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The Evolution of Al-Qaeda leading up to ISIS: The New Face of
Terror
Abstract
In this paper, I will focus on the evolution andcurrent status of the al-Qaeda terroristorganization leading up to one of its morerecent franchises which is known most frequentlyby any of three names– the Islamic States inIraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic States ofIraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic States(IS) – and is more brutal than the previousversions of al-Qaeda that the world has known.After three distinguishable generations of theal-Qaeda network – generation 1.0 which includesthe years before the shocking attack on New YorkCity and Washington D.C. on September 11, 20011;generation 2.0 which ranges from the September11th attacks to the death of al-Qaeda’scharismatic leader, Osama bin Laden in 2011; andfinally, al-Qaeda generation 3.0, in whichdifferent forms of al-Qaeda-based terroristsyndicates2, or lone wolves3, are active aroundthe globe. In addition to its organizationaltransition, their modus operandi and ideologyhave also changed in various ways. One of the
1 See Hoffman, B. (2006)
2 See Bucci, S. (2012); al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Jabaht al-Nusra in Syria are the main affiliated groups
3 See Simon, J. (2013), p.39-87
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successful reforms was the formation of the ISISgroup, the more heinous version of the “core”al-Qaeda whose leaders have turned against ISIS.Although the original al-Qaeda network has lostnotoriety, it is still known that its offshootcell-groups and lone wolves throughout the worldcontinue to commit frequent acts of violence tothe non-Muslim countries, especially the Westand Israel, unless they are stopped by anoutside force. Hence, it is of great importanceto examine what lies ahead for the twoindividual groups in light of the al-Qaeda’sversions to date.
The September 11, 2001 attacks were a turning point in the
perception of terrorist groups and their merciless attacks.
Many counter-terrorism departments4 and policies were created
during the “Global War on Terrorism” (Horwitz, S 2014; Howard,
R., & Sawyer, R. 2006:435). As a matter of fact, the world had
known smaller-scale and frequent terrorist activity in recent
history, but this understanding did not come to the forefront
4 See the official website of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); it was created in 2002, right after the September 11 attacks.
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until after 9/11 when al-Qaeda made it apparent that the
western superpower no longer needed to be considered
invincible, but an entity that is vulnerable from across the
oceans (Post 2009; Howard, R 2006). Numerous extremists all
around the world have since created their own organizations in
the name of groundbreaking “al-Qaeda.” Amid these groups, an
unprecedented one emerged with brutal tactics, plenty of
resources, and its own territories, and became the world’s
richest terrorist group in today’s world – that is ISIS
(Sekulow, J 2014). In spite of the enduring nature of the
counter terrorism policies put into action since the events of
9/11, contemporary terrorism is continuing to flourish. It
seems impossible that one nation, the United States itself,
spent more than 10 billion dollars to advance national and
domestic security, while it appears that terrorism continues
unabated. Consider the recent terrorist cases of the Boston
Marathon bombing5 in the United States, Charlie Hebdo shooting6
5 See. Valdmanis, R. (2015), Terroristic attack occurred in the finish line, April 15, 2013, a event carried out by Tsarnaev brothers, causing 11 citizens killed and more than 260 wounded; One of the brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, died of a gunfight with police later, and the other arrested; both were influenced by al-Qaeda’s lecture and messages.
6 See Read, M. (2015), Al-Qaeda in Yemen claims Charlie Hebdo attack ( Jan. 14, 2015), killing 12 staffs working in a satirical magazine called Charlie Hebdo, regardless of a long-standing
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in France, the tourists killed at the Bardo Museum in Tunisia7,
and the suicide bombing at the Sanaa mosque in Yemen8 as
evidence of terrorism’s seemingly unhindered march across the
globe. Most of these attacks and others like them are the work
of terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda or ISIS. Therefore, it
seems more crucial than ever to increase counter-terrorist
activities and continue research in the eradication of
ferocious terrorists such as al-Qaeda-based freelancers and
groups such as ISIS in this world. More importantly, learning
the history, ideology, and strategies of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates can be a springboard to more accurate predictions
of future terrorist movements.
What is al Qaeda?
The origin of al Qaeda – meaning “base”9 – began with the Soviet
harsh criticism against Mohammad, the Prophecy of Islam, only God to Muslim followers who could campaign against the freedom of writings.
7 See Carter, (2015); Members of the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, one of the most dangerous al-Qaeda’s North African arm, allegedly killed more than 19 tourists and 22 wounded
8 See Alfred, C. (2015); the tragedy was responsible of a purported affiliate of the Islamic State group, claiming 142 and 351 injured.
9See Perlmutter D. (2004), p. 97
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invasion of Afghanistan10 in 1989. Opposed to the communist
ideology to absorb the Afghanistan government, Arab
volunteers, also known as mujahideen11, joined what is referred
to the “holy war” or jihad12 against non-Muslim forces. Among
those Arab volunteers were men who would become key
ringleaders in al-Qaeda, men such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman
al-Zawahiri13, and Abdullah Azzam14. These leaders spearheaded
the movement to recruit jihadists from across the Muslim world
with a call for victorious jihad not only in Afghanistan, but
also around the world. Key to this victory was the destruction
of the American ideology that ran intolerably counter to that
of Islam (Hellmich, C 2011).
There were indeed, following Azzam’s sudden death in 1989,
clear-cut causes as to why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
targeted the United States as a major enemy. In the Iraqi
10See Post (2009). p. 195
11Ibid.
12Ibid. p. 22
13Ibid.
14Ibid. Addullah Azzam, as a radical Islamist fundamentalist, played a significant role in mentoring bin Laden and later became his deputy.
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invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia refused to deploy al-
Qaeda-offered jihadist forces against Saddam Hussein’s
aggression. Rather, the Saudi ruler, King Fahd, was partially
in favor of U.S. military and financial supports, creating a
deep division between the Saudis and bin Laden. Another
crucial event that provoked Osama bin Laden was King Fahd’s
invitation to the U.S. military forces to travel through the
Arabian Peninsula, popularly known as Mecca15 and is in close
proximity to their holy lands (Post 2009). This invitation was
a harbinger of new-era international terrorism between the
West and the al-Qaeda forces. After transferring headquarters
from Sudan into Afghanistan due to the construction of a
tight-knit relationship with the Taliban regime, which
furnished a training camp and military garrison, this
homegrown organization or network gradually turned their focus
to the transnational goals of the destruction of western
values16 and the existent Jewish state of Israel (Hellmich, C
2011).
15 See Post, (2009) p. 197; One of the sacred holy sites for Muslims
16 See Shiraev, (2006), Fundamental factors are democracy, capitalism, and individual freedom
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Attacks attributed to al-Qaeda and associated groups began
with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and continued to the
bombing of the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11,
2001 and further terroristic events17 against non-combatants on
a transnational scope. Most of these attacks were brought on
because of religious goals. Having identical goals, but
envisioning different avenues toward recreating the Islamic
empire that once existed caused friction within al Qaeda’s
rank and file. The one group began to split into individual
segments.
Al-Qaeda’s Ideology and Philosophy
The ideology of al-Qaeda can be found in a specific document –
“al-Qaeda operational manual,”18 where eight chapters of the
total contain not only a sophisticated list of instructions
for operation methods but also mistakes and lessons cited from
other adversaries such as an Israeli Mossad19 counter-espionage
17 Recited in BBC news (2014)
18 See Post (2009). p. 198-202; He extrapolated that it was with Ayman al-Zawahiri who played a central role in developing this terrorism manual.
19 See Hennigan, A., (2014); When a Mossad operation goes wrong
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failure and the Russian KGB elite Alpha Group20. Many of the
instructions cite certain suras (verses) of the Qu’ran21 as a
contrivance to justify their acts of violence. This training
manual has afforded one of the best insights into the al-Qaeda
leadership.
The mindsets of Osama bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-
Zawahiri were heavily inspired by Sayyid Qutb22, who was a
vanguard of an Islamic fundamentalist revival and laid the
foundation for al-Qaeda’s ideology. Qutb’s definition of the
enemy included ‘untrue’ Muslims as well as Western-Israelis
who had wickedly plotted, especially since the Israel
independence in 1948, to besmirch the pristine Islamic states.
Based on a notion of Salafist jihadists23, al Qaeda’s ideology
20 See Serio, J. (2008), p. 53, 227
21 See Perlmutter, D. (2004). p. 86
22 See Davidson, L. (1988). p. 99-100
23 In the term “Salafism,” “Salaf” means “ancient one,” which suggests that it be “the ProphetMohammad.” It is an ideological movement with deep religious and historical roots at first, however, Salafists, who see life as two aspects: the world of Islam (dar al-Islam), and the land of conflict or war (dar al-harb), yearned for the Great Caliph era when the Muslim world stretched from the Middle East up to Spain in the west, a part of Russia in the north, west coast of Africa in the south. The term began to be used by Muslim Brotherhood, a designated as an Islamic terrorist constellation later, who felt violence and terrorism by all means were justified to achieve their political ends. It thus has been involved with the followers of Al Qaeda. (Livesey)
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permitted the slaying of civilians dedicated to other
religions24 as well as unorthodox Muslims such as Sufis25 and
Shi’ites26, as religiously justified to achieve jihad (Wright
2006:32-59).
According to their ideology, al Qaeda has two objectives: one
is the collapse of western influence and Israel, and second is
the establishment of the “Islamic state” where one righteous
Caliph will rule an orthodox Muslim community according to
Shari’a law27, and eliminate non-Muslim collectives (infidels),
who have blemished the “pure” Islam (Wright 2006:175).
The Rolling Strategies
According to an interview with Saif al Adel, one of al Qaeda’s
high-ranking members, the group had a seven-juncture plan from
2000 to 2020 for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.
Strategic sub-objectives have evolved on a chronological basis
as below: (Parrish 2014).
24 Perlmutter, D. (2004). p.89
25 Ibid. p.90
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. p. 105
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The first phase (2000 to 2003) was an “awakening”
juncture that was to drag attention from the west forces
and awaken Muslims all over the world to their ultimate
goal, a reinstatement of Islamic states. It was assessed
as successful since al Qaeda instigated the World Trade
Center terror in New York and on the Pentagon in
Washington proving the U.S. was no longer untouchable.
However, American’s full scale military raids in Iraq and
Afghanistan resulted in the loss of key leaders and a
weakened stronghold in Afghanistan.
The second phase (2004 to 2006) was, according to the
interviewer Fouad Hussein, a transition from an
organization to a movement (Jihadism). In this
transition, they laid the groundwork for a base while
recruiting young men to set up an “army.” The Long War
Journal, in 2005, named this second phase a failure. But,
in fact, more extremists the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) were active in Iraq and Syria since its
inception in 2004. It, thus, can be called successful in
this regard.
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The third phase (2007 to 2010) was a period in which al
Qaeda’s masterminds planned attacks on Israel to marshal
like-minded terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. There was
a surge of al Qaeda affiliates such as al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Al Shabaab in Somalia,
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, the
Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq, all of which had carried
out terroristic courses of action against civilians,
albeit with different visions from “core-al Qaeda,” which
were more or less considered successful.
The fourth phase (2010 to 2013) was the collapse of the
hated Arabic government as well as undermining western
economy, the backbone of international trade and the
world economy, exemplified by a boat packed with
explosives in October 2002.28 This period was a turning
point for the group when their administrative structure
became more cellular. Bin Laden had previously employed a
top-down administrative model. Al Qaeda’s affiliates, and
28 Richardson (2004), p50
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individuals basing their actions on al-Qaeda’s vision,
managed to operate all over the North Africa, Syria,
Iraq, Pakistan, and even South Asia. In the wake of Arab
Spring, the Syrian Assad regime was seen as a template by
a majority of terrorist groups at the time.
The fifth phase spans from 2013 to 2016 during which time
an Islamic state or caliphate will be proclaimed while
western influence and Israel forces are weakened.
Societal order, legitimacy, and politics would be under
the al Qaeda’s oversight. In the present day, despite
differences from the original al Qaeda mission, the
movement can be seen as ongoing through cellular activity
or efforts. The creation of ISIS in 2013 as a terrorist
“state” corroborated the idea that this is not an
unrealistic narrative.
The sixth phase is the period from 2016 onward, which is
planned as a direct confrontation between Islamic
believers and non-believers.
The seventh phase, as a final step, is depicted as
“definitive victory” and should be attained by 2020.
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The sixth and seventh phase of what lies ahead is
indistinct.
The Organization in Transitions
Al Qaeda 1.0
The first generation of al-Qaeda, from its birth to the
September 11, 2001 attack on The United States, operated on a
command structure mainly under the guidance of Osama bin
Laden, who took control of the group following Abdullah
Azzam’s death. For this emerging generation of terrorists, al-
Qaeda played an unprecedented role in encouraging young
Muslims to resist their enemies: the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Western countries. When it came to
recruitment, al-Qaeda did not have a formal hiring system, but
relied on familial ties and relationships, mostly started from
a “brotherhood” status, a similar concept of “Muslim
Brotherhood.”
According to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks, there were
as many as 20,000 potential terrorists trained at bin Laden-
led camps throughout Afghanistan from May 1996 to September
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11, 2001. Many skillful and feared terrorist attackers
involved in high-profile strategic onslaughts such as the
World Trade Center bombing in 199329, the catastrophic
explosion in Saudi Arabia in 199630, the East African bombings
in 199831 and three years later the attacks of 9/11 in New York
and Washington, D.C., came from these training camps, which
were considered the main pathway for the next terrorist
generations (Post 2009:202-205).
The al-Qaeda’s top-down structure employed four
interconnected, but distinct factors: a pyramidal structure to
facilitate strategies and prompt decision-makings; a
transnational terrorist network to cooperate with other
terrorist syndicates to reach every corner of the world; a
base force of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan; and a loose
coalition of transnational and domestic groups to minimize
differences and emphasize similarities, such as the vision of
a common enemy – the West (Gunaratna, R 2002). Terrorists’
29 See Coll (2004)
30 See Wright (2006), p. 237-239
31 Ibid. p. 272
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targets were declared through The Two Fatwas32 in 1996 and 1998
respectively. The first fatwa, or holy decree, declared war
against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Places according to Bin Laden. The second fatwa further
expanded to “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” It has been a
religious obligation for global jihadists to do so thereafter
(Watts, C 2013).
Al Qaeda 2.0
Following the declaration of “War on Terror” in the post-9/11
world, al-Qaeda morphed from what has been called al-Qaeda
Version 1.0 into al-Qaeda Version 2.0 where the network lost
the hierarchical control, but its ideology still influenced
the global Salafi jihad movement. Many regional brigades with
different titles sprung up far and wide during this juncture
and marked post-September 11 attacks in Bali33, Yemen, Moscow34,
Spain35, North Africa, etc. as a response to Osama bin Laden’s32 See Watts (2013)
33 See Bonner, R., & Perlez, J. (2005); Chossudovsky, M. 2005; 2002 and 2005 bombings in Bali was both committed by members of Jemaah Islamiyah behind al-Qaeda, claiming 202 and at least 26 people respectively
34 See Roggio, B (2010)
35 See Corrigan, D (2004); the event committed by Islamists was motivated by the invasion of
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recording: “The Islamic nation, thanks to God, has started to attack you at the
hands of its beloved sons, who pledged to God to continue jihad, as long as they are
able, through words and weapons, to establish right and expose falsehood” (Post
2009:211-222).
In the face of the losses of the Afghanistan bases and senior
leaders, the withered “core” al-Qaeda force was still not
destroyed, but was being operated under the current leader,
Zawahiri’s, stewardship. The Zawahiri-operated al-Qaeda
embraced its rivals to shore up its strengths. One of its
rivals was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi36, a founder of al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, and later renamed ISIS after his death in
2006). In stark contrast to “moderate” bin Laden and
Zawahiri’s leaderships, Zarqawi utilized more aggressive and
indiscriminate means to achieve the political ends, one of
which was to purge Shi’ites. His main purpose was to destroy
the whole population of the Shia community in Iraq, rather
than to focus on destroying American and Israeli interests
(Zelin, A 2014).
Iraq in 2003
36 See Nance, M. (2015). pp. 207
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This stage raised concerns about “homegrown terrorists” who
had no central structure. Many Muslim youths not in the Middle
East who sympathized with the global jihadist movement
operated independently.
Al Qaeda 3.0
Less than four years ago, the idea of al-Qaedism37 was on its
last leg due to Osama bin Laden’s – a heroic and inspirational
figure to jihadists – passing in 2011. Since the Arab
Awakening38 started in 2010, corrupt, dictatorial, and secular
regimes from Tunisia to Syria have collapsed en masse or near
collapsed in case of Bashar al-Assad regime, one after
another, due to peaceful, pro-democratic protests. However,
these collapses failed to touch extremists who preferred to
practice violence and follow original Islamic laws (Riedel, B
2014). Thus, the third generation rose in what was known as
the Bashar al-Assad regime in which Jabhat al-Nusra39 – a self-
declared al-Qaeda affiliate – was created. The Anbar province
37 See Eben, K. (2007)
38 See the Arab Awakening film (2011)
39 See Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States (2014)
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became the epicenter of ISIS whose leader, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi40, called upon global jihadists to assemble and
reestablish the “Islamic States of Caliphate.” The reason they
were created in both countries was primarily due to the
gradual militarization of the Syrian infighting in early 2012,
which led jihadists to engage in the fighting on religious
grounds. Also, its proximity to US-occupied Iraq made Syria "a
terrorist attraction venue.” The Syrian government, which was
intent on keeping US forces busy fighting al-Qaeda, brought
calamity upon itself by offering a safe haven for world
jihadists. A series of peaceful protests triggered by the Arab
Spring ultimately wrought some tragic repercussions especially
in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq (Mustafa 2014).
What is ISIS?
The Islamic State has gone through scores of its names from
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the
latest moniker Islamic State (IS). The group today is
considered a monstrous organization due to their tactics, such
40 See Giovanni, J. (2014)
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as beheading, crucifixion, and public execution, practiced on
anyone, regardless of gender or age. ISIS is so brutal even
the current al-Qaeda organization has distanced itself from
the group (Lee, F., & Rym, M 2015). The expressed aim of ISIS
is to erect a Salafist government over the Levant areas of
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus and Southern Turkey.
Little is known about the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
and the origin of his enmity against literally everyone else.
Several eyewitnesses, as well as his neighbors, have given
testimony that he is a very quiet, introverted, and pious
person. His origins of ruthlessness, it is guessed, lie in the
U.S. invasion in 2003 to usurp the Saddam Hussein regime. He
has spent several years in confinement in Camp Bucca, known as
a “terrorist university” through which have passed many
Islamic State leaders41(Giovanni, J 2014). When al-Baghdadi –
his real name ‘Abu Du’ – was discharged from the camp in 2009,
he formed the Islamic State in Iraq, and was nominated as the
leader in May 2010. From the beginning, the Islamic State in41 More than 100,000 suspected jihadis including former Baathists, and nine of ISIS’s top leaders all spent time confined at Camp Bucca. Numerous terrorism researchers believed theprison deepened their extremism and radicalized internees who were illiterate and particularly susceptible to their preaching about jihad and later avowed to join ISIS after release.
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Iraq had voluminous ambitions and a different agenda from the
“core” al-Qaeda. They abandoned al-Qaeda’s flag and chose a
new one, which is the one they currently use (Newman, A 2014).
The Future of Al-Qaeda and ISIS
There are no natural laws or scientific principles that can be
used to predict how the next wave of al-Qaeda affiliates will
move. It is hard to foretell the future of terroristic
movements despite efforts and analysis conducted by scores of
scholars, terrorism experts, and government agencies. The
world could experience a complete liberation from terrorism if
ways were discovered to forestall what might unfold next.
Unfortunately, terrorism is still under way everywhere even
though many counter-terrorism organizations are working to
prevent or uproot al-Qaeda franchises and individual cells
(Simon, J, 2013, chapter 8, “A Look Toward The Future”).
Since the “core al Qaeda” has collapsed, a number of cellular
groups emerged around the globe. Although major counter-
terrorism policies have been reinforced across many countries,
radicalized individuals took advantage of off-guard moments as
evidenced in the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris, the events
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of May 2014 in Brussels42, and those of May 2013 in London43
committed “lone wolves” affiliated with al-Qaeda or Islamic
extremists. There is reason to believe that nations making
visible efforts to eliminate terrorism can have an impact in
destroying al-Qaeda’ creating safe-havens, cutting revenue
streams, and hampering would-be terrorists from traveling
abroad to participate international terrorist groups.
Nonetheless, many countries experienced a low-barrier for
self-motivated jihadists who have locally or domestically
carried out terroristic attacks such as 2013 Boston Marathon
Bombing. In this sense, although many people thought the war
was over when bin Laden was shot and officially declared dead
in 2011, many counter-terrorism experts commented we are still
playing on bin Laden-built game that no longer needed him (The
Economist’s blog 2011). A new version of violent jihad has
emerged on the very corner of the world, indicating that the
war against al-Qaeda is a battle of ideas that cannot be won
militarily (Hellmich 2011:162).
42 See Kochis, (2015)
43 Ibid.
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John Horgan, the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies,
also commented that the rise of lone wolf terrorism is a sign
of organizational weakness, and yet it does not mean that the
Western world, considered as a main enemy to al-Qaeda, is free
from such larger-scale attacks by al Qaeda’s affiliates (Ahmed
2015).
Unlike the al-Qaeda network, the more strategically radical
ISIS group, as the latest version of al-Qaeda, has focused
more on peripheral regions to build bases all over the Middle
East than on Western nations, at least not at this stage. To
achieve their objective - the establishment of the “Caliphate”
- ISIS will likely pay heed to allying other terrorist
organizations within the Middle East areas, rather than to
attacking a distance target. Clearly, this does not mean that
ISIS already has a solid basis on which to achieve their
wishes. In some cases, Baghdadi succeeded in partnering
extreme terrorist organizations such as the Ansar Bayt al-
Maqdis in Sinai, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Morocco, Boko Haram in
Uganda, and some Taliban groups in Pakistan, the leaders of
which have sworn allegiance to Baghdadi. However, a
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multiplicity of “moderate” terrorist groups44 rejected siding
with ISIS on account of different perspectives. Issam al-
Barkawi, a modern Salafi movement leader and the leader of the
Jihad in Jordan, sharply railed against ISIS’s antics killing
Shi’ites, other minorities, and even Sunni followers who do
not show loyalty to ISIS’s indoctrination. This is just one
example of the strained relationships and rivalries between
the various groups. The incumbent al-Qaeda leader, al-
Zawahiri, also condemned their tactics and methodology
(manhaj)45, saying that is not jihad, but nothing less than
aggression and barbaric crime. In this sense, such dynamics
amongst even terrorist groups in the Middle East would
definitely hamper ISIS’s pathway (Bar’el, Z. 2014; Zelin, A.
2014).
Conclusion
We have seen the evolution of the al-Qaeda network from its
rise to its dispersion, which continues through many versions
44 Jamaat Jund al-Qawqaz (the Caucasus Soldiers’ Group), the Nusra Front (also known as Jabhat al-Nusra), the Jordanian Salafi-jihadi group, and the original al-Qaeda, all of whose goals are in opposed to ISIS’s
45 See Asra, (2011), Islamic Terminology
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of terrorist groups and sleeper cells. In the face of the
weakened al-Qaeda power, its influence is still prevalent. It
remains a force with which to be reckoned in this world. The
most heinous al-Qaeda-based group, ISIS, which has performed
with a similar, yet skewed, vision, will surely threaten our
world in many ways. Despite their haphazard terrorism, their
threat to the western and third world countries at this stage
is somewhat lessened because al-Baghdadi now centers on
exterminating fellow Muslims through beheadings, crucifixions,
and public executions, activities which have become their
trademarks. However, such actions have garnered disapproval
from other terrorist organizations in the Levant regions,
which suggests that the reestablishment of the Caliphate would
not be achieved as planned unless they mutually succeed in
gaining alliances throughout the Middle East.
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