Do transhumanist arguments from human nature provide us with sufficient reason to support...

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Do transhumanist arguments from human nature provide us with sufficient reason to

support enhancement technologies?

Emily Morphy Student Number: 600011989

June, 2013 I hereby certify that, except where references show otherwise, all the material

contained in the attached dissertation is entirely my own work.

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Figure 1. The mythological depiction of the story of Prometheus. In this image Prometheus is receiving punishment from the Gods, after stealing fire to give to

mankind.

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Table of Contents 1) Introduction ................................................................................................................... 4 2) Defining enhancement technologies ..................................................................... 8 2.1) The enhancement/treatment distinction .............................................................. 8 2.2) Do means matter morally? ....................................................................................... 12

3) Human nature in the enhancement debate ...................................................... 14

4) Assessing the transhumanist approach through philosophical anthropology .................................................................................................................... 18 5) Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 28

6) References ................................................................................................................... 29

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1) Introduction This essay will propose that transhumanist arguments from human

nature do not provide us with sufficient reason to support enhancement

technologies. After clarifying the concept of enhancement, I will provide a

framework for understanding how human nature is used within the

enhancement debate. Specifically, transhumanist literature refers to human

nature both explicitly and implicitly and rests on a historically prevalent view

that humans are by nature meant to master nature (Merchant, 1989). Drawing

on the work of Arnold Gehlen, I propose this is an accurate observation.

However, I argue that this observation alone cannot provide us with sufficient

reason to support enhancement technologies. In particular, I suggest the

tranhumanist movement uses the human drive to mastery to uphold their

morally singular approach towards human nature (Murray, 2007). This

approach fails to acknowledge that mans ability to “act within the world” is

fundamentally connected to his “organic deficiencies” (Gehlen, 2002).

Following this, I argue the transhumanist movement needs to adopt a more

detailed, unified understanding of human nature in their endeavour to change it.

Nevertheless, before addressing the above arguments in turn, one must

have an understanding of the enhancement debate at hand. Transhumanism is a

loosely defined philosophical movement, which supports the use of

enhancement technologies to overcome the limitations of human nature

(Bostrom, 2005(a): 202). Transhumanists seek to guide us towards a

“posthuman” condition (More, 1996). In this posthuman condition, individuals

will have, “greatly exceeded the maximum central capacities currently attainable

to man” (Bostrom, 2008: 1). For instance, transhumanists often visualise vast

increases in human health-‐span. “Healthspan” is our capacity to remain fully

healthy, active and productive, both mentally and physically, and it has been

suggested that the maximum healthspan currently attainable to man does not

exceed far past 80 years1. However, if one could drastically slow down the aging

1 Although individuals often live longer than 80 years old, they do not normally retain the capacity to be fully healthy, active and productive past this age, nor in

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process through genetic engineering2 they might stretch our healthspan to

unimaginable lengths, making it posthuman (Bostrom, 2008: 7). With such a

posthuman healthspan, individuals would live longer, indefinitely free from

disease and aging, exploring a wide range of desirable life-‐plans. However,

transhumanists are not only concerned with improving the human healthspan,

but insist all central human capacities should be brought to a posthuman level

(Bostrom, 2008: 7). In particular, transhumanists discuss increasing our

intellectual and physical capacities, as well as the level of control we have over

our emotional states and moods (Bostrom, 2005(a): 202-‐3). Transhumanists

believe through improving our general central capacities, we will not only begin

to overcome our biological limitations, but will be able to explore the “larger

space of possible modes of being” (Bostrom, 2005(b): 19). The possible modes of

being attainable in a posthuman state would be better and more worthwhile

than those available to us now in our limited human states (Bostrom, 2005(b):

19). Following this, transhumanists often emphasis the moral urgency of

bringing about a posthuman state through enhancement technologies, helping us

to lead better lives and overcome suffering (Bostrom, 2005(b): 19)

In promoting widespread use of enhancement technologies to bring about

a posthuman state, transhumanists emphasize the importance of both

morphological and reproductive freedom (Bostrom, 2005(a): 203).

Morphological freedom maintains that individuals should be allowed broad

discretion over which technologies to apply to themselves. Similarly,

reproductive freedom insists parents should be free to decide which

reproductive technologies to use when having children (Bostrom, (a) 2005: 203).

The reason these freedoms are crucial to the transhumanist agenda, is to avoid

any single or authoritarian approach towards enhancement technologies being

imposed on all (2005(a): 205). The movement recognises that individuals will

comparison to their younger selves. Following this, we may differentiate healthspan enhancements from lifespan enhancements. The latter would include living longer, without living younger for longer. (Bostrom, 2008: 7) 2 See Gems, David. (2003). Is More Life Always Better? The New Biology of Aging and the Meaning of Life. The Hastings Center Report 33 (4). pp.31-‐39 for further details on the progress and research going into finding the, “gene for aging”.

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differ profoundly on their beliefs towards human enhancement, and should be

free to express such beliefs (2005 (a): 203). One may question whether

morphological or reproductive freedom could really prevent such outcomes. Yet,

for the purposes of our discussion it is more significant to acknowledge how

transhumanism emphasises individual self-‐expression and self-‐creation as being

an authentic and valuable part of human enhancement (DeGrazia, 2000).

Drawing on Thomas Murray’s discussion of ‘human nature within the

enhancement debate’, we will consider in greater depth, this transhumanist idea

of “the self-‐made man” (Murray, 2007: 502). Specifically, I will analysis whether

such an understanding of man is persuasive, or provides us with a reason to

support enhancement technologies. After all, wilful self-‐design is seen as a

distinctly human enterprise by transhumanists, and often valued for its own sake

(Murray, 2007: 501).

Despite the suggestions above, the range of individuals who oppose the

use of enhancement technologies to alter the human condition may be called

‘bio-‐conservatives’ 3 (Bostrom, 2005 (a): 202). Some of the influential writers

within this field include, Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, Bill McKibben, George

Annas, Wesley Smith and Jeremy Rifkin. Bio-‐conservatives often demand broad

bans on enhancement technologies, producing a large variety of objections to

support this claim (Bostrom, 2005(a): 202). Nevertheless, Baylis and Robert,

suggest most of the bio-‐conservative objections to enhancement technologies

typically belong to one of the following categories (Baylis and Robert, 2004: 5):

(i) enhancement technologies are intrinsically wrong; (ii) the effectiveness of

enhancement technologies, and their likely negative biological consequences;

(iii) the widespread misuse of enhancement technologies, producing harmful

social consequences; and (iv) the means of achieving laudable ends are not all

equally morally meritorious (Baylis and Robert, 2004: 6). Criticisms belonging to 3 As noted by Parens in “Authenticity and Ambivalence: Towards Understanding the Enhancement Debate” (2005: 34), the contra-‐enhancement, bio-‐conservative camp does not merely consist of political conservatives. Following this, the difference between bio-‐conservatives and transhumanists should not be understood in purely political terms. There are a large number of those opposed to enhancement technologies are also political liberals, such as, Susan Bordo, Alice Dreger, Carl Elliott, and Thomas Murray to name a few.

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the first category, may question whether enhancement technologies will

transgress divine or natural laws. Such objections can be argued on either

religious or secular grounds, and oppose a transhumanist understanding of

“what it means to be human” (Baylis and Robert, 2004: 6). In the second

category, enhancement technologies are criticised for fear of threatening genetic

diversity, or entailing an unacceptable level of risk of harm for those being

enhanced. Similarly, the third category of objections reject enhancement

technologies on the basis they threaten to widen the gap between the “haves”

and the “have-‐nots”, promote social conformity and homogeneity, undermine

free choice and would entail a misuse of social resources (Baylis and Robert,

2004: 6-‐13). Finally, the last category questions whether the means by which

certain enhancement technologies try and achieve praiseworthy ends matter

morally.

The categories proposed by Baylis and Robert demonstrates the range of

objections used by bio-‐conservatives within the enhancement debate4. This

essay is not an attempt to address all criticisms directed at the transhumanist

agenda. However, I will consider whether various bio-‐conservative objections,

particularly those surround human nature, become more persuasive in light of

observations made within philosophical anthropology. In doing so, I will

encourage one to consider whether a pro-‐enhancement “romantic-‐Promethean”

view of human nature, being to dominate nature, should really be seen as a

persuasive approach, leading to desirable outcomes (Murray, 2007: 501).

Furthermore, although the divide between those pro and contra-‐enhancement is

very distinct, it is important to remember that a key difference between those

who are anti-‐enhancement and pro-‐enhancement largely rests on an

appreciation of different values (Parens, 2005). As noted by Bostrom, bio-‐

conservatives draw attention to the ‘subtle human values’ they fear will be

4 I have draw upon the categories discussed by Francoise Baylis and Jason Robert. However, objections to enhancement technologies are often used in combination with each other, making a case against enhancement more persuasive. Furthermore, the suggested categories do not represent all criticisms ever use within the context of this debate, mainly a variety of which are commonly used by bio-‐conservatives.

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eroded by technological mastery, claiming transhumanists need to develop more

sensitivity for these concerns (Bostrom, 2005(b): 22). Meanwhile,

transhumanists emphasize the possible improvements for human well-‐being and

flourishing attainable through technological advance, arguing that bio-‐

conservatives should try and appreciate the realization of these great values

made possible by venturing beyond, rather than preserving, our current state

(Bostrom, 2005(b): 22). Nevertheless, both perspectives agree we face a realistic

prospect of technological development that will enable us to substantially

transform the human condition in this century (Bostorm, 2005 (b): 22).

2) Defining enhancement technologies

2.1) The enhancement/treatment distinction

In discussing the permissibility of enhancement technologies it is

important to understand what is included and excluded by the term. What do we

mean when we say someone has been enhanced? What is the difference between

technologies that work as a therapy and those that take an individual beyond

“normal” functioning or health? Enhancement technologies come in a variety of

forms and are typically contrasted with technologies used for therapy or

treatment. However, the distinction between therapy and enhancement may

sometimes appear arbitrary (DeGrazia, 2005(a)). Therefore, let us acknowledge

the difficulty in tightly defining enhancement technologies before questioning

how such technologies threaten different ideas of what it means to be human.

The term ‘technology’ itself can be used to express almost any range of

different things, actions, processes, methods and systems (Kline, 2003: 209). For

both Heidegger and Jacques Ellul, technology was an entire way of being in the

world, a social and material phenomena (Kass, 2002: 33). Hence, while the term

often refers to a particular tool or machine, it also refers to a wide range of

techniques outside of the merely physical or material (Kass, 2002: 32). Similarly,

when speaking of “enhancement technologies” one may be addressing a

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multitude of different processes, ranging anywhere from drinking coffee to

nanotechnology. Nevertheless, enhancement technologies can be defined as,

“those technologies employed for the purpose of enhancement” (DeGrazia,

2005(b): 205). Under this definition, the same technology will appear to be an

enhancement in certain contexts, yet not in others (DeGrazia, 2005 (b): 206).

Following this, DeGrazia suggests exercise, cosmetic surgery, SSRIs, steroids, and

genetic technologies can all be seen as enhancements when used to fulfil a desire

for self-‐improvement, beyond what is needed for normal health (Juengst, 1998:

32; DeGrazia, 2005(a): 263). On the other hand, when these technologies are

used to restore an individual back to normal health, or in response to genuine

medical needs, they may be considered a therapy or treatment. Although both

forms of technologies are aimed towards human improvement, the purposes for

which they are used is what allows us to identify them (Juentst 1998: 32;

DeGrazia, 2005(a): 263).

However, DeGrazia acknowledges some of the difficulties that arise from

the common enhancement/therapy distinction. He notes that in certain cases the

distinction between treatment and enhancement will appear arbitrary because

our distinction between normal and abnormal health will sometimes appear

arbitrary (DeGrazia, 2005(a): 263). Consider his discussion of the drug Prozac.

DeGrazia refers to the example of a woman called ‘Marina’, who desires to use

Prozac as a means of improving her personal life, sociability and performance at

work (DeGrazia, 2000: 35). Although she suffers from various psychological

issues, she does not have any diagnosable disorder. Therefore, Marina’s use of

Prozac would be seen as an enhancement, bringing her to a state that is above

normal functioning health and making her “better than well”(Elliot, 2003).

However, one might reasonably question this distinction. Specifically, one might

reject the idea that Marina should not receive Prozac on the basis it is an

enhancement that would not be responding to any genuine medical needs. After

all, it has been argued that patients such as Marina are not meaningfully or

significantly different from those patients who barely qualify as having a

psychological disorder, yet are still prescribed the drug as treatment (DeGrazia,

2005(a): 263). Following this, it is not clearly identifiable when technologies

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such as Prozac finish working as a therapy and start acting as a form of

enhancement.

Similarly, the growing demand for synthetic growth hormone (GH) in

America also helps demonstrate how the distinction between normal and

abnormal health can appear arbitrary5. Children who are very short due to a

deficiency in growth hormone, are prescribed synthetic GH as a treatment.

However, there are children who are equally as short, yet classified as “normal”

because their height is inherited from their parents and they have acceptable

levels of GH (DeGrazia, 2005(b): 206). For these children to receive synthetic GH

it would be considered an enhancement. Yet, both groups of children suffer the

same disadvantages of being short in a culture that values tall stature and stand

to gain equally from receiving the drug (White, 1993; Parens, 1998: 6).

Therefore, one may question how meaningful it is to claim that the first group of

children are receiving a treatment to bring them to normal functioning health,

while the second group would be receiving an enhancement that takes them

above and beyond normal functioning health. Arguably the

treatment/enhancement distinction merely obscures our responsibility to

respond to the equal suffering of both groups and should be revaluated (Parens,

1998: 6). After all, if both groups of children will gain equally from receiving

synthetic GH, how is the latter group being made better than well, or being

taking beyond normal functioning health? Again the distinction between normal

and abnormal health appears weak. Furthermore, the capacities used to

distinguish normal health, not only vary within a population but also within the

lifespan of a single individual (Roache, 2007: 122). Consider, as humans mature

their physical and mental capacities increase within certain boundaries, yet as

they grow old, these same capacities decline drastically (Roache, 2007: 122).

Following this, one may question whether a technology that would enable an

elderly person to have the same physical stamina, visual acuity and reaction time

as he experienced in his youth, would constitute as an enhancement or a therapy

5 For background, see White, Gladys. (1993). Human Growth Hormone: The Dilemma of Expanded Use in Children. Kennedy Institute of Ethics. Journal (3), pp.401-‐409.

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(Roache, 2007: 122)? This type of intervention would restore an individual’s

capacities back to those experienced in earlier life, reducing the risk of illness

and disease. Nevertheless, such an intervention may be understood as existing

outside the proper domain of medicine, working as a healthspan enhancement to

slow the aging process past normal functioning health (Roache, 2007: 122).

Following this, Erik Paren’s acknowledges at the root of this problem, is

the failure to find a single, universally accepted conception of what “health” is

(Parens, 1998: 3). Consider, Norman Daniels or those who uphold a “hard-‐line”

conception of health, which define a healthy state as one that is free from disease

and disability (Parens, 1998: 3). On the other hand, the World Health

Organisation define their concept of health as a “state of complete physical,

mental and social well-‐being” (Parens, 1998: 3). Following these definitions, it is

not surprising that we struggle to find a universally accepted definition of what

“going beyond health to enhancement” means, since the concept of “health” itself

is under question (Parens, 1998: 3). After all, if one believes being healthy is

being free of disease, then Marina’s use of Prozac will be an enhancement,

whereas if one supports a definition of health closer to that of the World Health

Organisation, her use Prozac would be classified as a treatment. Equally, the

definition of health one endorses would influence their stance on whether

children with “normal” GH should receive synthetic GH, or whether certain

technologies are outside the proper domain of medicine. Hence, whilst the

definition of “health” one supports is no trivial matter, it is important to

acknowledge that an element of personal opinion always plays a role within the

context of this debate, meaning our definition of what is an enhancement or an

enhancement technology suffers under exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless,

although the status of an enhancement technology can be problematic, DeGrazia

suggests that such a distinction, however vague, is identifiable in most cases

(DeGrazia, 2005(a): 263). Specifically, it is identifiable with those technologies

that look to fundamentally alter the human condition and bring about a

posthuman state, such as genetic engineering or nanotechnology. Furthermore,

bio-‐conservatives need this distinction in order to name the class of intervention

they intend to oppose and to prevent the concept of enhancement from

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collapsing into a concept of technology more generally (Roache, 2007: 122;

DeGrazia, 2005(a): 263). For these reasons, this essay will continue on the basis

that such a distinction can be meaningfully discussed.

2.2) Do means matter morally?

As suggested, an enhancement technology is a technology employed for

the purposes of enhancement-‐ fulfilling a desire for self-‐improvement beyond

what is needed for “normal” functioning health. Nevertheless, DeGrazia suggests

another common way enhancements are identified by is the nature of their

‘means’, regardless of whether or not the intervention is deemed medically

necessary (DeGrazia, 2000: 36; Juengst, 1998: 38). He believes many forms of

self-‐improvement are identified and deemed admirable if they are achieved by

natural means. Similarly, other forms of self-‐improvement are identified as being

artificial and hence morally problematic (DeGrazia, 2000: 36). For example, if an

individual studies for an exam or exercises, his activities are praised as virtuous,

enhancing physical and intellectual development. On the other hand, if an

individual uses Ritalin to improve intellectual achievements or steroids to

improve athletic performance, his enhancements are understood as artificial,

corrosive shortcuts that render the self-‐improvement they produce as morally

suspect (DeGrazia, 2000: 36).

However, transhumanists reject a distinction between the artificial and

the natural, emphasising the way in which unnatural enhancement technologies

pursue the same desirable goals or ends as generic enhancement (Baylis and

Robert, 2004: 5; Parens, 1998: 12). Parens describes this as “an argument from

precedent” (Parens, 1998: 12). Despite never being put into such an explicit

form, he suggests the implicit structure of this argument is as follows: We’ve

always used means A to achieve end A; means B also aims to achieve end A;

therefore means B is morally unproblematic (Parens, 1998:12). For example,

Savulescu makes a claim such as this when discussing genetic engineering. He

writes, “there is no morally relevant difference between producing a smarter

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child by immersing that child in a stimulating environment, giving the child a

drug, or directly altering the child’s brain or genes” (Savulescu, 2007: 522).

Despite, some of these interventions being “artificial” and some being “natural”,

Savulescu insists such a distinction is irrelevant, for in all cases the child’s

intellectual development is improved. Furthermore, without a morally relevant

difference between natural enhancement and artificial enhancement, why not

support enhancement technologies also looking to improve the human condition

as simply being “more of the same” (Baylis and Robert, 2004: 13; Brock, 1998)?

Yet, Cole-‐Turner suggests the objection regarding ‘means’ is not merely a

superficial claim that natural is always good and artifice is always bad (Cole-‐

Turner, 1998: 152). To claim human enhancement is praiseworthy only when it

is achieved by natural means would be a limited argument (Cole-‐Turner, 1998:

152). It would provoke questions such as, why is the “natural” better than the

“artificial”? However, new artificial means of self-‐improvement will most likely

help us achieve our goals more quickly and efficiently than natural means.

Furthermore, it is not necessarily clear that we are “natural beings” who are

meant to exist “naturally”, in any strict sense of the word. This idea will be

discussed at greater length with Gehlen, who suggests humans have always lived

in a “second nature” (Gehlen, 2002: 66). Nevertheless, for now it is significant to

note that arguments based on “means”, do not necessarily reject enhancement

technologies simply because they are artificial or unfamiliar. Rather, bio-‐

conservatives question whether the means of human enhancement are purely

instrumental, or could be understood as valuable in themselves, independent of

their ends (Cole-‐Turner, 1998: 155; Baylis and Robert, 2004: 13). Whilst

transhumanists suggest enhancement technologies, from education to germ-‐line

engineering, all exist on a continuum which promotes the same goal of human

enhancement, bio-‐conservatives do not think it is clear the ends justify the use of

any and all possible means (Baylis and Robert, 2004: 13). They suggest that the

experience of human accomplishment may be valuable rather than just the

accomplishment itself. For instance, the experience of climbing a mountain peak

may be valuable due to the physical and mental discipline, the experience of the

gradually opening vistas, and the sense of personal accomplishment involved in

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climbing, all independent of reaching the peak itself (Cole-‐Turner, 1998: 155).

Hence, if one was to fly to the top of the mountain rather than climb it, they

might feel “cheated” of the experience of climbing, despite achieving their end

more easily. Similarly, certain enhancement technologies might “cheat us” of the

value experienced by the traditional means of human enhancement primarily

because they help us achieve our ends more efficiently (1998: 155).

Following from this, Leon Kass suggests enhancement technologies

disrupt the character of a human ‘being-‐at-‐work-‐in-‐the-‐world’ and presents us

with issues surrounding ‘authenticity’ (Kass, 2003). He claims enhancement

technologies that allow us to skip certain means of experience, cannot really

produce a transformation that is genuinely our own as an individual or a human

being (2003). On the other hand, DeGrazia suggests that “the self” is not a not a

pre-‐existing reality that we should conform too (DeGrazia, 2000: 36). Rather, he

understands authenticity and self-‐creation as being process in which we shape

ourselves, and choose the means for ‘self-‐design’ (2000: 37). Underpinning the

concept of “authenticity” is the idea that, if one is not true to themselves as a

human being, they will, “miss the point of their life, they will miss what being

human is for them” (Parens, A: 35). Following this, Parens acknowledges that

different conceptions of authenticity grow out of different understandings of

ourselves and our proper relationships to the world (Parens, A: 36). However,

what exactly are the different understandings of ourselves, and how may they

determine a proper relationship towards enhancement?

3) Human nature in the enhancement debate

As suggested, developments within molecular biology may eventually

make it possible for us to alter our condition, or fundamentally remake human

nature (Gannet, 2010). Although it is worth noting that discussion into this topic

is highly speculative, already in 1969 Sinsheimer claimed, “for the first time, in

all time, a living creature understands its origin and can undertake to design its

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future” (in Kevles, 1992: 18; Buchanan et al, 2000: 87). Transhumanist

aspirations may not only threaten the survival of the species but will challenge

our basic idea of what it means to be human (Stock, 2002: 1). Following this,

Hans Jonas suggests a reflection on the “image” of man and on what is humanly

desirable is more urgent than ever before (Jonas, 2003: 200). Unfortunately,

Jonas also suggests, that “philosophy is sadly unprepared for this task” (2003:

200). Perhaps a key reason for this is that there is no single, universal

understanding of the “image” of man. As demonstrated by Leslie Stevenson and

David Haberman, some individuals are inclined to view humans as essentially

the products of evolution, programed to pursue self-‐interest, reproduce genes

and fulfil biological drives (Haberman and Stevenson, 1998: 3). Others insist

there exists some transcendent, objective, potentially divine purpose for human

lives and human history (1998: 3). Meanwhile, writers such as Marx, suggest

there is no such “essential” human nature, only the capacity to be moulded by

society and its economic, political and cultural forces (1998: 3). Nevertheless,

different ideas of the human are not only important to the individual, but

radically affect the kind of society we live in and the kind we would like to live in

(Trigg, 1998: 2). As noted by Trigg “without some conception of what it is to be

human, no one can say much about human societies or practices” (1998: 3).

Following this, Murray acknowledges three key ways of thinking about

human nature in relationship to the ethics of enhancement (Murray, 2007: 502).

He suggests human nature can be viewed as either raw material, as a contour of

the given, or as a normative guide. Of these perspectives, the transhumanist

movement upholds a view human nature as raw material. This approach

involves an acceptance that our nature holds no moral significance (2007: 502).

Whilst it is often argued by bio-‐conservatives there is something “precious” in

our given nature we should preserve from enhancement technologies,

transhumanist’s reject such claims. For instance, Leon Kass argues, “We need

more than a generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. We need a particular

regard and respect for the special gift that is our own given nature” (Kass, 2003).

However, Nick Bostrom suggests the “gifts” of nature are “sometimes poisoned

and should not be accepted” (2005(a): 205). In particular, he believes our own

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“own species-‐specified natures are a rich source of much that is thoroughly

unrespectable and unacceptable-‐ susceptibility for disease, murder, rape,

genocide, cheating, torture, racism.” (2005(a): 205). Consequentially, human

nature does act as a guide to what is desirable or normatively right for

transhumanists, but rather is seen as ‘‘raw material’ to be moulded how we

desire (Murray, 2007: 503; Bostrom, 2005(a): 205). For instance, Bostrom

describes human nature as, “a work-‐in-‐progress, a half-‐baked beginning we can

learn to remould in desirable ways” (Bostrom, 2003: 493). When accepting

human nature as raw material, an acknowledgement of human “plasticity”-‐ the

belief that our bodies are malleable, and transformable-‐ is necessary (Silver,

1998). Following this, transhumanists suggest it is not only permissible to

change ourselves through cosmetic surgery or performance enhancing drugs, but

also through more radical alterations (Murray, 2007: 503). In particular, genetic

engineering becomes acceptable on the basis it may help us transform into the

creatures we imagine we want to be and overcome our current biological

limitations.

Nevertheless, whilst transhumanists primarily view human nature as raw

material with no moral authority, they tend to emphasis another key aspect of

our nature when discussing enhancement technologies. This aspect is, “our

ability to intend coupled with the skill to remake ourselves according to our own

design” (Murray, 2007: 503). Through emphasising this capacity, transhumanists

argue enhancement technologies would not undermine, but rather improve,

what is “fundamentally human” (Savulescu, 2007: 531). Julian Savulescu, for

example, makes this claim through his discussion of performance enhancing

drugs in sport. He writes, “Far from being against the spirit of sport, biological

manipulation embodies the human spirit-‐ the capacity to improve ourselves on

the basis of reason and judgement. When we exercise our reason, we do only

what humans can do” (Savulescu, 2004: 667). Gregory Stock makes a similar

point in his book, “Redesigning Humans”, when he refers to the mythological

story of Prometheus. In this story Prometheus improves the human condition

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permanently after he steals fire from the Gods to give to man6 (Stock, 2002: 2).

However, Stock suggests we do not find Prometheus’ actions shocking because

they are “too characteristically human”, as is the desire for us to improve

ourselves with radical human enhancements once such technology becomes

available (2002: 2). Following these observations, one may argue Stock and

Savulescu allow an exception to the idea of human nature is raw material with no

moral authority (Murray, 2007: 503). These arguments understand human

nature in a morally singular way, suggesting that, “people should shape

themselves. Wilful self-‐design, from this perspective is a distinctly human

enterprise and therefore to be valued for its own sake. We are meant to be self-‐

makers” (Murray, 2007: 501-‐3).

Despite claims above, a central idea within bio-‐conservativism is our

obligation to understand human nature “as contours of the given”. To view

human nature “as contours of the given”, is to dismiss the idea that human

wilfulness and technical skill could provide us with a reason to support radical

enhancement technologies or unlimited human enhancement. In ‘The Case

Against Perfection’, Michael Sandel rejects such technologies on the basis they

fail to acknowledge our responsibility to express gratitude for the giftedness of

life (Sandel, 2007). He writes, “ if bioengineering made the myth of the ‘self-‐made

man’ come true, it would be difficult to view our talents as gifts for which we are

indebted, rather than as achievements for which we are responsible. This would

transform three key features of our moral landscape: humility, responsibility and

solidarity” (Sandel, 2007: 86). Leaving aside whether his predictions are

accurate for the moment, we can begin to discern the deeper danger for Sandel

(Parens, 2005: 37; Murray, 2007). He is arguing, on secular grounds, against

hyper-‐agency, or rather the Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including

human nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires (Sandel, 2007: 88).

If we perused this “Promethean aspiration” through enhancement technologies,

we would forget that life is a gift-‐ albeit from an unknown giver-‐ would mistake 6 N.B. Gehlen himself also makes a comparison to man and Promethues. He writes, “Like Prometheus, he must direct his energy to what is removed, what is not present in space or time […] he lives for the future and not the present” (2002: 62).

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the sort of creatures we really are and the way the world really is (Parens, 2005:

37). In contrast to transhumanist accounts of human nature, this perspective

does not see man as unlimitedly manipulable (Murray, 2007: 503). It does not

prioritize human wilfulness and technical skill over all other human capacities,

and it encourages more modesty over our ability to alter our nature and our

ability to decide which alterations are desirable (Murray, 2007: 503). Murray

suggests Sandel’s approach understands human nature as being, “complex and

often morally ambiguous, [telling] us something about the boundaries of what is

possible and desirable” (2007: 503). Whilst some enhancements are “out of

bounds”, others fit well into the contours of our given nature. It is under these

grounds that bio-‐conservatives such as Sandel attempt to reject transhumanist

aspirations for enhancement technologies, yet not all technology in general.

However, to what extent is the Promethean aspiration to re-‐make nature

a fundamental part of human nature? Furthermore could transhumanists be

justified in elevating it above all other human capacities to form a case for

enhancement technologies? Before claiming that the “idea of the self-‐made man”

is a myth, or that we have a responsibility to express gratitude for the giftedness

of life, I believe one must clarify their understanding of what it means to be

human. Turning to observations made within philosophical anthropology, one

may begin to achieve such clarification.

4) Assessing the transhumanist approach through philosophical anthropology

As suggested, human wilfulness and technical skill is emphasised

throughout transhumanist literature. Drawing on the work of Arnold Gehlen, one

may initially find vast support and justification for these claims. For instance,

using Herders concept of the deficient being, Gehlen suggests the basic defining

characteristic of man is “action” (Gehlen, 2002: 62; Gehlen, 2003: 213) According

to Gehlen, the use of weapons, fire and hunting techniques, all belong to the

behaviour patterns designed to preserve the species. Specifically, Gehlen

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discusses “replacement techniques” that allow us to preform beyond the

potentials of our organs, such as fire, which provides man with more security

and warmth than he could on his own (Gehlen, 1980: 3). “Strengthening

techniques”, that allow us to extend the performance of our bodily equipment

whilst still reinforcing natural abilities, such as our use of a hammer, microscope

or telephone (1980: 3). Furthermore, Gehlen suggests man also uses, “facilitation

techniques”, which operate to relieve burdens placed upon human organs, saving

them effort and disengaging them-‐ for example, a wheeled vehicle relieves us

from transporting materials by hand (1980: 3). Although he acknowledges

certain technologies may operate on all three principles-‐ consider an airplane

that provides us with wings we do not have, out preforms animal flight and

relieves us of contributing to our own movement-‐ it is significant to note that

Gehlen, like transhumanists, also makes a connection between mans organic

shortcomings and his ability to rise above such shortcomings through inventive

intelligence7 (2003: 213). Following these observations, it is unsurprising

transhumanists such as Bostrom discuss the human capacity to “expand the

boundaries of their existence and to find a way around the limitations and

obstacles experienced in life” (Bostrom, 2005(b): 1). However, what exactly are

man’s organic shortcomings? Furthermore, how do such shortcomings connect

to inventive intelligence or enable the development of technology?

Gehlen suggests man is unable to survive in any natural, uncultivated

environment, primarily due to his morphological deficiencies (Gehlen, 2002: 63).

In a biological sense, such deficiencies amount to a lack of adaptation, a lack of

specialization, and a failure to develop, all of which are essentially negative

features (2002: 63). For instance, in Der Mensch, Gehlen uses evidence from

comparative embryology to insist that the human gestation period is too short

(by several months) to bring a human foetus to the same level of maturity at

birth as the foetuses of closely related species (Gehlen, 1980: 3). Similarly,

7 This connection was first made by Ernst Kapp in his Philosophie der Technik (1877) and shortly after by Ludwig Noire in Das Werkzeug [The Tool] (1880) where he wrote: “Then man became released from his nature, for he became his own creator, created his own organs, became a tool maker, a tool making animals”. (Gehlen, 2003: 213)

20

Gehlen discusses the human “bite”, in order to demonstrates how a lack of gaps

between the teeth and an undetermined structure make him neither a herbivore

nor a carnivore (Gehlen, 2002: 63). Providing examples such as these, Gehlen

describes man as an “undetermined” and “unfinished” being-‐ by this, Gehlen

means man is a problem to himself, having to draw on his own aptitudes and

talents in a way no other animal does simply to survive (2002: 61). For instance,

he notes that humans have no natural protection against inclement weather,

have no natural organs for defence or attack, need an unusually long period of

protection during infancy and may be viewed as having a dangerous lack of

instincts (2002: 63). However, whilst humans are characterised by their

deficiencies, Gehlen believes other organic forms tend to become highly

specialized and adapted to specific environments within natural development.

For example, deep oceans, rivers, rainforests, and mountain ranges are all

specific environments where we find specialized animals suited to survive in

such areas (2002: 63). Even a comparison of humans to great apes allows us to

see how “hopelessly unadapted” man is in contrast to the rest of nature-‐ Gehlen

describes great apes as, “highly specialized arboreal animals with overdeveloped

arm for swinging, feet designed for climbing, body hair and power canine teeth”

(2002: 63). Perhaps such observations begin to explain why many other animals

possess much stronger, sharper senses than humans. Nevertheless, although

man exhibits an absence of specialization, which appears primitive from a

developmental, biological standpoint, his “undetermined” nature is essential for

turning survival into both, “his greatest challenge and his greatest

accomplishment” (2002: 61).

Although the above statement needs clarification, we are beginning to

understand what is meant when transhumanists claim that the human desire to

acquire new capacities is as ancient as the species itself8(Bostrom, 2005(b): 1).

8 N.B. In his article, “The History of Transhumanist Thought”, Bostrom discusses the cultural and philosophical antecedents to transhumanism. He does not specifically reference any philosophical anthropologist. Nevertheless, I have chosen Gehlen’s work in an endeavour to provide a unified explanation for how, and why, man has been able to overcome the limitations experienced in life.

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As noted, most animals have a specialized organic structure. This organic

structure has adapted to an unchanging environment and allows specific, innate,

instinctive behaviour to be carried out within this environment (Gehlen, 2002:

64). Following this, Gehlen suggests, animals are “tied” to their environment, that

their specialized organic structure and specific environment are mutually

dependant concepts (2004: 64). On the other hand, human beings who lack

specialization, avoid being constrained to a specific environment and achieve

what Max Scheler describes as “world-‐openness” (Max Scheler, 2002: 52).

Whilst, it initially it appears to be a disadvantage that man is “world-‐open”, for

his perceptions are not only concentrated to what is necessary for basic survival,

it is under these conditions that man is able to reach “his greatest achievement”

and become an “acting being” with a unique place in the world (Gehlen, 2002:

65). Hence, man’s ability to “act” depends on him being unspecialized and

deprived of a natural environment to which he is adapted. However, what

exactly is human “action”, and how is it achieved? Gehlen suggests, “all human

actions are twofold”, meaning firstly, that man actively masters the world around

him by transforming it to serve his purposes (2002: 66). However, to accomplish

this, he believes humans have to draw on a highly complex hierarchy of skills,

establishing a “developmental order of abilities” based on the potential

usefulness of such skills (2002: 66). This order of abilities is “constructed single-‐

handedly by man” –sometimes overcoming internal resistance from man himself.

Nevertheless, it means all human skills, whether sophisticated or basic, are

developed by man through a process of coming to terms with the world, in which

survival is eventually achieved and a ranking order of skills is also developed

(2002: 66).

Furthermore, when discussing mans ability to actively transform the

world to suit his own ends, Gehlen acknowledges there is no such thing as

“natural men” (Gehlen, 2002: 66). Rather, he believes humans exist in a “second

nature”. As suggested, humans are acting beings who master and re-‐create

nature due to their organic deficiencies. Yet, through reconstructing nature to

suit their own needs, humans create a “culture world” or “second nature” within

which they can survive (2002: 67). For Gehlen, the culture world exists for man

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in the same way particular environments exist for animals and explains why

human beings have no natural, geographically defined territories. As long as man

is able to construct a “second nature”, he is able to exist almost anywhere on

earth-‐ whether it be on a mountain or in a forest, on land or on water (2002: 67).

Furthermore, mans self-‐created “second nature”, contains the conditions

necessary for humans to develop “replacement technique”, “strengthening

techniques” and “facilitation techniques” (Gehlen, 2002: 66-‐7; 1980: 3). It is

within the cultural realm, humans are able become “world-‐open”, acting beings,

who create weapons to compensate for those not made readily available to them,

and who devise shelters to protect themselves against the weather (Gehlen,

2002: 66). Following these observations regarding human nature, it would

initially appear we have support for transhumanist arguments from human

nature. After all, Gehlen discusses man in a surprisingly transhumanist manner.

For example, he writes, “no longer an infallible machine in the hands of nature,

[man] himself becomes a purpose and an objective of his own efforts” (Gehlen,

2002: 24). This comment appears to be an extension of Max More’s claim that,

“humans (and transhumansts) are marked by a persistent desire to understand

and control their environment”(More, 1996). After all, from a philosophical

anthropological perspective, More’s statement expresses what we have just

explored. In contrast to animals who must follow their specialized natures,

human beings are “world-‐open” and able to gain control and mastery over their

contact with the world (Gehlen, 2002: 68).

Furthermore, Gehlen has not only provided us with an account of

understanding how human wilfulness and technical skill is able to occur, but he

has demonstrated “action” as the basic defining characteristic of human beings,

allowing them to achieve a unique place within the world (2002: 62). Following

this, wilful self-‐design is a distinctly human enterprise, and transhumanists are

justified to emphasize this point. Beyond this, Gehlen is not the only individual to

emphasis this unique human capacity within philosophical anthropology. It is

also acknowledged by Michael Landmann, who discusses the “anthropine gap” –

referring to the lack of specialization among humans as considered above-‐ as

being a precondition for human “creativity” (Landmann, 2002: 124). For

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Landmann, humanity is not a defective species that compensates for its

deficiencies with creativity. Rather, he believes humanity is ‘creative’ and

consequentially has no need for specialization, which would only work as a

hindrance to it (2002: 125). By claiming that humans are ‘creative’, Landmann

suggests we are able to design and shape our activity independently, raising it

above the mere “behaviour” seen in animals (2002: 125). Furthermore,

Landmann, like Bostrom, refers to the work of Pico Della Mirandola to reiterate

his point: “Other creatures were completed by God; but he left human beings

incomplete and instead lent us a part of his own creative power. With it we

complete ourselves” (in Landmann, 2002: 126).

However, despite initial similarities, the transhumanist account of human

nature differs from those we just looked at in an important respect. Whilst is may

be correct for transhumanists to acknowledge man as an “acting being”, or even

to emphasize human wilfulness and technical skill, transhumanists use such

observations to produce an argument for enhancement technologies. As noted by

Allen Buchanan et al, most theories of human nature do not entertain the

possibility of human nature itself changing, let alone the ways in which it might

be changed by biotechnology (Buchanan et al, 2000: 89) Similarly, Gehlen’s

theory of human nature was not developed for the purpose of impacting any

issues surrounding bioethics. When discussing mans ability to actively transform

the world around him to suit his own ends, Gehlen is not proposing an argument

in favour of man transforming his own biological nature to suit his ends.

Nevertheless, transhumanists such as Stock appear to use such observations to

develop their morally singular approach towards human nature, applauding

enhancement technologies as affirming human wilfulness and technical skill

(Murray, 2007; Stock, 2002). However, as seen in Bostrom’s rejection of the bio-‐

conservative understanding of human nature as a normative guide: ‘There is too

much that is thoroughly unrespectable in human nature (along with much that is

admirable), for the mere fact that X is a part of human nature to constitute any

reason, even a prima facie reason, for supposing that X is good’ (Bostrom, 2008:

20). That is, there is no necessary link between a project or capacities

distinctively human character and its moral desirability (Murray, 2007: 502).

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The fact humans are uniquely “acting beings”, does not in itself constitute a

reason to enhancement human nature, so that what is “fundamentally human”

may also be enhanced. For transhumanists to claim this is the case, means their

argument for human enhancement is subject to the same criticism directed

towards bio-‐conservatives such as Leon Kass. Yet, this is not to suggest that the

link between the distinctly human ability to self-‐make and the intrinsic value of

the project of self-‐making –with enhancement technologies-‐ could never be

made (Murray 2007: 502). Rather, transhumanists need to demonstrate how this

link can be made-‐ how they may elevate one human capacity over the rest.

Furthermore, once they have demonstrated how this link can be made, they

would need to consider whether the distinctly human quality of self-‐making is

limitless, or alternatively, if it may pose constraints on enhancement

technologies.

Following this, we arrive at another issue surrounding the Promethean

notion of the self-‐made man and its legitimacy. Murray produces this criticism

through exploring a separate instance of when wilful self-‐design and self-‐

creation is celebrated (2007: 501). Specifically, he suggests, the Rothmans report

also captures the transhumanist Promethean ideal in its discussion of anorexia.

The report claims, “Anorexia is the cultivation of a specific image as an image-‐ it

is a purely artificial creation and that is why it is so admired, Will alone produces

it and maintains it against considerable odds.” (Rothmans, 2003: 129). Aside

from the fact anorexia threatens to destroy the very self that is both the agent

and object of the impulses towards self-‐design, there is an additional concern

(Murray, 2007: 502). This concern is with the remarkably naïve understanding

of image cultivation as being the pure product of individual will, rather than a

complex interaction between social norms and an individuals search for identity

and acceptance within the world (2007: 502). Murray notes it is no coincidence

that anorexia occurs primarily in young women, who experience strong cultural

preferences for slimness, and whose identity is still largely in formation due to

their age (2007: 502). Similarly, when transhumanists discuss technological self-‐

design as if it will merely be the product of an individuals will, they do not

address the significance of this interplay. Although one’s own values and self-‐

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conceptions choose the means by which an individual creates himself, these

values and self-‐conceptions are impacted by the society or culture that human

beings must necessarily exist in (DeGrazia, 2000: 39). Consequentially, the idea

of the self-‐made man wholly determining himself with biotechnology is, at least

partially, a myth and not a sufficient reason support the use of unlimited

enhancement technologies.

However, Landmann suggested human beings are creative and

independently shape their actions. Yet, how can he make such a claim if an

individuals will is so affected by the culture they are born into the world

receiving? He acknowledges whilst animals have “primary fixations” that last

throughout their entire lives, human beings alternatively must be determinable,

plastic and impressionable to their “second nature” (2002: 132). For instance,

humans are so impressionable that when raised by wolves or bears they actually

begin to take on the habits of these animals, whereas when ducks –or other

animals-‐ are raised amongst chickens they will always follow their nature and go

to the water (2002: 132). However, he suggests this malleability, educability, and

the capacity to learn is, “the psychological counterpole to creativity” and does

not contradict it (2002: 132). Rather, he suggests a productive being is also a

receptive being, that the two things are mutually contained.

Nevertheless, through elevating the human as a being that is unlimitedly

malleable and self-‐creating, I believe transhumanists fail to understand human

nature in the complex or unified way we have explored. Specifically, when

Gehlen suggests survival is both man’s greatest challenge and his greatest

achievement, he believes this must be evident throughout his entire structure

(Gehlen, 2002: 65). Human vulnerabilities form a “coherent whole”, which is

manifested in his world-‐openness and is the foundation for man’s character as

an acting being with a unique place in the world (2002: 64-‐5). However,

transhumanists do not understand man’s ability to control, or master his

surroundings as fundamentally connected to his “undetermined” nature or his

biological deficiencies (2002: 62). In the case of Savulescu, for instance, he

26

suggests the human capacity to make normative judgements and act on the basis

of reason is what separates us from other animals, claiming that biological

manipulations would improve, rather than undermine, what is “fundamentally

human” when they improve our capacity to engage in rational and normative

judgements (Savulescu, 2007: 531). However, Gehlen has formulated a structural

definition of man, which does not rely solely on the characteristics of reasoning,

or of the mind (2002: 64). He suggests these capacities may essentially be seen

as an elaboration of the basic defining characteristic of man-‐ action-‐ and do not

in themselves, “bring light to the relationship between the peculiar human bodily

structure and the human mind” (2002: 63). Furthermore, if transhumanist

arguments from human nature do not bring light to the relationship between the

human bodily structure and the human mind as being a coherent whole, then

they entail a serious limitation. They do not fully understand what it is they are

seeking to change.

Yet, this brings us to a broader problem for the transhumanist movement.

One may argue that the way in which transhumanism attempts to understand

arguments from human nature is insufficient from the beginning as it entails

“scientific reductionism” (Fukuyama, 2002: 162). As acknowledged by Max

Scheler, Western Society does not have any unified idea of man (2002: 45).

Closely related to the Greek tradition that, for the first time, suggested man’s

self-‐consciousness raised him to a unique place on the grounds he is endowed

with ‘reason’, is the doctrine that there is a superhuman ‘reason’ in the total

universe in which man alone of all creatures is the participant (2002: 45). This

view is a tradition of its own, belonging to modern science and genetic

psychology and I believe it is also expressed throughout transhumanism. Scheler

suggests, from this view, man is seen as a recent product of evolution, a being

that is distinguished from its antecedents in the animal world only by the degree

of complexity of energies and capacities that may already be present at a

subhuman level (2002: 45). However, he suggests this increasingly popular view

tends to hide human nature more than it reveals it. He believes -‐in contrast to the

initial claim that “for the first time, in all of time, a species can understand its

origin”-‐ there has been no time in history where man has been so much a

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problem to himself as he is now (pp. 46). Similarly, as noted by Francis

Fukuyama, many contemporary Darwinians believe they have “demystified” the

problem of how humans came to be through the reductionist method of modern

natural science (2002: 162). This is the claim that ultimately every human

characteristic can be traced back to a prior material cause. For instance, one who

holds this view might believe, “any higher-‐order behaviour or characteristic,

such as language, can be traced back through the firing of the neurons to the

biochemical substrate of the brain, which in turn can be understood in terms of

the simpler organic compounds of which it is composed” (Fukuyama, 2002: 162).

However, whilst this type of thinking is not necessarily false-‐ after all, it is the

foundation of extremely successful modern science-‐ it is problematic to the

extent it does not help us sufficiently explain unique human traits and does not

provide us with a unified understanding of man (2002: 162).

Following this, one might want to question whether there would be

increased risks or unintended consequences for enhancement technologies

(Kass, 2003)? After all, without having a unified understanding of human nature,

is there any guarantee the human capacities transhumanists seek to extend

through biotechnology, will actually be extended in the way they expect? Leon

Kass suggests that no biological agent used for the purposes of “self-‐perfection”

or mastery, can ever be entirely safe (Kass, 2003). On the basis of ‘good

conservative medical sense’, Kass believes it is reasonable to assume that

anything powerful enough to enhance system A is likely to be powerful enough

to harm system B, “the body being a highly complex yet integrated whole in

which one intervenes partially only at one’s peril” (2003). However, could

concerns for the risks of enhancement technologies be increased based on

Gehlen’s findings? Arguably, enhancement technologies that would rid man of

his “unfinishedness”, should be revaluated by transhumanists, for they would

simultaneous undermine mans “world-‐openness” or ability to “act”. Although

this is not a criticism to all enhancement technologies promoted by

transhumanists, for not all enhancement technologies would bring about this

effect, it will be relevant to certain pro-‐enhancement agenda’s. For instance, a

transhumanist aspiration to produce a human chimera might seek to genetically

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engineer extra adaptations into the structure of a human from an animal

(Streiffer, 2011). However, this would not merely be a case of adding another

capacity on top of the structure of human capacities already in place, but may

fundamentally restructure the human, perhaps even making him more

specialized to a specific environment or eroding some of the conditions

necessarily needed for him to be an acting being.

5) Conclusion

As has been demonstrated by Gehlen, human beings master and recreate

nature in order to secure their existence. However, this is a necessary process for

a being for whom being is an issue. He must actively transform his environment

to suit his own purposes in order to survive. On the other hand, the process of

mastering or recreating his biological nature to suit his own purposes is not

necessary to survival. Furthermore, it may undermine the unified, coherent

structure that belongs to a human being. Transhumanist arguments from human

nature, in particular, provide us with an account of human nature that elevates

certain human capacities over others, without understanding that the entire

structure interrelated. Following this, transhumanist arguments from human

nature do not provide us with sufficient reason to support all possible

enhancement technologies that may eventually become available.

Transhumanists need to develop their account of human nature. Furthermore,

simply because humans have always mastered nature successfully, does not

mean they should then try and obtain technological mastery over their own

nature.

29

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