The Inefficiency of Efficiency: Retaliation, Equivalence and Efficient Breach in the WTO

C a r l o s E s p i n o s a G a l l e g o s - A n d a

THE INNEFFICIENCY OF EFFICIENCY: RETALIATION, EQUIVALENCE AND

EFFICIENT BREACH IN THE WTO

I. International Trade and Domestic Bias

The World Trade Organization (WTO) through the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 set out a series of complex

multilateral arrangements in favor of expanding trade

liberalization and improving the economic welfare of an

increasingly interdependent international trading community. As

any international agreement, a series of essential engagements

amongst States were set out, so as to construct the foundations

for a more liberalized and interconnected trading environment

between GATT signatories. For this purpose, contracting States

yielded sovereignty over domestic policy mechanisms so as to

afford traders ‘predictability to engage in commerce’; the overall

result was believed to be that through the limitation of certain

1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994,1987, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’)(GATT Treaty).

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domestic policy measures only efficient policy instruments would

prevail amongst member States.2

By constructing a clairvoyant international legal system regarding

trade and the enhancement of economic (mainly consumer) welfare,

the WTO could function within basic rules that limit discretionary

government responses related to trade. By favoring GATT

regulations, domestic policy measures would yield in favor of WTO

procedure, as the common consensus (amongst signatories) was that

they allowed for the implementation of efficient multilateral

trade policy.3 Abbott has proposed that these legal propositions

‘help the government of trading nations, particularly the

industrial democracies’ reach a resolution for a rather complex

dilemma where the individual interests of contracting parties

could off set the overall economic welfare and added value brought

forth by liberalized trade.4

2 Frieder Roessler, ‘The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order’, in Meinhard Hilfand Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law (Kluwer LawInternational, 1993) 53, 61.3 Ibid. 4 Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of InternationalTrade’, (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 501, 503.

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World trade required binding commitments amongst member States.

This necessity of consensus was due to the ever-looming

possibility that ‘in an uncertain world characterized by regular

elections’ (democratic process) short-run gains (political favor)

of elected public officials would upset the normality required for

investors and traders to fully engage in international trade.5 In

response the rules governing the WTO are drawn from the public

choice theory, which suggests that ‘the metric welfare of each

signatory’ of the GATT is the domestic political welfare that may

be drawn from obeying the rules.6

The underlying principle in this ‘Prisoners Dilemma’ based theory,

is that through cooperation contracting States will enhance the

economic welfare of all involved. Limiting defection amongst

member States, which would ultimately deplete the welfare of all

involved.7 Abbott suggests that WTO rules give way to a balancing

effect between private interests (represented by individual

States) and public interests (guarded by the institutional

5 Ibid. 6 Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Economics Structure of Renegotiation and DisputeResolution in the WTO/GATT System’ John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 143, 2002), 7 -8. 7 Abbott, above n 4, 506.

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structure of the WTO), in this sense the restraint of national

autonomy is justified for the achievement of a “greater good”

enacted by trade liberalization.8

Regulations under the GATT are based on economic predictions of

how certain policy instruments could “disrupt” the economic

welfare of interdependent economies, if bias elected officials

enact domestic policies contrary to GATT regulations as a means of

securing political welfare or short-run goals. Justification for

such measures has been drawn from a comparison exercise between he

economic and political ranking of policy instruments such as;

production subsidies (PS), import duties (ID), import quotas (IQ)

and voluntary export restrictions (VER’s). In said comparison the

preferred economic policy would be in direct opposition to the

preferred political policy, thus generating a tendency towards

defection or the dominant strategy within a Prisoner’s Dilemma

scenario. This is overcome by GATT regulations that opt for an

economic efficient solution where PS are permitted, ID are

8 Klaus Armingeon, Karolina Milewicz, Simone Peter and Anne Peters, The constitutionalisation ofinternational trade law, in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), ‘The Prospects of InternationalTrade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence’ (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 69, 86.

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negotiable, IQ are prohibited but subject to exceptions and VER’s

are permanently prohibited.9

Under the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm of trade (proposed by

Abbott), the short-run political temptation of public officials

(with a short time horizon in office) favors the protection of

domestic industries. GATT structure would thus allow for an

incentive based approach where protectionism would be discouraged

allowing for “long-run” political gains to take effect and

subsequently secure the continuity of the multilateral trade

system. Through such a reasoning, GATT regulations limit the scope

of decision (or the so called private interest of States) public

officials have, whilst securing the alleged long-run benefits of

open liberalized trade.10

Trade regulation on a multilateral level would ultimately (or

allegedly) eliminate defection amongst contracting parties, by

favoring cooperation and blockading the dominant strategy scenario

within a prisoner’s dilemma situation. However additional gains

9 Roessler above n 2, 58. 10 Abbott, above n 4, 520 – 521.

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may be drawn from international trade law on a domestic level. Due

to the domestic unattractiveness of economic efficient solutions

favoring world trade, the GATT system would (allegedly) also

reduce the short-run political cost public officials who favor

trade liberalization would have to face. This “immunity” from

domestic political retaliation would allow politicians to make

unattractive domestic policy decisions (in favor of trade

liberalization) by claiming their necessity under WTO

commitments.11

Scholars have also supported the GATT system by claiming that its

inherent flexibility allows for member states to secure their

individual interests. Sykes and Schwartz have argued that the GATT

permits the ‘efficient breach’ of obligations contracted by States

within the WTO system. This ‘efficient breach’ translates into

remedies such as the award of expectation damages, injunctive

relief and ‘equivalent’ compensation for the avoidance of

commitments.12 Flexibility of the system is largely enshrined in

the possibility of enacting retaliation through article 22 of the

11 Abbott, above n 4, 511. 12 Schwartz and Sykes, above n 6, 64

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DSU13 in order to ‘induce the compliance’ and further tested (in

extreme cases) through the renegotiation of concessions under

article XXVIII of the GATT. 14

WTO procedure nurses mechanisms that allow contracting parties to

deviate from their commitments when the cost of compliance exceeds

its associated benefits. In order to favor such deviation the GATT

incorporated articles XIX (safeguards) and XIII (Balance of

Payments safeguards) as a means through which member States could

reach efficient breach.15 As a final possibility renegotiation of

original concessions was also incorporated through article XXVIII

of the GATT as a final recourse mechanism.16

However renegotiation is a final resort, as retaliation should

allow for equivalence to be reached a priori. Retaliatory measures13 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April1994, 1987, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 2 (‘Dispute Settlement Understanding’)(DSU Treaty).14 Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Damages or Specific Performance?, in M. Broncker and R. Quick (eds), ‘New Directions in International EconomicLaw: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson’ (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 347, 355.15 Ecuador – Balance–of –Payments Restrictions, WTO Doc WT/BOP/R/91 (11 June 2009) (Report on theConsultations with Ecuador): such was the case of Ecuador where the economy has been dollarizedsince 2000, prompting the imposition of restrictions in order to safeguard national economic policyduring the Global Financial Crisis, this safeguard was accorded with the participation of theInternational Monetary Fund. 16 Ibid, 356.

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through article 22 of the DSU the WTO should secure the compliance

of contracting parties, restoring the original agreement amongst

contracting States. However these measures have also been

scrutinized, as they would indefinitely allow the violation of the

agreement, as long as the equivalent and proportionate price is

paid.17

II. Economic Efficient Retaliation and Equivalence

Efficient breach of WTO regulations is argued to be an economic

desirable and even efficient solution. GATT flexibility mechanisms

would restore original concessions, returning welfare to that

which was agreed during the Uruguay Round or at the moment of a

countries accession to the WTO.18 This efficient breach would also

allow member States to reach agreed incompliance, retaliate

against a violating State or in an extreme scenario renegotiate

initially granted concessions.

17 Schwartz and Sykes, above n 6, 6518 Sykes, above n 14, 353.

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However, for retaliation to take place an arbitral panel must

first determine its legitimacy and if the case were to merit it

the intensity or ‘equivalence’ which guides it. The limit would

ultimately be the specific nullification or impairment caused by

the violating State. WTO procedure treats cases of non–compliance

(article 22 (4) and (6) of the DSU) within (allegedly) strict

forms (procedure within WTO) and levels of intensity (equivalence

of the trade loss). Usually retaliation by contracting parties

(through the suspension of concessions) must occur in the same

sector where the violation occurred. Notwithstanding article 22

(3) of the DSU also permits cross retaliation ‘if retaliation in

the same sector is not practicable or effective’. The ceiling for

retaliation under the prescriptions of article 22 (4) of the DSU

demands that suspended concessions be “equivalent” to the

nullification or impairment originally caused. Unfortunately no

further guidance on how equivalence should be interpreted is given

to panel arbitrators.19

The equivalence principle behind the suspension of concessions,

seeks to rebalance the nullification or impairment described in19 Thomas Sebastian, ‘World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality:Equivalence and Appropriateness’, (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 338, 341.

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XXIII of the GATT. Under the GATT and the corresponding dispute

settlement mechanism, public choice (or defection by States) would

be limited, since a deviation from WTO regulations would bring

retaliatory measures against domestic industries (internal effect)

and loss of credibility amongst trading partners (external

effect).20

This would, according to Abbott, Sykes and Schwartz, trigger an

economic welfare loss for the violating States, which would

ultimately result into a political welfare loss for public

officials. This possible loss of political welfare would thus

generate an incentive against protectionism. Some scholars have

viewed the rebalancing of initial concession as a mechanism

inducing the compliance of member States, however this view seems

to be a misconception since the final “remedy” is actually the

reinstating of initial reciprocal trade concession amongst States

and not as a means of generating penalties or fines against

violators. 21

20 David Palmeter and Stanimir A. Alexandrov, “Inducing Compliance in WTO dispute Settlement”, inDavid Palmeter and Stanimir A. Alexandrov (eds), ‘The Political Economy of International Trade Law’, (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002) 646, 647.21 Ibid.

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Conceiving countermeasures via retaliation as a means of inducing

compliance is additionally unsupported, since article 22 (4) and

(7) of the DSU specifically circumscribe suspension of concessions

to the equivalence standard, disregarding punitive measures

against violations. Furthermore the reinstatement of concessions

underlines the delicate balance agreed amongst member States not

only through the WTO agreements but also due to the concessions

exchanged at the moment of entry.22 Through this reasoning

retaliation merely seeks the reinstatement of the economic

efficiency (welfare) that was brought to world trade through the

GATT and the WTO.

If retaliation is not meant to be a means through which the

inducement of compliance occurs, then what is its purpose?

Efficient breach would suggest that the equivalence standard of

article 22 of the DSU presented by Sykes and Schwartz should

legitimize the public choice theory presented by Abbott. If this

is so public officials of member States could deviate from initial

commitments (within the WTO) but at the same time maintain a

22 Ibid, 654.

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continuous level of certainty and predictability in the

performance of world trade shielding it form possible disruptions.

Under both positions the equivalence standard would necessarily

have to ensure the reinstatement of any welfare losses that

efficient breach situations would have originated. Moreover when

arbitrators permit the enactment of retaliatory measures, they

must also secure that there imposition are ‘precisely equal to the

decline in political welfare loss’ experienced by a complainant.

Such a precise remedy would result impossible as article 22 (7) of

the DSU, limits the arbitral panel in the determination of

products that are to suffer retaliation, vanquishing the

equivalence of legitimate countermeasures, since they would lack

adequate oversight.23

The effectiveness of retaliatory measures as a means of

reinstating economic welfare loss is questionable.

Countermeasures authorized by an arbitral panel amount to the

reinstatement of trade restrictions, which under an economic

efficiency understanding would translate into welfare losses for

23 Sebastian, above n 19, 375.

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both complainant and offender. Pauwelyn has underlined the irony

that the ‘the world body preaching the liberalization of trade

depicts trade protectionism’ as a means through which some sort of

neutralizing effect occurs by reinstating trade restrictions.24

Moreover an economic efficiency point of view suggests that

retaliation as a means of restoring equivalence when a loss ‘in

terms of gross trade value’ has occurred in no way guarantee’s the

same economic welfare effect as the initial damage.25

If countermeasures as a means of reinstating loss of economic

welfare are not plausible, then how does retaliation affect world

trade liberalization? Furthermore, since public choice theory

legitimizes the surrendering of national sovereignty (private

interest) in favor of attaining higher levels of trade

liberalization (public interest) and efficiency in the form of

welfare enhancement, are efficient breaches really that efficient?

Again the economic efficiency of countermeasures seem to be (much

like equivalence) another utopian goal drafted in the GATT but24 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward a MoreCollective Approach’, (2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law 35, 343. 25 Kym Anderson, ‘Peculiarities in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (Discussion Paper 0207, CEPR and Schoolof Economics International Economic Studies, 2002), 7 – 8.

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still far from materializing into a reality. Breuss confirms

Anderson’s thesis that equivalent damage never translates into

equivalent economic welfare. Breuss has suggested through the

modeling of ‘mini trade wars’ (which take into account 12 regions,

7 sectors and 5 factors of production), that retaliation proves to

be an inefficient model of restoring economic welfare losses as

the reduction of export possibilities (retaliation) disrupts the

complainant’s economic welfare, thus generating an economic loss

far superior to the original violation.26

Through these simulations, Breuss points out that from an

efficiency point of view, retaliation proves to be a sub–optimal

policy instrument for enhancing trade liberalization, as it

inevitably creates unpredictable economic welfare losses. Due to

the arbitrary nature and randomness of products that may be

selected, no arbitral panel could ever fully determine the true

magnitude of the economic welfare loss that will be generated.

This incapacity to “guide” retaliation to the path of equivalence

would effectively render elements of article 22 of the DSU

ineffective. Breuss then suggests that a more efficient mechanism26 Fritz Breuss, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars–ASurvey’, (2004) Kluwer Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 276 – 287.

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would be the direct transfers from the violating government to the

government awarded compensation, so it may then redistribute it

amongst the industry or sectors that have suffered the loss,

generating a positive and quantifiable remedy for non–compliance

situations.27

Through Breuss’s modelling, the WTO – DS system is at the very

least negligent, as the economic consequences of retaliation are

not fully comprehended.28 Likewise if the impacts of retaliation

cannot be effectively allocated, the possibility of legitimizing

the WTO system through public choice theory would be null as the

outcomes of compliance or incompliance would ultimately be

unpredictable or a mere act of consequence.

If the certainty of welfare loss (or gain) may not be secured

through this system, then what would be the actual incentive for

public officials to comply with the procedures and rulings of the

WTO? The coherence of the system (WTO) as a remedial mechanism

that secures trade liberalization and the economic efficiency of

27 Ibid, 308 – 309. 28 Ibid, 301.

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world trade would thus be seriously challenged, leaving public

officials that comply with trade liberalization no expected

(quantifiable) gain from cooperating within a prisoners dilemma

scenario by neglecting their dominant (protectionist) strategy.

III. The Present and Future World Trade Regime

Adjacent to the claims of economic inefficiency that retaliation

and the remedial procedure within the WTO give raise too, other

important issues currently loom over international trade and the

institutions that govern it. The asymmetrical distribution of

power amongst its members, the apparent “public goods” WTO

institutions protect and the inefficiency of so called “efficient

breach” mechanisms are all elements that should be scrutinized in

the present so as to secure a compliance in the future. The

apparent inefficiency of retaliation as well as the primitive “tit

for tat” remedial recourse seems to depict an obsolete system,

which lacks proportionality (therefore equivalence).29

29 Joost Pauwelyn, John H. Jackson and Alan O. Sykes, ‘ The calculation and design of traderetaliation in context: what is the goal of suspending WTO obligations? in Chad P. Bown and Joost

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The lack of certainty in the economic damage caused through

retaliation not only contradicts economic reasoning (as measured

by efficiency) but also opposes elemental understandings of

international law. In order for countermeasures of any kind to be

permissible, customary law dictates that they be proportionate to

the injury suffered.30 Since retaliation in its current form is

basically defined as ‘taking someone’s eye in response to that

person having taken mine’,31 a new coherence must be carved into

the GATT in order for it to reach efficiency.

Retaliation also poses other practical impediments. For a concept

that draws considerably from the notion of “fairness” it falls far

from achieving it. Retaliation in all cases leads to the

withdrawal of concessions; in such a mechanism smaller developing

countries would think twice before imposing such measures against

a larger trader.32 Such was the case of Ecuador following the

Pauwelyn, ‘The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (Cambridge University Press,2010) 34, 43.30 Palmeter and Alexandrov, above n 19, 655.31 Pauwelyn, above n 27, pp. 57. 32 Anderson, above n 23, pp. 10.

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Bananas Decision against the European Union, where cross–

retaliation under TRIPS33 was awarded but not enacted.34

Also it has been argued that the probability of a rich-country

complainant succeeding in the current system has inadvertently

improved under the WTO, leaving poor-country demands subject to

the statu quo inherited from the GATT, adding no true “fairness” to

the regime that spawned from the Uruguay Round.35

Through the GATT fundamental issues are left to ambiguity.36 As

Sebastian has pointed out, the lack of a concrete yardstick in the

system leaves to arbitrators the rather daunting task of filling

in the loop holes, therefore creating ad–hoc remedies which fall

far from the original negotiated treaty text.37 The severity of

such a normative shortcoming is that the GATT as a “public”

institution would impose trade values over individual interests of

33 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April1994, 1987, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘Trade – Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty’) 34 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO DocWT/DS27/R/ECU, AB – 1997 – 3 (22 August 1997, adopted 9 September 1997).35 Breuss, above n 26, 276.36 John H. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – Misunderstandings on the Nature ofLegal Obligation’, (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law, 60.37 Sebastian, above n 19, 344.

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member States,38 and by doing so it relinquishes from the pacta sunt

servanda principle, which governs international instruments.

Compliance with WTO regulations necessarily demands that public

officials comply with “efficient” trade policies. This ‘Golden

Straightjacket’ for domestic policy is apparently a good thing as

it limits “unwise” policy decisions within member states.39 Such a

perverse system would ultimately limit (without any further

analysis other then upholding trade liberalization) or invalidate

legitimate policy actions taken by national governments,40

replacing domestic institutions with a supra national entity that

creates and enforces law instead of simply applying it.

IV. Conclusion

International trade is undoubtedly a field that requires a legal

regime to mediate the relationships that occur amongst sovereign

States. However the current system viewed through the proposed

“prisoners dilemma” scenario (Abbott) and “public choice” (Sykes

and Schwartz) thesis seems to fall far from its intended empirical

38 Klaus Armingeon (et al), above n 8, 86.39 Peter Singer, ‘One World: the Ethics of Globalization’, (Yale University Press, 2002) 51, 71.40 Klaus Armingeon (et al), above n 8, 83.

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or legal vocation. Efficient breach through countermeasures (Art

22 DSU) or renegotiation (Art XXVIII GATT) is anything but

efficient under the current mechanisms.

The favoring of asymmetries in the balance of power as well as the

inefficient economic results it renders via retaliation give way

to an unjustifiable limitation of domestic policy measures (as the

public choice perspective lacks efficient allocation of results)

by a superseding international organization. All of which

contributes to arguments against the WTO such as:

Concerning the issue of unfair rules, (…) the Uruguay round that was

completed in 1994, was hailed as a great achievement, and in deed it was

for the United States and for Most of Western Europe (…) the poorest in

the world (…) found that their incomes would decrease around 2 per cent,

because of terms of trade.41

If international trade is to continue evolving in the ever–

changing landscape of geo-political interrelations, a review of

the core values of the institution and the procedures it enacts is

41 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Globalization and Development’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig–Archibugi(eds), ‘Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance’ (Polity Press, 2003) 47, 55.

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a pivotal necessity. It is evident that a governing institution

and regime is necessary for the economic welfare amongst all

member States to continue flourishing, however it is also evident

that the current rules (which in many cases date back to 1947) are

in desperate need of reform in order to adapt to the challenges of

the XXI century and the rebalancing of power away from the

traditional “industrialized democracies”.

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BIBILIOGRAPHY

A Articles/Books/Reports

Abbott, Kenneth W., ‘The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functionsof the Law of International Trade’, (1985) 26 HarvardInternational Law Journal

Armingeon, Klaus, Milewicz, Karolina, Peter Simone and PetersAnne, The constitutionalisation of international trade law, inThomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds.), ‘The Prospects ofInternational Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence’ (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011)

Anderson, Kym, ‘Peculiarities in WTO Dispute Settlement’,(Discussion Paper 0207, CEPR and School of Economics InternationalEconomic Studies, 2002)

Breuss, Fritz, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis ofFour EU–US Mini Trade Wars–A Survey’, (2004) Kluwer Journal ofIndustry, Competition and Trade

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Jackson, John H., ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding –Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation’, (1997) 91 AmericanJournal of International Law

Palmeter David and Alexandrov, Stanimir A., “Inducing Compliancein WTO dispute Settlement”, in David Palmeter and Stanimir A.Alexandrov (eds), ‘The Political Economy of International Trade Law’, (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002)

Pauwelyn, Joost, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules –Toward a More Collective Approach’, (2000) 94 The American Journal ofInternational Law

Pauwelyn, Joost, Jackson John H. and Sykes, Alan O., ‘Thecalculation and design of trade retaliation in context: what isthe goal of suspending WTO obligations? in Chad P. Bown and JoostPauwelyn, ‘The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement’,(Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Roessler, Frieder, ‘The Constitutional Function of theMultilateral Trade Order’, in Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-UlrichPetersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law(Kluwer Law International, 1993)

Sebastian, Thomas, ‘World Trade Organization Remedies and theAssessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness’,(2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal

Schwartz, Warren F. and Sykes, Alan O., ‘The Economics Structureof Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System’John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 143, 2002)

Singer, Peter, ‘One World: the Ethics of Globalization’, (Yale UniversityPress, 2002)

Stiglitz, Joseph E., ‘Globalization and Development’, in DavidHeld and Mathias Koenig–Archibugi (eds), ‘Taming Globalization: Frontiersof Governance’ (Polity Press, 2003)

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Sykes, Alan O., The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under WTODispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or SpecificPerformance?, in M. Broncker and R. Quick (eds), ‘New Directions inInternational Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson’ (Kluwer LawInternational, 2000)

B Treaties

Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Saleand Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc WT/DS27/R/ECU, AB – 1997 – 3 (22August 1997, adopted 9 September 1997)

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1987, 1867 UNTS 3 (enteredinto force 1 January 1995) annex 2 (‘Dispute Settlement Understanding’)

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1987, 1867 UNTS 3 (enteredinto force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade’)

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The Inefficiency of Efficiency: Retaliation, Equivalence and Efficient Breach in the WTO

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