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The Evolution of Al-Qaeda leading up to ISIS: The New Face of

Terror

Abstract

In this paper, I will focus on the evolution andcurrent status of the al-Qaeda terroristorganization leading up to one of its morerecent franchises which is known most frequentlyby any of three names– the Islamic States inIraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic States ofIraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic States(IS) – and is more brutal than the previousversions of al-Qaeda that the world has known.After three distinguishable generations of theal-Qaeda network – generation 1.0 which includesthe years before the shocking attack on New YorkCity and Washington D.C. on September 11, 20011;generation 2.0 which ranges from the September11th attacks to the death of al-Qaeda’scharismatic leader, Osama bin Laden in 2011; andfinally, al-Qaeda generation 3.0, in whichdifferent forms of al-Qaeda-based terroristsyndicates2, or lone wolves3, are active aroundthe globe. In addition to its organizationaltransition, their modus operandi and ideologyhave also changed in various ways. One of the

1 See Hoffman, B. (2006)

2 See Bucci, S. (2012); al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Jabaht al-Nusra in Syria are the main affiliated groups

3 See Simon, J. (2013), p.39-87

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successful reforms was the formation of the ISISgroup, the more heinous version of the “core”al-Qaeda whose leaders have turned against ISIS.Although the original al-Qaeda network has lostnotoriety, it is still known that its offshootcell-groups and lone wolves throughout the worldcontinue to commit frequent acts of violence tothe non-Muslim countries, especially the Westand Israel, unless they are stopped by anoutside force. Hence, it is of great importanceto examine what lies ahead for the twoindividual groups in light of the al-Qaeda’sversions to date.

The September 11, 2001 attacks were a turning point in the

perception of terrorist groups and their merciless attacks.

Many counter-terrorism departments4 and policies were created

during the “Global War on Terrorism” (Horwitz, S 2014; Howard,

R., & Sawyer, R. 2006:435). As a matter of fact, the world had

known smaller-scale and frequent terrorist activity in recent

history, but this understanding did not come to the forefront

4 See the official website of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); it was created in 2002, right after the September 11 attacks.

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until after 9/11 when al-Qaeda made it apparent that the

western superpower no longer needed to be considered

invincible, but an entity that is vulnerable from across the

oceans (Post 2009; Howard, R 2006). Numerous extremists all

around the world have since created their own organizations in

the name of groundbreaking “al-Qaeda.” Amid these groups, an

unprecedented one emerged with brutal tactics, plenty of

resources, and its own territories, and became the world’s

richest terrorist group in today’s world – that is ISIS

(Sekulow, J 2014). In spite of the enduring nature of the

counter terrorism policies put into action since the events of

9/11, contemporary terrorism is continuing to flourish. It

seems impossible that one nation, the United States itself,

spent more than 10 billion dollars to advance national and

domestic security, while it appears that terrorism continues

unabated. Consider the recent terrorist cases of the Boston

Marathon bombing5 in the United States, Charlie Hebdo shooting6

5 See. Valdmanis, R. (2015), Terroristic attack occurred in the finish line, April 15, 2013, a event carried out by Tsarnaev brothers, causing 11 citizens killed and more than 260 wounded; One of the brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, died of a gunfight with police later, and the other arrested; both were influenced by al-Qaeda’s lecture and messages.

6 See Read, M. (2015), Al-Qaeda in Yemen claims Charlie Hebdo attack ( Jan. 14, 2015), killing 12 staffs working in a satirical magazine called Charlie Hebdo, regardless of a long-standing

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in France, the tourists killed at the Bardo Museum in Tunisia7,

and the suicide bombing at the Sanaa mosque in Yemen8 as

evidence of terrorism’s seemingly unhindered march across the

globe. Most of these attacks and others like them are the work

of terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda or ISIS. Therefore, it

seems more crucial than ever to increase counter-terrorist

activities and continue research in the eradication of

ferocious terrorists such as al-Qaeda-based freelancers and

groups such as ISIS in this world. More importantly, learning

the history, ideology, and strategies of al-Qaeda and its

affiliates can be a springboard to more accurate predictions

of future terrorist movements.

What is al Qaeda?

The origin of al Qaeda – meaning “base”9 – began with the Soviet

harsh criticism against Mohammad, the Prophecy of Islam, only God to Muslim followers who could campaign against the freedom of writings.

7 See Carter, (2015); Members of the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, one of the most dangerous al-Qaeda’s North African arm, allegedly killed more than 19 tourists and 22 wounded

8 See Alfred, C. (2015); the tragedy was responsible of a purported affiliate of the Islamic State group, claiming 142 and 351 injured.

9See Perlmutter D. (2004), p. 97

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invasion of Afghanistan10 in 1989. Opposed to the communist

ideology to absorb the Afghanistan government, Arab

volunteers, also known as mujahideen11, joined what is referred

to the “holy war” or jihad12 against non-Muslim forces. Among

those Arab volunteers were men who would become key

ringleaders in al-Qaeda, men such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman

al-Zawahiri13, and Abdullah Azzam14. These leaders spearheaded

the movement to recruit jihadists from across the Muslim world

with a call for victorious jihad not only in Afghanistan, but

also around the world. Key to this victory was the destruction

of the American ideology that ran intolerably counter to that

of Islam (Hellmich, C 2011).

There were indeed, following Azzam’s sudden death in 1989,

clear-cut causes as to why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda

targeted the United States as a major enemy. In the Iraqi

10See Post (2009). p. 195

11Ibid.

12Ibid. p. 22

13Ibid.

14Ibid. Addullah Azzam, as a radical Islamist fundamentalist, played a significant role in mentoring bin Laden and later became his deputy.

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invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia refused to deploy al-

Qaeda-offered jihadist forces against Saddam Hussein’s

aggression. Rather, the Saudi ruler, King Fahd, was partially

in favor of U.S. military and financial supports, creating a

deep division between the Saudis and bin Laden. Another

crucial event that provoked Osama bin Laden was King Fahd’s

invitation to the U.S. military forces to travel through the

Arabian Peninsula, popularly known as Mecca15 and is in close

proximity to their holy lands (Post 2009). This invitation was

a harbinger of new-era international terrorism between the

West and the al-Qaeda forces. After transferring headquarters

from Sudan into Afghanistan due to the construction of a

tight-knit relationship with the Taliban regime, which

furnished a training camp and military garrison, this

homegrown organization or network gradually turned their focus

to the transnational goals of the destruction of western

values16 and the existent Jewish state of Israel (Hellmich, C

2011).

15 See Post, (2009) p. 197; One of the sacred holy sites for Muslims

16 See Shiraev, (2006), Fundamental factors are democracy, capitalism, and individual freedom

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Attacks attributed to al-Qaeda and associated groups began

with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and continued to the

bombing of the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11,

2001 and further terroristic events17 against non-combatants on

a transnational scope. Most of these attacks were brought on

because of religious goals. Having identical goals, but

envisioning different avenues toward recreating the Islamic

empire that once existed caused friction within al Qaeda’s

rank and file. The one group began to split into individual

segments.

Al-Qaeda’s Ideology and Philosophy

The ideology of al-Qaeda can be found in a specific document –

“al-Qaeda operational manual,”18 where eight chapters of the

total contain not only a sophisticated list of instructions

for operation methods but also mistakes and lessons cited from

other adversaries such as an Israeli Mossad19 counter-espionage

17 Recited in BBC news (2014)

18 See Post (2009). p. 198-202; He extrapolated that it was with Ayman al-Zawahiri who played a central role in developing this terrorism manual.

19 See Hennigan, A., (2014); When a Mossad operation goes wrong

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failure and the Russian KGB elite Alpha Group20. Many of the

instructions cite certain suras (verses) of the Qu’ran21 as a

contrivance to justify their acts of violence. This training

manual has afforded one of the best insights into the al-Qaeda

leadership.

The mindsets of Osama bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-

Zawahiri were heavily inspired by Sayyid Qutb22, who was a

vanguard of an Islamic fundamentalist revival and laid the

foundation for al-Qaeda’s ideology. Qutb’s definition of the

enemy included ‘untrue’ Muslims as well as Western-Israelis

who had wickedly plotted, especially since the Israel

independence in 1948, to besmirch the pristine Islamic states.

Based on a notion of Salafist jihadists23, al Qaeda’s ideology

20 See Serio, J. (2008), p. 53, 227

21 See Perlmutter, D. (2004). p. 86

22 See Davidson, L. (1988). p. 99-100

23 In the term “Salafism,” “Salaf” means “ancient one,” which suggests that it be “the ProphetMohammad.” It is an ideological movement with deep religious and historical roots at first, however, Salafists, who see life as two aspects: the world of Islam (dar al-Islam), and the land of conflict or war (dar al-harb), yearned for the Great Caliph era when the Muslim world stretched from the Middle East up to Spain in the west, a part of Russia in the north, west coast of Africa in the south. The term began to be used by Muslim Brotherhood, a designated as an Islamic terrorist constellation later, who felt violence and terrorism by all means were justified to achieve their political ends. It thus has been involved with the followers of Al Qaeda. (Livesey)

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permitted the slaying of civilians dedicated to other

religions24 as well as unorthodox Muslims such as Sufis25 and

Shi’ites26, as religiously justified to achieve jihad (Wright

2006:32-59).

According to their ideology, al Qaeda has two objectives: one

is the collapse of western influence and Israel, and second is

the establishment of the “Islamic state” where one righteous

Caliph will rule an orthodox Muslim community according to

Shari’a law27, and eliminate non-Muslim collectives (infidels),

who have blemished the “pure” Islam (Wright 2006:175).

The Rolling Strategies

According to an interview with Saif al Adel, one of al Qaeda’s

high-ranking members, the group had a seven-juncture plan from

2000 to 2020 for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.

Strategic sub-objectives have evolved on a chronological basis

as below: (Parrish 2014).

24 Perlmutter, D. (2004). p.89

25 Ibid. p.90

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. p. 105

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The first phase (2000 to 2003) was an “awakening”

juncture that was to drag attention from the west forces

and awaken Muslims all over the world to their ultimate

goal, a reinstatement of Islamic states. It was assessed

as successful since al Qaeda instigated the World Trade

Center terror in New York and on the Pentagon in

Washington proving the U.S. was no longer untouchable.

However, American’s full scale military raids in Iraq and

Afghanistan resulted in the loss of key leaders and a

weakened stronghold in Afghanistan.

The second phase (2004 to 2006) was, according to the

interviewer Fouad Hussein, a transition from an

organization to a movement (Jihadism). In this

transition, they laid the groundwork for a base while

recruiting young men to set up an “army.” The Long War

Journal, in 2005, named this second phase a failure. But,

in fact, more extremists the Islamic State of Iraq and

the Levant (ISIL) were active in Iraq and Syria since its

inception in 2004. It, thus, can be called successful in

this regard.

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The third phase (2007 to 2010) was a period in which al

Qaeda’s masterminds planned attacks on Israel to marshal

like-minded terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. There was

a surge of al Qaeda affiliates such as al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Shabaab in Somalia,

al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, the

Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Islamic State of

Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq, all of which had carried

out terroristic courses of action against civilians,

albeit with different visions from “core-al Qaeda,” which

were more or less considered successful.

The fourth phase (2010 to 2013) was the collapse of the

hated Arabic government as well as undermining western

economy, the backbone of international trade and the

world economy, exemplified by a boat packed with

explosives in October 2002.28 This period was a turning

point for the group when their administrative structure

became more cellular. Bin Laden had previously employed a

top-down administrative model. Al Qaeda’s affiliates, and

28 Richardson (2004), p50

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individuals basing their actions on al-Qaeda’s vision,

managed to operate all over the North Africa, Syria,

Iraq, Pakistan, and even South Asia. In the wake of Arab

Spring, the Syrian Assad regime was seen as a template by

a majority of terrorist groups at the time.

The fifth phase spans from 2013 to 2016 during which time

an Islamic state or caliphate will be proclaimed while

western influence and Israel forces are weakened.

Societal order, legitimacy, and politics would be under

the al Qaeda’s oversight. In the present day, despite

differences from the original al Qaeda mission, the

movement can be seen as ongoing through cellular activity

or efforts. The creation of ISIS in 2013 as a terrorist

“state” corroborated the idea that this is not an

unrealistic narrative.

The sixth phase is the period from 2016 onward, which is

planned as a direct confrontation between Islamic

believers and non-believers.

The seventh phase, as a final step, is depicted as

“definitive victory” and should be attained by 2020.

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The sixth and seventh phase of what lies ahead is

indistinct.

The Organization in Transitions

Al Qaeda 1.0

The first generation of al-Qaeda, from its birth to the

September 11, 2001 attack on The United States, operated on a

command structure mainly under the guidance of Osama bin

Laden, who took control of the group following Abdullah

Azzam’s death. For this emerging generation of terrorists, al-

Qaeda played an unprecedented role in encouraging young

Muslims to resist their enemies: the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and the Western countries. When it came to

recruitment, al-Qaeda did not have a formal hiring system, but

relied on familial ties and relationships, mostly started from

a “brotherhood” status, a similar concept of “Muslim

Brotherhood.”

According to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks, there were

as many as 20,000 potential terrorists trained at bin Laden-

led camps throughout Afghanistan from May 1996 to September

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11, 2001. Many skillful and feared terrorist attackers

involved in high-profile strategic onslaughts such as the

World Trade Center bombing in 199329, the catastrophic

explosion in Saudi Arabia in 199630, the East African bombings

in 199831 and three years later the attacks of 9/11 in New York

and Washington, D.C., came from these training camps, which

were considered the main pathway for the next terrorist

generations (Post 2009:202-205).

The al-Qaeda’s top-down structure employed four

interconnected, but distinct factors: a pyramidal structure to

facilitate strategies and prompt decision-makings; a

transnational terrorist network to cooperate with other

terrorist syndicates to reach every corner of the world; a

base force of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan; and a loose

coalition of transnational and domestic groups to minimize

differences and emphasize similarities, such as the vision of

a common enemy – the West (Gunaratna, R 2002). Terrorists’

29 See Coll (2004)

30 See Wright (2006), p. 237-239

31 Ibid. p. 272

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targets were declared through The Two Fatwas32 in 1996 and 1998

respectively. The first fatwa, or holy decree, declared war

against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy

Places according to Bin Laden. The second fatwa further

expanded to “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” It has been a

religious obligation for global jihadists to do so thereafter

(Watts, C 2013).

Al Qaeda 2.0

Following the declaration of “War on Terror” in the post-9/11

world, al-Qaeda morphed from what has been called al-Qaeda

Version 1.0 into al-Qaeda Version 2.0 where the network lost

the hierarchical control, but its ideology still influenced

the global Salafi jihad movement. Many regional brigades with

different titles sprung up far and wide during this juncture

and marked post-September 11 attacks in Bali33, Yemen, Moscow34,

Spain35, North Africa, etc. as a response to Osama bin Laden’s32 See Watts (2013)

33 See Bonner, R., & Perlez, J. (2005); Chossudovsky, M. 2005; 2002 and 2005 bombings in Bali was both committed by members of Jemaah Islamiyah behind al-Qaeda, claiming 202 and at least 26 people respectively

34 See Roggio, B (2010)

35 See Corrigan, D (2004); the event committed by Islamists was motivated by the invasion of

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recording: “The Islamic nation, thanks to God, has started to attack you at the

hands of its beloved sons, who pledged to God to continue jihad, as long as they are

able, through words and weapons, to establish right and expose falsehood” (Post

2009:211-222).

In the face of the losses of the Afghanistan bases and senior

leaders, the withered “core” al-Qaeda force was still not

destroyed, but was being operated under the current leader,

Zawahiri’s, stewardship. The Zawahiri-operated al-Qaeda

embraced its rivals to shore up its strengths. One of its

rivals was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi36, a founder of al-

Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, and later renamed ISIS after his death in

2006). In stark contrast to “moderate” bin Laden and

Zawahiri’s leaderships, Zarqawi utilized more aggressive and

indiscriminate means to achieve the political ends, one of

which was to purge Shi’ites. His main purpose was to destroy

the whole population of the Shia community in Iraq, rather

than to focus on destroying American and Israeli interests

(Zelin, A 2014).

Iraq in 2003

36 See Nance, M. (2015). pp. 207

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This stage raised concerns about “homegrown terrorists” who

had no central structure. Many Muslim youths not in the Middle

East who sympathized with the global jihadist movement

operated independently.

Al Qaeda 3.0

Less than four years ago, the idea of al-Qaedism37 was on its

last leg due to Osama bin Laden’s – a heroic and inspirational

figure to jihadists – passing in 2011. Since the Arab

Awakening38 started in 2010, corrupt, dictatorial, and secular

regimes from Tunisia to Syria have collapsed en masse or near

collapsed in case of Bashar al-Assad regime, one after

another, due to peaceful, pro-democratic protests. However,

these collapses failed to touch extremists who preferred to

practice violence and follow original Islamic laws (Riedel, B

2014). Thus, the third generation rose in what was known as

the Bashar al-Assad regime in which Jabhat al-Nusra39 – a self-

declared al-Qaeda affiliate – was created. The Anbar province

37 See Eben, K. (2007)

38 See the Arab Awakening film (2011)

39 See Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States (2014)

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became the epicenter of ISIS whose leader, Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi40, called upon global jihadists to assemble and

reestablish the “Islamic States of Caliphate.” The reason they

were created in both countries was primarily due to the

gradual militarization of the Syrian infighting in early 2012,

which led jihadists to engage in the fighting on religious

grounds. Also, its proximity to US-occupied Iraq made Syria "a

terrorist attraction venue.” The Syrian government, which was

intent on keeping US forces busy fighting al-Qaeda, brought

calamity upon itself by offering a safe haven for world

jihadists. A series of peaceful protests triggered by the Arab

Spring ultimately wrought some tragic repercussions especially

in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq (Mustafa 2014).

What is ISIS?

The Islamic State has gone through scores of its names from

al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

(ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the

latest moniker Islamic State (IS). The group today is

considered a monstrous organization due to their tactics, such

40 See Giovanni, J. (2014)

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as beheading, crucifixion, and public execution, practiced on

anyone, regardless of gender or age. ISIS is so brutal even

the current al-Qaeda organization has distanced itself from

the group (Lee, F., & Rym, M 2015). The expressed aim of ISIS

is to erect a Salafist government over the Levant areas of

Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus and Southern Turkey.

Little is known about the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

and the origin of his enmity against literally everyone else.

Several eyewitnesses, as well as his neighbors, have given

testimony that he is a very quiet, introverted, and pious

person. His origins of ruthlessness, it is guessed, lie in the

U.S. invasion in 2003 to usurp the Saddam Hussein regime. He

has spent several years in confinement in Camp Bucca, known as

a “terrorist university” through which have passed many

Islamic State leaders41(Giovanni, J 2014). When al-Baghdadi –

his real name ‘Abu Du’ – was discharged from the camp in 2009,

he formed the Islamic State in Iraq, and was nominated as the

leader in May 2010. From the beginning, the Islamic State in41 More than 100,000 suspected jihadis including former Baathists, and nine of ISIS’s top leaders all spent time confined at Camp Bucca. Numerous terrorism researchers believed theprison deepened their extremism and radicalized internees who were illiterate and particularly susceptible to their preaching about jihad and later avowed to join ISIS after release.

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Iraq had voluminous ambitions and a different agenda from the

“core” al-Qaeda. They abandoned al-Qaeda’s flag and chose a

new one, which is the one they currently use (Newman, A 2014).

The Future of Al-Qaeda and ISIS

There are no natural laws or scientific principles that can be

used to predict how the next wave of al-Qaeda affiliates will

move. It is hard to foretell the future of terroristic

movements despite efforts and analysis conducted by scores of

scholars, terrorism experts, and government agencies. The

world could experience a complete liberation from terrorism if

ways were discovered to forestall what might unfold next.

Unfortunately, terrorism is still under way everywhere even

though many counter-terrorism organizations are working to

prevent or uproot al-Qaeda franchises and individual cells

(Simon, J, 2013, chapter 8, “A Look Toward The Future”).

Since the “core al Qaeda” has collapsed, a number of cellular

groups emerged around the globe. Although major counter-

terrorism policies have been reinforced across many countries,

radicalized individuals took advantage of off-guard moments as

evidenced in the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris, the events

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of May 2014 in Brussels42, and those of May 2013 in London43

committed “lone wolves” affiliated with al-Qaeda or Islamic

extremists. There is reason to believe that nations making

visible efforts to eliminate terrorism can have an impact in

destroying al-Qaeda’ creating safe-havens, cutting revenue

streams, and hampering would-be terrorists from traveling

abroad to participate international terrorist groups.

Nonetheless, many countries experienced a low-barrier for

self-motivated jihadists who have locally or domestically

carried out terroristic attacks such as 2013 Boston Marathon

Bombing. In this sense, although many people thought the war

was over when bin Laden was shot and officially declared dead

in 2011, many counter-terrorism experts commented we are still

playing on bin Laden-built game that no longer needed him (The

Economist’s blog 2011). A new version of violent jihad has

emerged on the very corner of the world, indicating that the

war against al-Qaeda is a battle of ideas that cannot be won

militarily (Hellmich 2011:162).

42 See Kochis, (2015)

43 Ibid.

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John Horgan, the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies,

also commented that the rise of lone wolf terrorism is a sign

of organizational weakness, and yet it does not mean that the

Western world, considered as a main enemy to al-Qaeda, is free

from such larger-scale attacks by al Qaeda’s affiliates (Ahmed

2015).

Unlike the al-Qaeda network, the more strategically radical

ISIS group, as the latest version of al-Qaeda, has focused

more on peripheral regions to build bases all over the Middle

East than on Western nations, at least not at this stage. To

achieve their objective - the establishment of the “Caliphate”

- ISIS will likely pay heed to allying other terrorist

organizations within the Middle East areas, rather than to

attacking a distance target. Clearly, this does not mean that

ISIS already has a solid basis on which to achieve their

wishes. In some cases, Baghdadi succeeded in partnering

extreme terrorist organizations such as the Ansar Bayt al-

Maqdis in Sinai, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Morocco, Boko Haram in

Uganda, and some Taliban groups in Pakistan, the leaders of

which have sworn allegiance to Baghdadi. However, a

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multiplicity of “moderate” terrorist groups44 rejected siding

with ISIS on account of different perspectives. Issam al-

Barkawi, a modern Salafi movement leader and the leader of the

Jihad in Jordan, sharply railed against ISIS’s antics killing

Shi’ites, other minorities, and even Sunni followers who do

not show loyalty to ISIS’s indoctrination. This is just one

example of the strained relationships and rivalries between

the various groups. The incumbent al-Qaeda leader, al-

Zawahiri, also condemned their tactics and methodology

(manhaj)45, saying that is not jihad, but nothing less than

aggression and barbaric crime. In this sense, such dynamics

amongst even terrorist groups in the Middle East would

definitely hamper ISIS’s pathway (Bar’el, Z. 2014; Zelin, A.

2014).

Conclusion

We have seen the evolution of the al-Qaeda network from its

rise to its dispersion, which continues through many versions

44 Jamaat Jund al-Qawqaz (the Caucasus Soldiers’ Group), the Nusra Front (also known as Jabhat al-Nusra), the Jordanian Salafi-jihadi group, and the original al-Qaeda, all of whose goals are in opposed to ISIS’s

45 See Asra, (2011), Islamic Terminology

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of terrorist groups and sleeper cells. In the face of the

weakened al-Qaeda power, its influence is still prevalent. It

remains a force with which to be reckoned in this world. The

most heinous al-Qaeda-based group, ISIS, which has performed

with a similar, yet skewed, vision, will surely threaten our

world in many ways. Despite their haphazard terrorism, their

threat to the western and third world countries at this stage

is somewhat lessened because al-Baghdadi now centers on

exterminating fellow Muslims through beheadings, crucifixions,

and public executions, activities which have become their

trademarks. However, such actions have garnered disapproval

from other terrorist organizations in the Levant regions,

which suggests that the reestablishment of the Caliphate would

not be achieved as planned unless they mutually succeed in

gaining alliances throughout the Middle East.

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