The Jordan River Basin: 2. Potential Future Allocations to the Co-riparians, Water International 32...

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The Jordan River Basin:2. Potential Future Allocations to

the Co-riparians

David J.H. Phillips, Freelance Consultant, England, ShaddadAttili, Consultant, England, Stephen McCaffrey, University of the

Pacific, USA, and John S. Murray, Consultant, USA

Abstract: The Jordan River drains parts of fourStates and one territory (Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordanand Palestine), and is an important regional source ofwater. A previous paper in this series discussed theflow allocations from the Jordan River to the co-riparians which were proposed in the Johnston Plan of1955, noting that recently declassified documents shednew light on the allocation proposed for Israel. Thepresent paper discusses potential future allocations ofwater from the Jordan River basin to the co-riparians,providing alternative methods of calculating these usingbasic principles which are considered to generallyreflect customary international water law. It isconcluded that whilst certain of the downstream co-riparians are undoubtedly “water-stressed”, an acceptablesolution to the allocation of water within the region isattainable. However, this will depend on coupling theallocation of the existing resources to the strategicdevelopment of additional fresh water resources in theregion, which will also encourage the joint management ofthe resulting system.

Introduction

Despite its comparatively small size, the Jordan River(Figure 1) has long been recognized as a critical

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resource to the Middle East. These waters are ofimportance to each of the five co-riparians (Lebanon,Syria, Israel, Palestine and Jordan), in part because ofthe generally arid nature of the region as a whole.However, Lebanon and Syria have extensive additionalwater resources outside the Jordan River basin. The twodownstream co-riparians (Jordan; and Palestine,comprising the West Bank and Gaza) suffer fromparticularly severe water deficiencies. The averageavailability of water per capita in Palestine is presentlyabout 70 m3/year, with that in Jordan being approximately160 m3/year. These figures compare with the threshold for“absolute scarcity”, set at 500 m3/year. Israel currentlyutilizes about 330 m3/year on a per capita basis, againbelow the absolute scarcity threshold (for discussions ofwater scarcity, see Falkenmark and Widstrand, 1992;Gleick, 1993; Lawrence et al., 2002).

As noted in the previous paper in this series (Phillipset al., 2005), the Johnston Plan of 30 September 1955proposed allocations from the Jordan River basin to the(then) co-riparians as 35 MCM/year for Lebanon; 132MCM/year for Syria; and 720 MCM/year for Jordan (at thattime, including the West Bank, which is now part ofPalestine). Israel was allocated the “residual flow”,and this is the figure on which recently declassifiedmaterials have shed new light. The materials accessed bythe present authors indicate that Johnston calculated theresidual flow as 466 MCM/year, plus 150 MCM/year of“local water”. Thus, the available evidence indicatesthat the allocation proposed for Israel by Johnston was616 MCM/year, as an average (see Table 1 and Phillips etal., 2005).

Principles of Customary International Water Law

The methodology utilized by Johnston in the mid-1950s isnot that which would be used presently to allocate sharedor international water resources. As discussed byPhillips et al. (2005), Johnston based his proposedallocations only on the irrigable land areas within each

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of the basin States, satisfying the demand for water inthe three Arab nations as computed by the product of theirrigable land areas and the water duties pertaining tothese. The “residual flow” was then proposed forallocation to Israel, with out-of-basin transfer beingconsidered acceptable by Johnston for Israel, but notbeing contemplated by the other co-riparians.

Customary international water law has been codified in anumber of instruments, the key documents post-dating thework of Johnston. Two of the most fundamental principlesof customary international water law are the requirementfor the equitable and reasonable use of sharedwatercourses, and the obligation to avoid significantharm to co-riparian States.

The Helsinki Rules adopted by the International LawAssociation (ILA) in 1966 proposed a number of factors tobe taken into account in the equitable and reasonableallocation of international watercourses, as shown inTable 2. A similar non-exhaustive list of factors is setforth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of theNon-navigational Uses of International Watercourses(United Nations, 1997), as also shown in Table 2. Mostauthors have concluded that such requirements shouldapply to groundwaters as well as to surface waters, andboth the UN Convention and The Seoul Rules onInternational Groundwaters (1986) directly support thisview. The “Berlin Rules”, the ILA’s recently finalizedrevision of the Helsinki Rules, includes little of majornote with respect to the factors listed in Table 2,although a new factor concerned with the sustainabilityof proposed or existing uses has been included, and theextension of the Rules to both confined and unconfinedgroundwaters has been rendered more explicit (ILA, 2004).

However, the determination of the equitable andreasonable allocation of shared water resources is not asimple task. No definitive volumetric allocations to co-riparians arise automatically from the application of theprinciples in either of the legal instruments described

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above, nor indeed from any other internationally acceptedrules. Clearly, each situation should be treated on itsindividual merits, and both the Helsinki Rules and the UNConvention so provide.

Regional Relevance of the Factors AffectingEquitable Allocations

The factors as listed in Table 2 and which may influencethe equitable and reasonable allocation of waters to theco-riparians within the Jordan River basin are consideredhere in general terms. It is emphasized that the presentpaper does not attempt to exhaustively analyze thesefactors with a view to deriving quantitative proposalsfor equitable and reasonable allocations of the JordanRiver flows to the co-riparians. Rather, the factors areaddressed in qualitative terms only, to throw light onwhether they imply particular preferences in allocationto one party or another. Other authors have attemptedsomewhat more rigorous consideration of the factors andtheir relevance in the basin (e.g. see Moore, 1994;Sawalhi et al., 2001), and we do not seek to eitherchallenge or amplify these. Rather, an alternativemethodology is offered in the later sections of thepresent paper, as a platform for testing whether thepresent allocations are equitable or reasonable. Thespecific allocations of water from the Jordan River tothe co-riparians are for the co-riparians themselves toagree, by negotiation – some of which has already takenplace.

As shown in Table 2, the relative basin areas and thecontributions from the co-riparians to the flows withinthe Jordan River basin are of potential relevance indetermining the equitable and reasonable allocations ofthe shared resource. The contributions of the five co-riparians to the total flow within the Jordan River basinhave been estimated by various authors, and not all datasources agree. However, the annual contributions to flowapproximate the following in an average year, with theproportions of the basin area also being given:

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120 MCM from Lebanon, from 3.6% of the basin area; 435 MCM from Syria, from 37.3% of the basin area; 160 MCM from Israel, from 9.7% of the basin area; 155 MCM from Palestine, from 8.2% of the basin area;

and 530 MCM from Jordan, from 41.2% of the basin area.

It is evident from this that the bulk of the Jordan Rivercatchment is present within Syria and Jordan, with muchsmaller areas being located within the boundaries of theother three co-riparians. The flow contributions alsotend to follow this pattern, although there is a biastowards heavier flows per unit area from the north(especially Lebanon), which is rather less arid than thesouth of the basin. Interestingly, a mismatch betweenthe proposed allocation and the national contribution tothe total basin flow has been cited as one of theprobable reasons that Syria might have opposed theproposals in the Johnston Plan (El Musa, 1998; Haddadin,2003; Phillips et al., 2005).

The climate affecting the basin is also a potentialfactor to be taken into account (see Table 2), in partbecause areas with low rainfall will need greaterallocations from transboundary rivers to account forthis. The most arid areas of the basin are those towardsits southern extent, although all parts of the basinreceive low rainfall. Two issues are of particularimportance in the modern age in this respect, these beingthe impacts of droughts and how these are addressed; andthe potential effects of climate change on theavailability of water resources. The treatment ofdroughts (and high-flow periods) is discussed in a latersection of the present paper. While climate changeshould be taken into account in the development of plansfor future water allocations, its precise effects cannotbe predicted accurately for this (or any other) riverbasin. It appears appropriate that the potential impactsof this driving force be taken into account in anyagreement between the parties on the equitable and

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reasonable allocation of waters within the basin (perhapsby basing preferred allocations on percentages of thetotal flow), but more specific proposals are difficult tomake due to the current state of knowledge in the field.

The existing and potential utilization of waters withinthe basin is tied into the economic and social needs ofthe co-riparians, and these factors are addressedtogether here. Classically, the demand for water isoften considered to increase with the level of socio-economic development. According to this theory, thedemand for water would be greater in Israel than amongstthe other co-riparians of the Jordan River basin.However, this proposition does not bear criticalscrutiny, as the economies of several of the other co-riparians depend more heavily than that of Israel onagriculture, which generates the greatest demand forwater. While Israel allocates some 65-70% of the waterresources it uses to the agricultural sector, this isresponsible for only about 2% of Israeli Gross DomesticProduct, and is the main sector in Israel which issubjected to significant cuts in water resources duringdroughts (National Academy Press, 1999). The use ofwater in the industrial sector in Israel is notparticularly large (averaging about 130 MCM/yearcurrently; see ICBS, 2000), and this is also the case forthe other co-riparians. The economies of Syria andPalestine are based very heavily on agriculture, and thisis especially the case for the specific populationswithin the Jordan River basin (FAO, AQUASTAT Database,on-line). It might therefore be argued that at leastsome of the Arab co-riparians should receive higher percapita allocations of water than Israel, to support theireconomies based on ‘thirsty’ agricultural sectors. Insupport of this argument, Israel has developed methods ofwater use that are significantly more efficient thanthose of the other co-riparians (see also below). Thisis in part a reflection of the strategic importanceattached by Israel to water resources, which has been arecurring theme since the partition (Schwartz and Zohar,1991; Wolf, 1998; Selby, 2005).

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The populations of the co-riparians are estimated for2004 from national statistical data sources as follows,with the percentages of these within the Jordan Riverbasin also being given (see below for a discussion of thelatter):

3.8 million in Lebanon (about 8% within the basin); 18.0 million in Syria (11% within the basin); 6.7 million in Israel (4% within the basin); 3.6 million in Palestine (39% within the basin); and 5.6 million in Jordan (54% within the basin);.

All of these populations are growing at significantrates, although the reasons for this differ according tothe country concerned. Thus, Israel’s population isincreasing mainly due to high rates of immigration. Atthe opposite end of the spectrum, the population ofPalestine is expanding almost exclusively due to organicgrowth, the rates of which are amongst the highest in theworld (for Gaza in particular). The other Arab co-riparians display intermediate population growth rates,principally driven by organic growth (US Census Bureau,on-line). It should also be noted here that any futureallocation of water amongst the co-riparians shouldrecognize that Palestinian refugees merit equal treatmentto that of other nationals, as emphasized recently byFrederiksen (2005).

The comparative costs of various methods of satisfyingthe water demands of the co-riparians are discussed in alater section of this paper, as are issues relating topotential compensation (Articles V [II] [7] and [10] ofthe Helsinki Rules; Article 6 [1] [f] in the 1997 UNConvention). It is noted here, however, that theavailable regional water resources are very heavily used,and the provision of additional water (e.g. throughdesalination or importation) will be expensive for allthe co-riparians. Jordan faces the most difficultsituation in this regard, as its centres of populationare distant from potential new sources of water, and at

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high elevation. Palestine has the same problem inrelation to the West Bank, at least in some scenarios(see later sections of this paper).

The availability of other water resources also differsvery considerably between the distinct countries withinthe Jordan River basin. As noted in greater detailbelow, both Lebanon and Syria possess access to verylarge water volumes outside the Jordan River basin,whilst Israel has moderate external resources (mainlycomprising groundwaters). Palestine and Jordan have muchmore restricted access to alternative water resources,and both rely heavily on the flows within the JordanRiver basin as a result (although the Palestinians in theWest Bank have no access presently to the surface watersof the lower Jordan River itself, and utilizegroundwaters and some of the ephemeral surface waterflows in the Eastern Aquifer Basin, which drain thereto).Jordan has at least some other water resources, even ifcertain of these are confined aquifers such as the DisiAquifer, which is presently being “mined” at asignificant rate.

The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization ofwater is also a factor in the Helsinki Rules, and the1997 UN Convention includes this in the guise of economyof use, under Article 6 [1][f]. There can be littledebate that Israel uses at least some of its availablewater resources efficiently by comparison to the otherco-riparians, and the extensive development by Israel ofdrip irrigation systems in agriculture and the re-use ofwastewaters are testament to this. The re-use ofwastewater is also increasing in Jordan presently(Fardous and Al-Hadidi, 2004), but the other co-riparianshave done relatively little as yet to promote greaterefficiency of water use. Some authors have suggestedthat efficiency of water use is a particularly importantfactor in the allocation of resources. However, neitherthe Helsinki Rules nor the 1997 UN Convention emphasizesthis factor above others, simply acknowledging that the

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relative weights of the factors will vary on a case-by-case basis.

The need to avoid “significant injury” to other co-riparians is included in the Helsinki Rules as a factorfor consideration in determining equitable utilization.By contrast, the 1997 UN Convention separated thisconcept (Article 7, termed “significant harm” in thatinstance) from the factors affecting the determination ofequitable utilization. It is clear that the equitableutilization of international waters should be determinedwith the need to avoid significant harm as one of theguiding principles, as suggested by Article 7 [2] of theUN Convention. Where such harm is unavoidable, the UNConvention provides for the possibility of compensation.

A semi-quantitative synthesis of these various factors isshown in Table 3, with relative weights for each beinggiven to the various co-riparians. There is little doubtthat in the politically-charged regional atmosphere, theprecise scores shown in Table 3 may be open to debate.However, the present authors seek merely to suggest thatan analysis of factors relevant to equitable andreasonable utilization of the Jordan River waters doesnot yield a major advantage to any particular co-riparian. It appears from the analysis shown in Table 3that Lebanon might be somewhat less likely than the otherco-riparians to successfully demand a significant shareof the basin resources, while Jordan might have greatersuccess. This very general conclusion is revisitedtowards the end of the present paper.

It may be concluded here in general terms that aconsideration of the various factors relevant toequitable and reasonable utilization, as reflected incustomary international water law, fails to automaticallydetermine volumetric allocations of the Jordan River flowbetween the co-riparians. Each of the various factorsmay favour one party over others, but no consistentpattern exists and the accepted rules are too impreciseto prescribe equitable and reasonable volumetric

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allocations amongst the co-riparians. This is aparticular problem in the region, as any agreement whichdoes not cite specific volumetric allocations could beabused, and would not be amenable to monitoring andverification.

Equal Allocations on a Per Capita Basis

The lack of any automatic method of determining equitableand reasonable allocations using the legal instrumentsnoted above derives from their attempt to cover thepreferred methods of allocation for all internationalwatercourses, which inevitably gives rise to a need toinclude many factors. However, this difficulty should beaddressed in the Jordan River basin, if the availablewater resources are to be shared equitably amongst theco-riparians. This section proposes an alternativestarting point for such an analysis. It is once againemphasized that the intention of the present authors isnot to propose definitive volumetric allocations for theco-riparians in the future (which would only bedetermined through negotiations between the various co-riparians), but rather to indicate a methodology forbeginning to determine preferred allocations within thebasin as a whole.

Without detracting from the general importance of thefactors listed in Table 2 and discussed above, it isargued here that at least with respect to the JordanRiver basin, equality of water allocation is a useful anddesirable starting point for indicating possible patternsof equitable and reasonable allocations between theparties. Equality of allocation should clearly bedetermined on a per capita basis, in order to allow for therelative population sizes of the co-riparians sharing theJordan River.

This proposal for equality in water allocations (orperhaps, in the rights of distinct populations to theavailable water supplies) can be scrutinized in thecontext of the situation faced by the Palestinians and

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Israelis within the Jordan River basin. The concept ofequal per capita shares of water for Palestinians andIsraelis is not new. Shuval (1992, 2000) suggested that125 cubic metres/person/year (equivalent to 342litres/person/day) would be an appropriate volume for“domestic, urban and industrial use” for both thepopulations, with supplies for agriculture beingadditional to this currently but deriving mainly fromrecycled wastewaters in the future. Further, Shuval(2000) has argued strongly that there is no basis fordiscrimination between the populations in this respectand that many parties on both sides have accepted thisprinciple. Isaac (1994) proposed the same basic concept,which he termed ‘water equity’ between the Palestinianand Israeli populations.

In support of such an approach, it is noted thatinternational authorities on water use make nodistinctions between the magnitude of the demand forwater by different national populations or by distinctcommunities within countries, noting only that the degreeof attainment of adequate water supplies differs markedlyaccording to the level of socio-economic development andother factors (Howard & Bartram, 2003; WHO, 2003). Thisis also the case in relation to the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UnitedNations, 1966), which was ratified by Israel in January1992 and by the other riparian States in the basin in1976. The recent elaboration of the meaning of the humanright to water is based on the rights enshrined in thisInternational Covenant (CESCR, 2002; Guissé, 2004). Forexample, it is generally accepted that 100 litres percapita/day is a minimum requirement for humans for domesticuse, while 150 litres per capita/day is a preferred minimum.This requirement is effectively independent of socio-economic status, and of political or religiousaffiliation.

It is suggested here that in the politically intenseatmosphere of the Jordan River basin, any solution to theproblem of allocating shared water resources would be

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attacked by a party that was disadvantaged in relation toper capita allocations. While economics-based arguments onthe allocation of water resources are of undoubtedinterest and potential utility in the region, these seemmore applicable to the issue of trade in water resourcesor to compensation, than to the equitable and reasonableallocation of resources in this geography. This issue isaddressed later in the current paper, in greater detail.

In keeping with this argument, the following two sectionsof this paper utilize the notion of equal per capitaallocations of water as a starting point for developingconcepts for possible equitable and reasonable allocationpatterns for the water resources within the Jordan Riverbasin. No account is taken initially of the variousexisting or potential uses of water within the basin (orby the co-riparians as a whole), these matters beingaddressed retrospectively towards the end of the paper,together with a discussion of the possibilities fordeveloping new water resources. Palestine is treated asan independent political entity throughout the currentpaper, in keeping with the current attempts to derive atwo-State solution through permanent status negotiationsbetween Israel and Palestine.

Considerations Based on the Water Needs of EntireCountries

The first analysis presented here is founded on the waterneeds of entire countries, and seeks to calculate anequitable and reasonable allocation of the availableresources on this basis. This initial analysis takes noaccount of the uneven distribution of water resourceswithin particular countries, which is addressed bysubsequent discussion.

As noted previously, clear distinctions exist between thelevels of water stress experienced by the co-riparians ofthe Jordan River basin. Thus, the upstream countries(Syria and Lebanon) possess relatively abundant waterresources on a national basis, while water stress

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increases markedly in a downstream direction within thebasin, becoming severe in Palestine and Jordan. Thisreflects the water resources available to the variousparties external to the Jordan River, particularly theTigris and Euphrates Rivers in Syria; the Awali andLitani Rivers in Lebanon; and the Orontes River shared bythose two States.

Many sources of data exist in relation to the waterresources in the region. The current analysis utilizesthe AQUASTAT data of the Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO AQUASTAT Database, on-line), with somemodifications to reflect the actual (well-documented)situation within Israel and Palestine, and the upstreamwithdrawals by Turkey which presently affect Syria. Theuse of other sources of basic data to describe theregional resources would give rise to relatively minoralterations of the precise volumes quoted here, but wouldnot materially affect the conclusions of the analysis.Table 4 shows data for the water resources available toeach of the co-riparians in the Jordan River basin, on awhole-country basis. It is noted that:

The populations of each country shown in line 1 areestimates for 2004, and have been abstracted fromofficial national statistical sources in each case.

The AQUASTAT database distinguishes between the “totalnatural renewable water resource” and the “actual totalrenewable water resource” (lines 2 and 4 in Table 4),the latter being the volume available currently for useby each of the parties, in an average year (and beingthe figures relied upon here).

The AQUASTAT estimates as quoted by the FAO have beenamended to reflect well-documented facts on the groundin relation to the regional water resources. Thefigures provided by that database for Palestine andIsrael have been amended to reflect the actualmagnitudes of the water resources available to thoseparties at the present time. This is shown in the

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comparison of “theoretical data” and “actual data” withthe Jordan River included (lines 3 and 4 in Table 4).The total water resource available to Syria as shown inthe AQUASTAT database has been amended to account forupstream withdrawals by Turkey, from the Tigris andEuphrates Rivers.

The data on per capita water availability in line 5 ofTable 4 reflect the differing degrees of water stressexperienced by the co-riparians as a whole, asdiscussed previously. This is evident whether theJordan River is included in the analysis (line 5) or isexcluded (line 7), although it is apparent that on awhole-country basis, the three downstream co-ripariansrely on the Jordan River resource far more heavily thanthe two upstream co-riparians.

The total flow available within the Jordan River systemas derived from the AQUASTAT database is calculated as1,399 million cubic metres (MCM)/average year (line 8in Table 4, this equating to the sum of the differencesbetween lines 4 and 6). This estimate is a reasonableapproximation of the water volumes included in thevarious plans considered by Johnston in the mid-1950s(see Phillips et al., 2005), and is considered adequatefor the present analysis.

When the Jordan River is excluded from the analysis,the three downstream parties (Israel, Palestine andJordan) possess a total resource volume of 2,230MCM/average year, as shown in line 9 of Table 4. Theanalysis shown excludes the two upstream co-ripariansin lines 9-11 of Table 3, as it is evident that thewater needs of the populations in Syria and Lebanon (ona whole-country basis) can be satisfied withoutreliance on the Jordan River. This implies that noabstraction would occur by Syria or Lebanon in such atheoretical scenario, and that all waters would flowunutilized to the three downstream co-riparians.

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Line 11 of Table 4 allocates the water resourcesavailable to the three downstream co-riparians in anequal per capita fashion, taking account of the present(whole-country) populations of these parties. The percapita volumes available under this scenario are shownin line 12.

Line 13 of Table 4 shows a theoretical pattern for thereallocation of the Jordan River flows which would berequired to attain equal per capita allocations as far asmay be possible, under this whole-country scenario.The pattern of reallocation reflects the severe waterstress experienced by both Palestine and Jordan inparticular, and the paucity of alternative waterresources available to these two co-riparians.

The water which would be available on a whole-countrybasis to each of the co-riparians is shown in line 14of Table 4, this assuming that the reallocation of theJordan River flows has occurred, as calculated in line13.

It is important to emphasize that this analysis isconstrained by the assumption that the water resourcesavailable in the region are evenly distributed acrosseach of the co-riparians (or could be made to be evenlydistributed), and therefore that all communities wouldreceive adequate water supplies. This is of course notthe case in reality. However, the data in Table 4 showclearly that Palestine and Jordan have major requirementsfor the Jordan River flows, and the attainment ofequality in the allocation of the available waterresource would be a challenging objective, at best.

Considerations Based on the Within-BasinPopulations

The second analysis presented here considers only thewithin-basin populations in each of the co-riparians.This approach takes account of the fact that the waterresources are not distributed evenly throughout each of

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the countries, and also acknowledges the commonly-heldview that within-basin demands should take precedenceover out-of-basin transfers. This was in fact a majorpoint of controversy amongst the Jordan River co-riparians, during the period of development of theJohnston Plan (see Phillips et al., 2005).

The populations within the Jordan River basin have beengenerated for each of the co-riparians utilizing aGeographic Information System, coupled to statisticaldata on the population distribution in each country.Notably, Israeli settlers present in areas such as theGolan Heights and the West Bank of Palestine have notbeen included in this analysis (although they areincluded in the whole-country analysis above, as part ofthe Israeli population), and this is in keeping withinternational principles on the legality of suchsettlements and their use of water resources.

The results from this second analysis are shown in Table5. It is noted that:

The proportion of the population living within theJordan River basin varies widely amongst the countries(see line 3). More than half of the total Jordanianpopulation are present within the basin, and about 40%of the total Palestinian population. By contrast, lessthan 5% of the total Israeli population resides withinthe basin.

The analysis shown seeks to allocate the Jordan Riverflows as a whole (taken as 1,399 MCM/year, as shownalso in Table 4) on an equal per capita basis, simplyaccording to the within-basin populations. Thisassumes that no other water resources exist to supplythe populations within the basin (i.e. no resourcesfrom outside the basin; both surface waters andgroundwaters within the basin are included in the flowdata shown).

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Interestingly, such allocations generate a volumeamounting to 549 litres per capita/day (line 9 of Table5), and this is quite close to the per capita resource of625 litres/day available to the three downstreamparties in the whole-country analysis discussedpreviously (see line 12 of Table 4).

The overall allocations which result under thisscenario differ markedly from those proposed in theJohnston Plan (compare lines 13 and 15 in Table 5; seePhillips et al., 2005 for the Johnston Plan volumes).This comparison requires the disaggregation of theJohnston allocation to Jordan in 1955, to reflect theseparation of the West Bank from present-day Jordan.The data shown in Table 5 follow the analysis of ElMusa (1998) in this respect, with 480 MCM/year beingallocated to Jordan and 240 MCM/year being allocated toPalestine. In this scenario, the Arab co-riparianswould in all cases receive increased allocationscompared to the proposals of Johnston, but theallocation to Israel would be greatly reduced. Thisreflects the distinct approaches employed to generatethe data (Johnston basing his proposals only onirrigable areas and allocating the residual flow toIsrael, while the present analysis relies upon thecalculation of equal per capita allocations to thewithin-basin populations).

The scenario relating to the two upstream co-riparians isparticularly interesting. Under the present analysis,Lebanon would receive about 60 MCM/average year (ascompared to 35 MCM/year proposed by Johnston) to supporta within-basin population of 300,000. The current levelof abstraction by Lebanon from the Jordan River basin isless than 10 MCM/year, and has never approached even thelevels proposed by Johnston. Syria would receive about400 MCM/average year according to the analysis in Table5, again significantly above recent levels of abstraction(which have approximated 260 MCM/year). Syria hasincreased its level of abstraction from the Yarmouk Riverin recent decades even without the construction of the

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Maqarin Dam as proposed by Johnston, through thedevelopment of multiple small impoundments.

Other matters relating to the analysis shown in Table 5are discussed in the following sections of the presentpaper.

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Water Rights, Water Use, and Compensation

While the above analyses are based on relatively simpleinitial concepts, they differ significantly in relationto the assumptions made on the populations to be served.Despite this, the conclusions reached from the twoanalyses are remarkably similar, i.e. that Palestine andJordan in particular receive inequitable allocations ofthe Jordan River resource, at the present time.

Many authors have debated the interplay between theequitable and reasonable use of internationalwatercourses, and the demand to avoid significant harm toother co-riparians. The present paper does not seek toextend this debate, noting only that the two requirementsshould be respected in concert, and that anyquantification of equitable and reasonable use shouldtake account of the need to minimize significant harm toother parties sharing an international watercourse.

However, certain connected matters are of significantimportance in the context of the Jordan River basin, andthese should be emphasized here. It is clear that thewater rights of co-riparians (which could be equated to“legitimate allocations” of water quantities, forsimplicity) should be determined through negotiation,using the factors provided in customary international lawas discussed previously. A coherent agreement on thewater rights of co-riparians could also take account ofpossible changes over time, with provision for theadjustment of quantitative allocations if specificfactors alter with time (e.g. climatic conditions;possibly also differential changes in populations or inother factors driving the demand for water).

It is important to emphasize that water use by co-riparians may not always reflect their previouslynegotiated allocations as water rights. Thus, co-riparians face choices as to their preferred patterns forthe utilization of water. One element of this scenariois that options for trading water supplies may compete

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against alternatives for the internal allocation of waterfor specific uses. A watercourse state may thereforeprefer to trade water included as part of its rightfulallocation to a second co-riparian or even an externalthird party, perhaps for a specific temporary timeperiod. While this situation is not likely to occuroften in water-stressed regions, it may arise in thepresent context as discussed in later sections of thepresent paper.

The potential to de-link water rights and waterutilization in this fashion is of considerable importancein the Jordan River basin. Thus, any futurereapportionment of the available flows within the basin(to more accurately reflect the water rights of the co-riparians) could be achieved over a specified timeperiod, with a defined transition between the status quoand the eventual equitable allocation. During thetransition period, co-riparians faced with the need tocede supplies to other parties would have the opportunityto develop “new water” to replace such quantities, andwould therefore not be forced into a zero-sum game inrelation to the availability of water. This concept wasdiscussed by Phillips et al. (2004) in relation to thebilateral Palestinian/Israeli scenario and theirnegotiations on permanent status. It is developedfurther in the regional context in the following sectionof the present paper.

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Strategic Issues Affecting the Allocation ofWater

The foregoing analyses suggest that the presentallocation of water resources amongst the co-riparians ofthe Jordan River is inequitable, Palestine and Jordanbeing disadvantaged in relation to their access to theavailable resources. It is noted that the analysisprovided here seeks to generate greater equality simplyby reallocating the Jordan River resource, and the co-riparians obviously have other means to achieve thisobjective. Additionally, the analysis relies on equal percapita allocations of the available water resources, theappropriateness of which could be subject to furtherdebate. However, the arguments made previously inrelation to the effects of the factors cited in customaryinternational law are relevant here, and it is clear thata departure from equal per capita allocations would be hardfor any single party to justify. It is also evident thatsuch departures from equal per capita allocations would needto be very severe, to contradict the broad conclusionsattained from the analyses provided above.

It is clear, therefore, that both Palestine and Jordanare exceptionally water-stressed and a solution to thisdilemma should be sought. It is noted that:

such a solution will require adjustments to the presentpatterns of water use within the basin over time;

adjustments of this type cannot occur rapidly, due toboth political and practical constraints;

this implies that a transitional period will beavailable during which the resources may be reallocatedbetween the co-riparians; and

the existence of the transition period is of greatrelevance in ensuring that all parties have theopportunity to reach an acceptable end-point.

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It is therefore argued here that to achieve a workablesolution, the reallocation of the existing waterresources and the development of additional watersupplies should be considered in concert. These shouldbe addressed as part of a strategic regional developmentplan, which should transcend the narrow confines of theinterests of any one co-riparian. The most fundamentalelement of such an approach involves the avoidance of a“zero-sum game” (where one party must ‘give up’ water ifa second party is to gain additional resources), and thegeneration of a positive-sum game for all parties. Thepresent authors believe that this is the key to achievingan allocation of the available water resources that isbalanced and fair to all concerned, and one that isattainable in the present geopolitical circumstances.

It is acknowledged that the introduction of such effortsto the political arena will not be simple, however.Historically, the co-riparians to the Jordan River havelargely failed to cooperate in either the allocation ofthe regional water supplies or their strategicmanagement. While Johnston clearly believed at one pointthat agreement to his proposed allocations was attainable(Phillips et al., 2005), this did not eventuate.Subsequent events have tended to polarize the parties,with the early 1960s being a particular period ofconflict due in part to the commissioning of the NationalWater Carrier in Israel. At that time, the Arab Leaguethreatened to reduce flows downstream from certain of theheadwaters of the Jordan River and its tributaries,creating significant political tension (Arab League,1964). The failure to construct the Maqarin Dam (afeature of almost all of the plans for the development ofthe basin in the mid-1950s) was undoubtedly connected tosuch tensions, and the existence of major storage withinthe basin only in Lake Tiberias continues to reduce thestrategic options available for certain of the co-riparians.

Many authors have contended that the co-riparians havesought to justify their use of the Jordan River flows

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since the mid-1950s on the basis of the allocationsproposed by Johnston, even though the Johnston Plan wasnever accepted officially by the parties. However, whilecertain of the earlier water management schemes werebased on the Johnston proposals (and receivedinternational funding in recognition of this), morerecent events in particular have departed significantlyfrom these. The recent controversy in southern Lebanonprovides one example of this, with the Israeli Governmentobjecting vigorously to proposals for relatively minorlevels of additional abstraction (substantially withinboth the volume proposed by Johnston, and also thatcalculated here) from the Hasbani and Wazzani Rivers(Blanford, 2002; Haddadin, 2002; McCaffrey, 2003). Inaddition, the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994)cannot be considered to reflect the allocations of theJordan basin resources as proposed by Johnston in 1955(Wenig, 1995; Shamir, 2003). Jordan has never realizedthe allocation proposed in the Johnston Plan (477MCM/average year from the Jordan River itself, plus 243MCM/year of “local water”; see Table 1), even if theseparation of the West Bank from Jordan is taken intoaccount. The level of abstraction from the Yarmouk Riverby Syria in recent times has also significantly exceededthe allocation proposed by Johnston, averaging about 260MCM/year. It is informative that this higher level ofabstraction by Syria appears warranted according to thecalculations presented here, concerning the within-basinpopulations.

Notwithstanding the historical difficulties, certaincommentators have suggested that considerable scopeexists for an improved allocation of the Jordan Riverresources (Assaf et al., 1993; Baim, 1997; El Musa, 1998;Shuval, 2000), and the present authors concur with thisview. However, any such adjustments will be likely to berealized only if a zero-sum game can be avoided, as notedabove. This implies that strategic water developmentplans within the region should be integrated into anyproposal for the reallocation of the Jordan Riverresources, rather than these being treated as separate

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issues. It is notable that while several of the partieshave cited the need to develop additional water resourcesin a cooperative fashion in their bilateral agreements(e.g. the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty, 1994; theIsraeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 1995), little ofreal consequence has emerged from this, to date.

In addition to the obvious need for the co-riparians tomaximize the efficiency of their water use and to managethe future demand with care, there is a clear need forthe development of additional water resources. Threebasic options are available in this respect, theseconcerning the re-use of wastewater; the desalination ofbrackish water or seawater; and the possibility ofimporting fresh water from elsewhere. The re-use ofwastewater is practiced widely in Israel, with a volumeof about 350 MCM/year being made available currentlythrough this route, largely for use in the agriculturalsector (Albert et al., 2004). Similar techniques havebeen introduced in recent years in Jordan in response tothe developing scarcity of water, with major re-use ofwastewaters in the agricultural sector in the East Ghorarea of the lower Jordan valley, in particular (Fardousand Al-Hadidi, 2004). Considerable scope exists for theextension of such methods to the other co-riparians inthe Jordan River basin, and even for cooperation betweenthe parties in this respect. There appears to be no primafacie case why such initiatives should not be addressed aspart of the permanent status negotiations betweenPalestine and Israel for example, although this does notrepresent a substitute for achieving the equitable andreasonable allocation of the water resources betweenthem, as required by international law.

Desalination is also undoubtedly a major element of anyfuture solution to the water-related problems in theregion. Israel has significant expertise in this sector,and recent decisions by the Israeli Government (triggeredin part by the droughts beginning in the late 1990s andextending to late 2002) have led to reinvigoratedinitiatives for additional desalination along its

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Mediterranean coast (Moatty, 2002; Rudge, 2003). Currentplans are for a total of 365 MCM/year of desalinatedwater on the Mediterranean coast of Israel (Dreizin,2004a, 2004b), with additional supplies totalling 55MCM/year deriving from the desalination of brackish watersources inland (Arlosoroff, 2004; Dreizin, 2004a).Desalination is also clearly an option for the future inGaza, especially in view of the major reductions inquality of the shallow sub-aquifer utilized for localsupplies, this having been created by both over-abstraction and inadequate wastewater treatment anddisposal practices (El-Madhoun, 2004). In May 2004, anIsraeli representative proposed the desalination ofseawater at Hadera on the Mediterranean coast to supplythe West Bank with potable water, but this has not beenagreed to by Palestine and is considered by mostauthorities to be very unlikely to eventuate in thefuture, for a combination of legal, political andeconomic reasons (Shamir, 2004; New Scientist, 2004).

The recently renewed interest in a canal (or moreaccurately, a conduit; Benvenisti, 2004) between the RedSea and the Dead Sea is also of relevance. Schemesjoining either the Mediterranean Sea or the Red Sea tothe Dead Sea have been debated for many decades, theseutilizing the hydraulic drop to generate power;desalinate some of the flows; and refill the Dead Sea toits historic level. The current initiative arose in partfrom the World Summit on Sustainable Development inJohannesburg in the year 2002. The Jordanian authoritiesin particular have actively pursued the triggering of anew Feasibility Study on a Red Sea-Dead Sea conduit, withthe involvement of the World Bank. Any such scheme wouldbe of limited duration, as the Dead Sea basin wouldeventually be refilled to an appropriate level, with onlyminor demand for additional inflows thereafter whichwould not support the production of significant volumesof fresh water (Benvenisti, 2004). Nevertheless, thisinitiative appears worthy of consideration, especially asJordan possesses very few options to increase itsavailable fresh water resource and continues to “mine”

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the Disi fossil aquifer in the south of the country, aswell as other non-renewable water resources in the Jaferbasin (FAO AQUASTAT Database, on-line). Jordan couldalso introduce desalination at Aqaba in the future,although the major centres of demand for water aredistant from the Red Sea coast and at much higherelevation, and such supplies would therefore be expensiveto most end users.

Israel has recently concluded a contract with Turkey forthe supply of water in bulk (Shamir, 2004; Rende, 2004),although the volume involved is relatively minor at 50MCM/year. The importation by Israel of water from Turkeyby tanker, barge or in large floatable bags have all beenconsidered in the past. The construction of a pumping,treatment and loading station near the mouth of theManavgat River on the Anatolian coast in theMediterranean has been completed, and this willconstitute the initial source of water for importation byIsrael, by tanker. However, an agreement with a privatecompany for the transport of the water is still to beconcluded, and the reception facilities in Israel are notyet constructed (Gürer & Ülger, 2004; Rende, 2004).

Several distinct pipeline options have also beenconsidered to bring water into the region, for thepotential use of several of the co-riparians. A pipelinerunning northwards from the Nile to Gaza has been mooted,but this would be unlikely to extend to the other co-riparians addressed here. A scheme involving transferbetween the Euphrates River and northern Jordan has beenproposed, as has the so-called “Peace Pipeline” fromTurkey, which could be of interest to a number of the co-riparians covered in the present paper. Two possibleroutes for “Peace Pipelines” have been considered (Al-Jayyousi & Shatanawi, 1996; Becker et al., 1996; Gruen,2004), these involving abstraction from the Seyhan andCeyhan Rivers to supply Syria and Jordan (the westernpipeline sometimes termed the “Mini-Peace Pipeline”, withpossible extension to Israel and the West Bank); and the

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eastern pipeline running to countries between Kuwait andOman in the Arabian Gulf.

It has been argued that the Mini-Peace Pipeline could bereplaced by the release of further flows from Turkey intothe downstream section of the Tigris River for use bySyria, coupled to the release of greater flows from Syriato the Jordanian and Palestinian populations in the lowerJordan River (Assaf et al., 1993). While attractive insome respects, this proposal ignores the demands of Syriawithin the Jordan River basin, and in any event would notsupply sufficient volumes to the downstream parties onthe Jordan River to satisfy their needs in full. It isnotable that Turkey holds a key position in many suchscenarios, due to its richness in water resources(including the upper waters of the Tigris and theEuphrates, and also the Ceyhan, Seyhan, Goksu andManavgat systems).

It is argued here that in the near term, desalination andthe re-use of wastewaters are the preferred strategicoptions for enhancing the quantity of water available inthe region. Israel in particular has alreadyacknowledged this fact (Glueckstern et al., 2001; Turek,2002). Glueckstern et al. (2001) cite a likely demandfor desalinated water in Israel, Palestine and Jordanover the next 10-20 years as 1,000 MCM/year. The costsof desalination are currently approaching competitivelevels with those of some other sources of water, havingbeen reduced by the introduction of improved technologiesover the last decade. Clearly, desalinated water is bestutilized close to its source, as this minimizes the costsof pumping. The domestic requirements of coastal (ornear-coastal) communities of the downstream co-riparianswould be best served by desalinated supplies in themedium and longer terms. By contrast, the additionaltransfer costs to much higher elevations (e.g. the demandcentres in the West Bank or in Amman, Jordan) renderdesalination a highly questionable option for such areas.

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In the longer term, the importation of freshwater in bulkfrom outside the region appears a highly probablerequirement, particularly given the population growth inthe countries of the Jordan River basin (see thestatistics provided previously). The Mini-Peace Pipelineis considered an option with potential over the longertime frame, and there would be merit in the comparison ofthis to the Red Sea-Dead Sea conduit.

Towards a Unified Strategy

A unified strategy to address the allocation andavailability of fresh water to the co-riparians of theJordan River must contain a range of elements, thesebeing introduced in distinct timescales. As notedpreviously, it is critical that both the reallocation ofthe existing water resources and the coordinateddevelopment of additional water are included. Figure 2presents a framework for establishing a meaningfulcooperation between the co-riparians, as an initial step.

Many of the outputs proposed in Figure 2 already existwithin national strategy documents which are available tothe various parties. The key new element shown here isthe involvement of an international third party to act asan arbiter, or at least as a source of independentstrategic advice to all of the Governments. It may alsobe noted that the consideration of specific resourcesoutside the Jordan River basin (e.g. the Litani River inLebanon and the Euphrates River in Syria; see Figure 2)is intended to reveal whether inter-basin transfers couldbe of utility as an element of a future regionalallocation pattern.

Close management of the changes over time in theavailability of fresh water in the region is the key tothe attainment of an agreement amongst the co-riparianson the equitable allocation of the resources as a whole.Figure 3 shows a proposed generic framework for suchchanges over time. It may be noted that:

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The current abstraction rates by both Lebanon and Syriafrom the Jordan River basin are a very small percentageof their total available water resources. The analysispresented here of within-basin demands suggests thatboth these countries could abstract higher volumes fromthe Jordan River in the future, but there is littleurgency for this to occur. Small increases inabstraction rates may therefore be countenanced forLebanon and Syria at a later time, as shown in Figure3.

Israel presently relies on the Jordan River for about30% of its total use of water (notwithstanding its verylow population within the basin; see Table 5). Theanalyses provided previously suggest that this shouldbe reduced if an equitable and reasonable allocation tothe co-riparians is to be realized. Israel couldreplace this volume with “new water” produced throughthe methods described above, and is in the bestposition of all of the co-riparians to achieve this.Desalination and the importation of fresh water will bethe main methods to increase the available volume,although the re-use of wastewaters (perhaps includingsome flows arising from Palestine) could also beenhanced. Any reduction in the overall water volumesavailable to Israel could be avoided if the transitionperiod occurring during the reallocation process isappropriately planned and managed, and the totalresource volume available to Israel could remainconstant or even increase over time, as shown in Figure3 (see also Phillips et al., 2004).

Both Jordan and Palestine should substantially increasethe total water volumes available to their populationsover time, reducing the current water stress in eachinstance. It appears unlikely that Jordan will be ableto access additional flows directly from the JordanRiver, given the terms of the Israeli-Jordanian PeaceTreaty (1994). Jordan should therefore actively seekto develop new sources of water, both to enhance theper capita volumes available to its growing population

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and to reduce the current reliance on non-sustainableresources (including the Disi Aquifer in particular).Available options for Jordan include further increasesin wastewater re-use; the Red Sea - Dead Sea conduit;desalination at Aqaba; and the importation of freshwater from a number of potential sources (with theMini-Peace Pipeline being an option worthy of moredetailed study).

Of all the co-riparians, Palestine faces the mostcritical shortage of fresh water at present, and previousauthors have noted the need to remedy this as part of anyattempts at generating regional stability (Shuval, 1992,2000; Isaac, 1994; El Musa, 1998; Frederiksen, 2003a,2003b, 2005). A number of options are open to Palestine,and these could all be of utility during the time courseshown in Figure 3. In the early stages, a more equitableallocation of the existing regional water resources mustbe agreed, and the permanent status negotiations betweenIsrael and Palestine are the principal vehicle for thisto be realized. In particular, far greater access shouldbe provided for the Palestinian population to thegroundwater resources of the West Bank, and thePalestinians must be permitted to realize their equitableshare of water of acceptable quality from the JordanRiver. Thereafter, Palestine will need to develop “newwater” through the enhanced re-use of wastewaters and theintroduction of large-scale desalination in Gaza. Theongoing attempts in the latter respect have been stalledby regional instability, but in any event areinsufficient in volumetric terms to adequately supply theGaza population (1.3 million, currently) or to achieve asufficient reduction in the over-abstraction from thedamaged aquifer resource in Gaza (El-Madhoun, 2004;Kunder, 2004).

Cooperation between the Parties

The present authors consider that the general strategyshown in Figure 3 is altogether attainable, and amountsto a positive-sum game for all five of the co-riparians

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(and indeed, for parties outside the Jordan River basin).Thus:

Lebanon and Syria could eventually increase abstractionrates from the basin in a moderate fashion, supportingtheir within-basin populations and their (primarily)agricultural activities;

Jordan and Palestine could reduce their present extremelevels of water stress, using a combination of thethree methods discussed previously for providingadditional water resources to support their growingpopulations; and

Israel could maintain or even increase its total waterresource over time and could also attain watersecurity, through the introduction of increasing levelsof desalination and wastewater re-use, the importationof water, and the initiation of close cooperation withother co-riparians.

The scenarios for Israel and Palestine are critical inthe strategic development of the resources as a whole, asany future bilateral agreement between these parties mustbe “nested” within a broader multilateral frameworkinvolving not only the other co-riparians of the JordanRiver basin, but additional parties (e.g. Turkey, as theprobable source of imported fresh water for Israel). Therecent proposal by an Israeli representative for large-volume desalination at Hadera (Shamir, 2004) may be alegitimate element of the future regional scenario, butthis water should clearly be utilized by the coastalcities in Israel, rather than by the Palestinianpopulation in the West Bank. This would obviate the needfor pumping to high elevations, and would allow Israel toretain control over both the desalination facility andits associated infrastructure. The West Bank populationmust be accorded greater access to the aquifers (whichare recharged in large part within the West Bank) andtheir rightful share of Jordan River flows, of acceptablequality. Some of the available resources should also be

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provided in the short term to Gaza, to relieve thepresent massive over-abstraction and consequent damage tothe Gaza sub-aquifer. The early introduction of large-scale desalination in Gaza should also be a focus ofcooperative action between the parties, withinternational funding being of great importance (Kunder,2004).

As noted previously, cooperation between the parties hasnot been conspicuous, historically. However, all the co-riparians have an interest in water security, and it isclear that none has water security under the presentcircumstances. Rather than being a cause for conflict,the regional water resources could be utilized anddeveloped as a central pillar of a peaceful solution tothe present problems, as certain previous authors havesuggested (Baim, 1997; El Musa, 1998).

International financial institutions and donor countrieswill have an important role in any cooperative venturesuch as that discussed here. It is clear that thecoupling of strategic water resource development to thereallocation of the rights to existing resources is thekey to future success, and there is a need for both ahighly coordinated and transparent approach to theregional problems as a whole. This suggests that a high-level multilateral group should coordinate the programme,such that specific alliances favouring individual partiesare eliminated. The existing Multilateral Working Groupon Water Resources, established initially by the Madridprocess (and proposed for re-invigoration recently in theRoad Map from the Quartet) provides one possible suchforum.

The issue of costs must also be faced, in part becausecertain types of water resources tend to be moreexpensive than others. While the unit costs ofdesalination have decreased steadily over the last twodecades and are now becoming competitive by comparison toother regional water sources, this nevertheless tends toconstitute a more costly method of supply (especially if

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pumping costs are significant). The construction ofeither a Red Sea-Dead Sea conduit or a Mini-PeacePipeline would also involve very high capital costs. Inorder not to disadvantage certain parties in thecooperative venture envisaged here, the establishment ofa “Water Bank” could be considered, with cross-subsidization to ensure an equality of costs. This wouldhave the added benefit that any trade in water resourcesbetween the parties (which would be likely to eventuatein certain parts of the time-line, at least) could besubject to the same unit costs, in order not to introduceinequalities or to skew the marketplace (Shuval, 1995;Fisher, 1996; Fisher et al., 2002). Such a “Water Bank”could be virtual rather than actual, for the main part.

If a “Water Bank” of this nature could be developed, itwould be of significance during periods of drought, also.The expansion of the options available for generatingwater supplies in the region (with one or more elementsof importation, in particular) would tend to minimize theeffects of droughts, as intelligent management couldanticipate water demand and adjust the supplies fromoutside the region. However, it is also clear that theco-riparians should reach an agreement which “shares thepain equally” during droughts, just as the benefitsshould be shared equally during times of plentiful watersupplies. Future agreement to respective percentageallocations from each water source would be anappropriate starting point for the consideration of thisimportant topic.

The arguments of certain authors on the economic value ofwater in the region (e.g. Fisher, 1996, 2004; Fisher etal., 2002) should also be considered of relevance to thegeneral scenario proposed here. It is widely documentedthat the costs of developing the resources showndiagrammatically in Figure 3 are very minor, bycomparison to the costs of increased conflict between theparties. It is to be hoped that the introduction of amore coherent form of regional water management would addfuel to an attempt to optimize the overall use of water

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by the co-riparians, thus generating even greater impetusfor future cooperation.

If such a scenario can be achieved, international waterresources will have finally been used as a tool forgenerating peace, rather than constituting a source ofconflict. As emphasized recently by several authors (ElMusa, 1998; Frederiksen, 2003a, 2003b), the internationalcommunity has a responsibility to ensure that this is thecase.

Author Biographies

Dr. David J.H. Phillips (Freelance Consultant, Adam SmithInternational, 3 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SP,England; [email protected]) has been active inenvironmental and water-related issues throughout theworld for over 30 years. He presently advisesGovernments and other international bodies in a widerange of geographies.

Dr. Shaddad Attili (Senior Consultant, Adam SmithInternational, 3 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SP,England) has a background in geology and hydrogeology,with long experience in water-related issues in theMiddle East, including water conflicts and negotiations.

Professor Stephen McCaffrey (Distinguished Professor andScholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School ofLaw, 3200 Fifth Avenue, Sacramento CA 95817, USA) was aSpecial Rapporteur for the work of the UN InternationalLaw Commission on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses ofInternational Watercourses, which formed the basis forthe negotiation of the 1997 UN Convention on the subject.

Professor John S. Murray (Senior Consultant, CMPartners,LLC, 9 Waterhouse Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA)provides training and advice to Governments andinternational bodies in the areas of negotiation,conflict resolution and related legal issues.

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Rudge, D. (2003). Desalination said still essential.Jerusalem Post, 26 February 2003.

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Sawalhi, B.I., Z.A. Mimi & A.S. Aliewi (2001). Multi-criteria decision tool for allocating the waters of theJordan basin between all riparians. In Globalization andWater Resources Management: The Changing Value of Water,AWRA/IWLRI-University of Dundee International SpecialityConference, 2001.

Schwartz, Y. & A. Zohar (1991). Water in the MiddleEast: Solutions to water problems in the context ofarrangements between Israel and the Arabs. Jafee Centerfor Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv (in Hebrew).

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Shamir, U. (2003). Jordan River Case Study, Part II:The Negotiations and the Water Agreement between TheHashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel.UNESCO International Hydrological Programme, 2003 (withaccompanying notes from M. Haddadin).

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dpf8572PalIsLAWYER2final4

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Figure 1. The Jordan River basin.

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Figure 2. A framework for initial cooperation to addresswater-related issues amongst the co-riparians of theJordan River basin.

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Lebanon: Completion of a

strategic study ofwater availability anddemand nationally, overspecific distincttimescales (2005, 2010,2025, 2050).

Clarification of demandfor water in the JordanRiver basin and theLitani River basin, as

Syria: Completion of a


Clarification of demandfor water in the JordanRiver basin and theEuphrates River basin,

Israel: Completion of a


Clarification ofpreferred options fordevelopment of new

International ThirdParty:

Receipt of data inputfrom all five co-riparians.

Triggering of anindependent study ofthe available futuremixtures of options,matching the timescalesof the individual

Palestine: Completion of a

strategic study ofwater availability anddemand nationally, overspecific distincttimescales (2005, 2010,2025, 2050), relatingto the West Bank andGaza separately.

Output: Data of relevance

Jordan:o Completion of a


o Clarification ofpreferred options fordevelopment of new

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Figure 3. A diagrammatic representation of possiblechanges over time in the availability/allocation of waterresources to the co-riparians of the Jordan River basin.

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Volu

me

Lebanon

Volu

me

Israel

Volu

me

25,00

4,000

Syria

Volu

me

Volu

me

1,0001,000

2,000

Jordan Palestine

New water

Jordan River

Other water resources

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Table 1. The allocations to co-riparians underpinningthe Johnston Plan of 30 September 1955 (see also Phillipset al., 2005). The annotations below the Table are thoseshown by Johnston in his “Chart 2”.

Country Total WaterJordan River

Diversion StreamDepletion

Lebanon 35 35 23Syria 132 132 93Jordan 7201 477 477Israel4 6162 4663 463Total 1,503 1,110 1,056Saline water 28 28

1 Includes 243 mcm of local water.2 Includes 150 mcm of local water.3 May be larger as long as stream depletion values govern.4 These values include salvaged water from Hula swamp whichwere not a part of the natural river resources.

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Time Time

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Table 2. The factors to be considered when allocatinginternational watercourses, as included in the HelsinkiRules (1966) and the United Nations Convention (1997).

The Helsinki Rules The 1997 UN Convention

CHAPTER 2. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF THE WATERS OF AN INTERNATIONALDRAINAGE BASIN.

Article 6 - Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization.

Article V. I. What is a reasonable andequitable share within themeaning of article IV to bedetermined in the light of allthe relevant factors in eachparticular case.

1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:

II. Relevant factors which are tobe considered include, but arenot limited to:

1. The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainagearea in the territory of each basin State;

(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of anatural character;

2. The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water byeach basin State;

(b) The social and economic needsof the watercourse States concerned;

3. The climate affecting the basin;

(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;

4. The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including inparticular existingutilization;

(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;

5. The economic and social needs of each basin State;

(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;

6. The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;

(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use ofthe water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;

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7. The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin State;

(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned orexisting use.

8. The availability of other resources;

9. The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;

10. The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means ofadjusting conflicts among uses; and11. The degree to which the needsof a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.

2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article,watercourse States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.

III. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.

3. The weight to be given to eachfactor is to be determined by itsimportance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use, allrelevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.

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Table 3. The general tendencies of the various factors under international law (see Table 2)to favour one co-riparian over others, in decisions on allocations of water from the JordanRiver basin. The degree to which parties are favoured is indicated on a scale from [1]indicating that parties are heavily disadvantaged, to [4] indicating that parties are highlyfavoured by a consideration of the factor listed.

Factor Lebanon Syria Israel Palestine

Jordan

1. Relative basin area. 1 4 2 2 42. Relative contribution to overallflow.

2 4 2 2 4

3. Relative climate (rainfall) in thebasin.

2 2 1 3 3

4. Relative existing/potentialutilization.

1 2 3 3 3

5. Relative economic and socialneeds.

1 2 3 4 4

6. Relative total country population. 1 4 2 1 27. Relative populations within thebasin.

1 3 1 3 4

8. Comparative costs of additionalwater.

2 2 2 3 4

9. Availability of other waterresources (in the country)

1 1 2 4 3

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10. Efficiency of use. 1 1 4 1 2

Totals: 13 25 22 26 33

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Table 4. The water resources available on a whole-country basis to the co-riparians of theJordan River (JR) basin, and calculations of equal per capita allocations to the three downstreamco-riparians. All data as MCM/average year, unless stated otherwise. See the text fordetails.

Parameter Lebanon Syria Israel Palestine

Jordan Totals

1. Populations, millions 3.8 18.0 6.7 3.6 5.6 37.72. Total renewable water resource, natural 4,837 46,08

01,670 809 880 54,276

With the Jordan River included:Theoretical data (Aquastat)3. Theoretical total renewable water resource 4,407 26,26

01,670 809 880 34,026

Actual data, accounting for Israeli withdrawals4. Actual total renewable water resource 4,407 17,00

02,219 260 880 34,026

5. Actual litres per capita/day equivalent, withJordan River

3,177 2,588 907 198 431 -

Without the Jordan River:Actual data, accounting for withdrawals6. Actual total renewable water resource,without Jordan River

4,397 16,740

1,519 151 560 32,627

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7. Actual litres per capita/day equivalent,without Jordan River

3,170 2,548 621 115 274 -

Calculations of Equal Per Capita Allocations (Three Downstream Co-riparians Only):8. Total flow available from the Jordan River 1,399 1,3999. Total resources without JR available to threedownstream parties

- - 2,230 2,230

10. Total resources with JR available to threedownstream parties

- - 3,629 3,629

11. Equal per capita allocations to the threedownstream parties

- - 1,529 822 1,278 3,629

12. Litres per capita/day under equal per capitascenario

3,170 2,548 625 625 625 -

13. JR reallocation theoretically required cf.current actual situation

-10 -260 -690 +562 +398 0

14. Water available to each party in equal percapita scenario

4,397 16,740 1,529 822 1,278 34,026

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Table 5. Calculations of the equal per capita allocations of water to the co-riparians of theJordan River, considering the within-basin populations and water resources only. All data asMCM/average year, unless stated otherwise. See the text for details.

Parameter Lebanon Syria Israel Palestine

Jordan Totals

1. Total populations, millions 3.8 18.0 6.7 3.6 5.6 37.72. Populations within the basin, millions 0.3 2.0 0.28 1.4 3.0 6.983. Percentage of total population within thebasin

7.9% 11.1% 4.2% 38.9% 53.6% 18.5%

With/Without the Jordan River included:Actual data, accounting for Israeli withdrawals4. Whole-country renewable water resource withthe Jordan River

4,407 17,000

2,219 260 880 34,026

5. Whole-country renewable water resourcewithout the Jordan River

4,397 16,740

1,519 151 560 32,627

6. Present contribution of the Jordan River 10 260 700 109 320 1,399

Calculations of Equal Per Capita Allocations:7. Total flow available from the Jordan River 1,399 1,3998 Equal per capita division, if no other sourcesexist within the basin

60.13 400.86 56.12 280.60 601.29 1,399

9. Litres per capita/day under equitable scenario 549 549 549 549 549 -

Change from Current Scenario:

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10. Present abstraction from Jordan River basin 10 260 700 109 320 1,39911. Percentage of total within-basin flow in theexisting scenario

0.7% 18.6% 50.0% 7.8% 22.9% 100.0%

12. Theoretical change required to the presentabstraction

+ 50 + 141 - 644 + 172 + 281 0

13. Equal per capita allocations, as in line 8above

60.13 400.86 56.12 280.60 601.29 1,399

14. Percentage of total in equal per capitascenario

4.3% 28.7% 4.0% 20.1% 43.0% 100.1%

Comparison to Johnston Plan:15. Allocations proposed by Johnston 35 132 616 240 480 1,50316. Percentage of resource allocated by Johnston 2.3% 8.8% 41.0% 16.0% 31.9% 100.0%

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