“’The Most Belligerent Non-Resistant’: Lucretia Mott on Women’s Rights.” Political Theory...

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Article

“The Most Belligerent Non-resistant”: Lucretia Mott on Women’s Rights

Lisa Pace Vetter1

AbstractLucretia Mott is widely recognized as a moral and spiritual force in the early struggle for women’s rights, but the originality of her political theory has been downplayed in traditional narratives of the suffrage movement. This study reframes Mott’s theoretical contributions and recasts her role in the struggle for women’s rights by drawing from recent revisionist scholarship on Mahatma Gandhi, which reasserts the sophistication of his views on political agency and political power against deep skeptics of nonviolent political action. Careful analysis reveals a set of closely related concepts that form the core of Mott’s thought: an unwavering opposition to dogmatism in all forms; an insistence on freedom, autonomy, and independent thought; and a commitment to a form of political power that is fundamentally democratic, egalitarian, and voluntarist. A revised understanding helps reestablish the importance of Mott’s political theory in the early women’s rights movement, American political thought, and in contemporary feminist theory.

Keywordsearly women’s rights, abolitionism, feminism, pacifism, democratic theory, human rights, Gandhi

1Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD, USA

Corresponding Author:Lisa Pace Vetter, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250, USA. Email: [email protected]

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2 Political Theory

In her 1860 speech delivered to the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society, Quaker abolitionist and early women’s rights advocate Lucretia Mott proclaims,

Robert Purvis has said that I was “the most belligerent Non-Resistant he ever saw.” I accept the character he gives me; and I glory in it. I have no idea, because I am a Non-Resistant, of submitting tamely to injustice inflicted either on me or on the slave. I will oppose it with all the moral powers with which I am endowed.1

The characterization offered by Purvis, an African American abolitionist, captures the paradoxical sense of Mott’s life and work. The diminutive, plainly dressed, sixty-seven-year-old accepts with pride and defiance her sta-tus as a “belligerent” activist who will stop at nothing to combat injustice. Not long after John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry and before the outbreak of the Civil War, as fellow Garrisonians gravely reconsidered their commitment to moral suasion and contemplated supporting force to end slavery, Mott stands before the society and categorically rejects the use of violence.

The paradox of Mott’s nonviolent “belligerence” extends beyond her par-ticular ideas to the ways in which they were received and have been inter-preted. Mott’s influential status among pivotal reformers is well known by historians and biographers, yet she remains largely unknown in political theory. Given Mott’s progressive views and her remarkable achievements in such a tumultuous era of American history, the relative inattention is surpris-ing. Mott envisioned women’s rights in an expansive humanitarian context that included abolitionism, pacifism, temperance, and religious reform. Mott’s prominent role in the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention and her 1849 speech “Discourse on Woman” constitute significant contributions to the early women’s rights movement. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, whose political theory has been analyzed, credits Mott for inspiring her to plan the pivotal 1848 Seneca Falls Convention, for many interpreters the starting point of the women’s rights movement. Mott’s progressive views on religion, which emphasize the equality of men and women and the importance of indepen-dent thought, precedes Stanton’s widely read and deeply controversial Woman’s Bible by almost fifty years.2 Mott’s uncanny ability to maintain cor-dial relations among fiercely competing factions and mediate various con-flicts among early women’s rights activists and abolitionists provides an exemplary yet overlooked model of leadership.

Mott’s tireless struggle against slavery and her unwavering commitment to equality for all African Americans distinguish her from other well-known abolitionists. She founded and actively participated in the longest-lasting




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interracial abolitionist organization in the United States, the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society (PFAS), and her insistence on immediate eman-cipation predates William Lloyd Garrison’s commitment by several years.3 Mott never entertained the possibility of colonization or similar compro-mises. Whereas Stanton’s sense of expediency led her to advocate for wom-en’s suffrage over that of freed black men after the Civil War, Mott never abandoned her conviction that racial and gender equality are inseparable. When many abolitionists, including Garrison, turned away from anti-slavery societies to focus on aiding freedmen after the Civil War, Mott, like Frederick Douglass,4 continued to support both efforts because she knew the detrimen-tal effects of slavery did not end after the conflict and subsequent constitu-tional reforms. Mott’s deep skepticism about the ability of politics alone to enforce fundamental social change proved prescient, as brutal racial oppres-sion persisted in the Reconstruction era and beyond.5

Mott’s achievements are impressive, yet there is little indication at first glance that her views constitute a comprehensive political theory. Mott left behind no treatises or lengthy writings to include in the “canon” of political thought. Instead, her extant works include forty-nine speeches and sermons that were delivered extemporaneously and later transcribed for publication as well as personal correspondence of “kaleidoscopic” breadth. The equally “kaleidoscopic” nature of her commitments, combined with the lack of con-ventional theoretical works, has understandably led to portrayals that empha-size the moral and spiritual significance of Mott’s efforts rather than their theoretical importance.

And yet solid groundwork has been laid for an extended theoretical analy-sis of Mott. Political theorists have established the importance of her prede-cessor Mary Wollstonecraft and her prolific contemporary Stanton.6 Political theorists are expanding on the realization already established in studies of history, literature, and feminism that the exclusion of women from the public realm did not “silence” them but rather compelled them to employ informal modes of communication to convey their theories. For example, recent stud-ies of neglected nineteenth-century women’s rights advocate Hannah Mather Crocker have examined her speeches as alternative modes of theorizing whose philosophical sophistication emerges through detailed analysis.7 American political thought regularly includes prominent figures who were not “professional” philosophers but who offered sustained reflections on the vital questions that animate political life.8 Contemporary political theory has explored the complex understandings of political power held by pacifists and advocates of nonviolence as well as supporters of radical democracy, whose predecessors include Quakers such as Mott.9 My study seeks to expand on these trends in order to rehabilitate the political and theoretical significance




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of Mott’s life and work. What truly sets Mott apart from others, I argue, is the combination of radical principles at the heart of her thinking: anti-dogma-tism, individual freedom and autonomy, and participatory political power.

First, I will evaluate portrayals of Mott in major narratives of the history of women’s rights and abolitionism to show how her theoretical contributions have been minimized or obscured. Then I will turn to Mott’s writings and speeches themselves to bring to light the theoretical principles that animate her work. I return to the narratives of early women’s rights and abolitionism and apply my analysis to reposition Mott and highlight the truly innovative nature of her contributions. I conclude by exploring some instructive paral-lels between Mott’s thought, on the one hand, and contemporary and feminist democratic theory, on the other.

Situating Mott’s Life and Work

Mott has enjoyed elevated status in the received narratives of the early wom-en’s rights movement and Garrisonian abolitionism, and aspects of her work have been explored briefly in American political thought. Yet while these accounts seek to highlight Mott’s contributions, they paradoxically diminish the originality of her ideas and understate their complexity in a variety of ways.

Mott’s position among abolitionists and early women’s rights advocates as a moral and spiritual leader was established early on and has been widely accepted. The narrative that initially emerged from the pivotal multivolume study History of Woman Suffrage portrayed the early women’s rights move-ment as a linear, unified progression from the decentralized and informal approach initiated by Mott and others to the sophisticated theory of women’s equality and concrete plan of action devised by coauthors Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Although the received account carves out an influential role for Mott, it has mischaracterized her real contributions. As Nancy Hewitt explains, while giving Mott and others “the status of foremothers of the wom-an’s rights movement,” Stanton and Anthony “effectively removed them as active participants by claiming 1848 as the moment of its conception and relegating all that came before to prehistory” (emphasis in original).10 And for Carol Faulkner, the accepted “histories of nineteenth-century feminism” focus primarily on Stanton rather than Mott in spite of the fact that “Mott’s life suggests a more complicated, racially egalitarian history of early femi-nism” than Stanton’s.11 By contrast, “to create a narrative of woman’s rights . . . that does justice to the diversity of their origins and the complexity of their development requires . . . a broader definition of politics than is allowed by the conventional Seneca Falls-to-suffrage framing.”12 Because they were




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“less concerned with suffrage than with more general questions of political, economic, educational, and occupational access,” earlier “pioneer feminists” such as Mott “created the foundation on which later generations of women could build antiracist, global, and multicultural coalitions.”13

By portraying her ideas as a direct outgrowth of her Quaker faith and her obedience to Garrison, accounts that recognize Mott as an important aboli-tionist have nevertheless affirmed her unoriginality.14 Garrisonians were notoriously skeptical about politics and believed that slavery could not be abolished exclusively through legal-political means. Instead, they employed moral suasion to appeal to individuals indirectly through petitioning, speeches, and writing. Their convictions coincided with the Quakers’ rejec-tion of coercion at all levels, political and otherwise, and their commitment to pacifism and avoidance of political involvement. Seen in this light, Mott’s hesitation to push for legal and political solutions or engage in direct political action derives simply from her religious beliefs and her support of Garrison.

Recent studies have incorporated Mott’s influential counterparts Wollstonecraft and Stanton into the canon of American political thought and have brought needed attention to the theoretical vitality of the early women’s rights movement. Yet, these examinations too have the paradoxical effect of elevating Mott’s importance while simultaneously downplaying her original-ity. One analysis points to several parallels between Mott’s speeches on women’s rights and Wollstonecraft’s writings to portray Mott as, in effect, a transmitter of her predecessor’s ideas on women’s rights.15 This assessment effectively obscures the important differences between the two women and fails to mention alternative influences that independently shaped Mott’s views in significant ways.

Stanton’s status as “an important American political thinker” has been established by interpreting her corpus from the perspective of liberalism, republicanism, and prominent schools of nineteenth-century thought.16 Although Mott’s influence on Stanton is duly acknowledged, Stanton is por-trayed as ultimately transcending her predecessor by replacing spiritual lam-entations with political action. Stanton “presents a clear contrast to prominent abolitionist women like Lucretia Mott” and other Garrisonians because Stanton ultimately moved beyond their religious strivings for human rights by establishing a comprehensive political theory of women’s rights and a concrete plan for legal and political reform.17 Stanton surpasses Garrisonian women’s rights advocates, including Mott, by developing a “notion of women as a class with the potential to develop consciousness of itself as such and to organize for radical political change.”18 The received narrative of the early women’s rights movement is thereby reinforced as Mott’s moral and spiritual influence is supplanted by Stanton’s theoretical and pragmatic contributions.




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In the next section, I heed Hewitt and Faulkner’s calls for a broader and more nuanced approach by carefully examining Mott’s works largely on their own terms to allow their unique contributions to emerge. I provide a close reading of Mott’s speeches to demonstrate that her religious critique of dog-matism forms an essential component of her broader worldview, including her understanding of women’s rights. What distinguishes Mott’s approach theoretically is that, unlike her contemporaries, she extends Quaker doctrine beyond the religious realm to address all sources of oppression, political and otherwise. I then expand on the political implications of Mott’s anti-dogmatic approach, which forms the basis of a highly participatory, egalitarian, volun-tarist understanding of political power. After analyzing her views on political power, I resituate Mott within the debates on Garrison, Wollstonecraft, and Stanton. Specifically, I argue that Mott occupies a vital middle ground between anarchist Garrisonians, on the one hand, and “Institutionalist” aboli-tionists such as Frederick Douglass, on the other. Mott is deeply indebted to Wollstonecraft, yet she expands on her predecessor’s views on political power and political agency in a number of important ways. The sophistica-tion and complexity of Stanton’s theories are well established, yet Mott over-comes some of the weaknesses in Stanton’s thought and provides a compelling alternative in the history of woman’s rights. In the conclusion, I explore ways in which Mott’s progressivism serves as a precursor to egalitarian, demo-cratic, voluntarist strands of contemporary and feminist theory. We find a far more radical understanding of political power in the “belligerent non-Resis-tant” Quaker than we might expect, and we discover a progressive theory of participatory democracy that has deeper roots in the past than we might realize.

“Truth for Authority, Not Authority for Truth”: Mott’s Anti-Dogmatic Worldview

This phrase, one of Mott’s favorites, is borrowed from a rather unlikely source, Thomas Hobbes. The saying succinctly captures the spirit of Mott’s systematic attack on ideology, doctrine, and dogma, and her insistence on independent reflection and freethinking. The origins of Mott’s anti-dogma-tism can be traced to her early encounter with Elias Hicks, whose influence led to the 1827 Schism of the Society of Friends. Combatting what he per-ceived as an overreliance by worshippers on the Scriptural interpretations of Quaker elites and an undue reverence for the written word at the expense of good works, Hicks sought to reassert the importance of direct, individual encounters with Scriptural teachings and the necessity of actively applying religious principles to everyday life. Concurrent with the Hicksite emphasis




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on practice over principle is a downplaying, and in more radical circles an outright denial, of the divinity of Christ. Hicks also strove to reestablish the prominence of the “inner light” in Quaker practice, a kind of internal voice possessed by all human beings regardless of religious persuasion which nev-ertheless provides a direct connection to the divine. The “inner light” emerges when human beings engage in quiet reflection, hence the term “quietism” to describe the phenomenon. The “inner light” may also emerge when people engage in good acts such as advocating for equality and justice for all people. The extemporaneous speaking or “preaching” by individual members that comprises Quaker practice in religious meetings is inspired by this “inner light.” Although the “inner light” is for Quakers the primary connection between human beings and the divine, the Hicksite understanding required active engagement and reasoning, not passive obedience to the word of God. Hicksites also discouraged formal worship of the Sabbath in favor of encour-aging, as Jesus did, good works at every opportunity, not just on high days and holy days.

Hicks influenced a number of early women’s rights activists and abolition-ists, including Sarah and Angelina Grimke. But Mott innovates by taking what is primarily a religious approach and expanding it in several directions, including the political. The development and expansion of Mott’s anti-doctri-nal approach can be seen in her earliest speeches. Virtually every speech Mott delivered after returning from the 1840 World’s Antislavery Convention in London, where she first encountered Stanton, and leading up to the 1848 Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls begins with a systematic con-demnation of mindless acceptance of religious dogma and unreflective obser-vance of rituals and practices. While commentators have traditionally recognized little notable activity among early women’s rights activists before 1848, these speeches reveal that Mott was formulating a comprehensive worldview that contributed significantly to the movement’s progress.

In an 1841 speech, Mott lays the foundation for her anti-dogmatic approach. She begins by forging a strong connection between truth, freedom, and independent thought.19 Mott then provides a detailed interpretation of Scripture which elaborates on the crucial distinction she draws between sec-tarianism, on the one hand, and the “principles of universal obligation” which “are common to all, and are understood by all,” on the other.20 Acknowledging the controversial nature of her own actions as a female preacher in a male-dominated society, Mott challenges the common view that women should not speak in public. This view is based on St. Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians, which prohibits women from speaking in church. Yet Mott points to the Letter to the Galatians and other Pauline writings that declared men and women to be equal.21 It would therefore be a mistake to interpret Paul’s




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admonition to the Corinthian women as a blanket prohibition against preach-ing or to extrapolate from Scripture an absolute opposition to women speak-ing in public to mixed audiences.

Mott’s understanding of Scripture is not original in itself. The overall framework for the theological attack on dogmatism and sectarianism was laid by Hicks. And key components of her argument, including female role mod-els in the church, as well as the egalitarian messages throughout the Bible, were explored in great detail by the Grimkes, who also drew inspiration from Hicksite teachings as well as the seventeenth-century writings of George Fox and Margaret Fell, the founders of Quakerism. Throughout his long career, Garrison too delivered withering critiques of organized religion.

What is unique about Mott’s message, however, is the overarching attack on all “creeds and forms,” not just theological ones. For Mott, dogmas have been used to justify all sorts of objectionable practices, including “the preva-lence and the general justification of war, and slavery, and oppression . . . [and] all the vices of society.”22 If people reexamined dogmas and doctrines for themselves and thereby achieved true equality, Mott later emphasizes, “We should not see large classes, crushed by existing monopolies, laboring for their scanty pittance,” or “systems of oppression which have been con-formed to so long.”23

Not only should individuals familiarize themselves with sources that are used to devise a doctrine of oppression, religious and otherwise. They should also reflect on their own actions and beliefs to gain a better understanding of the pernicious effects of oppression and even of their own role in uncon-sciously perpetuating injustice. Thus, Mott urges every woman to “look seri-ously at herself” and “learn how great an evil her nature suffers in being prevented from the exercise of her highest faculties.”24 Along similar lines, all people should strive for “knowledge of themselves” and true fulfillment and turn away from “theories and abstractions” and “outward observances.”25 Mott does not restrict her call for self-reflection to her audience. Fully con-sistent with her method, she insists that her own words and deeds be subject to scrutiny as well. Instead of offering her interpretations and ideas as an alternative dogma, Mott insists that her audience test her views by studying the Bible, deciding for themselves if she is correct, and ultimately forming their own conclusions.26

Reinforcing the importance of self-reflection as the basis of just action, Mott moves to the subject of slavery and urges those in her audience to exam-ine their own involvement in its perpetuation, however indirect, “for we are all implicated in the transgression.” Mott continues:




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Let us examine our own clothing—the furniture of our houses—the conducting of trade—the affairs of commerce—and then ask ourselves, whether we have not . . . as individuals, a duty which . . . we are bound to perform.27

Mott’s view of social responsibility clearly places a heavy burden on human beings because it applies not only to those who actually commit injustice but also to those who tolerate or otherwise benefit from it.

Mott expands her attack on dogmatism and sectarianism still further, adapting the Quaker belief in the natural goodness of humankind and opposi-tion to original sin to her broader purposes. “In our earnest endeavor to exalt our favorite forms and rituals,” she explains to fellow Quakers, we regard “our professions of religion more than the practice of righteousness, of good-ness, of truth.”28 Mott draws a parallel between Quakers who mistake habit-ual practice and self-celebration with true faith, on the one hand, and Christians who believe in original sin and seek absolution through rituals and ceremonies, on the other. For Mott, the self-satisfaction displayed by Quakers and the Christian notion that we are naturally “more prone to evil” are equally destructive.29 Both doctrines compromise independent agency by encourag-ing adherents to place more faith in the unreflective, habitual practice of ritu-als than in thoughtful, deliberate actions.

Mott contends that elevating Christ to an abstract level of divinity and emphasizing the miraculous aspects of his actions at the expense of his every-day practical goodness compromises the effectiveness of Christ’s life as a model of behavior for mortals. Human beings are left without an accessible guide and fail to learn “dignity” and “responsibility.”30 Mott also denounces preachers within the Quaker hierarchy who, in their zeal to maintain author-ity, perpetuate this harmful doctrine and declare the divinity of Christ with absolute certainty while overlooking the fundamental unknowability of his divine nature.31

Mott makes a passionate plea for true righteousness born of independent thought by proclaiming that it is “high time there was more christian bold-ness, more moral courage, amongst mankind to speak to the sentiment of their hearts, whether they be in accordance with the popular doctrines of the day or not.”32 Yet she pulls back when her attack on particular forms of sec-tarianism threatens to become yet another dogma: “Far be it from me to judge anyone for practicing such things.”33 Instead, it is up to every individual to discover the most appropriate ways to honor God and live a righteous life.

Mott sheds further light on her theoretical approach with an autobiograph-ical account. She begins by stating that “none can revere more than I do, the truths of the Bible.” Yet she makes clear that discerning those truths demands active critical engagement with the text. The emergence of the Hicksite




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movement, she explains, “led me to examine, and compare text with the con-tent” on her own to such an extent that “I scarcely noted the passage of time.”34 Yet she again pulls back abruptly, lest she encourage her listeners to embrace her enthusiasm without independent reflection. Mott’s love of the Scriptures does not stop her from reexamining them, especially in light of the often destructive doctrines that arise pertaining to slavery and war. “Highly” as she “valued these ancient testimonies, they were not to take the place of the higher law inwardly revealed,” namely, “the governing principle of our lives.”35 With this added step, Mott innovates on Hicksite Quakerism by offering up her own teachings to further scrutiny lest they become yet another set of dogmas.

Not only does Mott want to avoid becoming another source of unques-tioned authority but she extends her critique of dogmatism to Elias Hicks himself. Hicks’s purpose was “to lead the mind to the divine teacher.” Yet for Mott, no worldly educator—not even Hicks—can provide a full understand-ing of “the divine teacher,” whose instruction by definition can never be fully grasped by mere mortals. Instead, one must go beyond or “above men’s teaching” and gain insight into the inner light by one’s own efforts. Mott warns against “an undue veneration of the Bible, or of any human authority, any written record or outward testimony.”36 These remarks indicate the depth of Mott’s attack on ideology and her unwavering insistence on independent thinking and action, both of which are essential to her understanding of wom-en’s rights.

Mott links the principle of self-scrutiny specifically to the cause of wom-en’s rights in her speech “The Laws in Relation to Women.” After rehearsing the Scriptural arguments challenging patriarchal interpretations of the Bible, Mott broadens her critique beyond the Scriptural: “I do not want to dwell too much upon Scripture authority. We too often bind ourselves by authorities rather than by the truth.”37 Mott effectively catches herself doing precisely what her opponents have done by replacing one dogma with another. Instead, as Mott contends, the original “Source” for Biblical inspiration, namely, the inner light of every individual, is the most important authority. This stance provides Mott with a great deal of intellectual freedom: “[I]t does not startle me to hear Joseph Barker point to some of those errors” in the Scripture. “I can listen to the ingenious interpretation of the Bible, given by Antoinette Brown,” the first female ordained minister in the United States and influen-tial women’s rights advocate.38 This openness to divergent points of view and celebration of unfettered inquiry in pursuit of truth reflect the philosophical spirit of Mott’s anti-dogmatism.

The philosophical character of Mott’s critique of ideology is further high-lighted when she declares in a later speech: “I believe that such proving all




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things, such trying all things, and holding fast only to that which is good, is the great religious duty of our age.” The ultimate religious duty for Mott is in fact also a philosophical one: the pursuit of the good through rigorous intel-lectual scrutiny, the replacement of dogma by the “incorruptible spirit which search[es] all things.”39

Mott repeatedly insists that her theory is “no mere Quaker doctrine” but intended to have a universal, secular appeal.40 For “difference of religious opinion need not prevent us from seeing the magnitude of the works of the Lord and feeling that our duty is not limited to our own particular sphere.”41 One need not be a Quaker, or even a Christian, for that matter, to appreciate the good works of Jesus. The anti-dogmatic approach Mott advocates is also fundamentally pluralistic in her view because it seeks to balance unity and diversity. “Although we should retain many of our peculiar views,” she explains, “we might enjoy them without enforcing them upon others.” Rather, the “petition walls of prejudice” that are based on “sectarian and sectional jealousies” must be “broken down” to allow lasting unity to be achieved among a variety of perspectives.42

Careful examination of Mott’s early speeches reveals a multifaceted approach that extends Hicksite Quaker teachings and offers a comprehensive worldview that has important religious, philosophical, and political implica-tions. By adopting a skeptical stance toward dogma, individuals realize the systemic nature of oppression that extends to slavery, women’s equality, eco-nomic injustice, intemperance, and political violence. Oppression emerges when dogmas elude scrutiny and are accepted at face value. All people, including Mott, must engage in self-reflection and recognize their uncon-scious participation in and support of doctrines of oppression. Mott lays the groundwork for radical change by redefining autonomy and by shifting power away from traditional authorities and locating it within every individ-ual. Only when all men and women empower themselves in this way can they reconstruct a pluralistic society in accordance with true freedom, equality, and justice.

Beyond “No-Governmentalism”: Participation, Suffrage, and Political Power

Mott’s views on political power have been interpreted as a reflection of Garrisonian anarchism, which rejected virtually all forms of direct political involvement.43 Garrison referred to Section 9 of Article I and the three-fifths clause of the Constitution to argue that the founding document was funda-mentally pro-slavery. Declaring “No Union with Slaveholders,” Garrison believed that any form of direct political participation represented collusion




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with his opponents, and went so far as to refuse to vote even though, as a white male, he had the franchise. In spite of his aversion to direct political action, he continued vigorous efforts to influence politics indirectly through petitioning, writing, participating in antislavery societies, and supporting antislavery conventions. Garrison’s “no-governmentalism” was so contro-versial, however, that it contributed significantly to the 1840 American Anti-Slavery Society schism between those who supported nonresistance and those who began to seek political solutions to the problem of slavery.44 Many of the latter would go on to form the abolitionist Liberty Party. Garrison’s radical apolitical stance also led Frederick Douglass to distance himself from his friend and colleague, creating a rift between the two men that was never reconciled.

Not only did Garrison formulate a doctrine of nonresistance and disunion. He was also known for advocating a radically different understanding of political life. The extreme aversion to any direct political participation led Garrison and other non-resistants to conclude that only the direct rule of God through the hearts of men would be acceptable. By contrast, political rule of any kind was fundamentally coercive and tyrannical because it deprived human beings of the ability to engage in self-rule, the only path to direct contact with God. Garrisonian anarchists despised the label “no-governmen-talism” imposed by their adversaries and they “insisted that they opposed not government, but human pretensions to govern.”45 But Garrison never explained the “government of God” in detail. Violence, force, coercion, or any form of direct rule of one person over another were prohibited, yet the actual role of individual human beings in this divine government remained unclear.

Close analysis reveals important differences between Mott’s views on political reform and Garrison’s “no-governmentalism.” Mott articulates an understanding of “superior law” that is not only informed by God but also developed through the transformative process of self-reflection and self-examination her anti-dogmatism requires. This “law” requires direct and indirect political participation by women and men alike. Although she acknowledges that political reform is only one of many means by which fun-damental transformation is achieved, Mott does not abandon politics alto-gether. Instead, reformed human rule can emerge by insisting that women be given the right to vote even if the government is corrupt. Women must have a say in the laws they are asked to obey, whether by voting or serving in political office. Women should also participate in a “convention” along with men and devise a new set of rules for self-government. Finally, Mott offers an innovative understanding of citizenship for women based on the worldview that individuals rule themselves and form associations with others that are




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fundamentally egalitarian and voluntary. Thus, it is not anarchy that Mott advocates but rather a radical form of democracy based on her view of autonomy.

For Mott, political injustice must be addressed by applying the very sort of anti-dogmatism she proposes. When religious adherents focus so intently on ceremonies and rituals for the relative security they provide, they lose sight of the “great evils which beset us as a nation,” such as war, slavery, and pov-erty, and fail to do anything to alleviate these injustices.46 Passive acceptance of received doctrines leads to passivity in the face of wrongdoing. For “there is a proneness in us, to put that off upon others, to say that it is because of the providential arrangements in society, the influences of circumstances over which we have no control.” When people defer responsibility for injustice, they leave it to others, especially conventional politicians, to resort to force in order to enact change: “We let the destroying sword go unsheathed without the exertions we might use to enlighten the people.”47 Instead of tolerating short-term or piecemeal reforms imposed by political elites, people should focus on living reflective lives, “enlighten” others to do the same, and begin the process of fundamental change.

Mott repeatedly implores her audience to work toward eliminating slav-ery, embracing pacifism, and alleviating poverty. Yet political action is not an end in itself. It “can only bring about a temporary relief” and “afford no per-manent good” unless “the morals of the people are changed” and “we bring our christianity to our everyday life.”48 In other words, such efforts must be combined with the very sort of self-reflection and personal transformation required by Mott’s approach. Only by freeing themselves from received dog-mas and persuading others to do the same, as Mott’s non-doctrinal Christianity requires, can individuals achieve true reform.

Mott later reinforces the message that a critical stance toward dogmatism will lead to a more just political order. Examination of “the causes of . . . great evils” would place “the axe at the root of the corrupt tree of arbitrary power which has been produced by the assumption of false claims of man over his fellow-man.”49 Accepting dogma leads individuals to support traditional hierarchies that work to the detriment of all. Power is wielded unequally, oppressively, and arbitrarily; it is not shared among equals for the moral advancement of the society as a whole. By contrast, Mott envisions an egali-tarian order free from injustice and oppression.

Thus, rather than abandoning political life, Mott interprets political power as something that is shared among equals, not imposed by authorities on pas-sive followers. Political reform is a necessary part of a much larger transfor-mation of society. In light of these observations, Mott’s statements on a vital source of political power, namely, suffrage, must be reexamined carefully.




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Throughout her life, Mott expresses mixed views on woman suffrage. She believes that women should not be prevented from voting, yet she is less direct than others like Stanton who demand that women positively be granted the right of suffrage. Moreover, she conveys these mixed messages about the political right of suffrage while at the same time deploring politics in general as fundamentally corrupt. For example, at the Seneca Falls Convention, Mott famously discouraged Stanton from demanding the vote. Yet the Convention became a pivotal event in the early women’s rights movement precisely because the demand for suffrage was explicitly made for the first time, by Stanton. In her best-known speech, “Discourse on Woman,” delivered the following year, Mott expresses more equivocal views. The “Discourse” reveals Mott’s conviction that suffrage is a right that should be granted to all citizens regardless of race or gender for them to use as they see fit, yet suf-frage alone is insufficient. Voting should be exercised within a larger context of reform efforts in religion, philosophy, economics, and culture, and it should be informed by the anti-dogmatic approach she tirelessly advocates. Suffrage in particular and political involvement in general are means toward a greater end, namely, the reformation of society.

Mott begins her discussion of suffrage by explaining that woman “asks nothing as favor, but as right. . . . She is seeking not to be governed by laws, in the making of which she has no voice.” Women are “cypher[s] in the nation” because their views and opinions about political matters cannot be expressed openly. Garrisonians support petitioning, but for Mott this indirect tool alone is woefully deficient. Women are denied status as “moral” and “responsible” human beings because they are “deprived of almost every right in civil society,” namely, the full range of opportunities to reflect on political options, express their preferences openly, and exercise informed consent in obeying laws.50 These remarks reveal Mott’s determination to expand the political involvement of women through suffrage and other means.

If the right of suffrage is granted to women, however, Mott is equally con-vinced that it will emerge in a deeply hostile and corrupt environment. This is why she begins her advocacy of suffrage by explaining that “it is with reluctance that I make the demand for the political rights of woman, because this claim is so distasteful to the age.” It is not because suffrage is distasteful to her personally that Mott is reluctant to mention it, but rather because it is so controversial to others. As Mott explains: “Woman shrinks, in the present state of society, from taking any interest in politics” because “the events of the French revolution, and the claim for woman’s rights are held up to her as a warning.” Again, it is not because women are incapable that they avoid political involvement but rather because they fear a backlash from opponents who profess a dread of violent upheaval. Mott’s subsequent remark that the




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bloody revolution “was marked with extravagance and wickedness in men as well as women” highlights her pacifist conviction that radical change, though necessary, must never be pursued through force.51 The ends do not justify the means. To transform society, men and women alike must reflect on their actions and accept responsibility for injustice. With these remarks, Mott acknowledges the hostile environment in which women would exert political power and proposes a more peaceful and just alternative.

Mott concludes this section by suggesting that “if woman acted her part in governmental affairs, there might be an entire change in the turmoil of politi-cal life,” and by asking, “If woman’s judgment were exercised, why might she not aid in making the laws by which she is governed?”52 Although Mott supports women’s suffrage, she does not demand that women vote. To do so would effectively replace one dogmatic teaching for another in a way that violates her fundamental principles. Consistent with her anti-dogmatic approach, Mott proposes that women be given the opportunity to choose to participate with the hope of improving political life and society generally. Indeed, she adds, “the works of Harriet Martineau . . . furnish evidence of woman’s capacity to embrace subjects of universal interest” and serve as a strong indication that the contributions of other equally talented women will have similar positive effects.

And yet, in a dialectical move, Mott circles back to her original skepti-cism. “Far be it from me to encourage woman to vote,” she explains, “or to take an active part in politics, in the present state of our government.” Again, Mott acknowledges the hostile environment in which women would exercise the franchise. Her opposition to political force and its reliance on coercion rather than consent is clear. In a succinct yet comprehensive expression of her position, Mott immediately reasserts that woman’s “right to the elective fran-chise however, is the same, and should be yielded to her, whether she exercise that right or not.”53

Through the perspective of Mott’s unwavering insistence on free and inde-pendent thinking, what appears to be ambivalence toward political action is in fact a principled stance that is deeply consistent with her anti-dogmatic approach: Even in an extremely corrupt society, women should without ques-tion be granted the opportunity to vote and participate in politics if they wish, with the ultimate hope of transforming it.

While the right of suffrage is essential, Mott has a still broader under-standing of female citizenship in mind. “When . . . a convention shall be called to make regulations for self-government on Christian, non-resistant principles,” Mott explains, “I can see no good reason, why woman should not participate in such an assemblage, taking part equally with man.”54 Mott is not abandoning the possibility of a political order. Instead, she insists that




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women along with men should gather and secure a more just society based on equality and self-rule. To be sure, Mott is vague about the structure and implementation of such a gathering. Nevertheless, she does not turn away from political involvement for women, but rather expands it. Indeed, to rein-force the need for change, Mott concludes this section by emphasizing that women “have no part or lot in the formation or administration of govern-ment” and “cannot vote or hold office.”55

While Mott is not a pure anarchist, neither did she align herself with reformists who believed that change could occur through established political institutions. Her anti-dogmatic stance in fact leads to a deep ambivalence about partisan organizations generally, which by their very nature encourage conformity and effectively discourage free thinking among participants. Partisan organizations, according to Mott, are supported by dogmas and empowered by unreflective followers. For this reason, sectarian societies “encroach far too much on individual rights.” By contrast, “associations . . . if properly conducted,” namely, by encouraging diversity and independent thought, “need not destroy individuality.”56 Mott’s aversion to formal organi-zations extended to the women’s rights movement as well. After the Civil War, she lamented that “it was a great mistake to . . . organize a Soc[iet]y For Wom[en’s] Rig[hts]” because the “several Conventions held were far more effective.”57 To encourage reform on specific issues such as women’s rights, Mott preferred the relatively informal, decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the conventions over the more rigid and bureaucratic organizations and societies that emerged from them.58 Thus Mott’s alternative understanding of power is fundamentally egalitarian and voluntarist.

Moreover, for Mott unity should never be secured by suppressing dissent within a group: harmony will never be “absolute.” Instead, true pluralism requires the sort of constructive conflict that arises when individuals confront injustice and oppression by questioning traditional beliefs and practices and translate true equality, freedom, and justice into action. Mott’s rejection of coercion is unconditional, and she believes that she and other women’s rights activists should “wish to avoid all angry opposition or ridicule.” But she nev-ertheless maintains that women “must at the same time enter the ranks, pre-pared to ‘endure hardness as good soldiers’;—and not disclaim the needful antagonism which a faithful presentation of Womans wrongs imposes upon us.”59

Mott is a pacifist, but she does not abandon the very notion of political power. Her nonresistance should not be mistaken for inaction. She wants to fundamentally transform American political life so that every individual can engage in self-rule, lead reflective and morally upright lives through their own devising, and encourage others to do the same. This transformation




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requires relentless self-reflection and scrutiny of dogma and can be attained only through the concerted action of self-governing individuals working together. On this view, power will not be wielded “arbitrarily” or coercively among unequal parties, but neither must it be completely abandoned. Rather, power will be shared deliberately and voluntarily among equals, laws will be founded on informed consent, and authentic representation of universal human concerns will replace narrow-minded political factions.60

(Re)Situating Mott among Garrison, Wollstonecraft, and Stanton

It is true that Mott aligned herself early on with Garrison’s apolitical stance, which preferred moral suasion over political activism. Like Garrison, she viewed the Constitution as a pro-slavery document.61 Moreover, PFAS con-sistently opposed direct political participation, focusing their efforts instead on petitioning and fundraising. For Mott, “true republicanism is true Christian democracy,” in which every individual is responsible for abiding by the inner light and living according to reason and reflection.62 Unlike Garrison, how-ever, Mott does not conclude that human beings will cease governing alto-gether. As we have seen, her rejection of the status quo and her call for fundamental political reform do not lead to the abandonment of political life required by Garrison. Thus, her ideas require repositioning in relation to the Garrisonians.

In his analysis of abolitionist politics, Douglas M. Strong offers useful classifications that help resituate Mott within both the abolitionist and early women’s rights movements. “Anarchists,” who comprise the first category, reject all human institutions and prepare for the “millennium—the eventual and inevitable rule of the government of God on earth.” For this group, “any attempt at reforming or restructuring human organizations was not only wrongheaded but wicked.”63 Garrison falls into this category. The second group, “Institutionalists,” is represented by activists such as Douglass and Gerrit Smith who supported the Liberty Party and with it the possibility of political reform through direct involvement. Interpretations of abolitionism typically focus on these two groups. Strong, however, adds a third category, “Reformers,” who were “neither wholly antiorganizational nor wholly insti-tution-supporting.”64 Reformers “believed that human governments should be reordered to correspond with God’s democratic moral government” and “left a place for localized, voluntary external structures.”65 It is this third category that best represents Mott’s ideas, which support a voluntarist, egali-tarian, democratic form of political life.




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Not only does Mott’s position among abolitionists require reassessment. Her relation to Wollstonecraft needs to be reconsidered as well. An influential study of comparisons between selected statements by Wollstonecraft and Mott concludes that Mott “played a pivotal role in the proliferation of Wollstonecraft’s ideas among prominent American women’s rights advo-cates.”66 Although Mott enjoys a “pivotal role,” it is as a “proliferator” of ideas that are not her own. However, Mott’s well-developed and wide-rang-ing views were shaped by a variety of experiences independent of her expo-sure to Wollstonecraft’s writings.

Wollstonecraft’s strong influence on the early women’s rights movement in general and Mott in particular is undeniable, and the sophistication of Wollstonecraft’s theories is unquestioned. Indeed, Mott recommended Wollstonecraft’s work to others and regularly defended the author’s reputa-tion, which was posthumously marred by controversy. Yet any assessment of Wollstonecraft’s influence on Mott’s views on women’s inequality, educa-tion, and religion must take account of the fact that it was not until the late 1820s that Mott first came upon the Vindication, according to a letter she wrote in 1867 claiming to have read the book some “40 years ago.”67 By this time, Mott had attended Nine Partners School as a student, and had taught there from 1808 until her marriage three years later. Her alma mater provided a progressive Quaker education for girls and boys alike, similar to Wollstonecraft’s vision, and was one of the first schools to allow female teachers as well.68 Indeed, the more “useful” model of coeducation Mott later calls for and which is attributed to Wollstonecraft is strikingly similar to that which she received at Nine Partners.69 At the same time, Mott’s recurring criticism of unequal pay for women, reminiscent of Wollstonecraft’s views, is deeply rooted in her own experience as a young teacher, when she saw her female mentor receive half the pay of fellow instructor and future husband James, and when she herself received no pay as James’s salary was raised.70

Well before her exposure to Wollstonecraft, Mott had already been steeped in Quaker doctrine about the unfair silencing of women in other religious circles, the inhuman institution of slavery, the benefits of coeducation, and the importance of living a life directed by reason and moderation and free of luxury, decadence, or frippery—themes explored by Wollstonecraft as well. Moreover, Mott had been sharing these views as an official minister of the Quaker church since 1821, a position which allowed her to travel to other Quaker meetings and speak before mixed audiences in various congrega-tions.71 Equally important, since 1811, Mott had enjoyed a progressive Quaker marriage that was deeply egalitarian.72 And given Wollstonecraft’s and Mott’s mutual interests in the teachings of religious Dissenters, it is not surprising that some of their theological ideas overlapped.73 In light of these observations, Mott’s advocacy for women’s rights was informed as much by




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her own unique experiences as by her later exposure to the writings of Wollstonecraft and many others as well.74 The convergences between the two thinkers in no way detract from the originality of Mott’s theoretical contributions.

Moreover, close study reveals an important difference between Mott’s and Wollstonecraft’s respective understandings of political power. Wollstonecraft claims that women gain political agency ultimately by developing their rea-son through education and applying their understanding of virtue as citizens, mothers, and wives.75 Wollstonecraft insists that women should study politics along with history and other subjects, seek “political and civil employments,” and gain a “political” and “civil existence in the state.”76 However, Wollstonecraft does not elaborate on the particular sorts of “employments” or the “existence” that women must gain in political life.77 By contrast, as we have seen, Mott’s thought presents a broader conception of political agency, one that fundamentally reconfigures political power in more egalitarian, democratic, and voluntarist directions.

The deep connection between Stanton and Mott is also undeniable. An analysis of Stanton’s work uses Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions theory to assess her theoretical contributions. By applying Smith’s interpretative framework to Mott’s speeches and writings as well, it is clear that both think-ers reflect elements of liberalism, republicanism, and “radicalism,” which is consistent with the notion that the two women were not far apart, especially in the early stages of the movement. However, the framework reveals signifi-cant differences in their theories as well. Both Stanton and Mott emphasize the importance of natural rights and equality of individuals, but for Mott, these principles ultimately originate from the Quaker view of human beings as creations of God. And she certainly never accepted the liberal view of minimal government that focuses so intently on suffrage to preserve indi-vidual rights, as did Stanton. Rather, Mott understands the individual more holistically, as created by a non-sectarian God to engage in reflective action and thereby honor her duties and obligations to others. Human beings must take responsibility for constructing a world that allows all people to function as moral beings. Only in such a world would suffrage be truly effective. Clearly, Mott’s understanding of justice requires extensive political, eco-nomic, social, and cultural reform beyond suffrage.78

Mott’s communitarian leanings seem to be indebted to civic republican-ism, but they too elude neat categorization along these lines. Like other early women’s rights theorists, Mott draws from the civic republican tradition of separate spheres for men and women by acknowledging social and cultural differences between the sexes. She, along with Stanton and other women’s rights advocates, categorically rejects the unequal treatment of women and specifically the exclusion of women from the public sphere that traditionally




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follows from that doctrine. Mott’s paradoxical reputation as a “non-belliger-ent Non-Resistant,” a modest, well-mannered proponent of radical reform, is an ideal example of early women’s rights advocates who subversively chal-lenged the doctrine of separate spheres and the cult of domesticity through their writings and speeches.79 Yet Mott’s progressive understanding of com-munity and political agency ultimately goes beyond the civic republican tra-dition by articulating a far wider range of means through which women can construct a morally just and pluralistic society along with men.

Although Mott’s ideas reflect aspects of the liberal and communitarian traditions in Smith’s theory, they were not tainted by the sort of ascriptive inegalitarianism that diminished elements of Stanton’s thought. Mott’s dual commitment to abolitionism and women’s rights never wavered in her life-time. She never embraced the social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism to which Stanton turned later in life and which were used to justify and perpetu-ate racial and economic inequality. Nor did Mott, a humanist, ever advocate any form of female exceptionalism, as did Stanton.

Stanton and Mott share some elements of “radicalism” in their respective views, yet differ in important ways. Mott supported Stanton’s efforts to pro-mote deeply controversial reforms of marriage and divorce and accepted the need for acquaintances and relatives to dissolve their troubled marriages. Mott deplored the Quaker tradition of disowning those who had formed inter-faith marriages or who had divorced.80 Yet Mott criticized as “extravagant” Stanton’s divisive characterizations of marriage as a legal contract. For Mott, marriage was a spiritual bond made voluntarily by equal parties and should only be dissolved in the most dire of circumstances.81 Stanton’s ultimate “radicalism,” however, arises not from her views on particular issues, but from her “notion of women as a class.”82 By contrast, the most “radical” ele-ments in Mott’s thought are not found in any kind of exceptionalism, but rather in her humanism, her philosophic commitment to self-reflection, her insistence that all dogmas be challenged, and her progressive understanding of political power. The striking differences between the two women and their respective understandings of the multiple traditions in American political thought problematize the notion that Stanton ultimately transcended Mott. My analysis suggests that the sophistication of Mott’s ideas matches and per-haps even surpasses Stanton’s in several important ways, a finding that is forcefully advanced in Faulkner’s recent historical biography of Mott as well.

Mott’s Legacy: Feminism, Pacifism, and Liberal Democratic Theory

Seen in a new light, a number of strands of Mott’s legacy can be found in unexpected areas of feminist and contemporary democratic theory.




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For example, her lifelong conviction that racial and gender equality are inseparable is a precursor to intersectionality, a concept by which oppression is understood in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity as well as class. Like her twentieth-century feminist counterparts, Mott adopts a systemic view of oppression that is rooted in political, social, cultural, economic, and religious inequalities and perpetuated by unreflective acceptance of patriarchal tradi-tions created by male elites seeking to maintain their own authority. The sort of radically egalitarian and voluntarist conception of political power elabo-rated by Mott has also been the focus of prominent feminist theorists such as Carole Pateman. Elements of the complex understanding of nonviolent resis-tance in Mott’s theory reappear in expanded forms in recent studies of Mahatma Gandhi by contemporary political theorists. I would not by any means assert a causal relation between Mott and these thinkers. However, a brief cross-temporal exploration of connections between Mott, Pateman, and Gandhi can be helpful in gaining insight into the evolution of some of the most important and enduring questions in political philosophy.

By challenging doctrinal understandings of freedom, autonomy, and polit-ical power, Mott’s progressive approach anticipates elements of Pateman’s radical reevaluation of the liberal democratic tradition. To be sure, Pateman’s political theory is more fully developed than Mott’s and, equally important, Pateman does not rely on a spiritual basis for human rights. Nevertheless, both seek to reawaken concern about hidden power inequalities, systematic denials of individual freedom and autonomy, and the deeply entrenched injustice that results. Both strive to improve the lives of women and the oppressed and refuse to compromise on their principles by accepting piece-meal reforms.

Mott’s anti-dogmatic approach offers a powerful critique of the society in which she lived. Under the guise of legitimacy, male elites perpetuate oppres-sive doctrines regarding slavery, gender roles, and economic inequality. Unreflective individuals passively accept these dogmas, absolving them-selves of any responsibility for the injustices that result. Individual power is transferred to the elites, autonomy disappears, and true accountability is lost.

Likewise, Pateman condemns liberal democracy for masking persistent inequalities and oppression under the guise of consent. “The essence of lib-eral social contract theory,” Pateman writes, requires individuals to agree to “obey representatives, to whom they have alienated their right to make politi-cal decisions.” For Pateman, “to promise to obey is to deny or to limit . . . individuals’ freedom and equality and their ability to exercise these capacities.”83

Pateman’s alienated citizen closely resembles Mott’s unreflective indi-vidual. Neither is asked to take personal responsibility for political decisions




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or work together to rid her community of inequality and injustice. Under both scenarios, oppression is allowed to flourish beneath a veneer of legitimacy imposed by patriarchal authorities. It becomes clear why Mott and Pateman believe that reliance on the franchise as the primary mode of political partici-pation is deeply problematic. For Mott, people “are going to the polls and voting for warriors and slaveholders” instead of “seeking to enlighten the public mind.”84 Likewise, for Pateman, when citizens in liberal societies vote, they “are content to let representatives act for them in the political realm” instead of personally taking an active role.85 For both women, voting in a corrupt society does not represent the true interests of individual citizens and fails to deal adequately with deeply entrenched injustices and oppression. Mott and Pateman encourage the direct, active engagement of all citizens to create a more just society.

Mott and Pateman agree as well that the absence of a vibrant political community in which citizens can develop their capacities and work together to solve problems deprives individuals—men and women alike—of the opportunity to become fully human, that is, moral beings. For Mott, the “dis-advantages, religious, civil, and social” of woman “have enervated her mind and paralysed her powers.”86 Along similar lines, Pateman argues that “the person making the promise” merely to obey her representative “is no longer free to exercise her capacities and decide upon her own actions, and is no longer equal, but subordinate.”87 Pateman’s theory “requires that individuals develop the capacities that enable them critically and self-consciously to appreciate the foundation, and operation, of their political association.”88

Mott and Pateman propose a highly participatory and egalitarian view of common life that holds individuals accountable to themselves and to one another. For Mott, there is “no power delegated upon one portion of the peo-ple over another.”89 Rather, power is shared among equals and exercised in many ways, whether it be through voting, petitioning, speaking in public or private to single-sex or “mixed” audiences, participating in segregated or integrated reform societies, or any other such activities. Citizens continually scrutinize dogmas and received doctrine, Christian and otherwise, for embed-ded justifications of oppression, and they voluntarily accept only those teach-ings that encourage true equality and freedom.

Likewise, for Pateman, political obligation is “a horizontal relationship between citizens” and “presupposes . . . a multiplicity of political associa-tions.” On this view, “the political sphere is one dimension . . . of social life as a whole.”90 Unlike political obedience, which is open to reconsideration only in periodically scheduled elections, political obligations must continu-ally be open to further scrutiny and contestation.

Recent scholarship on Mahatma Gandhi’s political theory reveals a num-ber of striking parallels between his work and Mott’s as well. Both are




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nonviolent humanists who support an expansive conception of freedom and offer radical solutions to the intractable problem of inequality. Both draw from a spiritual understanding of truth to articulate a theory of human rights. Both seek to elevate the status of women and other marginalized populations in their respective societies. Although both are idealistic in their high aspira-tions for humanity, Mott and Gandhi see themselves as exceedingly prag-matic, insisting that ideals are of little worth if not acted upon in everyday practice.

Challenging the notion that nonviolent political action is too unrealistic to achieve radical reform, recent studies rehabilitate Gandhi’s complex under-standing of political power and political agency. For example, from Gandhi’s expansive understanding of autonomy emerges the ability to continually scrutinize power structures for hidden sources of injustice.91 Similarly, Mott regularly deploys her anti-dogmatic approach to expose the hidden sources of inequality between men and women and the injustices of slavery, especially in religious and political ideologies. She continually exhorts her audience to engage in intensive self-reflection and to be alert to subtle incidences of coer-cion. Gandhi’s understanding of nonviolence (ahimsa) provides a method of “arbitration” that “allows people to use their own judgment to make moral and political choices in consonance with the truth.”92 Mott’s commitment to the “inner voice” provides a method of “arbitration” comparable to Gandhi’s nonviolence that opens new possibilities for political agency. Gandhi was ultimately a pragmatist because he “was attuned to the unintended conse-quences of political action, especially the ways in which idealism and moral-ism, despite the best of intentions, could enable ideological escalation and violence.”93 Mott too insists that all dogmas must be challenged because they are often unintended sources of oppression and conflict. Gandhi “was suspi-cious of the legitimacy and efficacy of state-directed legislation in general,” believing that “imposed reform” would only create “resentment [and] polar-ization.” As a result, he largely “eschewed state action . . . for effecting radi-cal social and economic reform.”94 Mott’s commitment to autonomy and distrust of formal organizations, like Gandhi’s, help reveal the limitations of short-term political and legal solutions to deeply divisive problems and point to the need for comprehensive reform.

Mott’s deeply egalitarian and voluntarist understanding of political power, the sophistication and radicalism of which have been highlighted by a brief comparison with Pateman and Gandhi, offers a compelling alternative to the hierarchical approach that was adopted—paradoxically– by subsequent women’s rights organizations. By bringing neglected aspects of her thinking into sharper focus, this analysis allows Mott’s progressive political thought to emerge from obscurity among the received narratives of early women’s rights, abolitionism, and American political theory.




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Conclusion

Anti-dogmatic yet principled, radical yet moderate, idealistic yet pragmatic, the “belligerent Non-Resistant” Lucretia Mott offers vital contributions to our understanding of the early women’s rights movement. Mott occupies an important position that bridges several schools of thought in nineteenth-cen-tury America—liberalism, republicanism, ascriptive inegalitarianism, anar-chist abolitionism, and “Institutionalist” abolitionism—and anticipates progressive strands in contemporary political philosophy and feminist thought. Her work contributes to the broader, richer, more complex account of political reform sought by Hewitt, Faulkner, and others that can help us better understand the emergence of “global and multicultural coalitions” for change.

As Mott continually reminds her audience, the task of challenging assump-tions about the nature of political power and oppression, the meaning of autonomy, and the requirements of justice is never complete. By advocating a more active, participatory society, Mott urges current and future genera-tions to continue the struggle for greater equality and freedom and a more just political order.

Acknowledgments

I thank Amy Hague, Curator of Manuscripts, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College; Christopher Densmore, Curator, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College; Devin Hagerty, Caroline Forestiere, and Jeffrey Davis, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County; and Joseph K. Vetter. Research support was provided by a Caroline D. Bain Scholar-in-Residence Fellowship, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, and a Summer Faculty Fellowship, University of Maryland, Baltimore County.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC), Summer Faculty Fellowship Smith College, Caroline D. Bain Scholar-in-Residence.

Notes

1. Dana Greene and Beverly Wilson Palmer have established editorial guidelines for Mott’s speeches and correspondence that retain the original transcriptions




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except in cases where the meaning is obscured. These guidelines are followed in this study as well. Dana Greene, ed., Lucretia Mott: Her Complete Speeches and Sermons (Lewiston: Edwin Mellon Press, 1980), 262; Beverly Wilson Palmer, ed., Selected Letters of Lucretia Coffin Mott (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002).

2. Early religious progressives such as Mott envisioned women’s rights in terms of a “true” Christianity, which relied on revised interpretations of the Bible to jus-tify equality for women while deploring patriarchal clergies who misinterpreted Scripture. Although this message resonated strongly with the younger Stanton, she later distanced herself from her predecessors by advocating a secular view of women’s rights, in response to Christianity’s persistent repression of women. “Stanton’s dream of a Religion of Humanity was continually interrupted by the real-life nightmare of women’s religious fidelity to an oppressive system of Christianity. By the early 1880s Stanton saw the church and the Bible uncom-promisingly, as looming obstacles to woman’s liberty that needed to be leveled.” Kathi Kern, Mrs. Stanton’s Bible (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 96.

3. Well into her sixties, Mott also fought for equal access to streetcars in Philadelphia and forcefully advocated for better treatment of black soldiers after the Civil War. Carol Faulkner, Lucretia Mott’s Heresy: Abolition and Women’s Rights in Nineteenth-Century America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 4.

4. Nicholas Buccola, The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass (New York: New York University Press, 2012).

5. Though she had limited understanding of their culture, Mott even supported equality and freedom for Native Americans at a time when relatively few did so. Subsequent women’s rights advocates such as Matilda Jocelyn Gage would focus greater attention on the plight of Native Americans.

6. Eileen Hunt Botting, Family Feuds: Wollstonecraft, Burke, and Rousseau on the Transformation of the Family (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Sue Davis, The Political Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton: Women’s Rights and the American Political Traditions (New York: New York University Press, 2008); Wendy Gunther-Canada, Rebel Writer: Mary Wollstonecraft and Enlightenment Politics (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2001); Virginia Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue: The Political Theory of Mary Wollstonecraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Natalie Fuehrer Taylor, The Rights of Woman as Chimera: The Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft (New York: Routledge, 2007).

7. Along similar lines, in the Renaissance the larger exclusion of women from uni-versities and “other institutional spheres of scholarly activity” did not silence philosophic women who instead pursued alternative modes of theorizing “via letters, published pamphlets and treatises, and scholarly journals” (Eileen O’Neill, “Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History,” in Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions,




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edited by Janet A. Kourany [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998], 19). Looking to the nineteenth century, “reclaiming Black women’s ideas involves discovering, reinterpreting, and in many cases, analyzing for the first time the works of individual U.S. Black women” who are not typically considered intel-lectuals or scholars, and often “involves locating unrecognized and unheralded works, scattered and long out of print.” Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 13; Eileen Hunt Botting, “Ascending the Rostrum: Hannah Mather Crocker and Women’s Political Oratory,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (2012): 977–91; Eileen Hunt Botting and Sarah L. Houser, “‘Drawing the Line of Equality’: Hannah Mather Crocker on Women’s Rights,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (2006): 265–78.

8. In particular, theoretical studies of the Framers confront the fact that these remark-able political and historical individuals did not leave behind extended treatises or scholarly works. These men were pragmatic and thoughtful politicians who were actively involved in the pressing issues of the day, not in extended theoreti-cal reflection. Although Thomas Jefferson’s ideas shifted considerably over time and were expressed in various ways, they nevertheless reflect a “comprehensive and coherent political philosophy” that borrowed from both Lockean and civic republican traditions (Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991], 3). Madison’s writings too reflect “an underlying coherence” of theory, a combination of Lockean liberalism, classical republicanism, Scottish Enlightenment philoso-phy, and Protestant theology (Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of James Madison [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001], xi). An examination of Alexander Hamilton’s thought recognizes that he “was not a ‘professional’ political theorist or scholar” and “he did not consciously write phi-losophy as a dispassionate observer of political action”—characterizations that could be equally applied to the other Framers ( Michael P. Federici, The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012], 4). Nevertheless, “the purpose of political theory is to convey the truth of reality” and Hamilton’s “political theory has an enduring quality to it because, in responding to the transient affairs of politics, Hamilton addresses the perennial problems of political life” (Federici, The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton, 5). Hamilton did not leave behind extended theoretical writings, so “scholars must mine his letters, speeches, newspaper articles, and public papers and reports to discover the various aspects of his political theory” (Federici 2012, 6).

9. Farah Godrej, “Nonviolence and Gandhi’s Truth: A Method for Moral and Political Arbitration,” The Review of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 287–317; Karuna Mantena, “Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 455–70; Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 1979; Ronald Terchek, Gandhi: Struggling for Autonomy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998).




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10. Nancy A. Hewitt, “From Seneca Falls to Suffrage? Reimagining a ‘Master’ Narrative in U.S. Women’s History,” in No Permanent Waves: Recasting Histories of U.S. Feminism, edited by Nancy Hewitt (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 21. The History of Woman Suffrage has understated and obscured other women’s rights advocates such as Hannah Mather Crocker as well (Botting and Houser, “‘Drawing the Line of Equality,’” 266). The ten-sions within the traditional narrative of the movement were not wholly lost on Stanton or Anthony, however. Whereas Stanton’s interest in religion was revived as she worked with Anthony on the third volume of the History and led to the Woman’s Bible, Anthony viewed the radical religious controversies of the 1840s and 1850s as largely resolved. Nevertheless, Anthony lamented the tendency among younger advocates to regard their predecessors such as Mott in terms of “something less than a ‘usable past.’” For example, Anthony was appalled when Carrie Chapman Catt’s suffrage calendar placed Mott at the bottom, calling it an “inversion of the ‘natural order’” and a violation of “the proper rank of old soldiers” within the movement. Kern, Mrs. Stanton’s Bible, 94.

11. Nancy Isenberg also notes the trend that continues to limit Mott’s influence to that of a mythic, prophetic figure whose role was “to initiate the movement” rather than to lead it (Nancy Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum America [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998], 3). On this view, Mott is “the voice of inspiration rather than causation,” a matriarchal, mystical, religious figure who had to be superseded by more driven activists such as Stanton to allow true reform to emerge (Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship, 5). Isenberg wryly adds that “like [Saint] Peter, Stanton positioned herself . . . as the heir and founder of the suffrage campaign” (p. 3). Faulkner, Lucretia Mott’s Heresy, 216.

12. Hewitt, “From Seneca Falls to Suffrage?,” 32.13. In similar reformist spirit, Isenberg adapts Hannah Arendt’s concept of the public

sphere to help reposition Mott and other early women’s rights activists within broader debates about political citizenship. Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship, 9; Hewitt, “From Seneca Falls to Suffrage?,” 33.

14. Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850 (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 59 and note 69; Ellen Carol DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women’s Movement in America 1848-1869 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 35.

15. Botting and Carey qualify Wollstonecraft’s influence on early women’s rights advocates with a number of disclaimers that she “should not be understood as the sole inspiration,” that “parallel terms and arguments do not independently provide evidence of . . . direct influence,” and that “the broader Christian, Enlightenment, and Romantic traditions surely influenced” these women as well. Nevertheless, the authors contend that “a shared set of philosophical con-cerns, . . . combined with evidence of direct references . . . and/or autobiographi-cal or biographical evidence of . . . engagement with Wollstonecraft’s work”




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provides a preponderance of evidence that is “so strong” as to prove that the ideas arose from A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Eileen Hunt Botting and Christine Carey, “Wollstonecraft’s Philosophical Impact on Nineteenth-Century American Women’s Rights Advocates,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 [2004]: 707–22,, 710). An analysis of linguistic and theoretical con-vergences between the two women confirms for the authors that Mott “echo[es] Wollstonecraft’s terms and arguments,” “shares Wollstonecraft’s view[s]” on education, and “follows Wollstonecraft’s arguments” about women’s pursuits. (Ibid., 714).

16. Lockean liberalism focused on “securing the natural rights that it held to belong to every human being.” For liberalism, “the role of government . . . was limited to protecting individual rights.” Republicanism shifted focus away from the lib-eral individual and toward “the achievement of collective self-government for the pursuit of the common good for the community” and “emphasized the neces-sity of public-spirited citizens enthusiastically participating in public affairs.” As the term suggests, “Ascriptive forms of Americanism” attribute “particular moral, intellectual, and physical qualities to people on the basis of their sex, race, or nationality” and view these qualities as “natural and unchangeable.” Davis, The Political Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 11–13.

17. Davis, The Political Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 44, 47.18. Ibid., 23.19. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 25.20. Ibid., 26.21. Ibid., 27.22. Ibid., 30.23. Ibid., 91, 103.24. Sarah Grimke offers a detailed critique of the notion of an organized priest-

hood but falls short of attacking dogmatism itself (Larry Ceplair, ed., The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimke: Selected Writings 1835-1839 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1989], 246–57). Grimke too laments the lack of independent thinking among women, but the idea of living without any kind of doctrinal inclination is, it seems, distinctively Mott’s (Ibid., 258). Greene, Lucretia Mott, 28.

25. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 29.26. Ibid., 27.27. Ibid.,, 31–32.28. Ibid., 35.29. Ibid., 36.30. Ibid., 37.31. Ibid., 54.32. Ibid., 37.33. Ibid., 40.34. Ibid., 111.35. Ibid., 112.36. Ibid., 111, emphasis added.




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37. Ibid., 217.38. Ibid., 224.39. Ibid., 302, cited in Palmer, Selected Letters, xxi.40. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 85; see also 26, 67.41. Ibid., 101.42. Ibid., 43.43. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism, 59 and note 69; DuBois,

Feminism and Suffrage, 35.44. For example, a large majority of the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society

voted to separate from its Garrisonian affiliate and formed a new organization “because of their dismay over the old organization’s ‘no-government friends’” ( Bruce Laurie, “Putting Politics Back In: Rethinking the Problem of Political Abolitionism,” in William Lloyd Garrison at 200: History, Legacy, and Memory, edited by James Brewer Stewart [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008], 82, emphasis in original). An equally important reason for the schism is the acces-sion of women into leadership positions in the society and its support for wom-en’s rights generally.

45. Lewis Perry, “Versions of Anarchism in the Antislavery Movement,” American Quarterly 20 (1968): 768–82, 770.

46. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 42.47. Ibid., 118.48. Ibid., 50.49. Ibid., 184, emphasis added.50. Ibid., 154.51. Ibid., 156.52. Ibid., 156.53. Ibid., 156.54. Ibid., 156–57.55. Ibid., 157.56. Palmer, Selected Letters, 122.57. Ibid., 399.58. The same ambivalence about formal associations prevented Mott from demand-

ing sex-integrated reform societies as other activists did.59. Palmer, Selected Letters, 211, emphasis added.60. Mott’s views on the Civil War also reflect a qualified anarchism that requires

state action only when absolutely necessary. Although Mott declared the conflict a “calamity,” she also believed that the struggle should not be unduly prolonged or “stayed by any compromises which shall continue the unequal, cruel war . . . waged from generation to generation, with all the physical force of our govern-ment” (Palmer, Selected Letters, 312, emphasis in original).

61. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 77–78.62. Ibid., 34.63. Douglas M. Strong, Perfectionist Politics: Abolitionism and the Religious Tensions

of American Democracy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 40.64. Ibid., 41.




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65. Ibid., 42.66. Botting and Carey, “Wollstonecraft’s Philosophical Impact,” 713.67. Palmer dates the encounter even later, to the 1830s, based on her reading of a

letter Mott wrote in 1858 (Palmer, Selected Letters, 174 note 5; ibid., 392; cited in Botting and Carey, “Wollstonecraft’s Philosophical Impact,” 712.

68. Faulkner, Lucretia Mott’s Heresy, 33.69. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 160; cited in Botting and Carey, “Wollstonecraft’s

Philosophical Impact,” 213.70. Faulkner, Lucretia Mott’s Heresy, 34.71. Ibid., 42.72. Ibid., 37.73. Palmer, Selected Letters, 179; Botting, Family Feuds, 158–75; Patricia

Howell Michaelson, “Religious Bases of Eighteenth Century Feminism: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Quakers,” Women’s Studies 22 (1993): 281–295..

74. Further evidence is provided by Mott herself in an 1855 letter, in which she men-tions that Wollstonecraft first made her “radical claim” for women’s rights “60 or 70 years ago” and adds that Quakers made the same claim “still earlier 1660 & 70” (Palmer, Selected Letters, 234).

75. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men with a Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints, edited by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1995 [1792], 274).

76. Wollstonecraft A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 238, 239, 264, 265, 272.77. Botting, Family Feuds, 174–75.78. Mott is not a liberal in the classical Lockean Enlightenment spirit, but more in

the Kantian sense. Mott did not develop anything like Kant’s comprehensive philosophy, but her understanding of morality shares several characteristics of Kant’s categorical imperative. Both emphasize the importance of mutual obliga-tion and insist on treating human beings in a non-instrumental way. Both advo-cate versions of republican government in which the voices of the people are heard. Both envision the progress of humankind through the development of human reason, although Mott maintains a connection between reason and the divine in terms of the “inner light.” They differ on the precise means by which to achieve “perpetual peace,” but both envisioned a world free of violent conflict and rule by coercion and force.

79. Botting and Houser 2006, 26780. Faulkner, Lucretia Mott’s Heresy, 160, 16.81. Ibid., 159–60.82. Davis, The Political Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 23.83. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation,19.84. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 140.85. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 89, 88.86. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 148.87. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 19.88. Ibid., 178.




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89. Greene, Lucretia Mott, 132).90. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 174.91. Terchek, Gandhi, 1998.92. Godrej, “Nonviolence and Gandhi’s Truth,” 298.93. Mantena, “Another Realism,” 457.94. Ibid., 466.

Author Biography

Lisa Pace Vetter is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), where she teaches political theory. She is the author of “Women’s Work” as Political Art: Weaving and Dialectical Politics in Homer, Aristophanes, and Plato (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). Her articles and reviews have appeared in Political Theory, Review of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Perspectives on Political Science, and Review of Metaphysics. Her current research examines the origins of American feminist political thought through the works of several prominent nineteenth-century early women’s rights advocates.




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