The Malacca Straits ‘Conundrum’ and India
Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana
(Paper presented at the 9th Asian Security Conference, IDSA, New Delhi, February 2007)
Map: The Straits of Malacca and Singapore
Introduction
The geographic centrality of archipelagic Southeast Asia has led to its waterways
assuming immense criticality for global maritime communications. The sea-route
transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SoM) is the busiest in the world, through
which, about a quarter of the world trade passes every year aboard nearly 70,000 vessels.
Besides, with about half of the world's oil and two-third of its Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) flowing through it, the waterway also encloses the ‘lifelines’ for energy-
dependent economies in East Asia. Given the global phenomenon of intensifying
economic interdependence among states, it is not surprising that the volume of mercantile
traffic passing through the SoM has been increasing over the years, leading to its growing
geo-strategic significance.
The stakes of the three adjoining littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore) in the Straits are even greater. Like many others, these countries have
embarked upon export-led development, which makes SoM critical for maritime
commerce. Besides, the waterway is also their maritime zones, from where vital living
and non-living resources are sourced. These states have also been promoting tourism to
2
supplement their economic growth, which has led to a significant increase of cruise-liners
transiting the SoM. More importantly, the survival interests1 of the Straits-littorals are
closely linked to tranquillity in the Straits, which constitutes their territorial waters and
can provide access to inimical forces.
In present times however, this crucial ‘sea-corridor’ has come to represent a
conundrum for global security. Maritime crimes are rampant in its waters, with an
attendant likelihood of maritime terrorism; and thus the high potential for a disruption of
the worldwide trading system. There is little consensus among states over how to respond
to these insecurities. The impasse is due to divergence of interests and the differing
interpretation of legal regimes, but more importantly, this crucial waterway has also
become an object of geo-political and strategic contention among the major powers.
While the governments of the Straits-littorals claim that the security scenario is
ameliorating, many security analysts assert otherwise. The contrasting positions could be
driven by extraneous considerations, and the truth may therefore lie somewhere in
between. Notwithstanding, prudence dictates responding to the worst-case; since even if
this leads to an ‘overkill’, it will be better to err on the side of caution.
It is often perceived that India does not have a major interest in the SoM,
particularly when viewed in relation to the criticality of the waterway for the East Asian
countries to ship their energy imports. This perception is however dated. The significance
of the Straits for India has grown over the years and today; India is one of the principal
stakeholders. This paper examines the risk to legitimate maritime activity in the Straits
from non-state threats. Further, in the context of the impediments to a comprehensive
security response, it attempts to identify a cooperative mechanism involving India.
The Straits: Appraising the Risk
The insecurities in the seas adjoining Southeast Asia essentially stem from the
‘maritime traditions’ of its people in historic times, which resurfaced in the late-1990s in
form of unlawful acts at sea. The foremost among these crimes was piracy, but it also
included the illegal sea-transfers of narcotics, weapons and humans. While piracy has
been on the decline since its zenith in 2003, it is now associated with greater violence and
better coordination/ planning. While the use of guns has increased sharply since 2001,
heavier weapons like rocket launchers, grenades and machine guns have begun to be used
since 2005.2
There have been no attacks by terrorists in the Straits so far, probably since their
‘nautical skills’ are not yet developed. However, events in the recent past indicate the
possibility of the terrorists acquiring the expertise for maritime operations from criminals.
1 In hierarchical order, ‘survival’ interest of a state is at the apex, followed by ‘vital’, ‘important’ and
‘other’ interests. 2 Sam Bateman, CZ Raymond and Joshua Ho, ‘Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits:
An Agenda for Action”, IDSS Policy Paper, May 2006, p.25
3
In March 2003, ten armed men hijacked and steered the tanker Dewi Madrim in the SoM
for an hour before fleeing with technical documents. The incident caused widespread
anxiety as a likely preparation for a ‘maritime 9/11’. More recently, fears have been
expressed of the terrorists’ growing ability to use novel methods of attack, which could
range from ‘high-asymmetry’ to ‘high-end technology’. In June 2006, the Malaysian
defence chief warned of the possibility of terrorists trying to disrupt trade by using sea-
mines, which could be as crude as explosives packed in oil-drums, or even sophisticated
ones, incorporating trigger-devices.3
Notwithstanding the above, there is no concrete evidence yet to indicate that the
intensity of ‘threat’ in the Straits is on the rise. However, the ‘risk’ to maritime activity is
certainly on the rise’. In arithmetic terms, ‘Risk’ (R) is essentially a product of ‘threat’
(T) and ‘vulnerability’(V). Therefore, R=TxV. Even if the threat level (T) may be
considered unchanged, the magnitude of the second factor (V) is clearly increasing, and
thereby increasing the risk (R). This ‘V-factor’ is increasing with the waterway becoming
more susceptible to disruption due to non-state activity. Navigation through the waterway
is beset with many constraints. At some stretches, the channel is only 2.8 km wide and
25m deep, and is lined with dangerous shoals and shipwrecks. The 2004 Tsunami caused
extensive damage to navigational aids like direction buoys and lighthouses, and
significantly altered the underwater terrain. In addition, the channel is becoming more
congested with the increasing density of shipping traffic and fishing activity. The tonnage
of ships is also growing reducing their ability to manoeuvre. These compel ships to cruise
at slow speeds, making them vulnerable to being boarded by pirates, and which also
translate into hazards for their navigational safety. As per an International Energy
Agency (IEA) report, oil traffic through the SoM is expected to double to 22 million
barrels per day by 2030.4 This would not only increase its vulnerability to maritime
violence, but also to marine accidents. Attendant to the increasing sea-borne trade is the
growing capacity of ports to handle cargo, making these ‘worthy’ targets for terrorism.
Of the few hub-ports in the world, Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas are located along the
Straits. Also notable is the increasing proportion of vessels carrying inflammable liquids
like crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and other dangerous cargo like ammonium
nitrate. The 2004 and 2005 bombing of passenger ships by the Filipino terrorist group
Abu Sayyaf demonstrated the assailability of passenger ships to pre-positioning
explosives onboard.5
The above ‘risk-equation’ is also valid from the Straits-littorals’ strategic
perspective. In this case too, the contours of the aforesaid “T-factor” (threat) are not well
defined. However, the ‘vulnerability’ (“V-factor”) of the Straits-littorals is growing with
3 ‘Malaysian Military Warns Underwater Mines Could be Terrorist Tool’, Agence France-Presse (Kuala
Lumpur), Defence News, July 6, 2006 at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1853798&C=navwar 4 William C. Ramsay (Deputy Executive Director, IEA, Paris), “Asian Oil: Current Trends, Outlook and
Issues’, Presentation to Conference on ‘Regional Cooperation: Key to Energy Security’, New Delhi,
January 6, 2005, at http://www.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/Textbase/speech/2005/ramsay/asianoil.pdf 5 In February 2004, the Abu Sayyaf attack on Super Ferry 14 by planting bombs onboard killed more than
a hundred people. In August 2005, another attack using the same modus operandi was carried out on a ferry
in southern Philippines injuring 30 people.
4
the increasing military and power-projection capabilities of big powers relative to the
littorals. To make matters worse for the littorals, non-state disorder in the Straits is
providing the justification for the politico-military presence of these major powers. Such
presence may not directly threaten the littorals, but could impinge on their vital interests
in an indirect manner. For example, in the possible event of a military conflict in the
western Pacific, the SoM will become a hotspot for naval jostling by the belligerents over
strategic imports.
Impediments to Security Response
The key to maritime tranquility in the area therefore lies in reducing the risk
posed by non-state threats since this will concomitantly attenuate the geo-political strains
and strategic insecurities of the Straits-littorals. In the aforesaid arithmetic terms, if either
one of the two factors – ‘threat’ and ‘vulnerability’ - is ‘zero’, the ‘risk’ would cease to
exist. This may not be practically achievable, but these factors must be minimized. The
current security response of the littorals is evidently directed to achieve this, and seems to
be a two-pronged approach: firstly, their individual efforts and ‘intra-littoral’
cooperation; and the second involving ‘extra-littoral’ states - the ‘stake-holders’ in the
Straits. However, these ‘remedial measures’ have not been without major impediments.
The Capability Void
In addition to the ‘local’ efforts to address the root cause of maritime crime
(socio-economic disparities and unemployment) and concurrently improving law and
order on land (from where the criminals operate), the littorals have taken some significant
maritime measures since 2004. These include improved policing and maritime domain
awareness (MDA) through means like the trilateral coordinated naval patrols
(MALSINDO) and aerial surveillance (Eye-in-the-Sky). Besides combating maritime
crimes, MDA is envisaged to help in search-and-rescue (SAR) and responding to marine
pollution. Another significant step was the launch of the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which began its operations in end-2005.6
However, ever since the resurgence of maritime crime in Southeast Asia in the
past decade, modern nautical technologies7 have facilitated unlawful activities. On the
other hand, the states’ ocean-surveillance and law-enforcement have grossly fallen short
of the need since mid-1990s, when the third United Nations Convention on Laws of the
Sea (UNCLOS-3)8 vastly extended maritime jurisdictions up to the 200-nm Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). This is particularly applicable to Indonesia with a high ‘EEZ-to-
land’ ratio. Thereafter, the Asian financial crises of late-1990s prevented the states to
acquire adequate policing assets. Most patrol vessels thus continue to be configured for
coastal tasks and have no integral aviation. Besides, high-value naval assets cannot be
employed by the states for these ‘constabulary’ tasks due to their high operating costs and
6 Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency website http://www.mmea.gov.my/hocgmy/mmea.htm
7 These include COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) equipment like navigation radars, GPS (global
positioning system) and wire-less communication sets. 8 The UNCLOS-3 (1982) entered into force in November 1994.
5
for the sake of maintaining military preparedness. These constraints also hinder the
required level of ‘sanitizing’ the SoM.
Diverse Stakes of Littorals
The aforesaid “capacity void” is aggravated by the littorals’ diverse stakes in the
SoM, which translates into varying commitment to its security. Due to archipelagic
Indonesia’s geographic centrality, the sea-route is not critical. Besides, the eastern coast
of Sumatra (Indonesia) is underdeveloped and has only one minor port of Belawan facing
the Straits. Furthermore, for Jakarta, religious extremism and centrifugal tendencies in the
widely scattered Indonesian islands are more pressing security issues than the need to
tackle sea piracy. The waterway is more important for Malaysia since four of its seven
major ports (Penang, Klang, Tanjung Pelepas and Johor) are located along the Straits.
Besides, these waters are important fishing grounds and are also used for illegal
immigration. Singapore is evidently concerned about security in the short stretch of
Singapore Strait at the southern end. Although it also has a significant economic interest
in the entire waterway, its contribution to the other stretches is inconceivable due to the
sensitivities of the other two littorals.
The Issue of ‘Sovereignty’
The aforesaid leads to another issue of ‘sovereignty’. Based on the high priority
accorded to upholding national sovereignty, Indonesia and Malaysia have always been
averse to a ‘direct’ security role of an ‘extra-littoral’ state in the Straits. The same reason
was also stated for their rejection of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) for
the SoM, proposed by the US in April 2004. Another notable factor for the littorals’
resistance to any US role was the American ‘monolithic’ view of Islam and its military-
oriented approach to combat terrorism.
The littoral-states’ objection to external involvement in the security of SoM is
well justified as per international law, under which, the prerogative of security lies with
the littoral states. However, such sensitivities have also led to Indonesia and Malaysia not
joining the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR-79) and the Convention for Suppression
of Unlawful Acts at sea (SUA-88). Captain Taib bin Yasin of the Maritime Institute of
Malaysia (MIMA) attributes it to the “fear of being drawn into the geopolitical game of
the major powers”.9 This has been among the major hurdles to the success of these
cooperative legal regimes.
Some developments since 2005 have displayed an increasing flexibility on part of
littorals to achieve security. These include the littorals’ request for international air-
surveillance assistance during launch of the Eye-in-the-Sky, the bilateral agreements for
‘hot-pursuit’ of criminals into the territorial waters of the adjacent state, and the decision
to include Thailand in MALSINDO (this of course never materialized due to political
compulsions of Bangkok). However, the states have continued to resist joining the global
9 Summary of Proceedings of the International Symposium on “The Changing Oceanic Landscape in the
IOR”, 13-15 December 2006, Centre for Security Analysis (CSA), Chennai (India), p.17
6
and regional cooperative legal mechanisms. Indonesia and Malaysia even refused to
ratify the recent Regional Cooperative Agreement against Piracy (ReCAAP-06) that
entered into force on September 4, 2006, which is essentially a cooperative mechanism
for information sharing.
The Littoral-User Divide
The straits-littorals have been insisting that since they derive no direct benefit
from the transiting sea-trade, the user-states must share the financial costs necessary for
maintaining security in the SoM.10
Funding projects related to navigational safety11
under
Article 43 of UNCLOS-3 is one of the means. (The underlying rationale is that improving
‘safety’ would also contribute to ‘security since there is a considerable overlap between
the two.) Towards this aim, the states have convened meetings under the auspices of the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), but these efforts have hardly succeeded. At
the latest meeting in September 2006 at Kuala Lumpur, only China consented to fund the
projects. (Japan is the only state that has done so in the past).
The littorals have also mooted a system of ‘toll-tax’ and ‘compulsory pilotage’ for
the vessels transiting the Straits, but the user-states have been opposing these on the
grounds that any such charges will amount to curtailing freedom of navigation, and
would thus not conform to the spirit of UNCLOS-3.
A ‘symbolic’ division between Straits-littorals and the user-states has also come
to the fore since February 2006, when the US convened the ‘user-state conference’ in
Alameda (California).12
Coast Guard Inspector General P Paleri led the Indian team at the
Conference. He says that the “specific task” of the US chairperson, Admiral Johnson, was
“to get the people to agree to the American views on the subject and prepare a team under
the name ‘user states.’ It was evident from the draft resolution prepared even before
consultations and discussions”. The outcome of the meeting was not divulged to the
Straits-littorals. This was perceived by the littorals as the US attempt to seize the
initiative in the security of the Straits, and internationalize the issue.
The Indian Role
In 1999, the hijacked Japanese vessel MV Alondra Rainbow, re-named by the
pirates as MV Mega Rama, was interdicted by the Indian maritime forces after a dramatic
chase in the Indian Ocean. It was a momentous event that demonstrated both India’s
commitment to combat low-intensity threats, and the dividends of trans-national security
cooperation. Of even greater significance was that the Indian court sentenced each of the
10
See, ‘Malaysia urges Malacca straits users to share security cost’, People’s Daily online, June 02, 2006,
at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/02/eng20060602_270365.html 11
These projects involved removal of wrecks, Automatic Identification System (AIS) for small ships, and
systems for nautical data measurement systems and aids to navigation. See, Ocean Policy Research
Foundation (OPRF), Japan, monthly report (September 2006), p.5, at
http://www.sof.or.jp/ocean/report_e/pdf/200609.pdf 12
Rajat Pandit, ‘India joins US war on maritime terror’, Times of India, February 15, 2006, p.8. Besides
India and the US, the other states were UK, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Russia.
7
fourteen pirates to seven years imprisonment, which was lauded by the shipping
fraternity as “a rare move by a national court to assume jurisdiction over a crime
committed in international waters”.13
India has been an active participant in cooperative security ventures and has
acceded to all global conventions that address not only non-state violence against
shipping, but also those aimed at human security and the preservation of marine
environment.14
In recent years, New Delhi’s disposition towards maritime security has
become more palpable. Its accession to the ReCAAP-06 on June 4, 2006 came barely 15
months after it was opened for signature, which enabled the treaty to enter into force
three months later. This was in contrast to its ratifications of the SUA-88 and SAR-79
conventions, which took eight and six years respectively (after their entry into force).15
In 2004, India also immediately consented to participate in the cooperative arrangement
among regional coast guards, the Asia Maritime Security Initiative (AMARSECTIVE).16
The overarching aim for the aforesaid is India’s increasing stakes in the maritime
realm in general, and in the safety and security of sea-lines in particular. As enumerated
below, India’s motivations for tranquility in the SoM are broadly driven by three
principal factors.
The Motivations
The first interest is driven by India’s sea-borne trade. In terms of landward
communications, India is virtually bottled up in the sub-continent due to the barriers,
either posed by natural topography or the political differences with Pakistan. Sea-borne
trade is thus critical for India’s economic growth17
. About 95 per cent of India’s
merchandise trade by volume uses sea-transportation - comparable to an island state.
Also, while the US and European states have traditionally been India’s largest trading
partners, India’s eastbound trade flows are increasing rapidly. An IBF report indicates
that in 15 years since 1991, the growth of India’s trade with its major trading partners in
Southeast Asia and East Asia has ranged from four-fold to sixteen-fold. Quoting an IMF
study, it adds that, “ASEAN+3 countries now account for the largest share of India's total
trade at almost 26 per cent, followed by 24 per cent with the European Union, 18 per cent
with the Middle East and 16 per cent with North America.”18
This pace is likely to gather
13
‘India: Court jails pirates in breakthrough for maritime security’, Statement issued by International
Maritime Bureau (IMB), Cargo Security International, March 28, 2003, at
http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/channeldetail.asp?cid=9&caid=853 14
These include UNCLOS-3 (1982), SUA (1988), SAR (1979), the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS-74) and
the Maritime Pollution (MARPOL-73/78). 15
‘Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments’ , IMO Report, December 31, 2005 at,
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14744/9193.pdf 16
AMARSECTIVE-2004 was initiated by Japan Coast Guard at Tokyo and adopted by 16 Asian states and
one Area (Hong Kong). See, “Coastguards adopt Amarsective 2004”, The Star, June 28, 2004 at
http://202.186.86.35/maritime/story.asp?file=/2004/6/28/maritime/8288099&sec=maritime 17
The share of overseas trade in India’s GDP has been steadily increasing from a mere 16 per cent in 1995
to 28 per cent in 2005 and expected to reach 55 per cent by 2020. 18
‘India ASEAN: India’s enduring commerce with rest of Asia’, IBEF report, February 2005, pp.2-3 at
www.ibef.org IBEF is a public-private partnership between Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and
8
a greater momentum with the regional Free Trade Areas (FTA) being established. An
April 2007 analysis of India’s trade data indicates that 31 per cent of its merchandise
trade currently moves east beyond the Southeast Asian straits.19
This proportion is likely
to grow further in the coming years.
Another important factor linked to the foregoing is the geo-political and strategic
need for India to diversify its energy sources to the east to reduce its excessive
dependence on the unstable West Asia (Middle East). While India has been importing
crude oil in relatively small quantities from the eastwards, the December 2006 arrival of
its first crude oil consignment from the Russian Far East (Sakhalin-1 project)20
is likely to
be a precedent to significant energy imports from that direction. India may also soon get
its share of natural gas from Sakhalin-1,21
and the follow-on projects of Sakhalin-2 and 3
hold much promise in the coming years. India is also negotiating a long-term LNG
contract with Malaysia.22
All these imports would need to transit through the SoM.
Most importantly, good order in the SoM is closely intertwined with India’s
national security, since the waterway is contiguous to India’s maritime zones. Piracy in
the waterway for example, bears strongly on the shipping activity in Indian waters. Other
types of organized maritime crimes like drug trafficking, gunrunning and human
smuggling in SoM frequently operate across the Bay of Bengal/ Andaman Sea as well,
providing nourishment to insurgencies in India’s north-eastern (provincial) states.
Besides, an untoward incident in the Straits due to a maritime disaster will have direct
security impact on India, including in terms of environmental damage. Located closest to
the Straits are India’s Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands, whose fragile eco-systems
are extremely susceptible to marine pollution.
The Approach
During the US-sponsored conference at Alameda, India preferred to call the event
as “prospective donor-states’ conference” instead of “user-state conference”. (The
reason is evident - as mentioned earlier, India is not a mere ‘user-state’ since its stakes in
the Straits are much more than the safety/ security of its shipping.) The wording of the
draft resolution was not acceptable to India. Contrary to the sense it carried, India insisted
that any proposal for the SoM must be with the littorals’ unanimous consent, including in
terms of assistance from identified user/ donor states. India also insisted on a Chairman’s
Ministry of Commerce (Government of India). Also see, Swati Lodh Kundu, “Asian surge in India trade”,
Asia Times Online, May 28, 2005 at http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GE28Df01.html 19
‘India's Foreign Trade: 2007-08’ (April), Division of International Trade, Department of Economic
Analysis and Policy, RBI Monthly Bulletin, July 2007, p. 1279 and 1281, at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/78684.pdf 20
Sanjay Dutta, ‘Sakhalin route to energy security’, Times of India, New Delhi, December 8, 2006, p.14 21
‘India Plans to Liquefy Sakhalin Gas’, Reuters, The Moscow Times, July 24, 2006 at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/07/24/049.html 22
Based on information provided by Captain Mohedin Shahul Hameed, Senior Executive, Malaysia LNG
Sdn Bhd, Petronas in September 2006. The process is still ongoing as per available information.
9
report (rather that a mere resolution of commitment) to be an input for the next IMO-
sponsored meeting.23
During the Fifth IISS-sponsored Asia Security Summit (Shangri La Dialogue)
held in June 2006 at Singapore, the Indian Defence Minister reaffirmed India’s offer to
assist in the security of the Straits saying that, "India has developed capabilities in various
aspects of maritime security and would be most willing to share its expertise with
countries of the region." His address also reflected the Indian position taken during the
Alameda conference that the assistance by “India…as a major user-state” would be
“Subject to the desire of the littoral states…”. 24
The Indian Navy is reported to have
made some operational plans for the SoM, which were even presented to the navies of the
Straits-littorals during the ‘Milan’ at Port Blair (A&N Islands) in January 2006.25
These
plans aptly went beyond looking to sanitize the area of pirates and terrorists, to soft
security issues like disaster relief, search and rescue, and pollution response. The process
can be taken further by exploring more avenues of cooperation, including those towards
navigational safety in the Straits, wherein too; there is immense potential for India to
contribute.
Avenues for an Indian Contribution
A cooperative framework involving India will therefore comprise of three broad
measures. The first will aim to mitigate the non-state threats through capacity-building
and capacity-augmentation. However, ‘threat-mitigation’ will not be easy considering the
amorphous attributes of the actors who employ asymmetrical means to further their
objectives. Hence, the second measure seeking to ‘reduce vulnerabilities’ will be
extremely essential. Since the states have more control over this, it will also be easier and
yield more tangible results towards lowering the ‘risk’. This also includes India’s
participation in international fora, like those under the auspices of the IMO, to reduce the
vulnerabilities of the global shipping industry and trading system. The third would
essentially be a response to contingencies that may occur notwithstanding the aforesaid
precautionary measures. In more specific terms, the following can be considered as the
potential areas of cooperation between India and the Straits-littorals.
Maritime Domain Awareness
The foremost need is to increase MDA for the purpose of identifying the threats.
While the Straits-littorals have instituted measures in this direction, such as through aerial
surveillance (Eye-in-the-Sky) and the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) project (being
implemented), these can be supplemented by inputs of the adjoining waters in the
Andaman Sea/ Bay of Bengal, which are under constant ‘watch’ by the Indian maritime
23
Based on the author’s discourse with Dr. P. Paleri, Coast Guard Inspector-General (now retired), who led
the Indian delegation at the February 2006 “user-state conference” at the US Coast Guard Pacific Area
Command, Alameda, California. 24
Ministry of Defence (MoD), Government of India press release, June 3, 2006, at
http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=18213 25
Shiv Aroor, ‘Centre approves Navy’s Malacca plan’, The Indian Express, January 11, 2006, at
http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_frame.php
10
forces. A May 2006 IDSS policy paper on the subject also states, “The ultimate objective
should be to establish a system of information exchange and situational awareness in the
Straits that engages the states in the approaches to the Straits (ie. India and Thailand)”.26
It was with this aim that Malaysia was contemplating requesting India for
photographs of the mercantile traffic entering the SoM.27
While it is not known whether
the request was made eventually, this was highly feasible for India to provide a compiled
surface picture in real-time, considering that the entire shipping entering the Straits
through its northern entrance must transit within 50nm of the southern tip of India’s A&N
Islands (Indira Point). (To augment its surveillance assets in these Islands, India will soon
be implementing a satellite-based national Automatic Identification System (AIS), which
would require ships to automatically transmit information periodically to coastal stations,
and thereby enable India to monitor shipping up to 50nm from its coast).28
Such a
measure will be invaluable for the Straits-littorals to sift legitimate shipping from suspect
vessels.
While the Eye in the Sky arrangement was being contemplated in July 2005,
Indonesia and Malaysia had requested for international assistance for air surveillance
provided the aircraft were controlled by the littorals. 29
India did not respond to the
request, probably because its air-assets based at the A&N Islands were grossly
inadequate. These are now being upgraded, including with addition of more Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and in due course of time, India may be in a position to offer its
air-assets, if required.
Coordination of Naval Patrols
Since 2002, India and Indonesia have been coordinating naval patrol along their
common maritime boundary in the six-degree channel, virtually at the northern entrance
to the SoM.30
Communication channels are continuously manned during the operation
between Port Blair and Belawan, and among the participating units. In 2005, India
entered into a similar understanding with Thailand.31
The patrols commenced in early
2006, with the Thai units operating from the Andaman Sea naval base of Phangna (north
of Phuket). While these arrangements has contributed to deterring unlawful acts in the
area, its effectiveness can be increased manifold if communication channels could be
established, connecting the three nodal centres of MALSINDO (Batam, Lumut and
26
Sam Bateman, Catherine Raymond and Joshua Ho, “Safety & Security in the Malacca & Singapore
Straits: An Agenda for Action”, Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies (IDSS) Singapore, May 2006, p.3. 27
‘Malaysia mulls new security step for Malacca Strait’, Reuters, MSNBC news, December 5, 2005 at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10332366/from/RL.3/ 28
Sandeep Dikshit, ‘New system planned to monitor ships’, The Hindu, December 1, 2006, at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2006/12/01/stories/2006120103131500.htm 29
Sean Yoong, “Air patrols set for Straits of Malacca”, The Standard, August 3, 2005 at
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/World/GH03Wd08.html
30
Govt. of India (PIB) Press Release, December 04, 2002 at
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2002/rdec2002/04122002/r041220027.html 31
PS Suryanarayana, “India signs maritime accord with Thailand”, The Hindu, May 21, 2005 at
http://www.hindu.com/2005/05/21/stories/2005052104421200.htm
11
Changi) with Port Blair, Belawan and Phangna. This measure will benefit all littoral
states.
Joint Patrols: Must we dismiss the option?
Joint patrols are presently inconceivable, even within MALSINDO. In fact, even
the idea is perceived by Indonesia and Malaysia as provocative. However, consider a
hypothetical scenario, which is unlikely but nonetheless possible in the future: the
insecurity in the SoM heightens due to a major terror attack, such as one involving an
attack on a hub-port using a vessel carrying dangerous cargo. If this happens, a military
intervention by a major power or a coalition cannot be ruled out. To obviate this, the
littorals may need to be prepared for joint-patrols, which may even necessitate the
involvement of ‘preferred’ extra-littoral states to augment security. This translates into
the need for Straits-littorals to draw out contingency plans, including in terms of standard
operating procedures (SoP) and rules of engagement (RoE) at the operational level. India
has always maintained that its assistance will be contingent upon the acceptance of all
three littorals. Besides, an Indian role is likely to be acceptable to all major powers,
including China. In October 2005, the Chinese ambassador to India stated, "Now,
geographically, you (India) have access to that area. As far as India is concerned, we
don't have any problem (with its naval ships patrolling these waters)," He however added,
"But if (the) Americans come and put their battleships there, we might worry about it."32
The Straits-littorals and India would need to work out the ways to incorporate India, and
yet fulfill the three major interests of the littorals. The first is the need for a balance of
power, which ushers tranquility. The second is preservation of sentiments of the Muslim-
majority states. India has the second largest Muslim population in the world, and thus,
this sentiment is not alien to India. The third is to cater for the sensitivities of the littorals
over issues of national sovereignty, for which, various options need to be explored. One
of these is embarking law-enforcement officials from the Straits-littoral onboard the
Indian Coast Guard vessels.
Transfer of Patrol Vessels
India could also contribute Indian-built patrol vessels to the maritime forces of
littorals to counter the prevailing threats in the Malacca Straits. In recent years, two Fast
Attack Craft in commission with the Indian Navy, Tarmugli33
and Tillanchang,34
have
been transferred to the maritime forces of Seychelles and Maldives respectively. With
their capability for high-speeds and shallow-water operations, and high-rate-of-fire guns,
these have been very effective in countering low-intensity threats in the A&N Islands.
32
‘No problem if India patrols regional waters: Chinese envoy’, NewKerela news report,
http://www.newkerala.com/news.php?action=fullnews&id=43186
33
‘Transfer Of An Indian Naval Patrol Craft To Seychelles’, Indian Navy press release, February 15, 2005
at http://indiannavy.nic.in/press05.htm 34
‘India transfers naval patrol craft to Maldives’, Indian Navy press release, November 21, 2005 at
http://indiannavy.nic.in/press%202005/pres96.htm
12
Exchange of Doctrines & Training
The Indian maritime forces could share their well-evolved counter-piracy &
counter-terrorism strategies with the forces of littoral states. Multilateral and multi-
agency exercises and joint training could be conducted to prepare for responding to
possible threat scenarios.
Hydrography and Diving Operations
The Indian Navy has a well-developed expertise in hydrography and scuba diving.
In the past, it has assisted many littorals of the Indian Ocean region (including Indonesia)
to conduct hydrographic surveys of their coastal waters. Such contribution may be useful
for the navigational safety of the SoM and other straits. Hydrographic surveys and diving
assistance may also be necessary for post-disaster measures. In the aftermath of the
December 2004 Tsunami, India provided diving assistance to Sri Lanka to clear the
obstructed approach passage for ships to enter harbour and berth (dock) alongside the
wharves.
Oil-spill Pollution Response
Another possible area of cooperation is sharing of capacity to respond to a major
oil-spill in case of an eventuality. The Indian Coast Guard currently has the capacity to
tackle Tier-2 oil-spills (of up to 10,000 tons). This is now being upgraded to Tier-3 (more
than 10,000 tons). For this purpose, three specialized pollution-control vessels are being
built indigenously.35
One of these is likely to be based in the A&N Islands. India has also
recently developed a mathematical model for satellite-based detection and monitoring of
oil-spills, which would lead to a significant spatial enhancement of its response
capability.36
Conclusion
The 17th
century global debate between Mare Clausum (Closed Sea) and Mare
Liberum (Free Sea) lingered on for centuries, till the international Laws of the Sea
addressed the issue in the 20th
century. The argument was whether the ocean-realm could
be “possessed” by nations, or was it a “common heritage of mankind”. Although the
UNCLOS-3 granted the coastal states complete sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles
(territorial waters), the principle of Mare Liberum prevailed, when it bestowed
“unimpeded passage” to global shipping through international straits (like SoM), despite
the fact that these are territorial waters of the littoral states. However, some user-states
perceive that this global understanding has now come under severe strain in the SoM, due
35
‘Coast Guard to acquire three pollution control vessels’, Ministry of Defence (Govt. of India) press
release, September 12, 2003 at
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rsep2003/12092003/r1209200312.html 36
Kounteya Sinha, ‘Eyes in the sky to help detect oil spills’, Times of India, 17 November 2006, at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/461225.cms
13
to moves by the littoral states to impose measures like ‘toll-tax’, which violates the
principle of ‘Freedom of the Sea’ enshrined in the UNCLOS-3.
On the other hand, the compulsions of the littoral-states cannot be discounted and
merit due attention. Their perspective is aptly reflected in the following excerpt from
Malaysia’s first law of the sea codified during the reign of Sultan Muhammed Shah in the
13th
century,
“When there is a violent storm, and it may be necessary to throw overboard a part
of the cargo for the safety of the vessel,…a general consultation shall be held with
respect to the property in the vessel, and those who have much and those who have little,
must agree to throw overboard in proportion”. 37
This essentially indicates that there may be times wherein a proportionate
contribution may become unavoidable to tide over adversities. The SoM ‘conundrum’
that the global community currently encounters is typical of such a situation. Sharing the
burden in proportion to the usage of the straits may therefore be inescapable; with the
cooperative framework going beyond threat-mitigation to reduction of vulnerabilities.
However, the littorals may also need to shed their sensitivities over issues of
‘sovereignty’, a term that is relative and highly subjective. The need has often arisen in
the past when, due to overriding concerns of the global community; states have acceded
to norms, which actually amount to infringement of sovereignty. The freedom of
navigation and over-flight in the straits-littorals’ territorial waters (not only for the global
commercial traffic, but also for foreign warships and military aircraft) is itself an example
of such a ‘compromise’.
Going by the same reasoning, it may not be prudent to rule out the option of joint-
patrols in the future to cater for the worst-case scenario, say, a terror strike in the Straits.
In such case, it is highly possible for an ‘inimical’ extra-regional power to intervene
militarily in the waterway to safeguard its vital interests. Besides, the increased threat of
maritime terrorism may coalesce the littorals amongst themselves and other states, and
with greater political trust, the littorals may not be averse to joint-patrols. It may be thus
necessary for the Straits-littorals to contemplate and prepare an action plan in advance
that would preserve their vital national interests.
37
As recorded by Sir Stamford Raffles, who founded Singapore in 1819, and transcribed in Sofiah Jewa,
12th
Commonwealth Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur, September 1999, at
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Tunku%20Datin,%20How%20has%20UNCLOS%20fared.ht
m
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