The Malacca Straits ‘Conundrum’ and India

Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana

(Paper presented at the 9th Asian Security Conference, IDSA, New Delhi, February 2007)

Map: The Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Introduction

The geographic centrality of archipelagic Southeast Asia has led to its waterways

assuming immense criticality for global maritime communications. The sea-route

transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SoM) is the busiest in the world, through

which, about a quarter of the world trade passes every year aboard nearly 70,000 vessels.

Besides, with about half of the world's oil and two-third of its Liquefied Natural Gas

(LNG) flowing through it, the waterway also encloses the ‘lifelines’ for energy-

dependent economies in East Asia. Given the global phenomenon of intensifying

economic interdependence among states, it is not surprising that the volume of mercantile

traffic passing through the SoM has been increasing over the years, leading to its growing

geo-strategic significance.

The stakes of the three adjoining littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia and

Singapore) in the Straits are even greater. Like many others, these countries have

embarked upon export-led development, which makes SoM critical for maritime

commerce. Besides, the waterway is also their maritime zones, from where vital living

and non-living resources are sourced. These states have also been promoting tourism to

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supplement their economic growth, which has led to a significant increase of cruise-liners

transiting the SoM. More importantly, the survival interests1 of the Straits-littorals are

closely linked to tranquillity in the Straits, which constitutes their territorial waters and

can provide access to inimical forces.

In present times however, this crucial ‘sea-corridor’ has come to represent a

conundrum for global security. Maritime crimes are rampant in its waters, with an

attendant likelihood of maritime terrorism; and thus the high potential for a disruption of

the worldwide trading system. There is little consensus among states over how to respond

to these insecurities. The impasse is due to divergence of interests and the differing

interpretation of legal regimes, but more importantly, this crucial waterway has also

become an object of geo-political and strategic contention among the major powers.

While the governments of the Straits-littorals claim that the security scenario is

ameliorating, many security analysts assert otherwise. The contrasting positions could be

driven by extraneous considerations, and the truth may therefore lie somewhere in

between. Notwithstanding, prudence dictates responding to the worst-case; since even if

this leads to an ‘overkill’, it will be better to err on the side of caution.

It is often perceived that India does not have a major interest in the SoM,

particularly when viewed in relation to the criticality of the waterway for the East Asian

countries to ship their energy imports. This perception is however dated. The significance

of the Straits for India has grown over the years and today; India is one of the principal

stakeholders. This paper examines the risk to legitimate maritime activity in the Straits

from non-state threats. Further, in the context of the impediments to a comprehensive

security response, it attempts to identify a cooperative mechanism involving India.

The Straits: Appraising the Risk

The insecurities in the seas adjoining Southeast Asia essentially stem from the

‘maritime traditions’ of its people in historic times, which resurfaced in the late-1990s in

form of unlawful acts at sea. The foremost among these crimes was piracy, but it also

included the illegal sea-transfers of narcotics, weapons and humans. While piracy has

been on the decline since its zenith in 2003, it is now associated with greater violence and

better coordination/ planning. While the use of guns has increased sharply since 2001,

heavier weapons like rocket launchers, grenades and machine guns have begun to be used

since 2005.2

There have been no attacks by terrorists in the Straits so far, probably since their

‘nautical skills’ are not yet developed. However, events in the recent past indicate the

possibility of the terrorists acquiring the expertise for maritime operations from criminals.

1 In hierarchical order, ‘survival’ interest of a state is at the apex, followed by ‘vital’, ‘important’ and

‘other’ interests. 2 Sam Bateman, CZ Raymond and Joshua Ho, ‘Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits:

An Agenda for Action”, IDSS Policy Paper, May 2006, p.25

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In March 2003, ten armed men hijacked and steered the tanker Dewi Madrim in the SoM

for an hour before fleeing with technical documents. The incident caused widespread

anxiety as a likely preparation for a ‘maritime 9/11’. More recently, fears have been

expressed of the terrorists’ growing ability to use novel methods of attack, which could

range from ‘high-asymmetry’ to ‘high-end technology’. In June 2006, the Malaysian

defence chief warned of the possibility of terrorists trying to disrupt trade by using sea-

mines, which could be as crude as explosives packed in oil-drums, or even sophisticated

ones, incorporating trigger-devices.3

Notwithstanding the above, there is no concrete evidence yet to indicate that the

intensity of ‘threat’ in the Straits is on the rise. However, the ‘risk’ to maritime activity is

certainly on the rise’. In arithmetic terms, ‘Risk’ (R) is essentially a product of ‘threat’

(T) and ‘vulnerability’(V). Therefore, R=TxV. Even if the threat level (T) may be

considered unchanged, the magnitude of the second factor (V) is clearly increasing, and

thereby increasing the risk (R). This ‘V-factor’ is increasing with the waterway becoming

more susceptible to disruption due to non-state activity. Navigation through the waterway

is beset with many constraints. At some stretches, the channel is only 2.8 km wide and

25m deep, and is lined with dangerous shoals and shipwrecks. The 2004 Tsunami caused

extensive damage to navigational aids like direction buoys and lighthouses, and

significantly altered the underwater terrain. In addition, the channel is becoming more

congested with the increasing density of shipping traffic and fishing activity. The tonnage

of ships is also growing reducing their ability to manoeuvre. These compel ships to cruise

at slow speeds, making them vulnerable to being boarded by pirates, and which also

translate into hazards for their navigational safety. As per an International Energy

Agency (IEA) report, oil traffic through the SoM is expected to double to 22 million

barrels per day by 2030.4 This would not only increase its vulnerability to maritime

violence, but also to marine accidents. Attendant to the increasing sea-borne trade is the

growing capacity of ports to handle cargo, making these ‘worthy’ targets for terrorism.

Of the few hub-ports in the world, Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas are located along the

Straits. Also notable is the increasing proportion of vessels carrying inflammable liquids

like crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and other dangerous cargo like ammonium

nitrate. The 2004 and 2005 bombing of passenger ships by the Filipino terrorist group

Abu Sayyaf demonstrated the assailability of passenger ships to pre-positioning

explosives onboard.5

The above ‘risk-equation’ is also valid from the Straits-littorals’ strategic

perspective. In this case too, the contours of the aforesaid “T-factor” (threat) are not well

defined. However, the ‘vulnerability’ (“V-factor”) of the Straits-littorals is growing with

3 ‘Malaysian Military Warns Underwater Mines Could be Terrorist Tool’, Agence France-Presse (Kuala

Lumpur), Defence News, July 6, 2006 at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1853798&C=navwar 4 William C. Ramsay (Deputy Executive Director, IEA, Paris), “Asian Oil: Current Trends, Outlook and

Issues’, Presentation to Conference on ‘Regional Cooperation: Key to Energy Security’, New Delhi,

January 6, 2005, at http://www.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/Textbase/speech/2005/ramsay/asianoil.pdf 5 In February 2004, the Abu Sayyaf attack on Super Ferry 14 by planting bombs onboard killed more than

a hundred people. In August 2005, another attack using the same modus operandi was carried out on a ferry

in southern Philippines injuring 30 people.

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the increasing military and power-projection capabilities of big powers relative to the

littorals. To make matters worse for the littorals, non-state disorder in the Straits is

providing the justification for the politico-military presence of these major powers. Such

presence may not directly threaten the littorals, but could impinge on their vital interests

in an indirect manner. For example, in the possible event of a military conflict in the

western Pacific, the SoM will become a hotspot for naval jostling by the belligerents over

strategic imports.

Impediments to Security Response

The key to maritime tranquility in the area therefore lies in reducing the risk

posed by non-state threats since this will concomitantly attenuate the geo-political strains

and strategic insecurities of the Straits-littorals. In the aforesaid arithmetic terms, if either

one of the two factors – ‘threat’ and ‘vulnerability’ - is ‘zero’, the ‘risk’ would cease to

exist. This may not be practically achievable, but these factors must be minimized. The

current security response of the littorals is evidently directed to achieve this, and seems to

be a two-pronged approach: firstly, their individual efforts and ‘intra-littoral’

cooperation; and the second involving ‘extra-littoral’ states - the ‘stake-holders’ in the

Straits. However, these ‘remedial measures’ have not been without major impediments.

The Capability Void

In addition to the ‘local’ efforts to address the root cause of maritime crime

(socio-economic disparities and unemployment) and concurrently improving law and

order on land (from where the criminals operate), the littorals have taken some significant

maritime measures since 2004. These include improved policing and maritime domain

awareness (MDA) through means like the trilateral coordinated naval patrols

(MALSINDO) and aerial surveillance (Eye-in-the-Sky). Besides combating maritime

crimes, MDA is envisaged to help in search-and-rescue (SAR) and responding to marine

pollution. Another significant step was the launch of the Malaysian Maritime

Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which began its operations in end-2005.6

However, ever since the resurgence of maritime crime in Southeast Asia in the

past decade, modern nautical technologies7 have facilitated unlawful activities. On the

other hand, the states’ ocean-surveillance and law-enforcement have grossly fallen short

of the need since mid-1990s, when the third United Nations Convention on Laws of the

Sea (UNCLOS-3)8 vastly extended maritime jurisdictions up to the 200-nm Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ). This is particularly applicable to Indonesia with a high ‘EEZ-to-

land’ ratio. Thereafter, the Asian financial crises of late-1990s prevented the states to

acquire adequate policing assets. Most patrol vessels thus continue to be configured for

coastal tasks and have no integral aviation. Besides, high-value naval assets cannot be

employed by the states for these ‘constabulary’ tasks due to their high operating costs and

6 Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency website http://www.mmea.gov.my/hocgmy/mmea.htm

7 These include COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) equipment like navigation radars, GPS (global

positioning system) and wire-less communication sets. 8 The UNCLOS-3 (1982) entered into force in November 1994.

5

for the sake of maintaining military preparedness. These constraints also hinder the

required level of ‘sanitizing’ the SoM.

Diverse Stakes of Littorals

The aforesaid “capacity void” is aggravated by the littorals’ diverse stakes in the

SoM, which translates into varying commitment to its security. Due to archipelagic

Indonesia’s geographic centrality, the sea-route is not critical. Besides, the eastern coast

of Sumatra (Indonesia) is underdeveloped and has only one minor port of Belawan facing

the Straits. Furthermore, for Jakarta, religious extremism and centrifugal tendencies in the

widely scattered Indonesian islands are more pressing security issues than the need to

tackle sea piracy. The waterway is more important for Malaysia since four of its seven

major ports (Penang, Klang, Tanjung Pelepas and Johor) are located along the Straits.

Besides, these waters are important fishing grounds and are also used for illegal

immigration. Singapore is evidently concerned about security in the short stretch of

Singapore Strait at the southern end. Although it also has a significant economic interest

in the entire waterway, its contribution to the other stretches is inconceivable due to the

sensitivities of the other two littorals.

The Issue of ‘Sovereignty’

The aforesaid leads to another issue of ‘sovereignty’. Based on the high priority

accorded to upholding national sovereignty, Indonesia and Malaysia have always been

averse to a ‘direct’ security role of an ‘extra-littoral’ state in the Straits. The same reason

was also stated for their rejection of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) for

the SoM, proposed by the US in April 2004. Another notable factor for the littorals’

resistance to any US role was the American ‘monolithic’ view of Islam and its military-

oriented approach to combat terrorism.

The littoral-states’ objection to external involvement in the security of SoM is

well justified as per international law, under which, the prerogative of security lies with

the littoral states. However, such sensitivities have also led to Indonesia and Malaysia not

joining the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR-79) and the Convention for Suppression

of Unlawful Acts at sea (SUA-88). Captain Taib bin Yasin of the Maritime Institute of

Malaysia (MIMA) attributes it to the “fear of being drawn into the geopolitical game of

the major powers”.9 This has been among the major hurdles to the success of these

cooperative legal regimes.

Some developments since 2005 have displayed an increasing flexibility on part of

littorals to achieve security. These include the littorals’ request for international air-

surveillance assistance during launch of the Eye-in-the-Sky, the bilateral agreements for

‘hot-pursuit’ of criminals into the territorial waters of the adjacent state, and the decision

to include Thailand in MALSINDO (this of course never materialized due to political

compulsions of Bangkok). However, the states have continued to resist joining the global

9 Summary of Proceedings of the International Symposium on “The Changing Oceanic Landscape in the

IOR”, 13-15 December 2006, Centre for Security Analysis (CSA), Chennai (India), p.17

6

and regional cooperative legal mechanisms. Indonesia and Malaysia even refused to

ratify the recent Regional Cooperative Agreement against Piracy (ReCAAP-06) that

entered into force on September 4, 2006, which is essentially a cooperative mechanism

for information sharing.

The Littoral-User Divide

The straits-littorals have been insisting that since they derive no direct benefit

from the transiting sea-trade, the user-states must share the financial costs necessary for

maintaining security in the SoM.10

Funding projects related to navigational safety11

under

Article 43 of UNCLOS-3 is one of the means. (The underlying rationale is that improving

‘safety’ would also contribute to ‘security since there is a considerable overlap between

the two.) Towards this aim, the states have convened meetings under the auspices of the

International Maritime Organisation (IMO), but these efforts have hardly succeeded. At

the latest meeting in September 2006 at Kuala Lumpur, only China consented to fund the

projects. (Japan is the only state that has done so in the past).

The littorals have also mooted a system of ‘toll-tax’ and ‘compulsory pilotage’ for

the vessels transiting the Straits, but the user-states have been opposing these on the

grounds that any such charges will amount to curtailing freedom of navigation, and

would thus not conform to the spirit of UNCLOS-3.

A ‘symbolic’ division between Straits-littorals and the user-states has also come

to the fore since February 2006, when the US convened the ‘user-state conference’ in

Alameda (California).12

Coast Guard Inspector General P Paleri led the Indian team at the

Conference. He says that the “specific task” of the US chairperson, Admiral Johnson, was

“to get the people to agree to the American views on the subject and prepare a team under

the name ‘user states.’ It was evident from the draft resolution prepared even before

consultations and discussions”. The outcome of the meeting was not divulged to the

Straits-littorals. This was perceived by the littorals as the US attempt to seize the

initiative in the security of the Straits, and internationalize the issue.

The Indian Role

In 1999, the hijacked Japanese vessel MV Alondra Rainbow, re-named by the

pirates as MV Mega Rama, was interdicted by the Indian maritime forces after a dramatic

chase in the Indian Ocean. It was a momentous event that demonstrated both India’s

commitment to combat low-intensity threats, and the dividends of trans-national security

cooperation. Of even greater significance was that the Indian court sentenced each of the

10

See, ‘Malaysia urges Malacca straits users to share security cost’, People’s Daily online, June 02, 2006,

at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/02/eng20060602_270365.html 11

These projects involved removal of wrecks, Automatic Identification System (AIS) for small ships, and

systems for nautical data measurement systems and aids to navigation. See, Ocean Policy Research

Foundation (OPRF), Japan, monthly report (September 2006), p.5, at

http://www.sof.or.jp/ocean/report_e/pdf/200609.pdf 12

Rajat Pandit, ‘India joins US war on maritime terror’, Times of India, February 15, 2006, p.8. Besides

India and the US, the other states were UK, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Russia.

7

fourteen pirates to seven years imprisonment, which was lauded by the shipping

fraternity as “a rare move by a national court to assume jurisdiction over a crime

committed in international waters”.13

India has been an active participant in cooperative security ventures and has

acceded to all global conventions that address not only non-state violence against

shipping, but also those aimed at human security and the preservation of marine

environment.14

In recent years, New Delhi’s disposition towards maritime security has

become more palpable. Its accession to the ReCAAP-06 on June 4, 2006 came barely 15

months after it was opened for signature, which enabled the treaty to enter into force

three months later. This was in contrast to its ratifications of the SUA-88 and SAR-79

conventions, which took eight and six years respectively (after their entry into force).15

In 2004, India also immediately consented to participate in the cooperative arrangement

among regional coast guards, the Asia Maritime Security Initiative (AMARSECTIVE).16

The overarching aim for the aforesaid is India’s increasing stakes in the maritime

realm in general, and in the safety and security of sea-lines in particular. As enumerated

below, India’s motivations for tranquility in the SoM are broadly driven by three

principal factors.

The Motivations

The first interest is driven by India’s sea-borne trade. In terms of landward

communications, India is virtually bottled up in the sub-continent due to the barriers,

either posed by natural topography or the political differences with Pakistan. Sea-borne

trade is thus critical for India’s economic growth17

. About 95 per cent of India’s

merchandise trade by volume uses sea-transportation - comparable to an island state.

Also, while the US and European states have traditionally been India’s largest trading

partners, India’s eastbound trade flows are increasing rapidly. An IBF report indicates

that in 15 years since 1991, the growth of India’s trade with its major trading partners in

Southeast Asia and East Asia has ranged from four-fold to sixteen-fold. Quoting an IMF

study, it adds that, “ASEAN+3 countries now account for the largest share of India's total

trade at almost 26 per cent, followed by 24 per cent with the European Union, 18 per cent

with the Middle East and 16 per cent with North America.”18

This pace is likely to gather

13

‘India: Court jails pirates in breakthrough for maritime security’, Statement issued by International

Maritime Bureau (IMB), Cargo Security International, March 28, 2003, at

http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/channeldetail.asp?cid=9&caid=853 14

These include UNCLOS-3 (1982), SUA (1988), SAR (1979), the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS-74) and

the Maritime Pollution (MARPOL-73/78). 15

‘Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments’ , IMO Report, December 31, 2005 at,

http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14744/9193.pdf 16

AMARSECTIVE-2004 was initiated by Japan Coast Guard at Tokyo and adopted by 16 Asian states and

one Area (Hong Kong). See, “Coastguards adopt Amarsective 2004”, The Star, June 28, 2004 at

http://202.186.86.35/maritime/story.asp?file=/2004/6/28/maritime/8288099&sec=maritime 17

The share of overseas trade in India’s GDP has been steadily increasing from a mere 16 per cent in 1995

to 28 per cent in 2005 and expected to reach 55 per cent by 2020. 18

‘India ASEAN: India’s enduring commerce with rest of Asia’, IBEF report, February 2005, pp.2-3 at

www.ibef.org IBEF is a public-private partnership between Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and

8

a greater momentum with the regional Free Trade Areas (FTA) being established. An

April 2007 analysis of India’s trade data indicates that 31 per cent of its merchandise

trade currently moves east beyond the Southeast Asian straits.19

This proportion is likely

to grow further in the coming years.

Another important factor linked to the foregoing is the geo-political and strategic

need for India to diversify its energy sources to the east to reduce its excessive

dependence on the unstable West Asia (Middle East). While India has been importing

crude oil in relatively small quantities from the eastwards, the December 2006 arrival of

its first crude oil consignment from the Russian Far East (Sakhalin-1 project)20

is likely to

be a precedent to significant energy imports from that direction. India may also soon get

its share of natural gas from Sakhalin-1,21

and the follow-on projects of Sakhalin-2 and 3

hold much promise in the coming years. India is also negotiating a long-term LNG

contract with Malaysia.22

All these imports would need to transit through the SoM.

Most importantly, good order in the SoM is closely intertwined with India’s

national security, since the waterway is contiguous to India’s maritime zones. Piracy in

the waterway for example, bears strongly on the shipping activity in Indian waters. Other

types of organized maritime crimes like drug trafficking, gunrunning and human

smuggling in SoM frequently operate across the Bay of Bengal/ Andaman Sea as well,

providing nourishment to insurgencies in India’s north-eastern (provincial) states.

Besides, an untoward incident in the Straits due to a maritime disaster will have direct

security impact on India, including in terms of environmental damage. Located closest to

the Straits are India’s Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands, whose fragile eco-systems

are extremely susceptible to marine pollution.

The Approach

During the US-sponsored conference at Alameda, India preferred to call the event

as “prospective donor-states’ conference” instead of “user-state conference”. (The

reason is evident - as mentioned earlier, India is not a mere ‘user-state’ since its stakes in

the Straits are much more than the safety/ security of its shipping.) The wording of the

draft resolution was not acceptable to India. Contrary to the sense it carried, India insisted

that any proposal for the SoM must be with the littorals’ unanimous consent, including in

terms of assistance from identified user/ donor states. India also insisted on a Chairman’s

Ministry of Commerce (Government of India). Also see, Swati Lodh Kundu, “Asian surge in India trade”,

Asia Times Online, May 28, 2005 at http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GE28Df01.html 19

‘India's Foreign Trade: 2007-08’ (April), Division of International Trade, Department of Economic

Analysis and Policy, RBI Monthly Bulletin, July 2007, p. 1279 and 1281, at

http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/78684.pdf 20

Sanjay Dutta, ‘Sakhalin route to energy security’, Times of India, New Delhi, December 8, 2006, p.14 21

‘India Plans to Liquefy Sakhalin Gas’, Reuters, The Moscow Times, July 24, 2006 at

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/07/24/049.html 22

Based on information provided by Captain Mohedin Shahul Hameed, Senior Executive, Malaysia LNG

Sdn Bhd, Petronas in September 2006. The process is still ongoing as per available information.

9

report (rather that a mere resolution of commitment) to be an input for the next IMO-

sponsored meeting.23

During the Fifth IISS-sponsored Asia Security Summit (Shangri La Dialogue)

held in June 2006 at Singapore, the Indian Defence Minister reaffirmed India’s offer to

assist in the security of the Straits saying that, "India has developed capabilities in various

aspects of maritime security and would be most willing to share its expertise with

countries of the region." His address also reflected the Indian position taken during the

Alameda conference that the assistance by “India…as a major user-state” would be

“Subject to the desire of the littoral states…”. 24

The Indian Navy is reported to have

made some operational plans for the SoM, which were even presented to the navies of the

Straits-littorals during the ‘Milan’ at Port Blair (A&N Islands) in January 2006.25

These

plans aptly went beyond looking to sanitize the area of pirates and terrorists, to soft

security issues like disaster relief, search and rescue, and pollution response. The process

can be taken further by exploring more avenues of cooperation, including those towards

navigational safety in the Straits, wherein too; there is immense potential for India to

contribute.

Avenues for an Indian Contribution

A cooperative framework involving India will therefore comprise of three broad

measures. The first will aim to mitigate the non-state threats through capacity-building

and capacity-augmentation. However, ‘threat-mitigation’ will not be easy considering the

amorphous attributes of the actors who employ asymmetrical means to further their

objectives. Hence, the second measure seeking to ‘reduce vulnerabilities’ will be

extremely essential. Since the states have more control over this, it will also be easier and

yield more tangible results towards lowering the ‘risk’. This also includes India’s

participation in international fora, like those under the auspices of the IMO, to reduce the

vulnerabilities of the global shipping industry and trading system. The third would

essentially be a response to contingencies that may occur notwithstanding the aforesaid

precautionary measures. In more specific terms, the following can be considered as the

potential areas of cooperation between India and the Straits-littorals.

Maritime Domain Awareness

The foremost need is to increase MDA for the purpose of identifying the threats.

While the Straits-littorals have instituted measures in this direction, such as through aerial

surveillance (Eye-in-the-Sky) and the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) project (being

implemented), these can be supplemented by inputs of the adjoining waters in the

Andaman Sea/ Bay of Bengal, which are under constant ‘watch’ by the Indian maritime

23

Based on the author’s discourse with Dr. P. Paleri, Coast Guard Inspector-General (now retired), who led

the Indian delegation at the February 2006 “user-state conference” at the US Coast Guard Pacific Area

Command, Alameda, California. 24

Ministry of Defence (MoD), Government of India press release, June 3, 2006, at

http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=18213 25

Shiv Aroor, ‘Centre approves Navy’s Malacca plan’, The Indian Express, January 11, 2006, at

http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_frame.php

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forces. A May 2006 IDSS policy paper on the subject also states, “The ultimate objective

should be to establish a system of information exchange and situational awareness in the

Straits that engages the states in the approaches to the Straits (ie. India and Thailand)”.26

It was with this aim that Malaysia was contemplating requesting India for

photographs of the mercantile traffic entering the SoM.27

While it is not known whether

the request was made eventually, this was highly feasible for India to provide a compiled

surface picture in real-time, considering that the entire shipping entering the Straits

through its northern entrance must transit within 50nm of the southern tip of India’s A&N

Islands (Indira Point). (To augment its surveillance assets in these Islands, India will soon

be implementing a satellite-based national Automatic Identification System (AIS), which

would require ships to automatically transmit information periodically to coastal stations,

and thereby enable India to monitor shipping up to 50nm from its coast).28

Such a

measure will be invaluable for the Straits-littorals to sift legitimate shipping from suspect

vessels.

While the Eye in the Sky arrangement was being contemplated in July 2005,

Indonesia and Malaysia had requested for international assistance for air surveillance

provided the aircraft were controlled by the littorals. 29

India did not respond to the

request, probably because its air-assets based at the A&N Islands were grossly

inadequate. These are now being upgraded, including with addition of more Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and in due course of time, India may be in a position to offer its

air-assets, if required.

Coordination of Naval Patrols

Since 2002, India and Indonesia have been coordinating naval patrol along their

common maritime boundary in the six-degree channel, virtually at the northern entrance

to the SoM.30

Communication channels are continuously manned during the operation

between Port Blair and Belawan, and among the participating units. In 2005, India

entered into a similar understanding with Thailand.31

The patrols commenced in early

2006, with the Thai units operating from the Andaman Sea naval base of Phangna (north

of Phuket). While these arrangements has contributed to deterring unlawful acts in the

area, its effectiveness can be increased manifold if communication channels could be

established, connecting the three nodal centres of MALSINDO (Batam, Lumut and

26

Sam Bateman, Catherine Raymond and Joshua Ho, “Safety & Security in the Malacca & Singapore

Straits: An Agenda for Action”, Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies (IDSS) Singapore, May 2006, p.3. 27

‘Malaysia mulls new security step for Malacca Strait’, Reuters, MSNBC news, December 5, 2005 at

http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10332366/from/RL.3/ 28

Sandeep Dikshit, ‘New system planned to monitor ships’, The Hindu, December 1, 2006, at

http://www.hinduonnet.com/2006/12/01/stories/2006120103131500.htm 29

Sean Yoong, “Air patrols set for Straits of Malacca”, The Standard, August 3, 2005 at

http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/World/GH03Wd08.html

30

Govt. of India (PIB) Press Release, December 04, 2002 at

http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2002/rdec2002/04122002/r041220027.html 31

PS Suryanarayana, “India signs maritime accord with Thailand”, The Hindu, May 21, 2005 at

http://www.hindu.com/2005/05/21/stories/2005052104421200.htm

11

Changi) with Port Blair, Belawan and Phangna. This measure will benefit all littoral

states.

Joint Patrols: Must we dismiss the option?

Joint patrols are presently inconceivable, even within MALSINDO. In fact, even

the idea is perceived by Indonesia and Malaysia as provocative. However, consider a

hypothetical scenario, which is unlikely but nonetheless possible in the future: the

insecurity in the SoM heightens due to a major terror attack, such as one involving an

attack on a hub-port using a vessel carrying dangerous cargo. If this happens, a military

intervention by a major power or a coalition cannot be ruled out. To obviate this, the

littorals may need to be prepared for joint-patrols, which may even necessitate the

involvement of ‘preferred’ extra-littoral states to augment security. This translates into

the need for Straits-littorals to draw out contingency plans, including in terms of standard

operating procedures (SoP) and rules of engagement (RoE) at the operational level. India

has always maintained that its assistance will be contingent upon the acceptance of all

three littorals. Besides, an Indian role is likely to be acceptable to all major powers,

including China. In October 2005, the Chinese ambassador to India stated, "Now,

geographically, you (India) have access to that area. As far as India is concerned, we

don't have any problem (with its naval ships patrolling these waters)," He however added,

"But if (the) Americans come and put their battleships there, we might worry about it."32

The Straits-littorals and India would need to work out the ways to incorporate India, and

yet fulfill the three major interests of the littorals. The first is the need for a balance of

power, which ushers tranquility. The second is preservation of sentiments of the Muslim-

majority states. India has the second largest Muslim population in the world, and thus,

this sentiment is not alien to India. The third is to cater for the sensitivities of the littorals

over issues of national sovereignty, for which, various options need to be explored. One

of these is embarking law-enforcement officials from the Straits-littoral onboard the

Indian Coast Guard vessels.

Transfer of Patrol Vessels

India could also contribute Indian-built patrol vessels to the maritime forces of

littorals to counter the prevailing threats in the Malacca Straits. In recent years, two Fast

Attack Craft in commission with the Indian Navy, Tarmugli33

and Tillanchang,34

have

been transferred to the maritime forces of Seychelles and Maldives respectively. With

their capability for high-speeds and shallow-water operations, and high-rate-of-fire guns,

these have been very effective in countering low-intensity threats in the A&N Islands.

32

‘No problem if India patrols regional waters: Chinese envoy’, NewKerela news report,

http://www.newkerala.com/news.php?action=fullnews&id=43186

33

‘Transfer Of An Indian Naval Patrol Craft To Seychelles’, Indian Navy press release, February 15, 2005

at http://indiannavy.nic.in/press05.htm 34

‘India transfers naval patrol craft to Maldives’, Indian Navy press release, November 21, 2005 at

http://indiannavy.nic.in/press%202005/pres96.htm

12

Exchange of Doctrines & Training

The Indian maritime forces could share their well-evolved counter-piracy &

counter-terrorism strategies with the forces of littoral states. Multilateral and multi-

agency exercises and joint training could be conducted to prepare for responding to

possible threat scenarios.

Hydrography and Diving Operations

The Indian Navy has a well-developed expertise in hydrography and scuba diving.

In the past, it has assisted many littorals of the Indian Ocean region (including Indonesia)

to conduct hydrographic surveys of their coastal waters. Such contribution may be useful

for the navigational safety of the SoM and other straits. Hydrographic surveys and diving

assistance may also be necessary for post-disaster measures. In the aftermath of the

December 2004 Tsunami, India provided diving assistance to Sri Lanka to clear the

obstructed approach passage for ships to enter harbour and berth (dock) alongside the

wharves.

Oil-spill Pollution Response

Another possible area of cooperation is sharing of capacity to respond to a major

oil-spill in case of an eventuality. The Indian Coast Guard currently has the capacity to

tackle Tier-2 oil-spills (of up to 10,000 tons). This is now being upgraded to Tier-3 (more

than 10,000 tons). For this purpose, three specialized pollution-control vessels are being

built indigenously.35

One of these is likely to be based in the A&N Islands. India has also

recently developed a mathematical model for satellite-based detection and monitoring of

oil-spills, which would lead to a significant spatial enhancement of its response

capability.36

Conclusion

The 17th

century global debate between Mare Clausum (Closed Sea) and Mare

Liberum (Free Sea) lingered on for centuries, till the international Laws of the Sea

addressed the issue in the 20th

century. The argument was whether the ocean-realm could

be “possessed” by nations, or was it a “common heritage of mankind”. Although the

UNCLOS-3 granted the coastal states complete sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles

(territorial waters), the principle of Mare Liberum prevailed, when it bestowed

“unimpeded passage” to global shipping through international straits (like SoM), despite

the fact that these are territorial waters of the littoral states. However, some user-states

perceive that this global understanding has now come under severe strain in the SoM, due

35

‘Coast Guard to acquire three pollution control vessels’, Ministry of Defence (Govt. of India) press

release, September 12, 2003 at

http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rsep2003/12092003/r1209200312.html 36

Kounteya Sinha, ‘Eyes in the sky to help detect oil spills’, Times of India, 17 November 2006, at

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/461225.cms

13

to moves by the littoral states to impose measures like ‘toll-tax’, which violates the

principle of ‘Freedom of the Sea’ enshrined in the UNCLOS-3.

On the other hand, the compulsions of the littoral-states cannot be discounted and

merit due attention. Their perspective is aptly reflected in the following excerpt from

Malaysia’s first law of the sea codified during the reign of Sultan Muhammed Shah in the

13th

century,

“When there is a violent storm, and it may be necessary to throw overboard a part

of the cargo for the safety of the vessel,…a general consultation shall be held with

respect to the property in the vessel, and those who have much and those who have little,

must agree to throw overboard in proportion”. 37

This essentially indicates that there may be times wherein a proportionate

contribution may become unavoidable to tide over adversities. The SoM ‘conundrum’

that the global community currently encounters is typical of such a situation. Sharing the

burden in proportion to the usage of the straits may therefore be inescapable; with the

cooperative framework going beyond threat-mitigation to reduction of vulnerabilities.

However, the littorals may also need to shed their sensitivities over issues of

‘sovereignty’, a term that is relative and highly subjective. The need has often arisen in

the past when, due to overriding concerns of the global community; states have acceded

to norms, which actually amount to infringement of sovereignty. The freedom of

navigation and over-flight in the straits-littorals’ territorial waters (not only for the global

commercial traffic, but also for foreign warships and military aircraft) is itself an example

of such a ‘compromise’.

Going by the same reasoning, it may not be prudent to rule out the option of joint-

patrols in the future to cater for the worst-case scenario, say, a terror strike in the Straits.

In such case, it is highly possible for an ‘inimical’ extra-regional power to intervene

militarily in the waterway to safeguard its vital interests. Besides, the increased threat of

maritime terrorism may coalesce the littorals amongst themselves and other states, and

with greater political trust, the littorals may not be averse to joint-patrols. It may be thus

necessary for the Straits-littorals to contemplate and prepare an action plan in advance

that would preserve their vital national interests.

37

As recorded by Sir Stamford Raffles, who founded Singapore in 1819, and transcribed in Sofiah Jewa,

12th

Commonwealth Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur, September 1999, at

http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Tunku%20Datin,%20How%20has%20UNCLOS%20fared.ht

m