathavehithertoafflictedotherswhohavealso

madetheattempt.

Table1.Asummaryofsomeimportantdistinctionsamongkindsofattention.

Whereisattention

focused?

InternalAttention

Attentiontointernalstates

ExternalAttention

Attentiontotheexternal

world

Howisattention

recruited?

Endogenous/

Top-DownAttention

Attentionisdirectedbythe

subject

Exogenous/

Bottom-UpAttention

Attentionisdrawnby

externalstimuli

Isvolitioninvolved? VoluntaryAttention

Ichoosetoattend

InvoluntaryAttention

Myattentionisdrawn

withoutmychoice

Aretheredegreesof

attention?

FocalAttention

The“centreofattention”

BackgroundAttention

Partialattentiontothe

peripheryofwhatis

attended

36Forabrieferandslightlydifferentlistofdistinctions,seeWatzl(2011b,p.846).

70

Whatisbeing

attended?

SpatialAttention

Attentiontoaregionor

locusin(forexample)a

visualfield

ObjectAttention

Attentiontoacomposite

objectasawhole

FeatureAttention

Attentiontospecificfeatures

ofanobject,ratherthanthe

objectasawhole

Howisattention

relatedtotime?

SynchronicAttention

Attentionatamomentin

time

DiachronicAttention

Attentionoverorthrough

time

Atwhatlevelisthe

attention?

Personal-LevelAttention

Thesubjectattends

Sub-Personal-Level

Attention

Somesubsystemor

cognitiveprocessattends

3.2.4 DifficultiesDefiningAttention

Definingatermthathasbeenemployedaspromiscuouslyas“attention”hasisa

difficulttask(Mole,2011b).ThreeissuesinparticulararerelevanttoQ,sobelowI

brieflydescribethem,inthehopethatIwilladequatelydealwiththeminmyown

treatmentofthequestion.Thethreeissuesare:“merelyverbaldisputes”;question

begging;andexplanatoryburden.Onewaytoaddresstheseissuesistodevelopa

taxonomyofattention,andIconcludethissectionwithareviewofthefewexisting

taxonomies,beforedevelopingmyowninthenextsection.

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“MerelyVerbalDisputes”

“iftherereallyistobeadefinitiveanswertothequestionof

whetherattentionisnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness,

thenobviouslywearenotfreetodefine‘attention’inanywaythat

wechoose.Ifwesimplyclaimthatthetheoristsinquestionarejust

workingwithdifferentconceptsofattention,andthatthisis

simplyalinguisticissue,thenwearedangerouslyclosetosaying

that‘really’thereisnoanswertothequestionofwhetherattention

isnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness,becausedifferent

theoristswilldeliverdifferentanswersdependingupontheir

definitionof‘attention’”(J.H.Taylor,2013a,pp.190–191).

ToavoidthetrapTaylorhighlights,37weneedaneffectivewaytoavoiddescending

intomerelyverbaldisputes(Chalmers,2011;Seager,2016,p.207).38Mysolutionis

todevelopadescriptivetaxonomyofhowattentionisemployedintheliterature,

acknowledgingthevalidityofthesedifferentsensesofattentionfordifferent

purposesandindifferentcontexts,thendistillingtheconceptsthattiethem

togethertogetattheessenceofattention.Thiscanbeseenasanapplicationof

Chalmers’(2011,p.526ff)methodofeliminationinthatIseekoutwhatexactly

peoplearedescribingwhentheyusetheterm“attention,”andbasemyarguments

onthat,diverseasitis.Outofthisapproachemergesaconceptattentionthatis

expedientforaddressingQininterestingandusefulways.

37SeealsoKentridge(2011,p.229)andSmithies(2011,p.247).38Aparallelproblemarisesinphenomenology(Kriegel,2007,pp.123–124).

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QuestionBegging

“Thetroubleisthatifonestartsoffwithadefinitionthat

determineswhattheevidenceissaying,findingoutwhatthe

relationbetweenconsciousnessandattentioniswillnolongerbe

anempiricalpuzzle.Andifonethinks,aswedo,thatthisisan

empiricalproblem,onehastobeverycarefulindefiningtheterms

insuchawaythatneitherofthemimpliesanalyticallytheother”

(DeBrigard&Prinz,2010,p.52).

ThereisaveryrealdangerinexploringQindefiningattentionaprioriinsuchaway

thatitisinseparablefromconsciousness,andtherebybeggingthequestionof

whethertheycancomeapart,andrenderingmootanyempiricalsearchforone

withouttheother.39ThisisafailingofPhenomenaldefinitionsofattention(3.3.3)

thathashistoricallyhamperedprogressonQ(oritsantecedents).Itakeitas

obviousthatattentionmustbeassumedtobeconceptuallyindependentof

consciousness,andtherelationshipbetweenthemtobeamatterforempirical

investigation(1.4.1).

ExplanatoryBurden

Ifwemanagetoavoidbothmerelyverbaldisputesandquestionbegging,wearestill

leftwiththeproblemofmakingsenseofallthosedifferentapproachestodefining

attention.Mole(2011b,p.61)arguesthatthedifficultiesinvolvedindefining

attentionmayderivefromthefactthatweareaskingasingletermtocoverfartoo

39SeealsoBarrett(2014,p.9,10),Mole(2008a,p.93).

73

manythings,muchlikeBilboBaggins’sadpredicament:“Ifeelthin,sortofstretched,

likebutterscrapedovertoomuchbread.”40

Molediscussesthreepossiblesolutionstothisexplanatoryoverburdeningproblem.41

First,wemightgiveupaltogetherontheideaofasingle,unitaryprocesscalled

“attention”andinsteadadoptapiecemealsolution,breakingdownattentioninto

manyrelatedyetdiscreteprocesses.Butthisfailstorespectthecommonalitythat

bindstogetherallthosethingswecallattention.Second,wemightadoptan

eliminativistsolution,andsimplydenythatthereissuchathingasattention.The

folkpsychologicalviewissimplymistaken,andthereisnocausalmechanismto

whichtheterm“attention”refers,andthereforeitisfruitlesstotrytoidentify,much

lessunderstandit.Butthistooisunsatisfactory.Notonlydoes“attention”playa

valuableroleindailylife,itisbothahighlyusefulconstructforempiricalresearch

(andhasbeenthesubjectofmuchresearch),andaveryplausible,indeed,integral

partofgoodpsychologicalmodelsofcognition.Recognisingthatitisnotasimple

unitarything,butacomplexmishmashofsub-thingsinnowaydiminishesthe

usefulnessoftheumbrellaterm“attention.”Third,onemighttakeasomethingelse

approach—ifattentionisnotacausalmechanisminthebrain,thenperhapsitis

somethingelse.Mole’sownadverbialapproachmightbeanexampleofthissolution.

TheNeedforaTaxonomyofAttention

MydescriptiveapproachbelowbuildsuponsomeofthelessonsfromMole.To

identifythepresenceorabsenceofattention,weneednotknowwhatattentionis.It

isenoughto—aswithconsciousness—beabletorecogniseitsfeatures.Butthe

diversityofways“attention”hasbeenusedmakesthistaskfraught.Thelistof

40J.R.R.Tolkien,TheFellowshipoftheRing.SeealsoWatzl(2011b,sec.5).41SeealsoFazekasandNanay’s(2018)discussionofandsolutiontothe“disunityproblem,”Henry

Taylor’s(2018)argumentforfavouringpluralismovermonism,andGaneri’s(2017,p.222)

argumentforfavouringa“varietiesofattention”accountover“attentionessentialism.”

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featuresthatidentifyattentionisgoingtobemuchlonger,andfarmorecomplex

thanthatforconsciousness.Yetsuchataxonomyofattentionwouldbeinvaluablein

resolvingtheexplanatoryburdenproblemthatarisesfromdefinitionaldiversityand

dissolvingtheapparentdisconnectionbetweenthemonisticaccountsofattentionof

thephilosophersandpluralisticaccountsofattentionofthepsychologists(H.

Taylor,2018).Doesanysuchtaxonomyexist?

“Althoughthediversityofattentionisrecognized,itisalsotrue

thatnocompletelysatisfactorytaxonomyofattentionhasbeenput

forward”(Parasuraman,1998,p.5).

“Atfirst,attentionwasassumedtobeaunitaryphenomenon.

Morerecentlyresearchershaveincreasinglycommentedonthe

absenceofaconvincingtaxonomyofattention(orevenauseful

definition)andtheheterogeneityofexperimentalfindings,

suggestingseveraldifferentattentionalmechanisms”(Rees,1999).

Therearenotmanyattemptsattheexplicittaxonomisationofattentioninthe

literature.Treisman(1969)describesfourkindsofattentionalstrategy:restriction

ofthenumberofinputs;restrictionofdimensionsanalysed;lookingorlisteningfor

specificitems;andselectionofoutputsforactionandstorageinmemory.My

taxonomybelowisasignificantexpansiononTreisman’s.Anotablerecent

taxonomyisthatofRensink(2015),whoadoptsamoredisciplinedapproachtothe

questionoftaxonomisingattention,andproposessomeguidelinesfortheproject

(pp.349-350).Inbrief,histaxonomyusesfunction,perceptualeffects,and

mechanismtocategorisevarietiesofattention.Onthisbasis,heproposesasimple

taxonomy,involvinganinitialdivisionofattentionintotwofunctions,witheachof

thesesubsumingsomesub-functions:orientationsubsumingsamplingandfiltering;

andintegrationsubsumingbinding,holding,andindividuating.Mytaxonomyleaves

outbindingandholdingforreasonsIdiscussbelow(3.4.2),butincludesamuch

broaderrangeoffunctionsandsomenon-functionalapproaches.

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Rensink’staxonomyhasanumberofvaluablefeatures.First,itconnectssub-

functionsofattentiontotheirexperimentalorempiricalperceptualeffects.For

example,attentionalblinkandchangeblindnesscanbestbeexplainedasfeaturesof

howattentionalholdingworks(p.357).Second,itattemptstomakesome

connections(“dependencies”)betweenthesub-functionsofattention(p.360),a

complexprojectIwillnotattemptherewithmybroadertaxonomy.Rensink’s

taxonomyofvisualattentionisoneofthefewintheliterature.Othersaremore

specialised,suchasReganetal’s(2011)taxonomyofDriverDistractionand

Inattention,whichcutsacrossmanyofthecategoriesinRensink’s

taxonomy.Arvidson(2003)providesa“lexicon”thattranslatescognitivescience

conceptsrelatedtoattentionintophenomenologicallanguage,therebycovering

someoftheterritoryIcoverbelow,andelsewhereinthisthesis.

Noneofthesetaxonomiesiscomprehensiveenoughtoprovideasolidbasisforthe

identificationofattentionrelevanttoQ,andindeed,nonewasdesignedspecifically

forthatpurpose.Well,weshallhavetoinventone.

3.3 ATaxonomyofAttention

“Itiscertainlyprematuretoclaimthatneuroscientistshave

understoodallpropertiesofneural,cognitiveandsensory

processingthatdefineaninstanceofattention.Butitappearsthat

decadesofintensiveresearchhaveresultedinabodyofworkthat

mayallowustoformallydefineattentionfromamechanistic

neuralperspective.Suchdevelopmentsareencouraging,andmay

ultimatelyhelpustounderstandwhichsubdefinitionsofthe

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conceptofattentionmaybejustifiedbybiologicalreality.Timewill

tellwhethersuchnotionswillventureoutsideofneuroscience,to

complementclassicintrospectivedefinitionsofattentionbasedon

verbaldescriptionsandmentalstates”(Ruff,2011,p.18).

InthissectionIsurveytheliteraturetobuildadetailedtaxonomyofdefinitionsof

attention,whichservesasthebasisformyownapproachtoidentifyingattentionin

amannercapableofprovidinginterestingandusefulanswerstoQ.

AsRuffobserves,attentionisnotasingle,monolithicmechanismorprocess.Any

accountofattentionwillhavetodojusticetoallits“subdefinitions,”asan

incompletetaxonomyofattentioncastsdoubtontheidentificationofthepresence

orabsenceofattention.Myapproach,then,istoseek“unityindiversity.”Iembrace

therichvarietyofextantdefinitionsofattentionandthendistiltheessenceofwhat

tiesthemtogether(3.4.1).Thesedefinitionsarenotlimitedtoanyonesensory

modality,oreventoperceptionitself,butmayapplyacrossallcognition.

AlthoughIattemptacomprehensivetaxonomy,Imakenoguaranteesofsucceeding

perfectlyinsaidattempt.Theliteratureonattentionishuge,andIhavenotbeen

abletoexhaustit.42Further,manyoftheentriesoverlapconceptually,andsomeof

themcouldplausiblybecategorisedunderadifferentheading.Forthesereasons,

mytaxonomyisliabletorevisionandimprovement.Norismytaxonomicstructure

theonlyonepossible.43

42Seealsothebrief“list”ofwaysofdefiningattentioninMole(2011b,pp.62–63)andthetaxonomy

ofChunetal.,(2011).43Anothertaxonomicdistinctionthatmightbemadeistodividedefinitionsofattentionaccordingto

whethertheyareatthelevelofthewholeperson,orofparticularcognitiveprocesses,oratthe

neurallevel.Somedefinitionsdescribewhatisthoughttoconstituteattention,whereasothers

describeoperationalfeatures.Yetanotherdistinctionmightdelineatewhichofthesensesisinvolved.

Orattentiveprocessesmightbecategorisedaccordingtothelevelofprocessingatwhichthey

occur—e.g.,atthelevelofindividualvisualcharacteristicslikeedges,oratthelevelofboundvisual

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IpresenttheTaxonomyintableformfirst(3.3.1,Table2)togivethereaderan

overview,andthenproceedtoassembleitfromtheliterature.Tohelpillustrateeach

entry,Iusetheexampleoftheinvisiblegorilla.Inthefamousinattentionalblindness

experimentofSimonsandChabris(1999),subjectswatchavideoofbasketball

playerspassingtheballtoeachother,andareaskedtocountthepasses.Many

subjectsdonotnoticethatamaninagorillasuitwalkedrightthroughthemiddleof

thescenewhiletheywerecounting.

3.3.1 ADefinitionalTaxonomyofAttention

Table2belowsummarisesthetaxonomyofdefinitionalapproachestoattentionthat

Ihavedevelopedabove.However,itshouldbenotedthatwhileatableisthe

simplestformat,itislessthanideal,forthereisagreatdealofsimilarity,connection,

andoverlapbetweenmanyoftheapproaches.

Table2.Adefinitionaltaxonomyofattention.

1. Behaviourist2. Phenomenal

A. ChiefTenancyofConsciousness

B. Confidence

C. ClarityandVividness

D. Salience

objects,etc.AlltheseothertaxonomicdistinctionscutacrosstheparticularcategoriesIhavechosen

here.

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E. Fixedness

F. Directedness

3. MechanisticA. Parts

I. AnatomicalRegions

II. Connectomes

B. Operations

I. Access

a. SimpleAccess(butnotaccessibility)

b. Abundance/

c. Increase/Amplification

d. Maintenance

e. Influence/effects

II. DetectionandRecognition

a. Orienting

b. VigilanceorMonitoring

c. ScanningorSearching

d. Expectation

e. Alerting

f. Tracking

III. Selection

a. Filtering

b. Gateway

c. Spotlight

d. ZoomIn/Out

e. Exclusion/Suppression/Absorption/Dedication/

AbsenceofDistraction.

f. Competition

g. SelectionforAction

IV. Control

V. Coherence

C. Organisation

I. Cyclicpathways

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II. Feedbackloops

III. Contextualinterconnection

3.3.2 BehaviouristDefinitions

Behaviourismis,roughly,thepositivistviewthatwecanreallyonlyknowabout

observedbehaviours,butwecanhavenousefulaccesstowhatisgoingoninsidethe

headtoproducethosebehaviours.Today,philosophicalBehaviourismhasfallen

somewhatoutoffavour,buttherehavebeenauthorswhoformulatedadefinitionof

attentioninBehaviouristterms.Forexample,inthenineteenthcentury(beforethe

adventoftheBehaviouristmovement)TheoduleRibotconsideredtheoutward

marksofattentiontobe“thenecessaryconditions,theconstituentelements,the

indispensablefactorsofattention”(Ribot,1890,p.19).44

Thisintuitionisastrongoneandthereissomethingtobesaidfortheimportanceof

theconsequencesofattentionasbeingpartofthatwhichdefinesit.Inpractice,that

isthemostcommonwaywerecogniseattentioninothers,andoccasionally,evenin

ourselves.Taketheinvisiblegorillaexample.Weidentifytheabsenceofattentionin

thetestsubjectsbythefactthattheyareunabletoverballyreportthepresenceof

thegorilla,andperhapsbyobservingthattheireyestrackthepassesbutneverturn

tothegorilla—allofwhicharebehaviouralmarkers.

So,adistinctionbetweenbehaviouralmarkersordefinitionalcharacteristicsof

attention,andBehaviouristdefinitionsofattentionisoneworthmaking.Whilethe

excessesoftheBehaviouristapproachseemunnecessary,forallthereasonsthat

Behaviourismhaslostfavour,thebehaviouralapproachcontinuestoplayan

44Seealsoadiscussionofhisview,andcomparisonwiththoseofAlexanderBain,inMole(2013,sec.

1.5).

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importantroleinattentionresearch,aswhen,forexample,attentionisdefinedas

occurringjustwhenasubjectmeetscertainexperimentalcriteria,orpassesa

certainthresholdonanexperimentalscaleofattention.Butweshallseein7.4that

thisapproachhassomeseriouslimitations.Thus,whileformulatingQin

Behaviouristtermsisunfruitful,respectingthebehaviouraldimensionofQis

inevitableanduseful,solongasduecareistaken.

3.3.3 PhenomenalDefinitions

Behaviourismleavesoutsomethingimportant.Oftenwhenweattend,thereis

somethingitisliketoattend.Butisattentionalwaysphenomenal?Onsome

definitions,itis.WhatIamcallingPhenomenaldefinitionsofattentionarethose

approachesthatincludeaphenomenalaspectofattentionasasinequanonfeature

ofattention:thereisalwayssomethingthatitisliketoattend.Intermsof

phenomenalexperience,PhenomenalAttentionistheantithesisofBehaviourist

Attention—itgroundsattentioninthephenomenalitythatBehaviourismdismisses.

ThechiefproblemwithPhenomenalAttention,ofcourse,isthatitdefinesthe

answertoQapriori,ratherthanallowingQtobeanopenempiricalquestion.If

consciousnessliesattheheartofattention,thenitisnecessaryforattention.

Whetheritissufficientwilldependonwhatonethinksoftheconsciouscontent

outsidethefocusofattention—whetheritisunattended,ormerelypoorlyattended.

IhavegroupedPhenomenaldefinitionsinsixsub-categories:chieftenancyof

consciousness;confidence;clarityandvividness;salience;fixedness;anddirectedness.45

45ForasummaryofsomeofthesesubcategoriesofPhenomenalAttention,includingcitationsto

EarlyModernandModernexamples,seeWatzl(2011b,p.843).

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“ChiefTenancyofConsciousness”

Thatwhichisattendedisjustthatofwhichwearemostconscious.Thus,the

subjectscannotreportthepresenceofthegorillabecauseitsimagenever

dominatedtheirphenomenalcontent,andtheycanonlyreportthatwhichdoesso

dominate.

“Take,forinstance,B.F.Bradley’soldview.Hestartsoffsayingthat

peoplehavetakenattentiontobe‘predominancein

consciousness’,andhecitesJ.S.Millinsupport:‘Theexpression

[attention]meansthatasensationtendsmoreorlessstronglyto

excludefromconsciousnessallothersensations’.Thus,

accordingly,Bradleydecidestocallattention‘astatewhichimplies

dominationorchieftenancyofconsciousness’(Bradley,1886,p.

306).46Inlightofthisdefinition,then,attentioninvolvesthe

activityofconsciousness;indeed,itimpliesthattherecannotbe

attentionwithoutconsciousness,i.e.,thatconsciousnessis

necessaryforattention”(DeBrigard&Prinz,2010,p.52).

Theprominenceofsomeobjectofattentionoverallotherpossibleobjectsof

attentionwithinthesubject’scognitiveeconomy,andtheexclusionofotherpossible

objects,arefeaturesthatbelongtonon-phenomenaldefinitionsbelow(3.3.4.2.3).

However,thedefiningcharacteristicofthisapproachisthatitemphasisesthe

phenomenalaspectoftheseintrinsicallynon-phenomenalactivities—thereis

somethingitisliketoperformthem.Thisapproachbearssomeinteresting

similaritiestocontemporaryaccountsthatdefineattentionasphysiological

consciousnessor“maintaininganalertstate”(e.g.,Posner,1994,p.7398).The

46DeBrigardandPrinzcitethismistakenlyas“(1886,22)”.Ihavecorrectedthepagenumber.

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interestingfeatureofthisdefinitionalapproachforourpresentpurposesistheway

itdescribesattentionasapropertyofconsciousness,thusdeterminingthe

relationshipbetweenthetwobyanactofdefinition.

Confidence

Thedefinitionofattentionasconfidencecanbetracedbackatleastasfaras

Descartes:

“Solongasweattendtoatruthwhichweperceiveveryclearly,we

cannotdoubtit.Butwhen,asoftenhappens,wearenotattending

toanytruthinthisway,theneventhoughwerememberthatwe

havepreviouslyperceivedmanythingsclearly,neverthelessthere

willbenothingwhichwemaynotjustlydoubtsolongaswedonot

knowthatwhateverweclearlyperceiveistrue”(Descartes,1988,

p.309).

Whateverweexperiencewithoutattendingisrelativelyvagueandunsure.47Paying

attentiontoathingbringsagreaterdegreeofcertaintytotheexperienceofthat

thing,andthisisreflectedasthephenomenalsenseofconfidence.Moleconcludes

thatforDescartes,“themovefromradicaldoubttocertaintyaboutthetruthof

particularclearanddistinctideas—is,therefore,atransitionthatismediatedby

attention”(Mole,2013,sec.1.1).

Thesubjectsintheinvisiblegorillaexperimentdidnotreportthegorillabecause

theyfailedtoattendtoitinawaythatwouldhavegiventhemaconfidenceaboutits

47ThispointbecomesveryimportantinChapters7and8.

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passingthroughthescene.Interestingly,Simon&Chabris(1999)triedtoteaseouta

reportofthegorillafromsubjectsusingnotonequestion,butaseriesoffour,

graduallymoreexplicitquestions,startingwith“didyounoticeanythingunusual?”

andendingwith“didyouseeagorillawalkacrossthescreen?”(p.1068).Yetonly

oneoutofnearlytwohundredsubjectsshowedanykindofwaveringthroughthis

seriesofquestions.Thatis,nearlyallthesubjectswerequiteconfidentintheir

answers,whetheryesorno,regardlessofthesuggestivelineofquestioning.Onthis

definitionofattention,thisconfidencetracksperfectlywherethesubjects’attention

wasdirected,whethertothegorilla,ornot.Ontheotherhand,Matthewsetal.,

(2018,p.5)foundthatsubjectiveconfidenceratingstrackobjectiveaccuracyrather

thanattention.

ClarityandVividness

Whileconfidenceisaboutapropositionalcertaintythatsomethingisthusandnot

otherwise,thereisacloselyrelatedPhenomenaldefinitionofattentionthatdefines

itasaperceptualclarityorvividness.48Inpractice,itishardtoimaginevividlyseeing

abrightredroseandnotbeingconfidentthatyouseeit,butthetwocancomeapart

atleastconceptually.Withoutdoubt,attentionusuallyenhancesclarityand

vividness.ThevagueandshadowyfigureImighthavefeltflittingaroundmyvisual

fieldbecomesaclearandvivid(ifsomewhatunconvincing)gorillathemomentI

turnmyattentionuponit.EvenifIlookuponavisualscenethroughtheout-of-focus

lensofacamera,IcanexperiencetheverylackofproperfocusclearlyandvividlyifI

attendtoit.49

48Thisdistinctionbetweenreflectiveandpropositionalconfidenceontheonehandandperceptual

clarityandvividnessontheotherplaysanimportantrolein7.2.1.3.49Foranargumentagainstthesuggestionthatvividnesscanvaryindependentofcontent,see

Bourget(2017).

84

Thisideaofattentionasclarityseemstohaveattractedinterestintheearly

twentiethcentury,50buthasfallenlargelyoutoffavourinmoderntimes.Treisman

(1964,p.12)lamentsthattheideaofattentionas“theincreasedclearnessofa

particularidea”hasproventobesterileinpsychologicalresearch,andWatzl

(2011a,pp.151–152)arguesagainsttheverysimilarperceptual“determinacy

view.”Buttheideahascontinuedtoplayaroleinatleastsomeresearch.For

example,BaddeleyandAndrade(2000)showedthatselectivelytaxingtheworking

memoryofasensorymodalityattenuatedthe“phenomenologicalvividness”of

perceptionsinthatmodality.AndSchlagbaueretal.,(2018)foundthatcontextual

cueing—awaytodrawasubject’sattentiontotheconfigurationofvisualdisplay

elements—enhancesthe“clarity”(p.2)ofthesubjectiveexperienceofboththe

targetobjectandthesurroundingvisualconfiguration.

However,thereissomereasontodoubtthatattentionaloneisthesoledeterminant

ofphenomenalclarityandvividness.Forexample,Wasselletal.,(2015)foundthat

higherblood(andsalivary)progesteroneconcentrationcorrelateswithan

enhancementofthevividnessofvoluntaryvisualmentalimagery,whichisperhaps

inkeepingwithotherresearchthatsuggeststhatfemalestendtohavemorevivid

imagerythanmales(Campos&Pérez,1988).However,themechanismofthe

enhancementhasyettobeelucidated.Thepossibilityremainsthatelevatedlevelsof

progesteronemightexerttheirenhancingeffectuponvividnessviaenhancing

attention,asadrenaline(epinephrine)mostlikelydoesinaclassicfightorflight

response.

50Stazicker(2011a,p.172footnote12)describesLeibniz’sideasofclarityandvividnessinrelation

toattentionandconsciousness.Philips(2011a,p.221,note4)observesthatdiscussionsofattention

as“clearness”maybefoundinauthorssuchasTitchener,Woodward,andGillandDallenbachinthe

earlytwentiethcentury.AmodernrevivaloftheideaisJennings(2012).

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Salience

Saliencehasbeendescribedasan“attendtome”signal(Sawaki&Luck,2010).

Potentialtargetsofattentionaremoresalientjustinsofarastheyaremorelikelyto

drawattention.Salienceisgenerallycharacterisedasbottom-upattention—features

that“standout”aremoresalient.Butinfact,itislikelytobeacomplexinterplay

betweenbottom-upstandingoutandtop-downcontext-sensitivebiasing(Egeth,

Leonard,&Leber,2010,p.130).51Whereasagorillainabasketballgamewould

normallybehighlysalient,thetop-downattentiontofollowingthebasketball

overpowersthisbottom-upsignal.AsaPhenomenaldefinitionofattention,the

salienceisaboutthatphenomenalsenseofurgencyorimportancethat—whether

bottom-uportop-down—drawsattentiontoatarget.Inthepositivesymptomsof

schizophrenia,thissenseectopicallyresultsfromunimportantstimuli(Fletcher&

Frith,2009).

Ruff(2011,p.5)observesthatsalienceisreadilycapableofbeingcharacterisedin

thenon-phenomenaltermsofneuralprocessingpatterns:abottom-upeffectofone

ormorestimulievokingastrongerneuralresponsethanotherstimulicompetingfor

limitedneuralresponseresources(compareSelection,3.3.4.2.3).Indeed,muchof

theattentiveprocessingofsalienceoccurssubconsciously,anditispossiblefor

unconsciousobjects—maskednudes,forexample—toattractattention-as-salience

(Jiang,Costello,Fang,Huang,&He,2006).Thisintuitionisfurthersupportedby

worksuchasthatofvanSwinderen(2005,p.324)whichsuggeststhatsalience

mechanismsmightoperateinproducingattentioninfruit-flies,whosecapacityfor

phenomenalconsciousnessremainsanopenquestion(Barron&Klein,2016;Key,

Arlinghaus,&Browman,2016;Tiffin,2016).

51Foradiscussionofthedifferentrolesplayedbysalienceandattentioninthisdanceinthecontext

ofmakingmoraldecisions,seeChappellandYetter-Chappell(2016,p.454).Foradiscussionofthe

neurallevelatwhichsalienceoperatesinthemechanismofattention,seeFellrathandPtak(2015)

andParkhurstetal.,(2002),andforapredictivecodingaccount,seeClark(2016,pp.28,66–69).

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Fixedness

Fixednessistheexperienceofbeingrestrictedtoanarrowtrainofcontentsuchthat

oneisunabletoescapethattrainandenterintoothertrains.Thesubjects’taskof

countingthepassesfixestheirattentionnarrowlyontheballandtheplayers,

excludinginterpretationsofthescenethatincludeanectopicgorilla.Baars(1988,

pp.143–145)developsthisviewofattentionbyconsideringasentencelikethe

following:

“Theshipsailedpasttheharboursank.”

Mostreaderswillinitiallyhavetroublemakingsenseofthissentence,untilthey

realiseitmaybereadas,“theship—whichwassailedpasttheharbourby

someone—sank.”Beforethisrealisation,thereader’sinterpretationofthesentence

isfixedbytheassumptionthatthemostobvioussubjectoftheverb“sailed”isthe

ship,ratherthanthepeoplesailingtheship.Liketop-downimperativesinsalience,

contextisanimportantdimensionoffixednesshereforBaars.Attention-as-

fixednessishavingourexperiencetrappedbypowerfulhierarchiesofcontextina

particularwayofexperiencingtotheexclusionofotherpossiblewaysof

experiencing.Thus,fixednessisaninherentlyphenomenalformofattention.For

example,“inabsorbedstatesofmind—inreadinganengrossingnovelorwatching

anentrancingmotionpicture—wearedeafandblindtotheworld”(p.145).52

52Jennings(2015,pp.288–289)discussesaninterestingdevelopmentofthisapproachinwhichshe

speaksof“focuswithouttheaidofattention”.

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Directedness

RelatedtoBaars’fixedness,theideaofintentionality(Menary,2009)hasalsobeen

conscriptedtothetaskofdefiningattention.Here,oneattendstoathingjustwhen

onedirectstheirthoughtstothatthing.Forexample,understandingawordmightbe

thoughtintuitivelytoimplybothattendingtothatwordandbeingconsciousofthe

wordanditsmeaning.Thesubjects’attention(andthereforethecontentoftheir

consciousness)isconstitutedbytheirdirectingtheirthoughttowardsthe

movementofthebasketball,butnevertothegorilla.Onceagain,attentionand

consciousnessaretiedtogetherbydefinition.Forexample,inapapersuggestively

titled“Attention:TheMechanismsofConsciousness,”Posner(1994,pp.7400–7402)

discussesattentionas“attendingtoideas.”Somemorerecentaccountsthatmightfit

plausiblyunderthissubcategoryareSmithies’(2011)rational-accessviewand

Koralus’(2014)erotetic(question-related)theoryofattention.

PhenomenalDefinitionsofattentionsatisfythepowerfulintuitionthatthereisa

closeconnectionbetweenattentionandconsciousness,buttheyfallintothetrapof

assumingapriorithattheyareinextricablefromeachother,atrapbestavoidedin

thequesttoanswerQ(3.2.4.2).Thethirdclassofdefinitionsavoidsthattrap.

3.3.4 MechanisticDefinitions

IfBehaviourismdefinesattentionsolelybyitsoutwardmarkers,amore

contemporarilypopularapproachistodefineattentionbyitsinternalmarkers—

patternsofbrainactivity.UsingBechtel’s(2008,pp.13–17)modelofmental

mechanisms,myMechanisticdefinitionsidentifyattentionbythepartsinthebrain

thatsubserveit,theoperationsthosepartsperform,orthewaysthatthosepartsand

operationsareorganised.

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Parts

Attentionmightbedefinedasactivityinthebrainstructuresthatsubserveit.But

thereareatleasttwowaystodelineatetheseparts:anatomicalregionsand

connectomes.53

3.3.4.1.1 AnatomicalRegions

Therehasbeensomeprogressmadeonidentifyingbrainregionsthatareinvolved

inspecifictypesofattention.Forexample,thefronto-parietalregionshavebeen

implicatedonfMRIstudieswithtop-downvisual,auditory,andtactileattention

signals,whilebottom-upattentionseemstobesubservedbylocalisedmodality-

specificregions,suchasV1forvisualsaliency(Kanwisher&Wojciulik,2000).But

fewhavebeentemptedtouseanatomicallocalisationasanidentifierofattention—

e.g.,“ifthereisnounusualfronto-parietalactivity,thesubjectisnotattending.”

Attentionisnotlocalisedinthebrain:“Scientificresearchsuggeststhattheclassof

suchsubpersonalattentionalprocessesislarge,highlydiverse,andnotwell

localizedinthebrain”(Watzl,2011a,p.163).

Thereisgoodreasontothinkthatthevastmajorityofcognitiveprocessesare

relatedtobrainareasinamany:manyrelation(M.L.Anderson,2010;M.L.

Anderson,Kinnison,&Pessoa,2013)—eachfunctionrequiringmanyareas,andeach

areasubservingmanyfunctions.Attentioninvolvesmanybrainregionsand

overlapswiththefootprintofmanyotherprocesses(M.L.Andersonetal.,2013;

Naghavi&Nyberg,2005;Rosenbergetal.,2017).Whatismore,verysimilaractsof

attention,suchastaskswitching,mayinvolveverydifferentpartsofthebrain

53Muchlesslikelywaysarebytypeofneurone,orbypredominantneurotransmitter(e.g.,Schmitz&

Duncan,2018).

89

(Wager,Jonides,Smith,&Nichols,2005).Givenallthis,ananatomically

circumscribedlocalised“attentioncentre”ishighlyimplausible.54

3.3.4.1.2 Connectomes

Analternativetothisanatomicalregionapproachmightbeanetworkapproachthat

carvesupthebrainaccordingtoconnectomesofneuronesthatcommunicateheavily

witheachother,eventhoughtheyaredistributedthroughoutmanyanatomical

regionsofthebrain.MogensenandOvergaard’s(2018)Reorganizationof

ElementaryFunctions(REF)frameworkisapromisingaccountthatrespectsthe

many:manyrelationshipandaccountsforbothfunctionallocalisationandthe

apparentlycontradictorycapacityofbrainsforrecoveringabilitiesaftertraumaby

conscriptingcompletelydifferentanatomicalandneuralstructurestoperformthe

lostfunctions.Thus,therearebothanatomicallylocalisedfunctionalunits—

“elementaryfunctions”—andlong-rangeconnectionsbetweentheseunits.Suchan

accountismorefelicitousgiventhatattentionofsomekindlikelypermeatesmost

cognitiveprocesses(3.4.4).

Anatomicalaccountsofattentionarerelativelyeasytoprobewithlesionstudies,

sincelesionsinthebraintendtobeanatomicallylocalised.Butconnectomessnaking

throughlargeswathesofthebrainarevirtuallyimpossibletolesioninisolation

fromtheirsurroundingneurones,evenifwecouldidentifytheminasubjectinvivo.

Noraretheylesioneddiscretelybydiseaseorinjury.Andwhilewehaveimaging

toolsofreasonablesensitivitytoexploretheactivityofanatomicalregions—fMRI

forexample—welacksatisfactorytoolsforselectivelymeasuringconnectome

activityinvivo.EEG(Eimer,2015)andMEG(Baillet,2017)cangivesome

54NaghaviandNyberg(2005)reviewanumberofempiricalstudiesthatfoundcorrelationsbetween

specificbrainregionsandspecifickindsofattention.Theyalsofoundthatthereareareasofthe

fronto-parietalregionsthatseemincreasetheiractivityduringallfourofattention,consciousvisual

perception,workingmemory,andepisodicmemoryretrieval.Thesignificanceofsuchfindings

continuestobedebated.

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information,butitisoffrustratinglylowresolution.Whatismore,thereremain

seriousproblemswithinterpretingscans(Carp,2012)andexplanatorilybridging

neuralactivitywithcognitivefunctionsgenerally(Fine,2010,pp.281–282;

Naselarisetal.,2018,p.3).

So,definingattentionbythepartsofthebraininvolvedseemsunlikelytotakeus

veryfar,notonlybecauseattentionissowidespreadinbrainactivity,butalso

becauseofourinvestigativelimitations.Ifthepartsapproachisasyetunsatisfying,

consideringbrainoperationsismorepromising.

Operations

“Incognitivescience,attentionisusuallydefinedintermsofits

functionalrole,ratherthanitsphenomenology”(Smithies,2011,p.

250).

Theoperationsofthebraincanprofitablybeviewedasfunctionalroles.55The

challengehereistodistilthosefunctionalrolesthatarespecificallybestconsidered

asattention,ratherthansomethingelse(onwhich,see3.4.2).

3.3.4.2.1 Access

Attentionmaybedefinedassimpleaccesstodataorcontent,orvariationsthereof

(abundance,increase,amplification,maintenance,influence,effects),butnot,Iargue,

mereaccessibility.Ontheviewthatattentionisjustsimpleaccess,whateverisbeing

55Forasimilar,thoughlessdetailedorstructuredlist,seeGaneri(2017,p.224).

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processedisthereforebeingattended.Thisapproachsufferstheseriousdrawback

ofmakingattentionmerelysynonymouswithcognition,andthereforeasuperfluous

term,soitisnotsurprisingthatitfindsfewproponentsinmoderndiscourse.The

subjectsundeniablyhavesomesortofaccesstothegorilla—itsimagefallsuponthe

retinaandmustthereforeregisterintheearlieststagesofvisualprocessing—yet

theyclearlydonotattendtoitatall.

Amorepopularapproachisthatwhichemploystheconceptofarelativeabundance

orincreaseinsomecognitivequantity.Kanaietal.,(2006,pp.2334–2335)assume

thataneffectofspatialattentionistoincreasetheactivitygenerallyofthe

orientation-perceivingcircuitsrelatingtothatlocationinavisualfield.Abundanceis

theideathataprocessthatrecruitsmorecognitiveprocessingpowerisattended

whileonethatrecruitslessisnot.Perhapstheremaybeathreshold,56abovewhich

aprocessisdeemedtobeattended,oritmaybeagradedaffairofmoreorless

attention.

Increaseistheideathatattentionisjusttheactofaprocessrecruitingmore

cognitiveprocessingresources.Thus,thegorillaisnotattendedunlessitsretinal

imageintheearlystagesofvisualprocessingispassedontolaterstages,orpasses

beyondacertainstageofprocessing,orexceedssomethresholdofprocessing

resourceuse.Amplificationofinputsignals(Fazekas&Nanay,2018)isaneural

versionofincrease.

Thethingthatisinabundanceorthatisbeingincreasedneednotbejust

‘processing’generally,butmaybedefinedmorenarrowlyasacertainkindof

processing.Forexample,attentionmaybetheincreaseof“accesstoconscious

experience”(Baars,1988,p.302),ortoparticularcontentsofconsciousexperience.

Ortheincreasedaccessmaybetounconsciousdata,sincethequestionofthe

relationshiptophenomenalconsciousnessisleftopen.Attention-as-accessmakes

56SeeDehaeneetal.,(2006)forasimilarthresholdmodelrelatingtoconsciousnessratherthan

attention.

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attentionvirtuallysynonymouswithBlock’s(1995)“accessconsciousness”,which

canalsobeseparatedfrom“phenomenalconsciousness”(7.2.2).

Onewaytofacilitateincreasedaccessorprocessingisthemaintenanceofaccess

overperiodsoftime(Kane&Engle,2002).Maintenanceintheformofproviding

accesstocontentbystoringitinashort-termbufferplaysanimportantrolein

workingmemoryfunction(5.4.1),andisoneoftheputativemechanismsofthe

capacitylimitationsofworkingmemory(8.2.4).

Ofcourse,maintainedorincreasedaccessorcognitiveprocessingimpliesthatthe

outputsofattendedprocesseswillalsobemoreinfluentialorhaveagreatereffect

onthecognitiveeconomy.Thisideaisattheheartofbiasingaccountsofattention

(Desimone&Duncan,1995),andithasbeensuggestedthatattentioninfluencesthe

characterofperceptions(Carrasco&Barbot,2019;Carrasco,Ling,&Read,2004;

Ling,2012)andinteractivelyinfluencemotormovements(Moore,Armstrong,&

Fallah,2003).57

Thereisadistinctiontobedrawnbetweenactualaccessandmerelypotential

accessibility(availability).Somehavethoughtthatattentionmaybedefinedinterms

ofeither,orboth(Chalmers,1997;Dehaene,Changeux,Naccache,Sackur,&Sergent,

2006),58butIseeamajorproblemwithdefiningattentionasmereaccessibility.It

wouldmeanthateverydormant,potentiallyaccessible,yetactuallyunaccessed

traceinlong-termmemoryis“attended”merelybecauseitispotentiallyaccessible.

Thatseemstomakeattentionatrivialanduselessconcept,andbearslittlesimilarity

tohowattentionisusedintheliterature.

57Seealsoattention-as-selection-for-actionbelow(3.3.4.2.4).58Chalmersconsidersavailabilityasdefininga“modifiednotion”ofaccessconsciousness,whichI

argueisroughlyequivalenttoExecutiveAttention(3.4.4and7.2.2)—thekindofattentionthatisof

interestforQ.MogensenandOvergaard(2018)repeatedlyassumethatphenomenalconsciousnessis

“availability.”Seager(2016,pp.203–204)critiquesPrinz’sassertionthatconsciousnessis

accessibilitytoworkingmemoryusingthe“meddlerdevice”objection.

93

NeitherdoesBlock’s(2007)Aristoteliandistinctionbetween“actuallyaccessible”

and“potentiallyaccessible”solvethisproblem.Hisdistinctionpointsoutthatwhile

avastamountofcontentisalwayspotentiallyaccessiblebyattention,thecapacity

limitationsofattention(8.3)severelylimittheamountofcontentthatcanbe

actuallyaccessedatanygivenmoment.Butnoticeherethattheconceptdoingallthe

workofdefiningcontentasattended—thesubstantialdefiningfeature—isstillthe

actualaccess,nottheaccessibility.Letussaythereareathousandpotentially

accessibletracesinlong-termmemory,butonlyanyfiveofthemareactually

accessibleatanygivenmoment.Ifwedefine“attended”as“thosetracesthatare

actuallyaccessible,”howdowedeterminewhichtracesareattended?Byobserving

whichtraceshaveactuallybeenaccessed.Forthepurposesofdefining(oratleast

identifying)attention,“actuallyaccessible”playsexactlythesameroleas“actually

accessed,”evenifithasotherusefulrolestoplayinotherdiscourses.Thus,potential

accessibilityfailstodefineattention,andactualaccessibilityjustcollapsesinto

actualaccess.Accessibilitydoesnotdefine(oridentify)attention.

3.3.4.2.2 DetectionandRecognition

Anotherapproachfocusesontheideaofdetectionorrecognition.Attentionisthe

processof“detectingsignals59for(conscious)processing”(Posner&Petersen,1990,

p.26).Thisprocessofdetectioncanitselfbeacomplexone,andwecanidentifya

numberofpossiblestageswithinitinwhichattentionmaybeinvoked.These

include:orienting;vigilanceormonitoring;scanningorsearching;expectation;

alerting;andtracking.

Orientingistheactofrearrangingone’sphysicaldeportmentinspaceinorderto

betterreceiveinformationfromtheenvironment.Classicalexamplesofthisare

turningone’sheadtoseebetter,andrapidsaccadesoftheeyes.PetersenandPosner

(2012)considerorientingtobeoneofthreedefiningcharacteristicsofattention,

59Iimaginethesignalsmaybesensoryinputsorabstractthoughts,emotions,beliefs,etc.

94

togetherwithalertingandexecutivecontrol.ButPrinzconsidersorientationand

attentiontoplaytwodistinctroles:“Informally,orientingalterswhatinformation

getsin,andattentionalterswhereitflows”(Prinz,2011,pp.193–194).Nonetheless,

theactoforientingitself—whetherphysicallymovingbodypartsoreventhe

shiftingofthefocusofspatialattentionwhileremainingphysicallystill—doesseem

toconstituteanintegralpartofsomekindsofattention.Itisharderforthegorillato

remainunattendedifone’seyesorientandfixateuponit,andthelackoforientation

amongthesubjectsisareliableindicatoroftheabsenceofattentiontothegorilla.

Vigilanceormonitoringisnon-specificreceptivenesstoanynewincomingcontent

(contrastedwithsearchingforaspecificTarget,below).Thegorillawouldhavebeen

attendedbysubjectshadtheybeenaskedtosimplyreportwhattheysaw,rather

thancountthenumberofpasses.Thisstateofexpectancyhasbeencalledakindof

“preparatoryattention”(Zeman,2001,p.1274).

Thepasscountingtaskitselfwasanexampleofthemorenarrowlyspecified

scanningorsearching—thegoal-directedsearchforsomethinginparticular.Thisis

James’(1890,p.434)ideathatoneofthefunctionsofattentionistoholdinthe

mindanimageofthethingoneissearchingfor,sothatonecanidentifythatthingby

comparisontotheimage.

CloselyrelatedtomonitoringandscanningisClark’s(2016,p.62)conceptof

expectation,aparticularmodeofsearchingwherethesubjectiscuedtoexpecta

stimulusatacertainspatiallocation,andforwhichhepresentsapredictive

processingaccount.Thegorillaisnotattendedbecauseitisnotexpected.

TheactoffindingtheobjectofthesearchiswhatPetersenandPosner(2012)call

alerting—thesignalthatsomethinghasactuallybeendetectedorrecognised.This

alertingisabsentinthecaseofsubjectswhofailtoseethegorilla,andreliably

indicatestheabsenceofattentiontothegorilla.

95

TrackingiswhathappenswhenonehasfoundaTarget,andthenmaintainsfocuson

thatTargetoveraperiodoftime60.Thesubjectsidentifiedthebasketball,attended

toitduetoatop-downimperative,andmaintainedthatattentionastheballwas

passedfromplayertoplayer.O’ReganandNoë(2001,p.944)suggestthattrackinga

targetwhileotherwiseoccupiedisthesignatureofmovingfrominattentiontothat

target,toattention.In8.3.2Iconsiderdividedattentionintrackingmultiplemoving

objects.

3.3.4.2.3 Selection

Ourcognitiveeconomyisengulfedconstantlyinaragingfloodofinformation,

whetherfromoutside,viaperception,orfromwithin.Howcanitdealefficiently

withallthisinformationandtameitintoJames’efficientstreamofconsciousness?

Howcanitsifttherelevantfromtheirrelevant,andchoosetoactaccordingly?One

ofthemostprominentdefinitionalapproachestoattentionviewsitasbeing

primarilyselection,61aselectionthatallowsthemindtoefficientlymanagethis

constantfloodofinformation.Inthemidtwentiethcentury,thebottleneckmodelof

attentionenjoyedavogue,whereattentionwasseenasaunitarymechanismof

constrictionofprocessingcapacityatsomestageinthechainofcognitiveprocessing

(Broadbent,1958,1971;Mole,2013,sec.1.6;Smithies,2011,pp.250–251).Thisled

tothequestionofwhethersuchselectionoccursearlyorlateintheprocessingchain

(Pashler,1998,pp.13–19),whichinturnledAllporttochallengetheunitarynature

ofconsciousness.Morerecently,Baars(1997b,p.368)characterisesattentionas

selectionincontrasttoconsciousnessasexperience,whileCampbell(2011)

contrastsselectionwithaccess,andarguesthataconstitutiverelationshipbetween

attentionandconsciousnessmaybefoundinselection,butnotinaccess.Idescribea

varietyofwaysinwhichthegeneralideaofselectionhasbeenappliedtothe

60Foranevolutionaryaccountofthetoolshumansusetomaketheirtrackingmoreeffective,see

Menary(2018).61“Theselectivenatureofattentionhasperhapsbeenthemostwidelystudiedarea”(Rees,1999).

96

definitionofattention:filtering;metaphorsofthegateway,thespotlight,and

zoomingin/out;andtheideasofexclusion,competition,andselectionforaction.

Attheheartofthebottleneckmodelistheideaoffiltering(Broadbent,1958)—

reducingalargeandunrulyamountofinformationtoasmaller,moremanageable

amountthroughaprocessthatselectstheinformationthatismorelikelytobe

relevantandusefultothesubject’scurrentgoalsandneeds(thegorilla,being

irrelevanttothepresenttaskofcountingpasses,wasfilteredoutofthesubject’s

focus).Theframeprobleminartificialintelligence62canbeseenasbeingsolvedin

humancognitionthroughattention-as-filtering.Usingcontextfrompastexperience

andcurrentcontextualhintsfrompresentperception,attentionfiltersoutthe

relevantandusefulcontentforthefurtherprocessingthatwillproduceresultsthat

achievethesubject’sgoals.However,thenatureofthisfilteringiscomplex,asisits

relationshiptoconsciousness(Baars,1988,pp.34–36).

Attentionhasbeendefinedbywhatitselectsfor—themetaphorofagateway

leadingtosomethingelse(furtherdowntheprocessingchain).Examplesof

attention-as-gatewayincludethegatewayto:visualprocessing(Desimone&Moran,

1985):consciousness(Baars,1988,p.369;Crick&Koch,1990,p.269;Mack&Rock,

1998,p.25);andworkingmemory(Awh,Vogel,&Oh,2006,p.202;DeBrigard&

Prinz,2010,p.52).Ofcourse,thesegatewaysarenotmutuallyexclusive—asan

umbrellaterm,attentionmaybeatonceselectionforvisualprocessing,

consciousness,workingmemory,andanynumberofotherprocesses.

Spotlighttheoriesofattention(C.W.Eriksen&Hoffman,1972)emphasisetheidea

thatwhatdetermineswhetherornotattentionisbeingpaidtoastimulusisits

location(Mole,2013,sec.2.7).Whilespatiallocationdoesseemoftentobeamajor

62Theframeproblemfirstaroseasatechnicalprobleminartificialintelligence(McCarthy&Hayes,

1969)whereithaslargelybeenresolvedtoday.Roughly,itistheproblemabouthowtoknowwhat

tosiftoutfromthefloodofdataavailableinareal-worldenvironmentsothatonlywhatisrelevantto

thetaskathandisfocusedon.Itcontinuestobedebatedandexploredincognitivescience(Dennett,

2006;Shanahan,2016).

97

factorinhowattentionisdirected,therearegoodreasonsforholdingthatitis

certainlynottheonlyfactor.Forexample,onemightarguethatthegorilla

undoubtedlyenteredthespotlightofthesubjects’attention,aswhentheballpassed

directlyinfrontorbehindit,yetitstillfailedtobeattended.Purespotlighttheories

cannotaccountforpop-outinvisualsearchwherewhatbringsthestimulusto

attentionisitscontrastagainstabackground,notitsspatiallocation.Neithercan

spatialattentionexplainolfactoryattention,ormuchofauditoryattention,which

arenotspatialbynature.63

Themetaphorofaspotlightnaturallyraisesthequestionofthedimensionsofthat

spotlight.Hownarroworwideisitsbeam?Andisitpossibletovaryitsdimensions,

to“zoomin/out”asitwere(C.W.Eriksen&StJames,1986)?Thegorillaisnot

attendedbecausethespotlighthasbeenzoomedinverytightlyupontheball,sothat

infact,thegorillaneverisinthespotlight,oratleast,neveristhewholegorillain

thespotlightallatonce,andperhapsneverisitinthespotlightlongenough,to

createapowerfulenoughbottom-upsignaltodrawthesubjects’attentiontoit.

Selectioninvolvestheinclusionofsomecontent,whichthereforemeansthatother

contentisexcluded.Whenoneselectsthebasketball,oneisautomaticallythereby

notselecting(excluding)theitemsleftover,includingthegorilla.Thisapproachto

definingattentionmaybetracedbackatleasttoJSMill:“Theexpression[attention]

meansthatasensationtendsmoreorlessstronglytoexcludefromconsciousnessall

othersensations”(citedinDeBrigard&Prinz,2010,p.52)andTreisman(2003,p.

102)contraststhemetaphorofanactivelyexcludingattentionalwindowwiththatof

aninclusiveattentionalspotlight.Thus,exclusionmayoccurviasuppression.van

Swinderen(2005,pp.327–328)suggeststhatinbothsleepandalertattention(as

opposedtobeinginanalertyetinattentivestate),weraisethethresholdrequired

byperipheralinputstoenterintoconsciousness.

63Keller(2011)arguesthatthecurrentfocusonvisualattentionattheexpenseofothermodalities

risksobscuringimportantaspectsofattention.

98

Theintenseconcentrationontheattendedtargettotheexclusionofallothersignals

maybedescribedasabsorption(Tellegen&Waller,2008).Anextremecasemaybe

savantslikeKimPeek,whereasuppressionofdistractingstimuliseemsresponsible

fortheirsuperhumanpowers(Treffert&Christensen,2005).Relatedtoabsorption

arethetotaldedicationofavailableresourcestoataskattheexpenseofothertasks

(Mole,2011b,p.67)andtheideaofabsenceofdistraction(e.g.,Cowan&Morey,

2006;Engle,Kane,&Tuholski,1999,p.104).

Onewaythatselectionofcognitivecontentcanoccurisviaaprocessofcognitive

competition.Thus,inthecompetitionforcognitiveresources,thebasketballwins

handsdownoverthegorilla,duetothetop-downimperativetofocusoncounting

passes.Mole(2013,sec.2.6)considerscompetitionmodelstobethe“clearestnon-

bottleneckmechanismsforachievingselectivity,”anddiscussesthesub-varieties

andnuancesofcompetitionmodels.Oneofthemostinfluentialoftheseisbiased

competition(Desimone&Duncan,1995;Ruff,2011),whichintroducestheideathat

otherprocessesinthebrain,whethertop-down,bottom-up,orlateral,interactwith

theprocessofattentiontobiasitsselection“choices.”Somehowever,havesoughtto

distinguishcompetitionfromattention,arguingthat“attentiondoesn’treferto

competition,assuch,but,rathertoaprocessthatoccurswhenacompetitioniswon”

(Prinz,2011,p.183).

Finally,recognisingthatattentionisnotrestrictedtoperceptionistheideaof

attentionasselectionforaction(Allport,1987;W.Wu,2011,2016).64“Action”is

usedhereinthemoregeneralsensethatencompassespurelycognitiveactivity

(thinking,remembering,calculating)aswellasmotoractivity,whetherphysically

performedormerelymentallyrehearsedorintended,sothisdefinitionisclosely

relatedtoattention-as-influence(3.3.4.2.1).Subjectsselectivelyattendedonlyto

contentrelevanttotheactionofcountingpasses.Othershavealsoseenanintimate

connection,perhapsevenaunityofmechanism,betweenattention,working

memoryandmotoraction(Postle,2006;Theeuwes,Olivers,&Chizk,2005).

64ThiswasoneofTreisman’sattentionalstrategies(3.2.1).

99

3.3.4.2.4 Control

Humangoalstendtobecomplexandextendedovertime.Coordinatingthecognitive

processesrequiredtosustainthepursuitofsuchgoals65isthereforeacomplextask.

Whenthesubjectssetouttocountthenumberofpasses,onemightarguethatthey

couldnotachievethisgoalwithoutattention-as-control.Parasuraman(1998,pp.7–

8)pointsoutthatsuchmechanismsofattentionalcontroldoindeedfeatureheavily

inexecutiveandplanningcomponents(D.Norman&Shallice,1986)ofpopular

modelsofworkingmemory(Chapter5).Attentioncanthereforebethoughtofasthe

mechanismthatdirectsthecognitivetrafficinacognitiveeconomyinorderto

ensurethesmoothandmosteffectiveandefficientfunctioningofthateconomyinits

constantstrivingtofulfilthosecomplexgoals.

3.3.4.2.5 Coherence

Ifattentionservestomakecontentmoremanageable,oneofthewaysitmight

achievethisisbymakingitcoherent.Ontheseaccounts,attentionmaybedefinedby

itsfunctionalroleinseparatingoutandcoordinatingalimited,relevant,and

coherentbodyofinformationasthefoundationforfurtherprocessinginthingslike

reasoning,agency,andaction.Thesensorydatafromthebasketballpassesis

processedtoformacoherentstoryaboutthemovementoftheballfromplayerto

playerintheacceptedcontextofabasketballgame(ofsorts).Thetrespassinggorilla

isincoherent—difficulttoreconcilewiththiscontext,andsoisignored,i.e.,

unattended.Attention-as-coherencefeaturesintheFeatureIntegrationTheory

(Treisman,2003;Treisman&Gelade,1980),whereattentionhelpsbinddisparate

featuresintocoherentperceptualwholes.Inpredictivecodingmodels,attentionis

theprocessofoptimisingprecisionofsignals,akindofcoherence(Friston,2009;

65CompareGaneri’s(2017,p.225)conceptofintending,whichismorethePhenomenalstriving

towardsagoal.

100

Hohwy,2012).Mole’s(2011a,2011b)cognitiveunisonviewalsoplausiblyfalls

underthissubcategory.Inasimilarvein,Wyble(2015)creativelydescribesvisual

attentionasbeingnotsomuchafilteroranewspapereditor,pickingwhichstories

topublish,aslikeamovieeditor,arrangingscenesintoacoherentstory.

Organisation

ThefinalcategoryofBechtel’sframeworkfocusesnotonwhichpartsofthebrain

areinvolvedinattention,noronwhatthosepartsdo,butonhowthepartsare

organisedinrelationtoeachother.Inrelationtoattention,thisorganisationcanbe

examinedonmanylevels:therelationshipsofindividualneuronstoeachother;of

networksofneuronestoeachother,ofregionstoeachother,oroffunctionally

specificconnectomestoeachother.Alternatively,wecouldlookatorganisationat

Marr’s(1982)threelevelsofcomputationaltheory,representationandalgorithm,

andimplementation.Organisationisnotmerelyspatialbutalsotemporal.Ofcourse,

theseareallnotmutuallyexclusiveaccounts,butcomplementeachother.A

thoroughanalysisofattentionalorganisationisfarbeyondthescopeofthisthesis

andwillnotplayamajorroleinidentifyingthepresenceorabsenceofattention,66

sinceitisasdifficulttoidentifyinlivingsubjectsaspartsare(3.3.4.1),soIwill

contentmyselfwithsomebriefremarksrelevanttomyarguments.

Inwhatsensemightorganisationdefineattention?Bechtel’striadofparts,

operations,andorganisationaremeanttobeintimatelyconnected.Theoperations

thatdefineattention(3.3.4.2)willnotonlyrequiretherightpartsinthecognitive

system,butalsothatthosepartsbeorganisedincertainwaysthatallowforthose

operations.Inotherwords,theremaybecertainpatternsoforganisationthatare

infalliblycorrelatedwithattentionandmightthereforeservetoidentifyitspresence

orabsence.

66Itbearsonlyindirectlyonthediscussionofneuralsignaturesandno-reportparadigms(7.4.3).

101

Thereissomehopethatwemightonedaybeabletoidentifytheorganisationofthe

varioussubtypesofattention,andhowtheyrelatetoeachother,whetherneuronally

orfunctionally.Forexample,Rosenbergetal.,(2017,p.299,Box1),adoptingan

individualdifferencesapproach,foundthatsomeofthefunctionssubsumedunder

theumbrellaterm,“attention”varyamongindividualstogether,whereasothers

varyindependentlyofeachother.Thus,theabilitytosustainattentionoverlong

periodsoftimedoesnotnecessarilycovarywiththeabilitytomultitask.Soalso,

spatialorienting,attentionalcapture,andinhibitionofreturnseemtovary

independentlyofothersub-functions.Ontheotherhand,functionslikesearch,

tracking,andvisualshort-termmemoryallseemtovarytogetheracrossindividuals

andovertime,suggestingtheymaydependonsomekindofcommonattention

factor,atleastinpart.Thesepatternsofco-variancemightindicateunderlying

organisationalpatterns.

Itwillcomeasnosurprisethattheorganisationcharacteristicofattentionis

complex.AttentionalOperationsrequirecontenttorelatetoothercontent,and

processestoinfluenceotherprocesses.Weshouldexpectthem,therefore,tobe

characterisedbyorganisationalpatternssuchascyclicpathwaysandfeedbackloops

(Bechtel,2008,p.17).Whatismore,partsandoperationsinvolvedinattentionwill

beintimatelyentwined—richlycontextuallyinterconnected—withothercognitive

systems,contentfully,functionally,neuronally,andintermsoforganisation.Thishas

ledsometoidentifyorganisationalneuralstructuresthatallowforrecurrentneural

firingpatternswithattention(Ruff,2011,pp.8–9),althoughothershaveidentified

themwithconsciousness(Lamme,2010).

Thiskindofinterconnectionwillbesignificantwhenwecome,forexample,to

exploreattentioninthevisualsysteminChapter7orteaseaparticonicmemory

fromworkingmemoryinChapter8.However,whilehighlyinterconnected

organisationalpatternsmaycharacteriseattention,theyarealsonearlyubiquitous

throughoutallcognitiveprocesses,sotheywillhardlydotoidentifyattentionorthe

lackofit.Whetherthereareorganisationalpatternsthatareuniqueandspecificto

attentionremainstobeseen.

102

Insummary,then,BehaviouristandPhenomenaldefinitionsbothbegthequestion

ofQ,albeitindifferentways.AmongMechanisticdefinitions,definingattentionby

virtueofitsPartsorOrganisationisfraughtwithdifficulties.However,functionalor

Operationsdefinitionsofattentionaremuchbetterdevelopedandmuchmore

useful.ItisthereforetheOperationsdefinitionsofattentionuponwhichIchiefly

relyintheargumentsthatfollow.InthisIwillnotbealone,asithasbeenmy

observationthatmostdiscussionsofattentionandconsciousnessassume—

implicitlyorexplicitly—oneormoreOperationsdefinitionsofattention.

3.3.5 IsItReallyAttentionperse?

Itcouldbearguedthatsomeofthedefinitionsinmytaxonomymaybeprecursorsto

attention(e.g.,monitoring,vigilance,salience)orconsequencesofattention

(influence,alerting,control,coherence),butarenotrightlyclassifiedasattentionper

se.Therearetworesponsestothisobjection.

First,mypurposeherehasnotbeenontological,butpractical.Thepurposeofmy

taxonomyistoprovideafirmbasisforidentifyingthepresenceorabsenceof

attentionincognition.WhethertheOperationsdefinitionsareconstitutiveor

attentionormerelyinfalliblemarkersofattentionisimmaterialtothispurpose.Of

course,theinfallibilityiscrucial,butIbelievethereisawaytodealwithit(3.4.4).

Second,Ibelievethatthereisaunifyingprinciplethatplausiblycapturesandunifies

theOperationsdefinitionsofattentioninmytaxonomyessence.Thisprinciple

warrantstheinclusionofallthedefinitionsaboveinthetaxonomy,butalsoprovides

apracticalandeffectivebasisfordiscussionsofattentionlikeQ.Idevelopthis

argumentinthenextsection.

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3.4 MyApproachtoDefiningAttention

Thepurposeofthisconceptualanalysisofattentionistodevelopanapproachto

definingattentionthatisoptimalforaddressingQ.Onewayofdoingthatmightbeto

lookatallthedifferentvarietiesofOperationsaboveandaskwhatitisthatties

themtogether.Whyhavetheyfallenunderthe“umbrella”ofattention?What

qualifiesordisqualifiessomethingtobecalledattention?Inthissection,Ipropose

thatattentionisasuiteofstrategiesforstructuringcognition,andsuggestthe

essenceofattentionthattiesalltheOperationsdefinitionstogetheristhebroadidea

ofselectionforfurtherprocessing.Ithenprovidesomeexamplesofothercognitive

strategiesthatdonotfallunderthisumbrella.Ifurthersuggestprinciplesfor

maximisingtheutilityofmyapproach,andtothatend,drawafinaldistinction

betweenLiberalandExecutiveAttention.

3.4.1 TheEssenceofAttention

Whatkindofthingisattention?Ithasbeensuggestedthatattentionisasystem

(Posner,1994,p.7399);aprocess(Kentridge&Heywood,2001);andavariable

(Baars,1997b)oranadverb(Mole,2011a)ofcognitiveprocesses.Butthe

Operationsdefinitionsabovearebestcapturedbyanotherpossibility—attentionis

thestructuringofcognition(Watzl,2010,2011a).TheOperationsenumeratedabove

are,Isubmit,bestthoughtofasstrategies,indeed,asuiteofstrategiesforstructuring

cognition.A“strategy”accountavoidstheproblemsinherentinreductionist

accountsofattention(Watzl,2011b,pp.846–8).Itisthusintimatelyrelatedto

104

systemsandprocessesthatimplementthosestrategies,whichmaythereforebesaid

adverbiallytobeattentionaljustwhentheydo.67Theessenceofeachofthe

Operationsdefinitionsismetaphysicallybestdescribedasamultiplyrealisable

strategy(Bickle,2016)—evensecuritycamerassuitablyequippedwithservo

motorscanmonitor,orient,andtrack.Andtheapparentlackofan“attentioncentre”

inthebrainsuggeststhatattentionalstrategiesareimplementedthroughout

cognition(Watzl,2011b,p.847).

WhatisitthattiestheOperationaldefinitionsofattentionabovetogether,and

distinguishesthemfromothercognitivestrategies?Whatcapturestheessenceof

eachdefinition?Averygoodcandidateistheconceptofselectionforfurther

processing.68The“furtherprocessing”canbeanything:storage;motoraction;

binding;reporting;etc.ThismakesperfectsenseoftheSelectiondefinitions,butthe

otherOperationsdefinitionscapturenuancesoftheselectionforfurtherprocessing

thatoccursinhumancognition.Thus,withoutAccesstocontent,itcannotbefurther

processed,anditisjustthatcontentthatisaccessedthatisfurtherprocessed.

DetectingandRecognisingcontentissometimesthefirststepinthatselectionfor

furtherprocessing,withoutwhichitcouldnotproceed.Controlisnecessarytodirect

theselectionandfurtherprocessingtothedesiredgoal.AndCoherenceensure

efficientstructuringforfurtherprocessingthatfulfilsgoals.Operationalattentional

strategiesarethusintimatelyinterconnectedinaconstantdancewitheachother,

andwithperception,motivation,motorcommand,andconsciousness(Merker,

2007).TheworkingdefinitionofattentionthatIuseinthistreatiseisthus:asuiteof

strategiesforstructuringcognitionforfurtherprocessing.

67ThisiswhyIrejected“accessibility”asanattentionaldefinitionabove(3.3.4.2.1).Wecanapplythe

adverb“attended”iffoneoftheattentionstrategiesisactuallybeingimplemented,notifitisonly

potentiallyimplementable.68CompareJennings’(2012,p.536)Phenomenaldefinitionofattentionas“theactofmental

selection.”Heremphasisisonthesubjectivephenomenalactasopposedtoanobjectiveeventof

attention,bothofwhichIeschewinfavourofanobjectivestrategy.FazekasandNanay(2018)

proposeanalternativeunifyingprincipletoselection—amplification—whichIsubsumeundermy

Accesscategory,andwhichdoesnotcapturethemanyotherOperations.

105

3.4.2 Non-AttentionalStrategies

Thisunderstandingofattentionwillonlybeusefulthough,ifattentionisnotjusta

termforanykindofcognitivestructuringstrategyatall.Thereareotherstrategies

forstructuringcognitionthatarenotstrategiesforselectionforfurtherprocessing,

butareeitherpre-conditionsforattentionalstructuringorconstitutethefurther

processingitself.Forexample,storageisconceptuallydissectiblefromattention.

Thestrategyofencodingcontentinaretrievablewayrequiresselectionofthat

contentforencoding,butencodingisnotitselfselection.Theessenceofstorageis

thatideaoftemporalendurance,notselection.Inasimilarway,theessenceof

bindingisnotselection,butcombiningcontentinprincipledways.69Attention-as-

coherenceisastrategyimplementedtohelpachievethatbindinginusefulways,but

isconceptuallydissectiblefromthecombiningitself.Similardissectionscanbe

madeforotherstrategiessuchascalculation,retrieval,comparison,andmanymore.

3.4.3 Using“Attention”

Onthisaccount,attentionispresentwhenandwhereanyoneormoreofthe

Operationalattentionalstrategiesisbeingimplemented,anditisabsentwhennone

thosestrategiesisbeingimplemented.Thevariousdistinctionsabove(3.2.3)mean

thereisampleroomtomove,however.Forexample,theremaybespatialattention-

as-selectionintheabsenceofobjectattention-as-selection.Andifattentionis

selectionforfurtherprocessing,thereferencepointof“further”needstobe

identifiedbeforewecandeterminewhetherattentionispresentornot.For

69PaceTriesmanandGelade(1980).

106

example,whenIattendtobarelylegiblescriptonapieceofpaper,thereisa

particularimplementationofattentionthattransformsmyperceptionofthatscript

fromillegibletolegible.Thatisnottosayattentionwasnotimplementedinmy

perceptionofthescriptwhenitwasstillillegible,butthetwoattentionshave

differentreferencepointsbeyondwhichthe“further”of“selectionforfurther

processing”applies.

Ihavetakenadescriptiveapproachtoattention,butthereremainsaproscriptive

question:howshouldweusetheterm“attention?”Myapproachisinnowaymeant

tobeproscriptiveexceptinthebroadestterms.Itisperfectlyvalidtousejustoneor

afewOperationaldefinitions,foraparticularnarrowpurpose,solongasoneis

awarethatthatiswhatoneisdoing.Astudyonattention-as-trackingneednot

botherwithattention-as-competition,althoughinmostimplementationsof

attention,wedoindeedfindmanydefinitionsco-occurringandoverlapping.Human

beingstrackingmovingobjectsimplementnotonlytracking,butorientation,

selection-for-action,suppressionofotherstimuli,andsoon.However,whenit

comestobroaderquestionslikeQ,thewholesuiteofstrategiesisinplay,

particularlywhenwewanttoidentifyacompleteabsenceofattention.

3.4.4 LiberalandExecutiveAttention

Thevirtualubiquityofattentionalstrategiesincognition(Serences&Kastner,2014)

threatenstorendertheconceptimpotentwhenitcomestoQ.Ifcontentmustbe

attentionallyselectedinordertobeprocessed,andwebecomeconsciousonlyof

contentthathasinsomewaybeenprocessed,thensurelytherecanbeno

consciousnesswithoutattention.Anotherdistinctionsavesusfromthisdilemma.

Letuscallanyimplementationofattentionalstrategieswhatsoever—atanylevelof

cognitiveprocessing—aliberaldefinitionofattention,orLiberalAttentionforshort.

Andletusdistinguishthisfromattentionalstrategiesimplementedspecificallyby

thecognitiveexecutive(IfleshthisideaoutinChapter5whenIdiscussworking

107

memory)—ExecutiveAttention.70NowitisclearthatnotallattentionisExecutive

Attention.Attentioninthebrainstemsystemsthatmaintainthebody’shomeostasis

(bloodpressure,bodytemperature,etc.)iscertainlynotExecutiveAttention.Butthe

attentionimplementedtovisuallytrackbasketballpassesisExecutiveAttention.

NotethatthedefiningfeatureofExecutiveAttentionisthatitisimplementedbythe

executive.Assuch,itcancutacrossallthosedistinctionsdrawnin3.2.3.71

ThisdistinctionprovidesaprincipledwaytoposeQinasubstantiveandinteresting

manner:isExecutiveAttentionbothnecessaryandsufficientforphenomenal

consciousness?Iamawarethatthisisindeedwhatmostauthorsonthequestion

haveinmind,butoccasionallytherecanbesomeconfusionbetweenLiberaland

ExecutiveAttentionthatcanmuddythewaters,soitisworthmakingthisdistinction

clear.Whatismore,Iobservedabove(3.3.5)thatallthatisneededforthepurposes

ofQisfortheOperationaldefinitionstobeinfallibleindicatorsofattention.Solong

aswecanbesurethatanattentionalstrategyisbeingimplementedbythecognitive

executive,thatinfalliblyconstitutesExecutiveAttention,asIhavedefinedit.Andso

longaswecanbesurethattheexecutiveisnotimplementinganyoftheattentional

strategieswithregardtotheTargetinquestion,thatinfalliblyconstitutesan

absenceofExecutiveAttention.ExecutiveAttention—properlydefined—isthusa

potenttoolforexploringQ.

70NotethatthisisnotthePersonal/SubpersonalattentiondistinctionIdiscussedabove.That

distinctionwasaboutreducingPersonallevelattentiontoSubpersonal.Here,ExecutiveAttentionis

implementedbythecoordinatingsystemofcognition,whichmayreceivecontentproducedbyother

specialisedsystemsimplementingLiberalattention,butisdistinctfromthem.Myconceptof

ExecutiveAttentionisalsobroaderthanthatKaneandEngle’s(2002,p.638)conceptof“executive

attention,”whichcapturesonlysomeofthestrategiesinmyTaxonomy.71MyapproachalsomeetsJHTaylor’s(2015a,pp.40–41)twocriteriafordefiningattention.Itis

extensionallyadequateinthatitallowsforvaryingdegreesof“leniency”indefiningattention,

dependingontheneedsofthetaskathand.Itisnon-circularinthatitisbasedonadescriptive

approachratherthanastipulativeapproach.

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3.5 ChapterSummary

Afterbrieflysummarisingsomepertinentdistinctionsanddifficultiesindefining

whatattentionis,Iadoptedadescriptiveapproachandsurveyedtheliteratureto

developataxonomyofwaysattentionhasbeendefinedthatwillinformthe

discussionstofollow.FromtheOperationsclassofthistaxonomyIdistilleda

workingdefinitionofattentionasasuiteofstrategiesforstructuringcognitionthat

haveincommontheconceptofselectionforfurtherprocessing.Thepresenceofany

oneormoreofthesestrategiesisthecriterionbywhichwemaydeterminethat

attentionispresent,andtheabsenceofthemallidentifiestheabsenceofattention.

Finally,IarguedthatinaddressingQ,LiberalAttentionisuninteresting,sinceitis

ubiquitousincognition.Thereallyinterestingquestionistherelationshipbetween

ExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousness.Iturntothenatureofthat

relationshipinthenextchapter.

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4 Relationships

4.1 Introduction

Therearetwobigissuesthathavemuddiedthewaterssomewhatinthediscourse

overQ.Definitionalclarityofthetermsinvolvedisone,whichIaddressedin

Chapters2and3.Theotherisincomplete,imprecise,orsuboptimalframeworksfor

analysingthepossiblerelationshipsbetweenattentionandconsciousness.Itisoften

difficulttoascertainwhatexactlyanauthor’spositionisonQ,ortorelatethat

positiontothoseofothers.Inthischapter,Iattempttomakesomeprogressin

bringingclaritytothisarea.IdevelopaframeworkforaddressingQthatcannot

onlyrelatethemanydifferentapproachestakenbydiverseauthorstoeachother,

butperhapsevenbeappliedtoquestionsotherthanQ,andevenbeyondcognitive

science.Whilethischapterrepresentspartofmyliteraturereview,italsoaimsto

makeanoriginalcontributiontostudyofrelationshipsbetweenanytwoconceptsin

anyfield.

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Iprefacethischapterwithabrieflookatthehistoryofthinkingaboutthe

relationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness,asanintroductiontoan

overviewofthediscourseonthisquestionoverthepastthirtyyears.Ithen

introduceanddevelopaconceptualframeworkthatgoessomewaytoalleviating

theproblemsinherentinthediscoursetodate.Icompareittosomeoftheexisting

(mostlyimplicit)frameworksintheliterature,beforeemployingittobringsome

ordertothevariousviewsofthechiefauthorsinvolvedinthisdiscourse.Patternsof

relationshipdonotnecessarilydisclosethereasonsfortheirobtaining,sofinally,I

describefourpossibleunderlyingreasonsfortherelationshipbetweenattention

andconsciousness.

4.1.1 History

Therelationshipbetweenwhatwetodaycallattentionandconsciousnessisnotjust

amodernissue.Forexample,theStoicChrysippusobservedthatbothhumansand

animalsperceivefarmorethantheyattendto(A.Long,1986,pp.172–173).He

developedatheoryofhowbothchoosewhattoattendtoandwhattoignore,based

ontheirnaturaldispositionandtheirrelationshiptotheirenvironment.This

process,governedby“impulse”inanimalsandinfants,comesunderthecommandof

reasoninmaturehumans:“reasonsupervenesasthecraftsmanofimpulse.”72

“Reason”heremayplausiblybetakentodenotewhatwetodaywouldcall

“consciousvolition”or“self-regulation,”asPetersenandPosner(2012,pp.82–84)

putitintheireerilysimilar(thoughthoroughlymodernandscientific)treatmentof

thesametopic.73Ofcourse,Chrysippus’maininterestwasindetermininghow

reasonusesattentiontoliveavirtuouslife,butitisevidentthatitisatleastpartof

72DiogenesLaertius,VII,86.73CompareChrysippus’maximabovetoPetersenandPosner’s“Bothbehavioralandrestingstate

functionaldatasuggestsubstantialdevelopmentoftheexecutiveattentionnetworkbetweeninfancy

andchildhood”(page84).

111

thisprojecttoattempttocharacterisetherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciouscognition.

InancientAbhidharmaBuddhistphilosophy,theconceptofmanasikāraorattention,

isconsideredtobeoneofthe“fiveomnipresentfactors”(Dreyfus&Thompson,

2007,pp.98–100).Thiswouldseemtoprefigurethoseinthemoderndebatewho

considerattentiontobe“omnipresent”orcoextensivewithconsciousness.However,

thetraditiondistinguishesmanasikārafromtwootherfactors:samādhior

concentrationontheobjectofthought;andsmiŗtiormindfulness,theabilityto

remainfocusedontheobjectofthoughtwithoutwandering.Unlikemanasikāra

neitherofthesefactorsareconsideredtobe“omnipresent.”Thesedistinctionsare

antecedentsofsomeofthedifferentdefinitionsofattentiondiscussedinChapter3,

butagain,weseetheintuitiveappealofrelatingformsofattentiontoconscious

experience.

Similardiscussionsmaybefoundinmanyotherphilosophicaltraditions,suchas

(butcertainlynotlimitedto):theconceptofcontemplative(θεωρία)prayerinthe

ChristiantraditionanditsrootsinPlatonicmysticism(Louth,2007);Augustine’s

viewthatattentionplaysaroleingeneratingexperience(Normore,2016);

Avicenna’sdiscussionofself-awarenessintheIslamictradition(Kaukua,2015);the

Scholasticdiscourseontherequirementsforself-knowledge(Perler,2017);and

Leibniz’sviewthatrationalityrequiresreflection—turningone’sattentiontoone’s

ownconsciousthoughts(Bender,2016).

4.1.2 ModernDiscourse

Moderndiscourseontherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousnessisoften

consideredtoreallytakeoffwithWilliamJames,whoconsideredattentiontobea

particularaspectofconsciousexperience(James,1890,pp.403–405).Wilhelm

Wundtsawattentionasthechoosingfromamongthatwhichwasalreadyconscious

112

(Wundt,1912,p.16).ButPhillips(2011a,p.221,note4)observesthat“discussion

ofattentionandconsciousnessinthisperiodisunsatisfactoryowingtodeep

disagreementoverthenatureofattention.”74

“Whenthedisciplinesofphilosophyandpsychologysplitfromone

anotherinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,itwaspsychology

thatgotcustodyofattentionwhilephilosophywasgiven

responsibilityforconsciousness…Whenthedisciplineofcognitive

psychologywasgettingunderwayattheendofthe1950s,nobody

feltmuchneedforadefinitionofattention.Researchintothebasis

ofattentioncouldproceedwithoutsuchadefinitionbecausethere

wasalmostuniversalagreementaboutwhichexperimentaltasks

involveattention”(Mole,Smithies,&Wu,2011b,p.xi).

Thelackofinterestinconsciousnessthatprevaileduntilthesecondhalfofthe

twentiethcenturymeant,ofcourse,thattherewasacorrespondinglackofinterest

intherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.Itisonlytowardtheendof

thetwentiethcenturythatwebegintoseeseminalpapersstirringdebateand

discussions.Block’s(1995)muchdiscusseddistinctionbetweenaccess

consciousnessandphenomenalconsciousnessprovidedthevocabularyand

inspirationforarichdiscourse.Hardcastle(1997)challengesauthorsfromthe

previoustenyearswhoassertthatattentionandconsciousnessamounttothesame

thing,andthatWilliamJamestookthemtobeso,arguinginsteadthatthetwoare

distinctphenomena.Hardcastle’sviewexemplifiestheempiricalflavourofrecent

attemptstoaddressQ,asdoesotherinfluentialworkfromthe1990s(e.g.,

Kentridge,Heywood,&Weiskrantz,1999).Aroundtheturnofthemillennium,

discussionofthisrelationshipbeginstoreallytakeoff,withanincreasing

74SeePhillips’pages204-205forasuccinctaccountofthediscoursearoundtheturnofthetwentieth

centuryandCombsetal.,(2010)foramoredetailedaccount.

113

convergencebetweenthedisciplinesofexperimentalpsychology,philosophy,and

neurobiology.Thisrecentdiscourseissurveyedin4.3below.

4.2 TheSetTheoreticalFramework(STF)

“inquiryproceedsconceptuallyandempiricallyintandemto

uncoverthemostfruitfulwaysofdelineatingthesubjectmatter”

(Gross,2018,p.2).

AuthorsonQpresentabewilderingvarietyofapproaches,definitions,andconcepts,

whichhasledto“thebafflingemergenceofparallelliteratures,akintodivided

universesthatreflectoneanother,butscarcelyinteract”(Tong,2013,p.489).It

wouldbeveryhelpfultohaveaframeworkagainstwhichallthesedivideduniverses

couldindeedinteract,butnosuchframeworkexistsforQ.Inthissection,Iinvent

one.

Inbrief:Idevelopadescriptiveframeworkthatexhaustivelydefinestheconceptual

spaceinwhichthisdiscourseisconducted.Itakeasubject’scognitiveeconomy—

thesumofalltheirmentallife—tobecomprisedofparticularcognitions.Eachof

thesecognitionsmayormaynotbeattendedand/orconscious.Thisgivesusfour

possibleCombinationsthatdescribethepatternsofabsenceorpresenceofattention

andconsciousnessinanygivenparticularcognition.Whenwecometodescribethe

cognitiveeconomyasawhole,wemusttakeintoaccountwhichofthese

Combinationsareinstantiatedinthecognitionsthatcomprisethateconomy,and

whicharenot.IcallapatternofCombinationsinacognitiveeconomyaScenario.

Thus,forexample,thereisaScenariowheresomeofasubject’scognitionsare

114

neitherattendednorconscious,somearebothattendedandconscious,someare

attendedbutnotconsciousness,butnoneareeverconsciousbutnotattended.Since

particularcognitionsareconsideredasmembersofsets(i.e.,Combinations)and

sinceIusethelanguageofsettheory,IhavecalledthissystemtheSetTheoretic

Framework(STF).

AfterderivingandexplainingmyframeworkofCombinationsandScenariosbelow,I

highlighttheadvantagesofSTFoverothercomparableframeworksortaxonomies,

andthenuseittoframealiteraturereviewofrecentworkonQin4.3,whichinturn

providesthespringboardtomyownargumentsinPartII.STFpromisestoprovidea

commoninterdisciplinaryframeworkfordiscourseaboutQ.

4.2.1 Combinations

Aparticularcognition—e.g.seeingaredapple—maybedescribedwithrespectto

attentionandconsciousnessbyoneoffourlogicallypossibleCombinations,75

describedjustbelow.Awholecognitiveeconomy,comprisedofmanyparticular

cognitiveprocessesorcognitions,eachwithitsownCombination,maythusbe

describedbyoneofsixteenlogicallypossibleScenarios,describedinthefollowing

section.

BeforeIbegintodeveloptheconceptofCombinations,threepreliminaryremarks

arenecessarytobracketcertainrabbit-holesIwishtoavoidfallinginto.First,the

Combinationsdescribedbelowdescribeonlypatternsofcorrelation.Theyare

metaphysicallyneutralastowhatattentionorconsciousnessare,andastothe

reasonsfortherelationshipbetweenthem(whichIaddressin4.4).STFmakesnoa

75Iuse“Combinations”ratherthan“Permutations”astheorderofitemsmattersinthelatter,butnot

intheformer.

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prioriassumptionsthatattentionandconsciousnessareidenticalorperfectlyco-

occurrent.Forexample,whilePhenomenaldefinitionsofattention(3.3.3)canbe

expressedinthelanguageofSTF,theyarejustoneofthemanypossibilities

capturedbySTF.TheexhaustivenatureofSTFallowsustoaddressQwithout

beggingthequestionoftheirrelationship(3.2.4.2).

Second,forthepurposesofthisdiscussion,Ihavepreferredtheterms“cognitive

processes”or“cognitions”over“cognitivestates”asthelatterhasconnotationsofa

staticsynchronicsnapshot,whereastheothersimplymoreofadiachronicevent,

whichisanimportantaspectofthenatureofthecognitionsweareconsidering.76

“Processes”or“cognitions”77thusalsoseemlessconfusingthantermslike“brain

activitystates”(Dehaeneetal.,2006,p.204)thatcombinethestatic(“state”)with

thedynamic(“activity”).

Third,whiletheCombinationsbelowrepresenttherelationshipsbetweenjusttwo

particularaspectsofcognitions(i.e.,attentionandconsciousness),itisimportantto

alwaysbearinmindthatanycognition—andindeed,theoverallcognitive

economy—isimmenselycomplex,andprofoundlyinterconnected.Cognitions

almostneveroccurinavacuum.

Ifweassume,then,thatattentionandconsciousnessarepossibledescriptionsof

cognitiveprocessesorcognitions,thereareexactlyfourlogicallypossiblewaysto

characteriseanygivencognitionwithrespecttoattentionandconsciousness—four

Combinations.78

76Foranin-depthdiscussionofthesekindsofissues,seeSoteriou(2013)andMole(2016).77Ingeneral,Iuse“cognitiveprocess”wherethephysicalbrainprocessismorepertinent,and

“cognition”wherethementalperceptionorthoughtismorepertinent.78TheexamplesgivenforeachCombinationareillustrativeonlyandopentodifferent

interpretations,sotheyarenottobetakenhereasargumentsthattheCombinationisinstantiated.

ThoseargumentsareinPartII.

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Combination1. ~A~C:neitherattended(A)orconscious(C)

• Aparticularcognitionmaylackbothattentionandconsciousness.

Thesubjectmaybeattendingtosomethingelse,ornotattendingatall,and

shemaybeconsciousofsomethingelse,ornotconsciousatall.

• ThisCombinationisrelativelyuncontroversial.Thatistosay,mostpeople

wouldacceptthatitoccurs,atleastsometimes.

• AnexampleofthisCombinationmightincludethe“housekeeping”cognitive

processesgoingoninthebrainwhileoneisinadeep,dreamlesssleep

(Lewis,2013).

Combination2. A~C:attended,butnotconscious.

• Aparticularcognitionmayinvolveattention,butnotconsciousness.

• ThisCombinationismorecontroversial,withsomepeoplearguingthatit

neveroccurs.

• AnexampleofthisCombinationmightbeacueintheblindregionofa

blindsightpatient’svisualfieldthat,despitebeingphenomenallyunconscious

tothesubject,nonethelessdirectsherattentiontoasecondregion

(Kentridgeetal.,1999).

Combination3. C~A:Conscious,butnotattended.

• Aparticularcognitionmayinvolveconsciousness,butnotattention.

• ThisCombinationtooiscontroversial.

• AnexampleofthisCombinationmightbethefamousSperling(1960)

experimentinwhichallthelettersinagridseemtobeconsciously

experienced,butonlyasmallsubsetofthemcanbeattendedand

subsequentlyreported.

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Combination4. A&C:Bothattendedandconscious.

• Aparticularcognitionmayinvolvebothattentionandconsciousness.

Youconsciouslyexperiencetheobjectofattentionandattendtotheobjectof

consciousexperience.

• ThisCombinationisalmostunanimouslyuncontroversial.

• Itcomprisesagreatdealofourcommondailyexperience,suchaswhenyou

pleasurablyattendtoyourphenomenalexperienceofthecolourofaroseand

theparticularshadeofitsredness.

MuchofthecontemporarydiscourseaboutQconsistsofmakingacaseforthe

instantiation(orlackthereof)ofoneormoreCombinationsinhumancognitive

economies.InPartII,ItakeCombinations1and4tobeuncontroversial,briefly

cataloguethepowerfulevidenceforCombination2,andspendthebalanceofthis

treatisecarefullyexploringtheevidenceforCombination3:C~A,forwhichIargue

thereisaverygoodcasetobemade.WhilederivingananswertoQrequires

exploringeachCombination,expressingananswertoQrequiresustobringtogether

theanswersaboutwhetherornotallfourCombinationsareinstantiatedornot.To

dothis,weneedtodescribeScenarios79—patternsofoccurrenceofCombinationsin

awholecognitiveeconomy(whichiswhatQisreallyabout).

79In6.2IdiscussthepossibilityofglobalCombinationsanddistinguishthemfromScenarios.

118

4.2.2 IntroducingSetTheory

ScenariosarederivedbyapplyingstandardsettheorytotheCombinationsof

attentionandconsciousnessinacognitiveeconomy.Wecanthinkofattention,as

beingaset,A,themembersofwhichareallparticularinstantiationsofhuman

cognitionsinthecognitiveeconomyofanindividualsubject,thatarecharacterised

byinvolvingattention.Wecanthinkofconsciousness,C,inthesameway.80Wecan

thusrepresenttheinstantiationsofattendedandconscioushumancognitionsusing

theVenndiagramsofstandardsettheory81asshowninFigure1.

ItneedsonlyoneirrefutableempiricalinstanceofaCombinationtoconfirmthat

thatCombinationisinstantiatedinsubjects.Ontheotherhand,theabsenceofeven

oneirrefutableinstanceofaCombination,whilehighlysuggestive,isnotproof

positivethatitcanneverbeinstantiated—itisimpossibletoproveanegative

80Moreformally,theextensionofthepropertyofinvolvingattentionisthesetA,andtheextensionof

thepropertyofinvolvingconsciousnessisthesetC.81Forsettheory,seeSmith(2012,Chapter16).

2. A~C 3. C~A 4. A&C 1. ~A~C

Figure1ThefourpossibleCombinationsofattention(A)andconsciousness(C).

attention (A) consciousness (C)

119

(absenceofevidenceisnotevidenceofabsence).Forexample:wemaysimplynot

yethavestumbledacrossthatCombinationempirically;orwemaynotyethave

recogniseditassuch;oritmaynotbeinstantiatedinnormalhumancognition,butit

maystillbeinstantiatedinabnormalhumancognition;orinactualnon-human

cognition(e.g.indogs);orinhypotheticalorfictionalnon-humancognition(e.g.

Martiansormoreevolvedhumanbeingsofthefuture).Iaddressthisquestionin

4.2.3.2.

4.2.3 Scenarios

WhileonlyoneCombinationcandescribeanyparticularcognition,any,all,ornone

oftheCombinationsmaybefoundtogetherwithinawholecognitiveeconomy,which

afterall,iscomposedofnumerousindividualcognitions.AScenariodescribesthe

patternofCombinationsthatareinstantiatedforanygivensubject(whether

synchronicallyordiachronically).Itturnsoutthattherearesixteenlogically

possibleScenariosthatIdescribebelow.ThesesixteenScenariosexhaustthe

possiblepositionsonQ.

Foraparticularcognition,Combinationsaremutuallyexclusive(onlyone

Combinationcandescribeaparticularcognition),butforawholecognitive

economy,Combinationsaremutuallyinclusive(any,none,orallofthemmay

describethesetofparticularcognitionsthatcompriseawholecognitiveeconomy).

Withinacognitiveeconomy,Scenariosaremutuallyexclusive.Thatis,onlyone

Scenariodescribesacognitiveeconomy,totheexclusionofallotherScenarios.It

maybethecase,though,thatdifferentspecies,orevendifferentindividual

organismswithinaspecies,maybedescribedbydifferentScenarios(see4.2.3.2).

Attheendof4.2.1,IforeshadowedtheargumentsforallfourCombinationsbeing

instantiatedinahumancognitiveeconomythatIwillprosecuteinPartII.Interms

120

ofScenarios,thismeansIwillarguefortheScenariothatrepresentsallfour

Combinationsbeinginstantiatedinahumancognitiveeconomy(AÈC,below).

Ihaveadoptedthesymbolsofsettheorytocreateashorthandforeachofthe

Scenarios.82Inthediagramsbelow,anXwithinanareaoftheVennDiagram(from

Figure1above)signifiesthattheCombinationrepresentedbythatareaofthe

diagramisinstantiatedinatleastoneofthecognitionsthatcomprisethatcognitive

economy.TheabsenceofanXsignifiesthattheCombinationisneverinstantiatedin

anyofthatcognitiveeconomy’sparticularcognitions.So,forexample,A=Cbelow

suggeststhatwhilesomecognitionsinvolvebothattentionandconsciousness,there

arenocognitionsthatareattendedbutnotconscious,andnocognitionsthatare

consciousbutnotattended.AnXoutsidebothofthecirclesrepresentstheideathat

therearecognitionsthatareneitherattendednorconscious,whiletheabsenceofan

Xoutsidebothcirclesrepresentstheideathattherearenounattended,unconscious

cognitions.

ThislatterpositionisonethatIhavenotfoundtobeheldbyanyone,sowhileI

includethemintheMatrix(4.2.3.1),IhavelargelyomittedtheeightScenariosthat

excludethatCombinationfromthisdiscussion.Whereitisnecessarytoreferto

them,IdenotethembyaddinganasterisktothetermfortheparallelScenario

(identical,exceptforhavinganXoutsidethecircles),e.g.,A=C*.Forcompleteness,

therearefourotherlogicalpossibilitiesthatfewpeopleconsiderlikely—thosewith

noXintheA&Cintersection.Again,thesearelargelyirrelevanttocurrentdiscourse

onQ,sotheyappearintheMatrix,buttheirdetaileddescriptionandsome

discussionareinAppendix2.

82Althoughmanyauthorsusethelanguageofconditionallogic,Ihavechosenthesymbolsofset

theoryoverthoseofconditionallogicbecause,asshouldsoonbeapparent,itoffersmoretoolsto

describeScenarios.Forexample,usingthesymbolsofconditionallogic,“attentionisnecessaryand

sufficientforconsciousness”(myScenario1),wouldbe“AÛC”.However,thereisnosymbolic

representationof“thereisonlyconsciousness,butneveristheresuchathingasattention”(STF

Scenario6).

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Scenario1. A=C(PerfectOverlay)

• Attentionisbothnecessary&sufficientfor

consciousness.Everythingthatisconsciousis

attended(necessary).Everythingthatisattended

isconscious(sufficient).

• Somecognitionsarebothattendedandconscious,buttherearenocognitions

thatareattendedbutnotconscious,andtherearenocognitionsthatare

consciousbutnotattended,andofcourse,someareneitherconsciousnor

attended.

• Insettheory,“P=Q”(theidentitycondition:everymemberofPisamember

ofQ,andviceversa)capturesnicelytheideathatanycognitionthatis

attendedisalsoconscious,andviceversa.

Scenario2. AÉC(AttentionOverflowsConsciousness)

• Attentionisnecessarybutnotsufficientfor

consciousness(consciousnessissufficientbutnot

necessaryforattention).

• Somecognitionsarebothattendedand

conscious;someareattendedbutnotconscious,butallcognitionsthatare

consciousareattended,andofcourse,someareneitherconsciousnor

attended.

• Insettheory,“PÉQ”(PisapropersupersetofQ:allmembersofQarealso

membersofP,butnotallmembersofParealsomembersofQ)83captures

nicelytheideathatallcognitionsthatareconsciousarealsoattended,butnot

allthosethatareattendedareconscious.

83NotethatIusethesymbolforapropersuperset,“É”,ratherthanjustasuperset,“Ê”.Thelatter

signifiesthatsetPhasmoreelementsorequaltosetQ,whereashere,thisScenariorequiresthatthe

setofattendedcognitionscannotbeequaltothesetofcognitions.

X X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

122

Scenario3. CÉA(ConsciousnessOverflowsAttention)

• Consciousnessisnecessarybutnotsufficientfor

attention(attentionissufficientbutnotnecessary

forconsciousness).

• Somecognitionsarebothattendedandconscious;someareconsciousbut

notattended,butallcognitionsthatareattendedareconscious,andof

course,someareneitherconsciousnorattended.

Scenario4. AÈC(PartialIntersection)

• Attentionisneithernecessarynorsufficientforconsciousness,and

consciousnessisneithernecessarynorsufficientforattention,butattention

andconsciousnesssometimesoccurtogetherinthesamecognition.

• Somecognitionsarebothconsciousand

attended,someareconsciousbutnot

attended,someareattendedbutnot

conscious,andofcourse,someareneither

consciousnorattended.

• Insettheory,PÈQ(theunionofPandQ:membersthatbelongtosetP,orset

Q,ortobothsets)capturesnicelytheideathatcognitionsmaybeeither

attendedorconsciousorboth.84

84Moreformally,PÈQ={x:xÎPÚxÎQ},whereitisnottruethatPandQareeitheridenticalor

disjointsets.

X X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

X X X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

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TheMatrix

TheScenariothatdescribesagivencognitiveeconomyisdefinedbythesetof

Combinationsthatareinstantiatedinthatcognitiveeconomy.Thisrelationship

betweenScenariosandsetsofCombinationsissummarisedinthematrixbelow.

Usingthismatrix,onecandetermineanauthor’spositiononQbyconsideringwhich

Combinationsshebelievesareinstantiated(evenrarely),andtherefore,which

Scenariosheholdstoobtain.ToholdthatScenarioA=Cobtainsistogiveapositive

answertoQ,whiletoholdthatAÉC,CÉA,orAÈCobtainsistogiveanegative

answertoQ.

NotethatthisSTFcanbeappliedtotherelationshipbetweenanytwocognitive

concepts.Itcandescriberelationshipsbetween,say,consciousnessandworking

memory,orattentionandperception.Beyondcognitivescience,itcanbeappliedto

anytwoentities,likegravityandmass,oranxietyanddepression.

Table3.TheMatrixofallpossibleSTFScenarios.

Combinations

Scenarios

A~C A&C C~A ~A~C

1. A=C

(PerfectOverlay) X X

2. AÉC

(AttentionOverflows

Consciousness)

X X X

124

Combinations

Scenarios

A~C A&C C~A ~A~C

3. CÉA

(Consciousness

OverflowsAttention)

X X X

4. AÈC

(PartialIntersection)X X X X

5. Ø

(Inattentive

Unconsciousness)

X

6. A\C

(Attentive

Unconsciousness)

X X

7. C\A

(Conscious

Inattentiveness)

X X

8. ADC

(Complete

Independence)

X X X

9. A=C* X

10. AÉC* X X

11. CÉA* X X

12. AÈC* X X X

13. Ø*

125

Combinations

Scenarios

A~C A&C C~A ~A~C

14. A\C* X

15. C\A* X

16. ADC* X X

StrongandWeakReadings

ItisalsonecessarytospecifythedomainoverwhichaScenarioobtains.For

example,itmaybethatamongthehumanpopulation,avarietyofScenariosmaybe

foundtoobtainindifferentindividuals,orperhapsvaryacrossverydifferent

cultures.CallthistheVeryWeakReading.Or,aScenariomaydescribeallnormally

functioningmembersofthespecieshomosapiens,butfailtoobtainonlyinthemost

extremecases(e.g.vegetativepatients).CallthistheWeakReading.Or,aScenario

mayobtaininallmembersofthespecieshomosapienswithoutexception,being

integraltotheverydefinitionofthatspecies.CallthistheStrongReading.Or,a

Scenariomaybetheonlyonethatobtainsforanyandallcreaturescapableofboth

attentionandconsciousness.CallthistheVeryStrongReading.Someofthe

disagreementsoverthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousnessmaybeclarifiedbyconsideringwhichofthesereadingsisbeing

adoptedbytheirauthors—differentreadingsmaybecompatiblewithdifferent

Scenarios,or,viceversa,thesameempiricalevidencemayleadonetoprefer

differentScenarioswhenansweringQforthedifferentreadings.

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ThereadingthatisappropriatetotheascriptionofaScenarioisanempiricalmatter,

notanalytical.InthistreatiseIargueforaWeakReadingoftheScenarioAÈCas

beingtheonethatobtains,butitisnothardtoimagineapossibleworldinwhicha

differentreadingmighthavebeenascribedwithperfectlylogicalcoherence.

IconsidertheWeakReadingtobethemostlikely,byaprocessofelimination.The

VeryWeakReadingseemsunlikelygiventhecopiousevidencethatthebrainsofthe

vastmajorityofhumanbeingsfunctionthesamewayinregardtoattentionand

consciousness.TheStrongReadingseemstobediscountedbycasessuchas

comatosepatients,who,whileclearlyfallingunderadifferentScenariotothat

obtaininginhealthyhumanbeings,arestillconsideredtobehumanbeings,and

treatedwithalltherespectentailedbythat.Forthisreason,andfortheadditional

reasonthatweknowverylittleaboutthebizarreandwonderfulcognitive

economiesofotherspecies(muchlessthoseofhypotheticalalienspecies),theVery

StrongReadingseemsunjustifiable.WhenIargueinPartII,then,thatAÈCisthe

“right”Scenario,itisonthebasisofaWeakReadingofthatclaim.

4.2.4 OtherTaxonomies

Otherframeworksthathavebeenemployedhavefacilitatedmuchfruitful

discussion:

“Muchworkhasfocusedontherelationbetweenconsciousness

andattention,usuallyframedintermsofthetwinquestionsof

whetherattentionisnecessaryand/orsufficientforconsciousness.

Everypossibleanswerhasbeenentertained”(Seager,2015).

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ButSTFprovidesaframeworkforexaminingQthatiscomplete,precise,and

optimaltoagreaterdegreethanpreviousframeworks,noneofwhichtrulyentertain

“everypossibleanswer.”Bycomplete,Imeanitencompassesallthelogical

possibilitiesforhowattentionmightberelatedtoconsciousness.Byprecise,Imean

thatitstaxonomiccategoriesareunambiguous.Andbyoptimal,Imeanthatitisthe

mosteffectivewaytostructurethepossibleanswerstothequestion.Bygathering

togetherallpossibleviewsinasingleconceptualspace,STFencouragescomparison

andcontrastbetweenthem.

InthissectionIhighlighttheadvantagesofSTFoveranumberofexisting

frameworks(Appendix3)85withrespecttocompleteness,precision,andoptimality.

Itisimportanttonotethatmostoftheseframeworksarenotintendedtobe

attemptsatacomprehensiveframeworkatall,somyanalysisisnotinanywaya

criticism.

Complete

Acomprehensiveframeworkneedstobecomplete.Theconceptualspaceitmaps

shouldexhaustalllogicalpossibilities.STFdoesthisintwoways.First,boththe

CombinationsandtheScenariosareexhaustive.Thatis,thefourCombinationsare

theonlylogicallypossibleCombinations,andthesixteenScenariosaretheonly

logicallypossibleScenarios.Second,describingbothinstantiationsofCombinations

andScenariosthatobtaingiventhosepatternsiscomprehensive.Thatis,itcovers

alltheterritoryrequiredtoanswerQacrossallthereadingsdiscussedabove

(4.2.3.2).

85Thesetablesareinthemselvesavaluabletoolforcomparingtheviewsoftheirauthors,andthe

readermayfindithelpfultorefertothemwhilereadingthediscussionbelow.

128

Whatismore,atrulycomprehensiveframeworkwillbeonethatiscapableof

completelysubsumingother,lesscomprehensiveframeworks(andthusprovidinga

valuablecommonbasisforcomparisonbetweentheotherframeworksandthe

authors’answerstoQ).STFdoesthisinboththewaysmentionedabove:it

subsumesthepartiallistsofCombinationsandofScenariosfoundinother

frameworksinitsexhaustivelists;anditsubsumesframeworksthatdescribeonly

CombinationsoronlyScenarioswithinitstwo-storeystructure.Iconsidereachin

turn.

ManydiscussionsincludeonlysomeCombinationswithoutofferinganysortof

opinionatallabouttheothers.Forexample,Hassinetal.,(Hassin,2013;Hassin,

Bargh,Engell,&McCulloch,2009)discussA~Catlength,butmakenomentionatall

ofC~A.Bycomparison,KochandTsuchiya(2007),vanBoxteletal.,(2010),and

Hohwy(2012,p.5)86doconsiderallfourCombinations,thusprovidingamore

comprehensiveviewofthelandscape.However,theirframeworkdoesnot

adequatelyaddressallthepossibleScenarios.

OtherframeworksprovideaScenario-typetaxonomy,butalloftheseare

incomplete.Forexample,theframeworkofIwasaki(1993)seemstoincludejust

twoScenarios,A=CandCÉA,althoughalackofprecision(seebelow)makesit

possibletoalsoreadhisoptionsasAÉCandAÈC.Schwitzgebel’sdistinction

between“rich”versus“thin”consciousnessmostlikelyincludesthesametwo

ScenariosasIwasaki,althoughagainalackofprecisionleavesopenthepossibilityof

otherinterpretations.Lamme(2003)alsoincludesjusttwoSTFScenariosinhisfive

categories,A=CandAÈC.DeBrigard(2010),MontemayorandHaladjian(2015),

andPittsetal.,(2018)featurejustthreeoutofthefourliveScenarios,leavingoutC

ÉA.87MontemayorandHaladjiancomeclosesttoatrulycomprehensiveframework,

inthatoneoftheircategories,“FullDissociation”,canbereadasreferringtoSTF

86Onthebasisofapredictivecodingaccountofattentionandconsciousness.87Somewhatconfusingly,DeBrigardenumeratesonlythreeScenariosasbeing“generalviews”(p.

189),framedinthelanguageofcontingency.HethengoesontodiscussMole’s(2008a)view,whichis

CÉA,thuscompletingthesetofthefourliveoptionsofSTF.

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Scenarios5-8,lumpingthefourScenariosintojustonecategoryinwhichthereis

neveranysuchthingasconsciousattention.Theirframeworkstillfallsshortofa

universalframework,then,sinceitdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthefourScenarios

wherethereisnoconsciousattention,andoverall,itcoversonlysevenoutofthe

possiblesixteenScenarios.

ThisbriefsurveyillustratestheabilityofSTFtocomprehensivelysubsumeexisting

frameworks,andgivessomereasontohopethatitwouldsubsumeanyother

frameworksnotconsideredabove,whetherpastorfuture.Thevalueofthetwelve

unlikelyScenarios(i.e.,Scenarios5-16)isillustratedbyhavingScenarios5-8

availabletocovertheoddcategoriessuchasthatofMontemayorandHaladjian.

Precise

Inotedthatsomeoftheframeworkscitedabovewereimprecise.Byprecise,Imean

thattheframeworkispreciseabouttheconditionsformembershipin,orexclusion

from,itscategories.ThefourCombinationsandsixteenScenariosofSTFarequite

preciseinthissense.Itisrelativelystraightforwardtoclassifyanycognitionintoone

oftheCombinations(providedoneisclearaboutthedefinitionsofattentionand

consciousness),andasthematrixaboveshows(4.2.3.1),relativelystraightforward

toderivetheappropriateScenariofromanygivensetofCombinations.

Thiskindofprecisionwouldimprovetheclarityandutilityofsomeoftheexisting

frameworks.Forexample,becauseIwasakidoesnotaddressthepossibilityofA~C,

allhisthreecategoriesareambiguousastowhichScenariotheydenote.His

formulationofthefirstcategory,“peoplemayperceiveonlythosestimulithatare

underfocalattention”(Iwasaki,1993,p.212),explicitlyinvokesA&C,butitcould

alsoimplicitlyallowforA~C.ThisleavesitunclearwhetheritisA=CorAÉC.The

secondviewhediscussescommitstoA&CandC~A,butbecauseitdoesn’tsay

anythingaboutA~CitisunclearastowhetheritisCÉAorAÈC.Similarly,histhird

viewisjustavariationonthesecond,inwhichattentionandconsciousnessare

independentprocessesthatmayco-occur,butwithoutattentionmodulating

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phenomenalcharacter.ThisiscompatiblewiththesameScenariosashissecond

view,butaddressestheadditionalquestionoftheinfluenceofattentionon

consciouscontents,aquestionIaddressbelowin4.4.ApplyingSTFtoIwasaki’s

implicitframeworkallowsustoformulatehisargumentsmoreprecisely.

Schwitzgebel’s(2007)distinctionbetween“rich”and“thin”consciousnesscanalso

beconfusing.Roughly,toholdthatconsciousnessisrichistoholdthatweare

consciousofmorethanthattowhichweattend,whiletoholdthatconsciousnessis

thinistoholdthatweareonlyconsciousofthattowhichweattend.Butwhat

exactlydoesthinconsciousnessmean?ApplyingSTFtotheconceptsuggeststhatit

commitstotheCombinationA&C,whilerejectingC~A.ButthestatusofA~Cisnot

clear.ThisactuallyleavesthinconsciousnessasqualifyingforeithertheA=C

Scenario(ifA~Cisrejected)ortheAÉCScenario(ifA~Cisallowed).Thetenorof

thediscussioninSchwitzgebel’spapersuggeststheformer,butforthepurposesof

Q,weneedtoknowforsure.

Neitherisrichconsciousnesswithoutambiguity.Onthefaceofit,itseemsquite

clearlytobeCÉA,sinceitallowsforA&CandC~A,butnotA~C(actually,A~Cisnot

mentionedexplicitly,butthetenorofthediscussionseemstoexcludeit).ButCohen

etal.,(2016b)88suggestthatonecanembracearichviewofconsciousnessthatisA

=C.Theyachievethisbyarguingthatensemblesandsummarystatisticsarefully

attended,andaresufficienttoillusorilyprovidetherichnessofconsciousexperience

(Chapter7).Thus,consciousnessandattentionoverlapperfectlyinrichness,akind

ofScenarioA=CbecausewearemistakeninthinkingthatthereisanyC~A.Here,

theprecisionofSTFhashelpedustounderstandhowCohenetal’sargumentsrelate

toSchwitzgebel’sbyprovidingacommonconceptualspaceagainstwhichtheycan

becompared.

88SeealsothesubsequentdiscussiongeneratedfromthispaperinTrendsinCognitiveSciences,2016,

volume20,number9,pages641-644.

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STFestablishestheoutlineoftherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness

indiscretebinaryterms,butitcaneasilyaccommodategradationofdifferentkinds,

andinfact,bringahigherdegreeofprecisiontotheiranalysis.Onekindofgradation

isthedegreetowhichattention(orconsciousness)occur:theremaybelessormore

attention.Thus,KochandTsuchiya(2007)usetheterm,the“near-absence”of

attention.TheideaofagradedattentionalsoappearsinvanBoxteletal.,(2010).

STFallowsforgradationwithinitsCombinations(andtherefore,Scenarios).A

cognitionthatisA&Cmaybeheavilyorlightlyattended,howeverthatmagnitude

mightbemeasured.89ForthepurposesofQ,andasmanyhaveremarked(De

Brigard&Prinz,2010,p.57;Koch&Tsuchiya,2008;Mole,2008b),the“near-

absence”ofattentionisactuallythepresenceofattention,nottheabsenceof

attention.

STFallowsustocaptureanotherkindofgradation—thedegreeofoverlapbetween

attentionandconsciousness.Thatis,wherethereisanoverlapbetweenattention

andconsciousness,thedegreetowhichthereisanoverlapmaybeaninteresting

questioninitsownright.ThiscanberepresentedgraphicallywiththeVenn

diagramsofSTF(Figure2,below).Thisisreminiscentoftheapproachtakenby

MontemayorandHaladjian(2015)intheirCADframework,whichisagain

comfortablysubsumedbySTF,andgivenapreciseformulation.

AnotherkindofimprecisionisinherentintheapproachofDeBrigard(2010)who

adoptsavianegativaofsorts.Unlikemostauthors,whodefinetheirviewsby

affirmingparticularCombinations,hedefineshisviewbyrejectingparticular

Combinations.STFcanaccommodatethisapproachtoo.WecanthinkofeachofDe

Brigard’srejectionsasdeletinganXfromtheVenndiagram(orfromtheMatrix).

ThecauseoftheambiguityinherentinDeBrigard’sapproachnowbecomesobvious.

ByremainingsilentontheXsheneitheraffirmsnordenies,heleavesopenmultiple

possibilitiesforScenarios.Ofcourse,hedealswiththisambiguityinhispaperin

89Forexample,ifonedefinesattentionasbeingthedevotionofcognitiveresourcesaboveacertain

threshold,onecandetermineavalueforanattendedcognitiveprocessthatreflectsquantitatively

howmuchabovethatthresholditsits.

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otherwaysandmakeshispreferredScenarioquiteclear(itisA=C),butthedanger

ofimprecisioninherentinavianegativaisnicelyevokedbyapplyingSTF.

ItcouldbearguedthattheprecisionofSTFisnotreallydesirable,thatSTFlacksa

certainnuance.Forexample,wehaveseenthatsomeapproachesfocuson

determiningtherelativeinfluenceofattentiononconsciousness(e.g.Iwasaki)oron

thedegreeofoverlapbetweenattentionandconsciousness(e.g.Montemayorand

Haladjian).Thesekindsofnuancedrelationshipsarenotcapturedintrinsicallyby

A~C C~A A&C ~A~C

Figure2Agraphicalrepresentationofonewaythatgradationsintheoverlapbetweenattentionandconsciousnessmightberepresented.Above,verylittleoverlap;below,agreatdealofoverlap.

attention consciousness

A~C C~A A&C ~A~C

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justconsideringCombinationsandScenarios.Doesthiscountagainsttheusefulness

ofSTF?Iwouldarguethatonthecontrary,IhaveshownthatSTFactsasabasic

foundationuponwhichotherapproaches,likethosejustmentioned,canbebuilt.

Whatismore,STFactsasasingleconceptualspacewithinwhichdifferent,more

nuancedapproachescanallbelocatedandcompared.Thiscommonspacemakesit

easiertounderstandhowthosedifferentapproachesrelatetoeachother.

AnotherpossiblecriticismofSTFisthatitsprecisionistoorestrictive.Toforceall

viewsonthetopicintooneorotherofitsScenarioscouldresultinastiflingof

imaginationandcreativity.Whatifthereareusefulviewsthatjustdon’tfitintoSTF

atall?Inresponse,IpointouttheabilityofSTFtosubsumequiteawidevarietyof

imaginativeandcreativeapproachestothetopic.Whatispertinentisthatwhen

theyarefittedintoSTF,theiroriginalityiselucidatedratherthanattenuated.STFis

apreciseanalyticframeworkthatcapturestheessentialnatureoftheconceptual

spaceeffectively,allowingquitevariedaccountstobebuiltuponit.

Optimal

EmployingsocompleteandpreciseaframeworkasSTFconfersanumberof

benefitsinthequesttoanswerQ—itis,oftheavailableframeworks,theoptimal

framework.Manyoftheauthorsmentionedabovediscussonlyoneormore

CombinationswithouttouchinguponScenarios.Ofcourse,theyarenotall

attemptingtoanswerQ.Butthismakesitclearthatgiventhebroadaffirmationof

theCombinationsA&Cand~A~C,Qcanonlybeansweredwhenthestatusof

remainingtwoCombinations—AÉCandCÉA—havebeendeterminedwithina

cognitiveeconomy.AnythinglessthanthatleavesQanopenquestion.STFclearly

mapsoutthepaththatmustbetakenifwewanttoseethewood,notjustthetrees.

STFisalsotheoptimalframeworkinthatitprovidesthecommongroundupon

whichtheviewsofdifferentauthors,oftenemployingquitedifferentlanguage,can

bestandardisedandcompared.Ithasthepotentialtobecomealinguafrancathat

unitesdisparateapproaches.Itallowsustosee,forexample,thatwhileMontemayor

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andHaladjian’s(2015)considerationofCombinationsisnotaswell-structuredas

thatofKochandTsuchiya(2007),theydoconsiderabroaderrangeofpossible

ScenariosthanDeBrigard(2010).ButSTFstillhastheadvantageoverMontemayor

andHaladjian’sCAD.Itnotonlyprovidestheapparatustoquicklyandeasilysituate

itagainsttheotherframeworks,italsosubsumesitssevenScenarioswithinthe

sixteenofSTF.Interestingly,theonlyScenarioMontemayorandHaladjianomitfrom

STF’sfirsteightisCÉA.Theythemselvesadmitthattheir“frameworkisnot

entirelyneutral”(p.21),beinginfluencedbytheirassumptionsaboutneural

correlatesandevolutionaryconsiderations.STF,Iwouldargue,isbasedonnosuch

pre-assumptionsandoughttobeusefulforprojectssuchascomparingcompeting

modelsanddevelopingnewones,independentlyofanytheoreticalassumptions.

Further,whiletheydiscussthepossibilityofCÉA,theyleaveitoutoftheir

frameworkonthebasisthattheC~ACombinationisadifficultthingtoprove

empirically.Thisdifficultyisasignificantone,andindeed,playsalargeroleinthe

discussionsofPartIIofthistreatise,butacomprehensiveanalyticframeworkmust

includeallhypotheticalpossibilitiesandleavetheirconfirmationtoempirical

investigation.

4.3 WhatOthersHaveSaid

HavingestablishedSTFasaframeworkforaddressingQ,Iturninthissectionto

reviewingsomeofthevastliteraturerelatingtoQ,situatingvariousauthorsagainst

STF,andsketchingsomepertinentobservationsonthediscourse.InAppendix4I

classifyauthorsbyallocatingthemtooneofthefourliveScenarioswithjustabrief

commentoneach.90WhileIhavedonemybesttoidentifytheScenariosofthe

90Phillips(2011a,p.222endnotes6&7)hasamuchbriefersurvey.

135

authorsasaccuratelyaspossible,thisisoftenadifficultthingtodo.Asobserved

above(4.2.4.2)someauthorsdonotaddressenoughCombinationstoconfidently

identifytheirpreferredScenario.Theymayalsomeandifferentthingsbytheterms

“attention”and“consciousness,”orusedifferenttermsaltogether(e.g.,“access”or

“awareness”),whichmaypartiallyexplainwhytheypreferdifferentScenarios.And,

Ihaveinsufficientspacetofullypresentthenuancesoftheirargumentsfortheir

preferredposition,andmustmostlybecontentwithcategorisationwithoutmuch

explicitjustification.

InthissectionIselectivelyreflectonsomeoftheworkoftheauthorssurveyedin

Appendix4inlightoftheSTF,drawingobservationspertinenttomyargumentsin

PartII.

4.3.1 STFClassification

IhavearguedthatSTFbringsadegreeofclarityandprecisiontotheviewsof

authorsinthediscourseaboutQ.SomeauthorsareeasytoallocatetoaScenario,

butothersarelessso.Ofcourse,manyauthorsconsideredherearenotspecifically

addressingQ,butissuesthatarerelatedtoQinsomeway,sotheirambiguityin

relationtoQisnotinanywayacriticism.ButfortheresearcherinterestedinQ,

applyingtheSTFcanbehelpful,andevenpromoteadeeperunderstandingofthe

authors’account.Iconsidersomeexamplesofauthorsthatareeasilyclassified

underSTF,andthenamoreambiguousexample.

Cricketal.,(Crick&Koch,1990;Koch&Tsuchiya,2007;Tsuchiya&vanBoxtel,

2010;vanBoxteletal.,2010)presentanunambiguouscaseforAÈC.Inadditionto

thefourKTargumentsdiscussedinChapter1,theideaoffleetingawareness(Crick&

Koch,1990,p.272)—aneurallyandfunctionallydistinctfastprocesslinkedto

iconicmemory,asopposedtotheslowerprocessofbindingneuronsviavisual

attentiontoproduceasinglevisualobjecttoshort-termmemory—providesaneural

136

underpinningtoC~A.91Theyalsoholdthatwhileattentionisthemechanismthat

bindscontentintoworkingmemory,“theattentionalmechanismsthemselvesare

largelyunconscious”(p.269),whichisA~C.TheAÈCScenarioisalso

unambiguouslychampionedbyBlock,Kentridgeetal.,andothers.

TheAÉCScenariofindsunambiguouschampionsinDeBrigardandPrinzand

O’ReganandNoë,buttheonlyunambiguousproponentofCÉAIcouldfindwas

Smithies.Smithies’argumentisthatitisafunctionalcharacteristicofattentionthat

it“makesinformationaccessibleforuseintherationalcontrolofthoughtandaction

…thereisnoattentionwithoutconsciousness,sincenounconsciousinformationis

fullyaccessibleforuseintherationalcontrolofthoughtandaction”(Smithies,2011,

p.248).However,thisdefinitionofattentionseemstobeinadequateforhis

argument.Notbeing“fullyaccessible”isnotthesamethingasnotbeingaccessible

atall.92Ifevensomeinformationcanbemadeavailabletotheprocessesofrational

controlwithouteverbeingconscious,thatwouldbeenoughtoestablishA~C.And

thatwouldseemtobethecasein,forexample,priming,wheremaskedorotherwise

unconsciousinformationdoesinfactmeasurablyinfluencebehaviourorreport

(6.2).

Otherauthorsaremuchmoreambiguous,andrequiresomedetectivework.93

Posner’s(1994)creativeapproachdrawsananalogybetweentherelationship

betweenattentionandconsciousnessandtherelationshipbetweenDNAand“life.”

WhileDNAisnotitself“life,”onecannotfullyunderstandlifewithoutunderstanding

DNA.Hesuggeststhatattentionbearsthekindofconstitutiveorcausalrelationship

toconsciousnessthatDNAbearsto“life”(Iconsiderthesekindsofrelationship

belowin4.4).However,itseemsimplausibletosuggestthatDNAisnecessaryfor

life(ifstrongArtificialIntelligenceiscorrectforexample)orthatitissufficientfor

91Seealso8.5.92ComparethisresponsetoDeBrigard&Prinz’sresponsetoKoch&Tsuchiya(2007):“thenear

absenceofattentionisnotthesameastheabsenceofattention”(DeBrigard&Prinz,2010,p.57).93Itisnoticeablethatthesetendtobeoldertexts.Perhapslaterauthors,respondingtothemore

explicitposingofQovertime,tookpainstobeclearerontheirpositiononQ.

137

life(undenaturedDNAinarecentlydeceasedcorpseforexample).Therefore,while

some(Cohen,Cavanagh,Chun,&Nakayama,2012,p.411;Hardcastle,1997,p.59)

haveattributedanexplicitlyA=Cpositiontohim,Iprefertobealittlemore

cautious.Posner’sdiscussionofhowtheputativeneuralcorrelatesofattention

mightfitintothecontemporarymodelsofconsciousnessofCrick,Edelman,and

Beck&Eccles(Posner,1994,p.7403)isfurtherreasonforconsideringhim

implicitlyA=Cratherthanexplicitly.

MackandRock(1998)pioneeredthestudyofinattentionalblindness—the

phenomenonwhere,whenone’sattentionisfocusedonaparticularobjectortask,

quiteobviousstimuliperipheraltothattaskcompletelyevadeconscious

experience.94Ahmadietal.,(2011,p.1366)takethemtorejectthepossibilityofC~A,

onthestrengthofstatementssuchasthis:“thereisnoconsciousperceptionwithout

attention”(Mack&Rock,1998,p.14,italicsintheoriginal).Concurring,DeBrigard

&Prinz(2010,p.52)commentthat,forMack&Rock,“everyoccurrenceof

consciousnessisgoingtobe,asamatterofdefinition,anoccurrenceofattention.”

ThisrejectionofC~AleavesopenthequestionofwhichoftheScenariosA=CorAÉ

CMackandRockwouldbecommittedto.Cohenetal.,(2012,p.411)classthem

amongthosewhohold“thatattentionandawarenessareinextricablylinked”,which

soundsverymuchlikeA=C,andSchwitzgebel(2007,p.7)takesthemtoespouse

thethinview,whichisvaguelyA=C.

However,onthequestionofA~C,Mole(2008a,p.93)saysthat“MackandRock

claim‘thatattentionisnecessaryforconsciousperception’(p.250)”,butthatthey

“rejecttheclaimthatconsciousnessisnecessaryforattention”(p.93).Insupport,he

citesthemthus:

“Unfortunately,althoughtheproposalthatconsciousperception

andattentionrefertoidenticalprocesseshastheadvantageof

94E.g.,theinvisiblegorillainplainsightofSimonsandChabris(1999).

138

simplicity,itisdiscreditedonseveralgrounds.First,itwould

appeartoleadtothefalseconclusionthattherecanbenoattention

without[conscious]perception.Thisconclusionseemsfalseon

bothexperientialandempiricalgrounds”(Mack&Rock,1998,p.

245).95

Thus,Moleargues,theyunambiguouslyembraceA~C,(andformypurposes,are

thereforeAÉC).However,Iarguethisistoostrongaconclusiontodraw,andthey

maynotinfactbeembracingA~C.Considertwooftheirfourreasonsforrejecting

theequationofattentionwithperception—anticipatoryattentionandvigilance—in

lightoftheTargetQuestion(1.4.6).Inthesecases,attentionTargetsnottheobject

thatisultimatelyidentifiedwhenitappears,buttheemptyperceptualfieldinto

whichtheobjecteventuallyenters.Thesubjectisbothconsciousofandattending-

as-vigilancetothefielditself.Andbeforetheobjectappears,sheisbothunconscious

ofandnotattending-as-vigilancetotheobjectitself.Thereis,infact,noA~Chere.

Molehimselfdiscussesthesituationwhereoneattendstoablankradarscreenin

anticipationofablipappearing.Herightlypointsoutthatthisisnotacaseof

attentionwithoutconsciousperception,foritis“byperceptionthatthevigilantradar

operatorknowsthatnopiphasoccurred…itconfusestheperceptionofabsence

withtheabsenceofperception”(p.98).Anotherwaytoputthisisthattheoperator

exercisesspatialattentionintheabsenceofobjectattention(sincethereisnoobject

toattendto).Thus,MackandRock’sstatementabovesuggeststhattheirpositionon

A~Cmaybeopentorevision,andthisambiguityjustifiesourkeepingthem

tentativelyundertheA=CScenario.

95The“[conscious]”,insidesquarebrackets,isinsertedbyMolewhenhequotesthem,butnot

presentintheiroriginal.Itisaplausibleinsertion,however,sincetheyusetheterm“conscious

perception”atthebeginningofthequote.

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4.3.2 UsingQtoProduceCognitiveModels

Qnotonlyaninterestingquestioninitself,buthasalsocontributedtoour

understandingonotherquestions.AlthoughDehaeneetal.,(2006)andLamme

(2003)subscribetodifferentScenarios,theybothbuildaspectsoftheircognitive

modelsatleastpartiallyonviewsacquiredfromconsideringQ.Deheaneetal’s

threefolddistinctionbetweensubliminal(neverconscious);pre-conscious

(potentiallybutnotactuallyconscious);andconsciousprocessingarisesoutoftheir

grapplingwithhowattentionandconsciousnessinteract,asdoLamme’sfour

modelsofthetemporalprogressionofprocessing(p.13,Figure2).

Emphasisingtheimportanceofthetemporalityofattentionandconsciousness,

Wolfe’s(1999b)explorationoftheinterplaybetweenattentionandconsciousnessin

thetemporalpatternofvisualprocessinginvisionunderwriteshisdistinction

betweenpre-attentiveandpost-attentiveconsciousness.Hearguesthatthevisual

contentoutsidethefocusofselectiveandconsciousvisualattention—the

background—isitselfconscious,butratherdata-poor.Thisispre-attentive

consciousness.Shouldthefocusofattentionturntothatregionofthevisualfield,

thecontentisstabilised,integrated,andinterpreted,andbecomespost-attentively

conscious,whiletheregionthatwaspreviouslypost-attentivelyconsciousnowfalls

backintopre-attentiveconsciousnessoncemore.Iconsiderthiskindoftemporal

interplayinmoredetailinChapters7and8,whereIproposemyownmodelof

cognitiveprocessing.

4.3.3 AnsweringQbyanActofDefinition

TheansweronederivestoQdependsheavilyonhowonedefinesattentionand

consciousness.InChapter3,IarguedagainstPhenomenalDefinitionsofattentionas

140

beggingthequestionofQ.Theremaybemoresubtleexamplesofthisproblem.For

example,O’ReganandNoë(2001)—whoCohenetal.,(2012,p.411)readasA=C

withgoodreason—stateatonepoint:“Butifyoushouldturnyourattentiontothe

colorofthecaraheadofyou,andthinkaboutit,ordiscussitwithyourfriend,oruse

theknowledgeofthecar’scolortoinfluencedecisionsyouaremaking,then,we

wouldsay,youareawareofit”(p.944).Thefirstpartofthatstatement,beforethe

word“then,”describesattentionalprocesses.Theythenassertthatthepresenceof

anyofthesemanifestationsofattentionjustifiesusimputingtheconcurrent

presenceofawareness.96ThisassumptionofaPhenomenalDefinitionofattentionis

basedontheclearcaseofA&Ctheydescribe,butmakesnoallowanceforother

cases,suchastheA~Cofbeingunawarethatyouhaveliftedyourfootofthe

acceleratorasyoupassedahigh-visibilityspeedcamerawhileengagedindeep

conversationwithyourpassenger.

Moresubtly,itcouldbearguedthatBlock(1995)mightbechargedwithlocking

himselfintoAÈCthemomenthecommitstohisdistinctionbetweenaccess

consciousnessandphenomenalconsciousness.Bydrawingthisconceptual

distinctionhetherebygivesrisetothepossibility—forwhichheargues—of

phenomenalcontentthatisnotaccessed,andaccessedcontentthatisnot

phenomenal.ButBlocktakesthesequestionsasnecessarilyempiricalonesand

answersthemaccordingly,whichcontrastswiththeanswer-by-definitionstrategy

ofO’ReganandNoë.

MogensenandOvergaard(2018)derivedifferentanswerstoQdependingon

definitions.Basedontheirreorganizationofelementaryfunctionsframework,they

concludethatwhilephenomenalcontentcanoverflowworkingmemory(whichis

closelytiedtoattentionandaccess,seeChapters5and7)itcannotoverflowthe

availabilityofinformationforaction(whichisalsoapossibledefinitionof

attention).

96Asynonymforphenomenalconsciousnessinthiscontext.

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4.3.4 InfluenceofaPriorTheoreticalBasis

Thishighlightsanotherpoint,thatthetheoreticalframeworkfromwhichoneworks

alsostronglyinfluencesone’sanswertoQ.Ifonethinks,asLamme(2003,2010)

does,thattheneuralcorrelateofconsciousnessisrecurrentneuralprocessing(or

RP—roughly,wavesofbothfeed-forwardandfeedbackactivationinthebrain),and

thatsuchRPoccurringonlyintheposteriorbrainissufficientforconsciousness,

thenconsciousnessmayariseintheabsenceoftheattentionthatisgenerally

thoughttodependuponinvolvementofthefrontoparietalregions.ThisisC~A.And

sincehefurtherconsidersattentionalmodulationofthefeedforwardsweepinthe

absenceoffeedbackactivationtobepossible(Lamme,2003,p.16),hemustallow

forA~C.Lamme’srecurrencetheoryofconsciousnessunderwriteshispreferencefor

AÈC.

Prinz’sAttendedIntermediate-levelRepresentationtheoryofconsciousness(Prinz,

2011,p.182)leadsinevitablytoA=C.Attentionisthegatewaytoworkingmemory,

modulatingintermediate-levelrepresentations,97andmakingthemavailableto

workingmemory.Allandonlycontentthatisprocessedinworkingmemoryinthe

rightwaysbecomesthecontentofconsciousness—hencethenecessityand

sufficiencyofattentionforconsciousness,viaworkingmemory.

97AnideaPrinzbuildsonearliermodels,e.g.,Jackendoff(1987).

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4.3.5 InterpretationofEmpiricalWork

Inrecentdecades,itisraretofindliteratureaddressingQthatdoesnotengage

deeplywithempiricalresearch.Butproponentsofdifferentviewsoftendifferasto

howtointerpretthatresearch.In1.4Idiscussedsomeaspectsoftheempirical

synthesesofKTandDP.HereIlookatanothercentralstrandinthediscourseabout

Q,thequestionoftherelativegrainsofattentionandconsciousness.

IhaveclassifiedBlockasespousingAÈC.WhilehemainlyfocusesonC~A,based

largelyonthefoundationalworkofKentridgeetal.,(seeAppendix4)andothers,98

hehasalsoarguedclearlyforadoubledissociationbetweenattentionand

consciousness(Block,2013b,p.182;Blocketal.,2014,p.556),thuscommittingalso

toA~C.MuchofBlock’srecentworkonC~Adealswithphenomenaloverflow—the

ideathatphenomenalconsciousnessoverflowsaccessconsciousness,atopicI

addressindetailinPartII.Inaninterestingvariationonthistheme,Block(2013b)

hasarguedthatattentionandconsciousnessseemtobeofdifferent“grains”—

differentresolutionorrichnessofdetail.Thatis,thereisempiricalevidenceto

suggestthatthecontentofphenomenalconsciousisofamuchfinergrainthanisthe

contentofattention.99Thishasprovokedsomefascinatingdiscussion,often

specificallyaboutthedifferentinterpretationsoftheempiricaldatathatarepossible

(Block,2013a,2014b,Richards,2013,2015,2016;J.H.Taylor,2013b;Tye,2014),

someaspectsofwhichIreturntolater.

ThedebateraisedbyBlock’sgrainargumentillustratestheremarkablepropensity

tointerpretthesameempiricalworkindifferentwaystocometocontradictory

conclusions.ThisphenomenonisalsoevidentinthedebateinspiredbyKT’s

empiricalcaseforAÈCandthechallengingoftheirinterpretationsbyDP,whose

interpretationisinturnchallengedbyBarrett(2014).Thereare,ofcourse,many

complexreasonsforthisdivergenceofinterpretation,andmuchworkhasbeen

98Forachallengetotheinterpretationsofempiricalevidenceadvancedinsupportofoverflowby

Blockandothers,seeGrossandFlombaum(2017).99Oraccessconsciousness(7.2.2).

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doneinthefieldofscientificobjectivitythatshowsthatinvestigatorsarerarelyideal

objectiveinterpreters(Reiss&Sprenger,2017).Idiscussedtheimportanceof

structuringthelogicofone’sinterpretationscarefullyin1.4.7.Anotherinteresting

questioniswhetheraninvestigator’sfieldmightaffecttheirpreferredScenario.

4.3.6 InfluenceofBackground

TheliteraturetouchingonQisvast.Whilemysurvey(Appendix4)ofnearlyfifty

authorsorgroupsofauthorsisinnowayexhaustiveorrigorous,andnostrong

conclusionscanbedrawnfromit,itdoesrevealsomeinterestingpatterns.100I

summariseasimplestatisticalsurveyofauthorsbyScenarioinFigure3below.101

Whilethereisnoclear“majority”view,A=CandAÈCaresignificantlymore

popularthantheothertwoliveScenarios.Whenwecometoconsidertheacademic

fieldsofauthors,wefindthatwhileboththeseScenarioshavearoughlyequal

numberofproponentsamongthephilosophicalandnon-philosophicalcamps,AÉC

andCÉAshowamoreskewedpattern.Norecentnon-philosophershaveespoused

CÉA(bothWolfeandIwasakiwerewritinginthe1990s),andonlyonephilosopher

(Richards)hasespousedAÉC.

100Onestartlinglyobviouspatternisthatwhilethereisaspreadofauthorsgeographicallyandeven

acrossdisciplines(includingmedicine,socialscience,mathematics,ophthalmology,etc.,see

Appendix4,Table14),thereisaremarkablegenderimbalanceamongleadauthors.Ofthe48here

classified,only4arefemale(92%male):ArienMack(A=C);ValerieHardcastle(AÈC);Catherine

Tallon-Baudry(AÈC);andCarolynDiceyJennings(CÉA).Thisisallthemoreremarkablegiventhat

thevastmajorityofdiscourseonQsurveyedhereoccurredinthelast30years,ratherthanbeing

spreadovercenturies,andislikelyanextrememanifestationofthegenderimbalanceinphilosophy

moregenerally(Holtzman,2016;Hutchison&Jenkins,2013)andinneuroscience(González-Álvarez

&Cervera-Crespo,2017).101This,bytheway,illustratesanotherbenefittoSTF.Itmakesthiskindofmeta-analysismuch

easier.

144

Thefiguresarenotstatisticallysignificant,buttheremaybegoodreasonbehindthis

pattern.Italmostcertainlyliesinthehistoryofthestudyofthemindoverthepast

hundredyearsorso.

“Mostpsychologistsworkingonattention,becauseofthe

intractabilityoftheproblemofconsciousness,hadeitherno

interestinconsciousnessornowaytoconnecttheirfindingswith

considerationsaboutconsciousness.”(Montemayor&Haladjian,

2015,p.18)

“Studiesofattentionareamainstayofcontemporarycognitive

science.Understandingthemechanismsofattentionhasprovedto

beessentialforunderstandingarangeofinformation-processes,

notleasttheprocessesofvision.Bycomparison,and

Figure3Thepreponderanceofphilosophersvsnon-philosophersamongtheScenariosofSTF.ThedataandsomenotesonmethodologyforthissurveymaybefoundinAppendix4.

145

notwithstandingsomerecentwork,attentionhasbeena

peripheralconcernforphilosophers”(Stazicker,2011b,p.1).

Oneplausiblestorymightgosomethinglikethis.Philosophershavespentalotof

theirtimeovertheyearsponderingproblemstodowithphenomenal

consciousness,andverylittletimeponderingattention.Whentheyfinallyturned

theirmindstothequestionoftherelationshipbetweenthetwo,someofthemat

leastweresomehow“primed”toseeconsciousnesseverywhere,butlesslikelyto

recogniseattention.Thus,intheeventtheyrejectedA=CandAÈC,theywerethus

farmorelikelytoendupespousingtheScenariowhereconsciousness

predominates,namelyCÉA.Asimilarstorymaybesaidofnon-philosophers:

psychologists,neuroscientists,biologists,andthelike,inwhichfieldsspeakingof

“consciousness”wasforsometimealmostataboo.Nodoubt,otherstoriesmaybe

told.Thisseemslikeafascinatingareaforfutureresearch.AsIhaveadmitted,the

smallsamplesizeofthissurveylimitsitsstatisticalsignificance,butitwouldbe

interestingtohaveaquestionlikethisincludedinanyfuturelargescalesurveysof

theviewsofphilosophers,likethoseofBourgetandChalmers(2014),orthat

conductedbyPhilosophyNow(2012).

4.3.7 ConsensusPosition?

ThespreadofauthorsacrosstheScenariosjustifiestheinferencethatQremainsan

openandhighlycontroversialquestion.Butifthereisnoconsensusonananswerto

Q,canweatleastidentifyapredominantposition?Thistooturnsouttobeavexed

issue.Isapositionpredominantamong“thefolk,”oramongscientistsgenerally,or

amongphilosophersofmind,oramongthatsmallgroupofpeoplewhohave

researchedthespecificquestionoftherelationshipofattentiontoconsciousness?

Wemustalsobewarelestwefallpreytothefallacyofargumentumadpopulum—

majoritiesoftengetthingswrong.Thesearchforapredominantpositioncanbe

146

complicatedbythedesireofsomeauthorstooveremphasisethepositiontheyare

arguingagainstinordertomaketheirargumentsbraverandmoredaring.With

theseandothercaveatsinmind,itmayseemthatthesearchforapredominant

positionissomethingofafool’serrand.Butwecangleansomeusefulinsightsfrom

theattempt.Therearemanyopinionsonwhatconstitutesthepredominantposition

onQintheliterature.Forexample,

“psychologistshavebeenincreasinglyconfidentthatitwillturn

outthateverythingthatoneisconsciousofisathingtowhichone

isattending”(Mole,2008a,p.93).

“Theseresultsledmanytosuggestthatattentionandawareness

areinextricablylinked.Broadlyspeaking,thiswasastandard

assumptionformanyyears”(Cohenetal.,2012,p.411).

“Mostresearcherscloselylinkattentionwithawareness(equated

herewiththecontentsofconsciousexperience),arguingthatthe

twoalwaysoccurtogether.Thatis,attendingtoanobjectisthe

sameasbecomingconsciousofit”(Koch&Tsuchiya,2012,pp.

103–104).

ThissuggeststhatauthorsfromavarietyofScenariosandfieldsseethatthe

predominantview,theincumbentviewonlyrecentlybeingchallenged,hasbeenA=

C(atleastforthepastthirtyyears).AnotherexampleofthisisAllport,whogoesas

farastosuggestthatintheworldofpsychologyatleast,attentionwasthoughtof

almostasbeingidenticalwithconsciousness.

“Thestudyof‘attention’beganinphenomenology.‘Everyone

knowswhatattentionis’,wroteWilliamJamesin1890.Ninety

yearslaterthewordisstillused,byotherwisehard-nosed

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informationprocessingpsychologists,asacodenamefor

consciousness(Allport,1980,p.113).”

Butontheotherhandothershaveportrayedthedebateasbeingmoreequally

balanced(DeBrigard,2010,p.190;Schwitzgebel,2007,p.7).Theseauthorshave

highlightedthecontinuingdisagreementthatcharacterisesthecontemporary

discourse.

“Ithasbeenrepeatedlymaintainedthatattentionfacilitates

consciousperception.However,itremainscontroversialwhether

ornottheregionoutsideoftheattentionspotlightisconsciously

perceived.”(Iwasaki,1993,p.229)

“Yet,aminoritytraditioninpsychology,goingbacktothe19th

century,emphasizesthatattentionandconsciousnessarerelated

yetdifferent,andthatonecanattendtoanobjectorfeatureofan

objectwithoutbecomingawareofit.”(Koch&Tsuchiya,2012,p.

104).

Andthentherearethose,likeMole(2008a,p.86),whopresentsthe“commonsense

view”—contrarytotheviewofthe“psychologists”—asbeingCÉA:“Accordingto

commonsensepsychology,oneisconsciousofeverythingthatonepaysattentionto,

butonedoesnotpayattentiontoallthethingsthatoneisconsciousof.”DeBrigard

(2010)challengesMole’scharacterisationofthe“commonsenseview.”Andthere

arethosewhoconsiderAÉCtobethepredominantview:

“Thereisanearconsensusontheclaimthatattentionisnecessary

forconsciousness…[but]therearemanywhobelieveattentionis

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notsufficientforconsciousness—thatattentioncanbedeployed

formentalstateswhichareneverconscious”(Barrett,2014,p.9).

AndthentherearethosewhoconsiderthepredominantviewtobeAÈC.

“Investigationsintotherelationshipbetweenattentionand

awarenessappeartoagreeononething;theformerisneither

necessarynorsufficientforthelatter”(R.Hine,2015,p.52).

OrthatthecasehasbeencomprehensivelymadeforAÈC.

“Wenowknow,contrarytomanypeople’sintrospectiveintuitions,

thatattentionandawarenessaredissociable:attentionofvarious

typescanfunctionintheabsenceofconsciousnessandthereis

someevidencethattheremaybeconsciousexperiencewithout

attentionorreport.Wenowhaveanideaofthekindsofcognitive

andperceptualprocessingthatcanoccurintheabsenceof

awareness,andhowthesemaydifferfromconsciousprocessing”

(Blocketal.,2014,p.556).102

Finally,therearethosewhotakeasomewhatmorepessimisticview.

102Theopinionpiecefromwhichthisquotecomeshasattachedtoitthenamesofnolessthaneight

distinguishedresearchersinthefield,manyofwhomIhaveclassifiedaboveasproponentsofAÈC.

149

“‘Everyoneknowswhatattentionis’isoneofthemostoft-quoted

remarksevermadebyWilliamJames(1890).Astimesgoesby,

researchersarebecomingmoreandmorescepticaloftheveracity

ofthisclaim,andsomehaveevenarguedthat‘itwouldbecloserto

thetruthtosaythat“nobodyknowswhatattentionis”’(Pashler,

1998;Styles,1997,p.1).Ithinkphilosophersofmindcouldbenefit

fromthisscepticism.Thereviewedstudiessuggestthatthereis

littleagreement,insofarasourcommonsensepsychologyis

concerned,abouttherelationbetweenattentionand

consciousness”(DeBrigard,2010,pp.199–200).

Perhapswhatweseehereisapatternofgrowingdisagreementovertime.Whatwas

oncetakenpredominantly,especiallyinpsychologycircles,tobethereceivedview,

A=C,hasnowcomeintoquestionsomuchthatwecannolongerspeaksensiblyofa

“predominantview.”58%(7outof12)oftheauthorsorgroupsofauthorscitedin

favourofA=Cpublishedtheirviewsbeforetheyear2000,comparedtoonly28%(5

outof18)ofthoseinfavourofAÈC.Ifanything,thetideappearstobegently

turningtowardsagrowingpopularityofAÈC.

4.3.8 UsefulnessofSTF

WehavenowseentheSTFinaction.Itisworthrecappingthebenefitsitbringsto

thestudyoftherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness,benefits

illustratedintheforegoingdiscussion.STFhasprovidedanexhaustiveandprecisely

partitionedconceptualspaceagainstwhichtheviewsofeveryauthorconsidered

havebeensituatedandcanbemoreeasilyandfruitfullycompared.Itsapplication

helpstoclarifytheinitiallyambiguousviewsofsomeauthorsonQ,andprovidea

betterunderstandingofwhattheyentail.

150

WhilealmostalltheviewsintheliteraturefallunderoneofthefourchiefScenarios,

theavailabilityoftheotherScenarioshasalsoprovedusefulintheevaluationof

viewsatthefringesofthedebate.Further,discussionofScenarios,ratherthanjust

someCombinations,hashelpedputspecificempiricalfindingsandparticular

individualargumentsintocontext,andhelpedtorevealtheirsignificancetoQ.

Finally,thissurveystructuredupontheSTFhasbroughtintosharpreliefsome

interestingoverallpatternsinthepositionsofauthors,patternsworthyoffurther

investigationforthelighttheymayshedonthemeta-topicofhoworwhyan

investigatorcomestopreferaparticularpositionoverothers.

4.4 KindsofRelationship

TheSTFdevelopedabovemerelydescribesthepossiblepatternsofrelative

occurrenceoftwoentities,asIsaidearlier.Whatitdoesnotcapturearethereasons

forthesepatterns.Inthissection,Isurveythelogicallypossiblereasonsforthe

patterns,providingoptionsfromwhichwecanchoosetodescribemorefullythe

relationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.Myapproachisrelativelysimple,

butsufficientforthepurposesofQ,withoutdelvingintorelationshipsatdifferent

levels(e.g.,Marr,1982),ordeeperphilosophicaltheorisingaboutthenatureof

causation(e.g.,Woodward,2003,2014).

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4.4.1 TheOptions

Thereappeartobefourpossibletypesofrelationshipbetweentwoentitiessuchas

attentionandconsciousness.103Inthissection,Ioutlineandillustrateeachofthem,

mainlytoprovideoptionsfromwhichtochoosebasedontheargumentspresented

inPartII,althoughIwillmakesomeinitialtentativeconclusionsonthetopichere.

Thefourkindsofrelationshipbetweenattention(A)andconsciousness(C)are:

Table4.Fourkindsofrelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.

• IdentityHypothesis(IH)

o AandCaretwonamesforthesamething.

o CfullyconstitutesCandCfullyconstitutesA.

• PartialConstitution(PC)(orpartialidentity)

o AandCshareparts,buteach(oratleastone)hasatleastonepartthat

isnottheother.

o Subtypes:

§ ApartiallyconstitutesC.

§ CpartiallyconstitutesA.

§ AandCpartiallyconstituteeachother.

103CompareKozuchandKriegal’s(2015)similardiscussionofpossiblereasonsunderlyingtheneural

correlatesofconsciousness,andYlikoski’s(2013)discussionofcausationandconstitution.

152

• Causation(CA)

o AandCareconnectedbyacausalchainofsometype.104

o Subtypes:

§ AcausesC(AàC).105

§ CcausesA(CàA).

§ BothAàCandCàA.

§ Complexcausalchains:e.g.,XcausesAandC;orXcausesbothY

andZ,YcausesA,ZcausesC);etc.

• MereCorrelation(MC)

o AandCarecorrelated,co-instantiated,orco-occurwithoutidentity,

constitution,orcausation.

4.4.2 WhichOption?

Whichoftheseoptionsistheonethatdescribestheoverallrelationshipbetween

attentionandconsciousnesswithinacognitiveeconomy?Howdoweevengoabout

answeringthatquestion?Someoftheseoptionscanbesupportedordiscountedon

purelyanalyticalbases.Butmostly,choosingbetweentheseoptionsisanempirical

matter,requiringempiricalevidence.

Animportantpointtonoteisthatsomeofthesefouroptionsexcludethepossibility

ofothers.IfMCobtains,then—byitsverydefinition—noneoftheotherthreecan

possiblyobtain.IfIHobtains,thenPCandMCcannotobtain.SomeformofCAmight

104Block(2007,p.482)alsodistinguishescausationfromconstitution.105Thearrowssignifytheconceptofcausationgenerallywithoutengaginginthedeepwatersofits

metaphysics.

153

obtain,dependingonhowweunderstandcausationandconstitution.Similarly,ifPC

obtains,thenIHandMCcannotobtain,butsomeformofCAmightobtain,depending

onhowweunderstandcausationandconstitution.AndifsometypeofCAobtains,

MCcannotobtain,butIHorsomeformofPCmightobtain,dependingonhowwe

understandcausationandconstitution.KeepinmindthatalthoughIamaddressing

therelationshipwithinawholecognitiveeconomy,thereisnoapriorireasonwhy

thereshouldnotbedifferentrelationshipsindifferentregionsofthateconomy,and

theremaynotbeasingledescriptionthatcapturesthewholecognitiveeconomy

accurately.

WhilstIaimtoarriveatareasonablyconfidentanswerastowhichScenarioobtains

forattentionandconsciousness,Ihavefarlessconfidenceaboutarrivingata

confidentanswerastothekindofrelationship—thereasoninsomesense,behind

thisScenario—inthistreatise.Weknowtoolittleatthisstageaboutthebrain’s

innerworkings.Theneuralcorrelatesofbothattentionandconsciousnessareyetto

bedefinitivelyidentified.Thecomplexityofneuralinteractions—likebiological

systemsmoregenerally—defieslawlikedescription(Mitchell,2000;Smart,1959).

Andthereremainsayawningexplanatorygulfbetweenmechanicaldescriptionsof

brainactivityandpsychologicalphenomena—atbest,wehaveatpresent

correlations,butlittleinthewayofgenuinelyexplanatoryreductions.

4.4.3 RelevancetoQ.

Icontentmyself,therefore,withsomesimpleobservationsastohowtheoptions

aboverelatetoQ,andtheemploymentoftheseobservationsintherestofthis

treatisewheretheyarehelpful.

IHmakesQtriviallytrue—ifattentionandconsciousnessarejustthesamething,

thenofcourse,eachisnecessaryandsufficientfortheother.Wesawabovethat

whileA=CisaviableScenario,itisbynomeanstheonlyone,andeventhosewho

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espouseitdonot,byandlarge,thinkofattentionandconsciousnessasbeing

identical.Forexample,A=CPosner(1994)explainstherelationshipofattention

andconsciousnessusingtheanalogyoftherelationshipbetweenDNAandlife

(4.3.1),whicharecertainlynotidentical,evenifinourearth-boundexperience,they

universallyco-occur.106

MCmakesQtriviallyfalse—ifthereisnoconstitutiveorcausalconnectionbetween

attentionandconsciousness(andthereisnootherkindofsubstantiveconnection

thanthesetwo),thenwhenevertheycorrelate,theydosocoincidentally,totally

contingently.Thereisnonecessityorsufficiencybindingthemtogether.Sucha

situationwouldindeedberemarkable,giventhefrequencywithwhichattentionand

consciousnessco-occur,soItakethisoptionalsotobehighlyimplausible.

PCandCAbearinmuchmorecomplexwaysuponQ,morecomplexthanIcanfully

discusshere.Forexample,ifattentionpartiallyconstitutesconsciousness,thenit

maybethatconsciousness—orsome“part”thereofnotconstitutedbyattention—

canoccurwithoutattention.Butitmayalsobethat,giventhespecificfeaturesof

humancognition,thisneveractuallyhappens,andeveryinstanceofconsciousness

doesindeedco-occurwithaninstanceofattention.Liferequiresmuchmorethan

justDNA,butitmaybethatwithoutDNA,lifeneverinfactoccurs(atleastonearth).

Andthecomplexityoftheinfinitenumberofpossiblepatternsofcausalchains

underCAmakesanyoftheScenariospossibleunderthisoption.

106ThereareofcourselifeformsthatdependonRNAinsteadofDNA,butassumeforthepurposesof

thisdiscussionthat“DNA”coversanykindofgeneticnucleicacid.

155

4.5 ChapterSummary

Inthischapter,IdevelopedaSTFforclassifyingthepossiblepatternsofco-

occurrenceofattentionandconsciousness.Anyparticularcognitionmaybe

characterisedbyoneoffourCombinations,andwithinawholecognitiveeconomy,

thesefourCombinationsmaybecombinedinanyoneofsixteenpossibleScenarios,

ofwhich,fourareliveoptionsasanswerstoQ.IarguedthatSTFisamorecomplete,

precise,andoptimalframeworkforaddressingQthananyexistingframework,and

appliedittoreviewtheliteratureonQ,bringing(Ihope)agreaterdegreeofclarity

andfacilitatingcomparisonbetweentheviewsofdifferentauthors.Tobetter

elaboratethenatureoftherelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness—the

reasonforananswertoQ—Idescribedfourbroadkindsofrelationshipandtheir

relevancetoQ.

Employedtogetherwiththedefinitionsofconsciousness(Chapter2)andattention

(Chapter3),STFandthefourkindsofrelationship(thischapter),providethe

frameworkformypursuitofananswertoQinPartII.Butthereremainsonemore

foundationtolayfirst.Inthenextchapter,Irecruittheoft-invokedconceptof

workingmemory.

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5 WorkingMemory

5.1 IntroducingWorkingMemory(WM)

“Selectiveattentionandworkingmemory(WM)havetraditionally

beenviewedasdistinctcognitivedomains…However,agrowing

numberofpsychologicalandneuroscientificstudieshaverevealed

extensiveoverlapbetweenthesetwoconstructs”(Gazzaley&

Nobre,2012,p.129).

“Theproposedlinkbetweenworkingmemoryandconscious

awarenessalsorepresentsalivelyandexcitinginterface”

(Baddeley,2003,p.837).

“TheconsensusamongWM-andconsciousnessresearchersisthat

thepsychologicalprocessesthatunderlieWM,attentionand

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awarenessarecloselyintertwined…Thenatureoftheserelations,

however,islessconsensual”(Hassinetal.,2009,p.666).

Asthequotationsaboveshow,theconceptofworkingmemory(WM)isintimately

associatedwithbothattentionandconsciousnessandpopsupregularlyinQ-related

discussions.Inthischapter,IbrieflydescribetheriseofWMmodelsandmetaphors,

describethem,andprobethemalittletoextractfromthemsomehighlyrelevant

observationsandpertinentQuestionsthatwill,todifferingdegrees,contribute

significantlytomyargumentsinPartII.TheseQuestionsarebynomeansoriginal,

buttheyservetofocusmythinkingintheargumentsthatfollow.Iwillonlybeable

toaddressoneoftheminsubstantialdetailinChapter8—theCapacityQuestion

(5.3.2.3).Later,IemployWMto—amongotherthings—spelloutthetemporal

natureofbothconsciousnessandattention,provideaprincipledwayfordissecting

outExecutiveAttentionfromLiberalAttention,andpavethewayfordefiningthe

capacitylimitationsofExecutiveAttentionimplementedintheexecutiveofWM.

5.2 History

“Wemaysomedayhopeforaunifiedscienceofmemory,butthat

dayisnotyetathand…thegreattruthofthefirst120yearsofthe

empiricalstudyofhumanmemoryiscapturedinthephrase‘it

depends.’”(H.L.Roediger,2008,pp.227,228).

AfullunderstandingofWMsituatesitagainsttheconceptofmemorygenerally.The

natureofmemorygenerallyhasbaffledhumansatleastsincetheGreekpoetHesiod.

159

Plato’smetaphorofmemoryasanimpressionmadeinsoftwax,107describedas

“probablythemostinfluentialimageintheentirehistoryofdiscourseabout

memory”(Danziger,2008,p.28)wastheforerunnertomanyothermetaphors

throughhistory,someofwhichIdiscussbelow,continuingalongandvenerable

tradition.Historically,memorywasalsoatopicofmajorinteresttoAristotle,

Augustine,Avicenna,Averroes,AlberttheGreat,Aquinas,andalsotophilosophers

whoseinitialisnot“A:”Descartes,Hobbes,Locke,Hegel,Schelling,Fichte,Nietzsche,

Bergson,Husserl,Heidegger,Deleuze,andDerrida(Nikulin,2015).

Inmoderntimes,definingmemoryseemstohavebecomemorecomplicated,rather

thanless.Roediger(2008)pointsoutthattheoptimisticallysimplelawsoflearning

andmemoryproposedbyresearchersintheearlytwentiethcenturydissolvedaway

inthefaceofincreasinglysophisticatedexperimentationandtheoreticalwork,so

thatheisabletostatethat“nogenerallawsofmemoryexist.Allstatementsabout

memorymustbequalified”(p.227).Evena“law”asintuitiveandbasicas“repetition

improvesmemory”is“eitherinvalidorneedsqualifying”(p.228).Roediger’spointis

notthatreplicablepatternsofmemorybehaviourdonotexist,butratherthatsuch

patternsarealwayshighlyspecifictoaverynarrowrangeofcircumstances.Whatis

lackingisanykindofuniversalortrulygeneralizablelawsofmemory(hencethe

universalityofthequalification,“itdepends”).

Eventheplausiblysimplertaskcategorisingtypesofmemoryhasprovenquite

difficult.Inhiseloquentpaper,Tulving(2007)revealsthevast,confusedlandscape

ofmemorytaxonomyinthecontemporaryliterature.Wehavealreadyseen,in

relationtoattentionandconsciousness,thatbrainsaremessy,mushythings,and

theiractivitiestendtodefyneatclassification.Evenwhatqualifiesasamemorycan

beunclear,asinthecaseofRilkeanmemory—autobiographicalmemorythatis

neitherepisodicnorsemantic—thingsliketheemotionalresponseonehasto

certainstimuliwithoutconsciouslybeingawareofthepastexperiencesthatarethe

reasonforthatresponse(Rowlands,2015).Classificationsofdifferentkindsof

107Theaetetus191c-e.

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memory,then,oftenbearlittlerelevancetoeachother,orcanpickoutdifferent

aspectsofthesameprocess.MichaelianandSutton(2017,sec.2)suggestthatthere

isanemergingconsensusonthetaxonomyadvocatedbySquire(2004,2009),which

dividesmemoryintodeclarativememory,whichrepresentstheworldandaimsat

truth—e.g.rememberingthataneventhappened(includingepisodicorrecollective

memoryandsemanticorpropositionalmemory),andnon-declarativememory,

whichisadefinitionbyexclusion(whateverisrememberedbutisnotDeclarative)

andwhichdoesnotrepresenttheworldoraimattruth—e.g.rememberinghowto

dosomething.Butthisdistinctionseemsquiteindependentofthedistinction,say,

betweenimplicit(subconscious)andexplicit(conscious)memories,orbetween

directmemory,whichcomestoasubjectautomatically,andgenerativememory,

whichtakesanefforttorecall.

Oneofthememoryconceptsthathasemergedandprovedpopularinrecenttimesis

workingmemory(WM).Itdevelopedoutoftheolderdistinctionbetweenwhatwe

mightcallshort-termmemory(STM)andlong-termmemory(LTM),althoughthose

technicaltermsaresomewhatlatearrivals.108Intuitively,weallknowthedifference

betweenremembering,say,aphonenumberforsecondstominutes,thenforgetting

it,andrememberingaphonenumbermoreorlesspermanently.Inthedaysbefore

writingemerged,manyculturesdevelopedquitesophisticatedpracticesfor

transferringinformationfromSTMtoLTM,oftenresultinginquiteprodigiousfeats

ofmemorisinghugenarrativeswithstunningaccuracy.Today,thisartispracticed

usingancienttechniquessuchasthe“mindpalace”andisthesubjectofintense

international-levelcompetition.109

WhiletheconceptofLTMremainsquiteviabletoday—inthatitseemstocapturea

genuinelydistinctandrelativelywell-circumscribedcognitiveability—theconcept

108Someothertermsofhistoricalinterest(althoughtheystillpopupinthecontemporaryliterature)

includeprimary(=STM)vsecondary(LTM)memory,duetoJames(1890),andimmediatememory

(STM),whichfirstenjoyedavogueinthe1880s(Ackerman,Beier,&Boyle,2005,p.31).109Seeforexample,Pillai(2016).TheWorldMemorySportsCouncilhasconductedaninternational

memorycompetitionsince1991,seehttp://www.worldmemorychampionships.com.

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ofSTMhasfallenoutoffavourinmanycircles(thoughnotall)inrecentdecades.110

UnlikeLTM,STMhascometobeseenasmoreofasuiteofdistinctabilities,suchas

iconicmemory,fragilevisualshorttermmemory,andWM.111Theconnection

betweenWMandtheearlierconceptofSTMisthereforeinsomewaysoneof

supersession:“Theterm‘workingmemory’evolvedfromtheearlierconceptofSTM,

andthetwoarestillonoccasionusedinterchangeably”(Baddeley,2012,p.3).112It

isadistinctionthatmanyauthorsstillfindofscientificinterest,113andthetermSTM

hascertainlynotdisappearedoverthehistoricalhorizon.

5.3 WhatisWorkingMemory?

Sinceitarose,theconceptofWMhasbeenremarkablypervasive.AsBaddeley

(2012,p.2)notes,hisrecentreviewofworkingmemory(Baddeley,2007)contained

50pagesofreferences,andaccordingtoLogieandCowan(2015,p.315)Baddeley

andHitch’s(1974)originalchapterhasbeencitedmorethan10,000timesinthe

110ForanrecentaccountofthedemiseofSTM,seeDanziger(2008,pp.176–182).Foranearlier

account,seeCrowder(1982).ForanaccountoftheroleofmeasurementofSTMinthedemiseofthe

conceptofSTM,seeRichardson(2007).111Foraniceaccountofthehistoryofthefractionationofmemorygenerally,anditsempirical

foundation,seeSquire(2004).ForthehistoryofthemorespecificrelationshipbetweenLTM,STM,

andWM,seeCowan(2008).112Thefirstuseoftheterm“workingmemory”wasinreferencetocomputermemoryinNewelland

Simon(1956),whichinspireditfirstuseinhumancognitionbyMilleretal.,(1960).Logie&Cowan

(2015,p.320)provideanoverviewofideasthatleduptoWM,fromLocke,throughWundt,James

andBroadbent.FormoreaccountsofthehistoryofWM,seeBaddeley(2003,2010,2012),Postle

(2006),Repovš&Bresjanac(2006),andSoto&Silvanto(2014).113Seeforexample,thediscussionofthedistinctionbetweenSTMandWMinrelationtointelligence

inAckermanetal.,(2005).

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scientificliterature,justifyingtheirassessmentofitasbeing“oneofthemost

influentialworksinthefieldofcognitivescience.”BaarsandFranklin(2003)among

others,agreewiththisassessment:“BaddeleyandHitch’sworkingmemorymodelis

probablythemostinfluentialintegrativemodelofcognitionofthelastfewdecades”

(p.166).Butthecostofsuchpervasivenessisthat—likeattentionand

consciousness—theconceptofWMhasbeenreworked,reimagined,andreusedina

bewilderingrangeofways.114

“Oncetherewasashort-termstore—asystemresponsibleforthe

memorizationofasmallnumberofchunksforthetimeoneneeds

towalkfromthephonebooktothetelephone.Overthepastthree

decades,thissystemhasevolvedintothecentralstageofhigher-

ordercognition.Nowcalledworkingmemory,ithasbeen

associatedwithanincreasingnumberofbasiccognitivefunctions,

uptoapointwhereitsometimesappearsasaconceptualragbag

foreverythingthatisneededforsuccessfulreasoning,decision

making,andactionplanning”(Oberauer,Süß,Wilhelm,&Wittman,

2003,p.167).

InthistreatiseIwillbracketthisongoingdebateoverhowbesttocapturethatbasic

cognitivefunctionofholdingcontentforbriefperiodsoftimeandmanipulatingitin

useful,oftengoal-orientedways.Likeattention,WMseemstomeltintomanyother

cognitiveprocesses(Cowan,1999,p.63).ButmodelsofWMprovideenoughclarity

ofconcepttoallowustoachievewhatisnecessaryformyargumentsinPartII—a

principledwayofdemarcatingExecutiveAttention(ratherthanLiberalAttention)

andoftherebyidentifyingitspresenceorabsence,andanalysingitsrelationshipto

114ForadiscussionofthemanyusesofthetermWM,seeCowan(2017)andPoldrackandYarkoni

(2016,pp.600–601).Thisispartiallyduetothetoothbrushproblem:“Psychologiststreatother

peoples’theoriesliketoothbrushes—noself-respectingpersonwantstouseanyoneelse’s”(Mischel,

2008).

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consciousness.Tothatend,IconsiderthetwochiefclassesofmodelsofWM,

multicomponentmodelsandembeddedprocessmodels.

5.3.1 MulticomponentModels

Workingmemoryis:

“ahypotheticallimited-capacitysystemthatprovidesthe

temporarystorageandmanipulationofinformationthatis

necessaryforperformingawiderangeofcognitiveactivities”

(Baddeley,2012,p.7).

TheauthorofthesewordsisAlanBaddeley,who,togetherwithGrahamHitch,

introducedtheBaddeleyHitchmodelofWM(henceforth,“BH”)thathasdominated

thefieldsincetheearly1970s(Baddeley&Hitch,1974).Toomanyauthorsto

mentionhavetakenthisbasicmodelanddevelopeditininterestingways.Baddeley

himselfidentifiesfouralternativemodelstoBH(Baddeley,2012,pp.19–22).

However,formypurposes,IwilldividecurrentlyproposedmodelsofWMintojust

twocategoriesthatIwillnowdescribe:multicomponentmodels,suchasBHandits

intellectualdescendants,andembeddedmodels,suchasthoseofCowan(1988,

1999)andPostle(2006).115Ihavetabulatedarangeofvariationsanddevelopments

ofthesetwocategories(Appendix5),aswellassomecommonmetaphors

(Appendix6),someofwhichIrefertointhediscussionsbelow.

115Thisdistinctioncouldbeseenasanapplicationofthedifferencebetweensystemsviewsand

processviewsofmemory,seeforexampleBechtel(2001).

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Initially,theBHmulticomponentmodelincludedonlythreecomponents.Thevisuo-

spatialsketchpadstoresvisualandspatialinformationforshortperiodsoftimeand

makesthemavailableformanipulationbythecentralexecutive,andthe

phonologicalloopsimilarlystoresauditoryinformation.Thecentralexecutive

subservesthemanipulationfunction.ThisisdescribedbyBaddeley(1996)asakind

ofhomunculus,aplaceholderinneedoffurtherelaboration.Butitsrolesarefairly

welldefined,andinclude,thoughtheyarenotlimitedto,accesstoLTM,attentional

controlofaction,andconsciousaccesstorelevantcontentsoftheothercomponents.

Later,afourthcomponent,theepisodicbuffer,wasaddedtoaccountforintegrated

multimodalrepresentations,whichcouldnotbeaccommodatedbythemodality-

specificvisuo-spatialsketchpadandphonologicalloop(Figure4A,below).The

centralexecutive,interactingwiththeothercomponents,isthuseminentlysuitedto

demarcatethelocusofExecutiveAttentionasdistinctfromLiberalAttention.

ThemulticomponentialnatureofBHgrewoutofempiricaldata:adissociation

betweentheeffectsofphonologicalandvisualdistractors.Thingsthatimpeded

visualWMseemedtohavelittleeffectonphonologicalWMoperatingatthesame

time,andviceversa.However,BHwasalwaysmeanttobeaconceptratherthana

detailedworkingmodel:“MyoverallviewofWMthereforecomprised,andstill

comprises,arelativelyloosetheoreticalframeworkratherthanaprecisemodelthat

allowsspecificpredictions”(Baddeley,2012,p.7).Inthesamepaper,hespeculates

aboutwaysothermodalities—andindeedtherestofcognition—mightbeintegrated

intothecoreofBH(seeespeciallyhisFigures4and5).116Thisraisesthefirst

pertinentquestion:

116TheInteractiveCognitiveSubsystemsModelofBarnard(1999)attemptstoincludeallmodalities.

Baddeley(2012,p.21)observesthatit“canalsobemappeddirectlyonto”BH.Butitalsodeparts

fromBHinsomeimportantways.Forexample,thereisanoticeableabsenceofanycentralexecutive

inthemodel,but“centralexecutivefunctionsarethemselvesaccomplishedbyprocessing

interactionsamongsubsystems”(p.298).

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TheFractionationQuestion

IstherejustoneWMsystemencompassingallmodalities/cognitive

functions,orarethereseveralsystems?

Relevance:e.g.,therelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousnessmightbeteasedapartbyconsideringhoweach

relatestodifferentcomponentsofWM.117

117IreturntotheFractionationQuestioninChapter8(2.1).

CENTRALEXECUTIVE

EPISODICBUFFER

VISUO-SPATIALSKETCHPAD

PHONOLOGICALLOOP

A

WM

Focusofattention=consciousness

B

Figure4.A.BH'smulticomponentWM.SeeFigures1and5inBaddeley(2012)forhowthismodelhasdeveloped.B.Cowan's(1988,1999)embeddedprocessesmodelofWM.

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Arelatedissuethathasbeenofsignificantempiricalinterestiswhetherthereis

suchathingasimplicitWM,WMactivitythatissubconscious.

TheSubliminalQuestion

IsthereasubconsciousorimplicitWM?

Relevance:ifthereisindeedsuchathingasimplicitWMcanitbe

attended?Thispromisestobeanarenainwhichwecanuntangle

therelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.

Hassinetal.,(Hassin,2013;Hassinetal.,2009),HsiehandColas(2012),Samahaet

al.,(2016)andmanyothershavearguedpowerfullyforimplicitWM,whilePrinz

(2012)hasarguedagainstsuchconclusions.Ifthereisindeedsuchathingas

implicitWM,thequestionarisesastowhetherattentionalstrategiesareinvolved,

whichwouldconstituteacaseofA~C(see6.2).

5.3.2 EmbeddedModels

Embeddedmodels(e.g.,Cowan,1988;Postle,2006)seeWMassomethingthat

happensinallormostcognitiveprocesses,ratherthanbeingadistinctsystemwith

itsownstructureandcomponents.ForPostle,

“workingmemoryfunctionsareproducedwhenattentionis

directedtosystemsthathaveevolvedtoaccomplishsensory-,

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representation-,oraction-relatedfunctions.Fromthisperspective,

workingmemorymaysimplybeapropertythatemergesfroma

nervoussystemthatiscapableofrepresentingmanydifferent

kindsofinformation,andthatisendowedwithflexiblydeployable

attention.Predictionsaboutthenatureofrepresentations

contributingtotheshort-termretentionofanyparticularkindof

informationaremadebyconsideringthenatureoftheinformation

thatistoberemembered,andthementalprocessesthatare

affordedbythetaskthatisbeingperformed”(Postle,2006,p.29).

Embeddedmodels(Figure4B,above)stronglyimplyawidelydistributedneural

implementation,asthiskindofimplementationreflectsthefunction.118Embedded

modelsseeWMasbeinginextricablyenmeshedinothercognitiveprocesses,or

perhapsevenarisingoremerging(inPostle’swords)fromtheoverallcognitive

economy,orpartsthereof.Thus,onembeddedmodels,thereisnodiscreteWM

store—onlysomethinglikeCowan’sideaof“activatedLTM,”wherethecontent

beingprocessedbyWMisjustLTMtracesthathavebeenactivatedinaparticular

way.119Thisraisesanothertwopertinentquestions:

TheDuplicationQuestion

ArecontentsofperceptionormemoriesretrievedfromLTM

somehowduplicatedinadistinctWMstore?

Relevance:itisimportanttounderstandwhetheroneattendstoor

becomesconsciousofinformationonlywithinWMoralsooutside

118ForadistributedaccountofWM,seeChristopheletal.,(2017).Forarecentreviewoftheneural

correlatesofWMandtheirrelationtoQ,seeFazekasandNemeth(2018,pp.3,5–6).119Foramorenuancedembeddedmodel,seeOberauer(2002).Foranargumentagainstactivated

LTMmodels,seeNorris(2017).

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ofWM.Thismaybeoneareawhereattentionandconsciousness

behavedifferently.120

TheManipulationQuestion

Whatexactlydoesitmeanwhensaythatinformationisbeing

manipulated?Howdoesstoragerelatetomanipulation?

Relevance:howdothefunctionalrolesofattentionand

consciousnessinmanipulationilluminatetheirrelationshiptoeach

other?E.g.,dotheyplaydistinctfunctionalroles?

OneofthemodelsthataddressesthisquestionisJonidesetal’s(2008)Mindand

BrainModel.Thecomplexityoftheirmodelmakesitdifficulttosummarisebriefly

(seepp.212-213fortheirownsummary),butofparticularinteresthereisthe

importantroleplayedbyattention.Inbrief,theycharacterisetheinformationtobe

manipulatedasbeingina“dormantstate,”whetherinLTMorinperceptualstores,

untilactivated.The“focusofattention”isthenjustthoseactivatedtracesthatare

accessiblefor“cognitiveaction.”Theymakesomefurtherpointsabouthowsuch

statesmightbemaintainedin,orlostfrom,thefocusofattention.Thismodelmakes

senseoftheintricateconnectionsbetweenrepresentations—the“context”ofeach

memoryorperceptualtrace—whichclearlyplayapartinhowthattracebehaves.I

considertheManipulationQuestioninalittlemoredetailbelow(5.4.2).

Standingoutsidethemulticomponent/embeddeddistinction,butcuttingacrossit,

isthecomputationalmodellingapproach,whichcanbeappliedtobothkindsof

model.MiyakeandShah(1999)presentanumberofverydetailedattemptsat

120Iaddressthisquestion5.4.1,7.2.1.3,and9.3.2).Oneaccountofactualneuralduplicationoftraces

isthatofJacobsandSilvanto(2015).

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computationalmodellingofWM.Whilesuchapproacheshavetheirbenefits(e.g.,

Lovett,Reder,&Lebriere,1999,p.136),theyareextremelycomplex,and

susceptibletotheobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainstcomputationalism

generally(e.g.,Rescorla,2017,sec.7).

InherentinnearlyallmodelsofWMistheidea—basedonalargebodyofempirical

work—ofonlyalimitedamountofcontentbeingcapableofbeingmaintainedand

manipulatedincomplexwaysatanyonetime:

TheCapacityQuestion

Whatisthemagnitudeandthenatureofthecapacitylimitationsof

WM?

Relevance:thecapacitylimitationsofattentionandconsciousness

areinterestingquestionsintheirownrightcurrentlyunder

investigation.Yetmoreempiricalworkhasbeenconductedinto

thecapacitylimitationsofWM.Thisempiricalworkmayfruitfully

bebroughttobearontheothertwoconcepts,thushelpingto

illuminatetheirrelationship.121

Bothapproachesdealwiththequestionofcapacitylimitations.OnBH,thecentral

executive-episodicbufferaxisisoflimitedcapacity,whileonCowan,itisthefocusof

attentionthatlimitscapacity.Theemphasisinembeddedmodelsison

understandingWM,notbyteasingoutthefunctionsofitscomponents,butby

teasingouthowitfunctionswithinthebroaderschemeofcognition,whichraises

anotherpertinentquestion:

121IaddressthisquestioninsubstantialdetailinChapter8.

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TheIntegrationQuestion

WheredoesWMfit,andhowdoesWMinteractwiththerestof

cognition?

Relevance:attentionandconsciousnessarebothglobalcognitive

processes.WMpromisestohelpelucidatetherolestheyplayinthe

cognitiveeconomywithafinerresolution,andthereforepossibly

helpshedlightontherelationshipbetweenthem.

Andofcourse,aspecificsub-questionoftheIntegrationQuestionishowWMcan

helpustomakeprogressonQ:

TheCorrelationQuestion

WhatistherelationshipbetweenWM,attention,andconsciousness,

andinwhatwaysdotheycorrelatewitheachother?

Relevance:WM’sintimateconnectiontobothattentionand

consciousnessmakesitavaluabletoolforinvestigatingQ.

ThedifferencebetweentheBHandCowanisperhapsmoreadifferenceinemphasis

thananythingmoresubstantive.Multicomponentmodelstendtoemphasisea

broadlymodularstructuretoWM,althoughBaddeley(2012,p.7)goestosome

painstoexplainthathiscomponentsarecertainlynotFodorianmodules(Fodor,

1983),inthattheyaremuchlessencapsulatedandmoreintegratedwitheachother

andwithothernon-WMsystems.BurgessandHitch(2005)proposeamodelofthe

BHphonologicalloopthatconnectsitintimatelytoLTM,raisingthequestionofjust

wherethelineoughttobedrawnbetweenWMandLTM.Onemightviewtheir

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modelasmulticomponent,sinceitisexplicitlyfoundedontheBHcomponents,yetit

alsohasfeaturesofembeddedmodelsinthatthefunctionsofWMseemtobetightly

entwinedwithLTM.Nonetheless,thecomponentialcharacterofBHiscentraltoit—

itisbyunderstandingthecomponentsandthefunctionsofthecomponentsthatwe

willbuildanunderstandingofWM.Thequestionofwhetherthecomponentsare

anatomicallydistinctentitiesisofcourseleftopen.Theymaybeimplemented

neurallyineitheralocalisedorawidelydistributedfashion.Thisisaquestiontobe

answeredempirically,andhaslittlebearingontheusefulnessofthemodelasa

descriptionofhowWMfunctions.Italsoraisesthelastofourpertinentquestions:

TheNeuralQuestion

HowisWMimplementedinthebrain?122

Relevance:agreatdealofworkhasbeendoneontheneural

correlatesofconsciousness,andtoalesserextent,onthoseof

attention.IdentifyingtheneuralcorrelatesofWMshouldhelpshed

lightonboth,andthereforeontherelationshipbetweenattention

andconsciousness.

122ForanexplorationoftheplethoraofpossibleneuralmechanismsunderlyingWMseeBarakand

Tsodyks(2014)andSerences(2016).Michaelian&Sutton(2017,sec.5.2.1)addressthequestionof

whetherphilosophersoughttoengageinneuralquestionslikethis.Theshortansweris,yes.Fora

recentpresentationoftwoopposingviews,seeLundqvistetal.,(2018)andConstantinidisetal.,

(2018).

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5.3.3 Metaphors

ModelslikeBH,Cowan,andothersarenottheonlywaytounderstandWM.Plato’s

metaphorofthewaxtablet(5.2)isanearlyexampleofthetime-honouredpractice

ofunderstandingbyanalogyormetaphor(threeofwhichIdescribeinthissection),

whichhasarichhistoryinenquiryintomemory.

“Throughoutitshistory,memorydiscoursehasprovidedarich

fieldfortheplayofmetaphors.Thiscontinuedtobethecaseeven

aftermemorybecameatopicforscientificpsychology.Infact,this

areaofpsychologyisunusualinthefranknesswithwhichtherole

ofmetaphorhasbeenwidelyrecognized.Littlemorethanadecade

agoadiscussionofmetaphorsinmemoryresearchinthejournal

BehavioralandBrainSciencesdrewinsometwenty-five

contributors,thegreatmajorityofthemexperimental

psychologists.Yetwellovertwothousandyearsagometaphor

alreadyplayedamajorroleinthefirstsustaineddiscussionof

memoryinEurope,thatofPlato.Norisitdifficulttofindnumerous

examplesofmemorymetaphorsduringtheinterveningcenturies”

(Danziger,2008,p.24).

Unlikeamodel,ametaphordoesnotseektosimulateascloselyaspossiblethe

realitybeingexplained,butrathertodrawaconnectionbetweencentralorsalient

featurescommontobothrealityandmetaphor.Thehopeisthat,byrecognisingthis

similarity,thecomplextargetisbetterunderstood,sinceitis“like”themorefamiliar

metaphor.Itisimportanttonotethatthemechanismsinvolvedinproducingthe

behaviourofthemetaphorandthetargetneednotbeidentical,orevensimilar—

onlytheresultsneedtobesimilarinrelevantways.Itisthusdangeroustotake

metaphorstoofar,toextrapolateunwarrantedconclusionsfromthemaboutthe

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reality.123MetaphorshelpusunderstandthenatureofWMandplayaroleinmy

argumentsinPartII,sobelow,IdescribethreeclassesofWMmetaphors:map

rooms;boxes;andmanipulationmetaphors,tabulatedinAppendix6.

MapRoomMetaphors

WellbeforethetermWMwascoined,peoplewerethinkingabouthowwegoabout

usingtheinformationwehavetothinkandact.

“Weassertthatthecentralofficeitselfisfarmorelikeamap

controlroomthanitislikeanold-fashionedtelephoneexchange.

Thestimuli,whichareallowedin,arenotconnectedbyjustsimple

one-to-oneswitchestotheoutgoingresponses.Rather,the

incomingimpulsesareusuallyworkedoverandelaboratedinthe

centralcontrolroomintoatentative,cognitive-likemapofthe

environment.Anditisthistentativemap,indicatingroutesand

pathsandenvironmentalrelationships,whichfinallydetermines

whatresponses,ifany,theanimalwillfinallyrelease”(Tolman,

1948,p.192).

Themetaphorofthetelephoneexchangeisclearlyinadequate.Ourmindsintegrate

informationinwaysfarmoreintricateandcomplexthansimpleone-to-one

connectionsbetweendiscreteinputsandoutputs.Butwhatexactlydoesthemap

roommetaphormean?Whatexactlyisthemap?Onwhatcanvasisitdrawn

(DuplicationQuestion),andwhereisthiscanvas(NeuralQuestion)?Needtherebe

consciouscontroldirectingtheoutputs(SubliminalQuestion)?Howdoes

123Forfurtherdiscussionofmetaphorsofmemorygenerally,seePartIofGroes(2016).

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informationonthemapcometoberelatedinlaw-likewaystobothinputsand

outputs(ManipulationQuestion,IntegrationQuestion)?

BoxMetaphors

Plato’swaxtabletmetaphorisonememberofaclassofmetaphorsIwillcallbox

metaphors.Here,WMisaboxintowhichmemoriesareplacedandremovedas

needed.Thelimitedsizeoftheboximposestherequiredlimitationsonthecapacity

ofWM(CapacityQuestion),andtheideaofsomesubjectfocusingattentionand

beingawareonlyofwhatisintheboxcapturesnicelythecloserelationshipbetween

WMandattentionandconsciousness(CorrelationQuestion).Differentkindsof

objectscanbeplacedintheboxindifferentrelationstooneanother(Fractionation

Question).

Variationsontheboxmetaphorincludememory(generally,notjustWM)asa

storehouse,arepository,anarchive,ormorepoeticallyas“thestomachofthesoul”

(Augustine)orthe“repositoryofforces”(Hobbes).124Amoreinterestingvariation

onthisclassofmetaphorsistoseeWMasaworkingdesktop.125Oneremovesbooks

fromashelfandplacesthemonaphysicaldesktop,butthefilesonacomputer’s

harddriveareduplicatedinworkingmemoryandrepresentedonthecomputer’s

desktopwhiletheoriginalfilesremainintactinsitu(DuplicationQuestion).Both

kindsofdesktopexhibitlimitedcapacity.Postle(2006)characterisesthe“standard

model”ofWM(likelyreferringtoBHanditsdescendants)asbeingsomethinglike

thisdesktopmetaphor.Embeddedprocessmodelsaremorelikeareaderpickingup

abookofftheshelfandreadingitthere,ratherthantakingitbacktoadesktop.

124Malyshkin(2013,p.38).125Myowninvention.

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Oneofthethingsthemaproomandboxmetaphorsimplyisthatthereissomeonein

themaproomorlibrary,lookingatandmanipulatingtheinformationonthemapor

theitemsinthebox,takingnoteofnewinformationoritemsandmakingdecisions

andactingaccordingly.OnBaddeley’saccount,thecentralexecutivecanplaythis

roleofthemetaphoricalhomunculus126—thecontrollerofthemaproomorthe

readerinthelibrary.Infact,itispossibletoreadBaddeley’sWMasplayingtherole

ofBaars’globalworkspace:

“Thecentralcoreofworkingmemorywouldincorporateand

synthesizeinformationfrommanydifferentmodalitiesandcodes

(bothsensoryandsemantic)toarriveatanoverallconceptionof

theenvironmentandofone’scurrentsituation”(Logie&Cowan,

2015,p.318).

IthereforeuseBH’scentralexecutiveandBaars’globalworkspaceasroughly

interchangeableconceptssincetheyplaythesamerolerelevanttomydiscussionsof

Q:thepersonal-levelcoordinationofcognition,127whichplaysanintegralrolein

whatwenormallythinkofasourongoingcognitivelife.

ManipulationMetaphors

AthirdclassofWMmetaphorsfocusesonthewaycontentismanipulatedinWM.

126Foradiscussionofthehomunculusproblem,seeRamsey(2007).127SeealsoBaarsandFranklin(2003)foradiscussionofhowBHmightbeharmonisedwithBaars’

GlobalWorkspace.NotallaccountsholdtheBHcentralexecutivetobeequivalenttoBaars’global

workspace(8.6.2.3).

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“Addingtotheconfusionisthatanumberofdifferentmetaphors

areusedtorefertoworkingmemory,andtohighlightdifferent

characteristicsoftheconcept,includingthe“box”or“place”

metaphor,the“workspace”or“blackboard”metaphor,the“mental

energy”or“resources”metaphor,andthe“juggling”metaphor”

(Miyake&Shah,1999,p.2).

Thelastthreemetaphorsmentionedaboveconstituteathirdclassofmetaphorsin

additiontoboxmetaphorsandmaproommetaphors—manipulationmetaphors.The

jugglingmetaphorcapturesthelimitedcapacitytoskilfullymanipulateonlya

certainnumberofobjects,aswellastheconstantdangeroflosing“concentration”

andseeingthemalltumbletotheground,anexperienceanyonewhodabblesin

challengingIQpuzzlesknowsonlytoowell.Similarly,theideaofalimitedquantity

ofmentalenergyorresourcesbeingavailableformanipulationcapturesthesame

idea.Thisisaveryneatwaytocaptureandperhapsbegintoexplaintheempirically

observedlimitationsofWM.Itrelatesnicelytomodelsofattentionthatarebasedon

competition,suchasthatofRuff(2011),whichaccommodatesthatcloseconnection

betweenWMandattentionwehavesooftenobserved.Boxmetaphorsemphasise

thestorageofcontent,whilemanipulationmetaphorsemphasisehowcontentis

processed.ThisdualityoffunctioninWMissocentral,itisevenreflectedinthe

term:“working”and“memory,”andisworthexploringalittlefurther.

5.4 TheDual-AspectNatureofWorkingMemory

AstrikinglyconsistentfeatureofallmodelsandmetaphorsisthatWMservestwo

chieffunctions:theshort-termstorageofinformation;andthemanipulationofthis

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information(e.g.,Cowanetal.,2005).128ThismanipulationaspectofWMsetsit

apartfromotherformsofmemory(e.g.iconicmemory,LTM)whichareusually

conceivedofasservingonlythestoragefunction,andmerelyprovidingthecontent

forothercognitivesystemstomanipulate.ItalsoledBaddeleytoponderwhethera

bettertermmighthavebeen“workingattention”(Baddeley,1993b,pp.167–168),129

butasIobservedearlier,“workingmemory”doescapturethedualfunctionsnicely.

Inthissection,Ielaborateonthesetwothemesalittlemoreandusethem

specificallytodelineateasenseofExecutiveAttentionemployedinmyinvestigation

ofQinPartII.

5.4.1 Storage

WMissaidtoincludeashort-term,limitedcapacitystorethatmaintainscontentfor

moderateperiodsoftime,makingiteasilyaccessibletomanipulation.The

DuplicationQuestionraisedonewaythismightoccur:contentmaybe“copied”from

anotherlocation—sayLTM,ortemporarycontentinthevisualcortex—toadiscrete

anddedicatedWMstorehouseelsewhereinthebrain.CallthistheDuplicateStore

Model.Butthisseemsprofligate.Thebrainhasevolvedtofunctionefficiently:“we

knowthatneuraltissueandactivityareexpensive;seeAielloandWheeler(1995);

andwealsoknowthatasaresultofsuchconstraints,thewiringdiagramforthe

brainisaboutasefficientasitispossibleforittobe;seeCherniaketal.(2004)”

(Carruthers,2016,sec.4).Duplicationofidenticalcontentinmultiplesitesseemsto

128Thisfunctionaldualityinmemoryisnotnew.Senecarecognisedthatmemoriesarenotsimply

stored,butinteractwitheachotherandevolve:“Weshouldimitatebees,weshouldmingleallthe

variousnectarswehavetasted,andthenturnthemintoasinglesweetsubstance,insuchawaythat,

evenifitisapparentwhereitoriginated,itappearsquitedifferentfromwhatitwasinitsoriginal

state,”quotedinCarr(2010,p.122).Fazekas(2018,p.6)addsathirdfunctionofmonitoringof

contentinWM,butthisplausiblyfallsunderthegeneralfunctionofmanipulation.129SeealsoBeaman(2010).

178

beawasteofresources,bothintermsofneural“realestate”andenergy

consumption.Wearestilltryingtounderstandtheneuronalbasisofcontent

transferandstorage,130buttheproblemismadeworsebytherequirementforthen

amendingtheLTMtracetoconformtothemoreprocessedtraceinWM,aprocess

likelyrepeatedoverandover.Whatismore,thismodelsuffersfromallthe

problemsidentifiedabovewithboxmetaphorsofWMstorage(5.3.3.2).

SomeoftheseproblemswiththeDuplicateStoreModelmightbealleviatedifwe

positthatitonlyduplicatesinformationfromelsewhereinthebrainpartially,only

thebitsreallyneededfortheprojectathand.CallthisthePartialDuplicateStore

Model.Butthisraisesanotherproblem:howistherightsetofcontentchosenfor

duplicationinWM?ThisistherolePrinz(2012)suggestsforattention—the

gatewaytoWM.Butwhilepartialduplicationalleviatessomeoftheprofligacy

concerns,itdoesnoteliminatethem.

AmuchmoreparsimoniousmodeliswhatI’llcalltheFileDirectoryModel,takinga

cueinthetruespiritofWMresearchfromcomputerscience.Thismodelbearsan

affinitytoembeddedmodels,withWMstoringonlydynamicallyevolvinglistof

pointerstocontentinotherstores,ratherthanduplicatingthecontentitself.Thislist

defineswhatiscurrentlybeingmanipulatedby,oriseasilyaccessibleto,the

executiveorfocusofattentionofWM.Thismodelisnotonlymoreparsimonious,

butalsoinharmonywithhowweunderstandmemoryretrievaltoworkneurally.131

ItcouldplausiblybethemechanismofWMaccesstoperceptualstores.Anditsolves

theproblemofneedingtore-encoderefinedcontentintoLTM—theLTMtraces

themselves,insitu,arethethingsbeingrefined.

AfourthpossibilityistoeschewstorageinadiscreteWMstoreofanykind,even

pointers.Onsomeembeddedmodels,WMisjustactivatedLTM,orperceptually,an

increaseinconnectivitybetween,say,iconicmemoryandWM(Landman,

130E.g.,howspatialLTMisencodedandaccessed(Jadhav,Kemere,German,&Frank,2012).131Thisisstillanareaofintenseinvestigation.SeeJonidesetal.,(2008)andthearticlesin

Neuroscienceissue139(2006).

179

Spekreijse,&Lamme,2003,p.163).Inotherwords,thereisnodiscreteWMstoreat

all,notevenalistofpointers.CallthistheNoStoreModel.Itthemostparsimonious

andefficientofthefourmodels,butatthecostofcallingintoquestionthevery

conceptofWMinthefirstplace.Ifthereisnouniquestore,whycallit“memory”?

Whynotjustemploytheconceptofanexecutive,globalworkspace,orExecutive

Attentionalone?Butthiswouldbetoignorethecopiousempiricalevidenceforthe

maintenanceinsomewayofasubsetofcontentthatiscapableofbeingmanipulated

incomplexways.IftheexactmodelofWMstorageisstilluncleartous,therealityof

suchstorageremainscompelling.

5.4.2 Manipulation:ExecutiveAttentioninWorkingMemory

NoneofourfouroptionsforunderstandingthestorageaspectofWMseemswithout

complications.IreturntotheseissuesinPartII.Whatofthemanipulationaspect?

Whatareweactuallytalkingaboutwhenwespeakofstoredinformationbeing

manipulated(ManipulationQuestion)?Heretoothereseemtobetwointeresting

options.ThefirstisanadverbialinterpretationofWM.Mole(2011a)arguesthat

somecognitiveprocessescanbecharacterisedbythepredicate“attended”while

otherscannot.Attentionisnotanoun,isnotaprocess,butacharacteristicofsome

cognitiveprocesses.Similarargumentshavebeenmadeforconsciousness.Mightwe

interpretWMinthesameway?Thus,somecognitiveprocesseswouldbe

characterisedbybeing“WM’ed,”whileotherswouldnot.

Onepossibleproblemheremightbehowtoexplainthehighdegreeofintegration

andcoordinationthatisundoubtedlycharacteristicofWM.Perhapssuch

coordinationemergesnaturallyfromtheoperationsofmanydivergentcognitive

functions,butitwouldcertainlybemorelikelythatthereisindeedsomekindof

centralexecutiveasinalmostallmodelsandmetaphorsofWM(Appendices5and

6),controllingtheflowofprocessingofcontentinordertoachievehigher-order

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outcomes.Thispictureprovidesaprincipledwayfordelineatingtheconceptof

ExecutiveAttentionIdistinguishedfromLiberalAttentionin3.4.4.

Simply,ExecutiveAttentioncanbetakentobeallandonlytheimplementationof

attentionalstrategiesbythecognitiveexecutive.Thisisthecharacterisationof

ExecutiveAttentionIemploytoexploreQinPartII.Itisacharacterisationthathas

foundproponentselsewhere.Forexample,“NedBlock,however,hasinmostrecent

publicationsinterpretedhisownconceptofaccessasbeingidenticaltothecontents

of‘workingmemory’(Block,2011a;Carruthers,2017)”(Mogensen&Overgaard,

2018,p.1).ThusalsoBaddeley(1993b,pp.167–168)pointsoutthatthecentral

executivedoesnotitselfperformanystoragetasks,onlymanipulation,and

considersthecentralexecutivetobe“primarilyattentionalinnature.”Othershave

alsoidentified“ExecutiveAttention”132withtheattentionalstrategiesimplemented

bythecognitiveexecutive(Engleetal.,1999,pp.104–105;Kane&Engle,2002,p.

638).

5.5 BoundariesofWorkingMemory?

TheinvolvementofWMinquitediversecognitivefunctions(multimodalperception,

motorcontrol,etc.)threatenstobloatourconceptofWMuntilitencompassesall

cognition,muchasLiberalAttentiondoes.Again,thatwouldmakeWMafarless

usefulconcept.Fortunately,boththemulticomponentandembeddedprocesses

modelsavoidthistrap.Thisisobviousfromthecharacteristicsofthecentral

executive-episodicbufferaxis(BH)orthefocusofattention(Cowan)—theseare

empiricallydiscernibleandmeasurablesystemsthatarespecialised,oflimited

132KaneandEngle’sdefinitionofExecutiveAttentiondiffersfrommineinthatitinvolvesonly

“controlled”(top-down)attention.

181

capacity,andmanipulateselectedcontentinspecific,coordinated,goal-oriented

ways,whileanawfullotofothercognitiveprocessingisgoingonunattendedand

unconscious“inthebackground,”sotospeak.

Anotherwaytoseethisistoconsiderthestorageandmanipulationfunctionsof

WM.Intermsofstorage,thereisclearlyadifferencebetweenWMstoresand,say,

LTMoriconicmemorystores.WMstoresaredemonstrablyfarmorelimitedin

capacitythanthestoresofeitherLTMoriconicmemory,andwhileiconicmemory

storesareretainedformuchbrieferperiodsoftimethanWMstores,LTMstoresare

retainedformuchlongerperiods.Clearly,anawfullotofcontentisstoredoutsideof

WM.Similarly,whenweturntomanipulation,weseethatanawfullotofcontentis

manipulatedoutsideWM,onlysomeofwhichultimatelycomestobemanipulated

byWM,preciselythatwhichis,onmydefinition,ExecutivelyAttended.Theearly

visualprocessingthatbindscontenttogetherintoobjects,forexample,iscomplex

manipulationthatproceedsindependentofWM.133

5.6 ChapterSummary

WMisanempirically-derivedconstructthatfrequentlyintrudesintodiscussionsof

therelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousness.Inthischapter,Ihave

surveyedbrieflyitshistoryandthemodelsandmetaphorsthathavebeenemployed

tocaptureitsnature,andfoundthatthedualnatureofWM—storageand

manipulation—connectitcloselytoattention,consciousness,andtherestofthe

cognitiveeconomy.Thissurveyraisedanumberoffascinatingpertinent

questions—noneofwhichareoriginal—applicabletoWMandtoothercognitive

133IargueforthedistinctnessofExecutiveAttentionandbindingin3.4.2.Foranoverviewofthe

neuroarchitecturalintegrationofWMwiththerestofcognition,seeErikssonetal.,(2015).

182

concepts,whichservetoscaffoldinvestigationintothenatureofcognitiongenerally,

andourquesttoanswerQspecifically.Themanipulationaspectofthecentral

executive(BH)orfocusofattention(Cowan)ofWMinparticulargivestheconcept

ofExecutiveAttentionafirmfoundationandclearlydemarcatesitfromattentional

strategiesemployedelsewhereinthecognitiveeconomy(LiberalAttention),

providingaprincipledbasisparticularlyformydiscussionofoverflowing

phenomenalcontent(Chapter7)andcapacitylimitations(Chapter8).

5.6.1 ConclusiontoPartI

PartIhasexhaustivelystakedouttheconceivableterritoryofpatternsof

relationshipsbetweenattentionandconsciousness(STF)andthefourkindsof

relationship(Chapter4),andnarroweddownaninterestingandplausiblesetof

definitionsfortheconceptsofconsciousness(Chapter2),attention(Chapter3),and

WM(Chapter5).Onthisfoundationwehavenowatthetoolswithwhichtoattempt

ananswertoaspecificversionofQinPartII.

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PARTII

AddressingQ.

185

6 PullingAttentionand

ConsciousnessApart

6.1 RecapandOutlines

ThegoalofthisthesisistoaddressQ:Isattentionbothnecessaryandsufficientfor

consciousness?InthebroadliteraturethattouchesuponQ,authorsapproach

differentissuesindifferentwaysusingdifferentdefinitionstoanswerdifferent

questions.InPartI,Ilaidsomefoundationstotrytoformulateaspecificquestion

(Q)tobeansweredinaspecificway,usingspecificdefinitionsofattentionand

consciousness,andemployingaspecificideaofWM.MytaskinPartIIistoattempt

ananswertoQ,soposed:“IsExecutiveAttentionbothnecessaryandsufficientfor

phenomenalconsciousness.”Thetermsaredefinedthus:

186

Consciousness:phenomenalexperience,characterisedbyfourcore

features:“whatitislike-ness;”asituatedfirst-personperspective;

unity;andtemporality.

Attention:asuiteofmultiplyrealisablestrategiesforstructuring—

inthehumancase—cognitionsbyselectionforfurtherprocessing.

ExecutiveAttentionisthespecialcaseofattention,implementedby

thecognitiveexecutive,thatmuchoftheliteratureonQmeansby

theterm“attention.”

WorkingMemory(WM):short-term,limitedcapacitystorageand

manipulationofinformation,describedbytwoimportantmodelsof

WM:theBHmulticomponentmodel,andCowan’sembeddedprocess

model.

ThisversionofQisparticularlyinterestingandconsequentialbecauseallthreeof

theseconceptsprovidesanintuitiveanswertothequestion,“whatismy‘self’?”My

streamofphenomenalexperienceandmychainofimplementationofExecutive

AttentionalstrategiesinWMarebothhighlyplausiblywaysofcapturingthatwhich

Itaketobemymental“self.”Pre-theoretically,theyoughtthereforetocoincide

perfectly.IfExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousnesscancomeapart,I

amforcedtore-evaluatetheverynatureofmy“self.”

6.1.1 OutlineofPartII

Consciousattentioniswhatwetakemostofourdailyexperiencetobe,whilethe

cognitiveeconomyisnumericallyspeakinglargelyablackeconomy,withmostof

theprocessingoccurringintheabsenceofeitherExecutiveAttentionor

consciousness.SincetheCombinationsA&Cand~A~Carewidelyacceptedasbeing

187

instantiatedinhumancognitiveeconomies,134whichofthefourliveSTFScenarios

obtainsmustbedecidedbythestatusoftheremainingCombinations:A~CandC~A.

Mypath,therefore,tofindingananswertoQinPartIIlookslikethis:inthischapter,

IexploreputativeempiricalcasesofA~CandC~A.Whilethereisconvincing

evidenceforA~C,C~Aismorecontroversial,andIdevotethebulkofmyenquiryto

it,butfailtofindacompellingcandidate.InChapter7Iturntothemostpromising

candidateforC~A,phenomenaloverflow,andbuildastrongabductivecaseforitin

oneparticularcondition—fovealvision.InChapter8Istrengthenthecaseby

buildinganabductiveargumentfromtherelativecapacitylimitationsofattention,

consciousness,andWM.IconcludethistreatiseinChapter10bysummarising

variousanswerstovariousformsofQ,reflectinguponterritorycovered,and

drawingoutsomeinterestingimplications,consequences,andapplications.

6.1.2 OutlineofthisChapter

InthischapterIsearchforcasesofA~CandC~A.Ibegineachsearchwithsome

reflectionsonwhateachCombinationmeansinahumancognitiveeconomy,and

thenturntoasystematicsearch,notonlyoftheexperimentalliterature,butalso

rangingacrossnormalhumanexperience.SomeofthecandidatesIconsiderare(as

farasIknow)novelinthecontextofQ.MysearchforC~Arangesoverfifteen

differentcandidates(andothersconsideredinlessdetail)butisstructuredina

novelframeworkoffivedifferentwaystheremightbeC~A,giventhedefinitionsof

thetermsabove.Noneoftheseareconclusive,butasixteenth—phenomenal

overflow(Chapter7)—ismorepromising.

134FornumerousargumentsandempiricalexamplesofA&CseePrinz(2011),andKochandTsuchiya

(2007,p.17),andfor~A~CseeMackandRock(1998),andKochandTsuchiya(2007,p.17).

188

6.2 AttentionWithoutConsciousness

WhatwoulditmeantofindA~C,andarethereanysuchcasesinthehuman

cognitiveeconomy?ThesearethequestionsIaddressinthissection.Ibeginby

addressingsomepreliminaryanalyticalandmethodologicalissuesbeforeturningto

empiricalevidenceforA~C.

6.2.1 Preliminaries

Thepresenceofattentionisrelativelyeasytoidentifybyreport,behaviourally,or

evenbyneuralsignatures.Whenasubjectreportsthatshehasattendedatarget,the

veryactofreportingitselfismediatedbyExecutiveAttention,andtherefore

confirmsthepresenceofattention.Thesamemaybesaidofbehaviourssuchas

pressingagivenbuttonuponnoticingatarget.AndtheN2pccomponentisanERP

signatureofattention(Eimer,1996;Luck&Hillyard,1994).Allofthesearereliable

indicatorsofthepresenceofExecutiveAttention.

Itismoredifficulttoidentifyanabsenceofconsciousness.Unlikeattention,reportis

noguaranteethatasubjectwasnotconsciousofatarget.Thesamemaybesaidof

behaviours,andtheneuralcorrelatesofconsciousnessarestillunknown.Idiscuss

thesedifficultiesatsomelengthin7.4135andcometosomeunexpectedconclusions

in9.4.3,butfornow,Itaketheempiricalstudiesbelowattheirword,andassume

135SeealsoSimonsetal.,(2007).

189

thattheyhaveareasonablyreliableandcoherentwayofidentifyingthat

consciousnessisabsent,unlessotherwisestated.

Finally,someofthecandidatesforbothA~CandC~AwillbelocalCombinations.For

example,attendingtoatargetintheperipheryofvisionwithoutbeingawareofitis

localA~C,sinceinotherpartsofthevisualfieldthereisA&C.Othercandidateswill

beglobalCombinations.Forexample,completesensorydeprivation(6.3.3.2)is

putativelyglobalC~A,sincethereisaputativetemporaryabsenceofExecutive

Attentionthroughoutthewholecognitiveeconomy.Itisimportantineachcaseto

keepattentionandconsciousnesscomparable—nottocorrelate,forexample,global

attentionwithalocallackofconsciousness.136AglobalinstanceofaCombination

likeC~AisnotthesamethingasaScenario.AScenariodescribestheongoing

cognitiveeconomythatistheverynatureoftheorganismovertime,whereasthe

putativeC~AglobalCombinationofsensorydeprivationisatemporaryand

relativelyrarestateforasubject.

6.2.2 EmpiricalCandidatesforA~C

AllthatisneededtoestablishA~CasaCombinationinstantiatedinthehuman

cognitiveeconomyisjustoneclearcaseofanykindofExecutiveAttentionwithout

anyphenomenalconsciousnessatall,globalorlocal,andcongruentwithrespectto

myfourquestionsfrom1.4.6:Target;Timing;Variety;andConsequences

(recognisableassuchbybeingcapitalised).

136Comparetheconceptsofglobalorbackgroundconsciousnesssuchashavingawakingexperience,

ontheonehand,andlocalorspecificconsciousnesssuchasseeingaface,ontheother(Windtetal.,

2016,p.872).

190

Itturnsoutthatthelistofpotentialcandidatesisaverylongone,andIshallonlybe

abletoconsiderasmallsample.However,itonlytakesoneconclusivecaseto

establishthatA~Cisinstantiatedinacognitiveeconomy.Ithereforebeginwith

someillustrativeproblemswithsomecandidatesbeforemovingontowhatI

considertobequiteconclusivecases.Iconcludethesectionbybrieflyaddressing

somegeneralchallengestothesekindsofcases,noneofwhichchallengesare,tomy

mind,compelling.

TononiandLaureys(2009,pp.378–379)discussneurologicalevidenceforA~C.A

neuralmarkerofattention,theN2pcevent-relatedpotentialcomponent,canbe

elicitednormallybystimulithatarenotconsciouslyexperienced,duetoobject-

substitutionmasking,whichpreventstheformationofaphenomenalperceptionof

anobject(Woodman&Luck,2003).Further,WyartandTallon-Baudry(2008)137

identifiedtwodistinctanddissociableMEGpatternscorrespondingtospatial

attentionandconsciousvisualexperiencerespectively.Ofcourse,toconfidently

assertthatonehasshownadissociationbetweentheneuralcorrelatesofattention

andconsciousness,oneshouldfirstbeconfidentthatonehasidentifiedtheneural

correlatesofconsciousness.Giventhatisstillalongwayoff(Chalmers,2000;de

Graaf,Hsieh,&Sack,2012;Koch,Massimini,Boly,&Tononi,2016),138itmightbe

wisetotakethisapproachwithadegreeofcaution.

KochAndTsuchiya(2007)consideranumberofempiricalresultsthatargueforA~C

(whichIcalledKT2in1.3.1).Theseinclude:visualcrowding;priming;continuous

flashsuppression;blindsight;andfeature-basedattention(pp.17-18).Someofthese

raisedoubtswedon’thavetimetogointohere,butamongthemoreconvincing

casesisthatofcontinuousflashsuppression.KTdiscussJiangetal.,(2006),inwhich

salientstimuli(eroticimages)maskedbycontinuousflashsuppression139draw

spatialattentiontoalocationinthevisualfield,thusfacilitatingthetaskof

137SeealsoWyartetal.,(2012)andChicaetal.,(2012).138Seealsoanissuedevotedtothismatter,ofConsciousnessandCognition,2017(54).139IbelievethatKTmistakenlydescribethisascontinuousflashsuppressionratherthaninterocular

suppression.

191

identifyingtheorientationofaGaborpatchbrieflypresentedsubsequentlyatthe

samespatiallocation.Fromthis,KTdrawtheconclusionthatthesalientnudes

attractspatialattentiontotheirspatiallocationintheabsenceofconsciousness

sincethenudesaremaskedfromconsciousexperience.ThisiscertainlyExecutive

Attention,sincetheattentionalstrategiesofalertingandorienting(attention,not

theeyes)areimplementedwithintheexecutiveprocessoffollowingtheinstructions

oftheexperimenters.AndtheTimingiscongruenthere,sincethenudesareboth

unconsciousanddrawspatialattentionatthesametime.Butthereisaquestion

aboutthecongruenceoftheTarget:whilethesubjectisunconsciousoftheobject

(thenude)heisnotnecessarilyunconsciousofthespatiallocationinthevisualfield.

Andwhilethereisspatialattentiontothatlocation,thereisnoobjectorfeature

attention.WhatwouldconstituteagenuinecaseofA~ChereisA(object)~C(object)

orA(spatial)~C(spatial).ButallwecanbesureofhereisA(spatial)~C(object).The

candidatesdiscussedunderKT2arecertainlysuggestive,butallsufferfromsimilar

concerns.

MoreconclusiveistheworkofKentridgeetal.,whichhasbeenfoundationalin

establishingbothA~CandC~A(Barrett,2014,p.13).InfavourofA~C,theyshowed

thatcuesintheblindregionofablindsightpatient’svisualfieldwereabletodirect

thepatient’sattentiontoasecondregionwithoutenteringthepatient’sconscious

awareness(Kentridgeetal.,1999;Kentridge,Heywood,&Weiskrantz,2004).Ifthe

Targethereistakentobethecue,thenthefactthatithastheConsequenceof

directingthesubject’sattentionconfirmsthatthecueitselfwasExecutively

Attended,andthefactthatthecueisnotphenomenallyexperiencedconfirmsthe

absenceofconsciousnessofthecue,andbothoftheseareatthesameTime.They

latergeneralisedtheparadigmtothenormalpopulation,ratherthaninblindsight

(Kentridge,Nijboer,&Heywood,2008).Inthispapertheyciterecentworkthatuses

otherparadigms(flashsuppression,maskedpriming)thatsupportstheir

conclusions(Kanaietal.,2006;Sumner,Tsai,Yu,&Nachev,2006).Morerecently,

theyhaveshownthatnotonlycanendogenous,voluntaryattentionoccurwithout

consciousawareness,butexogenous,reflexiveattentioncanalsooccurwithout

consciousness(L.J.Norman,Heywood,&Kentridge,2015).

192

AlsoconclusiveareSotoandSilvanto(2016),whodiscussnumerousempiricalcases

ofExecutiveAttentionintheabsenceofconsciousness.140Forexample,vanGaalet

al.,(2012)arguethatthereisconsiderableevidencethatcognitivecontrol—

functionssuchas“errordetectionandcorrectionmechanisms,conflictresolution,

responseinhibition,andtask-switching”(p.1),allofwhichwouldnormally

implementExecutiveAttention—canbeactivatedandoperateuponunconscious

stimuli.Here,theTargetandTimingconditionsaremetforA~C,sincethestimulus

beingprocessedbyExecutiveAttentionisunconscious,eveniftheConsequence,the

outcomeoftheprocess,isconscious.141

Inadditiontocandidatesthoroughlydiscussedintheliterature,Iventuretosuggest

somemorethathavereceivedlittleattentionornoneatallinthecontextofQ.Ido

notpresentthemasconclusive,onlyasworthyoffurtherexploration.

Proprioceptionispositionsense—theabilitytoknowthestateofaskeletaljoint,

whetheryourrightelbowisflexedorextended,forexample,andbyhowmuch.Does

proprioceptivecontententerintoWMforprocessesimplementingExecutive

Attention?Thatseemsindubitable,asinthecaseofreachingouttopickacupoftea

140SeealsoSotoetal.,(2011).141SomefurtherstrongcandidatesforA~C:middle-levelvisualcontent(Jacob,Jacobs,&Silvanto,

2015);cognitivecontrol(Christensenetal.,2016;Lamme,2018,p.8);implicitgroupingofobjects

(Kimchi,Devyatko,&Sabary,2018);objectbasedguidance(Chou&Yeh,2012);implicitlearning

duringsleep(Andrillon&Kouider,2016andvolume122ofNeurobiologyofLearningandMemory,

2015);limbicstatusepilepticus(Monacoetal.,2005,p.156);andpriming(Doyen,Klein,Simons,&

Cleeremans,2014).Somecontroversialcandidates:vegetativestateswithalert-likefMRIactivity

(Blocketal.,2014,p.556;Klein,2017;Naccache,2006,p.3196);gazecueing(Kentridge,2011,pp.

251–252);readingandmath(Sklaretal.,2012);experientialblinkanditsdissociationfrom

attentionalblink(Pincham,Bowman,&Szucs,2016);covertpainandthehiddenobserver

phenomenon(Bitter,2010;Hilgard,Hilgard,Macdonald,Morgan,&Johnson,1978);subconscious

motivations,memoryretrieval,etc.,(Kihlstrom,1997);implicitcognitioninhypnosis(Kihlstrom,

2007,pp.451–460);andimplicitsocialcognition(Greenwald&Banaji,1995).Forgeneraloverviews

oftheresearchonA~C:KouiderandDehaene(2007);Simonsetal.,(2007);Kentridge(2011);and

Barrett(2014,pp.11–16).

193

withyourhand,whereproprioceptivefeedbackisessentialforthesmooth

movementthatpreventsspillage.142

Dowephenomenallyexperienceproprioception?Introspectionrevealsthatthereis

something“itislike”toexperienceheatonyourfingertips,143butthereseemstobe

nothing“itislike”toknowpurelyproprioceptively(perceptuallyratherthan

propositionally)thatyourelbowisflexedratherthanextended.144Whatwedo

phenomenallyexperienceaboutourelbowsisnotproprioceptivecontentbutvisual,

tactile,andbaresthetic(pressuresense)perceptualcontent,whichmustnotbe

confusedherefortrueproprioceptivecontent.Seeingyourelbowbentorfeeling

pressureintheventralskinandtensioninthedorsalmayprovidethesame

propositionalknowledge—“myelbowisbent”—butviaaverydifferentpathwayto

thatofproprioception,whichreliesonaspecifickindofstretchreceptorinthe

muscle(Binder,Hirokawa,&Windhorst,2009).ThisseemsaclearcaseofExecutive

Attentionwithoutphenomenalexperienceoflocalproprioceptivecontent.

Asimilarargumentmightbemadeinthecaseofcircadianrhythm.Researchers

recentlydiscoveredathirdtypeofreceptorintheretina—inadditiontorodsand

cones—thatsenseslightbutsendsitssignaltothehypothalamus,whereitisusedto

regulatethebodyclock(Barinaga,2002).ThismeetsthecriteriaforLiberal

Attention,butifoneconsidersbodyclockinformationtoinfluenceone’sExecutive

Attentiondecisions—acontroversialproposition,Igrant—thenthiswouldbe

anothercaseofanunconscioussensoryperceptionthatisExecutivelyAttended.

SimilarcasescanbemadefromothersensesbeyondtheAristotelianfive,suchas

142Thistaskespeciallyreliesonproprioceptionifone’seyesareclosed.143Fulkerson(2014)discussessomecomplexitieshere.144Armstrong(1995,p.248)takesproprioceptiontobephenomenalperception.Dainton(2008,p.

209)says“Thisisnottosaythatproprioceptiveawarenessiswhollysensory,butitistoanextent.”I

amarguingthatitisatleastpartiallysensory,butitisnotatallphenomenalsensation.

194

vestibularbalancesense,carbondioxidebloodconcentration(Bogen,2007,pp.

790–791),145andtheabilitytosensethesaltconcentrationintheblood.146

HowhasthecaseagainstA~Cbeenmounted?SomeauthorsrejectA~Cbecauseof

priordefinitional(4.3.2.3)ortheoretical(4.3.2.4)commitments.Amongthosewho

explicitlyargueagainstempiricalcandidatesforA~C,seriousflawsareapparent.For

example,Prinz(2011)arguesagainstputativecasesofA~C.Yethehimselfaccepts

whathecalls“unconsciousperception”(pp.2-3),whichbasicallyamounts—onhis

owndescription,andonanyreasonableinterpretation—toExecutiveAttention

(selection,furtherprocessing,influence)withoutphenomenalconsciousness.His

reasonfordenyingthatthisisA~Cisthatthelackofconsciousnessinsubliminal

perceptionisdueto“attentiondeficit”(p.4).Inotherwords,ifthecontentisnot

phenomenal,itcannothavebeenattended,sinceattentionisthe“gatekeeperto

workingmemory”(p.9),andthustoconsciousnessandreport.147AsfarasIcan

ascertain,aconvincingcasehasyettobemadeagainstthestrongestkindsof

candidatesIdescribedaboveasconclusiveinstancesofA~C.

6.2.3 InterimConclusion

IconcludefromtheforegoingthatwemaybequiteconfidentthattheCombination

A~Cisinstantiatedinthehumancognitiveeconomy.Thatlimitstheavailable

Scenariostojusttwo:AÉCorAÈC.Whatwilldecidebetweenthetwoiswhether

theCombinationC~Aisinstantiatedinthehumancognitiveeconomy.

145BogenthinksthereisaphenomenalexperienceofhighCO2bloodconcentrationthoughIwould

argueitisnotthehighCO2itself,butthestrainingmusculature,paininthemusclesetc.,thatis

experienced.146Ontheinterconnectednessofdifferentsensorymodalities,seeBleicher(2012).147IconsiderthiskindofargumentindetailinChapters7and8.Furtherpersuasivecritiquesof

Prinz’sargumentmaybefoundinBarrett(2014)andTaylor(2013a,2013b).

195

6.3 ConsciousnessWithoutAttention

Inthissection,Iaddresssomepreliminaryissuesrelatingtohowwemightgoabout

identifyingthepresenceofconsciousnessandtheabsenceofattention,andtheways

inwhichconsciousnessmightbeunstructuredbyattention.Ithenembarkupona

methodicalquestinsearchofempiricalinstancesofC~A,structuringthesearchby

classesofwaysthattheCombinationmightoccur,givenmydefinitionsofExecutive

Attentionandphenomenalconsciousness.Iconsidercandidatesfromfivesuch

classesinthischapter,mostofwhichareglobal(6.2),andfindnoneofthem

conclusive.Thenexttwochaptersarededicatedtodetailedconsiderationofa

putativecandidateforlocalC~A—thephenomenalcontentthatoverflowsExecutive

AttentionimplementedinWM.BytheendIhopetohavesettleduponAÈCasthe

mostplausibleScenarioandanswertoQ.

6.3.1 Preliminaries

Whatwoulditmeanforthecontentofcognitiontobephenomenallyconscious

withoutbeinginanywayExecutivelyAttended?InexploringA~Cabove,Idiscussed

thedifficultiesinidentifyingthepresenceofattentionandtheabsenceof

consciousness.Herewemustconsiderthemirrorimageofthosedifficulties,namely,

thedifficultiesinidentifyingtheabsenceofattentionandthepresenceof

consciousness.

InsearchingforC~A,itwillnotbeenoughtoestablishphenomenalconsciousnessin

theabsenceoftheexecutivefunctionofjustoneorafewoftheOperational

definitionsofattentionenumeratedinmytaxonomyofattention(3.3.4.2),butofall

ofthem;norofjustonekindofattention(3.2.3),butofallofthem.Forexample,

consciousnesswithoutselectionmaystillbeconsciousnesswithvigilance.

196

Consciousnesswithouttop-downattentionmaystillbeconsciousnesswithbottom-

upattention.Infact,whatweseekisconsciousness(localorglobal)intheabsence

ofanyimplementationofanycommensurateattentionalstrategiesbythecognitive

executive.

IdentifyingthepresenceofExecutiveAttentionisinsomewayseasierthan

identifyingitscompleteabsence.Empirically,absenceisalsousuallyinferredfrom

reportbythesubject,orbyobservingtheirphysicalbehaviour,orbymeasuring

physiologicalparameterssuchastheEEG,MEG,fMRI,etc.,correlatesofattention(or

rather,theabsenceofsuchcorrelates,inoursearch).Butthisisnotoriouslydifficult,

anditmaybeonereasonwhyresearcherssuchasKochandTsuchiya(2007)resort

insteadthesomewhatlesssatisfactory“near-absenceofattention”(4.2.4.2).A

subjectmightnotreporttheirattending,mightnotexhibitanyovertbehaviour

associatedwithattending,andmightnotshowclearneuralsignaturesofattending,

yetstillbeattending(Fazekas&Nemeth,2018).

Identifyingthepresenceofconsciousnessalsopresentssomemajorchallenges.In

caseswherereportisreliable,wecantakethatasavalidmeasure.Butthereare

situationswhenwehavegoodreasontoquestionthereliabilityofreport.Iaddress

someofthesesituationsastheyariseinthediscussionbelow.Objectivemeasuresof

phenomenalconsciousness—theneuralcorrelatesofconsciousness—arevery

controversialatpresent,asIobservedabove.Idevotemuchdiscussiontothis

probleminChapter7.

InviewofalltheseempiricalchallengestoidentifyingC~A,thediscussionbelow

mustbetakenaspreliminary,andawaitingbettermethodsofconfirmation.Itis

nonethelessusefulinitsownright.AsoundtheoreticalargumentforacaseofC~A,

evenintheabsenceofanyconclusiveempiricalconfirmationthatsuchacaseexists,

stilltellsussomethingimportantabouttherelationshipbetweenattentionand

consciousness.Attheleast,itnarrowstheoptionsbyeliminatingtheIdentity

Hypothesis(4.4.1)byshowingthattheremaybeprincipledreasonswhythetwo

cancomeapart.Italsopointsthewaytowhereweshouldbelookingforempirical

197

casesofC~Aandstimulatesdiscussionabouthowthechallengesabovemightbe

addressedinthedifferentcandidatesunderdiscussion.

Attentionstructurescognitions.InsearchingforC~A,wemustbecarefultoremain

focusedonattentionalstrategiesstructuring(ornot)phenomenalcontentsof

cognitions,andnotthosestructuringtheprocessesthatproducethatcontent.AsI

haveobservedoften,LiberalAttentionindubitablycontributestoanyphenomenal

contentinthepre-phenomenalstagesofitsconstruction.WhatIwilltaketo

constitutegenuineC~Ahereisunifiedboundphenomenalcontentthatbecomes

conscious“allatonce”(Bayne,2010,p.238)thatisnotitselfExecutivelyAttended—

thatis,itisnotfurtherstructuredbyExecutiveAttention.

Itmightbearguedthatmerelybeingexperienceditselfconstitutesakindof

attention-as-access.ButIwouldargue(a)thatthiswouldbetofallbackintoa

Phenomenaldefinitionofattention,whichIdismissedin3.3.3,and(b)that

consciousnessneednotbereflectiveinahigher-orderway,butmaybemerely

reflexive(2.4.1),thereforerequiringnoExecutiveAttention-as-accessinordertobe

phenomenal.148

Thesituatedfirst-personperspectiveconditionforconsciousnesscanitselfbetaken

assmugglingattentionintrinsicallyintoconsciousness.Inbeingsituated,thereisthe

inherentselectionoftakingoneperspectivetotheexclusionofallotherpossible

perspectives.Isnotthisselectionandexclusionanimplementationoftwo

attentionalstrategies?Andifso,isnotattentiontherebynecessaryfor

consciousness?

IwouldarguethatbeingsituatedinthiswayisLiberalAttention,butnotExecutive

Attention,unlesswesubscribetoaPhenomenalDefinitionofattention.Executive

Attentionisattentionalstrategiesimplementedbytheexecutive.Unlessthatsituated

first-personperspectiveisheldnecessarilytoariseonlyfromtheactivityofthe

148Seealso8.6.2.2and9.5.2.1.

198

executive(whichamountstothePhenomenalDefinitionofattention),wecannot

assumethatExecutiveAttentionisresponsibleforit.Itmaybecapableofarisingby

meansindependentoftheexecutive,andifso,thenthefactthatconscious

experiencehasaselectiveandexclusiveperspectiveinnowayrequiresthatitbe

ExecutivelyAttended.

6.3.2 FiveWays

IturnnowfromtheconceptualanalysisofC~Atothequestforempiricalinstances

ofit.TherehavebeenmanycasesclaimedtobeC~Aintheliterature.Someofthese

arecaseswhereattentionisnotcompletelyabsent,butmerelyimpaired,for

example:“ADHD,depression,schizophrenia,bipolardisorder,post-traumaticstress

disorder,andtraumaticbraininjury”(Rosenbergetal.,2017,p.291),149andright

parietalextinctionandBalint’sSyndrome(Hardcastle,1997,p.59).Kochand

Tsuchiya(2007)gofurther,anddiscussanumberofcandidatecaseswhere

attentionisnotmerelyimpaired,but“near-absent.”Thislistis:pop-outinsearch;

iconicmemory;gist;animalandgenderdetectionindualtasks;andpartial

reportability(p.17,Table1).Jennings(2015)considersthreecandidates:

perceptualgist;imagisticconsciousness(superblindsight,thecolourblindcolour

expert);andphenomenalconsciousness(asopposedtoBlock’saccess

consciousness).Shegoesontoproposeherowncandidate,“consciousentrainment.”

MyquestforempiricalcasesofC~AwillrangemorebroadlythanthoseIhavefound

intheliterature,butnotclaimtosubsumeeverycaseconsideredbyothers.Instead,

IderivemylistofcandidatesbaseduponthepremiseIsetoutabove,thatC~Ais

149TheseauthorsalsodiscussthepossibilityofusingfMRItodistinguishormeasuretheattentional

abilitiesofdifferentindividuals,asopposedtogroup-leveldataaboutattentionalmechanismsin

general.

199

phenomenalcontentthatisunstructuredbyExecutiveAttentionforfurther

processing.Thus,Iconsiderfivebroadclassesofwaysthatcontentmightbeso

unstructured,andsearchforempiricalcasesexemplifyingeachclass.Idonotclaim

theseclassestobeexhaustive—perhapsothersmightbethoughtof.Andsomeofthe

candidatesconsideredbelowmightplausiblybeinterpretedindifferentwaysandso

fitundermorethanoneclass.Butweonlyneedonecandidatetoproveconvincing

toestablishthatC~Aiscapableofinstantiationinacognitiveeconomy.Thefive

classesare:PureConsciousness;globalUnprocessedContent;Simplicity;Chaos;and

Timing.

6.3.3 First:PureConsciousness

“Somepersonscanvoluntarilyemptytheirmindsandthinkof

nothing”(James,1890,p.404).

ThefirstcandidateforC~Aisthepossibilityofglobalphenomenalitywithout

content,subjectivitywithoutanyobject,oraconsciousnessthatisnota

“consciousness-of”anything.IwillcallthisPureConsciousness.150Theconceptof

150TheideaIamconsideringhereiscloselyrelatedtootherideasintheliterature,suchas“C”

(Bogen,2007)—thecoreofexperience,alsocalled“subjectivity,sentience,awareness,consciousness

itself,consciousness-as-such,consciousnessperse,primaryconsciousness,orsimply,bysomeearlier

authors,consciousness”(p.775),andMinimalPhenomenalSelfhoodandMinimalPhenomenal

Experience(Alcaraz,2018).Itmayalsoberelatedininterestingwaystocertainformsof

panprotopsychism,giventhatthebasic“units”ofconsciousnessonthesemodelsmaybetooprotean

tobearanyrelationshiptoanobjectofconsciousness.Itisnotrelatedto“minimalconsciousness”in

thedevelopmentalsense(Zelazo,2004),ortotheMinimallyConsciousStateinthephysiologicalsense

(Giacinoetal.,2002).

200

PureConsciousnessisquitecontroversial.Itmayevenbeanincoherentconcept.151

Butitisplausibleifoneacceptsthedistinctionbetweenphenomenalityassuchand

thecontentofphenomenalexperience(2.5).Ifsuchathingispossible,thenthiskind

ofexperiencewouldhavenocontentamenabletobeingstructured,andtherefore,

noarenaforattentiontobeimplementedasastrategyforstructuringit.Itwouldbe

C~A.AfterbrieflynotingsomeunlikelycandidatesIconsiderfourmoreinteresting

candidates:sensorydeprivation;decortication;dreamlesssleep;andmeditation.

UnlikelyCandidates

ConsiderthecaseofAttentionDeficitHyperactivityDisorder(ADHD)andrelated

conditions.Atfirstblushitseemsthesubject“losesattention,”butthatisnot,of

course,whatisreallygoingon.ADHDisafailure,notofattentionitself,butof

maintainingattentiononasingletargetoveraprolongedperiodoftime.Thesubject

continuallyattends,butthefocusofherattentionjumpserraticallyfromonetarget

toanother,makingitdifficulttocompletesettasks.Thesamemightbesaidofmind-

wandering(Christoffetal.,2018;Irving&Thompson,2017;Selietal.,2018).One’s

cogitativeramblesdonotlackstructure,theylackaplan(Irving,2016).

SensoryDeprivation

AmoreplausiblecandidateforglobalC~Aissensorydeprivation:“toreducethelevel

ofsensorystimulationtoaslowadegreeaspossible(e.g.,darknessandsilence)”

151Kriegel(2007,pp.130–131)expressesreservationsastowhetherthe“methodofsweeping

imaginativesubtraction”canreallysettleanythingorbemorethananintuitionpump.Itreatpure

consciousnesshereasmorethanathoughtexperiment,exploringactualempiricalcandidatesthat

involvephenomenalsubtraction.

201

(Zubek,Hughes,&Shephard,1971,p.282).152Intheabsenceofanysensoryinput,

perhapsasinamodernsensorydeprivationchamber,thereisnosensoryinputfor

attentionalstrategiestostructure.ButthistoofailstoconstituteacaseofC~A,forat

leastthreereasons.First,evenintheabsenceofsensoryinputfromtheoutside

world,thebraincontinuestogenerateitsown“innermodel.”Withoutthecorrection

ofconstantsensoryinput,thismodeleventuallybeginstogoawry,resultingin

variouskindsofaberrantthoughtpatterns,includinghallucinations,dreams,and

bodyimagechanges,aswellasemotionssuchasloneliness,tediumandanxiety

(Zubeketal.,1971,p.285Table1).ThisisnotPureConsciousness,itis

consciousnesswithattentionallystructuredcontentthatislessconnectedtothe

outsideworld.

Second,Iknowofnoexperimentalparadigmthatcanpreventinteroceptive

sensation—sensoryinputfromone’sownbodilyorgans—hunger,aching,etc.A

high-levelsurgicaloranaestheticdeafferentationmightblockinteroceptivecontent,

butthereisaseriousquestionaboutwhethersuchathingispossible(letalone

ethical)—Isuspectthatanyblockeffectiveenoughtostopallinteroceptionwould

alsointerferewithbasicfunctionslikebreathing.

Third,attention-as-vigilance/monitoringisconstantlyactive.Eveninthecaseof

prolongedsensorydeprivation,oneneverlosestheabilitytosenseinput.So,the

momentthatnewsensoryinputarises,thesubjectwillimmediatelybecomeaware

ofit,becauseherexecutivevigilancemechanismsarestillfunctioning.

Sensorydeprivationdeprivesexperienceofafferentperceptualcontent,butof

course,thestreamofconsciousnessincludesmorethanthat.Therearememories

andimaginings,thoughtsanddesires,tonameafew.Canthesetypesofphenomenal

contentbeeliminated?Threepossiblecandidatespresentthemselves:decortication,

sleepstates,andmeditation.

152Iconsiderperceptualdeprivationbelowinthediscussionofsimplicity.

202

Decortication

Decorticationistheabsenceoftheforebrain.Itoccursinatleasttwoempirical

situations:anencephaly(andrelatedconditions),acongenitalconditioninwhichthe

forebrainsimplydoesnotdevelopinutero,anddecortication,thesurgicalremoval

oflargepartsoftheforebrain,sometimesusedasatherapyoflastresortfor

dangerous,intractableepilepsy.Itisclearthatinsomepatients,asurprisingdegree

ofabilitycanbepreservedintheabsenceoflargeproportionsofcortex(Merker,

2007;Swancer,2017).TheseabilitiesalmostcertainlyimplementExecutive

Attention.Whatwearereallylookingforhereiswhetherenoughofthebraincanbe

absenttoeliminateallphenomenalcontent,yetmaintainphenomenalityassuch.

Unfortunately,weknowtoolittleabouttheneuralcorrelatesofconsciousness,or

thenecessaryandsufficientneuralconditionsforphenomenalitytodeterminehow

muchofthebraincanbeabsentbeforeeitherallphenomenalcontentor

phenomenalityitselfislost.Further,thereareseriousandlikelyinsurmountable

obstaclestoidentifyingwhetherornotsuchpatientsareindeedphenomenally

conscious(7.4),sothisseemstobeacurrentlyunanswerablequestion.

DreamlessSleep

Whenonesleepsanddreams,thereisveryplausiblyA&Cinthestreamofdreaming

experience.Thebrainundertakesagreatdealofsubconsciousreorganisationand

maintenanceworkinsleep(Nielsenetal.,2015),153someofwhichmayconstitute

A~C.Dreamlesssleepisgenerallytakento~A~C.But,somerecentwork(Siclari,

LaRocque,Postle,&Tononi,2013;E.Thompson,2015a;Windt,Nielsen,&

Thompson,2016)suggeststhatonemightbeinsomewayphenomenallyconscious

indreamlesssleep,althoughtheabsenceofdreaming,orperception,ormotor

153SeealsothewholeJuly2015issueofNeurobiologyofLearningandMemory(122).

203

commandsuggestsaconsciousnesswithattenuatedcontent,orperhapseven

devoidofcontentcompletely.OneofWindtetal’s(2016)threecategoriesof

dreamlesssleepexperienceis“‘Selfless’StatesandContentlessSleepExperiences”

(p.873,Box1,seealsop.878),describedas“aformofconsciousawarenessduring

sleepthatlacksimagisticorpropositionalcontents(E.Thompson,2015a,2015b;

Windt,2015),”andbearingacloseaffinitywiththeIndianphilosophicalideaofbare

consciousawareness“withoutthesubject–objectstructureofordinaryexperience

andthephenomenologyofbeingacognitiveagent”(p.878).154

Windtetal.,pointoutthatexperiencedmeditatorswhoreport“witnessingsleep”—

akindofluciddreamlesssleep,ormeta-awarenessofasleepexperiencedevoidof

specificthoughtcontentsorimagery—exhibittheelectrophysiologicalsignaturesof

selectiveattentionandmemory(enhancedgamma-bandactivity).Non-meditators

andinexperiencedmeditatorsneitherreportthiskindof“witnessingsleep”nor

exhibittheelectrophysiologicalsignature.Thissuggeststhatexperienced

meditatorshavelearnedtoExecutivelyAttendtoakindofpurephenomenal

experiencethatisnormallyutterlyunattended,andisnormally,therefore,C~A.

ContentlessphenomenalsleepisaplausiblecaseofC~A,buttherearesomecaveats.

First,inallnormalformsofsleep(excludingdeepcoma,anaesthesia,etc.)atypeof

ExecutiveAttentionpersists,evenintheabsenceofcognitivecontent—vigilance.A

subjectinanyphaseofsleepcanbeawokenbyaloudenoughnoise.Thereissome

debateastothewhichcomesfirst:doesoneattendbecauseonefirstbecame

consciousofthenoise,ordoesonebecomeconsciousofthenoisethroughattention-

as-vigilance(DeBrigard,2010;Mole,2008a)?Butthevigilanceitselfcountsasa

formofcontinuouslyimplementedExecutiveAttentionalstrategy,whetheroneis

experiencingphenomenalyetcontentlesssleepornot.Sodreamlesssleepwillnot

reallyworkascaseofglobalC~A.Generalanaestheticinductionandrecoverygiveus

goodreasontothinkthatglobalExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousness

switchoffandontogether.

154Seeforexample,MaitriUpanishad,6:19.

204

Second,itishardtofindacharacterisationofcompletelycontentlessdreamless

sleep.Windt(2015)characterisesdreamlesssleepasbeingthepurephenomenal

experienceoftimepassing,orduration,withoutanyfurthercontent.Butofcourse,

experiencingtimequalifiesasphenomenalcontent.Third,thereagainseemstobe

aninsurmountableobstacletoconfirmingwhetherdreamlesssleepisindeed

phenomenal.Wecanonlytellifasleeperisindeedexperiencingphenomenality,by

themreportingitassuch(asinthecaseoftheexperiencedmeditator).Buttoreport

it,shemustlearntoExecutivelyAttendtoit,renderingitnolongerC~A.Thereisno

dreamcontenttobestructured,itistrue,butknowledgeofthelackofcontentis

itselfattentivelystructured.Iconsiderthisepistemicconundruminmoredetailin

7.4.

Meditation

CertainformsofEasternmeditation(Lutz,Dunne,&Davidson,2007)arecandidates

forglobalC~A.Theseinvolvetheideaoflearning,throughlongpractice,howtoshut

downallcognitiveprocesses,leavingbehindaresidualofpure,contentless

consciousness—“thecontinuityofconsciousnessthroughdeepmeditativestatesin

whichallconsciousactivityissaidtohavehalted”(Chadha,2015,p.113).155Nash

andNewberg(2013)identifysixstagesinmeditation,fiveofwhichhaveExecutive

Attentionattheirheart.Forexample,intheMethodstage,“methodshavebeen

definedas‘afamilyofcomplexemotionalandattentionalregulatorytraining

regimesdevelopedforvariousends,includingthecultivationofwell-beingand

155Inthecontextofmeditation,Baars(2013)callsthis“silentconsciousness,”Taylor(2003,p.331)

callsit“’stillness’…anextendedcontent-freeexperience,”NashandNewberg(2013,p.14,endnote

1)callit“pureconsciousness”or“emptiness”(citingF.Travis&Shear,2010),andVliengenthart

(2011,pp.156–157)callsit“absoluteunitarybeing.”PureConsciousnessmayalsoariseincertain

kindsofmysticalexperience,notnecessarilyattainedthrougheasternmeditativepractice(Forman,

1999).

205

emotionalbalance’(Lutz,Slagter,Dunne,&Davidson,2008,p.163)”(p.4).Thesixth

stageistheEnhancedMentalState(EMS),“thecausalresultofthesuccessful

applicationoftheMethod—analteredstateofconsciousness,commonlyreferredto

asthemeditativestate”(p.5).OneformofthisEMSistheNullState,“anenhanced

emptystatethatisdevoidofphenomenologicalcontent—anon-cognitive/non-

affectivestate”(p.6).156

WhilethissoundsverymuchlikewhatIhavecalledPureConsciousness,157it

actuallyfailstobecaseofC~Abecauseitisnotgenuinelycontentless.Theselfinthis

statedoesnotdisappear,butitsboundariesseemtoexpand,mergingtheselfwith

externalreality—amuchlargerself,butaselfnonetheless(Forman,1999,p.641).

Thesituatedfirst-personperspectiveremains,albeitwithadifferentlocus.Nashand

NewbergspeculatethatthisNullStateof“non-self,oremptiness”mayarisefromthe

dampeningofsignalstoandwithintheareasofthebrainresponsibleforasubject’s

senseofthespatiallocationoftheselfwithintheenvironment.158Iarguedabove

(6.3.1)thatthepresenceofasituatedperspectivecanarisethroughLiberal

Attention,anddoesnotinitselfindicatetheinstantiationofExecutiveAttention.But

ifthereisanysenseofreflectionuponthatsituatedperspective,anythinglikethe

thought,“myselfisenlarged,”or“Ifeeldifferent,”orsimilar,thatwouldindicatethe

kindoffurtherprocessingthatidentifiesaninstantiationofExecutiveAttention.The

descriptionsIhavereadintheliteraturethusfardonotmakeitclearwhethersuch

thoughtsarecompletelybanishedintheNullState.

156Anothertantalisingdescription:“pureconsciousness,true-Self,non-Self,NDA,absoluteunitary

being;andothertermssuchasFormless,Void,emptiness,andundifferentiated‘beingness’or

‘suchness’…Oshodescribessamadhias‘noobjectinthemind,nocontent......,notmeditatingupon

something,butdroppingeverything(sothat)notevenaripplearisesinthelakeofyour

consciousness’(Osho,2003);andSriRamanaMaharshistatesthat‘samadhiisthestateinwhichthe

unbrokenexperienceofexistenceisattainedbythestillmind’(Godman,1985)”(Nash&Newberg,

2013,p.8).157Wemayassumeforthesakeofargumentthatthemeditatorcaneliminatephenomenal

interoceptionsaswell.158

206

Wemustbewareofconfusing“theperceptionofabsencewiththeabsenceof

perception”(Mole,2008a,p.98).ThemeditatorinaNullStatemaynotbeattending

toanyparticularcontent,butsheisina“hyper-attentive”state(Prinz,2011,p.

183)—beingawarethatoneisnotperceivinganythingisstillakindofExecutive

Attention(compareGanzfelds,6.3.5.3).GlobalC~Aeludesusineventheemptiestof

meditativestates.

SummaryofPureConsciousness

TosummarisethepossibilityofC~Aduetoanabsenceofphenomenalcontent

altogether:sensorydeprivationisonlyattenuationofphenomenalcontent,nottotal

elimination.Decorticationfailsbecausewehavenowayofknowingwhether

phenomenalityitselfissnuffedoutwiththelastbitofphenomenalcontent.

Dreamlesssleepseemsplausible,althoughthereisamajorepistemicobstacleto

overcomebeforewecanbecertain.Meditationfailsbecausetheinevitable

awarenessoftheveryabsenceofcontentisitselfcontent.Iconcludethatnoneof

thesecandidatesiswithoutseriousflaws,andcombininganytwoormoreofthese

candidatesservesonlytomultiplyflawsratherthanresolvethem.

Whatifthereiscontent(otherthanmerereflexivity),butitisunstructured,and

therefore,unattended?Iturnnowtotwowaysinwhichthismightbethecase:

globalUnprocessedContent,wherethereiscomplexcontentthatisnotattentionally

structured;andSimplicity,wherethereissolittlecontentthatattentional

structuringisnotpossible.

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6.3.4 Second:GlobalUnprocessedContent

WhereasPureConsciousnessisconsciousnesswithoutcontent,UnprocessedContent

isthephenomenalexperienceofperceptualornon-perceptualcontentthatisnot

utilisedinanyformorfashion.Onemightpurelyexperiencecontentwithoutany

furtheraccess,selection,influence,oranykindoffurtherattentionalprocessingof

thatcontent.159Ibelievethereisa“normal”varietyofthis,whichIcallFirst-Order

Content,andwillconsiderindetailinChapter7,inthecontextofaparticular

exampleofthisclass—thelocalperceptualcontentofphenomenaloverflow.Inthis

section,Iconsidertwoglobalcandidateswherenoneofthesubject’ssynchronic

phenomenalcontentisfurtherprocessedbyExecutiveAttention(C~A)—anabsence

ofwhatSchooler(2002)calls“meta-consciousness,”thesecond-order

consciousnessofone’sfirst-orderconsciouscontent.ThetwocandidatesIconsider

arementalblanknessandstupor;andfocalepilepticseizures.

MentalBlanknessandStupor

Mentalblankness(hereafter,just“blankness”),totalstupor,160vacancy,andoblivion

arealltermsthathavebeenusedforthatstateofmindwherethesubject

experiencesongoingphenomenalperceptions,butisnotthinkingofanythingat

159Someoftheearlystagesofmeditation—beforeoneachievesPureConsciousness—mightfall

underthiscategory.160Asdistinctfromeithercomaorpartialstupor(Joyston-Bechal,1966,p.969).Aconditionoften

associatedwithschizophrenia,severedepression,etc.Forthedevelopmentofthemodernconceptof

stupor,seeBerrios(1981).

208

all.161Travis(1937)foundthatmentalblankness162wastheonlyconsciousstateto

showpredominantly“large”EEGbrainwaves.Thisheinterpretedasrepresentinga

“basiccorticalequilibrium”(p.307).Thesmaller,more“choppy”wavesrepresent“a

relativelyhighdegreeofspecificityinpsychicactivity”(p.309).Thisspecificityis

interestinglydescribedasfocusingconsciousness,akindofattention.Forblankness

tobeacaseofglobalC~A,weneedtoestablishtheabsenceofExecutiveAttention

andthepresenceofphenomenalconsciousness.

Ontheattentionside,blanknessseemsplausiblytoinvolvethesubject’s

disengagementofanyExecutiveAttentionalstrategiesfromhersynchronic

phenomenalcontent.Thereisnoselectionordetectionandrecognition,inthatno

itemswithinthephenomenalfieldareselectedoutforfocalprocessing,and

thereforenothingisactivelyrecognised,neitheriseventhewholefieldrecognised

assuch.Thesubjectdoesnotthinktoherself,“Iamnowblank.”Shedoesnotthink

anythingatall.Shemerelyexperiencesthestateofbeingblank.Thereisnocontrol,

inthatnothingisdonewithanyofthephenomenalcontent—itissimply

experienced.Neitheristherecoherence,inthatnostrategiesarebeingimplemented

tomakepossiblyincoherentcontentmoretractable.So,apartfromsimpleaccessin

thesenseofexperiencingthecontentphenomenallyinafirst-orderway,itappears

thatblanknessisastrongcontenderforacaseofglobalC~A.

Butthereareanumberofproblemswiththisaccount.First,abouthalfofstupor

patientshavepartialortotalrecallofthingstheyexperiencedduringepisodes

161Thisisdifferentfromafuguestateorcertainkindsofamnesia,inwhichthesubjectpaysattention

throughoutthefuguestate,andactsintheworldaccordingly,butisunableafterwardstoremember

anythingshedidwhileinthatstate.Blanknessisakindofmirrorimageofthefuguestate:thereis

littleornoattentionduringthestate,butthatstateisrememberedafterwards.Neitherisblankness

thesamethingasthedefaultmodenetwork,which“isactivewhenindividualsareengagedin

internallyfocusedtasksincludingautobiographicalmemoryretrieval,envisioningthefuture,and

conceivingtheperspectivesofothers”(Buckneretal.,2008,p.1).162DefinedbyTravisratherlooselyasthesubjectansweringarequesttoreportwhatwasgoing

throughtheirmindatamomentintimewithanswerslike,“’nothing,’or‘I'veforgotten,’or‘nothingin

particular’”(p.305).

209

(Joyston-Bechal,1966,p.975,TableX).Theseexperiencesareoftenmorethanpure

first-orderperceptions,includingcomplexifpathologicalcognitions(Berrios,1981,

p.678).Thissuggeststhatalthoughthepatient’sbehaviourmayindicateanabsence

ofExecutiveAttention,thatisnotthecase.Thereremaintheproportionofcases

wherethereistotalamnesiaoftheexperience,buthere,evenifExecutiveAttention

isabsent,itisimpossibletoknowwhetherconsciousnessispresent,whichmeans

thiscouldwellbeacaseof~A~C.

Second,subjectsareresponsivetotherightkindofstimulithatcan“shake”themout

oftheblankstate.ExecutiveAttention-as-vigilanceremainsintacttovaryingdegrees

inblankness.Amoreprofoundvarietyofstuporthatmightcircumventthisconcern

issomeformsofcatatonia(Walther&Strik,2016)—aclinicalconditionpresentin

variouspsychiatricdisorders—inwhichthepatientiscompletelynon-responsive,

thussuggestinganabsenceevenofattention-as-vigilance.However,responsiveness

requiresmanystagesofprocessing,includingfurtherprocessingofperceptual

content,decisionmaking,andmotorcommand,nottomentionmotivationto

respond(recall,somecatatonicpatientsaredeeplydepressed).Itonlytakesa

failureofoneofthesestepstoproducenon-responsiveness,eveniftheremaining

steps—allconstitutingactiveExecutiveAttention—areintact.Itwouldbehasty,

then,toinferC~Afromcatatonicnon-responsiveness.Perhapsneuralstudiesof

patientssufferingfromthisconditionmightbeabletoshedlightonthequestion,

butIhavenotbeenabletofindanysuchstudies.163

Ontheconsciousnessside,thepartialorcompleterecallofsomestuporpatients

(above)suggeststhattheyatleastwerephenomenallyconsciousduringtheepisode.

Butthereremainsasubsetofpatientswithtotalamnesiaoftheepisode.Here,itis

163WaltherandStrik(2016,pp.344–345)discusstheobstaclesthathavehithertohinderedsuch

studiesfrombeingsuccessful,beforesummarisingthosethathavebeencarriedout.Manyofthe

studiestheydiscussarenotrelevanttothequestionathandassubjectswerenotexhibitingstupor,

althoughtherewasatantalisingfindingoffrontalandparietalhypoperfusioninpatientswith

akineticcatatonia.Theprefrontalcortexisoftenimplicatedinattention,soitshypoactivitymay

indicateadiminutionorevenlackofattention.

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difficulttoknowwhetherthisisaninabilitytorecallactualphenomenalexperience

oralackofphenomenalexperienceinthefirstplace.164EEGandfMRIinterpretation

instuporiscomplexandcomplicatedbytheinfluenceoftheunderlyingpathology

(Brenner,2005;Harrison&Connolly,2013),andthereforeunlikelytosettlethis

question.Again,wearefacedwiththeproblemofrelyingonreport(Executive

Attention)toidentifyconsciousnessintheabsenceofExecutiveAttention(7.4).All

theseconsiderationsmakeblanknessinallitsvarietiesunconvincingascasesof

C~A.

FocalEpilepticSeizures

Epilepsyisapathologicalconditionthatresultsfromuncontrolledelectricalactivity

inthebrain.Whereasgeneralisedepilepticseizuresinvolvebothcerebral

hemispheres,focalseizuresareunilateralandeitherdiscretelylocalisedormore

widelydistributed(Bergetal.,2010).Arecognisedfeatureofsomefocalseizuresis

impairmentofphysiologicalconsciousness,165whichinterestingly,isnotagraded

affairhere,butbimodal(Cunninghametal.,2014)—patientstendeithertobe

unconsciousorlucidlyconscious,withlittlegradationinbetween.Epileptologists

havedevelopedabi-dimensionalmodelofphysiologicalconsciousnessinepilepsy

with“levelofconsciousness”and“contentofconsciousness”dimensions(Monaco,

Mula,&Cavanna,2005),withpsychometricinstrumentstoevaluatethecontentsof

consciousnessinepilepticseizures(Alvarez-Silva,Alvarez-Rodriguez,&Cavanna,

2012,p.512),andathird“self”dimensionhasalsobeenproposed(Hanoğlu,Özkara,

Yalçiner,Nani,&Cavanna,2014).Adistinctioninthelevelofconsciousnessisalso

drawnbysomebetween“non-consciousness,”“primaryconsciousness”(roughly,

164SeeJohansonetal.,(2003,p.284)fordiscussionofasimilarprobleminfocalseizures.165Focalseizureshavealsobeencalleddyscognitiveseizures(Blumeetal.,2001).Theyshouldbe

distinguishedfromabsenceseizures,whichtendlastonlyafewseconds,andaremorecommonin

children(Panayiotopoulos,2008).

211

first-ordercognitions),and“reflectiveconsciousness”(roughly,introspection)

(Johanson,Revonsuo,Chaplin,&Wedlund,2003,p.280).

Somedescriptionsofcertainkindsoffocalseizuresareplausiblecandidatesfora

kindofC~Asimilartothatoftotalstupor.Theseizurepatientisunresponsive

suggestingashutdownofExecutiveAttention,butphysiologicallyconscious,

suggestingtheymayalsobephenomenallyconscious(Monacoetal.,2005,p.

153).166Bycomparison,inlockedinsyndrome(Kondziella,2017),thepatientis

richlyconsciouswithanactiveexecutive,butefferentcommandsfailtoproduceany

kindofphysicalaction.167Infocalseizures,itispossiblethattheexecutiveitselfis

inoperative,therebyrenderingExecutiveAttentionabsent.Giventhedepthofnon-

responsiveness,itseemsthathere,evenattention-as-vigilanceisinoperative.

Theliteratureonthistopicsuffersgreatlyfromanimprecisionandinconsistencyin

theuseoftermsforattentionandconsciousness(Monacoetal.,2005,p.150),and

thereisgreatdiversityofsymptomatologyoffocalseizures(Seneviratne,Woo,

Boston,Cook,&Dʼsouza,2015,p.591Table2).Whenanepileptologistspeaksof

“focalseizureswithimpairmentofconsciousnessorawareness”(e.g.,Bergetal.,

2010,p.260)itisdifficulttobecertainwhetherthismeansthatphenomenal

consciousnessisimpaired,ortheusualExecutiveAttentionalconcomitantsof

consciousstatesareimpaired.Confusingly,whenMonacoetal.,(p.156)describe

limbicstatusepilepticus168patientsashavingahighlevelofconsciousnesswithno

consciouscontent—whichsoundslikePureConsciousness-styleC~A(6.3.3)—they

considerthemtobecasesofSearle’s(1992)philosophicalzombies,whichIwould

taketobeA~C!

166Theyusetheolderterminologyofcomplexpartialseizures.167Arecentmeta-analysis(Kondziella,Friberg,Frokjaer,Fabricius,&Møller,2016)foundthata

significantproportionpatientsinavegetativestateexhibitevidenceofphysiologicalconsciousness

(14%byanactiveparadigm,26%passiveparadigm),andevenmorepatientsinaminimally

consciousstate(32%and55%respectively).168Differenttofocalseizures.

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Indescriptionsbyfocalseizurepatients(Johansonetal.,2003)—wherethe

consciousnessexploredis“subjectiveexperiences”ratherthan“objectively

verifiableresponsiveness”(p.279)—thepicturepaintedisasfollows(pp.280-284).

Mostpatientsexperienceafallthenriseinthelevelofconsciousnessovertime.

Whilesomeepisodesinvolvedreflectiveconsciousnessorprimaryconsciousness

foratleastpartoftheepisode,65%ofepisodesinvolvedatotalabsenceof

consciousnessduringthecoreevent(~A~C).Inmanyepisodes,ExecutiveAttention

isnotabsent,butphenomenallyexperiencedasbeingabnormallyimplemented

(A&C)—e.g.,difficulttocontrolorproducesdistortedcontent—andisinferredby

theauthorstobeduetoabnormalactivityinthepre-frontalcortex,notdiminished

activity(p.284).169ItisdifficulttoextractaclearcaseforglobalC~Afromthis

picture.

Finally,weagainstumbleupontheepistemicobstaclesrelatedtoamnesiaand

relianceonreport.Infocalseizures,amnesiamaybeanterograde(upto5minutes)

and/orretrograde(upto30seconds)(Devinsky&Luciano,1991),whichMonacoet

al.,correctlypointoutmakestheascriptionoflossofconsciousnessduringthe

seizureunreliableonthatbasis.

Insummary,whentheconfusingterminologyandsubjectivedescriptionsinthe

focalseizureliteraturearecarefullyanalysed,wefindevidencefor~A~CandA&Cfor

atleastsomeoftheepisodes,butnoclearcaseoftheC~Awearelookingfor.

Episodesofpurelyprimaryconsciousnesswithoutreflectiveconsciousnessare

describedasimplementingattention,albeitinabnormalways.Whilethismeansthat

onthecurrentlyavailableevidence,focalseizuresfailtoestablishC~A,thereisgreat

scopeforfurtherworktoclarifytheambiguitiesdescribedaboveandperhaps

reversethisconclusion.

169CompareMole’s(2014,p.52)characterisationofWu’s(2011,2014)modelofattention:“asubject

ispayingattentionjustincasesheisnavigatingthroughthespaceofpossiblebodilyandmental

actionsthatarecurrentlyavailabletoher,ratherthandriftingthroughthatspaceatrandom.”

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SummaryofGlobalUnprocessedContent

Neithermentalblankness/stupornorfocalepilepticseizuresconvincinglyestablish

C~A.PutativecasesarefoundeithertoinvolveExecutiveAttentionofsomekindor

beepistemicallyopaqueastowhetherthesubjectisindeedphenomenally

conscious.

6.3.5 Third:Simplicity

AnotherwaythatwemightfindC~Aisifthecontentofconsciousexperiencewere

soutterlysimplethatitlackedsufficientcontentorcomplexitytobeamenableto

structuring.OnecanstructureaLegosetinmanyinterestingways,butnotasingle

Legoblock.Thissituationmightoccurinatleastthreeways:inchoateperception;

singleobjectperception;andganzfelds.

InchoatePerception

Aninchoateperceptionisonewherethecontentissosparseastomakeitdifficultor

impossibletodeterminewithanyconfidencewhattheexactnatureofthestimulus

is.Letussayforillustrativepurposesthatapatchofskinontheupperarmof50mm

diameterhasonlyonetactilemechanoreceptor.Withoutlooking,asubjectcannot

distinguishwhereinthereceptivefieldsheistouchedbyabluntneedle-end,oreven

tellthedifferencebetweenbeingtouchedbyoneneedleortwoneedles

simultaneously30mmapart,sincethesinglemechanoreceptorfiresidenticallyin

bothcases.Thisinchoatenesscontrastswiththeveryclearandprecisehigh-

resolutiontactilesensationat,say,theverysensitive,mechanoreceptor-dense

finger-tips.Noamountofattentioncanrefineinchoateperceptionorimproveits

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resolution,sincethedatajustisn’tthere.IsthisacaseoflocalC~Aininchoatetactile

sensation?

Inresponse,itcouldbearguedthatthisisnotacaseoftheabsenceofattention,but

ofafailureofattention.Whenthesubjectstrainstomakeoutwhetheritisoneor

twoneedles,thesubjectiscertainlyExecutivelyAttending,implementingselection,

increasedaccess,andspotlightingofattentionontothesensationscomingfromthat

dermalregion.Theonlyproblemhereisthatallthisattentionfailstoproducethe

desiredresult:discriminationbetweenthetwoneedle-pricks.Itisnotthecasethat

oneisconsciousoftheTargetedtwoneedle-pricks,butunabletoattendtothemas

twoneedle-pricks.Rather,oneisneitherconsciousof,norabletoattendto,two

needle-pricks.So,thisisnotacaseofC~A,butoflocal~A~C.Iconsideran

inchoatenessaccountofC~Ain8.6.3.

SingleObjectPerception

ThesecondcandidateforC~Aduetosimplicityisthelocal170caseofvisualsingle

objectperception(Koch&Tsuchiya,2007).Ifone’svisualfieldcontainsonlyone

object,thenthereisnoscopeforselectionorexclusion,sincetherearenoother

objectstoselectamongorexclude.Butthisisnotreallyanabsenceofattention.One

may,forexample,beexercisingspatialselection,attendingtothelocusofthesingle

objectinspace,ratherthantotheotherlociintheemptyspacearoundit.Further,

anyvisualobjecthasfeatures:edges,dimensions,etc.Thesubjectcanattendto

somefeaturestotheexclusionofothers.Evenasingledotattheboundaryofvisual

resolutionstillpresentsacontrastagainstthebackgroundthatcanbetheTargetof

featureattention.ThistooisnotC~A.

170Notglobal,sinceattentioninnon-visualmodalitiesremainsunaffected.

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GanzfeldsandPerceptualDeprivation

ThethirdcandidateforC~Afromsimplicityisthelocalcaseofvisualexperienceofa

ganzfeld.

“Consider,first,anargumentfromCristofKoch(personal

communication).Imagineyouarelookingatanequallyluminous,

equallysaturatedwallofcolor(a“ganzfeld”).Yourentirevisual

fieldistakenupbythecolor,andthereisnovariationinit,andno

objectstofocuson.Inthiscase,thereisnoneedtoallocate

attention,becauseattentionisaselectivecapacity,andthereis

nothingtoselect.So,Kochreasons,undersuchconditions,

attentionisnotengaged.Yet,itisobviouswewouldexperiencethe

color”(Prinz,2011,p.196).171

Prinzresponds(correctly,Ithink)that(a)onemayallocatespatialattentionto

differentpartsofthevisualfield,evenifthereisnoobjectorfeatureattention;and

(b)itisjustasmuchattentiontoattendtothefieldasawholeasitistoattendto

oneobjectinavisualfield.ForPrinz,attentionisnotsolelythatactofselection,but

thebringingofinformationintoWM—i.e.,accessisalsoinvolved.Sincethe

perceptionofthesingleblandwallofcolourisindeedbroughtintoWM,then

ExecutiveAttentionisimplementedhere,evenintheabsenceofobjectselectionor

competition.Allthishighlightsthebenefitofhavingabroadviewofattentionlike

theoneIdevelopedinChapter3—Koch’sintuitioninthisexchangederivesfromtoo

narrowadefinitionofattention.

171TononiandLaureys(2009,p.379)makethesameargument.

216

Ganzfeldsareavisualvarietyofperceptualdeprivation(Idiscusseditsexperimental

sibling,sensorydeprivation,abovein6.3.3.2).

“theobjectiveofthePD[perceptualdeprivation]procedureisto

providehomogeneousandunpatternedstimulation(e.g.,diffuse

lightandwhitenoise)whilemaintainingthelevelofsensoryinput

nearnormal”(Zubeketal.,1971,p.282).

Theabilityofperceptualdeprivationtoproducehallucinationshasbeenwellknown

forsometimeandcontinuestobeanobjectofinteresttoresearchers.

Electrophysiologicalstudieshaveimplicatedattentionalprocessesintheproduction

oftheseganzfeldhallucinations,withtheEEGsignatureofattentionalactivity,low-

frequencyalphawaves,beingrecordedinthebrainsofsubjectsexperiencingthem

(Wackermann,Pütz,&Allefeld,2008).ThisisclearevidenceofExecutiveAttention

implementedinperceptualdeprivation—albeit,producingabnormalcontent—

thereforemakingthemcasesofA&C.PerceptualDeprivation,too,failstoestablish

C~A.

SummaryofSimplicity

IninchoateperceptionthereisacommensurateattenuationofbothExecutive

Attentionandphenomenalconsciousness.Insingleobjectperception,thereisat

leastspatialExecutiveAttention,evenifithasonlyasingleTarget.AndinGanzfelds

andPerceptualDeprivation,thereisatleastspatialExecutiveAttention,evenifits

onlyTargetisablankfieldoramultimodalperceptualfieldwithoutspecificcontent

otherthanitsemptiness(whichconstitutesattendablecontentofasort).Noneof

thesecasesconclusivelyestablishesC~A.

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6.3.6 Fourth:Chaos

“[Attention]implieswithdrawalfromsomethingsinordertodeal

effectivelywithothers,andisaconditionwhichhasarealopposite

intheconfused,dazed,scatterbrainedstatewhichinFrenchis

calleddistraction,andZerstreutheitinGerman”(James,1890,p.

404).

Insomefocalseizures(6.3.4.2)attentionmalfunctioned,producingabnormal

content.Mightthiskindofchaoticphenomenalcontentbetakenasthe“real

opposite”ofattention,asJamessuggests?PureConsciousnessandSimplicity

putativelylackedattentionbecausethereislittleornocontenttobeattended.

UnprocessedContentputativelylackedattentionbecausecontentwaspresent,but

notprocessedinanyhigher-ordersortofway.172Butwhatiffirst-ordercontentis

present,andfurtherprocessed,butthishigher-orderprocessinglacksthe

implementationofanyExecutiveAttentionalstrategies?TheresultwouldbeChaotic

phenomenalcontent,aputativecaseoflocalC~A.

Notethatattentionalstrategiesarenotsolelyresponsiblefortheorderingof

content.Forexample,bindingiscrucialtoorderingthecontentofphenomenal

experience,butasIarguedin3.4.2,bindingitselfisnotanattentionalstrategy.So,

chaoscouldtheoreticallyarisefromafailuretobind,evenwithExecutiveAttention

activeandintact.Theunlikelycandidatesconsideredin6.3.3.1abovecould

plausiblybeconstruedasChaoticcases,butwouldfailhereformuchthesame

172Theresultofunprocessedcontentisnotchaos,butstillness.Oneperceivestheworldasitis,and

that’sit,fullstop.MalfunctioningExecutiveAttention,ontheotherhand,involvesnotstillness,but

chaos.CasesofUnprocessedContentwouldbequitecalmtoexperience,whilecasesofchaoswould

seemquitedisturbingtothesubject.

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reasonsdiscussedabove.InthissectionIconsidertwostrongercandidatesfor

C~A—psychedelicstatesandsimultanagnosia.

PsychedelicStates

Itisuncontroversial(Ithink)thatsubjectsundergoingpsychedelicstates—induced

bypsychoactivedrugs,forexample—haveaphenomenalexperienceofthecognitive

contentofthatstate.Butsuchcontentisoftendescribedasbeingdifferentfromour

normalwakingstates,inthatitisdisjointed,fragmented,orchaotic.Mightthischaos

beanindicationofanabsenceofExecutiveAttentionalstrategies?

LethebyandGerrans(2017)recentlydescribedaninterestingmodelofego-

dissolutioninthepsychedelicstate.Onthismodel,theselfis“notanactualentityor

anobjectofperception,interoception,orintrospection”(p.2),but“anentity,

substance,orbareparticularthatinstantiatesproperties”(p.1).Withoutgoinginto

thesubtletiesofthisdefinitionofaselfwhichareimmaterialtomyargumenthere,

theselfisroughlydescribedasamodelofacross-modalunitaryego,constantly

beinggeneratedbythebraininordertopredicttheflowofexperience.Attention,on

thisview,servestomakeideas“sticky”(i.e.,increasedaccess,selection)tothisself.

“Atalllevels,salienceisattributed,attentiondirected,andinformationintegratedin

accordancewiththerelevanceofinformationtotheorganism’sgoals”(p.9).The

effectofthepsychedelicdrugistoinhibitcertainattentionalprocesses,thus—

amongotherthings—disruptingthe“normal”bindingprocess,disorganisingthe

predictivemodel,andproducingadiminishedsenseofself,onethatdiffersfromour

normalexperiencebybeinglessunitaryorcoherent.

Isconsciousnesspresentinapsychedelicstate?LethebyandGerransmakean

importantcomment:“eveninfloridpsychedelicexperiencetheself-modelisnever

entirelydestroyed”(p.2).Thatis,theconsciousexperienceofbeingaselfnever

disappearscompletely,butrather,itscontentismodifiedsuchthattheconnectionof

thepresentexperiencetothebackgroundcontentofselfhoodismoretenuous.

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Indeed,theirviewblursthephenomenality-contentdistinctionforwhichIarguedin

2.5.

“Thesubsequentdiminutioninthesenseofsolidselfhoodshows

subjectsthatthissenseisultimatelyjustonemoreconscious

experience,ratherthanatranscendentalpreconditionofallsuch

experiences”(p.9).

Thus,thatcomponentofthecontentofconsciousnessthatistheself-modelisnot

eliminatedinthepsychedelicstate.Indeed,itcanseem“bothmoreintenseandless

personal,andsalience,affectivefeeling,andmotivationbecomedetachedfrom

personalgoalsandhistory”(p.6).Itisthecoherenceofthecontent“surrounding”

thatself-modelthatisdisrupted.

“Psychedelicsubjectsoftenreportthattheirsenseofbeingaself,

or‘I’,distinctfromtherestoftheworld‘outthere’,isweakened,

altered,orabolishedduringtheintoxication…Variousauthors

havesuggestedthatsomevestigesofself-awarenessarepreserved

inmost,ifnotall,psychedelicexperiences(Pahnke,1969;Shanon,

2002),whichhelpsexplainthepuzzlingfactthatautobiographical

memoriescanapparentlybeformedoftheseputativelyselfless

episodes(Metzinger,2005)”(p.6).

Onthisdescription,itseemsthatwhatisdissolvedisthesenseofseparation

betweentheselfandtherestoftheworld—ablurringoftheboundaryoftheself,

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whilethesenseofphenomenalselfhooditself—ofbeing“me”—remainsintact.173

Further,whilethecontentofconsciousexperienceisseverelydisruptedinvarious

ways,theself-modelpersists,evenifinanimpoverished-contentstate.174Muchlike

meditationabove,onmydefinitionofconsciousness,allfourcorecharacteristics

remainintact,evenifthelocusofthesituatedperspectiveissomehowexpanded,

whetherspatiallyorconceptually.

So,consciousnessispreservedinthepsychedelicstate,butisthereanabsenceof

ExecutiveAttention?Thatishintedat,ofcourse,bythefailureofself-binding,which

ontheirview,dependsonattention.Butthereseemtobegoodreasonstothinkthat

attentionisnevercompletelyabsentinthepsychedelicstate.Foronething,the

abilitytoformautobiographicalmemoriesmentionedinthequotationjustabove

suggeststhatthecontentofpsychedelicexperienceisnotonlyaccessibleto,but

actuallyaccessedbyWM,andconvertibleintoverbalreport.Whatismore,Letheby

andGerransobservethat

“Subjectsoftenfindtheirattentiondrawntostimuliwhichthey

normallywouldnotnotice;asWattsputsit,psychedelics‘makethe

spotlightofconsciousnessafloodlightwhich...bringstolight

unsuspecteddetails—detailsnormallyignoredbecauseoftheir

lackofsignificance’(1964).175Attentionisnolongerguided

exclusivelybyadaptiveandegocentricgoalsandagendas;salience

attributionisnolongerboundtopersonalconcern”(p.6).

173“Egodissolutionexperiencesoftenoccurinthecontextofmysticalstatesinwhichtheordinary

senseofselfisreplacedbyasenseofunionwithanultimaterealityunderlyingallofmanifest

existence—thefamous‘cosmicconsciousness’experience”(p.6).174“egodissolutionisnotanall-or-nothingaffair.Differentaspectsofself-awarenessmaybemoreor

lessdisruptedindifferentwaysonpsychedelics”(p.6).175TheoriginalinLethebyandGerransseemstomis-citeWattsas2002ratherthan1964.Orperhaps

theymis-cite2002asWattsinsteadofShanon.Unfortunately,theydon’tprovideapagenumber.

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Itisnot,then,thatattentionisabsentinpsychedelicstates—itjustoperates

differently.Thegoalssubjectsstrivetofulfilarethoseofadifferentandlarger

self.176ButthestrategiesofExecutiveAttention—aspotlightoffocus,increased

processing,alerting,salience—continuetobeimplemented.Thechaosof

psychedelicstates,then,isnotafailureofattentionaltogether,butareorderingof

howattentionoperates.Wewillnot,itseems,findC~Ahere,butA&Cwithunusual

content,andwherethesituatednessofphenomenalselfhoodispreservedbut

expanded,withblurredborderswiththerestoftheworld.

Simultanagnosia

AnotherplausiblecandidateforC~Aduetochaoticcontentissimultanagnosia.A

recentreviewsummarisedtheconditionthus:

“Simultanagnosiaisadisorderofvisualattentionthatleavesa

patient’sworldunglued:scenesandobjectsareperceivedina

piecemealmanner.Itisgenerallyagreedthatsimultanagnosiais

relatedtoanimpairmentofattention,butitisunclearwhetherthis

impairmentisobject-orspace-basedinnature…Thesepatients

canseeonlyoneobjectatatimeandsometimesonlypiecesof

objects,unawarethattheyarelockedonjustonecomponentofa

largerform.Whattheycanseecannotbelocatedinspace,likely

becausetheyseenothingelsethatcanprovideareferencepointto

176“Theseresultsstronglyimplythatthesubjectiveeffectsofpsychedelicdrugsarecausedby

decreasedactivityandconnectivityinthebrain’skeyconnectorhubs,enablingastateof

unconstrainedcognition”(Carhart-Harrisetal.,2012,p.2138).

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situateobjectsintheworld”(Dalrymple,Barton,&Kingstone,

2013,p.1).

Simultanagnosia,then,isafailureoftheattentionalstrategiesthatnormally

underlietheformationandperceptionofaholisticsynchronicexperiencecontaining

multipleboundcontents.Yetclearly,thereisphenomenalexperienceofthischaotic

content.MightthisconstituteacaseofC~A?

ThereareatleasttwowaysthismightbeC~A.Thefirstisthatthewholecontentof

experienceis,forthesimultanagnosiac,globallyunstructuredbyattention.Butthis

isquicklydiscountedwhenweconsiderthatthepatientisindeedfocusingattention

upontheminimalcontentavailabletoher(limitedbytheneurologicaldeficit),and

quitecapableofattendingtocontentinothermodalities,sothisisnotacaseof

globalC~A.ItmayalsobeafailureofbindingratherthanExecutiveAttentionas

such,which,asIarguedin3.4.2,aredistinctcognitivestrategies.

ThesecondwayonemightfindC~Ainsimultanagnosiaistoarguethatthe

objects/spaceintheperipheryisconsciouslyexperienced,butnotExecutively

Attendedinanymeaningfulway.Nowthereissomequestionastowhetherthis

peripheralexperienceisphenomenallyexperiencedatall.Butevenifitis,this

becomesanargumentforlocalC~A—akindofphenomenaloverflow,whichI

considerinChapters7and8.

SummaryofChaos

Insummary,then,neitheroftheputativecasesofC~Aduetochaosstandsupto

scrutiny.Inpsychedelicstates,ExecutiveAttentionisimplementedbutproduces

unusualConsequences,builtaroundanexpandedself.Andsimultanagnosiafailsto

beglobalC~AbecausesomeattenuatedcontentisnormallyExecutivelyAttended,

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whilethecontentthatisnotneedstobeconsideredasaspecialcaseofphenomenal

overflow,whichIconsiderinthenextchapter.

6.3.7 Fifth:Timing

Obviously,attentionalstrategiestaketimetobeimplementedincognitiveprocesses.

OneindicationthatExecutiveAttentionmightbeabsentcouldbeinsituations

wherethereisnotenoughtimeforitsstrategiestobeimplemented.Ifthereis,

however,enoughtimeforconsciousexperienceofthatcontenttooccur,wewould

haveacaseofC~A.HereIconsidertwocandidatesforthiskindofC~A:gist

perception;andthesequenceofalerting.

Gist

“Inamere30mspresentationtime,thegistofascenecanbe

apprehended.Thisisinsufficienttimefortop-downattentionto

playmuchofarole”(Koch&Tsuchiya,2007,p.18).

ThismakesrapidconsciousgistperceptionaplausiblecandidateforlocalC~A.The

keyhereisthatthe30msisonlythedurationforwhichthesubjectisexposedtothe

stimulus.Whileitmayonlytake30msforthesensorydatatoregisteruponthe

retina,thatcontentmaybeheldiniconicmemoryforsignificantlylonger,allowing

plentyoftimeforExecutiveAttentiontoprocessitenoughtoarriveatagist

perception.Theconsciousnessofthatgistitselfalmostcertainlyalsodoesnotcome

aboutattheexactmomentthe30msexposureconcludes,butsometimelater.

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Jennings(2015,pp.278–281)makesastrongcaseforgistoccurringwithout

attention,butnotconsciousgist.ThisisnotacaseofC~A.

SequenceofAlerting

Thetemporalrelationshipbetweenattentionandconsciousnesspresentsanother

difficultconundrum.ConsideraninterestingcaseduetoMole(2008a,p.90):whena

baby’scryawakenshissleepingmother,whichcomesfirst—wasthemotherfirst

consciousofthecry,andthereforehadherattentiondrawntoit;orwasdidthe

motherbecomeconsciousofthecrybecauseherattentionwasfirstdrawntoit?177If

theformeriscorrect—consciousnessarisesfirstanddrawsattention—thenthereis

abriefwindowoftimeinwhichthemotherisconsciousofthecry,butnotyet

attendingtoit:localC~A.

Molepresentsaninterestingdiscussionofthisconundrum,butonmydefinitionsof

ExecutiveAttention,consciousness,andWM,wecanformulatearelativelystraight-

forwardsolution.Theimportantpropositionsherearethatvigilanceandmonitoring

areattentionalstrategies;thatimplicitWMcanoperatewithoutthebenefitof

consciousness;andthatattentionalstrategiesimplementedbytheexecutiveofWM

constituteExecutiveAttention.Giventhosepropositions,itseemsclearthat

ExecutiveAttentionimplementsvigilanceandmonitoringintheabsenceof

phenomenalconsciousness,andevenintheseverelyattenuatedphysiological

consciousnessofsleep.Unconsciousprocessesinvolvingthenormalauditory

apparatusofWMfirstprocesstheauditorystimulus,compareittoknownsounds,

identifyitasthebaby’scry,andtherefore“raisethealert,”whichthenactivatesthe

awakeningofphysiologicalconsciousnessbringingwithit—anddrawingthefocus

ofattentionto—thephenomenalexperienceofthebaby’scry.Thisgoesagainstthe

intuitionsofMole’ssampleofmothers(p.91)buttheydon’thavethebenefitofour

177Schwitzgebel(2007,p.13)raisesarelatedcaseoftactileexperienceofone’sfootinone’sleftshoe.

225

definitions!ThisisnotacaseofC~A—ifanything,thereisabrieftemporalwindow

inwhichExecutiveAttentionisprocessingthecrybeforethemotherbecomes

consciousofit—A~C.

6.4 ChapterSummary

InthischapterIfirstconsideredthepossibilityofA~Candfoundthatthis

Combinationisnotonlyconceptuallycogent,butwellsupportedempirically.This

leftuswithtwoliveScenarios:AÉCandAÈC,andtheCombinationC~Aasthekey

tochoosingbetweenthem.Ithereforedevotedthebalanceofthischapterto

consideringit.Onceagain,C~Aisconceptuallycogent,butisitempirically

supported?Ofthefiveputativeempiricalclassesofcases,encompassingfifteen

specificconditionsconsideredindetail,nonehavesofarprovedtobe

incontrovertiblecasesofC~A.Butthereremainsonemorecasethatisthemost

promisingofallthoseIconsider:phenomenaloverflow.Itistoadetailedanalysisof

thatcasethatIturninthenexttwochapters,sincetheanswertoQwouldseemto

hangonit.

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7 PhenomenalOverflow

7.1 TheEnigmaofPhenomenalOverflow

ThelastoftheputativecasesofC~AIconsideristhatofphenomenaloverflow

(henceforth,simply“overflow”),mostprominentlyposedbyNedBlock.178Thisis

theideathatweconsciouslyexperiencemorethanwecanattendto,access,further

process,orreport(broadlyconstrued,see7.2.3).Thecontentofourphenomenal

experienceatanygivenmomentintimeisthereforemuchricherthanthattowhich

wecanExecutivelyAttend.Ifoverflowobtains,itisindubitablyacaseoflocalC~A,

sincetheoverflowingcontent—thatsubsetofphenomenalcontentthatisnot

ExecutivelyAttended—instantiatestheCombinationC~A.

Atleastpartiallyinresponse,somehavearguedthatwhatBlocktakestoberich

overflowingphenomenalcontentisinfactmuchsparser(e.g.,Cohenetal.,2016b).

178Block(1995,2001,2005,2007,2011a,2013b,2013a,2014b,2014a,2018).

228

Thebrainemploysstrategiessuchasensemblestatistics(Alvarez,2011;Whitney,

Haberman,&Sweeny,2014)tocreaterough,sparseaveragesofthecontent

peripheral(notnecessarilyspatiallyperipheral)tothefocusofattentionwhile

focusingitsprocessingresourcesonthecontentinthefocusofattentiontoproduce

genuinelyrichcontentthere.However,sincebydefinitionwearenotattending

carefullytothecontentperipheraltoattention,weneverrealisethatitisinfact

sparse,insteadassumingthatitmustbeasrichasthecontentinthefocusof

attention—an“IllusionofRichness”179(8.6.1)

Thereisbothinterestandplausibilitytobothaccounts(andIconsidersomeothers

in8.6),andmuchinkhasbeenspiltarguingoverthematter.Inthistreatise,I

essentiallyarguethatwhileitisnotyetpossibletoestablishthefactofphenomenal

overflowbeyonddoubt,recentattemptstodiscreditit—alongthelinesofCohenet

al.,andothers—havenotbeensuccessful,andIexploresomereasonsforthat

failure.Infact,Iarguethattheoverflowaccountoffersthebestexplanationofthe

evidencecurrentlyavailable,especiallyinoneparticularcase:fovealvision.

Aftersomepertinentclarificationsanddefinitions,IintroduceFlorenceandher

forest,andBenandhishenasillustrativecasesthathighlightanimportant

distinctionthatnuancesCohenetal’sposition:full-fieldvisionmustbetreated

differentlytofovealvision.Thisbringsustothequestionofjusthowwecanknow,

inthefovealcase,whetherallthecontentthatisprocessedthroughtheretinais

experiencedphenomenally,orwhetheronlysomeofitis.Ipresentthreearguments

forkeepinganopenmind.First,thereareindisputableofcasesofdiachronic

phenomenaloverflow,andwhatwetaketobesynchronicexperiencemayjustbea

veryshort-durationcaseofdiachronicexperience.Ifso,thenoverflowbecomes

moreplausible.Second,thereisanincorrigibleimmediacyaboutcertainkindsof

veryrichexperiencethatsimplycannotbeextinguishedorbroughtintodoubt,no

179Thisiscloselyrelatedtothe“RefrigeratorLightIllusion”onwhichonethinksthewholevisual

fieldisrichbecausewheneveroneturnsone’sattentiontoanypartofit,onefindsthatparttoberich

(Schwitzgebel,2007,p.13).Otherfactorsmaybeatworkinadditiontoensemblestatistics,suchas

inflation(Odegaardetal.,2018).

229

matterhowthesubjectintrospectsit.Andthird,anepistemicimpasseinherentin

empiricalmethodsforfindingoutwhetherphenomenaloverflowoccurssuggests

thatnotonlyhavetheyfailedthusfartosettlethequestion,butthattheymaynever

becapableofdoingso.

WhatIamattemptinghereisnotaknockdowndeductiveargument,butan

abductiveone:giventhematerialdiscussedbelow,anopenmindonphenomenal

overflowisstillinorder,anditmayevenbethecasethatphenomenaloverflowisa

betterexplanationoftheevidencethantheillusionofrichnessorotheroverflow-

scepticalaccounts.

7.2 SomeMoreFoundations

Alittlefurthergroundworkisnecessary,inadditiontothatlaiddowninPartI.In

thissectionIdistinguishbetweenthreekindsofcognitivecontentthatare

particularlygermanetotheoverflowquestion,drawaconnectionbetweenBlock’s

“accessconsciousness”andmyExecutiveAttention,andstipulatewhatImeanby

“report,”aconceptthatisalsocentraltomyanalysis.Imakenoclaimstominebeing

theonlyoreventhe“correct”definitions—Imerelystipulatetheparticular(well-

grounded,Ihope)conceptsthatIthinkareinterestinginrelationtothequestionof

overflow.

230

7.2.1 ThreeTypesofPhenomenalContent

Thekeytoaddressingtheoverflowquestion,Ibelieve,istoseethatnotall

phenomenalcontentisequallystructuredforfurtherprocessingbyExecutive

Attention.Likemostmoderndiets,itconsistsofsomecontentthatisveryhighly

processed,somethatismoderatelyprocessed,andsomethatisinitsrawstate.If

thishypothesiscanbeestablished,phenomenaloverflowbecomesnotonly

plausible,buthighlylikely.Therelatively“raw”content—contentthatisnot

processedinanykindofhigher-orderway—iswherewewillfindoverflow,ifat

leastsomeoftheunprocessedcontentisphenomenalcontent.Muchofthischapter

willbedevotedtothequestionofwhetherornotthe“raw”contentisphenomenal,

andwhetherwecanknowittobeso.180Inthissection,Idevelopadistinction

betweenthreetypesofphenomenalcontentbasedonwhethertheyundergohigh-

orderprocessing,andwhatkindofprocessingtheyundergo.

Onewayofdepictingthisdifferentialprocessingofcontentistodrawadistinction

betweenthreetypesofcontent.Considerthispassage:

“Theclaimisnotthatweareunawareofourownconsciousbeliefs

andexperiences(orunawarethatwehavethem).Itis,instead,

thatourbeingawareofthem,orthatwehavethem,isnotwhat

makesthemconscious.Whatmakethemconsciousisthewaythey

makeusconsciousofsomethingelse—theworldweliveinand(in

proprioception)theconditionofourownbodies”(Dretske,1993,

p.281,myitalics).

180LestitbesaidIambeggingthequestionhere—Iamnotstartingbyclaimingthatthereissucha

thingaspureconsciousnessorphenomenalcontentthatisnotfurtherprocessedinanyway(indeed,

see6.3.3).Thatisamatterforempiricalinvestigation.Rather,Istartbyclaimingthatphenomenal

contentthatisnotprocessedinanyhigher-orderwayisconceptuallypossible,andthenproceedto

seekempiricalevidencethatitinfactoccurs.

231

ForDretske,thereisconsciouscontentthat(a)makes“usconsciousofsomething

else—theworld,”butthiscontentdoesnotrelyforitsphenomenalityonthingslike

(b)“ourbeingawareofthem”or(c)ourbeingaware“thatwehavethem.”Wecan

formulatethisdistinctionasonebetweenthreekindsofphenomenalcontent:181

First-OrderContent(FOC)isthatsubsetofphenomenalcontent

thatisnotprocessedinanyhigher-orderway.Forexample,to

simplyseealeafthathappenstolieinmydirectfovealvisionwhile

mymindisfullyengrossedinsolvingacomplexmathematical

problemisvisualFOC.Visualiconicmemoryisanexampleofa

cognitivesystemthatmayoftengiverisetoFOC(Prinz,2011,pp.

180–181).182

Experience-ofisperceptualcontentproducedbyacertainkindof

higher-orderprocessingofFOC.Forexample,toattendcloselyto

thetextureoftheleavesIsee,ortobeawareoftheirparticular

shadeofgreenareexamplesofExperience-ofhigher-order

processingofthatFOC.Experience-ofispurelyperceptual,onmy

definition.Experience-ofcontentarisesfromhigher-order

processingimplementedinaglobalworkspace(Baars,1988),orin

thecentralexecutive–episodicbufferaxisofmulticomponentWM

(Baddeley,2003,p.836).Apossibleexampleofrelativelypure

Experience-ofmightbegeneratingvisualimagery(e.g.,ofahen)

withone’seyesclosed(Schwitzgebel,2011,p.36).

181Eachofthethreehasitsnon-phenomenalcounterpart.182Iusetheterm“iconicmemory”(Neisser,1967)withoutanycommitmentsastothenatureofits

contents,representationalorotherwise.ForadiscussionoftherelatedconceptofFragileVisual

Short-TermMemory,seeBarrett(2014,p.23).

232

Seeming-thatisconceptualcontentproducedbyadifferentkindof

higher-orderprocessingofFOC(orofExperience-of)thatcanbe

characterisedasdemonstrativeorpropositional.Itisthatpartof

consciouscontentthatisaboutwhatIsee,whetherabouttheFOC,

oraboutotherExperience-oftypedetail.KnowingthatwhatIam

lookingatisaforestwouldbeSeeming-that.Gistperceptionisan

exampleofacognitiveprocessproducingSeeming-that(Mack&

Clarke,2012).

Dretske(1993,pp.276–277)(partially)makesthedistinctionclearerinhis

discussionofRock’swiggles.Subjectslookingattwonear-identicalbutslightly

differentcloudline-drawingsoftenfailedtonoticetheareawheresomewiggles

weremissinginonedrawingbutnottheother.Hedescribesthisassubjectsbeing

“thing-aware”—theysawthedifferentwiggles—butnotbeing“fact-aware”—they

wereunawareofthefactthatthewigglesweredifferent.Onmythreefold

distinction,thereisabareperceptionofthewiggles,avisualimageformedinthe

mind—whichisFOC—utterlybereftofidentifications,comparisons,judgements,etc.

Ifthesubjectisaskedastowhetherthecloudsdifferfromeachother,she

implementshigher-orderprocessingofthevisualimage,ExecutivelyAttendingto

variousfeaturesandlocations,toproduceamorerefinedExperience-oftheclouds,

perhapsincludingaperceptionofthewigglesthatdifferthatgroupsthemtogether

forcomparison.Onthisbasis,sheisabletocometoconclusionsorjudgements

aboutthefactthatthewigglesarecloud-shaped,andthattheyareslightly

different—Seemings-that.

SimilarandSupportingDistinctions

Thesedistinctionsaresurprisinglycommonintuitionsthatgobackalongway.They

areinherentinthereflexive/reflectivedistinctioninIndianphilosophy(2.4.1).First-

ordercognitions(e.g.,perceivingabluesky)canthemselvesbecometheobjectsof

233

second-ordercognitions(e.g.,Iamperceivingablueskynow,ratherthan

yesterday).Thesecond-ordercognitionisreflective,inthatitisacognitionabout

anothercognitionwithinthesamesubject.However,inherentinthefirst-order

cognitionisthat“I”amthesubject,experiencingthiscognition.Thisisreflexivity,

anddiffersfromreflectivityinthatitisinherentintheveryactofconsciously

perceivingthattherebeasubjectdoingtheperceiving.Thisfirst-order,ineliminable

subjectivityisreflexivity,whereastheoptional(inthatitdoesn’talwayshappen)

second-orderconsiderationofthefirst-orderperceptionisreflectivity.

AccordingtoWider(1997),Descartesdrawsadistinctionbetweenpre-reflectiveand

reflectiveconsciousness,asdoesSartre(pp.11-14).Kantspokeoftheideaof

transcendentalself-consciousnesswherenoreflectionisinvolved(pp.35-38),and

Lockespokeofdegreesofself-consciousness,distinguishing,forexample,betweena

thoughtandaperceptionofthatthought(pp.16-17).

Morerecently,othershavedrawndistinctionsverysimilartoallorpartofmythree

typesofcontent(Bayne,2010,p.78;Bayne&Montague,2011,pp.9–10;Campana&

Tallon-Baudry,2013;Coltheart,1980;Gallagher,2004,p.90;Gross,2018,p.2;

Horgan,2012,p.408;Lamme,2003,p.14,2010,p.208,2018,pp.3–4;May,2004;

Mogensen&Overgaard,2018,p.6;Mole,2011b,pp.72–73;Naccache,2018,pp.2,5;

Schooler,2002;Stoljar,2016,pp.1193–1195;Wolfe,1994,1999a,pp.3–5).183The

similaritiesanddifferencesliebeyondthescopeortherequirementsofthistreatise.

Itakeitthen,thatthishierarchicalstructureofcognitiveprocessingisso

widespreadastobelargelyuncontroversial.Fewwoulddisagreethatcognitive

contentisprocessedinmanysteps,often(ifnotalways)involvingLiberalAttention.

Thecontroversialquestionhereiswhetherthereisastageatwhichrichcontenthas

183Comparealsotheautonoetic/noetic/anoeticandtheremember/know/confidencedistinctions(H.

Roediger,Rajaram,&Geraci,2007;Tulving,1985),thenon-consciousness/primary

consciousness/reflectiveconsciousnessdistinctioninepilepsy(Johansonetal.,2003,p.280),andthe

distinctionbetweenlow-levelpropertiesofexperience(colours,shapes,etc.)andhigher-level

properties(potential,causalrelations,etc.)(Masrour,2011,p.366).

234

becomephenomenalbutatleastsomeofthatphenomenalFOCisneverfurther

processedinanywayemployingExecutiveAttention—i.e.,notprocessedbythe

cognitiveexecutive.Itisworthelaboratingandelucidatingthethreetypesof

phenomenalconsciousnessalittlefurtherinpreparationforargumentsbelowthat

shallbuilduponthem.

FOC

CohenandDennett(2011,p.362)ask,“Whatdoesitmeantohaveaconscious

experiencethatyouyourselfdonotrealizeyouarehaving?”PhenomenalFOCis

preciselythatpossibility(althoughalotofthetime,itisaccompaniedby

Experiences-ofandSeeming-that).ThatFOCcanbephenomenalisguaranteedbyits

ability(intheoryatleast)tosatisfymyfourcharacteristicsofconsciousness(2.4).It

isutterlycoherenttosaythatIseewiggleswithreflexivephenomenality—itbeing

inherentintheexperiencethatthereisan“I”—asituatedfirst-personalsubjectwho

isdoingtheseeing—withoutreflectinguponsuchseeinginanyhigherorderway,

andthereforewithout“realising”(itSeeming-that)Iamseeingthewiggles.184

Tobeclear:FOCistheresultofprocessing,justnothigher-orderprocessingasIhave

definedithere(ExecutiveAttentioninWM).Thereissignificantprocessingtaking

placeattheretinaandpost-retinallyintheearlyvisualcentresofthebrain,and

probablyevenbeyond.ThisprocessinginvolvesLiberalAttention.Buttheoverflow

question(asIamframingit)isnotconcernedwithLiberalAttention,butwith

ExecutiveAttention.FOCiscontentthatisnot(yet,atleast,orperhaps,ever)

ExecutivelyAttended.IallowthattheextentofExecutiveAttentionalprocessing

184Thisassertionisneutralwithregardtowhatwemightthinksubjectsare,orevenwhether

subjectsarerealentitiesatall.Foravarietyofviewsonthisquestion,seeGallagherandShear(1999)

andGallagher(2011).

235

mayrangefromprodigiousdowntonear-absence,butforthepurposesofQitwould

stillberegardedasExecutiveAttentionregardlessofits“quantity.”185

Alsotobeclear,Experience-ofandSeeming-thatbynomeansexhausthigher-order

processing.Rememberingthenameofsomethingyousaw,calculatingthesumof

twonumbersonthepageinfrontofyou,feelingsadonseeingapictureofa

departedlovedone—alltheseareexamplesofhigher-orderprocessingthatarein

themselvesquiteplausiblyneitherExperience-oforSeeming-thatassuch,yetthey

certainlyinvolvesomekindofhigher-orderprocessing(andtherefore,Executive

Attention).

Higher-OrderProcessing:Experience-ofandSeeming-that

Ihave,however,focusedonphenomenalcontentarisingfromtwoparticular

varietiesofhigher-orderprocessing,becauseitisthesethataremostrelevanttothe

overflowquestion.Inotedearlieradifferencebetweenpropositionalconfidence

(3.3.3.2)andperceptualclarityorvividness(3.3.3.3).Baynealsodescribesthis

distinctionbetweenconceptualandperceptualhigher-ordercontent.186

“Thisisperhapsmostobviouswithrespecttochangeblindness.It

isonethingtobeawareoffeaturesinascenethathavechanged,

anditisanothertobeawarethattheyhavechanged”(Bayne,

2010,p.78,italicsintheoriginal).

185Koivistoetal.,(2009)explorethecomplexelectrophysiologicalrelationshipbetweenattention

andFOC.186Siewert(2012)similarlyarguesforboth“sensing/thinking”and“first-order/higherorder”

distinctions.

236

BeingawareoffeaturesismyExperience-ofwhilebeingawarethattheyhave

changedismySeeming-that.Inchangeblindnessparadigms,itispossiblefor

subjectstohavenone,either,orboth.Thus,wemightthinkofFOCasbeingreflexive

butnotreflective,andperceptual;Experience-ofasbeingbothreflexiveand

reflective,andperceptual;whileSeeming-thatisbothreflexiveandreflective;and

conceptual.Intherealmofthephenomenalcontentretrievedfrommemory,

Experience-ofmaybetakentobethatwhichresultsfromnon-declarativememory

retrievalwhileSeeming-thatarisesfromdeclarativememoryretrieval(seeSquire,

2004,2009).187

Theconceptual/perceptualdistinctioniswellknowntosomeHigherOrderTheory

ofconsciousnessproponents.Forexample,Rose(2006,pp.369–373)discussesthe

distinctionbetweenHigherOrderPerception(HOP)andHigherOrderThought

(HOT).HOPpositsthatsomethinglikeaGlobalWorkspace“scans”lower-order

representations(“sensoryimpressions,phenomenal,creatureconsciousness,”p.

369)andperceivesthecontenttowhichitattends.HOT(asperRosenthal)posits

thatconsciouscontentonlyariseswhenyouthinkaboutunconsciouslower-level

representations.Mythreetypesofphenomenalcontentdonot,however,dependon

HigherOrderTheories,188butmerelyonthemoregeneralandrelatively

uncontroversialideaofhierarchicalcognition—theideathatsomecontentis

processedtoproducemorehighlyrefinedcontent—andthatwecandistinguish

betweenconceptualandperceptualvarietiesofsuchhigher-ordercontent.

Anotherarenathatutilisesthisconceptual/perceptualdistinctionisthedebateover

cognitivephenomenology(Bayne&Montague,2011)—whethercognitivecontent

mustalwaysbeperceptualincharacter,orwhetherthereisgenuinelynon-

perceptual,purelyabstractconceptualcontent.Again,Iinvokethisdebateonlyas

187Zimmermanetal.,(2016)drawasimilardistinctioninauditoryexperiencebetweenattentionto

higher-orderfeatures(Seeming-that)andattentiontosensoryinformationitself(Experience-of),and

finddistinctparietalpathwaysforeach.188Infact,theideaofphenomenalFOCmaywellbeantithetictosomekindsofHigherOrderTheories

(9.5.2.1).

237

evidenceforthevalidityofthedistinctionintheoryatleast,withoutwishingto

enterintoitsfinerpoints.189

FOCandhigher-ordercontentdonotnecessarilyimplyaDuplicateStoreorPartial

DuplicateStoremodel(5.4.1).ThesamecontentcannotbebothFOCand

Experience-ofatthesametime.190Rather,someFOCisprocessed,191altered,and

refinedbyExecutiveAttentioninWMsothatitbecomesExperience-ofcontent.The

originalFOCnolongerexists,muchashalf-waythroughachessgame,theoriginal

positionsofthepiecesnolongerexist.192Thereisevidencethattheimplementation

ofattentionalstrategiesenhancesprocessingofvisualcontent,notonlyinthevisual

periphery,butevenwithinthefoveolaitself(Poletti,Rucci,&Carrasco,2017):i.e.,

FOCbecomingExperience-of.Seeming-thatcanbethoughtofasakindofpointer

underaFileDirectorymodel.Itisthepropositional“tag”thatdescribesother

content,whetherthatcontentlieswithinoroutsideWM.

RelevancetoOverflowandQ

Mythreetypesofphenomenalcontentprovidetheconceptualtoolsfor

characterisingandperhapsidentifyingwhetherthereisinfactphenomenal

overflow.Experience-ofandSeeming-thataretheproductsofExecutiveAttention.If

189TheideaofphenomenalSeeming-thatwouldberejectedbythosewhorejectcognitive

phenomenology.190SeealsothedebateoverwhetherWMrecruitsvisualsensoryprocessingareastokeepvisual

contentinWM(Gayet,Paffen,&derStigchel,2018;Scimeca,Kiyonaga,&D’Esposito,2018;Xu,2018).191Onattentionmodulatingbothconsciousandsubconsciouscontent,seeSumneretal.,(2006).192Incidentally,thisprovidesaplausibleaccountofNeander’s(1998)tripletwhoseSeeming-that“I

haveasensationofgreen”followsfromanactualfirst-orderexperienceofseeingred.Onmyaccount,

thisismerelyacaseoffaulty(non-veridical)higher-orderprocessing.Evenifthetriplethasa

phenomenalFOCexperienceofseeingred,itisquicklyoverwrittenbyanExperience-of—and

consequently,aSeeming-that—sheseesgreen,beforeshehastimetoformaSeeming-thatshesaw

red.ComparetheaccountsofRosenthal(2009,p.249)andBlock(2011b,pp.423–424).

238

thereistobecognitivecontentthatisphenomenalbutnotExecutivelyAttended,it

isinFOCthatitwillbefound.Thetwoparticularlypertinentquestionsare:

[1]. CanFOCeverbephenomenal,independentofanyhigher-orderprocessing?

[2]. Howcanwecometoananswerto[1]?

Theparticularkindsofhigher-orderExecutiveAttentionalcontentIhavecalled

Experience-ofandSeeming-thatareespeciallyrelevanttotheepistemological

question[2],sincetheyarethestandardmeansbywhich[1]hashithertobeen

answered.Theyconstitutereport,towhichIreturnshortly.

WecannowreframethecompetingviewsofBlockandCohenetal.,usingthis

terminologyasfollows.Blockcanbetakentoholdthattherichnessofphenomenal

FOCisnotlimitedbythecapacitylimitationsofthehigherorderExperience-ofand

Seeming-that.Cohenetal.,canbetakentoholdoneoftwoviews:eitherthatFOCis

phenomenal,butisassparseasExperience-ofandSeeming-that;orthatFOCisnot

phenomenalatall—onlyensemblestatisticsthatareaveragesofrichunconscious

FOCbecomephenomenalascontentinthehigher-orderExperience-of.

7.2.2 AccessConsciousnessandExecutiveAttention

Thereisapotentialforsometerminologicalconfusionherethatisworthclarifying

fromtheoutset.ItakeBlock’s(1995,p.231)“accessconsciousness”toberoughly

equivalenttomyExecutiveAttention.Hedefinesitwiththreesufficientbutnot

necessaryproperties:contentthatispoisedforuseinreasoning,rationalcontrolof

239

action,andspeech.193ThisoverlaysmyconceptofExecutiveAttentionasstructuring

contentforhigher-orderprocessing,althoughIhavefocusedonperception

(Experience-of)aswellasconception(Seeming-that).Thisisinkeepingwithhow

othershaveunderstoodaccessconsciousness(Gross,2018,p.2;Lamme,2003,p.

14).Keepinmindthataccessconsciousnesscanbe“non-phenomenal”(1995,p.

231)—indeed,itisoneofBlock’schiefintereststoshowthatphenomenal

consciousnesscancomeapartfromaccessconsciousness.

7.2.3 BroadDefinitionofReport

Thestandardwayofdeterminingpreciselywhatcontentisphenomenalforasubject

isreport,bywhichImeanmorethanjustverballyreportingwhatoneexperienced.I

usereportinabroadersense,toencompassanyhigher-orderphenomenalcontent

bywhichasubjectisawareofthephenomenalcontentoftheirexperience.Thus,

reportincludesExperience-ofandSeeming-that,althoughitmaynotbeexhausted

bythem(7.2.1.3).194Reportmayincludeverbalcommunication,butalsonon-verbal

communication(e.g.,pressingabutton),andconsciousknowledgethatispoisedfor

externalcommunication,butisneveractuallyexternallycommunicated.195Itseems

obviousthatweveryoftenreport(inthissenseof“report”)thecontentofour

193Smithies(2011)presentsaverysimilaraccountofattentionasrational-accessconsciousness,

althoughheseemslessamenabletothepossibilityofdissociatingphenomenalconsciousnessfrom

accessconsciousness.194CompareSergentandRees(2007)whoarguethat“consciousaccessoverflowsreport”(p.524).

Onmyterminology,theyarearguingfortheviewthatphenomenalExperience-ofoverflows

phenomenalSeeming-that(whichmyaccountallows),andagainstBlock’sviewthatphenomenalFOC

overflowsbothExperience-ofandSeeming-that(whichmyaccountrefutes,agreeingwithBlock).195AdefinitionroughlysimilartothatofNaccache(2018,pp.3–4).

240

consciousexperience.Butitdoesnotfollowfromthatthatallthatisconsciously

experiencedisreported,orevenreportable.196

AsIuseithere,reportisalwaysphenomenal.Thus,theinvoluntarydilationofone’s

pupilsofwhichoneisobliviousinresponsetoanemotionalstimulusdoesnotcount

asreport,buthavingtheunverbalisedconsciousrealisationthatIamscareddoes.

AsIuseit,allreportisphenomenal,butnotallphenomenalityisreport.Inherentin

oneofmyfourcharacteristicsofconsciousness—whatitislike-ness—isanidea

verysimilartoreport.Thedescriptivestatement“whatitislike”isveryclosetothe

question“whatisitlike?”Questionsdemandananswer,andananswerisvery

similartoareport.However,itmaybelikesomethingformetoseearosewithout

myeveransweringthequestion,“whatisitlike?”197Thus,reportasIuseithereis

necessarilyphenomenal,butnotallphenomenalityisnecessarilyreport(or

reported).TheremaybesubconsciousExperiences-ofandSeemings-that,butthey

wouldnotbereportasIuseithere.

Indeed,overflowdictatesthatthereiscontentthatisphenomenal—somepartof

FOC—butnotreported,198andisnotitselfreport.ReportrequiresExecutive

Attention,sinceitisakindoffurtherprocessingbythecognitiveexecutivethat

implementsattentionalstrategies.Ifwearetofindinstancesofoverflow,itwillbe

byfindingFOCthatisnotaccessedintheseways(Fazekas&Overgaard,2018).

196Forexample,somevegetativepatientsexhibitnormalfMRIpatternsofactivitywhenaskedto

performmentalimagerytasks.Thiswouldsuggestthattheyareconsciouslyexperiencingthe

appropriatecontentforperformingthosetasksbututterlyincapableofexternalisingthatcontentin

anyway(Klein,2017).Conversely,strictlyspeaking,externalisationofcontentisnotitselfa

guaranteeofconsciousness—arecordplayerplayingavoicesaying“Iamconscious”isnot(thereby)

conscious.Itisfarfromestablishedthatevenverycomplexartificialintelligencedelivers

consciousness,evenifprogrammedtoanswerquestionsaboutitsconsciousnessintheaffirmative.

Andinhumans,thereareexperimentalparadigmswhereimplicitcontentmakesitswayinto

reporting.197CompareStoljar(2016,pp.1182–1183).198ItnevergetsfurtherprocessedintoExperience-ofcontent,althoughitmay(ormaynot)Seem-that

itisphenomenaltothesubject.Ielaborateonthisbelow(8.6.2.2).

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7.3 FlorenceandBen

InthissectionIdrawonemoreimportantdistinctionthathas—asfarasIcantell—

beenalmostentirelyoverlookedintheliteratureonQoroverflow—thepossibility

offovealratherthanperipheralphenomenaloverflow.ConsiderFlorence,whois

enjoyingtheviewofabeautifulforestfromherbalcony.Shestandsperfectlystillas

shetakesinthewholemagnificentvista,savouringitsgrandcomplexity,texture,

colour,andthegentlemovementofthebranchesandleavesinthebreeze.To

Florence,itSeems-thatshephenomenallyexperiencesseeingeverytree,perhaps

eveneveryleafvisiblebeforeherintheforest.

TheoverflowproponentarguesthatevenifFlorencedoesnothavearich

Experience-ofeverytree,atleastherphenomenalFOCcontainseverytree,anditis

thisthatjustifiesherSeeming-thatshehasavisualexperienceofeverysingletree,

evenifshecan’treportthefinedetailofeverysingletree.Theoverflowsceptic

countersthatFlorenceismistakeninthisSeeming-that—itisonlyanillusionof

richness,arisingfromsparseensemblestatisticsoftheattentionalperipheryanda

kindofperceptualassumptionthattheperipherymustbeasrichasthefocusof

attention.

ThereisoneverygoodreasontosidewiththeoverflowscepticinFlorence’scase.

WhenFlorenceholdsherheadstillandgazesupontheforestvista,thelightfrom

thatscenestrikesherretina.Butherfoveaisfarricherinreceptorsthantherestof

theretina.Italsohasvariousotherfeatures—pushingasideofganglionandvascular

cells,thinness,etc.—thatmaximiseitsresolution(Galvin,O’Shea,Squire,&Govan,

1997,p.2035;Hall,2015,p.647;Schwartz,2017,Chapters2,3).Butawayfromthe

fovea,intherestoftheretina,thereceptorsaresparser,andtheconditionsless

conducivetohigh-resolutionvision.Whatismore,althoughthefovearepresents

0.01%ofthetotalareaoftheretina,approximately8%ofthestriatevisualcortex

(primaryvisualcortex,orV1)isdevotedtoprocessingtheinformationthatderives

fromit.Thereisevenevidencethatitismoredifficulttoattendtotheretinal

242

periphery,andthatanumberoffactorscontributetopoorerperformanceon

variousvisualtaskswhenthestimuliareintheperipheryratherthanfoveated

(Staugaard,Petersen,&Vangkilde,2016).IfFlorenceismistakenaboutitSeeming-

thatsherichlyexperienceseverytree,theremaybeaverygoodreasonforthat:that

richnessofdetaildoesnotproceedbeyondtheperipheralretina.

EnsemblestatisticsdoanadmirablejobofexplainingwhyFlorencenonetheless

feelsthatshedoesexperienceeveryleaf,richly,andwhyshenevernoticessmall

changesintheperipherythatdonotsignificantlyalterthevalueofthosestatistical

averages(Greenwood,Bex,&Dakin,2010).Thebrainfillsinorinterpolatescontent

tomakeitSeem-thatsheexperienceseverytreeandleaf,muchasitfillsinthe

receptor-freeblindspotwheretheopticdiscislocatedontheretina(Ramachandran

&Hirstein,1997,pp.434–437).

Otherstrategiesalsocontributetothisfeelingofoverallrichness.Theeyesgenerally

donotstandstillwhenwegazeuponascene,butsaccaderapidlyandconstantly

withoutusevenrealisingthisishappening(Henderson,2003;O’Regan&Noë,

2001),flittingtodifferentpartsofthescenesothatthebraincantakeallofthisrich

informationandweaveitseamlesslyintoabroadertapestry.Wealsotendtoinflate

oroverestimatetherichnessofperipheralvisualcontent(Odegaard,Chang,Lau,&

Cheung,2018).AllthesestrategiescombinetoexplainwhyFlorencemightbe

mistakenaboutitSeeming-thatshephenomenallyexperienceseverytreerichly.In

fact—andthereadercantrythisathome—ifsheholdshereyesstillandfocusesher

spatialattentiononaregioninherperipheralretinalfield,noamountofattention

willbringforthanexperienceofrichdetail.199Informationaboutaveragecolourand

brightnessmaybepreservedandphenomenallyaccessibletoherExperience-of

(Saiki&Holcombe,2012),butwhatisunavoidablylackingisrich,high-resolution

visualphenomenalcontent.Cohenetal.,explicitlystatethattheirensemblestatistics

modelappliestoextrafovealvisualperception:

199Comparethephenomenonofcrowding(Block,2013b,p.131).

243

“Wearguethatitemsthatareattendedtoandfoveatedare

perceivedatahigherresolution,whileitemsthatunattendedor

areintheperipheryareprimarilyperceivedasbeingpartofan

ensemble”(Cohenetal.,2016b,p.327).

So,thesameconsiderationsdonotapplytofovealvision.200ConsiderFlorence’s

brother,Ben,whosharesFlorence’sloveofnature.ButwhereasFlorence’stastes

areheavilyinclinedtowardsflora,Ben’sinclinemoretowardsfauna.Heis

delightedlyattendingcloselytoarelativelysmallyetexquisitelyclearphotoofa

speckledhen201onapageinfrontofhim.Whenaskedifhecanseeeveryindividual

speckle,Benanswersquiteemphatically,yes.Thehenfitscompletelywithinhis

fovealvisualfield.202Here,thereisnoretinalfilteringofdatainthesensedescribed

above,forthereceptordensityacrossthefovea—andtherefore,acrossthewhole

speckledhen—ismuchmorethanadequatetoresolveeveryspeckle(Appendix7).

Whatismore,thewholeofthehenfitseasilywithinhisfocusofspatialattention—

noneofitisspatiallyperipheraltothatfocus—solongashefocuseshisattentionon

thehenasawhole,ratherthanonanysmallerpartofthehen.Andthisisquitean

easythingtodo,giventhatthewholehenfitswithinhisfovealfield.Allthatrich

data—thedetailofeverysinglespeckle—passesthroughthefovealretinatothe

earlyvisualprocessingareasofthebrain.Neitherdohiseyesneedtosaccadeto

takeinmoredetailfromabroadscene.Bykeepinghiseyesperfectlystill,Bencan

foveatethewholehen.IfBencannottrulyexperienceeachspeckle,ifhis

phenomenalFOCofthehenissparse,itwillnotbebecausethecontentisabsent

fromhisvisualprocessingcentres,asisthecasewithFlorence’speripheraltrees.

200AlthoughIhighlightthecontrastbetweenFlorenceandBencasesinthischapterandfocuschiefly

onestablishingfovealoverflow,thiskindofanalysismayprofitablybeappliedinsupportofoverflow

inFlorencecasestoo(see9.4.2forabriefsketch).201SeeTye(2009)foranaccountoftheoriginsandhistoryofthespeckledheninphilosophical

discourse,andsomerecentdebates.202ForatechnicalanalysisoftheBen’svisualanatomyandphysiology,seeAppendix7.

244

ThekindsofscepticalargumentsraisedbyCohenetal.,willnotavailinBen’scase,

oratleast,theyrequiresignificantlymorejustification.RecallthatFlorence’s

peripheralcontentissparserthanherfovealcontent.Initially,itSeems-thatshehas

richperipheralphenomenalFOC,butwhensheisaskedaboutit,shediscoversthat

itismuchsparserthanshenaïvelythought.WhenFlorence“zoomsout”herspatial

attentiontotakeinthewholevistaorholdshereyesstillandshiftsherspatial

attentiontotheperiphery,shecomestodoubtherinitialSeeming-thatshesawthe

wholeforestandeverytreeandleafinitclearly.Shecannotinfact,byExecutively

Attending,generateaclearanddistinctExperience-ofallthoseindividualitems.The

bestshecanhopeforisfilledincontentbasedonensemblestatistics,whichcannot

delivertrulyrichandveridicalcontent,anymorethanifsheweretoclosehereyes

andimaginethescene.

ButthingsaredifferentforBen.LikeFlorence,itinitiallySeems-thathehasrich

phenomenalFOCofeveryspeckle.ButwhenhebringsExecutiveAttentiontobearto

answerthequestionofwhetherheseeseveryspecklerichly,hedoesnotcometo

doubtitasFlorencedoes.UnlikeFlorence,heonlybecomesmoreconfidentinhis

Seeming-thatheseeseverysinglespeckleclearly.However,likeFlorence,heisvery

limitedinwhathecanreportaboutthosespeckles.Despiteseeingthemclearlyand

richly(FOC)hecannotreportonthenumber,individualshapeorprecisespatial

relations(Holcombe,Linares,&Vaziri-Pashkam,2011)ofmorethanafewspeckles

atatime—justthosespecklestowhichheindividuallyturnshisobjectExecutive

Attention.Hecannotevensubitiseasmallgroupofspeckles,orevenjudgetheleft

halfofthehentohavemorespecklesthantheright,withoutemployinghis

ExecutiveAttention.SoBen’sExperience-ofthespeckles—thehigher-order

perceptionthatisgristforthosekindsofjudgements—issparserthanhisFOC.

Whatismore,ifBenmaintainstheheninhisfovealfieldbutshiftshisspatial

attentiontoanobjectintheperiphery,solongashislensesmaintainopticalfocus,

hecontinuestoseeeveryspecklerichly.Inthiscase,thereisadiminutioninhis

Experience-ofthespeckles—thespecklesplaymuchlessofaroleinhisvoluntary

streamofthought,becomelessprominent—but,Ipropose,nodiminutionof

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phenomenalFOC.Neithertheactualcontentnorthephenomenalityassuchare

diminished.

Ben’sincorrigiblyrichandclearexperienceofeveryspeckle,coupledwiththe

relativesparsityofhisreportableExperience-ofthespecklesseemslikeaclearcase

ofoverflow.Theoverflowsceptichastwobroadwaysofobjecting.First,shemight

placetheburdenofproofontheoverflowproponenttoestablishthatphenomenal

experienceiscapableofsuchhigh-capacityrichcontentinthefirstplace—thetopic

ofthenextchapter.Second,shemightarguethatBen(orwe)havenowayof

knowingthatBen’sfovealphenomenalFOCisrich—thetopicofthebalanceofthis

chapter.

7.4 EpistemicWoes

Whenwecometoidentifywhetherornotphenomenalexperienceisrichorsparse,

wearefacedwithamajorepistemichurdle.

“Reportingonwhatweseerequiresustoattendtoit.Sothefailure

toreportanobjectofvisualconsciousnessmightreflectafailureto

attendtotheobject,ratherthananabsenceofvisualconsciousness

oftheobject”(Stazicker,2011a,p.163).203

203SeealsoBlock(2007,p.483),SheaandBayne(2010,pp.478–479),andPhilips(2018,p.1).

246

Thephenomenaloverflowcontentinquestionis,onmydistinctionabove,justa

subsetofFOCthatisphenomenal,butnotinterpretedorfurtherprocessedby

capacity-limitedExecutiveAttentioninanyway.Inparticular,itnevergivesriseto

Experience-oforSeeming-thatcontent,phenomenalornot.Andhere’stherub:our

chief—perhapscurrentlysole—wayofprobingFOCisviareport(Experience-ofand

Seeming-that).Theonlywaytoprobecontentthatundergoesnofurthercognitive

processingisviafurthercognitiveprocessing.Theonlywaytoidentifyconscious

contentthatisnotExecutivelyAttendedisviaExecutiveAttention.Theonlywayto

determinewhethericonicmemorycontentisphenomenallyrichisviatheapparatus

ofWM,whichisphenomenallysparse.So,theissueturnsuponepistemic

justification:howdowe(we,theinvestigators,orwe,thesubjectslikeBenand

Florence)confirmwhetherphenomenalFOCisrichorsparse,withoutrelyingon

suchhigher-ordercontent?

TheoverflowscepticarguesthatphenomenalFOCissparsebecausewhenIturnmy

ExecutiveAttentiontoit,Ifindittobesparse.ButExecutiveAttentioniscapacity

limited,duetothenatureofWM(Chapter8).Yes,thereportproducedbyExecutive

Attentionisitselfsparse,butthatwouldbethecasewhethertheFOCitpurportsto

reportissparseorrich,simplybecauseExperience-ofandSeeming-that—the

bearersofthereport—arebytheirnaturesparse.Thisisakintotakinga

photographofaboldandvividPicassooraWarholwithanold,grainy,low-

resolutioncameraandholdingtheoriginalpaintingtobegrainyandsmudgedon

theevidenceofthephotograph.Iftheonlyevidencewehaveavailableisthegrainy

photograph,itisasplausiblethattheoriginalpaintingisclearandvividasitisthat

itisgrainy.Infact,ifweknowthatthecameraproducesgrainyimagesevenwhen

theoriginalscenesareknowntobeclearandvivid,thenwehaveadditionalreason

tobecautiousaboutcomingtotheconclusionthattheoriginalpaintingwasgrainy.

Thatisthecasehere.WeknowthatWMiscapacitylimited,soweshouldbecautious

aboutimputingthesamelimitationstoFOCwhich,onmyaccount,liesoutsidethe

capacitylimitedExecutiveAttentionofWM.

Inthissection,Idevelopthisargumentbyfirstinvokingthediachronicnatureof

cognitiontoshowthatovertime,wecanonlyreportatinysubsetofthatwhichwe

247

infactexperienced.Thisprinciplecanbetelescopeddowntoassmallatime-period

aswelikeandstillhold.Ithenarguethattheintuitiveimmediacyofphenomenal

experienceprovidespowerfulwarrantfortakingtheintuitiverichnessof

phenomenalFOCmoreseriously.Finally,Iconsiderthepromiseofno-report

paradigmsforgettingaroundtheepistemicimpasseofrelianceonreport,butfindit

tobefatallyflawed.

7.4.1 SynchronicorDiachronicExperience?

In2.4.4Icountedtemporalityasacorefeatureofphenomenalconsciousness.We

commonlytakeoursynchronicconsciousexperiencetobesomethinglikea

snapshotintime,adiscreteframeonafilm,completelydissectiblefromallother

momentsinthestreamofconsciousexperience.Buttherealityisthatconscious

experience—andthereforephenomenalcontent—isfluid.Considerthecaseof

readinganovel.Ittakesmanyhourstoreadthenovel,perhapsspreadoutoverdays

orweeks.EachsentenceIreadinthatnovelisrichincontent,strikingconnections

inmymindtomemories,perceptualimagery,emotions,andimaginations.Theseare

notonlyexperiencedatthetime,butalsoattended.Yetthereisalsoavastbodyof

experientialcontent,whatDainton(2000,p.31)callsthe“phenomenal

background”—straybackgroundnoises,rumblingsofone’stummy,gaspsatplot

twists—thatisonlyslightlyornotallattendedasIreadthenovel.BythetimeI

finishreadingthenovel,allIhaveleftisanextremelysparseExperience-ofthedetail

ofthestory,suchthatIwillonlybeabletoreportthesmallestsubsetofallthatI

experienced—events,characters,myreactions—overthetimeIwasreadingthe

novel.Coupledwiththis,however,isanostensiblyreliableSeeming-thatIdid

248

indeedexperiencealltherichnessofthenovelandperhapsthebackgroundover

time,despitethesparsityofmyreportaboutitsdetails.204

Nowsomethingverysimilarmightwellbehappeningtoallofusonamuchshorter

timescaleallthetime.Benislookingatthehen.SpecificaspectsoftheFOCarebeing

constantlyinterpretedbyExecutiveAttentionintoExperience-ofandSeeming-that.

Allthreeareconstantlybeingboundintoaunifiedphenomenalexperience.When

Bencomestoreportthecontentofhisexperience,however,hecannotsimplyreport

hisphenomenalFOCpreciselyandcompletelyatthispresentmoment.Executive

Attentiontakestime,howeverbrief,todoitswork.Likethenovel,Benisalways

reportinginterpretationsofpastFOC.Andlikethenovel,muchoftherichcontentin

iconicmemoryisconstantlyfritteringaway,withonlyasmallproportionofitbeing

preservedfrommomenttomomentbyrehearsalandmanipulationinWM(8.2.4)

andmakingitthroughtoconsciousreport.Eventhatpreservedcontentisconstantly

competingwithnewpreservedcontent,suchthatanyparticularpreservedcontent

ispreservedinconsciousnessforalimitedperiodoftime,beforeitisreplacedby

otherpreservedcontent(Baddeley,2007,Chapter7;Oberauer,Farrell,Jarrold,&

Lewandowsky,2016).Evensynchronicexperienceisdynamic,andthereforeina

sense,diachronic.

Thisinherentdiachronicity,togetherwiththewell-establishedfactofthefragilityof

richveryshort-termstores(suchasiconicmemory)oughttogiveusseriouspause

withrespecttooverflow-scepticalargumentsbasedontheillusionofrichness.A

synchronicvisualexperienceisreallyatemporalprocess,andbythetime

Experience-oforSeeming-thatisproducedbythistemporalprocess,muchofthe

FOChasalreadyfritteredawaybeyondretrievalforanykindoffurtherprocessing.

Thenatureofcapacitylimitationsofthemechanismsofreport(Chapter8),taken

togetherwiththefragilityofveryshort-termstores,suggestthatwhethertheFOCis

phenomenallyrichornot,wewouldfacethesamesparsityofreport.Thesparsityof

204Ward(2018,pp.3–4)makesasimilarpointonamuchshortertimescale—theRSVPparadigm,

whereaseriesoflettersisflashedquicklybeforeasubject,whoexperienceseveryletter,butcannot

reportmostofthem.

249

report,then,cannotbetakentobeareliableguideastothesparsityofphenomenal

FOC.205

WeneedsomeotherwaytodecidewhetherthephenomenalFOCissparse.Inthe

caseofasomeonereadinganovel,weconfidentlytrustherSeeming-thather

diachronicexperienceofthenovelwasrich,despitehercurrentsparseExperience-

ofthenovel.Theburdenofprooffallsuponthesceptictogivegoodreasonstodoubt

thatSeeming-that.Perhaps,then,byanalogy,theburdenofprooffallsuponthe

overflowsceptictoshowwhyweshouldnot,intheappropriatelyparallelcase,trust

Ben’sSeeming-thathephenomenallyexperienceseveryspeckledespitehissparse

Experience-ofthehen?

Inthenextsection,IinvoketheimmediacyofphenomenalFOCtoargueforthe

reliabilityofBen’sSeeming-thatheseesthespecklesrichly,whichhastheeffectof

strengtheningtheoverflowproponent’sposition.Inthesectionfollowingthat,I

consideranotherwaytoaddressthisepistemicobstacle:bypassingreport

altogetherviano-reportparadigms,butfindintheseafatalflaw.Thishastheeffect

ofdiminishingourhopesthatthisquestionwilleverbefinallysettledbythisroute.

7.4.2 Immediacy

“Withoutfurtherargumentation,phenomenologycannotserveas

thesolebasisforanytheoryofreality.Itmaybetakenonlyasa

finger,pointinginsomedirection,ratherthanconclusiveevidence

205Spacepreventsmefromdelvingdeeperintotheimplicationsofthetantalisingfindingthat

cognitivecontentcanbestoredforafewsecondswithoutneuralactivity(Trübutscheketal.,2017),

so-called“activity-silentWM,”andwhetherthismightinsteadrepresentExecutive-Attention-free

phenomenalperceptualcontent.

250

fororagainstaparticularthesis…Butwemustbecarefulhere,for

first-personreportscanalsobeveridicalorevensourcesof

wisdom”(Forman,1999,pp.619,620,italicsintheoriginal).

InthissectionIarguethatthereisaverypowerfulreasontotakefoveal

phenomenaloverflowseriously:theimmediacyofexperience.206ToBen,itclearly

andconfidentlySeems-thatheseeseveryspecklerichly.Heisatleastasconfident

aboutthisasheisabouthisrichexperienceofthenovelhereadlastmonth.And

Ben’sincreasedconfidencesharplycontrastswithFlorence’slossofconfidencethat

sheseesthewholeforestrichly,whentheybothintrospecttheirownlevelof

richnessmorecarefully.Thisdatum,whilebynomeansconclusive,mustbetaken

seriously.

Attheheartoftheoverflowproponent’sview,Isuggest,liesanintuitionthatBen

phenomenallyexperienceseveryspeckleimmediately,inthemostliteralsenseof

theword:withoutthemediationofreflectionorExecutiveAttention.207Thisisthe

casewhetherornothefurtherprocessesthatcontenttoproduceExperience-ofor

Seeming-thathesawthespeckles.Carrutherscapturesthis“powerfulintuition:”

“ourawarenessofourownexperiencesisimmediate,insuchaway

thattobelievethatyouareundergoinganexperienceofacertain

sortistobeundergoinganexperienceofthatsort”(Carruthers,

2016,sec.3,italicsintheoriginal).208

206CompareKriegel’s(2007,p.132)MethodofKnowability,andhisideaof“first-personknowledge,”

characterisedaseffortless,withoutthemediationofinference,andquick,althoughheisthinking

moreofthecontrastwith“third-personknowledge.”207Tobequiteclear,Iamnotthinkinghereoftheimmediacyofperceptionofexternalobjects,asper

Locke,Berkeley,andHume(Shoemaker,1994,p.251).208SimilarideasmayalsobefoundinthefourthcenturyAugustine(1950,sec.3.11.24)andin

Descartes(1637).

251

Bencanbemistakenintheveridicalityofwhathesees—hisexperienceofahen

mightbepurelyahallucination.Benmightbemistakenwhenhereflectsuponwhat

hesees—hemightmiscountthenumberofspecklesorbefooledbyacleverillusion

thatmakesthehenlooklikeaHeffalump.Butthesemistakesoccurinthe

subconsciousprocessingpriortoFOCorthehigher-orderprocessingposteriorto

FOC.ThephenomenallyexperiencedFOCisitselfimmediate,andthereforenotliable

toerror,initself,quaexperience.AsHorgan(2012,p.406)putsit,“thereisnogap

betweenappearanceandreality,becausetheappearancejustisthereality.”

Metzinger(2003,p.125)discussesasimilarconcept,phenomenalimmediacyin

relationtorepresentationalism.Butmyusehereofthetermimmediacydiffersfrom

scene-immediacy(Schroer,2012)andhaslittletodowithrepresentationalismor

naïverealism.Itisnotaboutthesubject’srelationtotheobjectofexperienceout

there,intheworld(Lyons,2017;Masrour,2011,pp.381–383).Itisaboutthe

reflexiverelationbetweenthesubjectandthephenomenalFOCofexperience.When

Benlooksathishen,notonlyisthe“I-ness”intrinsictotheexperience,soalsoisthe

FOC.

ThereissomethingitislikeforBentoseethehenasawhole—immediately,without

reflection,analysis,contemplation,report,oranyotherkindofhigher-order

processingofthatcontent.Butthereisalso,fortheoverflowproponent,something

itislikeforBentoseeeveryspeckleonthehen—immediately,withoutreflection,

analysis,contemplation,report,oranyotherkindofhigher-orderprocessingofthat

content—andhence,formanyofthosespeckles,withoutExecutiveAttentionbeing

involved.

Theoverflowscepticmustrejectthislatterpossibility.209Benmustbemistaken

preciselyabouttherichnessofhisphenomenalFOC.IfhisphenomenalFOCofevery

209Iexplorethedifferentwaysthisrejectioncanbeframedin8.6.

252

speckleisricherthanhisExperience-ofthehen,thenphenomenalcontentoverflows

attendedcontent.ThecapacitylimitationsofExecutiveAttentionandWMguarantee

thathisExperience-ofcannotbesorich.Itmay—byvirtueofensemblestatisticsin

theperipheryofattentionandthenuancesofWMcapacity(8.2)—beinsomesense

richerthanthetraditionalthree-fouritemsofWMcapacity,butitcannotbeasrich

astheoverflowproponentwouldhaveit(Cohenetal.,2016b).

Thereseemstobeacontradictionhere,betweentheapparentsparsityof

Experience-ofontheonehand,andtheSeeming-thatBen’sexperienceisrich,based

ontheimmediacyofBen’sphenomenalFOCexperience,ontheother.Isthereany

wayofdeterminingwhichofthetwokindsofreportisthemorereliableforour

purposes?IconsiderfirstsomepositivereasonsfortrustingBen’simmediacy-

motivatedSeeming-thathisphenomenalFOCisrich,beforeconsideringsome

reasonsfordoubtingit.

FortheVeridicalityofImmediateRichness

“Theintrinsicphenomenalaspectsofone’scurrentexperienceare

epistemicallyspecialbecausetheyareself-presentingandarenot

subjecttoanyappearance/realitygap”(Horgan,2012,p.420).

Odegaardetal.,(2018,p.8)observethatwhileasubject’s“confidenceisnot

synonymouswithphenomenologyperse…therearemanycaseswhereconfidence

providesaneffectiveassessmentofphenomenology’spresenceorabsence.”They

givetheexampleofblindsight,wheretheabsenceofthesubject’sphenomenologyis

takenasveridicaldespitethepreservationofthesubject’sabilitytoperformtasks

usingtheunconsciouscontent.WemightthinkaboutFlorenceandBen’sconfidence

intermsoftheconceptsof“feelingofknowing”(Hanczakowski,Zawadzka,Collie,&

Macken,2017;Mangan,2001)or“feelingofrightness”(FOR)(V.A.Thompson,

253

ProwseTurner,&Pennycook,2011)andthe“feelingoferror”(Gangemi,Bourgeois-

Gironde,&Mancini,2014).Whilethesefeelingsarebynomeansinfallible,thereare

certainlysituationswheretheyareeminentlytrustworthy,asinthecaseoffeeling

thatyouknowthesumoftwoplustwotobefour.Weevaluateourfeelingsof

confidenceonthebasisofadditionalevidence,butBen’scaseisonewhere—dueto

itsverynatureasfirst-personexperience—itisverydifficultindeedtogarnerthird-

personevidence(7.4.3).Nonetheless,therefollowtwoargumentsfortheveridicality

ofBen’simmediateandconfidentSeeming-thatheseeseveryspecklerichly:Ben’s

increasingconfidenceonprobing;andtheveridicalityofhisSeeming-thatin

trackingthedynamicsoficonicmemory.

7.4.2.1.1 Confidence

First,asobservedabove,Ben’sconfidenceinhisSeeming-thatheseeseveryspeckle

richlyonlyincreaseswhenheintrospectshisexperiencemoreclosely,inawaythat

Florence’sdoesnot.210Thereissomethingirrevocable(Ramachandran&Hirstein,

1997,pp.437–438)aboutBen’sexperience—hisSeeming-thatheseeseveryspeckle

richlycannotvoluntarilychange,anymorethanhisSeeming-thattwoplustwois

four.Evenso,whenBenExecutivelyAttendstothehen,hecannot,nomatterhowhe

tries,generateanExperience-ofeveryspecklerichly.HecannotholdinWMand

manipulatetheexactshape,number,andspatialrelationsofeverysinglespecklein

thewaythathecould,say,justthreesmalldots.WhatBencandoisExecutively

AttendtothehenandgenerateaconfidentSeeming-thatherichlyexperiencesevery

speckle(asFOC).Importantly,thisSeeming-thatispropositional—it“describes”the

richnessofhisexperience,butisnotitselfrich,althoughitisirrevocable.ForBen,

therearenolacunae,andhecanreportonanysinglespeckle(orfewspeckles)

210RamsøyandOvergaard(2004,p.10)arguethat“onecannotaprioriassumethatreportsof

certaintyworkasreportsofawareness.”BelowIarguethattherearegoodaposteriorireasonsfor

assumingthatBen’sreaffirmingcertaintydoesworkasareportofhisawareness,especiallyby

contrasttoFlorence’sdiminishingcertainty.

254

richlywheneverhewantsto,byfurtherprocessingFOCcontentintoExperience-of

content.

Florencecan’tdothis.WhensheExecutivelyAttendstoherforest—whenshe,

holdinghereyesstill,zoomsoutherspatialattentionaswidelyaspossible,and/or

shiftsherspatialattentionawayfromthefovea,herSeeming-thatsheseesevery

treeandleafrichlyisquiterevocable—shebecomesmoreconfidentofthe

sparsenessofthephenomenalcontentofherperipheralvisualfieldforthereasons

outlinedabove.Ben’sindividualspecklesareimmediatelyphenomenally

experiencedinawaythatFlorence’sindividualtreesnevercanbe(unlesstheyare

foveated).

Issubjectiveconfidenceagoodmeasureoftheconsciousnessofcontent?Cosmelliet

al.,(2007,pp.761–762)proposethe“structuralinvariantsapproach”toimprovethe

reliabilityoffirst-personreport.Basically,detailsofreportthatareconsistentacross

differentindividualsubjectsaremorereliable.Icanfindnoformalempiricaltesting

ofthereplicabilityofFlorenceandBen’sevolvingconfidencelevels(itwouldmakea

worthwhileresearchproject)butmyownanecdotalresearchconfirmstheir

replicability.Pintoetal.,(2017,p.217)describeaprinciplewherebyconscious

contentcanbeidentified:

“Generally,itisthoughtthatifsubjectsprovidecorrectanswers

butfeelthattheyareguessing(lowconfidence),theirperformance

maybebasedonunconsciousinformation.However,ifsubjectsare

confidentwhentheygivecorrectanswersandfeelthattheyare

guessingonlywhentheygiveinaccurateresponses,thenthe

informationunderlyingtheperformanceisthoughttobe

consciouslyavailable(Merikle,1992;Pasquali,Timmermans,&

Cleeremans,2010).”

255

ForFlorence,herinitialconfidenceinSeeming-thatsheseeseverytreeandleafis

shakenbyfurtherintrospectionsothatshenowcomestothinkshemighthavebeen

guessingafterall,suggestingthatshemaynothavebeenconsciousofthatrich

detail.Phenomenasuchaschangeblindness,inattentionalblindness,andcrowding

areallexamplesofthisprincipleatwork,albeitindifferentwaysorfordifferent

reasons.Theyallillustratethefallibilityofourreportingoutsidethefocusof

attention,butcruciallyareaccompaniedwiththatfeelingofguessing,ifnotinitially,

certainlyonfurtherintrospectionoronbeingconfrontedwiththereality(e.g.,after

beingshownthegorillavideowithoutcountingbasketballpasses).Expectationcan

createillusorycontent(Aru&Bachmann,2017;Mack,Clarke,&Erol,2018).But

Ben’sintrospectionnotonlyleadshimtogrowmoreconfidentinhisSeeming-that

heseeseveryspecklerichly,hisconfidenceisconfirmedbytheobjectivelyrichly

speckledhen.Whilethereremainsomequestionsaboutthevalidityofthesekindsof

measures,theydorepresentpositiveevidencethatBenisindeedconsciousofevery

specklerichlyinawayFlorenceisnot.

Empirically,littleifanyworkonthisquestionhasbeendoneonBencases.Naccache

(2018)reliesonexplicitlyparafovealexperimentstoarguethattakingintrospective

reportsasveridicalisgullible(p.3).Odegaardetal.,(2018;2016)alsoaddress

Florencecases,arguingthatmisplacedconfidenceinwhatoneseesincreaseswith

distancefromthefovea(Odegaardetal.,2018,p.8).Whatismore,thekindof

misplacedconfidenceexhibitedbysubjectsinthatstudyisexactlythekindthatis

defeasiblebyfurtherattentionoftherightsort,aswhenFlorencetriestoascertain

whethershereallycanseeindividualtreesandleavesinhervisualperiphery,and

realisedthatshewasmistakeninherinitialSeeming-that.

7.4.2.1.2 TrackingIconicMemory

Second,Ben’sSeeming-thatreflectsthewayiconicmemoryworksinawaythat

suggeststhatitisareliableindicatorofhisphenomenalexperience.Haunetal.,

(2017,pp.2–3)argueconvincinglythatthesimplediscriminationstasksorforced

choicereportsthatdominatetheempiricalworkonthesemattersfailtocapturethe

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richnessofdailyperception,andsuggestmorecreativewaysofidentifyingthat

richness(suchasaskinganartisttodrawasmanydetailsastheycanrememberof

animage).IfBengazesevenbrieflyathishen,thencloseshiseyesandimmediately

attendsintentlytothepersistenttracesofthisvisualimage,hewillfindthatfor

somefractionofasecondhecontinuestobeconfidentinitSeeming-thatheseesthe

afterimageofeveryspecklerichly.Butthisonlylastsafractionofasecond,after

whichheloseseventheSeeming-thathehasmaintainedarichafterimageofthe

hen.Theafterimagequicklydegradesandbecomessparserbeforefading

altogether.211Iencouragethereadertotrythisathome.

Here,Ben’sSeeming-thatisaccuratelytrackingthedynamicsoficonicmemory(and

longer-termmemoryaswell)andrevealingtohimthedifferencebetweenthe

richnessofthedirectperceptionandinitialafterimagecomparedtotherapidly

degradingrichnessastheafterimagefadesfromiconicmemory.Thisaccurate

reflectionofthebehaviouroficonicmemoryisimportantthird-personevidencethat

Ben’sconfidenceinhisSeeming-thatheseeseveryspecklerichlyiswellfounded.

AgainsttheVeridicalityofImmediateRichness

TheoverflowscepticmustarguethatBen’sSeeming-thatheexperiencesevery

specklerichlywithoutExecutiveAttentionismistaken.Ben’sSeeming-thatisaform

ofintrospection,andtherearemuchdiscussedproblemswithintrospection

(Schwitzgebel,2011;Smithies&Stoljar,2012).Thereareanumberofobjectionsthe

overflowscepticcanpresshere:thattheevidenceforBen’sSeeming-thatistoo

scant;thatSeeming-thatisgenerallyunreliable;andthatnospeckleisinfact

experiencedwithoutExecutiveAttention.

211Perhapsaveryghostlyandsparseimagecanbemaintainedforminutes,orevenencodedinto

long-termmemory.

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7.4.2.2.1 LackofEvidence

First,theoverflowscepticmightarguethattheadmissioninthelastsectionthatitis

verydifficulttofinddirectindependentevidenceofrichphenomenalFOCmeans

thereisalackofdirectevidenceforimmediacyarguments,whichweakensthem

considerably.Inresponse,IrepeatthatIampursuinganabductiveargumenthere,

andtheevidencepresentedintheprevioussection,whilenotvoluminous,is:(a)

powerfulindirectevidenceforfovealoverflow;and(b)thebestonecouldhopefor

giventheimpenetrablyprivatefirst-personnatureofoverflowingphenomenalFOC

(see7.4.3).Whetheroverflowisrealornot,thisisthebestevidencewecould

currentlyhopefor(alwaysleavingroomforfuturenovelapproaches).212The

immediacyofphenomenalFOCinparticulardemandsanalternativeaccountfrom

theoverflowsceptic.

7.4.2.2.2 Seeming-thatisFallible

Second,thescepticmayarguethatSeeming-thatcananddoesgetthingswrong.In

general,propositions—evenaboutourownphenomenalcontent—require

epistemicjustification,anotoriouslydifficultarea(Silins,2015).213AsIobserved

above,thereliabilityofintrospectionhasbeenseriouslyquestionedinrecenttimes.

Ben’sconfidentSeeming-thatheseeseveryspecklerichlycouldbeaquirkofthe

brain,producingapowerfulbutunfoundedFeelingofKnowing(7.4.2.1).Thismight

ariseviaaninterplaybetweensparsecontentandone’sexpectations,fillinginthe

gapstoproducetheillusionofrichness(deGardelle,Sackur,&Kouider,2009;

Kouider,deGardelle,Sackur,&Dupoux,2010,p.306),ormerelyaninflated

metacognitivesenseofrichness(Odegaardetal.,2018).Therearecertainlyother

caseswhereSeemings-thatfailtobeveridical.Florence’spre-reflectiveconfidence

212Imakesomefurtherpointsonthistopicin8.6.1and9.5.2.3.213ForsomefascinatingexamplesofhowwrongSeeming-thatcanbeinpathologicalcognition,see

Bayne(2010,pp.218–219).

258

intherichnessofherperipheralvisionisone.Hypnosisiscapableofmakingit

Seem-thatonerememberssomethingtheyhaveactuallyforgotten(“hypnotic

hypermnesia”)orforgottensomethingtheyactuallydoremember(Kihlstrom,2007,

p.459).Falsememoriescanoftenbecompelling(Brainerd&Reyna,2005).

Confidenceandaccuracyonperceptualtaskshavebeenshowntodissociate

(Koizumi,Maniscalco,&Lau,2015,p.1305).

Butinallthesecases,therearewaysforthesubjectortheinvestigatortoprobethe

Seeming-thatandinvalidateit.ThatisnotthecaseforBen,whoseactualongoing

phenomenalexperienceofthespecklesiscontinuouslyprobe-able(unlike

memoriesofexperiencesinthedistantpast),andforwhommoreprobingleadsonly

tomoreconfidencethatheseesthemrichly.Neitherdowehaveaccesstodirect214

objectivemeasuresoftheaccuracyofBen’sSeeming-thataswedoinperceptual

taskparadigms.

Ontheotherhand,thereisconsiderableevidencethatinsomecases,Seeming-thatis

highlyreliable,suchasconfidenceratingsbypatientswithblindsight(Odegaardet

al.,2018,p.8).Infact,atentativeargumentcouldbemadethatBen’srichexperience

fallsunderHorgan’s(2012,pp.407–412)classofutterly“infallibleintrospections,”

butthatfailing,itcertainlymeetsallthecriteriaforhisclassof“super-reliable

introspections”inwhichfallibilityonlyoccursforthingslikealapseinconceptual

competence.215Takingallthatintoaccount,assumingtheveridicalityofBen’s

Seeming-thatoughttobethedefaultpositionuntilwehavegoodreasontodoubt

it.216

ThescepticcantrytolaunchaFlorence-styleargumentforthefallibilityofBen’s

Seeming-thatthus:thefoveatedspecklesmaynotbeintheperipheryofthevisual

214Thetrackingoficonicmemorybehaviour(7.4.2.1.2)isindirectobjectiveevidence.215Forasuccinctsummaryoftheproblem(sanssolution)ofwheretodrawthelinebetweenreliable

andunreliableintrospectioninempiricalparadigms,seeCosmellietal.,(2007,p.763).216Lamme(2010,p.210)discusseswhatwouldconstituteproper“confirmation”ofphenomenalityin

suchcases.

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field,buttheymaybeintheperipheryofthefieldofspatialattention,ifthatis

smallerthanthefovealfield.Thus,thesameconsiderationswouldapplytothe

specklesastoFlorence’speripheraltrees.Butthiswillnotworkeither.Bencan

easilyzoomhisspatialattentionouttoencompassorevenexceedhisfovealfield.

Andthespecificationsofthevisualsystemthatlentstrongsupporttooverflow

scepticisminFlorence’scasedonotapplyinBen’spurelyfovealcase(7.3).

7.4.2.2.3 It’sNotReallyFOC(ExecutiveAttentionisInvolved)

Thirdly,thescepticmightconcedetheveridicalityofBen’simmediaterich

phenomenalexperienceofeveryspeckle,butarguethatthisisnotactuallyFOCat

all.Thisrichcontentonlybecomesphenomenalbybeingfurtherprocessedinsome

waybyExecutiveAttentionsuchthatitisactuallyphenomenalExperience-of.I

considerthiskindofresponseindetailin8.6.2whereIexploretheExpanded

Attentionaccount,onwhichthecapacityofExecutiveAttentionislargeenoughto

encompassanyamountofrichphenomenalcontent,thusnegatingoverflow.For

variousreasonsdiscussedthere,thisobjectionwillnotworkeither.217

InterimConclusiononImmediacy

Thereis,then,admittedlylimitedbutcompellingevidenceforoverflowfromthe

immediacyofphenomenalFOC,andnoneofthesceptic’sobjectionsseemto

succeed.Ithasbeenproposedthat“theclaimthatvisualawarenessoverflows

cognitiveaccessmustbesupportedbyspecificexamplesofvisualinputthatcanbe

consciouslyperceivedwithoutbeingattended,heldinworkingmemory,reported,

orusedtoguidevolitionalaction”(Cohenetal.,2016b,p.332).Ihavearguedthat

whenwebreakdownBen’sexperiencetophenomenalFOC,Experience-of,and

217Mydiscussionofhigher-ordertheoriesofconsciousnessin9.5.2.1isalsorelevant.

260

Seeming-that,andwhenwetakeintoaccounttheinescapabledatumofthe

immediacyofBen’srichFOCexperienceofeveryspeckle,thecaseofBen’shen

satisfiesthesecriteria.TherichcontentitselfisnotheldinWM,butitisreportedon

veridically—untilwehavegoodreasontothinkotherwise—asbeingrich.

Butitwouldbenicetohaveawaytosettlethisquestiondecisively.Isthereanyway

forus(orBen,forthatmatter)tocircumventtheepistemicimpasseposedby

relianceonreportandobjectivelydeterminewhetherhisrichphenomenal

experienceofeveryspeckleisveridical?

7.4.3 No-ReportParadigmsandNeuralSignatures

“Butinfactwedon’tknowwhatweareconsciousof…Oncewe

acknowledgethat,itisclearthatweneedotherevidenceaboutthe

presenceorabsenceofaconscioussensationthanintrospectionor

behavior”(Lamme,2010,p.204).

Whatisrequiredtocircumventtheepistemicimpassedescribedinthissectionis

somewaytoobjectivelyidentifythecontentsofphenomenalFOCindetailwithout

relyingonreport.Thisisthepromiseheldoutbyno-reportparadigms.Roughly,no-

reportparadigmsareempiricalparadigmsthataimtoidentifycognitivecontentby

meansotherthanreport.Forexample,ithasbeensuggestedthatrecurrentneural

activityisthesignatureofconsciousness(Lamme,2010).218Ifsuchactivityis

measuredin,say,theposteriorvisualcentresofthebrain,thatisevidencethatthe

visualcontentassociatedwiththatactivityisconscious,evenintheabsenceof

218Thetheoryofrecurrentneuralactivityisfarfromestablished(Tsuchiya&vanBoxtel,2010).

261

heightenedactivityincertainparieto-frontalareas(Lamme,2006),generally

thoughttobecorrelatedtoExecutiveAttention.Simplistically,thissuggeststheC~A

ofoverflow.

Amoredetailedexampleofaputativeno-reportparadigmisinTsuchiyaetal.,

(2015,p.758):“Inthesecasesitisimportanttoasktowhatextentwecanbesure

thatsuchdecodedcontentsreflectconsciousexperience–asopposedto

unconsciousstimulusprocessing.”TheytakeFrassleetal.,(2014)toillustratea

methodbywhichconsciousperceptualcontentcanbeidentifiedwithout

introspectivereport.Frassleetal.,usedphysiologicalindicators,“optokinetic

nystagmusandpupilsizetoobjectivelyandcontinuouslymapperceptual

alternationsforbinocular-rivalrystimuli”(p.1738).CombiningthesewithfMRIand

introspectivereportenabledthemtobuildaprofileofwhatwashappening

objectivelyinthesubject—physicallyandphysiologically—whenthatsubject’s

perceptionofabistablefigureflippedfromoneimagetotheother.Intheory,

readingbackfromtheobjectivesignsoughttoindicatewhichperceptionthesubject

isphenomenallyexperiencing.Anotherinstanceofano-reportparadigmcitedby

Tsuchiyaetal.,isWilkeetal.,(2009),whereonceagain,objectivemeasurementsof

neuralactivityarecorrelatedtotheperceptualsuppressionofimagesinmacaque

monkeys.

Morerecently,Schelonkaetal.,(2017)suggestthatdistinctERPsignaturescanbe

correlatedwithconsciousawarenessofcontentinaninattentionalblindness

paradigm.Subjectswentthroughthreephasesinthisexperiment.First,they

performedadistractortaskwhilewords,consonantstrings,ormeaninglesscurves

flashedbrieflyinthebackground.Theywerethenprobedfortheirawarenessofthe

words,andasexpected,40-50%hadfailedtonoticethem.Thesecondphase

involvedthemperformingthesamekindoftaskaftertheawarenessprobing,so

theynowhadsomeexpectationthatthewordswouldappearinthebackground.

Awarenessprobingafterthesecondtaskshowed—again,asexpected—much

improvedrecognitionofthewords.Thethirdphaseshiftedtheirfocusfromthe

distractortasktothewordsthemselves,andthusconstitutedakindofcontrol

condition.Schelonkaetal.,measuredERPsforthesethreephasesandclaimthatthe

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differenceinthesesignaturesbetweenthefirstphaseandtheothersisitselfthe

signatureofconsciousawareness,andthedifferencebetweenthethirdphaseand

theothersistheitselfthesignatureofreport.

Pittsetal.,(2018,p.7)remarkthat“Todate,veryfewno-reportparadigmshave

beendeveloped.”219Theexamplesaboveillustratesomeseriousissuesthatare

commoninallofthem,andlikelytoafflictanynewonesthatariseinfuture,whichI

nowdescribe.Icallthemtheresolutionproblemandthecorrelateproblem.I

concludethesectionwithsomestrongreasonsforpessimismthatanykindofno-

reportparadigmwilleverbeabletoovercometheseobstacles.

TheResolutionProblem

First,existingparadigmspaintwithfartoobroadabrushtoreallysettletheissueof

fovealphenomenaloverflow.Knowingwhetherasubjectisexperiencingone

bistableimageortheother(Frassleetal.)isaverydifferentthingtoknowinghow

muchdetailofeitherfiguresheisconsciouslyexperiencing.220Similarly,recognising

aword(Schelonkaetal.)doesnottellusmuchabouttherichnessofphenomenal

FOC.Whatwouldreallyhelpwouldbeamethodthatpicksoutcontentmore

precisely.Whatweneedissomethingthatwilltelluswhetherthisspecificspeckleis

beingrichlyexperiencedbyBen.221Whiletechniquesarebeingdevelopedto“read”

cognitionsfromEEGorfMRIdata(e.g.,Nemrodov,Niemeier,Patel,&Nestor,2018),

wearestillveryfarfromidentifyingthatlevelofdetailinthebrain.

219SeealsoSergentandRees(2007,p.524)forcitationstoearlierworkinthisdirection,Naccache

(2018,p.4)foradiscussionofsomerecentno-reportexperiments,andStormetal.,(2017)fora

detailedsurveyandthoughtsonfuturedirections.Foranexampleofno-reportparadigmsfor

identifyingspatialattention,seeYeshurun(2019).220SeeasimilarobjectioninPhillips(2018,p.5).221Comparethe“sensitivitycriterion”inpriming(Doyenetal.,2014,pp.15–16).

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TheCorrelateProblem

Second,andmuchmoreseriously,evenifweattainedahighenoughresolution,

therewouldremaintheproblemofdeterminingwhatexactlythesignature

correlatesto.222ThesignaturesinFrassleetal.,distinguishbetweenwhichofthe

rivalperceptionsisbeingexperienced.Butbinocularperceptionssupplanttheir

rivalsviaExecutiveAttention.ThesignaturemaythereforebeofExecutiveAttention,

andtherefore,ofnouseinsearchingforC~A.

Schelonkaetal.,promisestoovercomethisproblem,sincetheyinferdiscrete

signaturesofconsciousnessandreport.Butevenhere,aseriousproblemremains.It

seemsimpossibletoestablishthecorrelationbetweenaphysiologicalindicatorand

specificconsciouscontentwithoutinthefirstinstancerelyingonreporttodoso.And

ifso,wearejustidentifyingthephysiologicalmarkerofreportedcontent,not

unreportedphenomenalFOC.Ifso,wecannotusesuchmarkersasindicatorsof

unreportedphenomenalFOC(Stazicker,2011a,p.164).

Toidentifyphenomenalcontentwithoutreport,weneedaneuralcorrelateof

consciousness(NCC)thatisindependentofreport.ButtodeterminewhataNCCis

inthefirstplace,wemustrelyuponreport.Thisparadoxhasrecentlybeen

observedbyanumberofresearchersregardlessoftheirpositiononoverflow

(Bronfman,Brezis,Jacobson,&Usher,2014,p.1402;Kanaietal.,2006,p.2335;

Mogensen&Overgaard,2018;Phillips,2018;Pittsetal.,2018;Stazicker,2018).

Eventhecleverestofparadigmsareunabletoovercomethisobstacle(Pitts,Metzler,

&Hillyard,2014;Pitts,Padwal,Fennelly,Martínez,&Hillyard,2014).

222Therearealsomethodologicalissues.Forexample,de-Witetal.,(2016)pointoutthatimaging

studiesoftenfocusonhowtheexperimenterinterpretsthedataratherthanhowthesubject’scortex

interpretsthedata.Thesearetwoverydifferentsensesof“information”inthebrain.Their

discussionsofthevariouspitfallsinvolvedintryingtocorrelatethetwoissobering.

264

Ofcourse,forthepurposesofaddressingtheoverflowquestion,signaturesneednot

themselvesbethesubstrateofconsciousness.Itwouldbeenoughtoidentifyany

kindofsignature—chemical(neurotransmitter),electrical(neuronalfiring

patterns),anatomical(aregionofthebrain,probablyprettysmall),orbehavioural

(atwitchoftheleftpinkiefinger)—thatinvariablycorrelatestothephenomenality

oftheFOCcontent.Butevenso,theobstacleremainssteadfast:tocalibrateanykind

ofsignatureatallasinvariablycorrelatingtothephenomenalFOC,wemustrelyin

thefirstinstanceonreport.Itseemsthat—unlessthereissomeotherwayof

determiningNCCswithoutreport—thisobjectionisfataltothehopesofidentifying

overflowvianeuralsignatures.223

TheImportanceoftheSubjective

MyargumentsfortheimmediacyofphenomenallyrichFOCareabductiverather

thandeductive,andno-reportparadigmsseemincapableofcircumventingour

relianceonreport.HowmightthequesttofindC~Ainoverflowproceed?OneviewI

findunconvincingisthatthequestioncanonlybesettledinstrictlyobjectiveterms:

“Currently,noexperimentalresultsuniquelysupporttheexistence

ofconsciousnessindependentoffunctionandaccess.Couldfuture

experimentsaccomplishthis?Wearguethatalltheoriesof

consciousnessthatarenotbasedonfunctionsandaccessarenot

scientifictheories”(Cohen&Dennett,2011,p.361).

223Briefargumentsforroughlythisconclusionhavebeenmadeelsewhere(Overgaard,2010;

Overgaard&Fazekas,2016).

265

Later,theyask,“Whatdoesitmeantostudyconsciousnesswithoutfunction?”(p.

362).Incontext,byfunctiontheymeanaccessingthephenomenalcontentfor

reporting,action,etc.,i.e.,higher-levelprocessing.CohenandDennett’spreferred

approachistodefineconsciousnessintermsoffunction.Theassumptionhereisthat

consciousnessisknownonlyinbeingsoaccessed.Thus,theyalsoask,“Whatdoesit

meantohaveaconsciousexperiencethatyouyourselfdonotrealizeyouare

having?”(p.362).Bycontrast,noneofthefourcharacteristicsinmydefinitionof

consciousness(2.4)intrinsicallyinvolvefunction.Theymaycertainlyinteractwith

functioninsomeway,buttheystandapartfromit.

Perhapsthisisthenub,oratleastonecrucialfactor,thatseparatestheoverflow

proponentfromatleastsomekindsofsceptic.CohenandDennett’sstipulationthat

thereisnoconsciousnesswithoutfunctionseemstometoechothemistakesof

Behaviourism(3.3.2),imposinganunwarrantedkindofverificationismwhereitis

notappropriate.Whatismore,Iarguedin3.3.3thatPhenomenaldefinitionsof

attentionbegthequestionagainstQ,becausetheyanalyticallydefineconsciousness

intoattention.CohenandDennettaresimilarlybeggingthequestionbyanalytically

definingfunction(ExecutiveAttention)intoconsciousnessratherthanleavingitto

empiricalinvestigation.

Objectivityisanobleprincipleinscientificinquiry,andCohenandDennett’scallfor

anauthentically“scientific”approach(p.361)isadmirable,butthisisonearea

whereweneedtobroadenwhatconstitutes“scientific.”Phenomenalconsciousness

isastrangebeastindeed.Itsfirst-personalcharacterisquitepossiblyuniqueinthe

naturalworld.Toexpectthekindofthird-personverificationorfalsifiabilitythatis

thestandardscientificstapletohandleitmaybeunrealistic.Weretheytoapply

theirstancetotheintractableProblemofOtherMinds(Hyslop,2018),theywould

havetoadmitthattheycannotbecertainthatanyoneelseisconscious.Thereisno

escapingthesimple,inescapablefactisthatnoonehasdirectaccesstomy

phenomenalcontentexceptme.Kriegel(2007,pp.124–125)raisesapatentlyfalse

hypothesis:olfactoryperceptionisnotphenomenal.Howdoweknowthis

hypothesisisfalse?Ultimately,itcomesdownnottoanythird-personevidenceor

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argument,buttofirst-personexperience.Thesamemightbesaidofhowweknow

thatproprioceptionpersehasnophenomenalcharacter(6.2.2).

HowthenmightthequesttofindC~Ainoverflowproceed?Inthischapter,Ihave

arguedonthegroundsofimmediacyfortakingseriouslyBen’sSeeming-thathis

phenomenalFOCisrich.Thereisakindoffalsifiabilityhere—itisjustnotthird-

personfalsifiability.Whetherthatqualifiesas“scientific”ornotmaynotreallybethe

issue,ifoneiswillingtoentertainthatnotallknowledgeisscientificknowledgein

thenarrow,formalsenseof“scientific”(whichIam).Perhapsthisisaquestion(like

theProblemofOtherMinds)thansimplycannotbeansweredinthethird-person,

onlyinthefirst-person.Amorepromisingdirection,then,willbetoimprovethe

accuracyofandresolutionofmethodsforassessingtheveracityofsubjective

reports(Rausch,Müller,&Zehetleitner,2015).

7.5 ChapterSummary

Tosummarise,ourconsiderationofFlorenceandherforestfoundgood

neurophysiologicalandphenomenologicalreasonstothinkthatphenomenal

overflowisanillusionofrichnessinhercase,assuggestedbytheoverflowsceptic.

However,thoseconsiderationsfindnotractioninthecaseofBen’shen.The

immediacyoftherichnessofBen’shenexperienceandthewayitreflectsthe

objectivebehaviourovertimeofhumanmemorysystemsgiveusreasontofavour

overflow,andtheobjectionsraisedthusfarhaveseriousflaws.Neithercanobjective

methodsanswerthisquestion,sincetheyaretoocoarse,andsufferaseeminglyfatal

methodologicalflaw—theyrelyonreporttobecalibratedinthefirstplace.Weare

leftwithoutareasonablewaytoexplainawayBen’sconfidentSeeming-thathe

richlyphenomenallyexperienceseveryspeckle,evenifhecan’treportoneach

speckle.GenuineC~Aseemstobethebestexplanationthusfar.

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Butthereismoreevidencethatcanbebroughttobear.Inthenextchapter,I

underwritethecaseforoverflowfromaconsiderationofthedifferentcapacity

limitationsonattention,consciousness,andWM.

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8 TriangulatingCapacityLimitations

8.1 ComparingCapacities

IfconsciousnessistooverflowExecutiveAttentioninWM,thenitmusthavea

relativelyhighercapacityforcontent.OverflowinthecaseofBen’shenrequiresthat

theTargetofconsciousness—alltheindividualspeckleswithalltheirfeatures—be

phenomenal,whileatthesameTiming,theTargetofExecutiveAttentionbelimited

toonlyasmallsubsetofthosespecklesandtheirfeatures.TheCapacityQuestion

(5.3.2.3)hasbeenstudiedextensivelywithregardtoWM,andtoaslightlylesser

degreewithregardtoattention,butmuchlesswithregardtophenomenal

consciousness.

Inthischapter,Iarguethatthecapacityofconsciousnessissignificantlygreater

thanthecapacityofExecutiveAttentioninWM.Whatismore,theydifferinboth

natureandneuralsubstrates.Ifthisisso,Iconclude,itwouldberemarkableindeed

iftheircapacitieswereidenticalinawaythatdeniestheC~Aofphenomenal

overflow.Afteracriminallybriefoverviewofthecurrentstateofthinkingaboutthe

270

naturesandmagnitudesofthecapacitiesofWM,ExecutiveAttention,and

phenomenalconsciousness,I“triangulate”thethreetodevelopanempirically

informedschema—myWitches’HatModel—forhowtheyinteract.Asmineis

essentiallyanabductiveargument—aninferencetothebestexplanation—I

concludethediscussionbyconsideringsomealternativeexplanations,noneof

whichseempreferabletotheonepresentedhere.

8.2 TheCapacityofWorkingMemory

ThatWMiscapacitylimitedisamatterofeverydayexperience,butdeterminingthe

natureandmagnitudeofthiscapacityturnsouttobesurprisinglydifficult.Miller’s

seminalpaper(1956)arguedonempiricalgroundsthatthereisarelativelyrigid

figureof7±2items224thatcanbestoredandmanipulatedinwhatwewouldtoday

callWM.AndBaddeley(2012,p.9)echoesthisfigure:“Atypicalmemoryspanis

aroundsixorsevendigits,notbecausethedigitsthemselvesareforgotten,but

ratherbecausetheirorderislost.”

Butthereisalargebodyofliteraturethatsuggeststhatafigureof3–4itemsisthe

truecapacityofWM.Forexample,Baddeley(2010,p.R138)putsthecapacityofthe

episodicbuffer,themainworkspaceofWM,at“aboutfourchunksorepisodes,”

somethingCowan(2001)arguedforearlier.Andothershaverecentlyconcluded

thatdifferentmodelsofcognitivecapacity“convergeontheideathatobserverscan

storearoundthreeorfouritemsinworkingmemory”(Cohenetal.,2016b,p.325).

224Suchcapacitylimitsonthecontentofattention,consciousness,orWMaregenerallymeasuredin

“items”ofsomekind(Chun,2011,p.1407).Thereareotherwaysofmeasuringcapacities,e.g.,areain

squaredegreesofavisualfield,butforourpurposes,itwillbeenoughtojustfocusontheitems

measureofcapacity.

271

InthissectionIsurveythreeaspectsofWMcapacityimitations:varietiesof

capacities;therelationbetweenthenumberandcomplexityofitemsinWM;and

thatbetweenstorageandmanipulationcapacities.Ithensurveytheoriesofthe

underlyingmechanismsoftheselimitationsbeforeaninterimapplicationtothe

casesofFlorenceandBen.

8.2.1 VarietiesofCapacity

Thereisalmostcertainlynotasingle“WMcapacity,”asshouldshortlybecome

apparent.OnbothBHandCowan’smodels,anawfullotofinformationisbeing

storedandmanipulated“inthebackground,”onlyaportionofwhichentersthe

episodicbufferorthefocusofattentionandisthereforeExecutivelyAttended.There

isasense,then,inwhichthecapacityofWMismuchgreaterthanthethreetofour

items,anditmayevenbedifficulttogaugeexactlywhere(non-executive)WMends

andothercognitivesystemsbegin.Butofcourse,ourinteresthereisinthatportion

ofWMthatimplementsExecutiveAttention.

Heretootherearemorecomplexitiestoberespected.Thereisampleexperimental

evidencefordifferentmodalitieshavingdifferentcapacitiesforcontent(the

FractionationQuestion,5.3.1.1).Forexample,Baddeley(2007,pp.198–199)

suggeststhatwhilethereisgoodevidenceforanoverall,generalWMcapacity,there

isalsogoodevidenceformorespecificorspecialisedWMcapacities.Thisapplies

notonlytothe“slave”componentsofWM,butalsotothecentralexecutive,which

maybecapacitylimitedeitherbythelimitationsofitsinputsfromthecomponents,

oritsowncapacityformanipulatingdifferentkindsofcontent,orboth.Inhumans,

visualcontentcapacityseemstobesignificantlyricherthan,say,olfactorycontent,

andcertainlyricherthaninteroceptivecontent.AccordingtoLogieandCowan

(2015,p.317),thereisgrowingevidencefordomain-specificWMcomponents,plus

domain-generalresourcesthatkickinwhentheformerexceedtheircapacity(called

byothers,peripheralandcentralcomponentsofWM).Thedomain-specific

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componentsdonotinterferewitheachother,butthereisadropinperformancein

specificmodalitieswhendomain-generalresourcesaredivertedtoothermodalities.

Allthesedifferentcapacitiesarepickedoutandmeasuredbydifferentexperimental

paradigms.225

Baddeley(2007)speculatesonthepossiblereasonsforthefindingthat“verbal

short-termmemoryismuchmorereadilyseparablefromexecutiveprocessesthan

visuospatial”(p.203).Hisanalysisisroughlythatitiseasiertorehearseverbal

tracesandthusmaintainthem,becausetheyinvolveover-learneditems(like

numericaldigits)whereasvisuospatialtracesdonot.Thus,moreattentionis

requiredtorehearsevisuospatialtraces,aresourcethatislimitedincapacity.Itis

notclearexactlywhathemeansbyattentionhere—isittheLiberalAttention

inherentspecificallyinthemiddlelevelvisuospatialstorageandmanipulation,oris

ittheExecutiveAttentionofthecentralexecutive?Indeed,somehaveconsidered

attentiontobethedomain-generalcognitiveresourcethatimposestheglobal

capacitylimitsonallcognition,oronWMspecifically(Baddeley,2007,p.190;

Miyakeetal.,2000,pp.88–89).Ireturntothisissuebelow(8.3).

8.2.2 NumberandComplexityofItems

IfthecapacityofWMismeasuredinitems,doesitmatterhowcomplextheitems

are?Forexample,thereissomeevidencethatasubjectcanrecallfewerlongwords

thanshortwords,aneffectthatdependsbothonthenumberofsyllablesinthe

words,andthecomplexityofthesyllables,ratherthanjusttheirbruteduration

(Service,1998).Controversycontinuesoverwhether“slot”modelsor“resource”

modelsarepreferable(Eriksson,Vogel,Lansner,Bergström,&Nyberg,2015,p.

225Ontheintricateinterplaybetweendomain-generalanddomain-specificWMcapacities,seealso

Miyakeetal.,(2000),Maehara&Saito(2007),Lietal.,(2014),andJarroldetal.,(2011).

273

33,35;Gross,2018,p.3;Ma,Husain,&Bays,2014).Onslotmodels,WMhasa

limitednumberofdiscreteslotsforstorageofitemsandtheirmanipulation,while

onresourcemodels,storageandmanipulationareanalogue,continuousresources

thatcanbesharedamongcontentinmuchmoreflexibleways.

InvisualWMcapacityAwhetal.,(2007)foundthatvisualWMrepresentsafixed

numberofitemsregardlessofthecomplexityofthoseitems,buttheydidalso

concludethatthenumberofrepresentationsandtheresolutionofrepresentations

aretwodissociable“dimensions”ofWMcapacity.Theyevensuggesttwoputative

neurallociforthetwodimensions(p.627).Aseriesofseminalexperiments(Luck&

Vogel,1997;Vogel,Woodman,&Luck,2001)showedthat“objectsdefinedbya

conjunctionoffourfeaturescanberetainedinworkingmemoryjustaswellas

single-featureobjects,allowingsixteenindividualfeaturestoberetainedwhen

distributedacrossfourobjects.Thus,thecapacityofvisualworkingmemorymust

beunderstoodintermsofintegratedobjectsratherthanindividualfeatures”(Luck

&Vogel,1997,p.279).226YetBradyandAlvarez(2015)havearguedthatwhen

itemsarequitecomplex,thecapacityofWMmaybereducedtoonly1–2items,

whichsuggestssomekindoftrade-offincapacitybetweenthenumberofitemsthat

canbeheldinWMandtheircomplexity.227

Nonetheless,Baysetal.,(2011)producedresultsthataredifficulttoreconcilewitha

popularmodelofWMstorageonwhichboundobjectsarestoredandretrieved.

Theyshowedthatsubjectsexhibitapatternofreportingerrorsinwhichaccuracy

forfeaturessuchascolourandorientationdissociate—thatis,subjectsmay

correctlyrecallthecolour,butbemistakenabouttheorientationofthesameobject.

Theytakethistosupporta“sharedresource”modelofWMcapacity,wherethe

centralresourcecannotbeexceededacrossdiscretefeaturechannels.Hardmanand

226SeealsoChun(2011)foramoredetailedsummaryofhowdifferentcapacitieswithinWMinteract

witheachother.227SeealsoMaetal.,(2014),whoconcludethat“manydetailsinthisframeworkcontinuetobe

debated,particularlytheextenttowhichresourcesaredivisibleandthedegreetowhichdifferent

featurestapindependentresourcepools”(p.355).

274

Cowan(2015)however,concludethatbothfeatureloadandobjectloadmustbe

invokedtoaccountfortheempiricalpatternsofreportingfailure.

Mostpertinently,DeLoofetal.,(2015)foundthatadistractingexecutiveWMload

impactedonvisualawarenessdifferentlytoadistractingvisuospatialWMload.228

TheyhypothesisethattheexecutiveWMloadraisesthethresholdofvisual

awarenessformaskedstimulibydrawingresourcesawayfrom“manipulating

information”and“decisionalprocesses”(p.2527)—i.e.,bydiminishingExecutive

Attentionalfurtherprocessingthatreportsonthephenomenalvisualcontent,

althoughtheyadmitthishypothesisawaitsanappropriateexperimentalparadigm

toconfirmit.Afortiori,distractingexecutiveloadnotonlyhindersawareness,but

alsoconfidenceinwhatthesubjecthasphenomenallyexperienced(Maniscalco&

Lau,2015),andahierarchicalmodelofprocessing,inwhichconfidenceratingsare

generatedbyhigher-orderprocesses,werethebestfitfortheempiricalpatterns

observed(Maniscalco&Lau,2016).

8.2.3 StoragevManipulation—Sharedresources?

In5.4IconsideredthedualfunctionsofWM—storageandmanipulation.Should

WMcapacitylimitationsbeascribedtoeither,orboth?Itseemsthetwoare

intimatelyconnected.

“InthisarticleweusethetermWMcapacityinadescriptivesense,

referringtothefactthatpeoplecanholdonlyalimitedamountof

228DeLoofetal.,werenotinfactmeasuringeffectsonconsciousnessassuch,butonreportabout

consciouscontent(Chapter7).Regardless,itisthedifferenceineffectbetweenvisuospatialand

executiveWMthatispertinenthere.

275

mentalcontentavailableforprocessing.Thecapacitylimitis

usuallyoperationalizedasalimitonhowmuchnewinformation

peoplecanrememberovershortperiodsoftime(intheorderof

seconds),buttherearereasonstobelieve(discussedbelow)that

thecapacitylimitalsoappliestopeople’sabilitytomake

informationinthecurrentenvironmentsimultaneouslyavailable

forprocessing”(Oberaueretal.,2016,p.758).

Oneinterestingquestioniswhetherstorageandmanipulationareindependent

resourceswithindependentcapacities,orwhethertaxingtheresourcesoftheone

diminishesthecapacityoftheother.Baddeley(2007)observesthat“Baylissetal.

(2003)concludethattheirresultsareinconsistentwithaninterpretationofcomplex

workingmemoryspanintermsofasingleresourcepoolthatissharedbetween

storageandprocessing”(p.202),yetCowan(2005,pp.52–66)reviewstheevidence

andconcludesthatstorageandmanipulationshareacommonresourceatleastto

someextent,andthatthatresourceiscontrolledattention.Boththeseconclusions

areconsistentwithapicturewherewhatcanbemanipulatedbyWMisonlythat

whichisstoredinWM,althoughnotallthatisstoredinWMisnecessarily

manipulated,especiallybytheexecutive.229Efficiencyofstorage(thusincreasing

capacity)maybeimprovedbystrategiessuchasgroupingorchunking(Brady,

Konkle,&Alvarez,2009),ensemblerepresentations(Brady&Alvarez,2015),and

prioritisation(Myers,Stokes,&Nobre,2017).

229Forfinerdetailontherelationshipbetweenstorageandmanipulation,seeMaeharaandSaito

(2007).

276

8.2.4 TheMechanismofWorkingMemoryCapacityLimitations

Anumberoftheorieshavebeenproposedtoexplainthemechanismsunderlyingthe

capacitylimitationsofWMdescribedabove.Thesearegenerallygroupedunder

threecategories:thespeedhypothesis;theresourcepoolhypothesis;andthe

inhibitionhypothesis.230Theunderlyingconceptbehindallthreeisthatsome

contentissomehowprivilegedoverothercontent,andaccesstotheprivileged

contentismaintainedforlonger,andtherebyaccessedmorebytheexecutive,i.e.,

ExecutiveAttention.

ThespeedhypothesispositsthatWMcapacitylimitsareimposedbytimeconstraints.

WMtracesdecayrapidlyovertime.Onlythosethatarerehearsedaremaintained,231

andthereisalimittohowmuchwecanrehearseatanygivenmoment.Thosethat

missoutarelost(Souza,Rerko,&Oberauer,2014),andthus,onlythatsmallnumber

ofrehearseditemsismaintainedinWM,andthereforeavailableformanipulation.232

TheresourcepoolhypothesispositsthatWMmanipulationisalimitedresourcethat

mustbedoledouttopossibleobjectsofmanipulation.Itmaybedoledoutinasmall

numberofdiscretequanta(“slots”)orasamorecontinuous,flexibleresource

(8.2.2).WMcapacitylimitationsarisefromthelimitednatureofthismanipulation

resource.Theinhibitionhypothesispositsthatneitherthespeedofdecaynor

resourcelimitationsareinplayinWMcapacity,butthatrepresentationscompete

againsteachother,untilthestrongereliminatetheweaker.Thevictorsgoonto

drinktheheadymeadofWMmanipulation.Thus,ontheinhibitionhypothesis,WM

capacitylimitsariseultimatelyfromtheeliminationofallcompeting

representationsexceptafew.

230IhaveusedterminologyfromBaddeley(2007),Chapter11,althoughotherauthorsuseslightly

differentterms.Forexample,Oberaueretal.,(2016)callthethreeapproaches:temporaldecay

(=speed);limitationincognitiveresources(=resourcepool);andmutualinterference(=inhibition).

Thesekindsofmechanismshavealsobeenexpressedintermsofpredictivecoding(Hohwy,2012,pp.

6–7).RhodesandCowan(2018)argueforanadditionalmechanismthatinvolvesinteractions

betweenWMandLTM.231Thismechanismhasbeenchallenged(Lewandowsky&Oberauer,2015).232Forarecentreviewofthespeedhypothesis,seeRickeretal.,(2016).

277

Oberaueretal.,(2016,p.759)exploretheprospectsofaparsimonioussinglefactor

explanationofWMcapacity,wherejustoneofthethreehypothesesissolely

responsibleforWMcapacitylimits.Butthisquestisunlikelytosucceed:“itis

unlikelythatworkingmemoryspan,withitscapacitytopredictperformanceona

richarrayofcognitivetasks,canbeadequatelyinterpretedintermsofasingle

variable”(Baddeley,2007,p.198).Insimilarvein:“theexistingdatadonotappear

touniversallysupportanyoneofthethreeaccountsofworkingmemorycapacity”

(Oberaueretal.,2016,p.758).Thismightbeatleastpartiallybecausethethree

hypothesisoverlapeachotherconceptually.Forexample,rehearsalcapacityplaysa

centralroleinthespeedhypothesis,butitisafunctionofthelimitedresources

availabletorehearsemultiplecontentssimultaneously,whichstronglyresembles

theresourcehypothesis.233

Inallthreehypotheses,attentionalstrategiesareclearlyimplemented—rehearsal

(abundanceofaccess/maintainingaccess),influenceonposteriorprocessing,

filtering,exclusion,andcompetition.Attentionisintimatelyembeddedinthe

manipulationsofWMandplaysavitalroleinthemechanismsofWMcapacity

limitations.Whatismore,thebiasedcompetitionmodelofattention(Desimone&

Duncan,1995;Ruff,2011)describedin3.3.4.2.3—whichemphasisesthat

competitionisnotfreeandfairbutbiasedbyinfluencesfrommemory,subconscious

heuristics,andsoon—expandsontheinhibitionhypothesisofWMbyhighlighting

thatWMisinseparablefromtherestofcognition,andthatattentionisanimportant

bridge.

233SeealsoOberauerandLewandowsky(2011)foradetailedmodelofhowthesetwohypotheses

mayinteract.

278

8.2.5 BacktoFlorenceandBen

The“capacityofWM”isnosimplematter.Theselectivesurveyabovehas

nonethelessservedtohighlightanumberofimportantpointsthatstrengthenthe

argumentsinthepreviouschapterandservetounderwritethosethatfollowinthis.

AppreciatingthevarietiesofcapacityinWM(8.2.1)indicatesthatthereisagreat

dealofcontentinWMthatisnotExecutivelyAttended,andindeed,itisdifficultto

drawclearboundariesbetweenWMandtherestofcognition.234

Inconsideringtherelationshipbetweencapacitiesforthenumberandcomplexityof

items(8.2.2),wesawthereisgoodevidencethatWMstoreswhole,boundobjects,

althoughtheprecisionorfidelityofthatcontentislimited(muchlessthanthe

dozensofspecklesonBen’shen)anddegradeswithincreasingnumbersofitems

simultaneouslystored.DeLoofetal.,suggestedthatitisExecutiveAttentionthatis

responsibleforthisdegradation.Thatis,ExecutiveAttentioninWMiswhatlimits

whatcanbereportedbythesubject,includingthedegreeoffinedetailinanitem.Its

effectsdissociatefromtheeffectsofnon-executiveloads,suchasvisuospatialones.

Whatismore,thereisaneffectonconfidencethatmatchestheeffectFlorence

experienceswhenshereflectsonherperipheralcontentandherconfidencedrops.

Butaspredicted,Ben’ssingleitemfovealexperienceofthehenshowsnosuch

diminutioninconfidence.ThehierarchicalmodelespousedbyManiscalco&Lau

accommodatesthisdifferenceandmatchestheWitches’HatModelIdescribebelow

(8.5).Furtherstill,prioritisationandchunking—strategiesemployedbytheWM

executive—donotdescribeBen’sphenomenalFOCofthespeckles.Rather,hesees

themasawhole,simply,astheyare(orappear).Theonlychunkingistheunityof

hisexperienceasawhole.

In8.2.3wesawthatnotallthatisstoredinWMismanipulatedbytheexecutive.

Overflow,asIhaveframedit,requiresonlyconsciousnesswithoutExecutive

Attention.ThatcouldplausiblydescribesuchunmanipulatedWMcontent,ifthe

234Seealso5.5and8.5.

279

mechanismforcontenttobecomephenomenalneednotinvolveExecutiveAttention

(contraPhenomenaldefinitionsofattention,3.3.3).Iarguebelowforthestronger

conclusionthatcontentcompletelyoutsideWMcanbecomephenomenal,buteven

un-ExecutivelyAttendedcontentwithinWMwouldstillbeenoughtoestablishthe

C~Aofoverflow.WhetherBen’srichspecklecontentiswithinoroutsideWMisnot

whatmattershere—onlywhetheritisExecutivelyAttended.

Finally,itisclearthatallthehypothesisedmechanismsunderlyingWMcapacity

(8.2.4)implementattentionalstrategies.Thesestrategiessubservehigher-order

processing,suchasExperience-ofandSeeming-that,butarenotintrinsically

inherentintheproductionofphenomenalFOCassuch.Noneofthefour

characteristicsofphenomenality(2.4)requirethem.

Clearly,ExecutiveAttentionisinextricablefromWMcapacitylimitations,yetsome

havestudiedattentionalcapacitylimitationsintheirownright,sometimescoming

toconclusionsthatcontrastwiththoseabove.Abriefsurveyofthatbodyof

knowledgeisalsoinorder.

8.3 TheCapacityofAttention

AsIobservedin5.4.2,ExecutiveAttentionhasnotuncommonlybeenidentifiedwith

themanipulationaspectoftheexecutiveofWM.Yettheliteratureonthecapacity

limitationsofattentiondivergesinsomewaysfromthepatternsobservedinthe

literatureonWMcapacitylimitations.Inthissection,Iconsiderwhattheconceptof

capacitymightmeanwhenappliedtomydefinitionofattentionasthestructuringof

cognitionforfurtherprocessing,andthenoutlinesomepertinentempiricalfindings

aboutthenatureandmagnitudeofthiscapacity.Iconcludebyconsideringhow

attentionalcapacityilluminatesthecasesofFlorenceandBen.

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8.3.1 TheNatureoftheCapacityofAttention

Onmydefinitionofattentionasasuiteofstrategies(Chapter3),thereseemsno

principledreasontothinkofitasalimited-capacityresourcewithinacognitive

economy.Thatwouldbelikethinkingof“running”asalimited-capacityresourceat

theOlympicGames:themoreracesareheld,thelessrunningisleftover,becauseall

therunninghasbeenusedupbytheathletes.That’snothowitworks.Theamount

ofrunningthatcanoccurdependsonthenumberofpeopleavailablewhocanrun,

andonhowfartheycanrun,butnotonthe“running”itself.Itisthespecificationsof

themechanism—theresourcesavailabletoimplementattentionalstrategies—that

limittheamountofattendingthatcanhappeninacognitiveeconomy,notthenature

ofattendingitself.

Theresourcesinquestionare,ifweidentifyExecutiveAttentionwiththecognitive

executive,justtheresourcesofthecognitiveexecutive.Wesawin8.2.4abovethat

thehypothesisedmechanismsofWMcapacityrelyuponattentionalstrategies.That

beingso,onewouldexpecttheempiricalpatternofExecutiveAttentionalcapacity

limitationstobeidenticaltothoseofWM.Butasweshallseeinthenextsection,

therearesomeinterestingcontrasts.

Apossiblereasonforthiscontrastisthatnotallresearchersmakesuchaclose

identificationbetweenExecutiveAttentionandthecognitiveexecutive.Oneviewis

thatattentionisthegatewaytoWM(Prinz,2012),thepathbywhichcontententers

WMandbecomesavailableformanipulation.Thisviewdoesnotdenytheroleof

attentionwithinWMmanipulation,butextendsitroletopre-WMselection.Onthis

kindofview,attentionandWMcouldindeedexhibitdifferentcapacitypatterns—for

example,morecontentmightbeencodedintoWMbyattentionthanWMcan

manipulate.However,onthedefinitionsIamusinghere,thispre-WMattention

wouldconstituteLiberalratherthanExecutiveAttention,whatWolfe(1994,p.202)

calls“apreattentive,massivelyparallelstagethatprocessesinformationaboutbasic

visualfeatures”anddistinguishesfrom“asubsequentlimited-capacitystagethat

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performsother,morecomplexoperations.”Myfocusinthissectionisonthelatter

kindofattention.

Anotherpossiblereasonforthecontrastisthedifficultyinoperationalising

measuresofattentionalcapacity.

“Althoughcomplexprocessesoftencannotbereducedtoasingle

number,summaryindiceslikecapacityforworkingmemoryand

gFforfluidintelligenceareusefulforquantifyingindividual

differencesandchangesinabilitiesovertime.Acomparable

measureofattention–anobjective,standardizedsummaryscore–

wouldbenefitbothresearchandclinicalpractice”(Rosenberget

al.,2017,p.291).

Theauthorsgoontohighlightsomeofthedifficultiesinherentinanyattemptto

measureasinglecapacitylimitofattention(pp.299-300,boxes1and2).Chief

amongtheseisthefactthatattentionisnotaunitaryentity,butasuiteofquite

diverseentitiesoperatingondiverseclassesoftargets.Thismeansthatanygiven

subject’sattentioncapacitywillvarywiththekindofattentionbeingemployed,and

evenovertime,asthesubjectperformsdifferenttasksindifferentsituations:

“Forexample,onepersonmaystruggletopayattentionforlong

periodsoftimebuthavenodifficultyswitchingbetweentasks

whereasanothermayhavenotroublemaintaininguninterrupted

focusbutlacktheabilitytomultitask”(p.299).

LikeWM,the“capacityofattention”asitiscommonlydiscussedintheliteratureis

betterthoughtof,then,asasuiteofindividualandspecificcapacitiesfordifferent

attentionaltasks(e.g.,search,tracking,orienting,etc.)indifferentmodalities(e.g.,

282

visual,auditory,etc.)thatvariesfromindividualtoindividualandevenwithinthe

sameindividualovertime.Whatismore,evenwithinasinglemodality,suchas

visualattention,itwillbecomplicatedbythedifferentkindsofattentionpossible,in

thiscase,object,feature,orspatialattention(3.2.3).Anoverall“capacityof

attention”shouldperhapsbeviewedwiththesamesuspicionasanoverall

“intelligencequotient”(IQ),andforsimilarreasons—becausetheyattempttosweep

upalargenumberofintricatelyinteractingcognitiveprocesseswithdifferent

capacitylimitationsinasinglenet.Thisfitsinnicelywithmyapproachoftaking

attentiontobeasuiteofstrategiesimplementedbyarangeofsystemsand

subsystemswhosecapacitylimitsdependonthespecificationsofeachsystem,and

interactincomplexways.Butthereisnoreasontosupposethatattentional

strategies(whichareconceptuallyderived)mapneatlyontoWMcomponentsor

subprocesses(whichareempiricallyderived).Ifso,differencesincapacitypatterns

betweenattentionandWMoughtnotsurpriseus.

8.3.2 TheCapacityLimitationsofExecutiveAttention

Nonetheless,peopledospeakoftheoverallcapacitylimitsof(Executive)attention.

Forexample:

“Intermsofvisualattention,initialstudiesestimatedthataround

threeorfourlocationscanbeattendedatonce,butmorerecent

effortshavepushedthatnumberclosertoaroundsevenoreight”

(Cohenetal.,2016b,p.325).

Franconerietal.,(2007)pointoutthatuptotheearly1990’s,visualspatialattention

wasthoughttobeunitary,focusingononespatiallocationinthevisualfieldatany

onetime.Subsequently,anumberofstudiesshowedthatsubjectscouldbecuedto

283

spatiallyattenduptofivelocationssimultaneously,asevidencedbythe

improvementintheirrecognitionofstimuliwhencued,asopposedtouncued

stimuli.Theythenpresenttheirownevidenceforspatialattentiontouptoeight

simultaneouslocations.Interestingly,however,theredoesappeartobeatrade-off

betweenthemaximumnumberoflocationsthatcanbeattendedandtheprecision235

withwhichalocationneedstobeattendedto—higherprecisionmeansfewer

locations.Theyponderwhethertherelativelyhighprecisionrequiredinprevious

experimentsmighthavebeenthereasonfortheobservedlimitsofoneoruptofive

spatiallocationssimultaneously.Inotherwords,theirevidencesuggeststhat

limitationsonthenumberofspatiallocationsthatcanbesimultaneouslyattended

donotarisebecause“thevisualsystemissomehowarchitecturallyrestrictedto

dealingwithafixednumberofitemsatonce”(p.1004)butbecauseofthetrade-off

betweenprecisionandnumberoflocations.Similarfindingstotheseinspatial

attentionhavebeenfoundinrelationtorapidenumeration,visualsearch,and

multipleobjecttracking(p.1011).

ThesefindingssuggestthatwhenExecutivelyAttendingtomultiplespatiallocations

ortrackingobjects,thestandardWMcapacitylimitationof3-4itemsoftendoesnot

apply.ExecutiveAttentioncapacitydoesnotneatlymapontoWMexecutive

capacity,atleastontheempiricalparadigmsdiscussedabove.Buthowfarcanthis

go?Isthereanylimittothecapacityofdividedspatialattention?Moreimportantly,

canattentionbedividedsofarastoattendtoeveryspeckleonBen’shen

simultaneously?

235Theauthorsmanipulatedprecisionbyvaryingthenumberoflocationswithinthetestfield.A

crowdedfieldrequiresmoreprecisiontoidentifythecorrectspatialcuesthanasparsefield(p.

1005).SeealsoWuandWolfe(2018)andCohen’s(2019)response.

284


ThereisalimittohowfarFranconerietal’strade-offbetweennumberandprecision

canbetaken.

“Thiseffectofthisinterelementcrowdingseemstoreflectalower

limitontheprecisionofselectionwhenasingleitemisselected.

Whenthedistanceamongelementsisdenserthanthislevelof

precision,elementscannolongerbeselectedindependently

(Intriligator&Cavanagh,2001)”(Franconerietal.,2007,p.1010).

Thereisalimittotheprecisionwithwhichspatiallocationscanbeselected:

“Ourdatashowthatselectionhasacoarsegrain,muchcoarser

thanvisualresolution…Theresultssuggestthattheparietalarea

isthemostlikelylocusofthisselectionmechanismandthatitacts

bypointingtothespatialcoordinates(orcorticalcoordinates)of

itemsofinterestratherthanbyholdingarepresentationofthe

itemsthemselves”(Intriligator&Cavanagh,2001,p.171).

ExecutiveAttentionalselectionlikelyoperatesviaadifferentmechanismtothatof

visualexperience.236Thatishardlyasurprise—holdingcontentinone’sexperience

isonething,selectingitemsamongthatcontentisclearlyanother.Butthe

interestingthinghereisthat“selectionhasacoarsegrain,muchcoarserthanvisual

236Usheretal.,(2018)arguefromtheabilitytodiscriminatetargetsoutsidethefocusofattentionto

phenomenaloverflow.ThatisnottheargumentIammakinghere.Onmydefinitions,theabilityto

discriminateisintrinsicallyattentional,involvinghigher-levelprocessing.Further,itcanbe

performedimplicitly,withoutconsciousness.

285

resolution.”ForFlorence,peripheralvisualresolutioniscoarsebecauseofthe

specificationsofthevisualsystem.Itmaybe(thoughitcannotbeassumed)thather

peripheralphenomenalvisualresolutionisroughlyascoarseasherperipheral

spatialresolution.

NotsoforBen.Thespecklesonthehenaresignificantlydenserthanthisthreshold

ofattentionalselection.Bencannotdividehisattentionamongthemall,both

becauseoftheirdensityandtheirnumber(manydozens).Clearly,Bencannotattend

toeveryspecklesimultaneously.Whiletherearesomedifferencesinthecapacity

patternsofExecutiveAttentionandWM(possiblyforreasonsexplainedin8.3.1),

bothpatternssharethistightconstraintontheirresolution.Thequestionthat

remains,then,iswhetherBen’sphenomenalvisualresolutionissoconstrained.

8.4 TheCapacityofConsciousness

Inmanywaysthecapacitylimitationsofconsciousnessaremoredifficulttohandle

thanthoseofeitherWMorattention.Thisisdueinnosmallparttotheenigmatic

natureofphenomenalconsciousnessitself,incontrasttotherelativelymoreeasily

definedoperationalcharacterisationsofattentionandmodelsofWM.Nonetheless,

thecontrastbetweenthecapacityforconsciouscontentandthatforattendedor

WMcontentissignificant,andcountsasastrongreasontothinkthatthereisindeed

C~A.

InthissectionIarguethatasdefined,phenomenalconsciousnesshasnointrinsic

capacitylimitations.Theonlylimittophenomenalcontentliesinwhateversystems

areresponsibleforproducingthatcontent.Inhumans,thesesystemsarecausally

complex,andtheburdenofproofisupontheoverflowsceptictoshowthatonly

executiveWMcontentcanbephenomenal,andthatnon-executiveWMcontentis

286

neverphenomenal.Butthisisimplausibleforanumberofreasons,amongwhichare

thedissociationbetweentheneuralsubstratesofattentionandconsciousness,and

theindubitablerichnessofnon-WMstoressuchasiconicmemory.Giventhese

factors,itwouldbeveryremarkableindeedforthecapacitylimitationsof

consciousnessnottodifferfromthoseofattention.

8.4.1 TheFeaturesofConsciousness

In2.4Idefinedphenomenalconsciousnessusingfourfeatures:what-it-is-likeness;a

situatedfirst-personperspective;phenomenalunity;andtemporality.Ifurther

madeadistinctionbetweenthecontentofphenomenalexperienceand

phenomenalityassuch.Ifthereisacapacitylimitationtoconsciousexperience,it

seemslikelythatsuchlimitationwouldbealimitationontheamountofcontent

(perhapstheresolutionorgrainofthatcontent)ratherthanalimitationon

phenomenalityitself.237TheTargetquestion,whichiscentraltoouridentificationof

instancesofC~A,appliesnottophenomenality,buttocontent—isthisTarget

simultaneouslyconsciousbutnotattended?C~Aisnotamatterofclarityor

vividness,isnotamatterofbeingmoreconsciousorlessattentive.ToanswerQ,

ideallyweneedclearcasesofphenomenalconsciousnessofaTargetwhichisnotin

anywayExecutivelyAttended.

Ifoneacceptsphenomenalunity,asituatedsubjectiveperspective,andtemporality

ascharacteristicsofconsciousness,theninonesense,thecapacitylimitationof

237Physiologicalconsciousness—thekindmeasuredbytheGlasgowComaScale(Reith,Brande,

Synnot,Gruen,&Maas,2016)ortheBispectralIndexofsedation(DeDeyneetal.,1998)—is

undoubtedlygraded.Butgradationsinwhatitislike-nessitself—whethergloballyforasubject,or

particularlyintheexperienceofspecifictargets—isamorecontentiousissue(Bayneetal.,2016;

Morin,2006;Overgaard,Rote,Mouridsen,&Ramsøy,2006;Sergent&Dehaene,2004;Windey&

Cleeremans,2015).Whilefascinating,itisnotdirectlyrelevanttomyargumentshere.

287

phenomenalexperienceisjustone.Asubjectcanonlyhaveoneunifiedexperienceat

agivenmomentintime.238Butofcourse,whatispertinenttotheCapacityQuestion

iswhetherthereisanykindoflimitationonthe“quantity”ofthemultiplecontents

ofaunifiedphenomenalexperience.

Likeattention-as-strategies(8.3.1)thereisnolimitontheamountofcontentthat

canbecomephenomenal.Itisplausiblethathumansexperiencefarmore

phenomenalcontentthangoldfish.Dogsexperiencefarmorephenomenalolfactory

contentthanhumans.Thereisnothinginherentinconsciousnessitselfthatdictates

alimitedcapacity.Actuallimitationsareimposedbythesystemsthatproducethe

content.Thecrucialquestionis,therefore,whichsystemscancontributeto

phenomenalcontent,andcantheydosowithoutemployingExecutiveAttention?

Therearegoodreasonstothinkthatphenomenalcontenthasafarfinerresolution

thanExecutivelyAttendedcontent.AccordingtoRaffman(1993),“whereaswecan

experienceanddistinguish1,400frequenciesinsound(throughsame/different

judgments),wecanreportonandidentifyonly80pitches,purportedlyshowingthat

phenomenalconsciousnesshasthecapacityofaround1,400pitcheswhereasaccess

consciousnesshasthecapacityofonlyaround80”(Jennings,2015,pp.284–285).

Thesuggestionhereisthatasubjectiscapableofbeingphenomenallyconsciousof

farmorenuancethanshecanexplicitlyreportthroughWMchannels.Cautionis

requiredindrawingconclusionsfromthisresult—e.g.,Raffmanistalkingabout

discriminatorycapacitiesovertime,whereasinthischapterIaminterestedin

synchroniccapacities.Buthisresultsdosuggestthatthegrainofauditory

phenomenalFOC(asmeasuredby1,400frequencydistinctions—Seemings-thattwo

soundsaredifferent)ismuchfinerthanthegrainofExperience-ofreport(as

measuredby80pitchidentifications).

Anotherwaytomakesenseofthisistogobacktomydefinitionsofattention,

consciousness,andWM,andconsiderthetypeofrelationshipthatconnectsthem

238ThusalsoBaars(1997b,p.368).

288

(4.4).Onmyview,theexecutiveofWMisthemechanismthatimplementsExecutive

Attentionalstrategiestomanipulatecontent,andphenomenalconsciousnessisan

attributeofsomeoralloftheoutputofthismechanism.Therelationshipthatbest

describesthisaccountisacomplexcausalchain(subsetofCA).Implementationof

attentionalstrategiesisoneofthecausesofcontentbecomingphenomenal(Aà

C).239Thereareverylikelyatleastsometimesintermediatesteps(AàX,Y,etc.àC).

Itisalsolikelythatbecomingconsciousofcertaincontentcanattractbottom-up

attentiontoit(CàA),andsoon.Overflowscepticismimposesaconstraintonthese

complexcausalchains:itdeniesthepossibilityofX,Y,etc.àCwithoutExecutive

Attentionbeingoneofthecausesofconsciousness.Thus,thecapacityof

consciousnesscanneverexceedthecapacityoftheExecutiveAttentionthatcauses

it,sinceonlycontentthatisExecutivelyAttendedcanbecomeconscious.

Thisconstraint,andthetransmissionofcapacitylimitationsfromExecutive

Attentiontoconsciousness,seemsimplausibleforatleastthreereasons,twoof

whichIconsiderbrieflyhereandthethirdinmoredetailinthenextsection.First,

thiskindofcomplexcausalchainmeansmanyothercausesapartfromExecutive

Attentionareinvolvedinproducingtheoutputofconsciouscontent.Whetherthese

othercausesarecapableofproducingthatoutputwithoutExecutiveAttentionis

somethingtobeestablished,notassumed.KeepinmindthatLiberalAttentional

strategiesarealmostcertainlynecessary,butthenecessityofExecutiveAttentionis

anopenquestion.

Second,preciselywhichcognitiveapparatuses(a)constitutethecognitiveexecutive

and(b)areresponsibleforconsciousness,remainopenquestions.Theoverflow

scepticrequireseitherbothtobeidentical,orfortheapparatusofExecutive

Attentiontosubsumetheapparatusresponsibleforconsciousness.Wedon’tyet

knowenoughabouteithertoassumeeitherproposition.

239Thearrowssignifytheconceptofcausationgenerallywithoutengaginginthedeepwatersofits

metaphysics.

289

8.4.2 NeurophysiologicalConsiderations

Thisraisesthethirdobjectiontothescepticalconstraintabove—theNeural

Question(5.3.2.6).Thereislittlesupportfromourcurrentpictureoftheneural

substratesofExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousnessfortheoverflow

sceptic’saccount.Myimpressionisthattheliteratureonthedegreeofcoincidence

oftheneuralsubstratesofExecutiveAttentionandconsciousnessisinconclusiveat

thistime.Nonetheless,thereareclues:thestrongevidenceforasignificant

differencebetweentheneuralsubstratesofExecutiveAttentionandconsciousness

castsseriousdoubtontheconstraint;andthephenomenonofneuraldivergenceis

goodreasontoaccepttherichnessofnon-WMstoressuchasiconicmemory,and

thereforeofFOC(andperhaps,therefore,ofphenomenalFOC).Iconsidereachin

turn.

DifferentNeuralSubstrates

Ithasbeensuggestedthatattentionandconsciousnesssharethesameneural

substrate(O’Regan&Noë,2001).Butatleasttworecentreviewsoftheevidence

relatingtheneuralsubstratesofattentionandconsciousnessconcludethatthey

significantlydissociateneurally(Lamme,2004;Tallon-Baudry,2012),aconclusion

sharedbyothers(e.g.,Baars,1997b,pp.367–368;Kanaietal.,2006;Koch&

Tsuchiya,2012).TheneuralmarkersofExecutiveAttentionandconsciousnessalso

doublydissociate(Koivisto&Revonsuo,2007;Wyart,Dehaene,&Tallon-Baudry,

2012),andacasecanbemadeforthemevolvingalongdifferentpaths(Montemayor

&Haladjian,2015,Chapters2.2,5).Eventheensemblestatisticsinvokedby

overflowscepticstoexplainawaythe“illusionofrichness”—whichareplausibly

Experience-of-typecontent—seemtohaveneuralpathwaysdistinctfromtherestof

perception(Cohenetal.,2016b,pp.325,330).Thisbuildsapowerfulcasefora

significantdissociationbetweentheneuralsubstratesofExecutiveAttentionand

290

consciousness(alwayskeepinginminduncertaintyabouteithersubstrate),and

thereforeunderminesthetransmissionofcapacitylimitationsfromtheonetothe

other.

IconicMemory

Ithasbeenfairlywellestablishedforsometimenowthatthereisatleastonefragile

short-termmemorystoreoutsideofWM—iconicmemory(G.M.Long,1980).240

Iconicmemoryisaprominentcandidateforanexampleofthisdissociationofthe

neuralsubstratesofExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousness.Thereis

evidencethatthecontentstoragecapacityoficonicmemoryfarexceedsthecontent

manipulationcapacityofExecutiveAttention.

IconicmemorydiffersfromWMintwochiefaspects:(a)itseemstocontainmuch

richercontent(phenomenalornot)thanWM;and(b)itdegradesmorequicklythan

WM.ButitinteractswithWMsuchthatasmallproportionofthecontentiniconic

memorycanbe“transferred”(whateverthatmaymean)toWM—perhapsthrough

mechanismssuchasrehearsalorcompetition—whereitmaybeusedformore

complexprocessing.IconicmemorybeautifullyexplainstheSperling(1960)

experiments.Recallthathere,asubjectisexposedbrieflytoagridof12or16

letters,andsubsequentlycuedtorecallarowofthem.Subjectsaregenerallyreliable

inreportingthecuedrow,butarethenunabletoreportanyotherrows.Thisholds

regardlessofwhichrowiscued,suggestingthatallthecontent—everysingle

letter—wasencodedintoiconicmemory,butonceasubsetofthoseletters—the

cuedrow—wastransferred(whateverthatmeans)toWMforreport,thetracesof

therestofthelettersdegradedandwerelost.Thissuggeststhatthecontentof

240SeealsoLandman(2003,p.162),Vandenbrouckeetal.,(2011).Similarargumentsmaybe

mountedforothershort-termsensorymemorystores,suchasauditoryechoicmemory

(Zimmermannetal.,2016).

291

iconicmemory—thewholegrid—isricherthanthecontentofWM—justonerow—

whichis(a)fromabove;althoughthepersistenceoftheiconicmemorytracesis

muchshorterthanthepersistenceoftheWMtraces,whichis(b),(Bronfmanetal.,

2014,p.1394).

Considerationofvisualsystemneurophysiology(Schwartz,2017,Chapters2,3)

providesfurtherreasontothinkthaticonicmemorycontentmayindeedberich

beyondtheabilitytoreport.Here,wefindapatternofinitialconvergenceand

shrinkingofcapacity,followedbyamuchgreaterdivergenceandexpandingof

capacity.Over100,000,000photoreceptors(120,000,000rodsand6,000,000cones,

p.37)convergeuponjust1,000,000ganglioncells.Thereisfurtherconvergence

throughthelateralgeniculatenucleus(LGN)tothestriatecortex(V1).Butfrom

there,thereisasignificantdivergence,spreadingoutfromV1firsttothe

extrastriatecortexwhichisspecialisedforanalysingattributessuchasmotionand

colour,andthen“tohighercentres,whichcombinevisualinformationwithmemory

andothersenses.Highervisualcentres,inturn,sendinformationbacktothestriate

cortex(V1)viareciprocalprojections”(p.20).Thus,fromthestriatecortexon,the

richnessofcapacityandprocessingisincreasing,incontrasttothedecreasein

capacityfromthelensthroughtothestriatecortex.241Thereremainopenquestions

astowhetherthisrichcontentisattendedand/orconscious,butneurophysiological

considerationscertainlygiveusgoodreasontothinkiconicmemorystorestobe

rich.

241NotethatmyFOCandhigher-ordercontentdon’tmapperfectlyontothisneuralgeography.

Highercorticalstructureshavecopiousfeedbackconnectionstolowerones(Montaser-Kouhsari&

Rajimehr,2004,p.434),asfardownastheLGN.Determiningtheactualneuralcorrelatesofmy

threefolddistinctionofFOC,Experience-ofandSeeming-thatisacomplextopicthatunfortunatelyI

cannotexplorehere.SeealsoLamme(2018,p.2)andHaunetal.,(2017)forretinalargumentsabout

Florencecases.

292


Tosummarisetheabove(8.4.1and8.4.2),neitherExecutiveAttention-as-strategies

orphenomenalconsciousnessasIhavedefinedthemareintrinsicallycapacity

limited.Rather,itisthestorageandmanipulationcapacitiesofsystemslikeWMor

iconicmemorythatimposethelimitations.NotonlydoExecutiveAttentionand

phenomenalconsciousnessseemtohavedissociableneuralsubstrates,but

considerationoftheneurophysiologyofvisionbooststheplausibilityoficonic

memorystoresrichbeyondthemanipulationcapacityofExecutiveAttentioninWM.

WethushavestrongreasonstoholdthatthecapacitylimitationsofExecutive

Attentionandphenomenalconsciousnessarenotidentical.

Ben’siconicmemoryholdsrichfovealspecklecontentwhileFlorence’smaynothold

richperipheraltreeandleafcontent.ThecriticalquestioniswhetherBen’s

overflowingiconicmemorycontentisbothphenomenalandunattended.The

patternoftradingoffprecisionfornumberthatcharacterisesExecutiveAttentionin

WM(8.3.3above)doesnotapplytophenomenalconsciousness.Ben’sfoveal

phenomenalvision,underwrittenbytherichnessoficonicmemorycontentandthe

neurophysiologyofthevisualsystem,makesnosuchsacrificesinresolution.

Florence’speripheralphenomenalvisiondoesmakesuchatrade-offandits

resolutionisseverelylimitedbytheneurophysiologyofthevisualsystem.Shehas

knowledgeofhertreesandleaves,albeitimperfect(Cohen,2019;C.-C.Wu&Wolfe,

2018).ButBenhasatleastperfectphenomenalexperienceofeveryspeckle,evenif

hisExecutiveAttention-dependentknowledge(Experience-of,Seeming-that)is

limitedandimperfect.Solongashecanvisuallyresolveahundredspeckles,hecan

phenomenallyexperience—asrichlyashisvisualsystemallows—everyspeckle.

Largelyperipheralphenomenasuchascrowding(Pelli,2008;Whitney&Levi,2011)

whilepertinenttoFlorence,simplydonotapplytoBen.242Whenhetriestospatially

attend,though,resolutionofattentiondegradesfarmorequickly(8.3.2).

242E.g.,“whenthesamedisplayappearsatthefovea,theorienteditemsarenotcrowdedandthe

orientationsignalsdonotappeartobeobligatorilyaveraged”(Alvarez,2011,p.172).

293

Thecriticalquestionhereisjusthowitisthatcontentbecomesconscious.Ifwe

knewthat,wecouldworkoutwhethertherichcontentiniconicmemorydoes

indeedbecomephenomenalindependentofExecutiveAttentioninWM.But

unfortunately,wedon’tknowthat,andtherearemajorobstaclestoourever

knowingthat(7.4).

Thatiswhythisisnotadeductiveargumentforoverflow,butanabductiveone.So

far,Ihavemarshalledtheevidenceforamodelwherecapacitylimitationsof

attentionandconsciousnessdissociate.Giventhis,itwouldonlybethemost

remarkableofcoincidencesifempiricallythosecapacitylimitationswerefoundto

beconsistentlyidentical.Whatismore,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatFOCin,

say,iconicmemoryisquiterich,farbeyondthecapacityofExecutiveAttentionin

WM,anduncertaintyabouthowitisthatcontentbecomesphenomenal.Taken

togetherwithmyargumentsfortheveridicalimmediacyofBen’srichspeckle

experienceinChapter7,thebestexplanationisonethatallowsforphenomenal

overflow.

Inthebalanceofthischapter,Ibringtogethertheideasaboveintoaroughmodelof

howcontentisprocessedthatprovidesaconvenientwaytoexpressthem,andthen

considerthechiefalternativestotheoverflowinterpretation.

8.5 TheWitches’HatModel

“Ratherthanattemptingtolocateconsciousnesswithinthebox-

and-arrowdiagramsbelovedbycognitiveneuroscience,itmightbe

bettertothinkofconsciousnessasinvolvingadynamicunitythat

294

issuperimposedontherelativelystaticstructureofthoughtand

perception”(Bayne,2010,p.245).

Memorystoresinhumans,andtheiraccessandmanipulation,arenotunitary.There

isnowsubstantialevidencefordifferentsystemswithdifferentsubstrates,

functions,capacities,andpatternsofbehaviour.Ihavealreadytoucheduponthe

differencebetweenWMandiconicmemoryabove.Thesetwosystemsdisplaythe

patterndescribedbyFranconerietal,(8.3)thatischaracteristicofattentional

processes(butnotphenomenality)wherebyquantityistraded-offforquality.

Attentionalprocessingincreasesrefinementofcontentatthecostofreducing

contentitemcapacity.BuildingonthiscentralideawecanderivewhatIcalla

Witches’HatModeloftheflowofcontentthroughcognition—amodel243that

capturesthefeaturesdiscussedinthischapterthusfar.

ItishighlylikelythatWMandiconicmemoryarenottheonlyshorttomedium-term

visualstores.CrickandKoch(1990,p.269)andLamme(2003,p.14)describea

modelwithjustthesetwo,butBlockelaboratesfurther:

“Theupshotisthatthefirstphaseisveryhighcapacityandisover

by1,000msecs;thesecondphaseishighcapacityandlastsupto4

seconds;andthethirdphasehasasimilarcapacitytotheworking

memoryphaseinSperlingandinLandmanetal.”(Block,2007,p.

491).

Similarly,Sligteetal.,(2008;2010)postulatea“fragilevisualshort-termmemory”

(VSTM)withcapacityanddurationintermediatebetweenbrief,richiconicmemory

243TheWHMmightbebetterdescribedasametaphorthanamodelinthatitdoesnotseekto

simulateascloselyaspossibletherealitybeingexplained,butrathertodrawaconnectionbetween

centralorsalientfeaturescommontobothrealityandmetaphor(5.3.3).

295

andpersistent,sparsevisualWM.244AndHaunetal.,(2017)sketchapictureofrich

short-termmemorystoresthatrequiretimeforsomeoftheircontenttoberefined

andfurtherprocessedindifferentways.

Therearedifferencesindetail,butformypurposes,thatiswherethedevilisnot.

TheseexamplesservetoillustratethegeneralprinciplecapturedbymyWHMofthe

gradualtrade-offasfurtherprocessingoccursbetweentherichnessandthenumber

ofitems(Figure5).

Ihavedepictedthreephases245followingBlockandSligteetal.,buttheboundaries

betweenthephases(andindeed,theboundarieswiththerestofcognition246—the

externalsurfacesofthehat)shouldbetakentobeveryfuzzyindeed.Iamagreat

believerthatbrainsareorganicorgansandoperateonprinciplesfarmorelikelivers

andbonemarrowsthansiliconchipsorquartzwatches.Therestofourphysiology

is“mushy”247inthisway,withveryfewdistinctfunctionalboundaries,and

interactingsystemsandsubsystemsmeltintoeachother.Itwouldbesurprisingif

brainsweretheexception.

244Phillips(2018,p.3)discussessomeofthechallengesthathavebeenraisedagainstadistinctlarge

capacityshort-termstore.245ThesethreephasesmustnotbeconfusedforthethreefoldkindsofcontentIdescribedin7.2.1.

WhileFOCmaymostlyariseinthebrimofthewitches’hat,Experience-ofandSeeming-thatdonot

correspondtoeitherofthetwohigher-orderphasesoftheWHM,butmaybothcutacrossthem.246Forexample,theboundariesbetweenWMandlong-termmemorymaybequitefuzzy(Brady,

Stormer,&Alvarez,2016;Rhodes&Cowan,2018).ThisistheIntegrationQuestion(5.3.2.4).247Iamdevelopingtheideaofthis“MushinessPrinciple”furtherinafuturepaper.

296

Figure5Witches’HatModelofConsciousContent.Ihavedepictedjustperceptionforsimplicity,butthemodelcouldbeextendedtoencompassothercognitions:long-termmemoryencodingandretrieval,imagination,efferentmotorcommand,etc.

WorkingMemory

OngoingContent

ExecutiveAttention

Consciousness

Binding

Medium-termContent

attention

Capacity

fuzzyboundaries

FragileVeryShort-termContent(consciousandsubconscious)

SensoryInputintero-andexteroceptive

Duration

fuzzyboundaries

297

Infact,itwouldbebettertothink,notofthreeindependentstoreswithdifferent

specifications,butofjustone“hat”—asinglestorewiththreeoverlappingphases,

whosecapacitytoholdontoitemsdegradespredictablyovertime,butindifferent

ways.ThediscretestoresdescribedbyBlock,Sligteetal.,andothersaredelineated

bytheexperimentalparadigmsusedtoinvestigatethem,butthereisnoreasonto

think,forexample,thatcontentcanonlypersistforeitheronesecondorfour

seconds,butnotanyperiodoftimeinbetween(Block,2007,p.491).Boththe

persistencedurationsandtheamountofcontentvarycontinuouslyamongthe

variousstores,ratherthanbeingstrictlyquantised,althoughtheremaybe“bulges”

alongthecontinuum.

Inthediagram,thehorizontalaxisrepresentsoverallcapacityforrichnessof

contentwhiletheverticalaxisrepresentsthemaximumdurationoverwhich

contentcanbemaintained.Theverywidebrimtaperingupintothenarrowerpeak

ofthecrownthuscapturesthetrade-offdescribedabove.Thevertical,temporalaxis

alsorepresentsinageneralsortofwaytheideathatcontent“moves”(whateverthat

maymean)248fromperceptualapparatusfirstintothelowestphase,thebrim,and

thencegraduallyupthroughthecrownofthehat,orpossiblynofurtherifitis

nearertheedgeofthebrim.Perceptualcontentmovesintothebrimmostlybybeing

LiberallyAttended.249Movementfromthebrimintothecrownisattended,but

dependingonhowonedefinesthecognitiveexecutive—andthereforeExecutive

Attention—thismaybeeitherLiberalorExecutiveAttention.TheboundariesofWM

willbedefinedwithreferencetoExecutiveAttentionandwhetheroneconsidersthe

248Imakenodefiniteclaimsaboutwhat“moves”signifieshere.WHMisneutralwithrespecttothe

ManipulationQuestionandtherelatedDuplicationQuestion(Chapter5and7.2.1.3)—whether

separateduplicatesofcontentareencodedinthedifferentphases,orthecontentremainsphysically

inthesameneuralsubstratebutactivateddifferently,somehow,orsomethingelseentirely.249Notethatnotallpersistenceisduetoattention.Thepersistenceofaretinaltrace,forexample,

occursindependentofattention(exceptperhapsorienting?).Thisistrueoftheearlierlevelsof

processing,andbecomesgraduallylesstrueasonemovesuptheprocessinglevels.

298

intermediatestorestobepartofWM(perhapsthevisuospatialsketchpad)ornot

(Sligteetal’sfragileVSTM).250

TheseborderdisputesdonotimpactheavilyonQandaremattersforempirical

clarification.WhatiscentraltotheWHMistheidearichunattendedFOC,someof

whichisfurtherprocessedbyattentiontodifferingdegrees,andsomovesupthe

witches’hat.ThecrucialdifferencebetweenWHM—whichisfriendlytothe

accountsofoverflowproponentslikeBlock—andWMmodelslikethoseofBHand

Cowan—whichmakeoverflowimpossible—isthatcontentanywhereinthewitches’

hatcanandregularlydoesbecomephenomenal,eventhatwhichnevermovesinto

thecrown.Processesofbindingareoccurringfromtheearliestvisualprocessing

areasonwards(Holcombe&Cavanagh,2001;Lamme,2010,p.211)andalltheway

tothepeak.Ultimately,whatwetaketobeourongoingstreamofconsciousnessis

composedofFOC(brim)andhigher-ordercontent(crown)allbound251and

integratedtogetherintoasingleunitaryphenomenalexperience.

Thismodelhasanumberofadvantages.First,itexplainstheimmediacyof

phenomenalFOC(7.4.2)sincecontentunprocessedbyExecutiveAttentioncan

becomephenomenal.ItunderwritestheconfidenceBenhasinhisimmediate

phenomenalFOC,sincefurtherprocessingcreatesmoreopportunityforerrors

(Gross,2018,p.5),whereasimmediateperceptionleaveslessroomforerror.

ModelsthatmakeExecutiveAttentionnecessaryforconsciousnessdonothavethis

explanatoryoption.Second,itmakessenseoftheobservedongoingintricate

interplaybetweenattention,consciousness,andWM.Idonothavethespacehere,

butagreatdealofempiricalevidencefitsneatlyintotheWHM.Thirdly,unlikethe

modelsofBH,Cowan,etc.,itdoesnotbegthequestionofwhetherconsciousnesscan

250Trübutscheketal’s(2017)descriptionofcontentheldnon-consciouslyintheprimaryvisual

cortexandrecalledsecondslatersoundsverymuchlikeitisheldiniconicmemory.Whatismore,it

is“activity-silent”onMEG.However,theydescribeitasnon-consciousWM—anillustrationofhow

difficultitcanbetodrawtheborders.Fortwopossibleneurophysiologicalaccountssimilartothe

WHM,seeMagnussen(2009)andLamme(2010,p.213).251TheroleofbindingintheWHMisunfortunatelytoolargeatopictoaddressindetailhere.

299

arisewithoutExecutiveAttentionorWM.WHMallowsforExecutiveAttention-free

consciouscontent,butalsoleavesthedooropenforthepossibilitythatallconscious

contentmightactuallybeExecutivelyAttended—if,forexample,itisshownthat

althoughitispossible,nobrimcontentactuallybecomesphenomenal,orthat

ExecutiveAttentionreachesdownallthewaytotheedgesofthebrimofthehat.

8.6 AlternativeInterpretations

“Inphilosophy,therearethewideandnarrowroadsaswellasin

religion,andthewideroadthatleadstodestructioninvolvesthe

smugnessofthinkingthatonecanestablishone'sownviewmerely

byunderminingthealternatives.Defendersofaviewoweusnot

onlyobjectionstoalternatives,butalsoaworkedoutversionofthe

viewthatcanwithstandscrutinyonitsown”(Kvanvig,2007,p.

167).

IhavesofarmadeacasefortheWHMonwhichfovealphenomenalcontentcan

overflowattentionbecauseitcanariseindependentofExecutiveAttentioninWM.

ButIhavestressedthatmineisanabductiveargument,aninferencetothebest

explanation.Havingdescribedmy“workedoutversion”ofapositiveview,it

remainsthentoconsiderthechiefalternativeaccountsandshowwhytheWHMisa

betterexplanationthanthey.ThatdoesnotmaketheWHM“right,”onlypreferable.

InthissectionIanalysethreesuchalternatives:theillusionofrichness;virtually

unlimitedExecutiveAttention;andinchoateness.TheaccountsIconsiderhereare

bynomeansexhaustive—thereareotherwaysofbeingeitheranoverflow

proponentorsceptic.

300

8.6.1 IllusionofRichnessAccount

InthissectionIcomparemyoverflow-friendlyWHMaccountofBen’shentothe

overflow-sceptical“illusionofrichness”accountbasedonensemblestatistics(7.1).

Thereareanumberofadvantagestothelatter,twoofwhicharehighlyrelevant

here.First,ensemblestatisticsallowthecapacitiesofattentionandconsciousnessto

beequalwithoutimpoverishingeitherconsciousexperienceorourfunctionalityin

theworld(Cohenetal.,2016b,pp.325,332).Statisticalaveragesofcontent

peripheraltoattentionareenoughforeffectivefunctionality,butnotsodemanding

thattheytaxcognitionwithirrelevancies.252Whatisthepointofbeingrichly

consciousofcontentthatyouneveruseforanypracticalpurpose?Second,itis

parsimonious.Theepistemicbarrier(7.4)suggeststhatwecanneverfind

conclusiveevidenceforphenomenaloverflow,sincewecanonlyidentify

phenomenalcontentviareport,whichrequiresExecutiveAttention.Whatisthe

pointofpostulatingphenomenayoucanneverconfirm(Cohen,Dennett,&

Kanwisher,2016a,p.644)?

SowhyprefermyWHM?First,theillusionofrichnessaccountisbasedexclusively

ontheperipheralvisionofFlorencecases.Ihavefoundnostudiesthatdealwith

ensemblestatisticsinfovealBencases.Crowdingdoesnotseemtooccurinfoveal

vision(Alvarez,2011,p.127).Whiletheillusionofrichnessaccountdoesnot

impoverishexperienceexcessively,ensemblestatisticsdonotatalldescribeBen’s

fovealphenomenalFOCcontent,orhisconfidentSeeming-thatheseeseveryspeckle

richly.ThisfailureisemphasisedwhenweconsiderthedifferencebetweenBen’s

directvisualexperienceofahenheisnowlookingat,withBen’seyes-closed

memoryexperienceofahenhestaredatoneminuteago.Thelattercasesounds

verymuchlikeanimagebuiltfromverysparsedataandsharesthecharacteristicsof

ensemblestatisticperception.WhenBenattendstothespecklesinhismemory-

252WhitneyandLeib(2018,pp.120–121)listthemanygeneraladvantagesoftheconceptof

ensembleperception.

301

image,hisconfidenceinseeingindividualspeckles—likeFlorence—drops.253

RememberedorimaginedfovealimagesbehavelikeFlorence’speripheral

content,254allthemorestarklyhighlightingthecontrasttodirectfovealperception,

andunderliningtheinadequacyofillusionofrichnessaccountstoexplainthelatter.

Second,in7.4.2.2.1Iarguedthatduetotheepistemicobstacletoidentifying

phenomenalFOCthatisnotfurtherprocessed,theevidenceofBen’sSeeming-thatis

allthatwecanreasonablyhopefor.HereIwouldaddthattheepistemicobstacle

cutsbothways.ItequallyfrustratesattemptstoconfirmthatphenomenalFOCisin

factsparse,astheoverflowscepticwouldhaveit.Ifanything,theonlyreportwe

havefromBenishisconfidentSeeming-thatheseeseveryspecklerichly.AsIargued

above,theburdenofproofmustsurelybeonthosewhoquestionthat.Nonetheless,

thisepistemicobstaclecountsagainstbothproponentandscepticequally.While

muchmorecouldbesaid,onbalance,then,theseconsiderationsmaketheWHM

preferabletotheillusionofrichnessaccountinBencases.

8.6.2 ExpandedAttentionAccount

Theillusionofrichnessaccountcircumventedoverflowbyrarefyingconscious

contenttomatchthesparsityofattention.Anotherwayaroundoverflowisto

expandtherichnessofattentiontomatchtherichnessofconsciousness—an

expandedattentionaccount.Thereareanumberofwaysofapplyingthisidea.HereI

considerthree:redefiningcapacitysothatBen’sspecklesfallwithinthecapacityof

WM;takingBen’sSeeming-thatashigher-orderprocessingofeveryspeckle;and

253ButnotforthesamereasonsasFlorence.Benmay,forexample,beabletoholdaclearpictureof

oneortwospeckleswitheyesclosed,butatthecostoftheothers.Florenceisnotcapableofholding

anyofherperipheraltreesclearly,evenwithhereyesopen.254Forapredictiveprocessingaccountoftheinchoatenessofimaginedcontent,seeClark(2016,

Chapter3).

302

redefiningtheboundariesofExecutiveAttentionsothatitisnolongerlimitedbythe

capacityofWM.IconsidereachinturnbutfindtheminferiortotheWHMaccount.

CapacityofExecutiveAttentioninWMisNeverReallyExceeded

Oneapproachistomeasurecapacitydifferently,thusbringingBen’srich

phenomenalcontentwithinthelimitationsofExecutiveAttentioninWM.Onemight

saythatonehenisjustoneobject—evenwithallitsspeckles—whichinnoway

exceedsWM’scapacityforobjectattention.Thiswillonlywork,however,ifone

incorporatesthefragileveryshort-termstoreintoWMitself.Onemightsaythatrich

contentcanbeheldin,say,theepisodicbuffer,oreventhevisuo-spatialsketchpad

ofBH,butonlyforafractionofasecond.ThisallowstheExecutiveAttentionofthe

centralexecutivetooperateuponitandmakeitphenomenalwithoutoperating

outsideWMassuch.

Butthereareseriousproblemswiththisapproach.First,whileit’struethatonehen

isoneobject,ahundredspecklescertainlyexceedWM’scapacityforobjectorfeature

attention.Weknowthis,becauseBencanmanipulatethefewspeckleshedoes

attendtoinwayshecannotmanipulateallthespecklesatonce(e.g.,subitise,

compare,etc.).Second,therearegoodempiricalreasonsfordistinguishingbetween

WMandiconicmemory(8.4.2.2).Tosimplydoawaywiththisdistinctionforthe

purposesofsolvingtheproblemofoverflowissomewhatadhoc.Itistruethaton

theMushinessPrinciple(8.5)weshouldnotbetoodogmaticaboutbordersbetween

systems,andthebordersintheWHMareveryfuzzy,butthisinnowaydiscounts

thefactthatcontentinWMandiconicmemorybehaveinverydifferentways.Atany

rate,solongasthereisphenomenalcontentthatisnotprocessedinanysortof

higher-orderway,wehaveC~A,regardlessofwhetheronelocatesthatcontent

withinWMorwithout.

303

Seeming-thatisExecutiveAttention

Anotherwayforthesceptictoexplainawayoverflowistoarguethattheveryact

itselfofgeneratingSeeming-thataboutthephenomenalFOCrendersitExecutively

Attended(andthereforenotoverflowing),sincethatisakindofhigher-order

processing.Ben’sphenomenalFOCisthereforenotunprocessedinahigher-order

way—ithasbeenprocessedtoproducetheSeeming-that.

ThisapproachisunderminedbyanapplicationoftheTargetQuestion.TheTargets

oftheFOCandtheSeeming-thataredifferent.TheSeeming-thatismerelyapointer

ortagthatlacksanythingliketherichnessoftheFOCitself.Thus,theTargetofthe

Seeming-thatisnotidenticaltotheTargetoftheFOC.Forthisscepticalargumentto

work,Ben’sExperience-ofeveryspeckleiswhatwouldneedtobeidenticaltohis

FOC,which,wehaveseen,issimplynotthecase.

RedefiningExecutiveAttention

Thestrongestoptionopentothesceptichere,Ibelieve,istochallengemydefinition

ofExecutiveAttentionasbeinglimitedtojusttheexecutiveofWM.Thediscussionof

thecapacitylimitationsofattentionpointedoutthatunlikeWM,insome

circumstances(e.g.,trackingmultipleobjects,8.3.2)ExecutiveAttentionseemstobe

ofvirtuallyunlimitedcapacity.Perhaps,then,evenifconsciousnessoverflowWM,

ExecutiveAttentioncaninsomewayalsooverflowWM(assuggestedin7.4.2.2.3)to

encompassalltherichcontentincluding,say,thatiniconicmemory.Onthisaccount

BenisconfidentinhisSeeming-thatheseesthespecklesrichlypreciselybecausehis

ExecutiveAttentioniswhatbringsallthatrichcontentintoconsciousness.What

limitshisabilitytoreportrichlyisnotthecapacitylimitationsofExecutive

Attention,butthoseofWM.

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Again,theMushinessPrinciple(8.5)dictatesthatwenotbetoodogmaticabout

drawingboundariesaroundsystemslikethecognitiveexecutive.Therearecertainly

precedentsforholdingExecutiveAttentiontooperatebothwithinandbeyondBH’s

centralexecutive-episodicbufferaxis(Baars&Franklin,2003;Carruthers,2017;

Mogensen&Overgaard,2018;Naccache,2018).AndSergentandRees(2007)argue

thatreportingisasignatureofWM,butnotnecessarilyoftheglobalworkspace.I

invokedtheexecutiveofWMtoprovideaprincipledwayofdemarcatingExecutive

AttentionfromLiberalAttention(onwhichQistrivial),butthereisnoreasonwhy

theglobalworkspaceshouldnotprovideanequallyprincipledwaytoestablishthis

demarcation.Indeed,Block’sespousalofoverflowhasbeenexpressedexplicitlyin

termsoftheglobalworkspace:hehasarguedexplicitlythat“thecapacityof

phenomenologyisgreaterthanthecapacityoftheglobalworkspace”(Block,2007,

p.549).255Icautionedin3.3.3againstbeggingthequestionofQbysimplydefining

attentionviaconsciousness—inthiscase,definingthebroadcastingoftheglobal

workspaceasbeingwhatmakescontentconscious.

Butthechiefproblemwiththisversionoftheexpandedattentionaccountisthatit

merelyshiftstheboundarieswithoutinanysubstantivewayaccountingforthe

presenceofFOCthatisnotfurtherprocessedinahigher-orderway.Itistruethat

ExecutiveAttention—howeveronedemarcatesit—isimplementedinthe

productionofmanyaspectsofperceptualphenomenalcontent.Itmodulatesvisual

contentinaccordancewithourmotivations,intentions,taskrequirements,etc.For

example,spatialandfeatureattentioninteracttomodulatetheperceptualresolution

offeaturesindifferentlocations(vanEs,Theeuwes,Knapen,&Ré,2018).Both

exogenousandendogenousattentionimprovetaskperformancebothperipheral

andcentral,albeitwithcomplexpatternsofmodulationofvisualresolution(Barbot

&Carrasco,2017).Butthesekindsofimplementationsareinvolvedinproducing

higher-ordercontentratherthanFOC.Thatmaybealargepartofourongoing

streamofconsciousness,butitonlytakesasmallsubsetofthatstreamtobe

unprocessedinsuchwaystoestablishC~A.AndthatisexactlywhatmostofBen’s

255FazekasandNemeth(2018)andPittsetal.,(2018)relatetheseopposingviewstoneuraltheories

consciousness.

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specklesare.Hecanseethemrichlywithoutanyoverlayofattentionalmodulation

withrespecttothebroadercontextandwithoutmodulationoftheirresolution.The

Targetoftheseattentionalmodulationsisthehen,orperhapsafewspecklesBen

attendsto,butnevereverysinglespecklesimultaneously.

Itisalsotruethatsomeattentionalmodulationmustbeinvolvedingeneratingeven

simpleFOC,suchas“filling-in”oftheblindspotinthevisualfield(Ramachandran&

Hirstein,1997,pp.434–437).Butthisisongoing,subconsciousLiberalAttention,

notExecutiveAttention.Ultimately,expandedattentionaccountscannotaccountfor

phenomenalFOCthatisnotprocessedinanyhigher-orderwaywithoutbeggingthe

questionandadoptingaPhenomenalDefinitionofattention.

Theforegoingdiscussionsuggeststhatregardlessofhowonedrawstheboundary

betweenLiberalandExecutiveAttentions—whetherthatboundaryisdefinedbythe

globalworkspaceorbythemorecapacitylimitedexecutiveofWM—thestrong

possibilityoffovealoverflowingphenomenalFOCremains.Infact,noneofthe

expandedattentionaccountsseemcapableofexplainingthatpossibility,a

possibilitymadeactualinBen’soverflowingrichfovealspeckleexperience.There

remainsonemoreinterestingalternativetotheWHMtoconsider.

8.6.3 InchoatenessAccount

Anissuehascomeupaspartofotherdiscussionsthatdeserves,Ibelieve,tobe

addresseddirectly,andprovidesathirdwaytoaccountforBenandFlorence’s

experiencewithoutincludingoverflow.Ishallcallitinchoateness,bywhichImean

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phenomenalcontentthatislessdetailed,vivid,orclear.256WhenFlorencekeepsher

eyesstillbutshiftsherattentiontotheperipheralvisualfield,shediscoversthatshe

cannotmakeoutindividualtrees(muchlessleavesonthetrees)andevenherability

toidentifythingslikecoloursandtexturesissignificantlydiminished.She

recognisesthediminutionbycontrasttoherfovealcontent,whichisvivid,clear,and

detailed.IarguedthatBennotexperiencingthisdiminutioninclaritywithinthehen

waspowerfulgroundsforthinkingthathisphenomenalcontentoverflowshis

abilitytoExecutivelyAttendtoitsdetail.ButmightitbethatBendoesindeed

experiencethespecklesinchoately?Ifso,hisfovealcontentmaynotexceedthe

capacityofExecutiveAttention,andhisexperienceisn’tsubstantivelydifferentto

Florence’safterall.

InthissectionIconsiderthetwoaspectsthatingeneraldiscoursedefineinchoate

phenomenalexperienceandapplythemtoFlorenceandBen.Whileinchoateness

adequatelycapturesFlorence’speripheralforestexperience,itfailstocaptureBen’s

fovealspeckleexperience,andthereforefailstobepreferabletotheWHMoverflow

account.

TwoAspects:PeripheralityandIndistinctness

Theconceptofinchoatephenomenalexperience,asdiscussedintheliterature,has

twodimensionsoraspects:peripheralityandindistinctness.Peripherality

recognisesthatallcontentisnotattendedequally.Thereiscontentthatisthe

currentfocusofattention,andcontentthatliesoutsidethatfocus.Byandlarge,the

focusistakentograduallyfadeintoperipheralityratherthanhavingasharp

boundary,muchliketheumbraandpenumbraoftheshadowcastinalunar

eclipse—hence,KochandTsuchiya’s(2007)conceptofthe“near-absenceof

256Iamnot,here,adoptingaquestion-beggingPhenomenalDefinitionofattention,butdescribinga

contingentfeatureofphenomenalcontent.

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attention.”Thereareperipheralitiesotherthanthatofattention—thecentralfoveal

andperipheralretinalfields,andthephenomenalumbraandpenumbra(DeSousa,

2002;Galin,1994;James,1890;Mangan,2007;May,2004)beingthemostrelevant

twotothisdiscussion.257

IndistinctnessItaketobeabouttheclarityofcognitivecontent.258Anexampleof

indistinctperceptionistwo-pointtactilediscriminationfromtheskinoftheupper

arm(6.3.5.1)wheretheindistinctnessarisesfromverylow-resolutionsensory

inputsduetothesparsityofskinreceptors.Indistinctnessmayalsoarisefromthe

contentbeingprocessedrelativelyless—alackofattention.Thisinturnmaybe

becausetop-downattentionisnotdirectedtothatcontent,orbecauseofcapacity

limitationsinExecutiveAttentionand/orWM.259

Peripheralityandindistinctnessusuallygotogether,asdocentralityand

distinctness,buttheycandissociate.Itispossibleforcontentinthefocusof

attentiontobeindistinct,aswhenasubjecttriesveryhardtodiscriminatewhether

oneortwopinsaretouchingherupperarm.Shemayvividlyexperiencethe

inchoatecharacteroftheexperience,butthatismetacognitive—thetactile

perceptionofherskinitselfremainsinchoate.

Similarly,peripheralcontentcanbequitedistinct.Invision,thefovealfieldisthe

focusofattentionmostofthetime,resultinginthemostdistinctcontentsofour

257CrickandKoch(2003,p.124)suggestaneuralpenumbratotheneuralcorrelatesof

consciousnessthatisnotitselfconscious,butmayberesponsiblefor“implicitpriming.”Thephrase

“penumbraofconsciousness”haspoppedupinothercontexts(e.g.,Lukens,1896;Singleton,Mason,

&Webber,2004)whereitseemstomeansomethingmorelikeimplicitbeliefsorattitudesthatare

notreflecteduponbyasubject.258Asopposedtoadiminutioninthephenomenalityassuchofpatchesoftheexperience(recallthe

phenomenality-contentdistinction,2.5).Gurwitsch’sfieldtheoriesofattentionandconsciousnessare

ofinteresthere(Arvidson,2003;Yoshimi&Vinson,2015),butthisisacomplexissueIbracketasnot

directlyrelevanttomyargument.259CompareWatzl’s(2011a,pp.151–153)discussionofdeterminacyanditsrelationtoattentionand

consciousness.MostofhisdiscussionrelatestoFlorencecases,notBencases.

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experience,whiletheretinalperipheryisusuallyinthepenumbraofattention,

resultinginaratherindistinctperipheralvision.However,retinallyperipheral

contentcanbecomethefocusofattention,andthereforebecomeremarkably

distinct.Astronomicalobserverslearnhowtokeepthetelescopiclightofa“faint

fuzzy”(anastronomicalobjectsuchasanebulaoragalaxywhosefaintluminosityis

spreadoutandcanonlybedetectedbythemoresensitiverodsoftheperipheral

retina)fixatedabout15°lateralofthefoveawhileshiftingspatialattentiontoit.

Whenfoveated,thefaintfuzzyisinvisible.Whenattendedintherod-richperiphery,

itmagicallybecomesvisible,ofteninprodigious(andpicturesque)detail(R.N.

Clark,1990,pp.17–18).Thisisanunusualcase,andittakestimeandpracticeforan

astronomertolearnhowtoperipherallydirectandmaintainherspatialattention

upontheretinalperipherysoeffectivelyastoexamineafainttelescopicobjectin

finedetail,andevensketchitwithgreatfidelity.260Two-pointtactilediscrimination

andtelescopicperipheralobservationareclearevidenceofthedoubledissociation

betweenperipheralityanddistinctness.

BacktoFlorenceandBen

AninchoatenessaccountofFlorence’sexperienceisquiteplausible,butcanitbe

appliedtoBen?First,considerFlorence.Whiletheumbrasandpenumbrasofthe

attentionalandretinalfieldscandissociate,itisnotsoclearthatthoseofthe

attentionalandphenomenalfieldscandoso.Initially,whenFlorence’sretinal

peripheryisalsoinherattentionalperiphery,herperipheralphenomenalcontentis

inchoatealthoughitdoesnotSeem-thatitis.Byholdinghereyesstillandshifting

herfocusofattentiontotheretinalperiphery(likeanastronomer)sherevisesher

Seeming-thatandconcludesthatherretinalperipheralcontentisindistinctafterall.

Therearetworeasonsforthis:theperipheralretinaisrelativelysparseinreceptors;

andherfocusofattentionbringsthissparsitytoherknowledge(Seeming-that).A

260Bottom-upattentionprobablycontributes—thereisa“pop-out”effectinvolved.

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thirdpossiblereasonisnotrelevanthere:thecapacitylimitationsofExecutive

AttentioninWMarenotexceeded,becausethecontentistoosparsetoapproach

themanyway.

InBen’scase,wehavethemirroroppositeofFlorence’scase.Thefirsttworeasons

cannotapplytoBen,whilethethirdonemight.ForBen,thefovealretinaprovides

veryrichinputs.Andwhetherornotheisfocusinghisattentiononhisfovealfield,it

Seems-thatheseeseveryspecklerichly,afacthecanconfirmbyfocusinghis

attentiononthehen,buthasnoreasontodoubtevenifheshiftshisattentiontothe

retinalperiphery.Buthere,thecapacitylimitationsofExecutiveAttentioninWM

comeintoplay.

Therearetwowaysthisaspectofthescepticalaccountcanbeformulated.First,

evenwhenBenfocuseshisExecutiveAttentiononthewholehen,heisnotreally

phenomenallyexperiencingeveryspecklerichly,butonlyinchoately,enoughfor

phenomenalcontentnottooverflowExecutivelyAttendedcontent(callthisfoveally

attendedfovealinchoateness,FAFI).Second,ifBenshiftshisExecutiveAttentionto

theretinalperiphery(likeanastronomer),thescepticwouldexpecthisfoveal

phenomenalcontenttobecomemoreinchoate,sinceitisExecutiveAttentionthat

rendersitdistinct,andExecutiveAttentionalresourceshavebeenlargelyshifted

awayfromthefovealfield(peripherallyattendedfovealinchoateness,PAFI).261I

considereachinturn.

IntheFAFIcase,Ben’sfovealphenomenalcontentisallegedlytosomedegree

inchoate,muchliketheinchoatecontentofupper-armtwo-pointtactile

discrimination,albeitforadifferentreason.Liketactilecontent,fovealcontentcan

beinchoateduetosparseinputslikeGaborpatchesontheedgeofdiscernibilityor

thevagueimagesofanimaginedhenwithone’seyesclosed.Butherethe

mechanismcannotbesparseinput—itmustbesparseprocessingpower.The

261ThiswouldnotbethecaseifExecutiveAttentionalresourcesheavilyexceededwhatisrequired

formakingthespecklesphenomenal.Thisseemsunlikely,butIhavenoempiricalevidencetoback

thisup.

310

overflowproponent’sresponsetoFAFIistheonegiveninChapter7:theimmediacy

ofdirectfovealphenomenalFOCisapowerfuldatumthatdiscountstheclaimthat

thespecklesareatallinchoateforBen.

ThePAFIcaseismoreinteresting.IfitwerethecasethatwhenBenshiftshisspatial

ExecutiveAttentiontotheperiphery,thefoveatedspecklesbecomeinchoate,that

wouldapowerfulpieceofevidencefortheoverflow-scepticalcase.Itwouldshow

thatphenomenalcontentisindeedonlyasrichasExecutiveAttentionallows.When

thatExecutiveAttentioniswithdrawn(totheperipheryinthiscase)phenomenal

contentisproportionatelyimpoverished.Butifitwerefoundthatshiftingspatial

attentionhasnoeffectonthephenomenalrichnessofthespeckles,thatwouldbe

powerfulevidencefortheoverflow-proponent’saccount.Phenomenalrichnessdoes

notvarywithvariationsofExecutiveAttentionalresources.

Howmightwegoaboutdeterminingwhoseaccountisrighthere?Fovealchange

blindnessorinattentionalblindnessparadigmsinthePAFIconditionaren’tgoingto

help,becausetheymeasurereport(andthereforeExecutiveAttention)ratherthan

therichnessofphenomenalFOC.IfBenisaskedtofixatehisfovealfieldonthehen

whileshiftinghisspatialattentiontoastimulusintheretinalperiphery,andthehen

issubtlychangedwhilehedoesso,hisinabilitytorecognisethechangeisafailureof

comparison—whichrequiresExecutiveAttention—butnotnecessarilyanindication

ofphenomenalsparsity.262

Toprovideananswer,wearegoingtoneedsomekindofelaborateintrospective

reportparadigm(Ramsøy&Overgaard,2004).Thesimpledichotomicmeasuresof

Targetperceptiontypicallyemployedwillnotsuffice—detailedinformationabout

thephenomenaldistinctnessoftheTargetmustbeobtained(Haunetal.,2017,pp.

2–3).WewantBentofixatehisspatialattentiononasuitablydisplacedretinally-

peripheraldistractorbutatthesametimeintrospecthisfovealphenomenalcontent

262Watzl(2011a,p.151)discussessomeempiricalworkthatshowsthatthingslikeperceptual

contrastimprovewithattention,buttheseinvolvehigher-orderprocessingperformanceratherthan

thephenomenalFOCthatinterestsmehere.

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toproduceaSeeming-thatreportabouthowdistinct(andrich)itis.Thisisa

complexprocedure.Astronomersusuallyneedtotraintomastertheartof

peripheralinspectionoffaintfuzzies.Subjectsforthiskindofexperimenttoowould

needtobetrained.Thepossibilityofinflationorfillinginwouldneedtobe

controlledfor(Odegaardetal.,2018).

Ihavenotfoundanyempiricalstudiesofthiskind,263andtheepistemicwoesabove

(7.4)castsomedoubtoverwhethereventheproposaljustdescribedwouldtruly

settlethematter.Butonthebasisofmyargumentsfortheveridicalityofimmediacy

ofphenomenalFOC,itcertainlyseemsworthtrying.Myownpersonalexperiments

suggestthatnomatterhowstronglyIfocusmyspatialattentiontoaperipheral

Target,thedistinctnessofmyfoveatedTargetneverchanges.Thereisno

proportionaldiminutionindistinctnessasaspecklebecomeslessandlessattended.

WhenBenfocuseshisspatialattentionperipherally,heisnotcountingthespeckles,

ornotingtheirshape,orsubitisingafewofthem,orcomparingtwoofthemtoeach

other.Indeed,hismetacognitive“awareness”ofthemmayevenbeseverely

diminished.Butsolongashislenses’focallengthdoesn’tchange,heis

phenomenallyseeingthemclearly.

Ifthisconclusionisborneoutbyempiricalinvestigation,itwouldapowerfulreason

torejecttheinchoatenessaccountofBen’sexperience:thereareindeedTargetsthat

aredistinctlyphenomenallyexperiencedwithoutbeinginanywayExecutively

Attended.264Again,thisisaninferencetothebestexplanation.TheWHMaccount

explainsBen’scontinuedfovealclaritywhiletheinchoatenessaccountcannot.

263AlacunaconfirmedbyAninaRich(personalcommunication).Weldonetal.,(2016)demonstrates

theeffectsoffovealcontentonperipheraldiscriminationtasks,andEriksenandEriksen(1974)

flankertasksandLavie(2010)loadmanipulationsdemonstratetheeffectsofperipheraldistractors

onfovealtaskperformance,buttaskperformancemeasuresExecutiveAttention,notphenomenal

content.Whatweneedhereistoidentifytheeffectofperipheraldistractorsonthecharacterof

fovealphenomenalperception.264Seeming-thatexcepted,see8.6.2.2above.

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8.7 ChapterSummary

Inthischapter,IposedtheCapacityQuestioninrelationtoattention,consciousness,

andWM.Ifoundthattheydiffersignificantly,notonlyintheirquantitative

capacities,butalsointhenatureoftheirlimitations.WhereasbothWMand

ExecutiveAttentionexhibitatrade-offbetweenthenumberofitemsandthe

complexityofitems,phenomenalconsciousnessdoesnot.Whenthesethreecapacity

limitationsaretriangulated,wefindamodelofcognitionemergingonwhich

phenomenalcontentneednotemergesolelyfromtheimplementationofExecutive

AttentioninWM.ThisWitches’HatModel,whencomparedtocompetingoverflow-

scepticalaccounts(illusionofrichness,expandedattention,andinchoateness

accounts),betterexplainssomecrucialpiecesofevidence,especiallyBen’sSeeming-

thathephenomenallyexperienceseveryspeckleonthehenrichlyanddistinctly,

regardlessofwherehisattentionisfocused,anddespiteonlybeingabletohigher-

orderprocessandreportasmallsubsetofthatrichcontent.

IamnotherearguingthatbecausetheWHMiscorrect,consciousnessoverflows

attention.NoramIarguingthatreverse,thatbecausecaseslikeBen’shenshowthat

consciousnessoverflowsattention,thereforesomethingliketheWHMmustbe

correct.IamnotconvincedthatIhaveenoughevidencetomakeeitherofthose

cases.WhatIamconfidentinarguingisthatcaseslikeBen’shenarenotonly

plausiblyexplainedbyconsciousoverflowontheWHM,butthatmyexplanationhas

manyreasonstorecommenditovercompetingexplanations,atleastatthisstageof

ourknowledge.

Inthefinalchapter,Iconsiderhowtheresultsofthisquestfordissociatedattention

andconsciousnessinPartIIcanbesituatedwithinmySetTheoreticalFramework,

andtherefore,whattheymeanforQ.

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9 Answer(s)toQ

9.1 Conclusions,Implications,Applications.

Isattentionbothnecessaryandsufficientforconsciousness?Ihavearguedinthis

treatisethatthisquestion,Q,isnotonequestion,butmany.Itcanbeaddressed

analyticallyorempirically.Itdependsonwhatexactlyonemeansbyattentionand

consciousness.EachwayofposingQadmitsofitsownanswer,andrevealsdifferent

thingsabouttherelationshipbetweenthetwo.Thistreatisethereforefocusedona

questtoansweroneofthemostinterestingversionsofQ:isExecutiveAttentionboth

necessaryandsufficientforphenomenalconsciousness?

Inthisfinalchapter,Ibringtogethertheconclusionsoftheprecedingchapters,

considertheimplicationsforthediscoursesurroundingQ,andconcludeby

sketchingsomebroaderimplicationsandapplicationsofmywork.

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9.2 SeekingAnswers

Inthissection,IfirstsummarisethefoundationalbasisIdevelopedinPartI:

definitionsofattention,consciousness,andWM;analyticalandempirical

approachestoQ;theSetTheoreticFramework(STF)thatdescribesQ’sconceptual

space;thekindsofrelationshipthatmightunderliethepatternofco-occurrence;

andthespectrumofweaktostrongreadingstowhichananswertoQmaypertain.

Forthepurposesofcomparison,IthenposethreedifferentversionsofQand

discusstheminthelightoftheaforementionedfoundations,beforereturningto

drawdetailedconclusionsabouttheversionofQ(ExecutiveAttentionand

phenomenalconsciousness)thathasbeenthechieftopicofPartII.Iconcludethis

sectionwithsomeobservationsaboutthethirdconceptinthetriad—WM.

9.2.1 TheTerrain

WecanthinkofaddressingQasbeingsomethinglikeadjustingthedialsonapanel

andreadingofftheresultantoutputsonaseriesofdisplays.Eachdialrepresentsa

particularvariable—definitions,analyticalorempiricalapproach—andeachoutput

displaysrepresentsavalueforaparticularparameter—answertoQ,Scenario,kind

ofrelationship,andreadings.Theterrainthusmappedoutistrulyvast,andIbelieve

thatvirtuallyalltheanalyticorempiricalliteratureontherelationshipbetween

attentionandconsciousnesscanbelocatedsomewhereonit.Inthisrelativelybrief

treatise,Ihaveofcourseonlybeenabletoexploreatinyportionofit,andthere

remainsmuchbeyondthisportionthatiseitherlittleexploredornotatall.

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DefinitionalVariety

Onesetofdialsadjuststhedifferentwaysofdefiningattentionandconsciousness.In

Chapters2and3Iconsideredthemanydifferentwaysthetermsattentionand

consciousnesshavebeenusedintheliterature.Onewaytoarriveatdifferent

answerstoQistoemploydifferentdefinitionsofattentionandofconsciousnessand

todeterminetherelationshipbetweeneachpairing.

Ontheattention“dials,”onemayselectanyofthekindsofattention:internalversus

external;endogenousversusexogenous;voluntaryversusinvoluntary;Liberal

versusExecutive;etc.,andwithanyofthedefinitionsofattentionIcataloguedinmy

Taxonomy:Behaviourist;Phenomenal;orthemanykindsofMechanisticdefinitions.

Ontheconsciousness“dials,”onemayselectanyofthedifferentdefinitionsof

consciousnessdescribedin2.3:physiological;access;phenomenal;etc.Eachofthis

largearrayofsettingswillproduceitsownoutputs.Onourcurrentstateof

knowledge,somewillproducemoreconfidentoutputsthanothers.

AnalyticalandEmpirical

In1.4.1IdescribedanalyticalandempiricalversionsofQ.Thistreatiseleadsusto

theconclusionthatwhileonmostdefinitionsofattentionandconsciousness,the

twoconceptscancertainlycomeapartanalytically,ananswerderivedfromthe

empiricalevidenceislessclear.Iemployedbothanalyticalandempirical

approachesinthistreatise.

PatternsofCo-occurrence:STF

ThesimpleyesornoanswertoQmaybefurtherelaboratedbyidentifyingthe

patternofco-occurrenceaccordingtomySTF.In4.2.1Idescribedthefourpossible

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Combinationsofattentionandconsciousnessinanygivencognition:A&C;A~C;C~A;

and~A~C.TheseCombinationsallowforlocalanswerstoQ—whetherattentionis

necessaryandsufficientforconsciousnessinaparticularcognition.Ofchiefinterest,

however,hasbeentheanswertoQthatcharacterisesawholecognitiveeconomy.

Forthis,weneedScenarios.Tothatend,Idevelopedanexhaustiveframeworkfor

allthepossibleScenarios(sixteen)thatmightrelateattentiontoconsciousnessina

cognitiveeconomy.Ofthese,onlyfourwereplausibleorlikelytoobtain,although

theothertwelvearenotwithoutinterest.Myliteraturereviewinthesamechapter

revealedthateachofthefourhasitsproponents.

KindsofRelationship

TheyesornoanswertoQandtheCombinationorScenariomaybefurther

elaboratedbyelucidatingthekindofrelationshipthatunderliesthepatternofco-

occurrenceofattentionandconsciousness,asIsketchedoutin4.4.Thepossible

outputsherearetheIdentityHypothesis(IH),PartialConstitution(PC),Causation

(CA),andMereCorrelation(MC),refinedbytheirmanysub-varieties.Thisquestion

opensthedoorintomorefar-reachingquestionsabouttheverynaturesofattention

andconsciousness.

WeakandStrongReadings

Finally,thesignificanceoftheoutput—orperhapsthedomainoverwhichit

obtains—canbedescribedbywhichoffourReadingsappliestoit(4.2.3.2):Very

Weak;Weak;Strong;orVeryStrong.Thepreponderanceofmaterialcoveredinthis

treatiserelatestohumancognition,oftennormal,butsometimespathological.My

answerstoQandpreferredScenariosbelowshouldthereforebetakenasaWeak

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Reading—applyingtohumancognitiongenerally,thoughwithsomepossible

unusualexceptions.

9.2.2 DifferentQuestions,DifferentAnswers

HavingmappedouttheterrainofpossibleinputsandoutputsinaddressingQ,Iturn

nowtosomeofthemoreinterestingpossibleanswersthatmightbederivedby

twiddlingthedials.

PhenomenalAttentionandPhenomenalConsciousness

In3.3.3,IcoinedaclassofdefinitionsofattentionthatIcalledPhenomenal

DefinitionsofAttention.Theseweredefinitionsthatincludedphenomenal

consciousnessasanintrinsicfeatureofattention.Clearly,onPhenomenalAttention,

therecanbenoA~C,sinceanycognitionthatlacksphenomenalitywouldthereby

lackanintegralconstituentofattention,andcannotbeattention.AsIhaveoften

remarked,thistrivialisesQbybeggingthequestion,bydefiningconsciousnessinto

attentionapriori.

PhenomenalAttentioneliminatesthepossibilityofA~C,butitleavesopenthe

possibilityofC~A.Forexample,ifattentionisconsideredtobethe“chieftenancyof

consciousness”(asperBradley,3.3.3.1)onemaystillaskwhethertherearelesser

tenants.Itmaybethatthereisconsciouscontentaltogetherperipheraltothefocus

ofattentionandthereforealtogetherunattended,whichislocalC~A.Oritmaybe

thatattentiongraduallyfadesinmagnitudeasonemovesoutward(notnecessarily

spatially)fromthefocusofattention,sothatallconsciouscontentisattended,but

peripheralcontentisonlyminutelyattended,KT’s“near-absenceofattention”

318

(4.2.4.2).Onthisview,thereisnotrueC~A.TherelationshipbetweenPhenomenal

AttentionandphenomenalconsciousnessadmitstwopossibleScenarios,then,

dependingonwhichofthetwoforegoingviewsoneprefers:CÉA(notoQ—

attentionissufficientbutnotnecessaryforconsciousness)orA=C(yestoQ),

respectively.

LiberalAttentionandPhenomenalConsciousness

Ialsocoinedanotherwayofdefiningattention,LiberalAttention,onwhichany

implementationofanyattentivestrategy(ascataloguedintheOperations

Definitionsofattention)isenoughtoconstituteattention.WhereasPhenomenal

Attentionbegsthequestionbymakingconsciousnessintrinsictoattention,Liberal

Attentionbegsthequestionbymakingattentionubiquitous,suchthatvirtuallyany

cognitiveprocessatall(andmanynon-cognitiveprocessesaswell)involves

attention.ForLiberalAttentionandphenomenalconsciousness,therecantherefore

neverbeC~A.265ButtherewillalmostcertainlybeA~C,sinceitiswidelyaccepted

thatmuchofthebrain’sworkgoesonunconsciously.AdoptingaLiberalDefinition

ofattentioncommitsonetotheScenarioAÉC(notoQ—attentionisnecessarybut

notsufficient).

ExecutiveAttentionandAccessConsciousness

BothPhenomenalandLiberalAttentionarenotasinterestingasthevarietiesofQ

addressedbymostoftheliterature—thoseinvolvingwhatIhavecalledExecutive

Attention.Butthevarietyofconsciousnessinvolvedisnotalwayssoeasyto

determine.Block’svaluable(thoughsomewhatcontroversial)categoriesofaccess

265Unlessoneacceptsthepossibilityofconsciousnessindependentofcognitiveprocesses.

319

andphenomenalconsciousnesscovermanyofthediscussionsintheliterature.But

thesetwokindsofconsciousnessproducedifferentanswerstoQ.

Iarguedin7.2.2thataccessconsciousnessisroughlyequivalenttoExecutive

Attention.DefiningconsciousnessinQasaccessconsciousnessthereforebegsthe

questioninawaynotunlikePhenomenalAttention:ratherthandefiningattention

asakindofconsciousness,itdefinesconsciousnessasakindofattention,atleaston

Block’sdefinitionofaccessconsciousnessandmydefinitionofExecutiveAttention.

OnthisversionofQ,then,therecanbenoA~CorC~AsinceExecutiveAttention

roughlyjustisaccessconsciousness,andtheonlyviableScenariowillbeA=C(yes

toQ).IfoneconsiderstheconceptsofaccessconsciousnessandExecutiveAttention

nottobeequivalent,thentherewillbethepossibilityofA~Cand/orC~Adepending

onhowtheydiverge,thusopeningthedoortootherScenarios.

ExecutiveAttentionandPhenomenalConsciousness

Tomymind,thereallyinterestingversionofQ—andtheonewithmostpromiseto

illuminatethefascinatingquestionsaboutthenatureofcognitiongenerallyand

attentionandconsciousnessspecifically—istherelationshipbetweenExecutive

Attentionandphenomenalconsciousness.ItistothisversionofQthatPartIIhas

beendevoted.InthissectionIsummarisetheargumentspresentedthereanddraw

somefinalconclusionsfromthem.

InChapter6.2IexploredtheevidenceforA~C,andfounditquitecompelling,a

minorityofdissentersnotwithstanding.Tothesampleofexistingempirical

evidence,IaddedsomeotherplausiblecandidatesforA~CthatIhavenotfoundso

fardiscussedinrelationtoQintheexistingliterature.Further,thosedissenting

voicespresentambiguousargumentsagainstA~C,suchasPrinz(6.2.2),whose

acceptanceof“unconsciousperception”basicallyamountstoanacceptanceofA~C.

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ThisaffirmationofA~Cprovidesabruteanswerof“no”toQ.ButtherightScenario

hasnotyetbeenestablished.GivenwhatIhavetakentobetheuncontroversial

affirmationofA&Cand~A~C,thechoiceofScenariorestsuponwhetherornotC~Ais

instantiatedinahumancognitiveeconomy.ThetworemainingviableScenariosare

AÉC(ifC~Aisnotinstantiated)orAÈC(ifC~Aisinstantiated).266Keepinmind

thatweneedonlyoneundeniablecaseofC~AtoconfirmaScenario.Thatbeingthe

case,Iembarkeduponathoroughandmethodicalexplorationofboththeanalytical

congruenceandtheempiricalevidenceforC~A.Analytically,thefoundational

conceptsdescribedinPartIplayedanimportantrole,especiallymydefinitionsof

phenomenalconsciousnessasawhat-it-is-like,situated,temporal,first-person

perspectiveandofExecutiveAttentionasasuiteofstrategiesforstructuring

cognitionimplementedbythecognitiveexecutiveandsharingthecharacteristicof

structuringcontentforfurtherprocessing.ThisversionofQ,thencomesdown

roughlytothis:cantherebecognitivecontentthatisphenomenalyetnotstructured

byExecutiveAttentionalstrategiesandfurtherprocessed?

InChapter6,IthenproceededtocritiquefivedifferentpossibleclassesofC~Athat

havebeendiscussedintheliterature—PureConsciousness,GlobalUnprocessed

Content,Simplicity,Chaos,andTiming—andfoundthatwhilemanyofthemare

suggestive,noneofthemprovidesconclusiveevidenceforC~A.

InChapter7IturnedtowhatIconsidertobethemostpromisingputativecaseof

C~A,aparticularkindoflocalUnprocessedphenomenalContent:phenomenal

overflow.HereIdrewthedistinctionbetweenthreekindsofcontent:FirstOrder

Content(FOC);Experience-of;andSeeming-that.InotedthatFOCdoesnotbegthe

questionbybeingdefinedasphenomenalcontentunstructuredbyExecutive

Attention,sinceitsconceptualpossibilityinnowayguaranteesitsempirically

confirmedexistence.Bywayofanalogy,toposittheideaofmultidimensionalstrings

isinnowaytobegthequestionofwhetherStringTheoryistrue.

266ThesetwoScenariosanswer“no”toQindifferentways:AÉCmeansthatattentionisnecessary

butnotsufficientforconsciousnessandAÈCmeansthatattentionisneithernecessarynorsufficient

forconsciousness.

321

Thechiefcompetitortotheoverflowinterpretationoftheapparentrichnessof

experienceistheillusionofrichnessaccount,onwhichthebrainmerelyfillsinakind

ofaveragedplace-markerintheperipheryofattention,underwrittenbyensemble

statistics.Florencethinkssheseeseverytreeandleafintheforestrichly,butinfact,

sheseesonlythecontentofaverynarrowfocusofattentionrichly,withtherestof

herforestexperiencebeingaSeeming-thatitisrich,withoutactualFOCor

Experience-ofrichdetailperipheraltothefocusofattention.Iarguedthatthis

explanationfindssupportintheneurophysiologyofthehumanvisualsystem,from

theretinathroughtothehighervisualcentres.However,Ben’sspeckledhen

experiencecannotbethusexplainedaway,sinceitisthephenomenalcontentthat

lieswithinhisfovealvisualfieldandspatialfocusofattentionthatisfartoorichto

allbeprocessedbytheexecutive.

Thereremainsanintransigentepistemicobstacletoconfirmingthisassertion.Our

chiefsourceofinformationastowhethercontentisphenomenalornotisreportby

thesubjectoftheexperience.YetreportnecessarilyrequiresExecutiveAttentional

processing.Ifthereisphenomenalcontentthatisnotreported(andunattended)

thenwecanonlyknowthisthroughsomemethodofidentifyingitwithoutreport.

No-reportparadigmshavenotyetbeenabletodeliverthis,andinfact,maywell

neverbeabletodoso,sinceanyno-reportparadigmmustinitiallybecalibrated

usingsubjectivereport(7.4.3.3).

Nonetheless,Imountedanabductiveargumentforoverflowasthebestexplanation

ofthedataavailableintwoways.First,thereistheimmediacyofphenomenalFOC

(7.4.2).Ben’sSeeming-thatheseeseveryspeckleonthehenisclear,confident,and

onlystrengthenedbyfurtherintrospectioninawaythatFlorence’sSeeming-that

sheexperienceseverytreeandleafisnot,andconstitutespowerfulevidencethathe

doesindeedhaveaphenomenalFOCexperienceofeveryspeckle,richly.Further,

Ben’sinabilitytoaccuratelyperformExecutiveAttentionalprocesssuchascountor

evensubitisethedozensofspecklesisnotevidencethathedoesnotexperience

everyspeckle.TheillusionofrichnessaccountmayexplainFlorence’sforest

(although,see9.3.1.2),butcannotexplainBen’shen.

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Second,inChapter8,Idevelopedanargumentfromthecapacitylimitationsof

attention,consciousnessandWM.WMcapacityislimitedbythecognitive

executive’slimitedcapacitytoprocesscontentatanygiventime,thedimensionsof

whicharereasonablywelldescribed(thoughnotconclusively)intheempirical

literature.ExecutiveAttentionalstrategiesimplementedbythecognitiveexecutive

arethereforedefinedbythislimitedcapacityoftheexecutive,evenifattentional

strategiespersearenotsolimited.Thereisnowaytoenlargethecapacityof

ExecutiveAttentionalprocesses,therefore,withoutenlargingthecapacityoftheWM

executive,atleastonmydefinitionsoftheseconcepts.Ontheotherhand,

phenomenalconsciousnesshas,intheory,andlikeattentionalstrategiesperse,no

capacitylimitations.Asubjectcanintheorysynchronicallyexperienceanyamount

ofconsciouscontentthatareproducedintherightway.Whatismore,both

attentionandWMexhibitatrade-offbetweenthenumberofitemsandthe

complexityofthoseitems,whileconsciousnessdoesnot.Evenifonerejectsmy

characterisationofExecutiveAttentionastheattentionalstrategiesimplementedby

theexecutiveofWMandallowsExecutiveAttentiontooperateoutsideofWM(ina

Baarsglobalworkspace,forexample),thisdifferenceintrade-offpatternsremains.

ItwouldthusberemarkableindeedifthecontentofExecutiveAttentionand

phenomenalconsciousnesswerealwaysidentical.

Thequestionthenbecomeswhetherwethinkconsciouscontentcanbegenerated

outsidetheexecutiveofWM.Ifurtherarguedthatwhenweconsiderthestructureof

memorystorageandmanipulationinhumanWM,thepicturethatemergesisnotof

anydiscretemoduleofWM,butofanorganic,gradedinterplayofstoreswhere

durationofstoragevariesinverselywithstoragecapacity—myWitches’HatModel

(WHM,8.5).Ifthisisindeedthestructureofourstorageandmanipulationsystems,

thereisnoprincipledreasontothinkthatphenomenalityissharplyrestrictedto

contentintheexecutiveofWM,unlesswethinkthatitistheexecutiveofWMitself

thatissolelyresponsibleformakingcontentphenomenal.Butthatwouldbebegging

thequestion.Afinalanswertothequestionofwhethercontentinarichshort-term

storecanbedefinitivelyshowntobephenomenalawaitsaconvincingwayfor

identifyingspecificconsciouscontentinthebrain.ButIventuretosuggestthatmy

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accountofphenomenaloverflowwithinaWHMparadigmprovidesamoreplausible

accountthanthealternatives(illusionofrichness,expandedattention,

inchoateness)forBen’sSeeming-thatheseeseveryspeckleintheabsenceofan

Experience-ofeveryspeckle.

SummaryofConclusionsforExecutiveAttentionandPhenomenalConsciousness

In9.2.1Iidentifiedanumberofoutputparametersordimensionsonwhichwecan

answerQ.HereIsummarisetheanswersthatfalloutofmyanalysisinthecaseof

ExecutiveAttentionandphenomenalconsciousnessin9.2.2.4.

9.2.2.5.1 STF

IfphenomenaloverflowdoesindeedconstituteabonafidecaseofC~A,thenallfour

Combinationsareinstantiatedinahumancognitiveeconomy.TheScenariothatbest

describesthiscognitiveeconomyisthusAÈC(notoQ—attentionisneither

necessarynorsufficientforconsciousness).

9.2.2.5.2 KindsofRelationship

Myanalysisdoesnotpointtoasingleanswertothequestionofthekindof

relationshipthatobtainsbetweenExecutiveAttentionandphenomenal

consciousness,butitcanrulesomeoftheoptionsout.Mostobviously,theScenario

AÈCrulesouttheIdentityHypothesis.Ifattentionandconsciousnesscanbe

instantiatedeachwithouttheother,thenitisnotpossibleforthemtobeidentical.

Onemightproposethattheyarethesameentitythatiscalleddifferentthingsin

differentcircumstances,butmycarefulanddistinctdefinitionsofbothentitiesdo

notleavethatdooropen.WecanalsoruleoutvarietiesofPartialConstitutionon

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whichjustoneofthetwopartiallyconstitutestheother,sinceboththe

CombinationsA~CandC~Aobtain.Wecannot,however,ruleoutthevarietyof

PartialConstitutionwhereattentionandconsciousnesseachpartiallyconstitutethe

other.MereCorrelationisunlikelytobetheanswer,becauseoftheintimatepattern

ofco-occurrence,whichwouldbemostoddiftherewerenoconstitutiveorcausal

relationshipofanykindtyingthetwotogether.

ThisleavesthepossibilityofsomekindofCausationasbeingthemostplausible.

ThereseemslittledoubtthatthesameFOCcanbeExecutivelyAttendedorcan

becomephenomenal.Thereseemslittledoubtthatitisoften(butnotalways)the

casethatattendingtoatargetbringsitintoconsciousness,orbeingconsciousofa

targetfacilitatesattentiontoit.Therearelikelytobecloseconnectionsbetweenthe

neuralcorrelatesofattentionandofconsciousness.Averyplausiblecasecanbe

madeforacomplexcausalchain,avarietyofCA(8.4.1).Butultimately,myapproach

herewasnotdesignedtoprovideaclearanswertothequestionofthenatureofthe

relationship,butonlytoQ.Icannot,onthematerialcoveredinthistreatise,draw

confidentconclusionsaboutthekindofrelationship,anymorethantosketchthe

constraintsabove.

9.2.2.5.3 Readings

Theevidencediscussedinthistreatiserelatedalmostexclusivelytohuman

cognition,whether“normal”267orpathological.TheScenarioofAÈCought

thereforetobetakenasobtainingonaWeakReading—itistheScenariothat

obtainsinallhumancasesexceptsomerareandextremeconditions.ItisnotaVery

WeakReading,sinceitseemstoreflectthebasiccharacterofhumancognition,and

doesnotvaryfromindividualtoindividual,exceptforrare,extremecases.Itisnota

StrongReading,sincethereareextremeexceptionssuchasvegetativepatientsin

267Whetherthereissuchathingas“normal”cognition,andhowexactlywemightgoabout

delineatingitsboundaries,areinterestingquestions(Holmes&Patrick,2018).

325

whomtheremaybeanabsenceofeitherExecutiveAttentionorphenomenal

consciousnessaltogether.Andofcourse,itisnotaVeryStrongReadingsince

differentScenariosmightobtaininthephysiologiesofdifferentspecies,orin

hypotheticalalienspecies,oreveninadvancedartificialintelligencecomputers.

9.3 WorkingMemory

WhatrolehasWMplayedinmyanalysis?TheliteratureonQoftenemploys

empiricalworkonWM,suggestingthatthisbodyofresearchwouldbearichveinto

mine,ashasprovedtobethecase.ByaddingWMasathirdconcept,triangulated

withattentionandconsciousness,Iwasabletodefinethemostinterestingformof

attentioninrelationtoQ—ExecutiveAttention—anddistinguishitfromLiberal

Attentioninaprincipledwaythatreflectsboththenatureofhumancognitionand

muchoftheliteratureonQ,evenifmuchofthatliteraturedoesnotitselfaccurately

definewhatismeantby“attention.”WManditsrelationtootherkindsofmemory,

e.g.,iconicmemory,alsoprovidedabasisformyWHMofcognitionwhichinturn

providedtheframeworkformycomparisonofcapacitylimitationsofattention,

consciousness,andWM.WMmodelsalsounderwritemydistinctionbetweenFOC,

Experience-of,andSeeming-that.ThelattertwoaretheproductofExecutive

AttentioninWM,whiletheformerisnot(oratleast,isnotnecessarily).Myanalysis

ofphenomenaloverflowinChapter7dependedheavilyonthisdistinction.

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9.3.1 ModelsofWorkingMemory

MyanalysisalsohasimportantimplicationsformodelsofWM,suchasBHand

Cowan’s.onbothoftheseinfluentialmodels,contentisassumedtobecome

phenomenalonlywhenitisattendedbythecentralexecutiveorthefocusof

attentionrespectively.IfphenomenaloverflowisindeedpossibleasIhaveargued,

andifsomethinglikemyWHMbettercaptureswhatishappening,thenthese

modelsofWMwouldneedtoberevised,atleastinrespectoftherelationship

betweenattentionandconsciousness.

ForPrinz,attentionisthegatewaytoWM.Bythis,heisthinkingofattentionas

somethingbroaderthanBH’scentralexecutive,whichinteractswiththeslave

components(visuo-spatialsketchpad,phonologicalloop,episodicbuffer).Butfor

Prinz,itisattentionthatisresponsibleforbringingcontentintotheslave

componentsofWMinthefirstplace.ThisisasignificantdifferencebetweenPrinz’s

viewofhowattentionworksinWMandthatofBH.Butitisalsoincompatiblewith

myview,inthatitlimitsconsciouscontenttoonlythatwhichisattended(recall

from4.3.1thatIclassifiedPrinzassubscribingtotheA=CScenario).Thepossibility

ofphenomenalFOCinsomethinglikeiconicmemoryisincompatiblewithPrinz’s

viewthatonlythefurtherprocessingofattentioncanmakecontentconscious.

9.3.2 OtherPertinentQuestions

InChapter5IarticulatedanumberofpertinentquestionsinrelationtoWMandits

interactionwiththerestofcognition,allofwhichItouchedupon,butonlyoneof

whichIwasabletoexploreinsignificantdetail—theCapacityQuestioninChapter8.

Theotherquestionsallholdgreatpromiseforfurtherinvestigationandfuture

research.Forexample,theDuplicationQuestionisafascinatingonethatholdsmuch

promiseforprogressonQ.Whilewehavesomeideaastohowamemoryis

encoded,maintained,andretrieved,westillknowagonisinglylittleabouttheneural

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substrateofWM.TheunresolvedconflictbetweenBH’scomponentsandCowan’s

activatedlong-termmemorymodelsreflectsthisignorance.Forexample,shouldit

beshownthatcontentonlybecomesphenomenalwhenaduplicatetraceofthat

contentisencodedintosomeWMneuralbuffer,thatwouldbeasignificantblowto

myaccount,makingthepossibilityofphenomenalFOCiniconicmemoryless

appealing.Ifontheotherhanditweretobeshownthatsomethinglikeneural

reverberationoperatingattheneurallocusoficonicmemorystoresisthe

explanationforhowsuchcontentbecomesphenomenal,thatwouldstrongly

supportmyaccount.Below,IreflectbrieflyontheMetaphysicalQuestion(9.5.1)and

theFunctionQuestion(9.5.2.2).

9.4 ImplicationsfortheCurrentDiscourseonAttentionandConsciousness

InthissectionIhighlightsomefurtherways—beyondtheactualconclusionsIdrew

above—inwhichmyanalysismightimpactonthediscourseovertherelationship

betweenattentionandconsciousness.Iconsidersomefurtherwaysthatthe

foundationsIdevelopedinthistreatisemightbeofuse;Iexploresomefurtherways

thatthesearchforC~Amightbeexecuted;andIdrawasomewhatstartling

consequencefrommyaccount—thenatureofourphenomenalinnerlivesmaybe

quitedifferenttohowwecommonlyconceiveofthem.

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9.4.1 Foundations

InChapter4,Idevelopedanumberofconceptualtoolstofacilitatemyinvestigation

ofQ.TheseincludedmySetTheoreticalFramework(STF)withitsexhaustive

possibilitiesforCombinationsandScenarios,thecatalogueoffourpossiblekindsof

relationship,andthedifferentReadingsofananswertoQ.Further,in1.4.6I

proposedfoursalientquestions—Target,Timing,Variety,andConsequences—to

assistinassessingwhetheranygivenempiricalparadigmanditsexperimental

resultsactuallyaddressesQornot.Thesearegeneraltools—whetherintheir

currentform,orinimprovedforms—thatmaybeofassistanceinbringingclarityto

thediscoursesurroundingQ,andperhapsevenstimulatenewapproachestothe

question.TheymayalsobeusefulforquestionsotherthanQ.268

Iobservedearlierthatdefinitionalambiguityhasbeenamajorbaneonthis

discourse.Tothatend,Iventuretohopethatmyapproachtodefiningphenomenal

consciousnessintermsofitscorecharacteristics,andespeciallymydefinitional

taxonomyofattention,wouldbeofsomeuseincircumventingthatambiguity.Both

oftheseare,ofcourse,alsosubjecttoimprovements.Ihavenotinsistedonanyone

wayofdefiningattention(althoughIhaveadoptedone—ExecutiveAttention

definedoperationally—forthediscussioninPartII),buthaveratherprovidedan

integratedrangeofoptions.Bybeingcleareronwhatexactlyanygivenaccount

meansbythetermsattentionandconsciousness,andbysituatingitagainstmySTF,

kindsofrelationship,andReadings,itistobehopedthatmorefruitfulcomparison,

engagement,andinteractionmaybefacilitatedbetweendifferentaccounts.

268Forexample,theSTFapproachcanalsobeextendedtomorethantwoconcepts.Appliedtothree

concepts(e.g.,attention,consciousnessandworkingmemory),thereareeightpossibleCombinations

and256possibleScenarios.Moregenerally,thenumberofCombinationspossiblewithxconceptsis

2x,andthenumberofScenariospossiblewithnCombinationsis2n.Suchextensionsquicklybecome

unwieldy,butmaystillbeusefulinsomeways.

329

9.4.2 ConsciousnessWithoutAttention

In6.2.2IonlybrieflysurveyedcandidatesforA~Candsuggestedsomenewones.

ButthesurveyofpossiblecandidatesforC~Athatfollowedis,Ibelieve,themost

comprehensivetodate,althoughthebroadnessofitsscopemeantacertainlackof

depthinthetreatmentofindividualcandidates.Nodoubtmyconclusionsonsome

ofthecandidatesareopentochallenge,butIhopethatsobroadasurveybringing

togethersomanycandidatesinoneplacemaybeofusetootherresearchersasa

reference,andmyclassesofcandidatesforC~Amayperhapsalsobeaninspiration

fornewplacestolookforcandidateswithinthoseclasses,orevenfornewclasses

altogether.Ialsoidentifiedsomecandidates(e.g.,focalepilepticseizures,6.3.4.2)

wherealittleempiricalinvestigationoftherighttypemayyieldsignificantprogress.

TheonecandidateIdidexploreindepth—phenomenaloverflow—hasbeenahot

topicinrecentyears.MyWHMisnotsignificantlyoriginalinitsconcept,butisanew

wayofexpressingtheideathatcontentcanbecomephenomenaloutsideof

ExecutiveAttention.TheexampleofBen’sfovealhenhighlightsacasethathas

hithertoreceivedverylittleattentionintheliterature(especiallyempirical),despite

itbeing,Ibelieve,astrongercandidateforoverflowthanthemorecommon

Florence’sforestcase.MoreempiricalworkonoverflowinBencaseswouldbe

especiallyinteresting,althoughthemanymethodologicalobstaclesinherentin

investigatingitmeansthatnewandcreativeapproachesareneededtoprobeit.

Mytriangulationofcapacitylimitationsofattention,consciousness,andWM

(Chapter8)providedthebasisforanaccountofphenomenaloverflowthatwas

moreplausible(Ihold)thanitsscepticalrivals.Considerationofcapacitylimitations

canprofitablybeappliedtomanyothercandidatesforC~A,anotheravenuefor

futureresearch.Whatismore,thetriangulationapproachitselfcanbeprofitably

implementedtoaddressQusingothercognitiveconstructsinrelationtoattention

andconsciousness.Howdoeslong-termmemoryrelatetoQ?Whatofcognitive

control,ormotorcommand?

330

ThekindofthoroughanalysisIemployedinChapters7and8mightalsobeapplied

tothecandidatesforC~AinChapter6.SomeoftheconclusionsIreachedinthat

chaptermighttherebyberevised.Phenomenaloverflowisalocalversionofthe

classof“unprocessedcontent”(6.3.4),butsomeoftheargumentsappliedmightbe

adaptedtobothlocalandglobalmembersofthisclass.

ThroughoutPartIIIhavecontrastedFlorenceandBencasestostrengthenthecase

foroverflowinthelatter.However,amorethoroughanalysisofFlorencecases

mightalsoleadtoarevisionoftheconclusionsIreachedaboutthem.Idoubtthatan

illusionofrichnessaccountforFlorencecasescouldbeoverturnedcompletely,but

theremaystillberoomforfindingsomeformordegreeofoverflowthere.For

example,thefovealfieldisquitesmallinrelationtothewholevisualfield(Appendix

7),certainlysmallerthanthesubjectivefieldoffocusitSeems-thatweexperience.

Thatis,ourSeeming-thatwehavenotonlyarichfovealexperience,butanequally

richclose-parafovealexperienceisnearlyasconfidentasBen’sconfidenceinhis

fovealrichness.Certainly,saccadesandotherfactorsmaybecontributingtothat

richness,butthereisscopehereforsomethingliketheimmediacyoffovealrichness,

albeitattenuatedaswemovefurtherawayfromthefovea.Thereareinteresting

parallelsbetweenBen’srichexperienceofspecklesandFlorencedrinkinginthe

broadvistaofadarknightskyawashwithstars.Excitingdevelopmentsin

experimentalparadigmsmaysoonleadtomoreconfidentanswersinthesecases

(e.g.,Kentridge,2011,pp.233–235;F.F.Li,Vanrullen,Koch,&Perona,2002;

Vandenbrouckeetal.,2014),soanyadvanceontheanalyticalfrontwouldbe

advantageous.

9.4.3 ForgottenConsciousContent

Finally,myaccountofphenomenaloverflow,ifcorrect,wouldsupportwhatis

currentlyaminorityinterpretationofsomeprominentempiricalparadigms.Onmy

account,itisquiteplausiblethatsubjectswhoexperienceinattentionalblindness,

331

changeblindness,orflashsuppressiondoindeedhaveaphenomenalFOC

experienceofthecontentthatismasked,buttheysimplycannotreport(inthe

broadsenseabove)thatcontent(Wolfe,1999a).269

CanwesaythatBen’shenexperiencediffersfromhishen-minus-one-speckle

experience(changeblindness)?Yesandno.Yes,becausehisphenomenalFOC

experiencesweredifferent.No,becauseExecutiveAttentionwasnotableto

compareandtellthedifference(Lamme,2010,pp.219–220;Pintoetal.,2017,pp.

223–224)sothatthetwoExperiences-ofandSeemings-thatwereidentical.Likethe

lessinterestingpassagesinthenovel,thefleetingexperienceiniconicmemoryis

soonforgottenandlostforever.Thismaybeanalogousto“whitedreams”where,

uponbeingawokenfromadream,asleeperreportsaconfidentSeeming-thatshe

haddreamtrichlybutisunabletorecallanycontentofthedream(FOC/Experience-

of)whatsoever(Siclarietal.,2013;Windtetal.,2016,p.879).270Incasesofsevere

memorypathology—suchasthememorylossofAlzheimer’sdisease(Förstl&Kurz,

1999),ortheclassicextremecaseofHMwhowasunabletolaydownnewmemories

(Corkin,2002)—notevenaSeeming-thatpersiststomarkthelostphenomenal

content.Yetinallthesecaseswehavenoreasontodoubtthattheinitial

phenomenalcontentwasinfactexperiencedbythesubject.

269AnideaforeshadowedbyCondillac:“Thoseperceptionsthatweattendtocanseemtodrownout

theothersandproducetheillusionthattheyaloneexist,whereasthoseperceptionsthatweareless

consciousofcanbesofaintthatitisimpossibletorecallthatwehavehadthemtheinstantafterthe

stimulusthatproducedthemfades”(Falkenstein&Grandi,2017,sec.5).Formodernevidenceof

rapidoverwritingofphenomenalcontent,seeLandmanetal.,(2003,p.150).Forrecentevidenceand

argumentsagainstthisview,seeWard(2018),Pittsetal.,(2018,pp.2–3),andMatthewsetal.,

(2018).RamsøyandOvergaard(2004,p.20Note1)observethatwhileinthecognitivescience

literature,subliminalperceptionisheldtobecompletelywithoutphenomenality,inthe

phenomenologicalliterature,somekindofminimalphenomenalityisassociatedwithsubliminal

perception.Spacepreventsmefromengaginginadetailedanalysishere.270Foranalternative“illusionofrichness”typeinterpretationofwhitedreams,seeFazekasetal.,

(2019).

332

Ihavenotmountedacasethatthismustbewhathappensinmaskingconditions,

onlythatitisaquiteplausiblepossibility.Ultimately,myargumentsarearguments

forepistemichumility,foradmittingwecannotyetbesureofanswers,andshould

keepanopenmind.Ifthiskindoffleetingconsciousnessiswhathappens,however,

thereareseriousimplicationsforourunderstandingofconsciousexperience.The

ideathatmyconsciousexperiencemightincludesomuchcontentthatissofleeting

astobeimmediatelyforgottenasthoughitneverhappenedthreatensoursenseof

thenatureofourselves.Torealisethatyoucannottrustthecontentofyourown

senses—asillusionofrichnessaccountswouldhaveit—isdisturbingenough.Butto

realisethatyoudonotknowwhatyouareinternallyexperiencingisutterly

disconcerting.ItsoundslikeaparadoxfromPlato.HowcanInotknowwhatIknow?

Thereismuchfertilegroundforphilosophicalexplorationhere.

9.5 BroaderImplicationsandApplications

TheimplicationsofmyaccountextendbeyondQ.TheissuesItacklebeloware

treatedonlyverybriefly,andonlyinsofarastheytouchuponmyanalysisofQ,

althoughtheyare,ofcourse,farbroaderanddeeperthanIcanevenhinthere.Inthis

sectionIconsiderfourbroadareasofimplicationandapplication:theontologyof

attentionandconsciousness;theoriesofconsciousness;othercognitivefunctions;

andsomeethicalapplications.

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9.5.1 Ontology

Thequestionofwhatkindofmetaphysicalentitiesattentionandconsciousnessare

hasreceivedmanyanswersovertime.HereIconsidersomepossiblelightthatmy

accountmightshedonit,anduponhowattentionandconsciousnessfitintotherest

ofreality.

Attention

MyquesttodistiltheessenceofattentioninChapter3ledmetoclassifyattentionas

astrategy,whichwouldfallunderthemetaphysicalcategoryofanabstract

particular(Lowe,2002,p.16).Butitisaparticularlyinterestingparticular.Onmy

definition,thereisnoreasontothinkthatattentionislimitedtohumancognition,or

tocognitiongenerally,oreventobiology.Aplantslowlyturningitsleavestofacethe

sunlightfullyimplementstheattentionalstrategiesoforienting,tracking,selection-

for-action,andcontrol.Sodoesasecuritycamerafittedwithservomotorsthatallow

ittopansoastomaintainamovingobjectinthecentreofitsopticalfield.Liberal

Attentionisnotonlyvirtuallyubiquitousinhumancognition,itseems,butextends

far,farbeyondit.

Whatdoesthispromiscuityofattentionmean?Wecouldtakethisasablurringof

themetaphysicallinesbetweencognitionandnon-cognition—betweenmindand

non-mind.Manyassumeasharplinebetweenthetwo,butperhapstheymeltinto

oneanother?Wemayevenbegintowonderifthedistinctionisavalidoneatall.

Thisshouldnotdisturbus.Itisoftenforgottenthatbrainsareorganic,andthatthey

operate“mushily”(8.5).Theydonothavediscretepartsperformingdiscrete

clockworkoperationssomuchasvastlyinterconnectedpartsoperatinginchaotic,

probabilisticways.Theoperationofabrainisinmanywaysfarmoreakintothe

operationofaliverthanitistothatofasiliconchip.Thepromiscuityofattentionis

plausiblyareflectionofthisorganicbasisofcognition,andweoughtnotbe

334

surprisedthatotherorganicentities—e.g.,liversandsun-followingplants—also

implementLiberalAttention.

Whatofnon-organicattention?Canwetakeattention’spromiscuityasevidencefor

reductionismaboutcognition?Andifattentioninatrackingsecuritycameracanbe

completelyreducedtoitsparts,operations,andorganisation(Bechtel,2008),why

nothumanattention,includingExecutiveAttention?Ithinkthatagoodcasecanbe

madeforthiskindofreductioninthecaseofattention,andevenExecutive

Attention,andthecasefallsoutnaturallyfromtheMechanisticdefinitionsof

attentioninmyTaxonomy.Muchmoreproblematic,Ithink,wouldbetoinferthe

reducibilityofphenomenalconsciousnessfromthereducibilityofattention.IfAÈC

isthecorrectScenarioinhumans,andC~Aobtains,then,asIarguebelow(9.5.2.3),

attentioncannotsimplybesubstitutedforconsciousnesstodrawconclusionsabout

consciousness.

Consciousness

Attentionandconsciousness,whilecapableofbeingdefinedasdistinctentities,

certainlyseemtobeintimatelyconnected.Yet,thereisanasymmetryevident

throughoutPartII.ItwasnotdifficulttoestablishA~C,evenwhentheattentionwas

ExecutiveAttention.ButwhywasitsodifficulttoestablishC~A?Ihighlightedsome

prominentepistemicormethodologicalchallengesin7.4,butmighttherebe

somethingmoretothematterthanmeremethodology?Mighttheconnectionbea

causalone(CA)?Whatmightthisdiscussiontellusabouttheverynatureof

phenomenalconsciousness?InthissectionIspeculateratherfreelyonsome

possibledirectionsthistopicmighttakeinlightofmyarguments,alongthelines

thatattentionalstrategiesareinherentinthecognitive“system”whilephenomenal

consciousnesscanplausiblybeseentobeproductofsuchsystems,yetstanding

outsidethesystemassuch.

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MechanisticAttentionisintegrallyinvolvedintheprocessesthatproduceeitherthe

contentofconsciousness,orphenomenalityitself.Thismeansthereisasignificant

ontologicaldifferencebetweenattentionandconsciousness:beingastrategy,

attentionisintrinsictothesystem,inawaythatconsciousnessisnot,for

consciousnessisanoutputofthesystem.Attentioncharacterisesthemechanismof

cognition(intheBechtelsense).ExecutiveAttentioncharacterisesthemechanismof

thecognitiveexecutive.Butphenomenallyconsciouscontentistheresult,

consequence,oroutputofthatsystem’soperations.Onmyaccount,itisanoutput

notonlyofthecognitiveexecutive,butalsoofother,non-executivesystems.Evenif

LiberalAttentionisalwaysinvolvedinproducingthecontentofconsciousness,

phenomenalityitselfmaynotrequireattention—e.g.,onprotopanpsychistaccounts

ofconsciousness.

Thisdifferencehelpsexplainwhyconsciousnessissomuchhardertoclassify

ontologicallythanattention.Mechanisms,andstrategiesthatcharacterisetheir

operations,arerelativelycommoninourexperienceoftheworld,andeasily

classifiedbyanalogywithotherexamples.Butoutputscomeinmanymetaphysical

kinds,andtheoutputthatisconsciousnesshasfewcounterpartsinnatureor

possiblynone,asIhintedinChapter2.

Theontologicaldifferencebetweenattentionandconsciousnessisfurther

highlightedbythecontrastbetweenthedivisibilityofattentionandtheunityof

consciousness.In8.3.2IdiscussedthesurprisingpotentialforExecutiveAttention

tobedividedamongmultipletargetssimultaneously.Thisnowappearstobewell

establishedempirically.Therearestrong(thoughnotconclusive)arguments,onthe

otherhand,tothinkthatphenomenalconsciousnessisintrinsicallyunitary—the

PhenomenalUnityThesis(Bayne,2010;Bayne&Chalmers,2003).Phenomenal

experienceisalwaysasingleunitaryexperiencewithmultiplecontents.Whatis

more,thecontentsofasingleexperiencecanaltereachother—thephenomenonof

phenomenalinterdependence(Dainton,2000;Kaldas,2015).Butattentionseemsto

becapableofhavingnosuchunifyingfeaturewhenitisdividedamongmultiple

tasksandmultipletargets.

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IfExecutiveAttentionismerelyasuiteofstrategiesimplementedinthecognitive

processesthatconstitutethecognitiveexecutive,thereisnoproblemwithitbeing

sodividedinacognitiveeconomy,sincedifferentparticularexecutiveprocessescan

allimplementitsimultaneouslyinparallelwithoutanythingtounitethemintoa

singleindivisiblewhole.The(likely)factthatphenomenalexperienceisnotdivisible

inthiswaysuggeststhatitmaynotsimplybeafeatureofacognitivemechanismin

thewaythatattentionis,andthatitmightnotevenbeofthesameontologicalclass

asattention.Infact,phenomenalunityisoneofthethingsthatmakesconsciousness

sounique,andexploringtherelationshipbetweenphenomenalFOCandExecutively

Attendedhigher-ordercontentisapromisingavenueforunderstandingwhy.271

9.5.2 TheoriesofConsciousness

Theholygrailofcontemporaryphilosophyofmindisarguablyaconvincingtheory

ofconsciousness.Thelackofsuchatheoryisreflectedinthebroadnessofthe

optionsthatarestillcurrentlyconsideredtobeviable.272IftherecanindeedbeC~A

andAÈCistheScenariothatobtains—ifExecutiveAttentionisnotnecessaryor

sufficientforphenomenalconsciousness—thenanysuccessfultheoryof

consciousnessmustaccountforthis.Whilethereissomuchmorethatcanbesaid,in

thissectionIcontentmyselfwithsomebriefobservationsonhowmyconclusions

mightbeappliedtoHigherOrdertheoriesofconsciousness,consequencesforthe

FunctionQuestionasitrelatestoconsciousness,andsomemethodological

considerations.

271Iexplorethispossibleontologicaluniquenessofconsciousness—"ConsciousnessUniquism”—ina

papercurrentlyunderpreparation.272Chalmers’(2010)taxonomyoftheoriesofconsciousnessisquiteausefulone.SeealsovanGulick

(2017).

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HigherOrderTheories

SometheoriesofconsciousnessareincompatiblewithmyWHMofhowcontent

becomesconscious.Mostobviously,HigherOrdertheoriesofconsciousness

(Carruthers,2016)holdsomesortofrecursiveprocessingtobenecessaryfor

phenomenalcontent,suchthatallphenomenalcontentarisesviaExecutive

Attentionbydefinition.273MyargumentsinChapters7and8infavourof

phenomenaloverflowthereforehavetheeffectofcastingdoubtonHigherOrder

theories.Tobeclear:theycastdoubtonthenecessityofhigher-ordercognitionfor

phenomenality,notonitsabilitytoproducephenomenality.Myargumentsdonot

discountphenomenalityarisingfromhigher-ordercognition—theydiscountthe

ideathatphenomenalitycanariseonlyfromhigher-ordercognition.274

Forman(1999,p.626)pointsoutthatgenuinecasesofwhatIhavecalledglobal

PureConsciousness(6.3.3)—phenomenalityintheabsenceofanycontent—would

countstronglyagainsttheoriesofconsciousnessthatmerelyidentifyconsciousness

withparticularcognitivefunctions(functionalism)orseeconsciousnessasaside

effectofparticularcognitivefunctions(epiphenomenalism),furtherdissociating

consciousnessfromExecutiveAttention.Myanalysissuggeststhatwhilethiskindof

argumentmaybevalid,itsmostimportantpremise—genuinecasesofglobalPure

Consciousness—isdiabolicallydifficulttoestablish.However,fovealphenomenal

overflow,whichIhavearguedisonmuchmoresolidground,maybeenoughtocast

doubtthatconsciousnesscanonlyarisefromExecutiveAttentionalactivityina

HigherOrdertheory.Butofcourse,myanalysisofno-reportparadigmsandneural

signaturesin7.4.3isgroundsforpessimismthatwecaneverempiricallyresolve

thisquestion.

273E.g.,Rosenthal(2011,p.431)“Ifsomebodyisinamentalstatebutdoesn’tseemsubjectivelytobe

inthatstate,thestateisnotconscious.”

274Myaccountcanembracea“modest”higher-ordertheory,butnotan“immodest”one(Block,

2011b,p.421).Forfurtherargumentsagainstambitioushigher-ordertheories,seeFarrell(2018).

338

TheFunctionQuestion

Ithasbeensuggestedthatatheoryofconsciousnesscannotbedivorcedfroman

understandingofthefunctionofconsciousness,andthatconsciousnesscannotbe

investigatedapartfromfunction(Cohen&Dennett,2011).Thefunctionofattention

isrelativelyuncontroversial.Itwasimplicitinmydefinitionofattentionasasuiteof

strategiesforstructuringcognitionforthefurtherprocessingofcontent.Attention

facilitates,perhapsevenmakespossible,thefurtherprocessingofcontent.Thatis

thefunctionalroleitplays.Assuch,LiberalAttentionisinvolvedinvirtuallyevery

cognitivefunction,andExecutiveAttentionisinvolvedineveryexecutivefunction.

Attentionthereforehasdeeprootsthroughoutthecognitiveeconomy.

Thefunctionalroleofconsciousness,ontheotherhand,isfarmoredifficultto

identify(Tsuchiyaetal.,2015,p.757).Debatecontinuesoverwhether

consciousnessperseiscausallyefficaciousormerelyepiphenomenal(Kriegel,

2004).Somehavearguedthatconsciousnessisimportantintheintegrationof

information(Baars,1988;Tononi,2008),orforvolition(Pierson&Trout,2017).

However,onceyouhavesubtractedoutprocessesthatareknowntobecapableof

occurringunconsciously,thereseemsnothingleftforconsciousnesspersetodoin

termsofintegrationorevenvolition.Similarsubtractionscanbemadeforother

proposedfunctionalrolessuchasrationalthought,controlofactions,etc.,eventhe

mostcomplexofwhichcanintherightcircumstances(e.g.,withmuchrehearsal)

becomesubconscious.Indeed,Hassin(2013)hasproposedthatvirtuallyany

cognitioniscapableofproceedingwithoutconsciousness,anhypothesisthatseems

likelytobeconfirmedbytherapidadvanceofartificialintelligence(9.5.4.1).

Thisopensupthecontroversialpossibilitythatconsciousnessitselfmaynothavean

integralroletoplay,butmerelybeanevolutionary“spandrel”(Haladjian&

Montemayor,2015;Robinson,Maley,&Piccinini,2015)—achanceby-productof

othercognitivedevelopmentsthatcamealongforafreeride.Morespecifically,

though,phenomenalFOCthatisneverExecutivelyAttended—likeBen’soverflowing

speckles—seemsespeciallyprofligate.Whatisthepointofdevotingcognitive

339

resourcestoproducingsomuchrichcontentandmakingitphenomenalwhenit

contributesnothingatalltoourongoingpracticallives?Wecanonlyspeculateat

thisstage,butIventuresomethoughts.

First,theneedforthisprofligatephenomenalcontentmayberelatedtoourhuman

needforotherapparentlyprofligatepursuitssuchasbeauty,art,music,and

meaning,allofwhichmaybeenhancedbytherichnessofvisualandothersensory

experience.Thesethingsdonotcontributedirectlytooursurvivalorreproductive

potential(thedriversofevolution)buttheydoenrichourlivesandconstitutea

largepartofwhatitmeanstobehuman.

Second,andmuchmoreprosaically,suchneedsmaycontributeindirectlyto

evolutionaryfitness.Forexample,acapacityforpowerfulaffectiveappreciationfor

beautymaybeconducivetothechoiceofhealthyreproductivemates(DeRidder&

Vanneste,2013;Grammer,Fink,Møller,&Thornhill,2003).Whilephenomenally

overflowingfovealvisionitselfseemsunlikelytocontributetothis,itmaybeuseful

inathirdway:havingallthatrichphenomenalcontentavailableprovidesmore

optionsforExecutiveAttention,thusenhancingitseffectiveness.Benmaynot

usuallycountallthespeckleshephenomenallyexperiences,butifeverhislife(or

reproductivesuccess)dependedonit,hisoverflowingcontentprovideshimwith

theconsciousknowledgethattherearealotofspecklesthere(Seeming-that)and

thepotentialtocountthemone-by-oneorinsmallsubitisedgroupsbyshiftinghis

ExecutiveAttentionrapidlyandseriallyamongthem.AsIsay,allthisisquite

speculative,butworthyoffurtherinvestigation.Whateverthecase,ifphenomenal

fovealoverflowoccurs,itisanimportantdatumindiscussionsaboutthefunctionof

consciousness,andmaythereforeinformdiscussionsabouttheoriesof

consciousness.

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MethodologicalImplications

Thetemptationtouseattentionasaproxyforstudyingconsciousnessisonethat

hasbeguiledmany(Allport,1980,p.113;Mole,2008a,pp.87–88;Posner,1994),

althoughithasalsobeenchallenged(Hardcastle,1997;Lamme,2003).Ifmy

analysisiscorrect,thenthisisatemptationweshouldavoid.Notonlydoattention

andconsciousnessoccurindependentlyofeachother,butthekindofrelationship

(4.4)betweenthemremainsunclear.IconcludedabovethatIHandMCarehighly

unlikely,ontheevidenceavailable.ThisleftoneformofPCandmanyvarietiesofCA

astheremainingpossibilities.CAentailsthepossibilityofacomplexsetofsub-

options.Usingattentiontounderstandconsciousness(orviceversa)dependson

identifyingandunderstandingthestructureofthecausalrelationshipbetween

them,beforewecandrawanyinferencesfromthisapproachwithanykindof

certainty.Thatseemsprematureatthisstage.Nonetheless,thesesub-options

providehypothesesthatdeserveinvestigation.

Althoughitisdangeroustouseattentionasaproxyforconsciousness,thereare

validusesofitasamarkerofconsciousness.Ben’sconfidentSeeming-thatisthe

markerofhisrichphenomenalFOC(7.4.2),althoughitscontentisdifferent.Thereis

broadagreementthatmanycognitionsinstantiatetheA&CCombination,andin

thosecases—dependingonthekindofrelationshipbetweenthem—theremaybea

strongcaseforunderstandingconsciousnessthroughstudyingattentionincertain

ways.Forexample,Bayne(2013)makesacogentcaseforagency—whichplausibly

dependsonattentionalstrategies—asamarkerofconsciousness.Mypointisthat

thisshouldneverbetakenasgiven,butalwaysconsideredcarefully.Certainly,if

Ben’sExecutivelyun-Attendedspecklesarephenomenal,hisphenomenal

experienceofthemisagoodplacetoexplorethebasisofconsciousness,stripped

bareofasmuchdetritusaspossible.

Finally,Itakethepessimisticconclusionthatno-reportparadigmscanneverbe

successfulatidentifyingC~Ain7.4.3.3asachallengetoseeknewandcreativeways

togetaroundthisseriousepistemicobstacle.Thecentralproblemwasthatto

calibratesomethingasasignatureofconsciousness,weinevitablyrelyonreportin

341

thefirstinstance,whichmeansthatwecanneverbesurethatthatsignatureisnot

justasignatureofreport(whichinvolvesExecutiveAttention)ratherthana

signatureofconsciousnessperse.Whilemyintuitionisthatthisobstacleis

ultimatelyimpenetrable,anyprogressmadewilllikelyrequirehighlycreative

thinkingthatacceptstheintrinsicallyfirst-personnatureofphenomenalexperience

andleveragesittogoodeffect,evenifthatmeanswemustrethinkwhatconstitutes

thedomainofthescienceofconsciousness(paceCohen&Dennett(2011),see

9.5.2.2).275

9.5.3 OtherCognitions

In5.3.2.4IposedtheIntegrationQuestion,whichisabouthowattention,

consciousnessandWMintegratetogetherandwiththerestofcognition.Inthis

sectionIfocusontwoothercognitiveconcepts—intelligenceandsymbolic

cognition—andsketchsomereflectionsandapplicationsinthelightofmy

argumentsandconclusions.

Intelligence

ThetriangulationofWMwithattentionandconsciousnesshasaninteresting

applicationinthestudyofintelligence.Therehasbeenmuchworkpositively

correlatingindividualdifferencesinWMcapacityandExecutiveAttentionwithGfor

275Dennett’s(2003,2007)heterophenomenologyacceptsfirst-personphenomenologybutonlyasa

datuminneedofthird-personverification.Itakemyargumentsforimmediacytoprovideverification

ofakind,butnot,Isuspect,thekindthatwillsatisfyDennettandCohen.Foracontraryview,see

Kriegel(2007).Spacepreventsfurtherexplorationofthisissue.

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fluidintelligence(Kane&Engle,2002,p.638).Againstthis,itmightbethoughtthat

someempiricalmeasuresofattentiondonotseemtocorrelatesowellto

intelligence.Forexample,subjectswithattentiondeficithyperactivitydisorder

(ADHD)showabroadspreadofIQscores,includingveryhighintelligence(Katusic

etal.,2011).However,asdiscussedbrieflyin6.3.3.1,ADHDisnotadiminutionin

attentionalactivity,butmerelyaninabilitytomaintainattentiontoasingletarget

overaperiodoftime.TheADHDsubjectpaysattentionjustasmuchasanyoneelse,

justnottothesamethingovertime.ADHDisthusnoexceptiontothecorrelation

betweenExecutiveAttentionandintelligence.

Doesphenomenalconsciousnessplayaroleinintelligence?Imentionedtheongoing

debateoverwhetherphenomenalconsciousplaysafunctionalroleinthekindsof

complexcognitionsthatdistinguishhumansfromotheranimalsabove(9.5.2.2).

KaneandEngle(2002,p.637)notethatdamagetotheprefrontalcortex(PFC)

resultsindeficitstocoreExecutiveAttentionandWMfunctions,including,among

otherthings,“attention,motorcontrol,spatialorientation,short-termmemory,

temporalandsourcememory,metamemory,associativelearning,creativity,

perseveration,andreasoning.”Yetinnoneofthesecasesisitthoughtthatthereis

anykindofdeficitofphenomenalconsciousness.TheparticipationofPFC-damaged

subjectsinlaboratorytestingrequiresthattheybephysiologicallyconscious,which

sofaraswecantellisanindicationoftheirphenomenalconsciousnessaswell.This

notonlysuggeststhatphenomenalconsciousnessplaysnonecessaryrolein

intelligence,butalsothatPFCactivitymaynotbenecessaryforphenomenal

consciousness,asLamme(2003)andothershaveargued,andasmyWHM

suggests.276Indeed,wecallcomputers“intelligent,”notbecausewethinktheyare

conscious,butbecausetheyarecapableofcomplexfunctions,functionsthatrely

upontheimplementationofstrategiesofLiberalandExecutiveAttention(see

9.5.4.1).Attention,then,isintimatelyconnectedtointelligenceinwaysthat

consciousnessisnot.Empirically,measuresofintelligencerelyonmeasuresof

attentionalabilitiesthathavelittletodowithconsciousness.

276Itisatbestsuggestive,sinceofcourse,significantportionsofthePFCremainactive.

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SymbolicCognition

Aspecificexampleofhumanintelligenceisouruniqueabilitytounderstand,

manipulate,andcreativelyproducesymboliccontent:e.g.,languageand

mathematics.Qplaysininterestingroleinaparticularaspectofsymbolic

cognition—so-called4E(embedded,embodied,enactive,andextended)cognition

(Menary,2010).InthissectionIlayouttheevidencethatattentionand

consciousnesscandissociateforcomplexsymboliccognitioninthebrain,and

considersomepossibleapplicationsofthedissociationbetweenattentionand

consciousnesstotheextendedcognitiondiscourse.

TheconnectionsbetweensymboliccognitionandExecutiveAttentioninWMare

obvious.Butitwasthoughtthatcomplexsymboliccognitionrequiresconscious

processing(Deutsch,Gawronski,&Strack,2006;Dijksterhuis&Nordgren,2006).

Recently,however,evidencehasbeenfoundforcomplexrule-basedsymbolic

cognitiveprocessingintheabsenceofphenomenalconsciousness.Examplesinclude

maskedsimpleadditioninstructions(Ric&Muller,2012),semanticprocessingand

multisteparithmeticalcalculationsundercontinuousflashsuppressionmasking

(Sklaretal.,2012),277implicitsequencelearning,wherethesymbolsareconscious

butthelearningofrelationsbetweenthemissubconscious(Mudrik,Faivre,&Koch,

2014),andsophisticatedsyntacticprocessingevenintheabsenceofsemantics

undercontinuousflashsuppression(Hung&Hsieh,2015).278

AllthesecasesconstituteA~C,butthingsmaynotbesostraightforward.Thereisan

emergingpatternthatsuggeststhatconsciousnessisrequiredfortheintegrationof

contentincertainconditions:

277ButseeMoorsandHesselmann(2018)andRabagliatietal.,(2018)whichcastsomedoubtonthis

paper’sconclusions,andonthebroaderlandscapeofcomplexnon-consciouscognition.278SeealsoalongerlistofstudiescitedinGelbard-Sagivetal.,(2016,pp.1–2).

344

“Reviewofexistingempiricaldata(especiallyinthevisualdomain,

becausemoststudiesfocusonvisualawareness)suggeststhat

thereisnoabsolutedependencyofintegrationonconsciousness.

Rather,themorecomplexornovelthestimuli,themorelikely

consciousnesswillbeneededforintegrationtooccur”(Mudriket

al.,2014,p.488).

Complexityisnotnecessarilytiedtoconsciousness.Expert,over-rehearsedactions

ofgreatcomplexityareperformedwithoutthesubject’sconsciouscontrolor

consciousperceptionoffinedetail(Christensen,Sutton,&McIlwain,2016).Itseems

thatitisthenoveltythatmostcommonlyrequirestheinvolvementofconsciousness.

Thesameistrueofcomplexsymboliccognition.

Symboliccognitionquiteofteninvolvesexternalmedia,whichgreatlyexpands

humanabilities.Taketheexampleofsolvingacomplexmathematicalproblem

algebraically,onethatneedstwoorthreepagesofmulti-termequations.The

capacitylimitationsofWMpreventthemathematicianfromholdinganythinglike

thecomplexseriesofequationsandperformingthemanipulationsinherhead.At

theleast,therearehugegainsinbothefficiencyandaccuracywhenshewritesher

workingdown.Literacyalsoinvolvesnotonlysemanticprocessinginthebrain,but

conductingconversations,recordingwordsonapageoracomputer,sharingthem

withothers,etc.,(Oatley&Djikic,2008).Thisinterplaybetweenwhatishappening

inthebrainandwhatishappeningbeyondthebrainhasledsometoconcludethat

“cognitiveabilitiesareneithersolely,oressentially,neural”(Menary,2007,p.622).

Theseareverydeepwaters,andIcanonlyherepointtosomepossiblewaysmy

approachtodefiningattentionmighthelpilluminatesomeoftheirdarkdepths.On

myOperationaldefinitionsofattentionasasuiteofmultiply-realisablestrategies,

thereisnoreasontothinkthatonlyneuronalsystemsarecapableofimplementing

them.Indeed,Iwillarguebelow(9.5.4.1)thatmachinesimplementtheminquite

complexways.However,thatisnoreasontotherebyascribeconsciousnesstothe

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mechanismsthatimplementthisattention,sinceattentionisnotaninfallibleproxy

forconsciousness(9.5.2.3).

Thereisaninterestingquestionaboutwhereonemightdrawtheline,then,between

whatconstituteshumancognition,andwhatconstitutesnothingmorethananaidto

humancognition.Ifoneishappytoconsidertheprocessingcarriedoutbya

supercomputerasakindofcognition,thenwhatistostopusconsideringthelinesof

mathonthepageaspartofthemathematician’scognition?Ifonestipulates

consciousnessasamarkofcognition,thecasesofunconsciouscomplexsymbolic

cognitionlistedabovemakethatuntenable.Indeed,therearereasonstothinkthat

evenwithinthebrain,cognitiveoperationsarenotjustconductedbytheneurones,

butrequiretheactiveinvolvementoftheglialstructuresinwhichneuronesare

embedded.279Ifglialcells—whoseactivitiesdirectlycontributetothe

implementationofOperationalAttentionalstrategies—canbesaidtoparticipatein

cognition,whynotacalculator?Therearemanyobjectionsthatcanberaisedhere.I

raisethesequestionsonlyaspointerstointerestingfutureapplicationsofmy

approachtothesekindsofquestions.

9.5.4 EthicalApplications

Theobservationthatcomputersrequireattentionforintelligencebutnot

consciousnesspointstosomeinterestingethicalapplicationsofthedissociation

betweenattentionandconsciousness.Inthissection,Iconsiderthreesuchareas:

artificialintelligence;animalethics;andmoralresponsibility.

279Theneglectedfieldofextra-neuronalinvolvementincognitionisafascinatingone(De-Miguel&

Fuxe,2012;Fields,2009,2013;Guidolin,Albertin,Guescini,Fuxe,&Agnati,2011;Syková&Vargová,

2008).

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ArtificialIntelligence

Therecentadvancesinartificialintelligence(AI)systemswithprodigious

capabilitiesposetwoproblemsonwhichmydiscussionofQmighthavesome

bearing.IarguethatifwewishtoaddressthedangersofrapidlyadvancingAI,itis

attentionthatismostrelevant,whileifwewishtoaddressquestionsofthevalue

andrightsofhighlyadvancedAI,itisconsciousnessthatmatters.

Thefearofmachinesbecomingsentientandtakingovertheworldofhumansisboth

ancientandmodern.280Oneancientformtobefoundinmanyculturesinvolvedthe

needtokeepthe“barelyhuman”slavesfromrisingupandharmingtheir

aristocraticmasters.Inmoderntimes,thisfearhascometobeappliedtonon-

biologicalslaves—machines—andmaytakeanumberofforms.Oneformisthefear

overhumansbecomingsuperfluous.Asahighschoolstudentinthe1970s,Ivividly

recallmyEconomicsteachergushingabouthowincreasingautomationwillfree

humansforalifeofleisureandpleasure.Hispredictionsweredeadwrong.

Automationtakesemploymentawayfromhumansandleavesthemnotinpleasure,

butinpoverty(Ford,2013).Anotherfearisthatmachineswillbeuntrustworthy,

liabletoserious,perhapsevenfatalmistakes(Parnas,2017).Andofcourse,science

fictionisrepletewithtalesofsuperintelligentmachinesrisingupagainsttheir

intellectuallyinferiorhumanmastersandenslavingthem,orworse,eliminating

themaltogether.281Morerealisticscenariosinvolvingtheexponentialgrowthin

computingpowerandtheemergingabilityofcomputerstoself-learnandself-

correcthavealsobeenproposed,suchasthesingularity(Dubhashi&Lappin,2017).

280Forsomelessdramaticquestions,seeFloridietal.,(2018).281TheBorgofStarTrek:TheNextGeneration,theCylonsofBattlestarGalactica,andtheReplicators

ofStargateSG1springtomindasexamples,nottomentiontheanxietyunderlyingIsaacAsimov’s

ThreeLawsofRobotics,allofwhichareintendedtoprotecthumansfromanypotentialmalicious

intentoftheirroboticslaves.Arecentandmorefocusedexplorationofmoralissuesarisingfrom

human-likemachinesistheAMC/Channel4/Kudosproducedtelevisionseries,Humans(2015-,

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4122068/).

347

Ontheotherhand,asAIadvances,itcanbecomemoreandmorehuman-like,atleast

inoutwardbehaviour.282InoneepisodeoftheseriesStarTrek:TheNext

Generation,283thequestionisposedinaparticularway:ascientistwishesto

dissembleanandroidnamedDatainordertobetterunderstandhowheworks,in

thehopesoflearningenoughtoreproducehim,forthebenefitandserviceof

humanity.Thescientistbaseshisrighttopursuethisprojectonthegroundsthatan

androidlikeDataismerelyamachine.Noonewouldobjecttopullingapartthe

ship’son-boardcomputerforanoblereason,norwouldanyoneeventhinktoaskits

permissiontodoso,sinceasamachine,itismereproperty.Dataisjustanelaborate

computer,sowhywouldanyonetreat“it”anydifferently?

ButDataisnothiddenbehindaglassscreenandkeyboard.Heisanandroid,which

meanshelookshuman.Liketheship’scomputer,hecarriesonconversations,buthis

conversationsarefarmoreintricateandhumanlike.Further,heinteractsphysically

withhumans,shakingtheirhands,lookingthemintheeyewithhisownhumanlike

eyes,helpingthemoutoftightsqueezesbyapplyinghisformidableproblem-solving

skillsandphysicalstrength.Data’scaptain,Picard,afterinitiallybeingambivalentor

evensympathetictothedisassemblyproject,givenitspotentialbenefitsfor

humanity,eventuallycomestodefendData’srighttobetreatednotasproperty,but

asaperson.Oneoftheargumentsthatswayshimisthesimilaritybetweenafuture

multitudeofandroidsbeingtreatedaspropertyandthepastmultitudeofhuman

slaveswhoweretreatedasproperty.UntilwebetterunderstandjustwhatDatais,

Picardargues,wecannotruntheriskofenslavingmultitudesofpossiblepersons.

Suchquestionsarenotpurelyacademic,noraretheyconfinedtofiction.recently,

GooglerevealedanewfeatureinitsAssistantthatallowsittoringpeopleonyour

282Thereislittledoubtthatbrainsprocessinformationindifferentwaystocomputers.Aninteresting

questionIcannotgointohereiswhethernon-humansystemsneednecessarilytousethesame

attentionalstrategiesIcataloguedinmyTaxonomy(3.3.4),orwhethertheymightachievethesame

endsbyimplementingdifferentstrategies,orperhapsthesamestrategiesindifferentways.283Series2,episode9,TheMeasureofaMan,firstairedFebruary13,1989.

348

behalfandconductaconversationthatwouldpasstheTuringtest(be

indistinguishablefromanall-humanconversation).284Asmachinesapproximate

humanbehaviourmoreandmoreclosely,ourviewofthemisalsolikelytobedrawn

closertoourviewofactualhumans.

Myanalysisofattentionandconsciousnesswouldsuggestthatthetwoconcepts

playdifferentrolesindiscoursessuchasthese.ThedangersofAIdonotdependon

theAIbecomingconscious,butonpracticalabilities.AnAIprogramthatdetermines

thathumanbeingsarebadfortheenvironmentandmustthereforebeeliminatedin

ordertopreserveallotherspeciesneednotbeconscioustocometosuchalogical

conclusion.Infact,itisallthemorechillinglylikelytocometothisconclusionifit

doesnotpossessthekindofconsciousabilityforsympathywenormallyassociate

withhumanexperience.Whatwillbecriticalinthiskindofsituationwillbethe

effectivenessoftheAI’sprocessing,whichinturnrequiresattentionalstrategiesto

beimplemented.

Ontheotherhand,whenwecometodeterminethevaluetobeplacedon

maintainingtheintegrityorevenexistenceofanandroidlikeData,orwhenwe

cometodecidewhethersuchanentityhasrights,itisnotattentionwethinkabout.

Itisnotmerecomplexityofcomputation,behaviour,orabilitythatwarrantsour

moralrespect—otherwisetrackingsecuritycamerasandsupercomputerswouldbe

consideredpersons.Rather,Ibelieveitisaverycomplexsetoffactors,amongwhich

computingabilityisveryminorindeed.Muchmoreinfluentialareverysubjective

(andofteninterrelated)factorssuchastheformationofanemotionalbondwiththe

entity,similarityinimportantwaystoourselves,andmembershipofourown“tribe”

or“group”insomesense.Consciousnessplaysanimportantroleinthesekindsof

factors,sinceweareourselvesessentiallyconsciousbeings.Data’scaseis

ambiguouspreciselybecauseofhissimilarity—externallyviewedatleast—to

humanbeings.Thesomewhatpoorlydefinedquestionof“sentience”israisedasa

284“GoogleI/O2018:Assistantimpersonateshumanstomakephonebookings”AdamTurner,Sydney

MorningHerald,9May2018,https://www.smh.com.au/technology/google-i-o-2018-assistant-

impersonates-humans-to-make-phone-bookings-20180509-p4ze52.htmlaccessed15May2018.

349

majordeterminantintheproceedingsintheepisode—ifitisevenpossiblethatData

issentient,thenheshouldbeaccordedthesamevalueandrightsasahuman

being.285Itisnotcognitiveabilitieslikeattentionthatarerelevanttoascriptionsof

moralvalue,butphenomenalconsciousness.

Agoodruleofthumb,then,mightbethatifweareworriedaboutmachinestaking

over,itisattentionandnotconsciousnessthatweshouldbeconcernedwith,butif

weareworriedthatwearetreatingourmachinesethically,itisconsciousness,not

attentionthatweshouldbeconcernedwith.Iarguedabove(9.5.2.3)thatinhumans

wecannotuseattentionasaproxyforconsciousness.Itwouldbeinterestingto

explorewhetheracaseforaVeryStrongReadingofQcouldbemade,onwhich

attentionwouldnotbereliableindicatorofthepresenceofconsciousnessin

machinesaswellashumans.Onemajorissueisthatmachinesarenot“mushy”like

humanbrainsandalmostcertainlyoperateondifferentprinciples.Justwhat

machineconsciousnesswouldbelike,andwhatitwouldtaketoproduceit,arehuge

questionsthatarelargelyopaquetousatpresent.

AnimalEthics

Asimilarissuearisesinthefieldofanimalethics.Forexample,Singer(1975)and

manywhohavefollowedhimarguethatanimalinterestsoughttoberespected

becauseanimalsarecapableofexperiencingsuffering—aconceptthatisinherently

phenomenal.286Hisconceptofspeciesism—discriminationonthegroundsthatan

individualbelongstoadifferentspecies—isreflectedinmyargumentabovethatwe

ascribemoralvaluechieflyonthebasisofsimilarity,inthiscase,belongingtothe

285Wisely,itisleftupintheairastowhetherornotDataissentient.TheProblemofOtherMinds

suggestswecanneverbecertainwhetherevenotherhumanbeingsaresentient.286Thatanimalsareconsciousappearstobeaconsensuspositionamongacademics(Cambridge

DeclarationonConsciousness,2012).SeealsoAndrews(2016),Godfrey-Smith(2016),andBarron

andKlein(2016).

350

samespecies.Butourempathywithevenanon-humanorganismismediatedbythe

thingwehaveincommon:theconsciousexperienceofpain.Thisempathymaybe

whatmakesusascribemoremoralvaluetoananimalthantoamuchmore

intelligentmachine.

Theotherbigmoralquestionoftendiscussedinresponsibility.Onwhatbasisdowe

ascribemoralresponsibilitytoanentity?Weholdhealthyadulthumansmorally

responsiblefortheiractions,butgenerally,notmachines,animals,orsmallchildren.

Whatlightcanattentionandconsciousnessshedonthisquestion?Thesetooturn

outtobedeepwaters.

Consideroneaccountofmoralresponsibility:reasonsresponsiveness(Kennett&

Fine,2009,p.86).Onthisaccount,anentitymaybeheldmorallyresponsibleonly

insofarasitiscapableofrespondingappropriatelytoreasons.Reasons

responsivenessisnotaninherentlyphenomenalprocess,butitisinherently

attentional(Bello&Bridewell,2017):appropriateresponsesaretheoutputsof

processesthatselecttherightinputsforfurtherprocessingtoproduceacoherent

outputandcontrolbehaviour.Theinterestingthingisthatmachines,animals,and

humaninfantsareallquitecapableofdoingallofthat.Yetwegenerallydonothold

themmorallyresponsiblefortheirbehaviour.Inthecaseofmachines,wetransfer

theresponsibilitytothehumanbeingwhoprogrammedoroperatedit.Themachine

justfollowsordersandhasnochoiceinthematter.Similarly,weholdanimalsand

humaninfantstobetheslavesoftheirinbuiltinstincts,andthereforenotmorally

responsible.Inbothcases,itturnsoutthatitisnotthefacultyforreasons

responsivenessassuchthatunderwritestheascriptionofmoralresponsibility,but

thefacultyforcontroloverhowattentionisimplementedandexecuted,something

morelikethe“abilitytodootherwise”(Frankfurt,2003).

Theabilitytodootherwiseisacontroversialconcept,butonethatisonsome

accountstiedtoconsciousness.Amachineexecutingitsprogramming“blindly”is

notheldmorallyresponsible,whereasanadulthumancapableofreflectingonher

behaviourandchangingitinresponse,is.Theanimalandtheinfantfailtobe

morallyresponsible,notbecausetheylackconsciousness(theydon't),butbecause

351

theylackthematureconsciousreflectionoftheadulthuman.Moralresponsibility,

then,appearstobeascribedonthebasisofproperlyfunctioningphenomenal

higher-order(i.e.,ExecutivelyAttended)processing—Experience-of,Seeming-that,

andothers.Itisnotascribedifeitherthephenomenalityismissing,ortheExecutive

Attentionismissing.

Wecanupdateourruleofthumbthus:ExecutiveAttentionisrelevanttothe

dangersofAI;phenomenalconsciousnessofanykindisrelevanttotheascriptionof

moralvalue;butitisonlyphenomenalExecutiveAttentionofaparticularkind

(reflectivereasonsresponsiveness)thatisrelevanttotheascriptionofmoral

responsibility.Thisruleofthumbwill,however,bechallengedbymachinesthatare

capableoflearninganddevelopingthemselves,independentlyoftheirhuman

programmers.ThatisafascinatingtopicIsadlydonothavethespacetopursueany

furtherhere.

MoralResponsibility

Consideringmachines(9.5.4.1)suggeststhatconsciousnessiswhatisimportantin

ascriptionsofmoralvaluetoentities,whileconsideringanimalsandchildren

suggeststhatconsciousattentionoftherightkindiswhatisimportantinascriptions

ofmoralresponsibility(9.5.4.2).InthissectionIconsiderwhethercasesofA~Cand

C~Ainhealthyadulthumansareamenabletotheascriptionofmoralresponsibility.

ConsiderfirstanactionthatarisesviaA~C.Wepraisethesportspersonfortheir

exquisitereflexshot,yetweholdamurdererblamelessforacrimecommittedwhile

sleep-walking(Ohayon&Schenck,2010).BotharecasesofA~C,yetwerespondto

theminoppositeways.Why?First,thereisaquestionastowhetherweoughtto

respondtothemindifferentways.Acasecanbemadethatinthesamewaythatthe

sportspersonpracticedvoluntarilyandconsciouslyforyearstobeabletomakethat

A~Creflexshot,thesleep-walkertoovoluntarilyandconsciouslyallowedviolence

andhatredtofesterwithinforyears,resultinginthehorribleviolentactthe

352

momentthatnormalsocietalcontrolsweredisabledinsleep-walking.Butthisisa

weakargument.Aperson’sresponsibilitymustbetakenasawhole,theremustbea

“unityofagency”(Kennett&Matthews,2014).Allofushavegoodandbad

intentionswithin,butweareheldresponsiblefortheultimatechoiceswemake.The

sportsperson’sexpertiseandeventhereflexshotitselfaretheultimateresultofthe

sumtotalofhervoluntary,consciousdecisions.Shecouldhavedoneotherwise(not

practice,notcareaboutwinning,etc.)Butthesleep-walker’scrimeistheresultof

oneaspectofhiscognitivelifeescapingtherestofhiscognitivecontrolinvery

unusualcircumstances.Conscious,voluntarycontrolcanbelostinsleep-walking

(Cartwright,2004).Werespondinoppositewaysbecausethesearenotequivalent

casesofA~C.Theyposenothreattotheprinciplethatconsciousattentionofthe

rightsortisnecessaryfortheascriptionofmoralresponsibility.

WhatofC~A?Thistreatisehassuggestedthatifitistobefoundanywhere,itwillbe

inlocalphenomenalFOC,bereftofExecutiveAttention.Iillustratedthisinthecase

ofphenomenalvisualFOC,butofcourse,similarcasesmaybemadeforother

modalities,perhaps(thoughthisislesscertain)evenforsubsetsofthecontentsof

memories,imaginings,andactions.Inanycase,thelackofExecutiveAttention

wouldseemnecessarilytoindicatealackofthekindofreflection—consciousor

otherwise—thatresultsinanabilitytodootherwise(Bello&Bridewell,2017).The

healthyadulthuman,then,cannotbeheldmorallyresponsibleforcognitionsthat

areC~A,orfortheirconsequences,unlessofcourse,consciousExecutiveAttentionis

subsequentlyappliedtoproducethoseconsequences.

353

9.6 FinalReflections

Ibeganthisquestwithaserenestrollthroughalushrainforest,andendedwith

machinestakingovertheworld,muchlikeablockbustermovie.Butthisjourneyhas

ledusthroughfarmoreinterestingterrain—themysteriousinnercosmosofthe

humanmind,that“glory,jest,andriddleoftheworld.”287Isaidattheoutsetthatthis

researchwasmotivatedbysheerunbridledandunapologeticcuriosityaboutthe

mind,andespeciallyabouttheenigmathatisconsciousness.Ifwearetoimprove

ourunderstandingofconsciousness,oneofourapproacheswillbetostrikeit

againstotheraspectsofcognitionandseewhatsparksflyfromtheencounter.That

hasbeentheapproachofthistreatise.Buttherearemanymorewaystoapproach

thequestion.

ThereissomuchmorethatcanbesaidaboutQ.Iconductedthisresearchwithas

openamindaspossible,andindeed,changedmymindabouttheanswertoQa

numberoftimesalongtheway.Perhapsthistreatiseisbestviewedasasnapshot

capturingasingleframeinamoviewithalongpastand(hopefully)alongfutureto

come.Thereisnotellingwhereitwillend,butthejoyisinthejourney.Itisa

privilegetobepart—howeversmall—ofthatwonder-filledandveryhumanquestto

understandwhatitisthatmakesuswhoweare.

287AlexanderPope,AnEssayonMan,2.1.

355

Appendices

Appendix1.Distinctionsbetweendifferentkindsof

attention.

InthisappendixIfleshoutthedistinctionsbrieflysummarisedin3.2.3.

InternalvExternal

Thelocationoftheobjectofone’sattentionprovidesthefirstofourdistinctions,

thatbetweeninternalandexternalattention(Buckner,Andrews-Hanna,&Schacter,

2008).288Internalattentionisdirectedtothesubject’sowninternalmentalstates

(e.g.,asenseofgeneralsadness,orthenumbersix),whereasexternalattentionis

directedtoobjectsintheenvironment(e.g.,amosquitobuzzingnearone’sear).

EndogenousvExogenous

Arelateddistinctionisthatbetweenattentionthatistop-downorendogenous,or

bottom-uporexogenous.289Thisisadistinctionthatdealswithhowattentionis

recruited.Top-downattentionisdirectedbythesubject’sowninternal,highergoals,

aswhenyouarepurposefullylookingforawordinapuzzle.Orattentionmaybe

capturedbottom-upbyexternal,salientstimuli,aswhenyouautomaticallyturn

288Foxetal’s(2005)distinctionbetweentask-negativeandtask-positivebrainnetworksmaybe

relatedtothisdistinction,althoughtherearesomequestionsthatmightberaised.289Otherauthorsemploydifferenttermsforthisdistinction,e.g.,goal-directed(endogenous)v

stimulus-driven(exogenous),(Corbetta&Shulman,2002).

356

yourheadinthedirectionofaloudbang.DesimoneandDuncan(1995,p.201)point

outthatsometimes,endogenousinformation—e.g.,longtermmemoryofthe

importanceofcertainperceptualfeatures—canbiasattentioninbottom-upfashion,

suggestingthatthesecategoriescaninteractininterestingandcomplexways.

VoluntaryvInvoluntary

Acloselyrelated,thoughdiscretedistinctionisthatbetweenvoluntaryor

involuntaryattention.Thisisadistinctionthatdealswithwhetherthesubject

controlsthedirectionofattention,orwhetheritisdirectedbyfactorsoutsidethe

subject’svoluntarycontrol.Attention(again)maybedirectedbythesubject’sown

highergoals,aswhenyouarepurposefullylookingforawordinapuzzle.Oritmay

becapturedwithoutthesubject’svoluntarychoice,andperhapsevenagainstthe

subject’swill,aswhenyoucan’tgetasongoutofyourhead.

Someauthorsseemsimplytoidentifytop-downendogenousattentionwith

voluntaryattentionandbottom-upexogenousattentionwithinvoluntaryattention

(Ciaramelli,Grady,&Moscovitch,2008;Theeuwes,1991).Ibelievethisisamistake.

Onthepurelyconceptuallevel,itiscertainlypossibletoimagine,say,involuntary

top-downattention—attention,perhaps,thatisdirectedbyaninvoluntaryinfluence

ofpriming.Weshouldalsoavoidthetemptationtothinkthatthisdistinctionsimply

mapsneatlyontotheconscious/non-consciousdistinction.Voluntarydoesnot

necessarilymeanconscious:theminutelydetailedfine-motoradjustmentsthatgo

intohighlyrehearsedactionslikefine-tuningtheangleatwhichonestrikesagolf

ballareinsomesensevoluntary,yetnotconscious.Similarly,lookingatahorror

sceneinamoviealthoughonedearlywantstoavoidnightmaresarisingfromthe

sight—maybecasesofattentionthatisinsomesenseinvoluntary,yetconscious.

Theseexamplesaresubjecttochallengeofcourse,andtheytouchupondifficult

questionsinthephilosophyofthewillthatIneednotdelveintoanyfurtherhere,

butImerelyraisethemtoshowthattheassumptionthatvoluntaryequalsconscious

andinvoluntaryequalsunconsciousneednotbetakenforgranted.

357

FocalvBackground

Afourthdistinction—focalversusbackgroundattention—relatestothesizeofthe

fieldofattention.Forexample,one’savailablevisualfieldisquitewide,butthe

sectionofthefieldtowhichonecanpayattentionmayberelativelysmall.Braun

andSagi(1990,p.45)citeevidenceforthefocusofvisualattentionsubtendingan

angleofabout1°ofeccentricityandIwasaki(1993,pp.213–214,220)considers

processingthatoccursoutsidethis“spotlight”offocalattentiontobenon-

attentionalprocessing.However,itisgenerallythoughtthatthefocusofattention

maybevariable,usingthecamera’szoomlensasananalogyfortheabilitytowiden

ortightenone’sfieldofattention:“attentioncanvaryfromauniformdistribution

overtheentirefieldtoahighlyfocusedconcentration”(Theeuwes,1991,p.83),

althoughwideningtheattentionalfieldseemstodistributethesameprocessing

resourcesmorethinlyoveralargerarea(C.W.Eriksen&StJames,1986).The

borderbetweenfocalandbackgroundattentionmaybeagradedone,resembling

theratherfuzzyumbraandpenumbraofasolareclipse(8.6.3).Theborderbetween

focalorbackgroundattentionandnon-attentionmayalsobegradedoranon-off

affair.Weshouldresistthetemptationtoidentify,apriori,focalattentionwith

consciousness,andbackgroundattentionwithunconsciousprocesses.Thetwo

distinctionsarecertainlyconceptuallydiscrete,andhowtheyrelateisamatterfor

empiricalinvestigation.

Spatial,Feature,orObject

Fifth,thetargetofvisualattentionmaybeofthreekinds:“definedbya

circumscribedregioninspace(focalattention),byaparticularfeature(feature-

basedattention),orbyanobject(object-basedattention)”(Koch&Tsuchiya,2007,

p.16).Ishallcallthesethreespatial,feature,andobjectattentionrespectively.There

areotherwaysofdrawingthisdistinction.Duncan(1984)callsfeatureattention

“discrimination-basedattention,”whileDesimoneandDuncan’s(1995)findings

suggesttomethatobjectattentionmayinasensejustbeaspecialcaseoffeature

358

attention,onewheremanyfeaturesareboundtogether,ratherthancompared.

Kanai,Tsuchiya,andVerstraten(2006,p.2335)suggeststhatspatialandfeature-

basedattentionsatleasthavedifferentneuralcorrelates.Theyconcludethat

feature-basedattentionmaybecorrelatedsometimeswithunconsciousprocessing,

whilespatialattentionmaycorrelatewithconsciousprocessing,butagainIcaution

againstsuchidentifications.Whilethisdistinctionarosefromworkonvisual

attention,itmaywellhaveanaloguesinattentionoutsidevision.

SynchronicvDiachronic

Sixth,synchronicviewsofattentiondescribeitasastateofacognitiveprocess,a

“snapshot”intime,whereasdiachronicviewsofattentionrespectthefactthatany

processnecessarilyplaysoutoveraperiodoftime.Therewouldseemtobenoroom

formiddlegroundbetweenthesetwopoles.Howeveronemightaskwhetherwecan

speakofsynchronicattentionatall.Itiscommon,forexample,tospeakofan

“attentionspan,”theperiodoftimeoverwhichonecanmaintainattention.

Attentionmaybedeconstructedintosmallertemporalcomponents—BraunandSagi

(1990,p.46)citeevidenceforthedurationofasinglefixationofvisualattentionof

between20and100milliseconds.AndatleastasfarbackasWilliamJames,the

experienceofthe“speciouspresent”hasbeenunderstoodasnotbeingexperienced

asinstantaneousanyhow,butratherashavingsomebriefyetfiniteduration

(Gallagher,1998,Chapter2;LePoidevin,2015),perhapssomewherebetweenhalfa

secondandthreeseconds(Dainton,2000,pp.170–171).Eventhe“now,”therefore,

seemsnecessarilydiachronic.Andofcourse,attentioncanbeoveranextended

periodoftime,aswhenonecaresfortheenvironmentandattendstoenvironmental

issuesovermanydecades.

Weneednotcompletelyabandontheconceptofsynchronicity,though,solongaswe

understandthesequalifications.Theideaofastatic“snapshot”isanincomplete

pictureofwhatattentionreallyis,justasaphotographicsnapshotofanOlympic

sprinterinfullflightisanincompletepictureofwhatarace,orrunning,reallyis.

359

Personal/Subpersonal

Finally,attentionmayoperateonapersonallevel(e.g.,trackingamovingtargetwith

one’seyesandhead),oronasubpersonallevel(e.g.inearlyvisualprocessing).The

subpersonal,ofcourse,admitsofmanylevels.Personalandsubpersonalattention

arenotmutuallyexclusive,andWatzl(2011b)considerstherelationshipbetween

them.Somehavearguedthatpersonalattentionmayjustbereducibletosub-

personallevelattentionalmechanism,whileothershaveresistedthisreductionism.

360

Appendix2.FourUnlikelyScenarios

ThefourmainScenariosdescribedin4.2.3eachhaveanXintheA&Cintersection,

signifyingthatthereareatleastsomecognitiveprocessesthatarebothattended

andphenomenallyconscious—consciousattention.However,thereisagroupof

Scenariosparalleltothefourabove,inwhichthereisnoXintheA&Cintersection.

TheseScenariosdonotfigureinmostdiscussionsonQ.FortheseScenarios,

attentionisneithernecessarynorsufficientforconsciousness,andconsciousnessis

neithernecessarynorsufficientforattention.ThisgroupofScenariosisdescribed

belowforcompleteness,eventhoughitseemsquiteobvioustoalmosteveryonethat

weoftenexperienceconsciousattention.290

Table5.FourunlikelySTFScenarios.

Ø(InattentiveUnconsciousness)

• Thereneverissuchathingaseitherattentionor

consciousness.Thustrivially,thereisnosuchthing

asaprocessthatisbothattendedandconscious.

• Insettheory,“Ø”isthesymbolforanemptysetornullset,asetwithzero

members,whichcapturesnicelytheideathatnocognitiveprocessesareever

attendedorconscious.

290Montemayor&Haladjian(2015,p.4)citeTallon-Baudry(2012)asfavouringtheviewthatthereis

nosuchthingasconsciousattention.

X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

361

A\C(AttentiveUnconsciousness)

• Thereisonlyattention,butneveristheresucha

thingasconsciousness.Thustrivially,thereisno

suchthingasaprocessthatisbothattendedand

conscious.

• Insettheory,“P\Q”(differenceoftwosets:291membersthatbelongtoPbut

nottoQ)capturesnicelytheideathatcognitiveprocessesmaybeattended

butcannotbeconscious.

C\A(ConsciousInattentiveness)

• Thereisonlyconsciousness,butneveristheresuch

athingasattention.Thustrivially,thereisnosuch

thingasaprocessthatisbothattendedand

conscious.

ADC(CompleteIndependence)

• Someprocessesareconsciousbutnotattended,

someareattendedbutnotconscious,butno

processesareeverbothattendedandconscious,

andofcourse,someareneitherconsciousnorattended.Attentionand

consciousnessneveroccurtogetherinthesameprocess.

• Insettheory,“PDQ”(symmetricdifference:membersthatbelongtoPortoQ,

butnottotheirintersection)capturesnicelytheideathatcognitiveprocesses

maybeeitherattendedorconscious,butnotboth.

291AlsoknownastherelativecomplementofQinP.

X X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

X X

~A~CC~AA~CA&C

362

ThesefourScenariosaregenerallyconsideredtobeunlikelyasadescriptionofa

normalhumancognitiveeconomy,althoughtheyarenotcompletelyimpossible.

Theymightobtainincertainunusualorimaginarycircumstances.

TheØScenariodescribesacognitiveeconomyinwhichthereareneverany

cognitiveprocessesthatareeitherattendedorconscious.Thissoundslikea

descriptionofadeeplycomatosepatientinwhombothattentionandconsciousness

areimpossible,althoughmanyunattendedandunconsciouscognitiveprocessesare

stillproceeding,asevidencedbycontinuingactivityon,say,theEEGtrace.

Someextremeformsofeliminativismaboutconsciousness(Churchland,1983;

Wilkes,1984)mightbetakenasacaseofthetwoScenariosinwhichthereisno

consciousness(A\CandØ).Lessextremeforms,suchasDennett’s(1991)scepticism

aboutqualia,mightalsoplausiblyfallundertheseScenarios.Onemightalsoread

someformsofphilosophicalBehaviourismasbeingepistemicversionsofthe

Scenariosinwhichthereisnoconsciousness.

PerhapsanappropriatelyprogrammedcomputerfallsundertheA\CScenario,since

itmaybecapableofattendingtostimuli(giventherightdefinitionofattention),and

processingthem,whilemostpeoplewouldacceptthatacomputerhasnoconscious

experienceofthatprocessing.

AnexampleoftheC\AScenariomightbeapre-conceptionPlatonicsoul—a

disembodiedconsciousnessthatisunattachedtoanybrain,andthereforeapure

consciousnesswithoutanykindofcognitiveabilities,includingattention.Another

examplemightbesomeformsofbraindamagethatleaveasubjectwithaninability

tofocusherattention,withoutimpactingonherabilitytohaveaconscious

experience(althoughshemaystillbecapableofamorediffusekindofattention).

Finally,theADCScenario,inwhichbothattentionandconsciousnessarepresentin

acognitiveeconomywithoutevercoincidingaspropertiesofanysinglecognitive

process,isadifficultScenariotofindexamplesof.Perhapsitmightoccurinsome

kindofhypotheticalextremeformofbraindamagethatdisconnectsthetwofrom

363

eachother,suchthat,forexample,onelosesallvisualconsciousnessbutnotvisual

attention,andonelosesallauditoryattentionbutnotauditoryconsciousness.

Anotherpossibilityisacomputerwiththeabilitytodevotecomputingresourcesto

certaininputdataoverothers,whichisthen“haunted”byaghostlydisembodied

Platonicsoulwithoutaccesstoitscomputations.Iamawareofnoactualsituationin

whichthisScenariooccurs.292

TheconceptofLiberalAttention(3.4.4)beingubiquitousincognitionwouldbe

capturedbyScenariosthatlacktheCombinationsC~Aand~A~C,namelythefour

asteriskedCombinations:A=C*;AÉC*;Ø*;andA\C*.

292Iwasaki(1993)seemstoconsidersomethinglikeADCseriously.MontemayorandHaladjian

(2015,pp.5–6)alsoincludethispossibilityintheirCADframework.

364

Appendix3.TabulatedComparisonsofSTFwith

OtherFrameworks

Iwasaki

Table6.ComparisonofSTFwiththedescriptionsofIwasaki(1993,p.212).

Iwasaki STF

1. “peoplemayperceiveonly

thosestimulithatareunder

focalattention”

A=C

(orAÉC?)

2. “althoughattentionmaybring

aboutsomedifferencesinwhat

weperceiveconsciously,

consciousnesscanexist

independentlyofattention”

CÉA

(orAÈC?)

3. “consciousnessisamental

facultywhichworks

independentlyofattention.

Thedistinctivefeatureofthis

viewisitsdenialofany

possibilityofattentional

modulationofconsciousness”

CÉA

(orAÈC?)

365

LammeTable7.ComparisonofSTFwiththemodelsofLamme(2003).

STF

A=C

A=C

A=C

AÈC

Attended

Attended

Attended

Attended

Conscious

Conscious

Conscious

Conscious Report

Unattended

Unattended

Unattended

Unattended

Unconscious

Unconscious

Unconscious

Conscious Report

Conscious Report

Conscious Report Inputs

Inputs

Inputs

Inputs

Figure6Fourmodelsofvisualawarenessanditsrelationtoattention,modifiedfromLamme(2003)p.13.

366

Schwitzgebel

Table8.ComparisonofSTFwiththecategoriesofSchwitzgebel(2007).

Schwitzgebel STF

RichConsciousness:

thecontentsofsensory

experienceatany

momentintimeare

multimodalandfullof

details.

CÉA

ThinConsciousness:

thecontentsofsensory

experienceatany

momentintimeare

limitedtojustafew

modalitiesanddetails.

A=C

(possiblyAÉC)

367

Koch&Tsuchiya

Table9.ComparisonofSTFwiththeframeworkofKochandTsuchiya(2007).

FourfoldtaxonomyofconsciousandunconsciousperceptsandbehavioursofKoch

andTsuchiya(2007)p.17,indicatingthecorrespondingSTFScenario.

Mightnotgiveriseto

consciousness

Givesrisetoconsciousness

Top-down

attentionis

notrequired

Formationof

afterimages

Rapidvision(<120ms)

Zombiebehaviours

~A~C Pop-outinsearch

Iconicmemory

Gist

Animalandgender

detectionindualtasks

Partialreportability

C~A

Top-down

attentionis

required

Priming

Adaptation

Visualsearch

Thoughts

A~C Workingmemory

Detectionand

discriminationof

unexpectedand

unfamiliarstimuli

Fullreportability

A&C

Dijksterhuisetal.,(2010,p.472)comparethistaxonomytotheearliermore

complex,butmoregeneralsystemofWegnerandSmart(1997).

368

DeBrigard

Table10.ComparisonofSTFwiththepropositionsofDeBrigard(2010,pp.

189–190).

DeBrigard STF

(a) Attentionisnecessaryandsufficientfor

consciousness.

A=C

(b) Attentionisnecessarybutnotsufficientfor

consciousness.

AÉC

(c) Attentionisneithernecessarynorsufficientfor

consciousness.

AÈC

Mole(2008a)“believesthat,accordingtoour

commonsense,whileconsciousnessisnecessary

forattention,attentionisn’tnecessaryfor

consciousness”

CÉA

369

VanBoxtelComparisonofSTFwiththeframeworkofvanBoxteletal.,(2010,p.6,Figure2a)

~A~C A~C

A&CC~A

Attention

Nor

mal

ised

Per

form

ance

0

50

no A, no C A without C Low High

C without A with A & C

100

Figure7ConsciousnessvsAttention,modifiedfromVanBoxteletal.,(2010,p.6,Figure2a).

370

MontemayorandHaladjian

Table11.ComparisonofSTFwiththeCADframeworkofMontemayor&

Haladjian(2015,pp.5–6).

CAD STF

1.Identity.Consciousnessisidenticalwith

attention.

A=C

2.Type-ACAD:onekindofconsciousattention;

attentionisnecessaryforconsciousness.

AÉC

3.Type-BCAD:onekindofconsciousattention;

attentionisnotnecessaryforconsciousness.

AÈC

4.Type-CCAD:manyformsofconsciousattention,

(thusincreasingtheopportunitiesfordissociation);

attentionisnotnecessaryforconsciousness.

AÈC

5.FullDissociation:A&Carecompletelyseparate

inbothdescriptionandmechanism;“thereisno

consciousattention.”

Scenarios5-8

371

Pittsetal.

Table12.ComparisonofSTFwiththedescriptionsofPittsetal.,(2018,p.2).

Pittsetal. STF

“attentioncanmodulatesensoryprocessingevenin

theabsenceofconsciousperception,andconscious

experiencecananddoesoccurintheabsenceof

attention”

AÈC

“attentionandconsciousnessaredistinct

psychologicalprocesses,andwhereasattentioncan

operateindependentlyofconsciousness,thereverse

isnotthecase“

AÉC

“Athirdviewhasalsobeenproposed,whichargues

againstanytypeofdissociation—i.e.consciousnessis

attention”

A=C

372

Appendix4.ClassificationofAuthorsbySTF

ScenarioInthisappendixIsetoutsomemethodologicalnotesonhowIderivedthefigures

forFigure3(4.3.6)followedbyalistofauthorsbyScenario(Table13)andanother

ofScenariosbyauthor(Table14).

SomeMethodologicalNotes.

• Imakenoclaimwhatsoevertothissurveybeingscientific,andall

observationsdrawnfromitaretobetakenasliabletorevision.

• ThesamplesethereisthosetextsIhaveconsultedinthecourseof

researchingthisthesisthatdirectlyaddressQinsufficientdetailtoidentifya

particularScenario.

• Itisbynomeansexhaustive,andnodoubttherearesignificantbiasesdueto

theresearchresourcesavailabletome,etc.Smallersamplesetsmightbe

derivedbysurveyingseminalpublications,suchasthecommentariesto

Block’s(2007)BBSarticle,thechaptersofMole,Smithies,andWu(2011a),

orthearticlesinthespecialissueofPhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyal

SocietyB:BiologicalSciences(2018,volume373,issue1755)on“Perceptual

consciousnessandcognitiveaccess.”

• ManytextsthataddresssomenarrowaspectofQ(e.g.,whetherornota

singleCombinationobtains)havenotbeenincluded,sincetheydonot

providesufficientevidenceforaScenario.Insomecases,furtherresearch

intotheauthors’otherpublicationsmightidentifyapreferredScenario,but

asthissurveyisnotthechiefgoalofmythesis,Ihavenotpursuedthis

projectfurther.

• Theideasofanumberofauthorsresisteasyclassification,andIhave

indicatedthisby“tentatively”classifyingthem.AfewaresoambiguousthatI

leftthemwithoutaScenario(“UnabletoClassify”).

• Whereapaperorsetofpapershavemultipleauthors,Ihavecountedthemas

singleauthors(andused“etal.”),unlesstheyhaveindependentpapersthat

373

differonsignificantpoints(e.g.,DeBrigardandPrinz).Thisavoidsasourceof

biassincephilosopherstendtowritealone,whilescientiststendtowritein

groups,whichwouldhaveheavilybiasedthecountsinfavourofthe

scientists.

• Theacademicfieldsofauthorsweredeterminedbyexaminingtheir

departmentalaffiliationsand/orresumesifpubliclyavailable.

• Whereanauthorhasqualificationsinmorethanonefield,thefieldofhis

highest-levelqualificationwaspreferred.Mostly,thiscorrespondedwithhis

departmentalaffiliation.

• IcountedWilliamJamesasaphilosopheralthoughasafounderofmodern

psychology,healsobelongsunderthenon-philosopher(psychology)

category.

AuthorsbyScenario

Table13.ClassificationofAuthorsbyScenario.

[P]=philosopher—backgroundprimarilyinphilosophy.

[NP]=non-philosopher—backgroundprimarilyinafieldotherthanphilosophy.SeeTable14

formoredetailonspecificnon-philosophicalfields.

Authors Citations Comments

1.ScenarioA=C

WilliamJames[P] (1890) ReadbyCowan(1999,p.63)and

manyothersasseeingattentionas

operatingwithin

consciousness.293

293But,seeHardcastle(1997).

374

Allport[NP] (1980) ReadbyMole(2008a,p.87)as

usingattentionas“acodename

forconsciousness.”

Dennett[P] (1991) ReadbySchwitzgebel(2007,p.7)

asespousingathinviewof

consciousness,althoughheisco-

authorwithCohenofpapersthat

takeaAÉCview.

Stazicker[P] (2011a) Arguesforaconstitutive

connectionbetweenattentionand

consciousness.

Baddeley[NP] (Baddeley,1993a,

2000)

Identifiesconsciousnesswiththe

activityofthecentralexecutive

componentofworkingmemory

(seeChapter5).

Cowan[NP] (1988,1995) Identifiesconsciousnesswiththe

activityofthefocusofattentionin

workingmemory(seeChapter5).

Hine[P] (2010,2015;

2010)

Consciousnesscanbeexplained

byattention.

DeBrigardandPrinz

[P]

(DeBrigard,2010;

DeBrigard&

Prinz,2010;Prinz,

2011)

Attentionisthegatewayto

workingmemory,consciousness

arisesfromworkingmemory.

Carruthers[P] (2017) ArguesthatBlock’sphenomenal

consciousnessandaccess

consciousnessarenottruly

distinct.Consciouscontentisthe

375

contentoftheglobalworkspace,

thoughnotofworkingmemory.

O’Regan[NP]

andNoë[P]

(2001) ReadbyCohenetal.,(2012,p.

411)asA=C.

Posner[NP] (1994) Drawsananalogybetweenthe

relationshipbetweenattention

andconsciousnessandthe

relationshipbetweenDNAand

“life.”

MackandRock[NP] (1998) Pioneeredthestudyof

inattentionalblindness.

2.ScenarioAÉC

Dehaeneetal.[NP] (Dehaeneetal.,

2006;Dehaene,

Charles,King,&

Marti,2014;

Dehaene,Lau,&

Kouider,2017,p.

489;Naccache,

Blandin,&

Dehaene,2002)

Theorizeastotheneural

underpinningsofattentionand

consciousness,andproposea

modelthatbearssomesimilarities

tothatofLamme(2003).

Cohenetal.[NP] (2012) Rejectthesuggestionthat

“attentionandawarenesscanbe

doublydissociated,”yetaffirm

that“attentionisnecessary,

376

thoughnotsufficient,for

consciousawareness”(p.411).

Pittsetal.[NP] (2018) Arguefora“singledissociation

view”(pp.2-3)onwhichtherecan

beA~CbutnotC~A,albeitwith

somenuanceandanopenmind.

JohnGTaylor[NP] (2002) AssertsA~CanddeniesC~A(p.

206).

Richards[P] (2013,2016) CritiquesofNedBlock’sthesis

thatconsciousnessoverflows

attention.

Baars[NP] (1988,1997b) Difficulttoclassify—butGlobal

Workspacemodelissuggestive.

Soto&Silvanto[NP] (Soto,Mäntylä,&

Silvanto,2011;

Soto&Silvanto,

2014,2016)

TentativeSTFclassification.Their

“emergingframework”(2014)

endowsattentionwiththedual

rolesofbringingcontentinto

workingmemoryandbringing

workingmemorycontentinto

consciousness(adenialofC~A,

compareDeBrigard&Prinz)but

theyalsoarguestronglyfornon-

consciousworkingmemory(A~C).

377

3.ScenarioCÉA

Smithies[P] (2011) “attentionisessentiallya

phenomenonofconsciousness”(p.

247)

Watzl[P] (2010,2011a) Seesattentionasastructuringof

consciousexperience,andargues

thatputativeempiricalcasesof

A~Cfail(2010,p.322).

Wolfe[NP] (1999b) Introducestheconceptsofpre-

attentiveandpost-attentive

consciousness.

Iwasaki[NP] (1993) Difficulttoclassify(4.2.4.2and

Appendix3,Table6).

Jennings[P] (2012,2015) AffirmsaparticulartypeofC~A

shecalls“consciousentrainment.”

4.ScenarioAÈC

Block[P] (2013b,p.182;

2014,p.556)

SeeChapters7and8fordetailed

discussion.

Bronfmanetal.[NP] (2014;2018) ArguestronglyforC~A.

AssumeA~Cintheir2018(pp.16-

17)citingKouiderandDehaene

(2007)insupport.

378

Armstrong[P] (1995) AcceptsthatBlock’sphenomenal

andaccessconsciousnessescan

occurinisolation.

Hardcastle[P] (1997) ReinterpretsWilliamJamesto

allowforC~A(p.56),andargues

againstthesufficiencyofattention

forconsciousness(i.e.,arguesfor

A~C,p.62)

Kentridgeetal.[NP] (Kentridge,2011,

pp.233–235;

Kentridgeetal.,

1999,2004,2008;

L.J.Normanetal.,

2015)

Empiricalevidenceforthe

dissociationofattentionand

consciousnessinabroadvariety

ofcircumstances.

Cricketal.[NP] (Crick&Koch,

1990;Koch&

Tsuchiya,2007;

Tsuchiya&van

Boxtel,2010;van

Boxteletal.,2010).

KTcontroversiallyusetheterm

“near-absenceofattention”

(4.2.4.2).

Lamme’s[NP] (2003,2010) Basedontheneuralactivity

patternsofrecurrentprocessing

andfeedforwardsweep.

Mole[P] (2008a,2011a,

2014)

Cognitiveunisonmodelof

attention.Inhis2014(pp43-49),

hereverseshisprevious

oppositiontoA~C.

Hohwy[P] (2012) Basedonapredictivecoding

modelofattentionand

consciousness,heaffirmsthe

379

possibilityofallfour

Combinationsonp.5.

Montemayor[P]and

Haladjian[NP]

(2015) Discussmultipleprocessesof

attention,consciousness,and

consciousattention(seeAppendix

3),dissociationsthatreflectA~C,

C~A,andA&Crespectively.

Dijksterhuisetal.[NP] (2010) Socialscientistswhoacceptthe

fourfoldCombinationstructureof

KochandTsuchiya(2007).

Hassinetal.[NP] (2013;2009) Conceptofimplicitworking

memoryisindubitablyA~C.

AffirmsC~Aifonetakesattention

tobesomethinglikeaspotlight

amidstconsciouscontent,butnot

ifattentionisjustdefinedasthe

devotionofcognitiveresources294

(see3.4.4);

Koivisto,Revonsuo,et

al.[NP]

(Koivisto&

Revonsuo,2007;

Koivisto,

Revonsuo,&

Salminen,2005)

Electrophysiologicalevidencefor

theindependenceofawareness

andattention.

Bayne[P] (Bayne,2010;Shea

&Bayne,2010)

Tentativeclassificationbasedon

suggestivestatementsinShea&

Baynepp.468(A~C)and469

(C~A).

294Hassin,personalcommunication.

380

Tye[P] (2010,2014) DespitearguingagainstBlock’s

(2013b)argumentfordifferent

grainsofseeingandattention,he

hashimselfarguedforbothA~C

andC~A

Tallon-Baudry[NP] (2012,p.7) Arguesfordistinctneuralbasesof

attentionandconsciousness,and

explicitlysaysthather

“cumulativeinfluence”model

suggestsbothA~CandC~A.

Wegner&Smart[NP] (1997) FrametheCombinationsinterms

ofdeepcognitiveactivationand

consciousness.

Wu[P] (2014,pp.150–

172,2016,p.3)

Explicitandrepeatedaffirmation

ofA~C.HetentativelyaffirmsC~A

(2013,p.1180),soatentativeSTF

classificationofAÈC.

UnabletoClassify

Barrett[P] (2014) ArguesagainstPrinz’s

interpretationoftheempirical

evidence,butleavesthequestion

openhimself.

Phillips[P] (2011a,2011b,

2015,2018)

HasarguedagainsttheC~Aof

phenomenaloverflow(Chapter7)

butmaintainsasceptical

agnosticismonQ.

381

JohnHenryTaylor[P] (2013b,2013a) ArguesagainstDeBrigardand

Prinz(A=C),butalsoagainst

Block(AÈC).HisPhDthesis

(2015b),whichmightclarifyhis

position,isunfortunatelyunder

copyrightembargountil2020.I

didnotattempttocontacthimfor

acopy.

ScenariosbyAuthorTable14.AlphabeticallistofScenariosbyauthor.

NOTES:

• “OtherDisciplines”—Ihaveincludeddisciplineswhereauthorshaveformal

qualifications,asgleanedfromtheircurriculumvitae.Sometimes,theyarenolonger

activelyengagedinthesedisciplines.

• Whereanauthor’sdisciplineismoredifficulttopindown,Ihaveusedtheumbrella

term“cognitivescience”(Bechtel,Abrahamsen,&Graham,2001;Simon,1980).

Scenario Name Discipline OtherDisciplines

A=C Allport,Alan Psychology

AÈC Armstrong,DavidM

Philosophy

AÉC Baars,Bernard Psychology

A=C Baddeley,Alan Psychology

382


? Barrett,David Philosophy

AÈC Bayne,Tim Philosophy

AÈC Block,Ned Philosophy

AÈC Bronfman,Zohar(etal.)

ComputationalCognitive

Neuroscience

HistoryandPhilosophyofScience

A=C Carruthers,Peter Philosophy

AÉC Cohen,MichaelA CognitivePsychology

Philosophy

A=C Cowan,Nelson Psychology

AÈC Crick,Francis CognitiveScience PhysicsBiology

A=C DeBrigard,Felipe Philosophy

AÉC Dehaene,Stanislas(etal.)

CognitiveScience CognitiveNeuroscience,AppliedMathematicsandComputerScience,Mathematics.

A=C Dennett,Daniel Philosophy

AÈC Dijksterhuis,Ap(etal.)

SocialScience SocialPsychology

AÈC Haladjian,HarryH CognitivePsychology

AÈC Hardcastle,Valerie Philosophy PoliticalScienceCognitiveScience

AÈC Hassin,Ran(etal.)

CognitiveScience

A=C Hine,Rik Philosophy

AÈC Hohwy,Jakob Philosophy

CÉA Iwasaki,Syoichi CognitiveScience

383


A=C James,William Philosophy MedicinePsychology

CÉA Jennings,CarolynDicey

Philosophy Psychology

AÈC Kentridge,RobertW

(etal.)

Psychology

AÈC Koivisto,Mika(etal.)

Neuroscience Philosophy

AÈC Lamme,VictorAF CognitiveScience Medicine

A=C Mack,Arien&Rock,Irvin

CognitiveScience

AÈC Mole,Christopher Philosophy Psychology

AÈC Montemayor,Carlos

Philosophy

A=C Noë,Alva Philosophy

A=C O'Regan,JohnKevin Psychology MathematicalPhysics

? Phillips,Ian Philosophy Physics

AÉC Pitts,MichaelA(etal.)

Psychology

A=C Posner,MichaelI Psychology Physics

A=C Prinz,Jesse Philosophy

AÉC Richards,Bradley Philosophy HistoryandPhilosophyofScience

AÉC Soto,David&Silvanto,Juha

CognitiveScience ExperimentalPsychology

CÉA Smithies,Declan Philosophy Theology

A=C Stazicker,JamesDavid

Philosophy Classics

384


AÈC Tallon-Baudry,Catherine

Neuroscience Biology

AÉC Taylor,JohnG Mathematics Physics

? Taylor,JohnHenry Philosophy

AÈC Tye,Michael Philosophy Physics

CÉA Watzl,Sebastian Philosophy Biology

AÈC Wegner,DanielM Psychology Physics

CÉA Wolfe,JeremyM Psychology OphthalmologyRadiology

AÈC Wu,Wayne Philosophy BiologyChemistry

385

Appendix5.ModelsofWM:ASelection

Thenameofamodelisprovided,generallybytheauthors,togetherwiththechief

originatorsofthemodel,andoneortwocentralcitations.Thisisfollowedinthe

secondcolumnbymysummaryofthemodel,andinthethirdcolumn,someofmy

ownthoughtsofrelevancetothisthesis.Foranexcellentoverviewandanalysisof

elevenmodels,seeMiyakeandShah(1999).

Table15.ModelsofWM.

Model,Authors,&

SelectCitationsSummaryofModel Comments

1 Multi-ComponentWM

Baddeley&Hitch(BH)

(Baddeley&Hitch,1974)

(Baddeley,2012)

Fourcomponents:

- CentralExecutive

- VisuospatialSketchpad

- PhonologicalLoop

- EpisodicBuffer(addedlater—see

(Baddeley,Allen,&Hitch,2011)

Thelastthree“slave”systemsare

considered“placeholders”withthe

possibilityofothersbeingadded,

especiallytoaccountforothersensory

modalities.

Chieflyoperations-

focused.

2 EmbeddedProcesses

Model

Cowan

(Cowan,1988)

(Cowan,1999)

AnaccountthatgrewoutofBaddeley&

Hitch’smodel,withfivecentralfeatures:

o WMinformationcomesfrom

hierarchicallyarrangesfaculties:

§ LTM

§ SubsetofLTMthatiscurrently

“activated”.

Chieflyoperations-

focused

Oneproblemwiththis

modelisthatitdoesn’t

seemtoaccountfor

datathatneverreaches

386

Model,Authors,&


§ Subsetofactivatedmemorythatis

“inthefocusofattentionand

awareness”.

o Focusofattentioniscapacitylimited,

activationistimelimited.

o Focusofattentioniscontrolled

conjointlybyvoluntary(central

executive)andinvoluntary

(orienting)systems.

o Thereishabituationoforienting:

stablestimuliactivatememorybutdo

notelicitawareness.

o Awarenessinfluencesprocessing:it

increasestheresolutionofperception

andmakesrepresentationsavailable

forexplicitrecall.

Foradiagrammaticrepresentationof

themodel,seeCowan’s1988,Figure1,

page180(reproducedfollowingthis

table).

LTM—perceptualor

cognitivedatathatis

usedinWMthen

disappearsforever.Of

course,itwouldn’tbe

hardtotweakhis

modeltoaccommodate

this.

3 MindandBrainModel

Jonides

(Jonidesetal.,2008)

Anembeddedprocessesmodelwith

significantdetailandcarefulempirical

grounding.

AsBaddeley(2012,p.21)pointsout,

thisisafarmoredetailedapproachthan

BH.

Chieflyparts-focused,

experimentally

derived,especially

neuroimaging.

4 EmergentProperties

Model

Postle

Alternativetoa“standardmodel”ofWM

inwhichdedicatedneuronesinthePFC

arethebuffersofWM.

Chieflyparts-focused,

experimentally

derived.

387

Model,Authors,&


(Postle,2006)

Twochiefprinciples(p.31):

o “theretentionofinformationin

workingmemoryisassociatedwith

sustainedactivityinthesamebrain

regionsthatareresponsibleforthe

representationofthatinformationin

non-workingmemorysituations,such

asperception,semanticmemory,

oculo-andskeletomotorcontrol,and

speechcomprehensionand

production.”

o “humansopportunistically,

automatically,recruitasmanymental

codesasareaffordedbyastimulus

whenrepresentingthatstimulusin

workingmemory”.

Therefore,thePFCisnotinvolvedinthe

storagefunctionofWM,butinthe

executiveprocessing.Heofferssome

specificpossibilities,andnotesthatthey

arenotuniquetoWM.

5 FacetModel

Oberauer

(Oberauer,2009;

Oberaueretal.,2003)

2003version:

Twofacets:functionanddomain:

ThreeFunctions:

o Simultaneousprocessingandstorage

o Supervision

o Coordination

TwoDomains:

o Visuo-spatial

o Linguistic/Numeric

Thisgivessixpossiblecombinations.

Chieflyoperations-

focused,

experimentally

derived.

388

Model,Authors,&


Mainlyaimedatprovidingaframework

forusefulexperimentalparadigms.

2009version:

ThreeStatesofRepresentation:

o activatedlong-termmemory

o capacitylimitedregionofdirect

access

o focusofattention

TwoProcesses:

o Declarative

o Procedural

Again,sixpossiblecombinations,with

furthersubcomponentsmakingthe

pictureevenmorecomplex.

6 PerceptualMemory

Model

Magnussen

(Magnussen,2009)

Fivecharacteristics:

o Numerous,earlylevel,highly

perceptualstimulus-specificstorage

andprocessingunits.

o Inhibitionoccurswithinunitsbutnot

acrossunits.

o Eachunithasitsownindependent

resources.

o Higherlevelprocessingbrings

togetherlower-orderinformation.

o Extractionofinformationisviaa

“corticalsearch”oflowerlevel(V1)

representations.

Further,lowlevelrepresentationsmay

beencodedinLTMwithoutever

attainingthelevelofsemantic

representation.

Chieflyoperations-

focused,

experimentally

derived.

Highlightsthefactthat

thereisanimplicit

WM,andthatthe

bordersbetween

implicitandexplicit

maybefuzzy.

IsIWMsomething

otherthanWM?But,

no,itcanbeshownto

havealltheproperties

thatdefineWM

generally.

389

Model,Authors,&


Highlightstheextreme

interrelatednessof

cognitiveprocesses

generally.

7 InteractiveCognitive

SubsystemsModel

(Barnard,1999)

Atheoreticalmodelthatlendsitselfto

computationalmodelling,based,asitis,

onamultiprocessorarchitecture.

The“core”theoryassumesan

architecturecomposedofnine

subsystems.Theseallshareanidentical

internalstructureinvolvingthreebasic

resources(p.299ff):

• processesthatchangetheform

inwhichinformationis

represented;

• animagerecordthatpreserves

pastinputtothesubsystem;and

• aprocessthatsimplycopies

informationintothatrecord.

Assessedpositivelyin

Logie&Cowan(2015,

p.317).

8 Computational

Modelling

See(Miyake&Shah,

1999,Chapters5–11)

ACT-Rismentionedby

Jonidesasapopular

computationalmodel.

Abroadvarietyofmoredetailed

accounts,involvingcomputational

modellingorsimulation.

Parts,operationsand

organisation-focused

(comprehensive

models).

Oftentakeabroader

theoreticalapproach

thatcanlaterbetested

empiricallyby

computersimulations

390

Model,Authors,&


See(Lovettetal.,1999)

mimickingbiological

behaviour.

Baddeleyworries

aboutthecomplexityof

thesemodels,although

ofBarnard’shesaysit

“canalsobemapped

directlyontoM-WM”

(2012,p.21).

9 IndividualDifference

Theories

E.g.,Engleetal.

(Engleetal.,1999)

(Engle&Kane,2004)

WMperformance(retentionand

processing)seemstocorrelatewith

taskslikecomprehension(i.e.,better

WM=greatercomprehension),butnot

pureWMretentioncapacity.Why?

Onthisbasis,EngleetaldistinguishWM

frompureSTM.TheydefineWM

succinctlyas:

“WM=STM(activatedportionofLTM)+

controlledattention”(1999,p.126).

Exploringindividualdifferencesin

performancecanthuselucidatethe

natureofWManditsrelationshipto

othercognitiveprocesses.

Rosenbergetal(2017,p.299,figure3)

proposedevelopingthisapproachusing

connectome-basedmodelling,inthe

samewaytheyhavemodelledattention.

Chieflyoperations-

focused,

experimentally

derived.

Highlightsthe

interrelatednessof

attentionandLTM

withWM.

391

Appendix6.MetaphorsofWM:ASelection

Table16.MetaphorsofWM.

MetaphorsSummaryofMetaphors,

withCitationsComments

1 Storehouse/Box

WMislikearoomorabox,intowhich

arebroughtbitsofdatathatare

currentlybeingmanipulated,inorderto

achievecurrentgoals.Havingalimited

amountofphysicalspaceinit,the

room/boxcanonlycontainsomany

thingsatanyonetime(Fodor,1983,pp.

8–9).Thelimitedcapacitymaybe

measuredbythenumberoritemsthat

canfitinthebox,ormorelikely,bythe

precisionwithwhichitemscanbestored

(seeCorrespondenceModelsabovein

Appendix5),(Koriat,Goldsmith,&

Pansky,2000,pp.482–485).

2 DesktopMetaphor WMislikeacluttereddesktop,literalor

onacomputer,intowhichcurrently

relevantdocumentsaretakenoffthe

shelvesandplaced,consulted,andthe

informationthereinusedtocreatenew

documents(myowninvention).

392



2 Telephone

Exchange

WMisapatternofone-to-one

connections,drivenbyacentral

purposefulcontroller,inthesameway

thatanold-fashionedtelephone

operatorsatataconsoleandconnected

telephonecustomerstoeachotheras

appropriate.Usefulconnectionsare

strengthenedbythecontrollerandthus

morelikelytobereusedinfuture

(Tolman,1948,pp.190–191).

3 MapControl

Room—Central

Office/Global

Workspace/

Blackboard/

Cauldron/Theatre

Thismetaphorfocusesonthe

manipulationaspectofWM:WMislikea

mapcontrolroomoracentralofficein

whichselect,complexinformationis

gatheredandformedintoamap,upon

thebasisofwhich,strategicdecisions

aretaken(Tolman,1948,p.192);a

workspaceinwhichworkisdone(Baars,

1988);ablackboardonwhich

calculationsareperformed(Oberauer,

2009,p.86);acauldroninwhichnew

memoriesarecreatedfromtheright

ingredientstossedinandstirred(Logie

&Cowan,2015,p.320);oratheatre

stageuponwhichthestoryisactedout

(Baars,1997a).

“Thefocusofattentionorepisodicbuffer

mightserveasacauldronforthe

formationofnewlong-termmemories”

(Logie&Cowan,2015,p.320).

“Intheworkingtheatre,

focalconsciousnessactsas

a‘brightspot’onthestage,

directedtherebythe

selective‘spotlight’of

attention.Thebrightspotis

furthersurroundedbya

‘fringe,’ofvitalbutvaguely

consciousevents(Mangan,

1993).Theentirestageof

thetheatrecorrespondsto

‘workingmemory’,the

immediatememorysystem

inwhichwetalkto

ourselves,visualizeplaces

andpeople,andplan

actions”(Baars,1997a,p.

292).

393



4 TrafficCop/

MentalEnergy/

Resource

Allocation

Herethefocusisonthecompetitionfor

cognitiveprocessingresourcesor

energy.WMisthe“trafficcop”,directing

thetrafficofcognitiveprocessingata

busyintersectionofcompeting

processes(Powledge,1997,p.333).

Whatisbeingcontrolledanddirectedor

allocatedmaybecognitiveresources,or

“mentalenergy”(seeMiyake&Shah

page2,buttheyprovidenocitations).

5 Juggler Amoreentertainingversionofthe

TrafficCopMetaphor.WMjugglesthe

competingprocessesinordertocreate

somethingbothbeautifulandof

practicaluseinachievinggoals(Rossi,

1998,p.118).

6 Computer

Hardware

WhereasLTMisroughlylikethehard

driveofacomputer,WMismorelikethe

RAM-processorassembly:ashortterm

storeoflimitedcapacity(RAM)working

togetherwithasystemformanipulating

whatisstored(CPU),thatcreatescopies

ofdatafromLTMandmanipulatesthem.

NumerouscomputationalWMmodelsof

varyingdegreesofcomplexityanddetail

havebeenproposed(seeforexample,

Miyake&Shah,1999).

394

Appendix7.AnatomyandPhysiologyofFoveal

Vision

TheRetina.

Thefoveaisaspecialisedregionoftheretina,temporaltotheopticdisc,thatallows

muchhigherresolutionvisualacuitythantherestoftheretina.295Itdoessoby

havingamuchhigherdensityofphotoreceptors,withthecoloursensitivecones

predominatingoverfaint-lightsensitiverods(theoppositepatterntotherestofthe

retina).Further,innerretinalneuralelementsarepushedaside,allowingmoreof

thelighttofalldirectlyuponthereceptors.Thus,retinalthicknessislessatthe

fovea,creatingtheso-called“fovealpit,”whichisgentlyslopedandsubtendsan

angleontheretinaofabout5°.Thistranslatestotheangleofthefovealvisualfield

being5°also.Thereisalsoanavascularzonesubtendinganangleof2.5°,whichalso

contributestoprovidingclearaccessforlighttothereceptorcells.Atthebottomof

thefovealpitliesthefoveola,subtendinganangleof1.2°.Thefoveolacontainsonly

cones—norods—atadensitygreaterthananywhereelseontheretina.Although

thefovearepresents0.01%ofthetotalareaoftheretina,approximately8%ofthe

striatevisualcortex(primaryvisualcortex,orV1)isdevotedtoprocessingthe

informationthatderivesfromit.

Rodsaremoredenselypackedasoneapproachesthefovea,rangingfromperipheral

densitiesofabout50,000rods/mm2tocentraldensitiesofabout150,000rods/mm2

(p.37).Cones,whiledistributedthroughouttheretina,havetheirhighestdensities

inthefovea,wheretheycanreachdensityof225,000cones/mm2atthecentre.This

highdensity,combinedwiththeabsenceofneuralandvascularelements,explains

themuchhigherresolutionpossibleinfovealvision.Further,rodsaresuitedto

295Unlessotherwisestated,theinformationandthepagereferencesinthisappendixarefrom

Schwartz(2017,Chapters2,3).

395

scotopiclightconditions(luminanceof10–6–10–4candelas/m2)whileconesare

moresuitedtophotopiclightconditions(102–106candelas/m2)(p.27).Sincealmost

allempiricalparadigmsexploringtherelationbetweenattentionandconsciousness

involvephotopicstimuli,itisconevisionthatisofmostinterest,althoughthe

avertedvisionofastronomersviewing“faintfuzzies”(8.6.3)involvesscotopic

conditions.

Whatisthesizeofthefovealvisualfield?Clearlythisisnotaquestionwitha

straightanswer.Thefoveaisnotadiscreteanduniformstructure,buthas

gradationsofconedensityandneuralandvascularpaucity,increasingasone

approachesthecentre.Thefieldofthefoveola,whichhasmaximumoptimisation

andresolution,is1.2°,whilethatofthefoveaproperis5°.Ipresenttherelevant

calculationsforBen’shenbelow(Table17andFigure8).Inthemaintext,Iwill

employthefovealfieldsizeof5°,althoughIdonotthinkmuchwouldchangeevenif

weadoptedthesmallerfieldofthefoveolaforBen’shen,orifweacceptedthatthe

relevantresolutionbenefitsextendfurtheroutthanthefovea,albeittogradually

decliningdegree(seethediscussionofFlorencecasesin9.4.2).Thefovealfield

coversadiameterofabout17cmatadistanceofonemetre,whilethefoveolarfield

coversadiameterofabout4.2cmatone-metredistance(seetablebelow).

Table17.Calculationsoffovealandfoveolarvisualfields.

Fovea Foveola

Retinalangle 5° 1.2°

Sizeoffield

subtendedat1m

fromtheeye

r/1=tan5°

r=0.087m

2xr=0.17m

Diameteroffield=17cm

r/1=tan1.2°

r=0.021m

2xr=0.042m

Diameteroffield=4.2cm

396

ResolutionAcuity

Therelativedensityofreceptorsinthefoveolameansthatresolutionisgreatest

there,graduallydiminishingasonemovesawayfromit.Whattheeyecanresolve

dependsonmanycomplexinteractingfactors(Schwarz,Chapter7).Factorsthat

impactonresolutionacuityincludethedegreeofcontrastinthestimulus(p.158,

Figures7-6and7-7)andofcourse,focus(p.156,Figure7-5).Forarelativelyhigh

contrastspeckledheningoodfocus,beingviewedbyayounghealthyadult,thelimit

ofresolutionacuityisapproximately60cycles/degree(p.157).Thatis,youngand

healthyBencanresolveasine-wavegratingwith60dark-lightbandsperdegreeof

visualfield.Ifweassumeeachdark-lightbandtoequatetoasinglespeckle,thenthe

limitofBen’sresolutionacuityistoresolve60specklesacrosseachdegreeofhis

foveolarfield.Giventhatfieldsubtendsandangleof1.2°,Bencouldresolveupto72

speckleslaidoutinastraightlineacrosshisfoveolarfield.Aspeckledhenwith100

speckleslaidoutina10x10gridwouldbecomfortablywithinBen’sacuitylimitsto

resolve.

Insummary,aspeckledhenfittingwithina17cmdiametercircleatadistanceofone

metrewouldfitcompletelywithinBen’sfovealfield,easilyallowinghimtoresolve

everyspecklewithgreatclarity.Ahenfittinginsidea4.2cmdiametercircleatone

A 1mr

Figure8Visualfieldangleanddiameter.

397

metredistancewouldfitcompletelywithinBen’sfoveolarfield,alsoeasilyallowing

himtoresolveeveryspeckleclearly.

Post-Retina.

Axonsintheopticnerve,bringinginformationfromtheretina,mostlyterminatein

theLateralGeniculateNucleus(LGN)ofthethalamus.Fromthere,cells

communicatemostlywithV1,andfromthere,tohighervisualprocessingregions

(collectivelyknownastheextrastriatecortex)andtomanyotherregionsofthe

brain.therearealsosignificanttractsconnectingtheseregionsintheopposite

directions.Theretinocorticalprojection(retinatoLGNtoV1)hasthreedistinct

parallelpathways:parvo(spatialandredcolourinformation);magno(fast

movement);andkonio(blue-yellowcolour).

Signalsfromtheretinaundergoakindofconvergence.Theroughly100,000,000

photoreceptors(120,000,000rodsand6,000,000cones,p.37)convergeupon

1,000,000ganglioncells.However,inthecortex,signalsundergosignificant

divergence,spreadingoutfromV1firsttotheextrastriatecortexthatarespecialised

foranalysingattributessuchasmotionandcolour,andthen“tohighercentres,

whichcombinevisualinformationwithmemoryandothersenses.Highervisual

centres,inturn,sendinformationbacktothestriatecortex(V1)viareciprocal

projections”(p.20).AllofthisfallsundermydefinitionofLiberalAttention,of

course.

StudieshaveshownthatindividualcellsinV4showselectivelevelsofactivation

dependingonwhichobjectamonkeyispayingattentionto,eveniftheeyeandthe

stimuliareinexactlythesameposition.Ontheotherhand,cellsinV1donotshow

suchselectiveactivationduetoobjectattention.296Thissuggestsstronglythatvisual

attentionismediatedbytheextrastriatecortex,andnotbyV1.“Thissuggeststhat

theremaybeafilteringofvisualinformationfromstriatecortextoV4thatisatleast

296AlthoughV1cellactivationmaybemodulatedbyspatialattention(AlexHolcombe,personal

communication).

398

partiallydependentonthestimulustowhichtheanimalisattending”(p.305).Also,

infootnote2onthesamepage:“Thereceptivefieldsofneuronsinhighervisual

centrestendtobelargerthanthoseinlowercentres,makingitpossibletostudy

themwithlarge,complexstimulusarrays.”Doesthisnotarguefortherichnessof

FOC?

399

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Is Attention Both Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness?

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